Greenaway Et Al (2015) Preprint

GROUP IDENTITY AND CONTROL 1
Running head: GROUP IDENTITY AND CONTROL
From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived personal control
with consequences for health and well-being
Greenaway, K.H., Haslam, S.A., Cruwys, T., Branscombe, N.R., Ysseldyk, R., &
Heldreth, C. (2015). From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived
personal control with consequences for health and well-being. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 109(1), 53–74.

Abstract
There is growing recognition that identification with social groups can protect and
enhance health and well-being, thereby constituting a kind of “social cure.” The
present research explores the role of control as a novel mediator of the relationship
between shared group identity and well-being. Five studies provide evidence for this
process. Group identification predicted significantly greater perceived personal
control across 47 countries (Study 1), and in groups that had experienced success and
failure (Study 2). The relationship was observed longitudinally (Study 3) and
experimentally (Study 4). Manipulated group identification also buffered a loss of
personal control (Study 5). Across the studies, perceived personal control mediated
social cure effects in political, academic, community, and national groups. The
findings reveal that the personal benefits of social groups come not only from their
ability to make people feel good, but also from their ability to make people feel
capable and in control of their lives.
Keywords: social identity, group identification, perceived control, agency, efficacy,
health, well-being
From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived personal control
with consequences for health and well-being
When people think of being healthy, it is often at the level of the individual.
How much do you exercise? What is your diet? Do you have a genetic predisposition
to particular health problems? Yet an emerging research agenda based on the
principles of the social identity approach demonstrates that individual health and well-
being is profoundly shaped by a person’s group memberships and social connections
(e.g., Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012;
Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, & Branscombe, 2009). Collectively referred to as the “social
cure,” these findings show that belonging to, and identifying with, important social
groups can make people healthier. But how—and why—do the groups we belong to
improve our health and well-being?
What is currently less well developed in the literature is an understanding of
the mechanisms through which group-level factors impact individual health and well-
being. The present research addresses this gap, testing perceived personal control as a
novel mechanism through which group identification operates to protect mental and
physical health. This is a counterintuitive approach, given that people often see groups
as compromising individual control and agency because they entail the subjugation of
personal desires to the interests of the group. However, we demonstrate in five studies
that groups can, in fact, enhance individuals’ feelings of personal control. This
research sheds light on the mechanisms through which social identity impacts
personal health, and introduces a new perspective on the question of how group-level
factors shape individual-level perceptions and behavior.

Social Identity and Health
One of the core insights of the social identity approach—comprised of both
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987)—is that groups shape individual
psychology through their capacity to be internalized into a person’s sense of self. In
these terms it is the ability to shift from thinking in terms of ‘me’ to ‘we’ that forms
the psychological glue that binds together groups of all shapes and sizes. That is, it is
through the development of shared social identity that group life is made possible
(Turner, 1982).
Social identities refer to one’s construal of self through the lens of group
membership (e.g., as a woman, an academic, an Australian). A key message of the
social identity approach is that the self is social, reflecting the fact that people come to
understand who they are through their internalization of, or identification with,
particular groups (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Although this approach has typically
been used to understand issues of intergroup relations and social motivation (e.g.,
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Jetten, Spears, &
Manstead, 1996; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), researchers have
begun to consider the implications of social identity for individual health and well-
being. A core argument here is that when groups are internalized into a person’s sense
of self they have the potential to imbue life with meaning, security, comfort, and
purpose (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, & Jetten, 2014). In doing this, groups are
shown to have a considerable bearing on psychological health (Haslam et al., 2009).
Groups Promote Mental and Physical Health
One key reason why social identities are beneficial for mental health is that
identifying with one or more important groups provides people with psychological
resources to face and overcome adversity (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Jetten et al.,
2012). For example, identification with a variety of groups has been found to promote
functional coping and adjustment (e.g., Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe,
2009; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010, 2011) and to protect well-being during
traumatic and tumultuous life experiences (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999;
Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Haslam et al., 2008; Iyer, Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes, &
Haslam, 2009; Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, & Celious, 2006).
In addition to promoting healthy mental states, group identification can also
protect against unhealthy mental states such as anxiety and depression (Cruwys et al.,
2013; Cruwys, South, Greenaway, & Haslam, 2014; Sani, 2012; Sani, Herrera,
Wakefield, Boroch, & Gulyas, 2012; Ysseldyk, Haslam, & Haslam, 2013). Moreover,
group identification profoundly shapes the experience and expression of stress, both
psychologically and physiologically (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Strong group
identification tends to reduce stress and increase perceived ability to cope with stress,
while the absence of group identification tends to elicit the opposite response (Khan et
al., 2014; Matheson & Cole, 2004; Matheson, Jorden, & Anisman, 2008).
In addition to enhancing mental health, group memberships and the social
connections they afford can have profound implications for physical health. Beyond
the interpersonal ties provided by groups, identification with those groups predicts
unique variance in age-related cognitive decline (Haslam, Cruwys, & Haslam, 2014).
Group identification is also associated with various physical benefits, such as fewer
visits to the doctor (Gleibs, Haslam, Haslam, & Jones, 2011), and faster heart-rate
recovery and endurance (Jones & Jetten, 2011). The positive effects of group
identification have been observed on a broad range of health behaviors including
attending aerobics class, wearing a hearing aid, using condoms, and getting
vaccinated (e.g., Falomir-Pichastor, Toscani, & Despointes, 2009; St Claire & He,
2009; St Claire, Clift, & Dumbleton, 2008; see Haslam et al., 2009 for a review).
People who identify with groups therefore tend to be physically and mentally
healthier than people who do not.
Why Do Groups Promote Health?
Given the robust relationship between group identification and health, it is
important to understand the factors responsible for this link. Critically, though,
researchers do not yet have a full understanding of the precise mechanisms through
which group identification impacts well-being. One important pathway that speaks to
the role of social identification is the experience of social support. Shared group
identity is a basis for the incorporation of others into one’s sense of self (such that
another person’s interest becomes one’s own), thus facilitating constructive helping
between individuals. This means that people are not only more likely to provide
support to, and receive support from other ingroup members, but are also more likely
to interpret support in constructive ways when it is structured by shared identity (e.g.,
Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010; Haslam, Reicher, & Levine,
2012; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Levine & Thompson, 2004).
This, in turn, has important implications for health and well-being, given that
social support (of a variety of forms) generally buffers the effect of psychological
stressors and enhances mental and physical health (Brewer, 1991; Cohen, 2004;
Rosal, King, Ma, & Reed, 2004; Turner-Cobb, Sephton, Koopman, Blake-Mortimer,
& Spiegel, 2000; Uchino, 2009). Indeed, the availability of social support informs
individuals’ secondary appraisal of their ability to cope with events that they perceive
as stressful (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

Another potential mechanism for social cure effects comes from more
traditional theorizing in the social identity tradition in the form of the self-esteem
hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Self-esteem is implicated in two pathways: the
first in which low self-esteem promotes group identification; the second in which
group identification enhances self-esteem. Of these, the second pathway has received
more support than the first (Jetten et al., in press; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), making
self-esteem a viable mechanism through which group identification might enhance
well-being. Indeed, self-esteem that is derived from group sources has been shown to
be a robust predictor of psychological health and well-being (Bailis, Chipperfield, &
Helgason, 2008; Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994).
To date, the analysis of social identity mechanisms therefore suggests that
groups make people feel supported and esteemed and for these reasons have the
capacity to promote well-being. Augmenting these previous analyses, the present
research suggests a novel mechanism whereby groups make people feel capable of
acting effectively and achieving important goals in life. That is, by identifying with
groups people can feel personally in control of their life outcomes.
We see perceived control as an equally viable, and independent, mechanism
through which group identification might affect personal health and well-being. While
perceived control is related to both social support and self-esteem—and indeed, some
research suggests that both constructs may increase a sense of personal control (e.g.,
Bolger & Amarel, 2007; Bullers, 2000; Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983; Uchino, 2009)—
they are nevertheless theoretically and empirically distinct (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001).
These dissimilarities recall early theorizing on the distinction between intrinsic and
instrumental value (Dewey, 1939) that differentiates the value of a state that is
considered good in and of itself (e.g., self-esteem) from that of a state that is good as a
result of what it can achieve (e.g., perceived control, social support). Perceived
control and social support are further distinguished on the internal vs. external
dimension—while both may be derived from group membership, perceived control is
a feeling within an individual whereas social support is derived from relationships
outside the individual.
In several of the studies contained in this paper we distinguish perceived
personal control empirically from self-esteem and social support as mediators of
social cure effects. While we agree that self-esteem and social support can also serve
this function, our primary focus is on exploring the role of perceived control and
testing whether it makes a contribution over and above self-esteem and social support
—in empirical terms, accounting for additional variance.
Perceived Control and Health
We define control as the perceived ability to alter events and achieve desired
outcomes (Burger, 1989; Wallston, Wallston, Smith, & Dobbins, 1987). Before
discussing the role of control in enhancing mental and physical health, we first unpack
and describe our proposed mediator, perceived personal control. First, we focus on
perceived rather than actual control, given that it appears to be the subjective feeling
(rather than the objective reality) of being able to influence events that is most
predictive of mental and physical health (e.g., Averill, 1973; Burger, 1989). Second,
we refer to personal control to denote the fact that individuals themselves feel capable
of achieving desired outcomes. That is, we investigate whether group memberships
enable people to feel personally in control of their actions and life outcomes.
Perceived Control Promotes Mental and Physical Health
A vast body of research demonstrates that perceived control is a critical
building block of mental health. Across a diverse range of populations, perceived

