G.R. Nos.

L-91011-12 November 24, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO MACAM y LONTOC, EUGENIO CAWILAN, JR. y BELEN, ANTONIO CEDRO y SANTOS, ERNESTO
ROQUE y MARIANO AND DANILO ROQUE y MARIANO, accused. DANILO ROQUE and ERNESTO ROQUE,
accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Conde and Associates for accused-appellants.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-
53781, finding Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. Q-53781, appellants, together with Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr.,
were accused of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of August, 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused; conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of
intimidation and/or violence upon person, armed with a firearm and bladed weapons, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one BENITO MACAM y SY in the
manner as follows: on the date and in the place aforementioned, the said accused, pursuant
to their conspiracy, entered the residence of said offended party located at No. 43-A Fema
Road, Brgy. Bahay Toro, this City, and thereafter divested the said offended party of the
following properties:

One (1) model .59 cal. 9mm (toygun)

One (1) Walter P 38 cal. 9mm (toygun)
One (1) airgun rifle with leather attache case
One (1) master CO2 refiller
One (1) Sony TV antennae
Three (3) betamax tapes
One (1) Kenyo betamax rewinder
One (1) Samsonite attache case
One (1) set of four pieces of trays
One (1) Airmail typewriter
One (1) Sony betamax
One (1) Sony TV Trinitron
One (1) chessboard
One (1) Toyota Crown car bearing plate No. CAS-997
Assorted jewelry
Cash money (still undetermined)
One (1) .22 Walter

valued in the total amount of P454,000.00, more or less, Philippine Currency, and by reason
of the crime of Robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
 one Leticia Macam y Tui, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal injuries which were
direct and immediate cause (sic) of her untimely death, and on the occasion of said offense,
one Benito Macam y Sy, Salvacion Enrera y Escota, and Nilo Alcantara y Bautista, all
sustained physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of more than
thirty (30) days and which have incapacitated all of them from performing their customary
labor for the said period of time, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the late LETICIA
MACAM y TUI and to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in such amount
as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code (Rollo, pp. 3-4).

Together with Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Criminal Case No. Q-53783 was filed against Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for
violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law (Rollo, p. 31).

Upon being arraigned, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-53781 and Q-53783 pleaded "not guilty" to the
crimes charged.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence on July 4, 1989, accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and
Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" (Rollo, p.
23). Consequently, a separate judgment was rendered sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering each of them to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs of Leticia Macam without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, but with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs
(Rollo, p. 24).

The trial proceeded with respect to Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. and appellants. Of the latter, only Danilo Roque testified.

On September 26, 1989, the trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. Q-53781 and acquitting Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. of violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law in Criminal Case No. Q-53783 (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

II

The trial court accepted the prosecution's version as correct and made the following findings of fact:

The prosecution evidence, stripped of non-essentials, shows that on August 18, 1987,
Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque
went to the house of Benito Macam located at 43 Fema Road, Quezon City, and that upon
arrival at said place, Eduardo Macam, a nephew of Benito Macam, entered the house and
talked to Benito Macam. Benito then offered lunch to Eduardo, who told him that he had
companions waiting outside. Benito then told his maid, Salvacion Enrera, to call the said
companions of Eduardo and ask them to enter the house and have their lunch. Salvacion
went outside and called the persons waiting in a tricycle who, she positively identified, were
Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque. Salvacion Enrera
testified that only Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque entered the house
and that Ernesto Roque remained in the tricycle. After Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr.
and Danilo Roque had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam suddenly grabbed the clutch bag
of Benito Macam and pulled out Benito's gun and after they announced a hold-up, they
started ransacking the place and looking for valuables. After tying up the members of Benito
Macam's household, namely, Leticia Macam, Nilo Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and the
children of Benito Macam, the same persons brought them to a room upstairs. After a while,
Leticia Macam, Nilo Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and Benito Macam were taken out of the
room and brought to another room where Leticia Macam was killed and Benito Macam, Nilo
Alcantara, and Salvacion Enrera were stabbed. The prosecution presented as Exhibit "C" a
list of the items taken by the said persons with a total value of P536,700.00.

Nilo Alcantara testified that while he was being brought downstairs by Antonio Cedro, he saw
Leticia Macam being held by Danilo Roque inside the comfort room and that Danilo Roque
told Antonio Cedro that "pare doon mo na upakan yan." Nilo then testified that he was
 brought back to a room upstairs where he suddenly heard a very loud scream from Leticia
Macam, after which, he was suddenly stabbed by Antonio Cedro.