control predicts positive outcomes including resilience, motivation, cognitive
functioning, and life satisfaction (Greenaway, Cichocka, Van Veelen, Likki, &
Branscombe, 2014; Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007; Knight & Haslam,
2010; Knight, Haslam, & Haslam, 2010; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Schulz, 1976;
Skinner, 1996; Skinner & Greene, 2008; Snyder, 2002; Spector, 1986). Underscoring
the importance of this construct, the 2013 World Happiness Report identified
perceived control (defined as freedom of choice) as one of the six “pillars” of life
satisfaction, alongside GDP per capita and national healthy life expectancy (Helliwell,
Layard, & Sachs, 2013).
In addition to promoting healthy mental states, perceived control can also
ward off or ameliorate unhealthy mental states. As work on learned helplessness
demonstrates, individuals who are deprived of control become helpless, passive, and
withdrawn (e.g., Seligman & Maier, 1967)—an observation that formed the basis of a
contemporary understanding of human depression (Alloy, Peterson, Abramson, &
Seligman, 1984; Brown & Siegel, 1988). Having a strong sense of control has also
been shown to reduce psychological stress (e.g., Averill, 1973; Averill & Rosenn,
1972; Staub, Turskey, & Schwartz, 1971) both by increasing perceived ability to cope
and by reducing the likelihood that an event is appraised as stressful in the first place
(e.g., Bandura, 1982; Folkman et al., 1986; Rodin, Bohm, & Wack, 1982).
In addition to improving mental health, perceived control has an impact on
physical health. For example, perceived behavioral control is consistently the best-
performing variable in the theory of planned behavior in predicting health outcomes,
ahead of attitudes and subjective norms (Godin & Kok, 1996). Perceived control also
affects the physiological system, reducing biological stress reactions when high and
increasing them when low (e.g., Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982; Dickerson &
Kemeny, 2004). Feeling a high degree of personal control thus appears to be key to
thriving across the lifespan (Peterson & Stunkard, 1989).
Social Identity and Perceived Control
Groups are a potent source of agency and control. Where an individual may
have no hope of accomplishing a goal alone, interdependent action by a group of
individuals can overcome obstacles and achieve otherwise impossible ends (Asch,
1952). Indeed, it may be a uniquely human trait to work collaboratively in the pursuit
of shared goals and intentions—a process referred to as shared intentionality
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Some researchers have suggested
that shared social identity is a mechanism through which people coordinate their
actions and function as effective social beings (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004;
Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2000). In this regard, a sense of shared identity makes
group behavior possible by providing a cognitive basis for collective coordination of
social perception and action (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003; Turner, 1982).
Through the development of shared social identity people are able to marshal
and channel resources to effectively achieve their individual goals—in part because
social identity serves to redefine those goals so as to make them compatible with
those of the collective (Haslam et al., 2011). Some social identity analyses have
described this as process of gaining control through groups (Haslam, Reicher, &
Platow, 2011; Turner, 2005). These perspectives focus on social influence and
mobilization of other people as the process through which control is achieved. In
contrast, in the present work we focus on how shared identity can increase feelings of
personal control within the individual. While both perspectives emphasize the ways in
which group life is functional for individuals, the latter focuses not only on how
groups can help people, but on how groups can help people help themselves.
Recent work has investigated the idea that social connections might enhance
individual motivation. Walton, Cohen, Cwir, and Spencer (2012) revealed that small
cues to social connectedness (e.g., belonging to a minimal group) can promote
achievement motivation that results in improved persistence and performance on
cognitive tasks. Relatedly, Carr and Walton (2014) found that the impression of
“working together” with a partner increased intrinsic motivation and persistence on
unsolvable problems. This research suggests that social connectedness—or shared
identity to use our preferred term—leads people to internalize others’ motivations as
their own, thus influencing personal behavior. Where we depart from this previous
research is in investigating the broader psychological experience that may underlie
this buoyant motivation to complete specific tasks—a general sense of control and
capability in achieving the things that one sets one’s mind to.
Extending previous research, we propose and test the novel argument that the
sense of agency that derives from social identification is not experienced solely at a
group level or in relation to a specific domain, such as academic achievement or
problem solving. Rather, drawing on the social identity view of “the social self”, we
propose that individuals can derive feelings of control from group memberships and
incorporate these into their self-concept (in a way that mirrors the structuring of
personality by social identity; Reynolds et al., 2010; Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, &
Veenstra, 2006). As a result, people experience themselves as personally more
capable and in control of their lives when this sense of self is informed by a
meaningful social identity. Indeed, such a position accords with long traditions of
theorizing on the nature of self which suggest that it is only through connection to a
collective that a sense of potent personhood can be achieved (Burkitt, 1991;
Durkheim, 1933; see Postmes & Jetten, 2006; Turner & Onarato, 1999).
Loss of Personal Control Promotes Group Identification
Research suggests that people commonly react to loss of personal control by
turning outside themselves to broader social systems and group memberships (e.g.,
Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky,
2009). The group-based control restoration model proposed by Fritsche and
colleagues (2008, 2013) provides strong evidence for this process of gaining control
through the group. The core tenet of this model is that people construe themselves in
terms of group memberships and identities in order to maintain a sense of global
control. Multiple studies have demonstrated that when personal control is threatened
people turn to the group, showing greater ingroup bias, support, and identification
(Fritsche et al., 2008, 2013). In addition, group membership is thought to be an
effective method of resolving personal uncertainty, because groups prescribe
unambiguous patterns of thought and behavior in line with group norms (e.g., Hogg,
2007, 2012). Despite such theorizing on this point in both the group-based control
restoration model and uncertainty-identity theory, there is as yet no concrete empirical
evidence that group identification can enhance perceived personal control.
The Present Research
We propose that people will feel more personally in control when their sense
of self is structured by shared social identity. In short, even when control is not
forthcoming through the personal self, it can nevertheless be achieved through the
social self. We present the results of five studies testing whether perceived personal
control can be derived from group identification, and examining the consequences of
this enhanced control for protecting health and well-being, as outlined in Figure 1.
Perceived personal
H1 control
+ +
Group
identification
+ Positive health and
well-being
outcomes
H2
Figure 1. Predicted relationships between identification, control, and
well-being.
Our primary hypothesis is that identification with a range of different groups
will be associated with greater perceived personal control (H1). Our secondary
hypothesis is that group identification will have the indirect effect of promoting health
and well-being through heightened perceived personal control (H2). We test these
predictions using cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 2), longitudinal (Study 3), and
experimental methodologies (Studies 4 and 5). An emerging and robust “social cure”
literature suggests a direct relationship between group identification and well-being.
However, at present the evidence for this association comes mainly from correlational
studies (e.g., Jetten et al., in press), and experimental evidence is only now beginning
to emerge (Cruwys, South, et al., 2015). We therefore expected this association in our
correlational studies, but were less certain that it would emerge in the experiments.
Study 1
Study 1 served as the initial test of our claim that group identification operates
through perceived personal control to enhance well-being. Our goal was to test our
model on a large scale to provide robust evidence for the hypothesized relationships.
To do this we used data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey, which
employed face-to-face interviews from 2010 to 2014 in a large number of countries
around the world. In this survey, group identification was assessed three ways in
terms of identification with one’s local community, national group, and the human
race. Measuring identification in this way allows us to assess the robustness of the
relationship between group identification and perceived personal control across
multiple groups.
The World Values Survey includes a diverse range of demographic variables
that might be expected to predict variance in perceived control and well-being. These
include age, gender, income, employment status, marital status, education, political
orientation, subjective social class, number of children, literacy, nationality, and
ethnicity. To further test the robustness of the hypothesized associations, we tested the
key relationships both with and without including these demographic controls.
It is worth noting that many measures of group identification include affective
evaluations (e.g., I am proud/glad to be a member of this group). This is important
because many well-being measures are also affective in nature (e.g., life satisfaction,
depression), meaning that group identification may be associated with greater well-
being simply because the two measures share affective content. To rule out this
possible alternative explanation for the patterns we identified, in the correlational
studies reported in this paper (Studies 1–3) we report the results without affective
identification items included in the measures of group identification. This allows us to
establish that it is group identification per se, rather than the affective nature of some
of the items that explains variance in well-being.1
Drawing on the theoretical analysis outlined in the General Introduction it was
hypothesized that group identification would be associated with greater perceived

1
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this strategy. Note,
however, that the results remain significant (and in fact are larger in magnitude)
across all studies when the affective identification items are retained in the scales.
personal control (H1) and, through this, would be associated with greater well-being
(H2). Well-being was measured in terms of life satisfaction, happiness, and subjective
health.
Method
Participants
Data on the core variables of interest (see descriptions below) were available
from approximately 62,000 participants across 47 countries. World Values Survey
samples are broadly representative of each nation’s population (Inglehart, Basanez,
Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004). Because national group identification was
included as a predictor, only data from participants who were citizens of the country
in which they resided were included in the analyses.
Measures
Group identification. Three items measured group identification with three
different groups: national group identification (“I see myself as part of the [country,
e.g., French] nation”); human identification (“I see myself as a world citizen”); and
community identification (“I see myself as part of my local community”). The items
were measured on a scale ranging from 1, strongly agree to 4, strongly disagree. All
items were reverse scored so that higher numbers indicated greater identification. We
report the results for each of the identification items separately below (although all
three items are significantly associated with perceived control and well-being when
entered as simultaneous predictors, ps<.001).
Perceived personal control. Perceived personal control was measured with
one item (“Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their
lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to
them. Please use this scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you
feel you have over the way your life turns out”) measured on a scale ranging from 1,
no choice at all to 10, a great deal of choice.
Well-being. Well-being was measured as a composite of three items assessing
life satisfaction (“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these
days?” scored on a scale ranging from 1, completely dissatisfied to 10, completely
satisfied); happiness (“Taking all things together would you say you are:” scored on a
scale ranging from 1, very happy to 4, not at all happy); and subjective health (“All in
all, how would you describe your state of health these days?” scored on a scale
ranging from 1, very good to 4, poor). The happiness and subjective health items were
reverse scored and all three items were standardized before being combined into a
single index of well-being, α=.66. All effects reported below using the well-being
index are also significant at p < .001 on the separate life satisfaction, happiness, and
subjective health items.
Demographic variables. The World Values Survey includes a diverse range
of demographic variables, including age, gender (coded as 1, male and 2, female),
income (ranging from 1, lowest income group to 10, highest income group),
employment status (ranging from 1, full time to 7, unemployed), marital status
(ranging from 1, married to 6, single), education (ranging from 1, no formal
education to 9, university-level education), political orientation (ranging from 1, left
to 10, right), subjective social class (ranging from 1, upper class to 5, lower class),
number of children (ranging from 0 to 7), literacy (coded as 1, literate and 2,
illiterate), and ethnicity. These demographic variables were included as controls.

Results
Analytic Strategy
To analyze the multilevel data (i.e., participants nested within countries), a
multilevel modeling strategy was implemented using the ‘lme4’ package in the R
statistics program. The model estimated the fixed effect of group identification after
accounting for the random effect of country. Additionally, p values were calculated
using the ‘LmerTest’ package in R, which runs the lme4 models through a Kenward-
Rogers approximation test to calculate degrees of freedom (examining the variance
explained by the fixed effects and scaling estimates to best approximate the F
distribution, which thus differ per fixed effect). All variables were standardized prior
to inclusion in the model.
We conducted these multi-level analyses first without the demographic control
variables included in the model, and then with the demographic control variables
included in the model (as reported in Table 1). All effects remain significant with
demographics entered in the model. The results described below represent separate
analyses for the three different identification measures, although all effects remain
significant with the identification measures entered simultaneously in the same model.
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 1.
Personal Control
Supporting H1, all three forms of identification were associated with
significantly greater perceived personal control after accounting for the random factor
of country. National identification had a significant positive relationship with
perceived personal control, ß=.08, p<.001, as did human identification, ß=.08, p<.001,
and community identification, ß=.07, p<.001.
Well-being
All three forms of identification were associated with significantly greater
well-being after accounting for the random factor of country. National identification
had a significant positive relationship with well-being, ß=.08, p.<.001, as did human
identification, ß=.10, p.<.001, and community identification, ß=.08, p<.001.
Perceived personal control was associated with significantly greater well-
being over and above the fixed factor of identification and the random factor of
country. Perceived control had a significant positive relationship with well-being after
accounting for national identification, ß=.31, p<.001, human identification, ß=.32,
p<.001, and community identification, ß=.32, p<.001.
Indirect Effects
We used a bootstrapping technique (with 1,000 iterations) to estimate the
indirect effects of the different forms of identification on well-being via perceived
control after accounting for the random factor of country. The size of the indirect
effects is estimated by examining the 95% bootstrap confidence interval of these
estimates. All indirect effects were significant; that is, national identification, human
identification, and community identification were all associated with well-being
through a process of greater perceived personal control (95% CIs ranged from 0.022
to 0.049; see Table 1). Supporting H2, group identification was thus associated with
well-being via perceived personal control.
We also tested the reverse indirect effects of well-being on the different forms
of identification via perceived personal control. These indirect effects were also all
significant, although they were slightly weaker than those described above (95% CIs
ranged from 0.002 to 0.017).

Discussion
The results of Study 1 provided initial support for our two hypotheses in a
sample of over 62,000 people in 47 countries. Consistent with H1, three forms of
group identification were associated with greater perceived personal control over
one’s life. Supporting H2, personal control mediated the associations between group
identification and well-being, operationalized as a combination of greater life
satisfaction, greater happiness, and better subjective health. However, the relationship
also appeared to work in the opposite direction, in that personal control mediated the
associations between well-being and group identification, although these effects were
slightly weaker than our main hypothesized path. Because correlational evidence of
this sort precludes causal inference, we introduce experimental manipulations of
group identification in Studies 4 and 5.
These findings are broadly consistent with an emerging research agenda
provided by work on the social cure (e.g., Jetten et al., 2012) and fit with a large body
of evidence that perceived personal control predicts superior health (e.g., Helliwell et
al., 2013; Knight et al., 2010; Schulz, 1976). However, to our knowledge, this is the
first concrete evidence that feelings of personal control are associated with group
identification, or that this process mediates the positive relationship between group
identification and well-being.
Our confidence in this conclusion is increased by three factors. First, the use
of multi-level modelling demonstrates that the relationships were consistent after
accounting for variance at the country level. Second, the relationships predicted by
our theoretical analysis remained significant with a range of relevant demographic
control variables entered into the model. Third, we found evidence that multiple forms
of identification (i.e., national identification, human identification, community

identification) were associated with greater perceived personal control. Together,
then, these findings provide robust evidence that group identification—across a broad
range of identities and while controlling for an array of other factors—predicts
heightened feelings of personal control.
Study 2
Study 2 tested our hypotheses in the context of political group identification.
Political identities provide people with a defining worldview and set of principles by
which to live their lives (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). People
have also been shown to turn to political systems when personal control is deprived
(Kay et al., 2008, 2009, 2010), suggesting that political identities may be linked with
feelings of control. Indeed, particular political ideologies have been found to be
associated with intolerance of uncertainty and threat, and a greater desire for control
(i.e., political conservatism; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, 2003; Jost et al., 2007). The
same political ideologies are also associated with higher well-being (Jetten, Haslam,
& Barlow, 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008).
Study 2 tested whether political group identification was associated with
greater perceived personal control over life outcomes. Given that our core hypothesis
is that group identification predicts perceived control (H1), we expected this
relationship to be observed across different political parties, not merely those
associated with a particular political ideology or those that are more successful. To
test for this we controlled for political ideology (on a continuum ranging from
conservative to liberal) and tested the model in two political parties in the United
States with different ideological underpinnings—Democrats and Republicans.
Observing this relationship in members of both political parties would indicate that
group identification is associated with greater perceived personal control regardless of
the political orientation or success of the group in question.
In testing these relationships in political groups, we took advantage of a high-
profile political event by eliciting responses from Democrats and Republicans shortly
after the 2012 United States Presidential Election. Specifically, we tested whether
identification as Democrat or Republican predicted greater perceived personal control
immediately after the election. Indeed, while it seems logical that groups might
provide one with a sense of personal control when they are successful (i.e., after an
election win), an even stronger test of our hypothesis would be to show that group
identification is still positively associated with perceived personal control when the
group has failed (i.e., after an election loss). Such an effect would show that group
identification functions as a psychological resource that is associated with feelings of
personal control even when the group itself has experienced a setback.
As in Study 1, it was hypothesized that group identification would be
associated with greater perceived personal control (H1) and through this process
would enhance well-being (H2). We anticipated that these relationships would be
present over and above the effect of political ideology (as conservative or liberal), and
that the relationship would be consistent across both Democrats and Republicans.
Well-being was assessed in this study in terms of life satisfaction.
Method
Participants
Participants were 129 American community members (50% female,
Mage=33.68, SD=10.61, age range 18 to 63) who were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk and paid for their participation. The study description informed
participants that they would be asked questions about their feelings toward the recent
election. The questionnaire was completed on November 8th 2012, two days after the
US Presidential election. Forty-four participants identified as a Republican and 85
identified as a Democrat. The measures are presented in the order in which
participants completed them.
Measures
Political group membership. Participants indicated their political group
membership at the beginning of the questionnaire by responding to the item “Do you
identify as a Republican or a Democrat?” Responses were scored as 1=Republican,
2=Democrat, and 3=neither. Participants who did not identify with either party did
not complete the remainder of the questionnaire.
Political group identification. Depending on their political group
membership, participants were diverted to separate questionnaires that measured their
level of identification with the relevant political party. Political party identification
was assessed using two items (adapted from Leach et al., 2008; “I identify with
Democrats/Republicans” and “Being a Democrat/Republican is an important part of
how I see myself”) on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree,
r=.74, p<.001. This scale originally included three items but we deleted one affect-
laden item (“I am glad to be a Democrat/Republican”).
Political ideology. This was assessed using one item (“How would you best
characterize your political ideology?”) scored on a scale ranging from 1, very liberal
to 7, very conservative.
Perceived personal control. This was assessed using three items (“I feel in
control of my life”; “I am free to live my life how I wish”; “My experiences in life are
due to my own actions”; Greenaway, Louis, & Hornsey, 2013) scored on a scale
ranging from1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, α=.85.

Life satisfaction. This was assessed using three items (“I am satisfied with my
life”; “I am pleased with my accomplishments in life”; “Although some parts of my
life could be improved, overall I have no complaints”; Schmitt, Branscombe,
Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002), scored on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to
7, strongly agree, α=.93.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
There was no difference between Democrats and Republicans in group
identification, F(1,127)=0.47, p=.496, ηp²=.004, perceived control, F(1,126)=0.21,
p=.648, ηp²=.002, or life satisfaction, F(1,127)=2.24, p=.137, ηp²=.017. We also tested
whether political group membership (Democrat vs. Republican) moderated the effect
of political group identification on perceived personal control. We would expect a
significant interaction if the relationship between identification and personal control
were stronger for one particular political party.
Personal Control
Supporting H1, political group identification was associated with significantly
greater perceived personal control, R2=.12, F(1,126)=17.47, ß=.35, p<.001. This
relationship remained significant when controlling for political ideology and political
group membership, R2=.13, F(3,124)=5.99, ß=.36, p<.001. The interaction between
political group identification and political group membership was non-significant,
ß=-.05, p=.855, indicating that the association is no different for Democrats and
Republicans.
Life satisfaction
Political group identification predicted significantly greater life satisfaction at
Step 1, R2=.07, F(1,126)=10.05, ß=.27, p=.002 (with control variables ß=.29, p=.001).
Perceived personal control predicted significantly greater life satisfaction when
entered at Step 2, R2∆=.23, F∆ (1,125)=42.37, ß=.52, p<.001 (with control variables
ß=.51, p<.001). The relationship between identification and life satisfaction became
non-significant when perceived control was included in the model, ß=.09, p=.215
(with control variables, ß=.11, p=.195).
Supporting H2, bootstrapping analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS tool
with 10,000 resamples confirmed that there was a significant indirect effect such that
political group identification was associated with higher life satisfaction through
greater perceived personal control (IE=0.19, SE=0.07, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.078,
0.341). The reverse indirect effect was also significant such that greater life
satisfaction was associated with greater identification through greater perceived
personal control (IE=0.15, SE=0.06, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.045, 0.294).
The indirect effect of group identification via personal control was significant
for both Democrats (IE=0.20, SE=0.09, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.067, 0.414) and
Republicans (IE=0.16, SE=0.10, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.016, 0.430). All indirect
effects remain significant with and without political group membership and political
ideology included in the model.
Discussion
The findings of Study 2 supported our hypotheses. Political group
identification—regardless of whether it was as a Democrat or a Republican—was
associated with greater perceived personal control, which mediated the positive
relationship between political group identification and life satisfaction. The
relationship persisted when controlling for political ideology and political group
membership, indicating that it is not the worldview associated with a particular