Salvacion Enrera testified that she was brought to another room by Antonio Cedro where
she saw Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara bloodied from stab wounds and that she heard a
loud scream from Mrs. Leticia Macam prior to her being stabbed by Danilo Roque (Rollo, pp.
36-37).

III

The version of the defense, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:

In exculpation, the defense in Criminal Case Q-53781 presented its sole witness accused
Danilo Roque, who testified that in the morning of August 18, 1987, while he was driving his
tricycle, he was stopped by three persons who, he came to know only during the trial of this
case, were Eduardo Macam, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Antonio Cedro. According to Danilo
Roque, the said persons stopped him and asked that he bring them to Fema Road for which
they were willing to pay P50.00 and that he agreed to bring them to Fema Road after
Eduardo Macam gave him a calling card. Danilo Roque testified that they stopped at the
residence of Benito Macam where Eduardo Macam alighted from his tricycle and entered the
compound, and that after a while, he, together with Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr.,
was called by the maid of Benito Macam to go in the house and eat. After eating, Danilo
stated that he washed the dishes and swept the floor, when suddenly, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr.
pulled out a gun and announced a hold-up and told Danilo to keep silent and just follow what
was asked of him to do. After the said persons tied the occupants of the house of Benito
Macam, they told Danilo to help them gather some of the things therein, which order, Danilo
obeyed for fear of his life. Danilo Roque then testified that after placing the things in a car
parked inside the house, Eduardo Macam said, "Kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil
kilala ako ng mga yan," and that upon hearing this, he went out of the house and went home
using his tricycle. He likewise testified that his brother, Ernesto Roque, was not at the said
location. Danilo testified that his brother Ernesto had just arrived from the province on August
19, 1987 and that he asked Ernesto to go with him to the factory of Zesto Juice and that
while they were at the said factory, where he was told by Eduardo Macam to get his
payment, he and his brother Ernesto were suddenly apprehended by the security guards. He
and Ernesto were then brought to the Quezon City Headquarters where Danilo alleged (sic)
they (Ernesto Roque, Eduardo Macam, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., and Antonio Cedro) were
forced to admit certain acts (Rollo, pp. 34-35).

The issues raised by appellants can be summarized into whether or not (a) their arrest was valid; and (b) their guilt
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled identification by the prosecution
witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights under Section 12, Article
3 of the Constitution (Rollo, p. 119).

Appellants gave the following version of the circumstances surrounding their arrests:

. . . , Accused-Appellant Danilo Roque stated that between 4:00 o'clock (sic) and 5:00 o'clock
(sic) in the afternoon of August 19, 1987, he and his brother, Accused-Appellant Ernesto
Roque, went to the factory of Accused Eduardo Macam's father in Kaloocan City to collect
the fare of P50.00 from Accused Eduardo Macam; they were suddenly approached by the
security guards of the factory and brought inside the factory where they were mauled by the
security guards and factory workers and told they were involved in a robbery-killing;
thereafter, Patrolman Lamsin and his policemen-companions brought them to the
headquarters of the Quezon City Police Department for investigation and detention; the other
Accused, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., were in the jail of the
Station Investigation Division, the Accused including Accused-Appellants Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque were forced to admit to the robbery killing, but Accused-Appellants Danilo
 Roque and Ernesto Roque refused to admit they had anything to do with it; then all the
Accused were brought to the Quezon City General Hospital before each of the surviving
victims of the crime charged in handcuffs and made to line up in handcuffs together with
some policemen in civilian clothes for identification by the surviving victims who the
policemen spoke to before all of the Accused were pointed to as the suspects in the crime
charged (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 15-18; Rollo, pp. 145-148) (Rollo, pp. 121-122).

It appears that the security guards at the factory of the father of accused Eduardo Macam detained appellants. They
were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters for investigation. Since they refused to admit their
participation in the commission of the crime, appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and
were made to line-up together with several policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam and Nilo
Alcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the
perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces caused by the blows
inflicted on them by the police investigators (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 15-18).

In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), we held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or
admissions from the accused (See also People v. Dimaano, 209 SCRA 819 [1992]).

Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the
accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However,
as a result of the changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and
the judicial system well before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is
therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law
enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial
proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A
police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S
Ct 1926 [1967]).

After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before
the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the
victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police line-up. Hence,
the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused
can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at
the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as being
tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951
[1967]).

The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court.
They have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity
attendant to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial (People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]).

Appellants further contend that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, conspiracy not having
been established by positive and conclusive evidence (Rollo, p. 131).

The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the other accused can be shown through their conduct before,
during and after the commission of the crime (People v. Dagoma, 209 SCRA 819 [1992]).

It is undeniable that appellant Danilo Roque was the tricycle driver, who brought the accused Eduardo Macam,
Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. to the house of Benito Macam. He contends that he did not know the said
accused. Yet, why did he agree to bring them to the Macam residence when the route going to that place is out of
his regular route? Why did he agree to bring them to that place without being paid the P50.00 as agreed but was
merely given a calling card?

Upon arriving at the residence of Benito Macam, appellant Danilo Roque, together with his co-accused, went inside
the house to eat. He even admitted that after eating, he washed the dishes, swept the floor and sat on the sofa in
the sala instead of going out of the house. This conduct is not in keeping with his being merely the tricycle driver
hired by the accused to transport them to their destination.

Appellant Danilo Roque was the one who gathered the articles stolen from the house of the victim and who placed
them inside the tricycle. While he claimed that he was merely intimidated by the accused to do so, his subsequent
conduct belied this claim. According to him, he escaped after hearing accused Eduardo Macam tell his co-accused
to kill all the possible witnesses who may be asked to identify them. Yet he continued to ply his route as if nothing
unusual happened. How he was able to escape unnoticed by his co-accused is a puzzle by itself. Likewise, he did
not mention the incident to anyone, not even to his brother, appellant Ernesto Roque, whom he saw the following
day. He did not report the incident to the police. In People v. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519 (1992), we noted: "For
criminals to make an innocent third party a passive and unnecessary witness to their crime of robbing and killing,
and then to let such witness go free and unharmed, is obviously contrary to ordinary human experience."

Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the commission of the crime is not sufficient to overcome the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified the former as one of the persons who entered the
Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the occupants therein.

Salvacion Enrera testified that she was stabbed by appellant Danilo Roque. Nilo Alcantara, likewise, positively
identified appellant Danilo Roque as one of those who brought Leticia Macam to the comfort room, where she was
found dead.

Appellant Ernesto Roque did not even testify in his defense at the trial. The Constitution does not create any
presumption of guilt against an accused who opts not to take the witness stand (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
14 L. Ed 2d 106, 85 S Ct 1229 [1965]). That is his right. However, appellant Ernesto Roque cannot rely on the
testimony of Danilo Roque because said testimony failed to rebut and impeach the evidence of the prosecution
against both appellants (Cf. Desmond v. U.S. 345 F. 2d 225 [CA 1st 1965]). We agree with the finding of the trial
court that appellant Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house of Macam, stood as a look-out, which makes
him a direct co-conspirator in the crime (U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 189 [1905]).

Appellants contend that the crimes committed were robbery and homicide, and not the complex crime of robbery
with homicide (Rollo, p. 143). We do not agree. The rule is whenever homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of the special crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173
[1982]; People v. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [1926]; U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1 [1907]).

Lastly, the award of civil damages made by the trial court is not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. In its
judgment, the trial court disposed in pertinent part as follows: "In Crim. Case Q-53781, the court finds accused
DANILO ROQUE and ERNESTO ROQUE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, . .
. and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and each to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P30,000.00, ." (Rollo, pp. 43-44; emphasis supplied). The trial court overlooked
the rule in Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code that the principals shall be "severally (in solidum)" liable among
themselves (People v. Hasiron, 214 SCRA 586 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the civil damages awarded in favor of
the heirs of Leticia Macam are increased to P50,000.00; and (2) that the word "each" before "to indemnify the heirs"
in the dispositive portion of the decision is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio
City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.

Nelson Lidua for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an individual
not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the
right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not disputed.

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio
City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained.2

On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as
follows:

2-8-86

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE

IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE
1700/9 FEB 86.

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At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in
the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in
response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had
not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation
to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves
Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned
out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa
allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and
during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —

.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ...
having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip
and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the
proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession
thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there
... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65
and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .

On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.

At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL
Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on
February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples'
Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and
'J.'