political identity that drives the relationships between political group identification,
perceived personal control, and life satisfaction.
Furthermore, the interaction between political party and group identification
was non-significant, indicating that the relationship between group identification and
personal control was no different across the two political groups. Indeed, group
identification was still associated with greater perceived personal control among
Republicans whose group had just suffered a major election defeat. The fact that
groups can provide people with a sense of personal control even when the group itself
has experienced a profound failure speaks to the powerful psychological protection
afforded by social identities.
Study 3
Our first two studies demonstrate that group identification is associated with
greater perceived personal control in a range of groups (political, national, human,
community) in different collective circumstances (i.e., following group success and
failure). Study 3 tested our hypotheses in an academic group of final-year psychology
students submitting their undergraduate thesis. This is a stressful time that impacts
adversely on the well-being of most students (Stallman, 2010), as it represents the
final piece of assessment that will determine their graduating grade and eligibility for
entrance into postgraduate study. We surveyed students immediately after submitting
their thesis and again one month later prior to graduation. The study investigated
whether, when controlling for baseline differences, increases in student group
identification predicted increases in perceived personal control.
In addition to assessing our key variables of group identification, perceived
control, and well-being over time, we assessed self-esteem at both time points. This
allows us to distinguish perceived control from self-esteem, which is another potential

mechanism through which group identification increases well-being (Jetten et al., in
press). We aimed to show that group identification is associated with greater well-
being through perceived control independent of its association with self-esteem.
It was hypothesized that greater student group identification over time would
be associated with greater perceived personal control (H1) and through this process
would predict better well-being (H2). We further expected that these relationships
would be observed over and above increases in self-esteem. In this study, well-being
was measured in terms of depression and life satisfaction.
Method
Participants, Design, and Procedure
Participants were 142 final year psychology students (82% female,
Mage=23.93, SD=5.07, age range 20 to 51) surveyed at the time of thesis submission.
Participants were eligible for the study if they submitted a final-year psychology
thesis at one of four Australian universities with cohorts greater than 50 students.
Students were given a gift voucher worth AU$10 for their participation in the study,
which was introduced as an opportunity for students to provide feedback about their
final-year experience.
The study employed a longitudinal design. The Time 1 survey was completed
in the week immediately following thesis submission. Participants provided their
email address at Time 1 to be contacted to participate at Time 2. The Time 2 survey
(N=91) was collected one month later, approximately one week after participants
received their final-year grade. Included in the Time 1 and Time 2 surveys were
measures of student group identification, perceived personal control, self-esteem,
depression, life satisfaction, and academic performance.

Measures
Group identification. Identification with the student cohort was measured
using 10 items (e.g., “Being a Psychology Honours student is an important part of my
identity”; Leach et al., 2008) on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7,
strongly agree. This identification scale usually includes 14 items, but we deleted four
affect-laden items from the scale (e.g., “I am glad to be a Psychology Honours
student”). Group identification was assessed at Time 1 and again one month later at
Time 2, αT1=.87; αT2=.91.
Perceived personal control. Perceived personal control was assessed using
the same three items from Study 2 (e.g., “I feel in control of my life”) scored on a
scale ranging from1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, αT1=.70; αT2=.88.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the one-item measure
recommended by Robins, Hendin, and Trzesniewski (2001; “I have high self-esteem”)
scored on a scale ranging from 1, not very true of me, to 5, very true of me.
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured in the same way as Study 2
using three items (e.g., “I am satisfied with my life”) scored on a scale ranging from
1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree. The items were averaged to form a reliable
index of life satisfaction, αT1=.91; αT2 =.92.
Depression. Depression was measured using the Centre for Epidemiological
Studies–Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff, 1977). Participants rated how often each
of 20 items (e.g., “I felt that everything I did was an effort”) had applied to them in
the last week, on a four-point scale ranging from 0, rarely or none of the time (less
than 1 day) to 3, most or all of the time (5-7 days). The items were summed to form
an index of depression.
Academic performance. Achieved grade was measured at Time 2 as the
score out of 100 that students received for their thesis.
Results
Analytic Strategy
We performed regression analyses predicting Time 2 variables while
controlling for their Time 1 counterparts. We included academic performance as a
control variable to demonstrate that the effects hold above and beyond how well
students performed in their final year. See Table 2 for a summary of these
longitudinal results.
We also tested whether academic performance moderated the effects of
student group identification on perceived personal control (in a manner similar to
testing for moderation by political group membership in Study 2). We would expect a
significant interaction if the relationship between Time 2 identification and personal
control were stronger for people who performed well or poorly on their thesis.
Personal Control
We regressed T2 personal control onto T1 identification and personal control
in Block 1 and T2 identification and academic performance in Block 2. In Block 1,
the T1 variables predicted T2 personal control, R2 =.35, F(2,88)=23.47, p<.001,
although only T1 personal control was a significant unique predictor, ß=.59, p<.001.
Supporting H1, in Block 2, T2 identification predicted greater T2 personal control,
R2∆=.09, F∆(2,86)=6.57, ß=.27, p=.017. This indicates that, controlling for baseline
differences, increases in group identification were associated with increases in
perceived personal control. Additionally, the interaction between group identification
and academic performance was non-significant, ß=.10, p=.296, indicating that the
association did not vary as a function of performance.

Self-esteem
We regressed T2 self-esteem onto T1 identification and self-esteem in Block 1
and T2 identification and academic performance in Block 2. In Block 1, the T1
variables predicted T2 self-esteem, R2 =.67, F(2,88)=89.42, p<.001, although only T1
self-esteem was a significant unique predictor, ß=.82, p<.001. In Block 2, T2
identification predicted marginally greater T2 self-esteem, R2∆=.01, F∆(2,86)=1.74,
ß=.15, p=.066.
Depression
We regressed T2 depression onto T1 identification, personal control, self-
esteem, and depression in Block 1 followed by T2 identification and academic
performance in Block 2 and T2 personal control and self-esteem in Block 3. In Block
1, the T1 variables predicted T2 depression, R2 =.22, F(4,86)=5.89, p<.001, although
only T1 control was a significant unique predictor, ß=-.30, p=.021. In Block 2, T2
identification predicted T2 depression, R2∆=.08, F∆(2,84)=4.41, ß=-.35, p=.007. This
indicates that, controlling for baseline differences, increases in group identification
were associated with decreases in depression. In Block 3, T2 personal control and
self-esteem predicted T2 depression, R2∆=.16, F∆(2,82)=11.84, p<.001. Both T2
personal control, ß=-.39, p=.001, and T2 self-esteem were unique predictors, ß=-.39,
p=.013.
Supporting H2, bootstrapping analyses with 10,000 resamples revealed that
when T2 personal control and T2 self-esteem were entered as simultaneous mediators,
only the indirect effect via T2 personal control was significant (all T1 variables were
controlled for in the indirect effect tests). That is, there was a significant indirect
effect such that T2 identification was associated with reduced T2 depression through
increased T2 personal control (IE=-1.39, SE=0.80, bias-corrected 95% CI: -3.400, -

0.123). The indirect effect via T2 self-esteem was not significant (IE=-0.56, SE=1.10,
bias-corrected 95% CI: -2.887, 0.205). The reverse indirect effects were not
significant. That is, after controlling for T1 variables, T2 depression did not predict
T2 identification through T2 personal control or T2 self-esteem (CIs ranged from
-.022 to .005).
Life Satisfaction
We regressed T2 life satisfaction onto T1 identification, personal control, self-
esteem, and life satisfaction in Block 1 followed by T2 identification and academic
performance in Block 2 and T2 personal control and self-esteem in Block 3. In Block
1, the T1 variables predicted T2 life satisfaction, R2 =.49, F(4,86)=20.84, p<.001,
although only T1 life satisfaction was a significant unique predictor, ß=.55, p<.001. In
Block 2, T2 identification predicted T2 life satisfaction, R2∆=.05, F∆(2,84)=4.73,
ß=.23, p=.026. This indicates that, controlling for baseline differences, increases in
group identification were associated with increases in life satisfaction. In Block 3, T2
personal control and self-esteem predicted T2 life satisfaction, R2∆=.16,
F∆(2,82)=22.19, p<.001. Both T2 personal control, ß=.39, p<.001, and T2 self-esteem
were unique predictors, ß=.39 p=.001.
when T2 personal control and T2 self-esteem were entered as simultaneous mediators,
only the indirect effect via T2 personal control was significant (controlling for T1
variables). That is, there was a significant indirect effect such that T2 identification
was associated with increased T2 life satisfaction through increased T2 personal
control (IE=0.16, SE=0.09, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.003, 0.381). The indirect effect
via gains in self-esteem was not significant (IE=0.06, SE=0.09, bias-corrected 95%
CI: -0.016, 0.342). The reverse indirect effects were not significant. That is, after
controlling for T1 variables, T2 life satisfaction did not predict T2 identification
through T2 personal control or T2 self-esteem (CIs ranged from -0.038 to 0.198).
Discussion
Study 3 provided further evidence that group identification is associated with
greater perceived personal control and, through this, lower depression and greater life
satisfaction. We did not find that Time 1 group identification predicted Time 2
control. However, we did find that controlling for baseline differences, change in
Time 2 group identification was associated with change in Time 2 control and through
this was associated with Time 2 well-being in a manner that replicated the findings in
our earlier correlational studies.
Although we observed these relationships with life satisfaction as a well-being
indicator in Studies 1 and 2, this was the first time we observed the benefit of the
identity-control relationship for negative mental health states in the form of
depression. This effect is consistent with research showing that group identification
(e.g., Cruwys et al., 2014) and personal control both protect strongly against
depression symptoms (e.g., Alloy et al., 1984; Brown & Siegel, 1988).
Although we found evidence that group identification was associated with
greater self-esteem, this relationship did not disrupt the key relationships predicted by
our theoretical model. First, although group identification predicted greater self-
esteem, this relationship was marginal. Moreover, although self-esteem and perceived
control both independently predicted well-being, only the indirect effects of group
identification on well-being via perceived control was significant. These findings
suggest that perceived control can be distinguished from self-esteem, and that control
operates as an independent mediator of social cure effects over and above the variance
accounted for by self-esteem.

In line with the pattern in the previous studies, participants in this study came
from multiple different groups (i.e., separate universities), ruling out the possibility
that identification with one particular student cohort was responsible for the observed
relationships. In addition, the reverse indirect effect whereby well-being was
associated with group identification through perceived control was non-significant for
both well-being indicators. Although we believe such a meditational path is possible
(and indeed, observed it in Studies 1 and 2), there was no evidence of it in this study.
Study 4
Studies 1 to 3 provided correlational evidence that group identification is
associated with greater perceived personal control. To address the issue of causality,
Study 4 tested whether experimentally inducing group identification enhances
perceived personal control. We also included measures of self-esteem and social
support to distinguish perceived control from these related variables that represent
alternative social cure mediators. We aimed to show, first, that experimentally
manipulated group identification increases perceived control and, second, that the
indirect effect of group identification on well-being via perceived control operates
independently of, and additional to, any indirect effects via self-esteem or social
support.
It was hypothesized that manipulated group identification would increase
perceived personal control (H1) and through this process would be associated with
better well-being (H2). We further expected that these relationships would be
observed over and above any effects of manipulated group identification on self-
esteem and social support. As in Study 3, well-being was measured in terms of
depression and life satisfaction.

Method
Participants and Design
Mage=34.39, SD=10.81, age range 18 to 70) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid US$0.50 for their participation. The study was advertised as an opportunity
for Americans to report their social attitudes. The study employed a three-cell,
between-subjects manipulation of group identification (high vs. low vs. no treatment).
Perceived control was assessed and depression and life satisfaction were the
dependent variables. Self-esteem and perceived social support were included as
alternative mediators. The measures are presented below in the order in which
participants completed them.
Materials and Measures
Identification manipulation. Identification was manipulated using a
linguistic framing procedure adopted by Jetten, Spears, and Manstead (1997).
Participants indicated their agreement with five positive and five negative statements
about the United States by ticking statements that they agreed with and leaving blank
statements that they disagreed with. This linguistic manipulation is designed to lead
participants to feel highly or lowly identified with their group.
Participants in the high identification condition (coded as 1) responded to five
extremely negative statements (e.g., “I feel no affiliation with the United States”) and
five moderately positive statements (e.g., “In general, I like living in the United
States”), making it easy for them to agree with the positive and disagree with the
negative statements. Participants in the low identification condition (coded as -1)
responded to five moderately negative statements (e.g., “There are some things I don’t
like about the United States”) and five extremely positive statements (e.g., “I identify
very strongly with the United States”), making it easy for them to agree with the
negative and disagree with the positive statements. Participants in the no treatment
condition (coded as 0) did not respond to any statements and simply completed the
dependent measures.
Personal control. Perceived personal control was measured with the same
three items as in Studies 2 and 3 (e.g., “I feel in control of my life”) scored on a scale
ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, α=.81.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using the same single item used in
Study 3 (“I have high self-esteem”) scored on a scale ranging from 1, strongly
disagree, to 7, strongly agree.
Social support. Perceived social support was measured using four items
adapted from Van Dick and Haslam (2012; “I get the emotional support I need from
other Americans”; “I get the help I need from other Americans”; “I get the resources I
need from other Americans”; and “I get the advice I need from other Americans”).
The items were scored on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly
agree, α=.94.
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured using the same three items
used in Studies 2 and 3 (e.g., “I am satisfied with my life”). Responses were made on
a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, α=.93.
Depression. Depression was measured using seven items adapted from the
depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale, short form (DASS;
e.g., “I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all”; Henry & Crawford,
2005). Participants reported how much the items had applied to them during the
previous week on a scale ranging from 0, did not apply to me at all, to 3, applied to
me very much or most of the time. The items were summed to form an index of
depression.
Manipulation check. Two manipulation check items were included
(“Completing the questions at the beginning of the survey led me to identify as
American” and “Completing the questions at the beginning of the survey made me
feel proud to be American”). The items were scored on a scale ranging from 1,
strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, and combined to form a reliable scale, r=.77,
p<.001.
Results
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA applied to the manipulation check revealed a significant
omnibus effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,296)=9.75, p<.001,
ηp²=.062. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the high-identification condition led
participants to identify as American (M=4.82, SD=1.49) more than the low-
identification condition (M=3.98, SD=1.59), p<.001, and the no-treatment condition
(M=3.93, SD=1.70), p<.001. There was no significant difference between the no-
treatment and low-identification conditions, p=.809.
Personal Control
A one-way ANOVA applied to perceived personal control revealed a marginal
omnibus effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,297)=2.69, p=.069,
ηp²=.018. Supporting H1, pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the high-
identification condition reported significantly greater perceived personal control
(M=5.35, SD=1.06) than participants in the low-identification condition (M=4.99,
SD=1.15), p=.021. The no-treatment condition fell between the two identification
conditions (M=5.19, SD=1.10), but was not significantly different from either,
ps>.209, see Figure 2.
Self-esteem
A one-way ANOVA applied to self-esteem revealed a non-significant
omnibus effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,296)=0.98, p=.377,
ηp²=.007. None of the pairwise comparisons were significantly different from one
another, ps>.179.
Social Support
A one-way ANOVA applied to perceived social support revealed a non-
significant omnibus effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,297)=1.59,
p=.206, ηp²=.011. There was a marginally significant pairwise comparison such that
participants in the high-identification condition tended to report greater social support
(M=4.71, SD=1.21) than participants in the no-treatment condition (M=4.37,
SD=1.61), p=.076. All other pairwise comparisons were non-significant, ps>.179.
Life Satisfaction
A one-way ANOVA applied to life satisfaction revealed a significant omnibus
effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,297)=3.27, p=.039, ηp²=.022.
Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the high-identification condition
reported significantly greater life satisfaction (M=5.05, SD=1.37) than participants in
the low-identification condition (M=4.53, SD=1.47), p=.016, and marginally greater
life satisfaction than participants in the no-treatment condition (M=4.64, SD=1.68),
p=.058. There was no significant difference between the no-treatment and low-
identification conditions, p=.597.
only the indirect effect via perceived personal control was significant. That is, there
was a significant indirect effect such that the identification manipulation increased life
satisfaction via increased perceived personal control (IE=0.14, SE=0.06, bias-
corrected 95% CI: 0.028, 0.268). However, the indirect effect via self-esteem
(IE=0.09, SE=0.07, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.036, 0.222) and social support were
both non-significant (IE=0.05, SE=0.05, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.047, 0.147).
Depression
A one-way ANOVA applied to depression revealed a non-significant omnibus
effect of the group identification manipulation, F(2,284)=1.42, p=.243, ηp²=.010.
There was a marginally significant pairwise comparison such that participants in the
high-identification condition tended to report lower depression (M=3.74, SD=4.56)
than participants in the low-identification condition (M=4.88, SD=4.58), p=.094. All
other pairwise comparisons were non-significant, ps>.349.
only the indirect effect via perceived personal control was significant. That is, there
was a significant indirect effect such that the identification manipulation reduced
depression via increased perceived personal control (IE=-0.39, SE=0.16, bias-
corrected 95% CI: -0.736, -0.092). However, the indirect effect via self-esteem (IE=-
0.21, SE=0.17, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.567, 0.098) and social support were both
non-significant (IE=-0.09, SE=0.12, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.335, 0.110).
Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, manipulated group identification tended to
increase perceived personal control and, through this, was associated with greater life
satisfaction and lower depression. Perceived personal control was the only significant
mediator of the effects of group identification on well-being. Ruling out two
alternative mediators, we found no evidence that self-esteem or social support

functioned as social cure mechanisms in this study. There was no effect of the group
identification manipulation on self-esteem and although there was a marginally
significant effect on social support in the expected direction, the indirect effects on
well-being outcomes via this potential mediator were not significant. These findings
suggest that perceived control is distinct from self-esteem and social support, and that
control operates as an independent mediator of social cure effects over and above the
variance accounted for by these alternative mediators.
Although the results provide experimental evidence for our theoretical model,
it should be noted that the effects we observed were relatively weak. For example, we
found a marginally significant omnibus effect of the identification manipulation on
perceived control, and only the key high and low identification conditions were
significantly different from one another (the control condition fell between these two
means but was not significantly different from either). We found a similar linear
pattern on life satisfaction whereby the control condition was only marginally lower
than the high identification condition. And although the pattern of means on
depression was in line with hypotheses, participants in the high identification
condition were only marginally less depressed than those in the low identification
condition.
It may not be surprising that we did not observe consistent experimental
effects on the well-being outcomes, given that these dependent variables represent
relatively stable psychological constructs (perceived control over one’s life in general,
life satisfaction, and depression) that may be difficult to shift with minimal
manipulations. This may explain why we found more robust associations between
group identification measured chronically (as in the previous studies) and perceived
control and well-being. It is therefore possible that if perceived control and well-being
were measured in a more focused way (e.g., assessing control over a specific event, or
well-being in the moment) we would observe stronger effects for a group
identification manipulation. Indeed, previous research that has observed experimental
effects of group identification have measured well-being in terms of negative affect in
the moment, rather than more stable depression scores (Cruwys, South, et al., 2015).
It could also be the case that the direct association between group identification and
well-being is more easily observed correlationallyin part because it is not always
responsive to experimental manipulations in either direction. Certainly, our findings
here provide stronger evidence for an indirect rather than a direct effect of group
identification on well-being. Nevertheless, even with a relatively subtle manipulation
of group identification we found that experimentally increasing group identification
tended to increase perceived personal control and, through this process, was
associated with greater well-being.
Study 5
Our first four studies provided cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experimental
evidence that group identification promotes perceived personal control and, through
this, enhances health and well-being. Study 5 advanced this empirical chain of
evidence by manipulating both group identification and perceived control to
determine whether group identification protects well-being against a loss of personal
control. While we have measured and manipulated the proposed independent variable,
group identification, we have thus far only measured the proposed mediator,
perceived personal control. Manipulating both proposed independent and mediating
variables therefore provides the strongest evidence for our hypothesized model by
utilizing the power of full experimental designs to demonstrate causality (e.g., Haslam
& McGarty, 2004; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).