By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it
rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused
Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the
Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance
actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe
J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not
appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In
justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,
121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149
SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present
Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense
of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage
of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was
administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."

These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By
Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition,
and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including
the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case,
now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe
Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the
petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside
respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor
General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the
name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.

The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of whether or not it was grave abuse of
discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.

At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has
given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:

1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
 2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."

Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of
the same Article III.13

Right Against Self-Incrimination

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to
every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or
not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency
to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right
to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and
answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate
him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer
presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-
incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every
one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of
things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to
be put to the latter. 17

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18

Rights in Custodial Interrogation

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These
rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by
police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against
self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative.

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution.
It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as
an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20

Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"--

21
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right,

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him; 22 and

3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police custody,
"in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting

in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." 28

.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law
in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this imbalance.

Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional
protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of
investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she
was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.

Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case

As Regards Giving of Testimony

It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2)
those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for
a crime.

It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation.
His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the
criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case
already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
"custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."

But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in
common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section
20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time
that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to
do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all
criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others-

1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers
himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the
accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be
required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words —
unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the
right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal
action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34
And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him." 35

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he
"may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct
examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the
ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him
for the crime with which he is charged.

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate
him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused,
he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the
first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus,
assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline
to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has
the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:

1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

37
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

a) to refuse to be a witness;

b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;

c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the

prosecution;

d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends

to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.

It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the
disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the
same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor
sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far
divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application
of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set
aside.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into
play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed
to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should
be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors
on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person
against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies,
or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or
pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless
suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy
and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that
disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has
been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and
afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral
or written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement
at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it
would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal
action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his
"Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in
custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper,"
"answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating
officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.

Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may
be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under
investigation — or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In
such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in
evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may
not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in
evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the
trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is
now declared of no further force and effect.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, P. 21, 34.

2 Id., p. 13.

3 Id., p, 29.

4 Rollo pp. 6, 28.

5 Id., p. 19.

6 Rollo, pp. 8, 21-27.

7 Id., pp. 30-32.

8 Id., pp. 8-9, 33.

9 Id., pp. 34-44.

10 Id., pp. 48-55.

11 The admissions were allegedly made on February 8 and 9, 1986, at which time the 1987
Constitution was not yet in effect, indeed had not yet been conceived or drafted.

12 SEE, e.g., Tanada & Fernando, Constitution of the Phil., Anno., 2d ed., pp. 378-379.

13 The provision reads as follows:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

14 Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483; Gonzales v. Secretary of Labor, 94 Phil. 325; Suarez
v. Tengco, 2 SCRA 71; Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344.

15 SEE Chavez v. C.A., 24 SCRA 663; Suarez v. Tengco, supra, 2 SCRA 71; Gonzales v.
Secretary of Labor, supra, 94 Phil. 325, citing Jones on Evidence, Vol. 6, pp. 4926-7.

16 Suarez v. Tengco, supra, at p. 73.

17 SEE Cruz, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 275.

18 U.S. v. Molina, 317 U.S., 424; U.S. v. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23; SEE also Tanada & Fernando,
op. cit., p. 379.

19 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 694. 1 0 A.L.R. 3d 974.

20 Peo. v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379.

21 The 1987 Constitution (Sec. 12, ART. III) makes clear that the person's right to "counsel"
refers to "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice," that if "the
person cannot afford the services of (such) counsel, he must be provided with one," and, as
suggested in Peo. v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, that the rights to silence and to counsel "cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel' (SEE Cruz, op. cit., p. 282).

22 The 1987 Constitution adds that "Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited."

23 The proviso, as now found in the 1987 Constitution, makes inadmissible in evidence any
confession or admission obtained not only in infringement of the rights mentioned (to silence,
to counsel, etc.) but also in violation of Sec. 11, Art. III, to the effect that "Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty." The new charter also requires that "The law shall provide for
penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families."

24 SEE Peo. v. Duero, supra, 104 SCRA 379; Peo. v. Jimenez, 71 SCRA 186; Peo. v.
Robles, 104 SCRA 450; Peo. v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.

25 Peo. v. Duero, supra, at p. 388.

26 Peo. v. Duero, supra, at p. 386.

The Solicitor General's Comment, rollo, pp. 95, 102-103, states that the 1971 Constitutional
Convention defined "investigation" as "investigation conducted by the police authorities
which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and
such other police agencies in our government (Session, November 25,1972)."