Given the strong relationship between perceived control and health we
reasoned that well-being should remain relatively high when people feel high in
control regardless of their level of identification. However, because groups represent a
potent source of personal control (as demonstrated in the previous four studies), group
identification should buffer against a loss of control. In line with this logic, our main
hypotheses were that perceived control and well-being would be uniformly high in
conditions of high control, but that high group identification would protect perceived
control and well-being relative to low group identification in conditions of low
control. Well-being was measured in this study in terms of depression and life
satisfaction.
Method
Participants and Design
Mage=34.92, SD=11.86, age range 18 to 73) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid US$0.75 for their participation. The study was advertised as an opportunity
for Americans to report their social attitudes. The study employed a 3 (group
identification: high vs. low vs. no-treatment) X 2 (control: high vs. low) design.
Perceived personal control was measured and depression and life satisfaction were the
dependent variables. Self-esteem and perceived social support were included as
alternative mediators.
Materials and Measures
Identification manipulation. Identification as an American was manipulated
using the linguistic framing procedure adopted in Study 4. Participants in the high-
identification condition (coded as 1) responded to five extremely negative statements
and five moderately positive statements, making it easy for them to agree with the
positive and disagree with the negative statements. Participants in the low-
identification condition (coded as -1) responded to five moderately negative
statements and five extremely positive statements, making it easy for them to agree
with the negative and disagree with the positive statements. Participants in the no-
treatment condition (coded as 0) did not respond to any statements and simply
completed the control manipulation and dependent measures.
Control manipulation. Control was manipulated using a procedure from
Greenaway, Louis, and Hornsey (2013). Participants in the high control condition
(coded as 1) recalled and wrote about a time that they experienced complete control
over a situation. Participants in the low control condition (coded as -1) recalled and
wrote about a time that they experienced a complete lack of control over a situation.
Personal control. Perceived personal control was measured with the same
three items used in Studies 2–4 (e.g., “I feel in control of my life”) scored on a scale
ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, α=.85.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using the same single item used in
Studies 3 and 4 (“I have high self-esteem”) scored on a scale ranging from 1, strongly
disagree, to 7, strongly agree.
Social support. Perceived social support was measured the same four items
used in Study 4 (e.g., “I get the emotional support I need from other Americans”). The
items were scored on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree,
α=.96.
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured using the same three items
used in Studies 2–4 (e.g., “I am satisfied with my life”). Responses were made on a
scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, α=.93.

Depression. Depression was measured as in Study 4 using the DASS short
form. Participants reported how much each item applied to them during the previous
week on a scale ranging from 0, did not apply to me at all, to 3, applied to me very
much or most of the time. The items were summed to form an index of depression.
Identification manipulation check. Two identification manipulation check
items were included as in Study 4 (“Completing the questions at the beginning of the
survey led me to identify as American” and “Completing the questions at the
beginning of the survey made me feel proud to be American”). The items were scored
on a scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, and combined to
form a reliable scale, r=.84, p<.001.
Control manipulation check. Two control manipulation check items were
included (“Completing the writing task at the beginning of the survey made me feel in
control” and “Completing the writing task at the beginning of the survey made me
think about being in control”). The items were scored on a scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and combined to form a reliable scale,
r=.69, p<.001.
Results
Identification Manipulation Check
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the group identification
manipulation on the identification manipulation check, F(2,594)=61.85, p<.001,
ηp²=.172. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the high-identification condition led
participants to identify as American (M=5.01, SD=1.68) more than the low-
identification condition (M=4.12, SD=1.66), p<.001, and the no-treatment condition
(M=3.15, SD=1.67), p<.001. Participants in the no-treatment condition were less
identified than those in the low-identification condition, p<.001. There was no

significant main effect of control, F(1,594)=0.71, p=.399, ηp²=.001, and no significant
interaction, F(2,594)=1.86, p=.157, ηp²=.006.
Control Manipulation Check
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the control manipulation on
the control manipulation check, F(1,594)=330.79, p<.001, ηp²=.358. Participants in
the high-control condition reported greater control (M=5.59, SD=1.32) than those in
the low-control condition (M=3.43, SD=1.56). There was no significant main effect of
group identification, F(2,594)=1.70, p=.184, ηp²=.006, and no significant interaction,
F(2,594)=0.02, p=.985, ηp²<.000.
Perceived Control
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group identification,
F(2,594)=0.99, p=.373, ηp²=.003, but a significant main effect of control,
F(1,594)=20.72, p<.001, ηp²=.034, such that participants in the high-control condition
reported feeling more in control (M=5.63, SD=1.10) than participants in the low-
control condition (M=5.20, SD=1.26).
As hypothesized, and as shown in Figure 3, there was a significant interaction
between group identification and control, F(2,594)=3.72, p=.025, ηp²=.012. Simple
effect analyses revealed that there was no significant effect of group identification in
the high-control condition, F(2,594)=1.19, p=.306, ηp²=.004. However, there was a
significant effect of group identification in the low-control condition, F(2,594)=3.67,
p=.026, ηp²=.012. Here high identification increased perceived control (M=5.44,
SD=1.16) relative to low identification (M=5.07, SD=1.21), p=.021, and the no-
treatment condition (M=5.05, SD=1.42), p=.021, which did not differ from one
another, p=.911.
Self-esteem
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group identification,
F(2,591)=1.50, p=.224, ηp²=.005, or control, F(1,591)=0.36, p=.550, ηp²=.001.
However, there was a marginal interaction between group identification and control,
F(2,591)=2.45, p=.087, ηp²=.008. Simple effect analyses revealed that there was no
significant effect of group identification in the high-control condition, F(2,591)=0.45,
p=.639, ηp²=.002. However, there was a significant effect of group identification in
the low-control condition, F(2,591)=3.63, p=.027, ηp²=.012. Here high identification
increased self-esteem (M=5.11, SD=1.46) relative to low identification (M=4.62,
SD=1.60), p=.021, and the no-treatment condition (M=4.60, SD=1.61), p=.022, which
did not differ from one another, p=.938.
Social Support
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed a marginal main effect of group identification,
F(2,594)=2.59, p=.076, ηp²=.009. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in
the high-identification condition felt more supported (M=4.66, SD=1.53) than those in
the no-treatment condition (M=4.33, SD=1.45), p=.024, although no other comparison
was significant, ps>.152. The main effect of control was non-significant,
F(1,594)=0.23, p=.629, ηp²<.001, as was the interaction, F(2,594)=1.73, p=.179,
ηp²=.006.
Depression
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed no main effect of identification, F(2,562)=0.77,
p=.463, ηp²=.003, no main effect of control, F(1,562)=0.30, p=.586, ηp²=.001, and no
interaction, F(2,562)=0.92, p=.401, ηp²=.003.

Life Satisfaction
A 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of identification,
F(2,594)=0.87, p=.421, ηp²=.003, but a significant main effect of control,
F(1,594)=4.38, p=.037, ηp²=.007, such that participants in the high-control condition
reported feeling more satisfied with life (M=5.22, SD=1.44) than those in the low-
control condition (M=4.98, SD=1.51). The interaction was non-significant,
F(2,594)=2.30, p=.101, ηp²=.008.
Indirect Effects
As in Study 4, we tested whether the manipulations exerted an indirect effect
on well-being via perceived control, self-esteem, and social support. All of the
mediating and dependent variables were significantly correlated with one another
(rs>.36, ps<.001). Bootstrapping analyses with 10,000 resamples were conducted to
test the indirect effect of group identification via the mediators on depression and life
satisfaction. These indirect effects were conducted separately for participants in the
high and low control conditions (Hayes, 2013, model 7). Perceived control, self-
esteem, and social support were entered as simultaneous mediators.
Depression. None of the indirect effects were significant in the high-control
condition (IEs<-0.04, SEs<0.14, bias-corrected 95% CI range: -0.315 to 0.231).
However, in the low-control condition, the indirect effect of group identification via
perceived personal control was significant. That is, there was a significant indirect
effect such that the identification manipulation reduced depression via increased
perceived personal control (IE=-0.15, SE=0.08, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.336 to -
0.014). The indirect effect via self-esteem was also significant (IE=-0.26, SE=0.13,
bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.536 to -0.006), although social support was not significant
(IE=-0.04, SE=0.05, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.142 to 0.040).

Life satisfaction. None of the indirect effects were significant in the high-
control condition (IEs<0.01, SEs<0.05, bias-corrected 95% CI range: -0.091 to 0.107).
However, in the low-control condition, the indirect effect of group identification via
perceived personal control was significant. That is, there was a significant indirect
effect such that the identification manipulation increased life satisfaction via increased
perceived personal control (IE=0.08, SE=0.04, bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.016 to
0.157). The indirect effect via self-esteem was also significant (IE=0.11, SE=0.05,
bias-corrected 95% CI: 0.020 to 0.203), although social support was not significant
(IE=0.01, SE=0.01, bias-corrected 95% CI: -0.050 to 0.038).
Discussion
This final study provided causal evidence for our proposed model by
manipulating both group identification and personal control and measuring their
impact on well-being. As hypothesized, high group identification buffered against the
detrimental effect of loss of control. That is, people felt more in control in a low
control context when they were induced to experience high, versus low or no, group
identification. The findings of the first four studies suggest that this effect is due to the
fact that groups can serve as a source of perceived personal control, thus protecting
against the full effect of control deprivation. Unsurprisingly, perceived control was
relatively elevated when people recalled a time that they felt in control of their lives,
regardless of their level of group identification.
Although we found no interactions on more distal measures of well-being in
the form of depression and life satisfaction, there were nevertheless significant
indirect effects on these variables via our key mediator, perceived personal control.
These findings are consistent with the patterns in Study 4, which showed relatively
weak effects of manipulated group identification on well-being outcomes but stronger

evidence for the indirect effect via perceived control. Although it is possible to
demonstrate these relationships experimentally to test causality, it seems likely that in
the world at large the relationships play out over the long term in a mutually
reinforcing upward spiral of identification, control, and well-being. In addition, in this
study we found that the manipulations had an independent indirect effect on well-
being via increased self-esteem (cf. Studies 3 and 4). The fact that perceived control
was a significant mediator even when controlling for this alternative effect supports
the idea that perceived control is an independent mechanism of social cure effects.
Meta-analysis
A summary of the five studies and their effects is presented in Table 3. In
addition to reporting the observed relationship in each study, we conducted a meta-
analysis using a random-effects model to assess the average effect size across the
studies (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). For each study we
calculated the effect size correlation estimate, r (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996), for the
relationship between (a) group identification and perceived personal control and (b)
perceived personal control and well-being after controlling for group identification.
For each of these relationships we computed the average effect size both with and
without inclusion of control variables where appropriate.
Without control variables. To assess basic relationships, we calculated the
mean r effect size of the relationship between group identification and perceived
personal control. For the correlational studies (Studies 1–3) we calculated r using the
reported beta weights that did not control for other variables (except for Time 1
variables in Study 3). For the experimental studies (Studies 4 & 5) we calculated r
from the t-test of the specific main effect comparison between the high and low group
identification conditions. This yielded an average effect size of r=.13 (z=19.72,

p<.001, CI: 0.116, 0.141) for the relationship between group identification and
personal control and r=.47 (z=26.90, p<.001, CI: 0.436, 0.494) for the relationship
between personal control and well-being.
With control variables. To assess the relationship between group
identification and control, we calculated r using the reported beta weights that
controlled for other variables (i.e., demographics in Study 1, political ideology and
political group in Study 2, academic performance in Study 3). To assess the
relationship between control and well-being, we calculated r using the reported beta
weights that controlled for the effects of the alternative mediators (i.e., self-esteem in
Studies 3–5, social support in Studies 4 and 5). This provides an indication of the
strength of the association between the key variables of interest independent of any
variance accounted for by other variables entered in the model. This yielded an
average effect size of r=.13 (z=20.54, p<.001, CI: 0.116, 0.140) for the relationship
between group identification and personal control and r=.32 (z=56.36, p<.001, CI:
0.307, 0.327) for the relationship between personal control and well-being.
Summary. The results of the meta-analysis therefore revealed that the
association between group identification and perceived control is robust and of small
size. In addition, the association between perceived control and well-being is robust
and of moderate size.
General Discussion
The present research tested the claim that feelings of personal control can be
derived from group sources. More particularly, we found consistent evidence to
support two key hypotheses derived from social identity theorizing (Tajfel & Turner,
1979; Turner et al., 1987). First, that group identification would predict greater
perceived personal control (H1). Second, that group identification would have the
indirect effect of enhancing health and well-being through a mechanism of heightened
perceived personal control (H2). Our support for these hypotheses represents the first
empirical demonstration of a causal relationship between social identity and personal
control, and the first evidence that this is a process through which “social cure”
(Jetten et al., 2012) effects can operate.
Five studies employed a range of methods to test the relationship between
group identification and personal control. In Study 1, national, human, and
community group identification were associated with greater perceived personal
control across 47 countries, which in turn was associated with greater well-being. In
Study 2, identification with a winning and losing political party was associated with
greater perceived personal control and through this process was associated with
greater life satisfaction. In Study 3, controlling for baseline differences, increases in
student group identification was associated with increases in perceived personal
control and well-being over the course of one month. Study 4 manipulated group
identification and showed that high identification increased perceived personal control
relative to low identification, with positive consequences for well-being. Finally,
Study 5 manipulated identification and control, demonstrating that high group
identification buffered against a loss of personal control.
These results were robust to a range of different methodologies and measures.
We found consistent effects across the studies despite employing various measures of
depression (CES-D, Study 3; DASS, Studies 4 & 5) and life satisfaction (1 item,
Study 1; 3 items, Studies 2–5). Although perceived control was typically measured
using the same scale (with the exception of Study 1), our identification scales varied
across the studies and yet all consistently predicted perceived control and well-being.
Addressing Alternative Explanations

Identification predicted personal control across a variety of different groups.
The relationship was observed in national, human, community, political, and
academic groups. The consistency of the effects across this broad range of identities
speaks to the robustness of the core relationship that this research has uncovered. To
further rule out the possibility that factors other than group identification drove these
effects, in some studies we also controlled for beliefs or abilities that are associated
with particular identities—for instance, political ideology in Study 2 and academic
performance in Study 3—and showed that group identification predicted perceived
control over and above these other characteristics. It therefore appears not to be the
case that only certain types of groups inspire feelings of control; rather, it is the
process of identification itself—independent of group content—that appears to help
people to feel more in control of their lives and outcomes. Although the magnitude of
such effects may vary across different groups depending on their structure or
underlying belief systems (e.g., religious groups; Kay et al., 2010; Ysseldyk, Talebi,
Matheson, Bloemraad, & Anisman, 2014), the evidence collected here suggests that
the ability for group identification to promote perceived control is stable.
In some studies we assessed potential alternative mediators in the form of self-
esteem (Studies 3, 4, & 5) and social support (Studies 4 & 5). As outlined in the
General Introduction, these variables represent additional mechanisms through which
social cure effects may operate. We consider personal control as an additional, and
independent, mechanism through which group identification promotes well-being.
Supporting this view, we found that perceived personal control mediated the effect of
group identification on well-being in longitudinal and experimental designs. Indeed,
control was the only variable that consistently performed this function across all
studies.
These findings confirm perceived control as an independent mechanism of
group identification beyond self-esteem and social support. Naturally, this does not
represent the full scope of alternative social cure mechanisms, which might also
include uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007, 2012), purpose (Dingle, Brander, Ballantyne, &
Baker, 2012; Jones, Haslam, Jetten, Williams, Morris, & Saroyan, 2011), resilience
(Khan et al., 2014), and others. A richer understanding of the variety of “resources”
that social identity provides will be an important future direction for the field to better
understand the ways in which groups can support and scaffold people’s individual
level health, well-being, motivation, and agency.
Theoretical Implications
According to conventional wisdom, groups can drain personal autonomy and
control as individuals sacrifice their own needs and goals for the good of the group.
From this perspective, personal control would be relinquished or diminished as
individuals join groups (Reicher, 2001; Zimbardo, 1969). However, we have
demonstrated that the opposite is true—groups nurture feelings of personal control
and help individuals to feel capable of pursuing and accomplishing their goals. The
present research therefore brings a new perspective to the social identity literature by
showing perceived personal control to be a novel mechanism through which shared
identity serves to structure social psychological functioning. Importantly, this analysis
unites the group and personal levels of analysis to shed light on a path through which
group-level factors come to influence individual beliefs and behavior (Turner et al.,
2006). Indeed, from a social identity perspective these levels of analysis are
inextricably linked, since social identity provides the critical conduit through which
the socially structured field (Asch, 1952) is incorporated into the self-concept (Turner
& Oakes, 1997).

Previous research has theorized about a link between shared social identity
and control, although its focus has been on links at the group level whereby group
identification is associated with feelings of collective efficacy and agency (e.g.,
Bandura, 2000; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Turner, 2005;
Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Indeed, groups are heuristically perceived as agentic—in
the sense that people assume that a collection of individuals is more capable of
achieving a goal than an individual alone (e.g., Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004). In this
context, shared social identification is the psychological “glue” that binds group
members together and enables them to coordinate their behavior and channel their
energies into efficacious group-based action. However, the present research shows
that feelings of collective agency and efficacy that flow from shared identity can be
experienced at the personal level. These complementary findings suggest that it is
through increased feelings of agency and efficacy at both the group and personal level
that shared social identity motivates individual and collective behavior.
The present research also represents an important advancement on work on the
group-based control restoration model (Fritsche et al., 2013), which argues that
individuals turn to the group when personal control is depleted. The model’s core
argument is that groups represent control and transmit feelings of control to their
members. This argument implicitly assumes that group identification is associated
with greater perceived personal control and for this reason is pursued most vigorously
when personal control is lacking. Yet, until now, this assumption had not been tested.
In doing so, we not only provide tangible empirical evidence for the model but go
further by demonstrating the benefits of social-identity based personal control for
health and well-being.

Practical Implications
A vast range of research has explored the link between perceived control and
health. Across a variety of health domains, greater perceived personal control is
reliably associated with better health and greater engagement in health-related
behavior (e.g., Alloy et al., 1984; Godin & Kok, 1996; Helliwell et al., 2013; Knight
et al., 2010; Schulz, 1976). However, due to a focus on consequences rather than
antecedents, less research has addressed the conditions that foster feelings of control.
Importantly, the present findings suggest that one way feelings of control can be
increased is by attending to an individual’s social environment, and ensuring that they
have strong social connections and identify with important social groups. This is a
positive perspective on health whereby people need not be “stuck” with feelings of
helplessness and passivity but can proactively grow and strengthen feelings of control
as they grow and strengthen their social group ties.
This suggests the potential for social interventions to nurture feelings of
control and well-being. Recent large-scale social interventions focused on value
affirmation and promoting a sense of belonging have been shown to improve well-
being and academic outcomes (Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski,
2009; Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, & Cohen, 2012; Walton & Cohen, 2011).
Interventions that are based on social identity principles have likewise been successful
in improving well-being over time. For example, Cruwys and colleagues (2014) found
that depressed individuals who joined community and therapy groups showed a
reduction in depression one month later. This effect was particularly pronounced
among people who identified with the social group that they had joined. This suggests
that interventions that increase group identification can promote well-being, and our
findings suggest they may operate through a process of enhanced perceived control.
It is likely that by reducing depression, such interventions may pave the way
for people to become more socially connected, thus promoting a recursive relationship
that improves well-being and identification over time. Negative recursive spirals have
been observed whereby negative psychological states compromise well-being and
social outcomes, which in turn increase psychological threat and so on. Indeed, it is in
interrupting this self-reinforcing cycle that value affirmations are protective in
vulnerable populations (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009). Yet, our correlational and
longitudinal analyses in this paper suggest that positive recursive cycles also exist, or
may be engendered through social interventions. That is, the more well-being is
improved through social identification, the more motivation and energy people will
have to seek out additional social opportunities, thus further enhancing well-being.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although our focus has been on the effects of group identification on personal
control, the reverse causal path is certainly possible and, we would argue, likely to
operate. Previous work has shown that individuals who are dispositionally high in
autonomy (a proxy for control) are more likely to identify with and feel included in
groups (Sheldon & Bettencourt, 2002). A number of literatures also suggest that
greater feelings of competence and control enable people to connect with others in
meaningful ways (e.g., Amiot & Sansfaçon, 2011; Amiot et al., 2010; Vignoles et al.,
2006). We found evidence of such a reverse causal path in Studies 1 and 2, whereby
perceived control acted as a mediator of the effects of well-being on greater group
identification. Although this reverse meditational path was not observed in Study 3, it
is nevertheless clear that it is possible for these relationships to be bidirectional.
We believe that, at least in part, this possible alternative relationship may
contribute to the robust positive association often observed between group