27 Peo. V. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2, 9, quoting Miranda.

The Solicitor General's Comment (rollo, p. 103) states that according to Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, which preceded Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, "the right to counsel attaches when
'the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect. the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements."'
The Comment (rollo, p. 108) also draws attention to Gamboa v. Cruz G.R. No. 56292, June
27, 1988 where this Court declared that "The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
an investigation, when the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the accused."

28 Morales v. Enrile, et al; Moncupa, Jr. v. Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, 553.

29 Peo. v. Taylaran 108 SCRA 373. In this connection, the Solicitor General opines that so-
called "on-the-scene questioning" of citizens by police officers in the fact- finding process are
"undoubtedly admissible," for, as "distinguished from all questioning of a suspect, in x x
(such a) situation the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present." According to him, "when investigating crimes, an
officer may inquire of persons not under restraint (Constitutional Law, Klotter/Kanovitz, 4th
ed., 1984) x x x and such general on-the-scene questions are not thought to be accusatory
because they lack the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation' (Civil Rights and Liberties, A.L. Bonnicksen, 1982 ed.).'

30 See footnotes 2 to 5 and related text, at p. 5, supra.

 31 Sec. 1 (e), Rule 115 of the 1964 Rules of Court. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
have amended the provision to read, 'to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness
against himself.'

32 Sec. 1 (d), Rule 115. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure amended the provision to
read: "To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters
covered by direct examination. His silence instead of merely his 'neglect or refusal to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice him."

33 Chavez v. C.A., supra, 24 SCRA 663.

34 Id., at pp. 677-678, citing; Cabal v. Kapunan, L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962; 21 Am. Jur. 2d., p.
383; 98 C.J.S., p. 265; Wigmore, Evidence, 1961 ed., p. 406; 3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, llth ed., pp. 19591960, all cited in Gupit, Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1986
ed., p. 240.

35 See People v. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282.

36 However, as already pointed out, the rule now limits cross-examination of an accused
only to "matters covered by direct examination."

37 Or during preliminary investigation before a Judge or public prosecutor.

G.R. No. 101808 July 3, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON BOLANOS, accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case No.
1831-M-90, for "Murder", wherein the accused-appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Crime of Murder and the Court hereby imposed upon the accused Ramon Bolanos the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 With Costs.

SO ORDERED. (Judgment, p. 6)

The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow:

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Patrolmen Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco
Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito Caballero,
Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence were after the fact
narration of events based on the report regarding the death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian which was
communicated to the Police Station where the two (2) policemen who responded to the incident are assigned and
subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2)
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime of the
Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised
bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were informed
that the deceased was with two (2) companions, on the previous night, one of whom was the accused who had a
drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following
morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid., p. 3)

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further indicated that when they apprehend the
accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated;
that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to the police
station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the
deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)

During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without the
assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The
specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as follows:

. . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay in their jeep and
proceeded to the police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to be investigated, on the way the accused told
the police, after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim because
the victim was abusive; this statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence
against him by the Court because it was given freely and before the investigation.

The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused
Ramon Bolanos is guilty of having killed the victim Oscar Pagdalian. (Judgment, p. 6)

A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's Office, dated April 2, 1992, with the
position that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on board
the police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was given, it was done in violation of
appellant's Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice, while already
under police custody." (Manifestation, p. 4)

Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station
where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional
rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.
(Emphasis supplied).

Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be
admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle
was the only reason for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.
WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused-appellant have been violated, the appellant is
ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994

ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Pepino Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

VITUG, J.:

On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte (docketed Criminal Case No.
299). It read:

That on or before January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del Carmen, Province of Surigao
del Norte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused who is the Collecting
and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also
located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte and while a Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
aforestated school therefore was holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust public funds with all
freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and intent of gain, did then and there voluntarily,
unlawfully, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own
private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in
the total sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and
SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62), Philippine Currency, which total sum accused failed
to account during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the office of the
Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount
misappropriated.

Act contrary to par. 4 of Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code with a penalty of Reclusion
Temporal, minimum and medium periods and in addition to penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and fine as provided in the same Article.1

A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner Ernesto Navallo still
then could not be found.