identification and perceived personal control. Moreover, as with the social identity–
social support link (Haslam et al., 2006; Sani, 2012), such a bi-directional relationship
would create an upward spiral of well-being whereby feelings of control increase as
individuals identify with groups and these feelings of control in turn allow individuals
to increase the quantity and quality of their social connections. Nevertheless, evidence
of these more complex causal sequences was beyond the scope of the present
investigation and remains to be examined in future work.
In the present research our theorizing and measurement of perceived personal
control was very general. We focused on control at the broadest possible level—the
degree to which people feel capable of achieving desired outcomes in life. We
deliberately started at this general level to investigate the basic relationship between
group identification and personal control. It is therefore a task for future research to
address whether group identification also enhances more specific forms of control,
such as perceived control over health outcomes. Indeed, if identifying with an
important group helps people to feel more in control of specific life experiences, such
as improving one’s health, this relationship seems likely to account for even more
variance in health and well-being than was the case in the present studies.
Conclusion
The key contribution of the present research is the consistent finding that
groups can act as a source of personal control. As we demonstrated, feelings of
control have decided benefits for health and well-being. Indeed, we know from a
wealth of previous work that individuals with high perceived control approach
difficult tasks as challenges rather than threats, set challenging goals and persist in
efforts to achieve them, respond to failure with resilience and optimism, and cope
proactively with difficult life experiences. In short, perceived control is a fundamental

building block of motivation and successful self-regulation. Likewise, shared social
identity has long been known to enhance individual motivation and performance. The
present research suggests that social identity might achieve this partly by enabling
individual group members to feel a sense of personal control over their lives. To the
extent that Pythagoras was correct in observing that “no man is free who cannot
control himself,” it thus appears that by providing the basis for a sense of personal
control, group identification may be a foundational source of the human capacity for
emancipation—in even the most challenging circumstances.

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5.6
Perceived personal control
5.2
4.8
4.4
4
Low identification No treatment High identification
Figure 2. Study 4: Effect of manipulated group identification on perceived personal
control.
5.5
Perceived personal control 5
4.5
4
Low control
3.5 High control
3
Figure 3. Study 5: Interactive effect of manipulated group identification and
manipulated control on perceived personal control.

GROUP IDENTITY AND CONTROL
Table 1. Relationships between identification, perceived control, and well-being (Study 1).
Identification-control Identification-wellbeing Control-wellbeing 95% CIs for I-WB 95% CIs for WB-I
relationship relationship relationship indirect effect indirect effect

Without control variables
National identification =.08, t(61,960)=20.55 =.08, t(63,290)=20.85 =.31, t(61,960)=86.46 0.040 to 0.049 0.011 to 0.015
Human identification =.08, t(59,780)=18.45, =.10, t(60,900)=23.85 =.32, t(59,840)=85.36 0.025 to 0.032 0.011 to 0.017
Community identification =.07, t(60,630)=15.75, =.08, t(62,370)=19.43 =.32, t(61,210)=86.37 0.025 to 0.032 0.008 to 0.013
With control variables
National identification =.08, t(61,930)=19.73 =.08, t(62,770)=22.15 =.27, t(61,940)=76.64 0.037 to 0.046 0.010 to 0.014
Human identification =.07, t(59,710)=16.40 =.08, t(60,440)=20.80 =.27, t(59,820)=76.26 0.022 to 0.028 0.011 to 0.016
Community identification =.08, t(60,110)=15.05 =.10, t(61,850)=21.07 =.27, t(61,190)=76.68 0.023 to 0.030 0.002 to 0.003
Note. All effects are significant at p < .001.
I = identification; WB = well-being
Table 2. Relationships between identification, perceived control, and well-being at two time points (Study 3).
T2 Control T2 Self-esteem T2 Depression T2 Life satisfaction

2 *** 2 *** 2 ***
Block 1 R =.35 R =.67 R =.22 R =.49***
2
T1 Identification -.02 -.03 .14 -.11

***
T1 Control .59 - -.30* .18†
T1 Self-esteem - .82*** -.08 .04
T1 Depression - - .16 -
T1 Life satisfaction - - - .55***
Block 2 R2∆=.09** R2∆=.01 R2∆=.08* 2
R ∆=.05 *
T2 Grade .18* -.03 -.04 .12

T2 Identification .27* .15† -.35** .23*
Block 3 - - R2∆=.16*** R2∆=.16***
T2 Control - - -.39** .39***
T2 Self-esteem - - -.39* .39**
***
p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10. Values in the columns are standardized ß weights.
Table 3. Summary of results across the studies.

N Group Identification Control Well-being H1 H2 Effect size H1 Effect size H1 H2 95% CIs
w/out controls with controls with controls
S 63038 National Measured Measured control Well-being (life Y Y rnational=.13 rnational=.13 0.037 to 0.046
1 Human identification (1 item) satisfaction, rhuman=.13 rhuman=.12 0.022 to 0.028
Community (1 item for each measure) health, happiness) rcomm.=.12 rcomm.=.13 0.023 to 0.030
S 129 Political Measured Measured control Life satisfaction Y Y r=.39 r=.40 0.077 to 0.338
2 identification (2 items; (3 items; Greenaway et
Leach et al., 2008) al., 2013)
S 91 Student Measured Measured control a. Life satisfaction Y Y r=.36 r=.32 0.003 to 0.381
3 identification (10 items; (3 items; Greenaway et b. Depression -3.400 to -0.123
Leach et al., 2008) al., 2013)
S 300 National Manipulated Measured control a. Life satisfaction Y Y r=.16 n/a 0.028 to 0.268
4 identification (high vs. (3 items; Greenaway et b. Depression (high vs. low id) -0.736 to -0.092
low vs. no treatment; al., 2013)
Jetten et al., 1997)
S 600 National Manipulated Manipulated control a. Life satisfaction Y Y r=.15 n/a 0.016 to 0.157
5 identification (high vs. (high vs. low) b. Depression (high vs. low -0.336 to -0.014
low vs. no treatment; Measured control identification in (indirect effects in
Jetten et al., 1997) (3 items; Greenaway et low control low control
al., 2013) condition) condition)
Meta-analysis of relationships across the studies Identification–control relationship Control–wellbeing relationship

Heterogeneity (Q) in brackets Heterogeneity (Q) in brackets
Mean effect size (without control variables) .13 (20.69) .47 (235.68)
Mean effect size (with control variables) .13 (19.19) .32 (20.59)
Notes: H1 predicted that group identification would be positively associated with greater perceived personal control
H2 predicted that perceived control would mediate the relationship between group identification and well-being
Y indicates hypothesis was supported

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GROUP IDENTITY AND CONTROL 1

Running head: GROUP IDENTITY AND CONTROL

From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived personal control

with consequences for health and well-being

Heldreth, C. (2015). From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived

and Social Psychology, 109(1), 53–74.

process. Group identification predicted significantly greater perceived personal

experimentally (Study 4). Manipulated group identification also buffered a loss of

capable and in control of their lives.

Keywords: social identity, group identification, perceived control, agency, efficacy,

From “we” to “me”: Group identification enhances perceived personal control

with consequences for health and well-being

to particular health problems? Yet an emerging research agenda based on the

being is profoundly shaped by a person’s group memberships and social connections

improve our health and well-being?

What is currently less well developed in the literature is an understanding of

factors shape individual-level perceptions and behavior.

Social Identity and Health

One of the core insights of the social identity approach—comprised of both

psychology through their capacity to be internalized into a person’s sense of self. In

membership (e.g., as a woman, an academic, an Australian). A key message of the

shown to have a considerable bearing on psychological health (Haslam et al., 2009).

Groups Promote Mental and Physical Health

Haslam, 2009; Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, & Celious, 2006).

In addition to promoting healthy mental states, group identification can also

psychologically and physiologically (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Strong group

In addition to enhancing mental health, group memberships and the social

identification have been observed on a broad range of health behaviors including

healthier than people who do not.

Why Do Groups Promote Health?

Given the robust relationship between group identification and health, it is

to interpret support in constructive ways when it is structured by shared identity (e.g.,

as stressful (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

self-esteem a viable mechanism through which group identification might enhance

be a robust predictor of psychological health and well-being (Bailis, Chipperfield, &

Helgason, 2008; Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994).

To date, the analysis of social identity mechanisms therefore suggests that

capacity to promote well-being. Augmenting these previous analyses, the present

groups people can feel personally in control of their life outcomes.

We see perceived control as an equally viable, and independent, mechanism

dimension—while both may be derived from group membership, perceived control is

a feeling within an individual whereas social support is derived from relationships

outside the individual.

In several of the studies contained in this paper we distinguish perceived

personal control empirically from self-esteem and social support as mediators of

—in empirical terms, accounting for additional variance.

Perceived Control and Health

of achieving desired outcomes. That is, we investigate whether group memberships

Perceived Control Promotes Mental and Physical Health

A vast body of research demonstrates that perceived control is a critical

building block of mental health. Across a diverse range of populations, perceived

control predicts positive outcomes including resilience, motivation, cognitive

Layard, & Sachs, 2013).

In addition to promoting healthy mental states, perceived control can also

ward off or ameliorate unhealthy mental states. As work on learned helplessness

contemporary understanding of human depression (Alloy, Peterson, Abramson, &

In addition to improving mental health, perceived control has an impact on

performing variable in the theory of planned behavior in predicting health outcomes,

thriving across the lifespan (Peterson & Stunkard, 1989).

Social Identity and Perceived Control

have no hope of accomplishing a goal alone, interdependent action by a group of

of shared goals and intentions—a process referred to as shared intentionality

group behavior possible by providing a cognitive basis for collective coordination of