Meanwhile, on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and
conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisional liberty upon the
approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") on 18 July 1985, he pleaded
not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its
records to the Sandiganbayan. On
27 January 1989, Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the
case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed
(Criminal Case No. 13696) with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had
posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective,
on 30 August 1989, a new bond was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the
person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. On 15 September 1989, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo's motion. On 20 October 1989, Navallo was arraigned; he
pleaded, "not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution:

On 27 January 1978, the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte, Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit
examination of cash and other accounts of Ernesto Navallo (then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia
National Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. The auditor, however, was then
merely able to prepare a cash count sheet since he still had to proceed to other municipalities. Before departing,
Espino sealed the vault of Navallo.

On 30 January 1978, Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by Espino to complete the preliminary examination and to
conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal, opened the vault, and made a new cash count. Dulguime next
examined the cashbook of Navallo. Dulguime did not examine the official receipts reflected in the cashbook, said
receipts having been previously turned over to the Officer of the Provincial Auditor. After the audit, he had the
cashbook likewise deposited with the same office. The audit covered the period from July 1976 to January 1978 on
the basis of postings and record of collections certified to by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed Navallo's shortage of
P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the
missing amount. The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the shortage. The official receipts and
cashbook, together with some other records, were subsequently lost or damaged on account of a typhoon that
visited the province.

Evidence for the Defense:

The accused, Navallo, testified that in 1970, he was a Clerk I in the Numancia National Vocational School. In 1976,
he was appointed Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the school. His duties included the collection of tuition fees,
preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to
the National Treasury. Even while he had not yet received his appointment papers, he, together with, and upon the
instructions of, Cesar Macasemo (the Principal and Navallo's predecessor as Collecting and Disbursing Officer of
the school), was himself already doing entries in the cashbook. Navallo and Macasemo thus both used the vault.
Navallo said that he started the job of a disbursement officer in June 1977, and began to discharge in full the duties
of his new position (Collection and Disbursement Officer) only in 1978. There was no formal turn over of
accountability from Macasemo to Navallo.

Gainsaying the prosecution's evidence, Navallo continued that the charge against him was motivated by a personal
grudge on the part of Espino. On
25 January 1978, he said, he was summoned to appear at the Numancia National Vocational School where he saw
Espino and Macasemo. The safe used by him and by Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the cash
which was taken out from the safe was placed on top of a table. He did not see the actual counting of the money
and no actual audit of his accountability was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash count only because he was
pressured by Macasemo who assured him that he (Macasemo) would settle everything. The collections in 1976,
reflected in the Statement of Accountability, were not his, he declared, but those of Macasemo who had unliquidated
cash advances.

Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not reply because he was already in Manila looking
for another employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not exert any effort to have
Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying instead on Macasemo's assurance that he would settle
the matter. He, however, verbally informed the investigating fiscal that the shortage represented the unliquidated
cash advance of Macasemo.

The Appealed Decision:

On 08 November 1990, after evaluating the evidence, the Sandiganbayan reached a decision, and it rendered
judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERNESTO NAVALLO y GALON GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly and there being no modifying circumstances nor reason negating the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, the Court imposes upon the accused the
indeterminate sentence ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor
as minimum to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of
reclusion temporal as maximum; the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine
in the amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS AND
SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62), Philippine Currency.

The Court further orders the accused to restitute the amount malversed to the Government.

SO ORDERED. 2

Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of
05 February 1991.

Hence, the instant petition.

Four issues are raised in this appeal —

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the offense filed
against petitioner in spite of the fact that long before the law creating the Sandiganbayan
took effect, an Information had already been filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte.

2. Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial
Court on July 18, 1985.

3. Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the
certification prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.

4. Whether or not the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.

We see no merit in the petition.

On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect providing, among other things, thusly:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those

employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; and
 (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. Transfer of cases. — As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused
has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan.

The law is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be transferred to it so
long as the accused has not as yet been properly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the law, i.e., on
10 December 1978. The accused is charged with having violated paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised Penal
Code —

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of Malversation. — Any

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds
or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.

an offense which falls under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code and, without question, triable by the
Sandiganbayan. Navallo's arraignment before the RTC on 18 July 1985 is several years after
Presidential Decree No. 1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan, had become
effective.

Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court, pleads double jeopardy. We cannot
agree. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:

(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;

(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;

(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and

(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.

When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an
attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which
necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.

In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by
then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.

Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial
3

investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law
4
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
5

examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any
case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears
to be belied by his own testimony. To quote:

Q How were you pressured?

A Mr. Macasemo told me to sign the report because he will be the one to
settle everything.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why did you allow yourself to be pressured when you will be the one
ultimately to suffer?

A Because he told me that everything will be all right and that he will be the
one to talk with the auditor.

Q Did he tell you exactly what you will do with the auditor to be relieved of
responsibility?

A No, your Honor.

Q Why did you not ask him?

A I was ashamed to ask him, your Honor, because he was my

superior. 6

Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to sign the auditor's report.
Furthermore, Navallo again contradicted himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:

Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his superior officer and taking into
consideration his gratitude for the favors that his superior officer has extended him in
recommending him the position he held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed
to sign the auditor's report even if he was not given the opportunity to explain the alleged
shortage. 7

Finally, accused-petitioner challenges the sufficiency of evidence against him. Suffice it to say that the law he
contravened itself creates a presumption of evidence. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct
proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain. 8

Not least insignificant is the evaluation of the evidence of the Sandiganbayan itself which has found thusly:

The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the unliquidated cash advance of
Macasemo does not inspire belief. No details whatsoever were given by the accused on the
matter such as, for instance, when and for what purpose was the alleged cash advance
granted, what step or steps were taken by Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact,
Navallo admitted that he did not even ask Macasemo as to how he (Navallo) could be
relieved of his responsibility for the missing amount when he was promised by Macasemo
that everything would be all right. When Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even
write Macasemo about the shortage.

As to the collections made in 1976 which Navallo denied having made, the evidence of the
prosecution shows that he assumed the office of Collecting and Disbursing Officer in July
 1976 and the cashbook which was examined during the audit contained entries from July
1976 to January 1978, which he certified to. Navallo confirmed that indeed he was appointed
Collecting and Disbursing Officer in 1976.

Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the unliquidated cash advance of
Macasemo and that Navallo did not collect tuition fees in 1976 was advanced for the first
time during the trial, that is, 12 long solid years after the audit on January 30, 1978. Nothing
was said about it at the time of the audit and immediately thereafter.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results
of the case, those findings should not be ignored. We see nothing on record in this case that can
justify a deviation from the rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 28.

2 Rollo, p. 52.

3 Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

4 See People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47; People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379.

5 People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2; Miranda vs. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436.

6 Rollo, pp. 19-20.

7 Rollo, p. 6.

8 De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA 337.

G.R. No. 221424

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROBELYN CABANADA y ROSAURO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before Us for review is the August 29, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05585,
1

which affirmed the Decision dated April 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 214, Mandaluyong City
2

in Criminal Case No. MC-09-12269 finding accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro (Cabanada) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, the accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then employed as housemaid of complainant Catherine
Victoria y Tulfo, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of the trust reposed upon her with intent to
gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following to wit:

a) cash amounting to [₱]20,000.00;

b) one (1) Pierre Cardin lady's watch worth [₱]l0,000.00;

c) one (1) white gold ring with diamonds and white gold earring with diamonds worth [₱]90,000.00;

d) one (1) Technomarine lady's watch worth [₱]15,000.00;

e) one (1) Santa Barbara [lady's] watch worth [₱]6,000.00;

f) one (1) Relic lady's watch worth [₱]3,000.00;

g) one (1) pair of white gold with briliantitos earrings worth [₱]l0,000.00

h) assorted ATM cards

in the aggregate amount of [₱]154,000.00 belonging to one Catherine Victoria y Tulfo, without her knowledge and
consent, to her damage and prejudice in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law." 3

Cabanada pleaded not guilty at her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that: at about 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, an Easter Sunday, private complainant
Catherine Victoria (Catherine) and her family visited her mother in Bulacan. Cabanada was left at the house since
she was not feeling well and would rather clean the house. The family returned at 9:30 p.m. of the same day. 4

On April 13, 2009, Catherine asked her husband Victor Victoria (Victor) for the ₱47,000.00 he was supposed to give
for their household expenses. Victor went to his service vehicle to get the money he kept in the glove compartment,
1âwphi1

and was surprised that ₱20,000.00 was missing. When Victor informed her, Catherine checked their room and
discovered that several pieces of her jewelry were also missing. She immediately called the Mandaluyong Police
Station to report the incident.5

In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to PO2 Maximo Cotoner, Jr. (PO2
Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them to her room and took a pouch (white envelope) containing
₱16,000.00 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet containing the missing master key of Victor's vehicle.
Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. Cabanada
apologized to Catherine, and admitted that she still had some of the missing jewelry in her house at Panatag
Compound, Welfareville, Mandaluyong City. The police went to her house and recovered the Technomarine, Pierre
Cardin, Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box. 6

On the other hand, the defense narrated a different set of events. At around 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, Cabanada
went to Catherine's house to work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around 9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria
family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00 a.m. and left at 3:00 p.m. In the morning of April 13,
2009, Cabanada returned to the house to resume her work. She was washing clothes at around 9:00 a.m. when
Catherine called her and asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same. The police came
and asked her and her sister Rose to board the police mobile. For half an hour, Catherine was talking with the
police, while Cabanada and her sister stayed in the mobile. Thereafter, they were brought to the police station, and
while in a small room, she was asked thrice if she mortgaged the missing jewelry, to which she denied any
knowledge. She was not assisted by a lawyer at the police station nor was allowed to call her relatives.

The RTC found Cabanada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. It held that the prosecution
was able to establish the continuous series of events which undoubtedly point to Cabanada as the perpetrator of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

SO ORDERED. 7

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Cabanada's admissions were not obtained
under custodial investigation as it was established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The "uncounselled
admissions" were given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry. The CA considered the testimony of PO2
Cotoner that they contemplated that Cabanada might have been covering for someone else. The fallo of the
decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 8

Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation, informed this Court of its intention not to file a
9

supplemental brief since its Brief dated July 23, 2013 has exhaustively discussed and refuted the issues in the
10

case. For her part, Cabanada, through the Public Attorney's Office, asserted that she adopts all her defenses and
arguments in her Appellant's Brief, and asks for the said Manifestation be considered as substantial compliance in
lieu of supplemental brief.
11
Cabanada alleges that her alleged admissions cannot be considered as done in an ordinary manner,
spontaneously, fully and voluntarily as it was elicited through the questions of PO2 Cotoner. She was patently
treated as a suspect when she was being interviewed at the Victoria's residence. Thus, her uncounselled
admissions are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained without a valid waiver on her part. 12

On the other hand, the OSG argues that although Cabanada's confession may have been obtained through PO2
Cotoner's interview, the same was given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry and not while she was
under custodial investigation. She made the said admission in her employer's residence wherein she was neither
deprived of her liberty nor considered a suspect. The OSG emphasizes that since the investigation had just begun, it
was entirely within the authority and discretion of the police officers to question any person within the household
who could have related any unusual events that occurred on the day the Victoria family went to Bulacan. 13

This Court finds the appeal partly meritorious.

Section 12, paragraphs 1and3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provide that:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

The above provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights." The Miranda
doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
14

coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
15

The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial investigation." Custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission.16

This Court expounded in People v. Marra: 17

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is
taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate. 18

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and expanded the definition of custodial
investigation. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
1âwphi1

their Miranda rights. The same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. A portion of Section 2 of R.A.
19

No. 7438 reads:

SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. -

xxxx
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law.
20

Applying the foregoing, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made the confession, without
counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing ₱20,000.00. The prosecution established that the confession
was elicited during the initial interview of the police after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal
effects. The investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also,
she admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of her freedom. As PO2 Cotoner's testified:

Q: Why did you start your interview with accused Robelyn Cabanada?

A: Because she's only the person left in that house during that time, ma'am.

Q: You said that you started interview with Robelyn Cabanada, what was her reaction if you can remember when
you started to interview her?

A: At first she was crying and later she was talking and talking and admitted that she was the one who took the
money, ma'am.

Q: How according to her were she able to get the money, you mentioned earlier that private complainant in this case
Catherine Victoria told you that she discovered [₱]20,000 out of [₱]47,000.00 inside a white envelope which white
envelope was inside her car. How did accused tell you how she got the money?

A: She said that she also stole the master key of the car prior to that time she stole the money, ma'am.

Q: When you were interviewing accused Ms. Robelyn Cabanada, who were present?

A: The complainant, ma' am.

Q: Aside from the complainant who else were present?

A: PO3 Rodel Samaniego, ma'am.

Q: How did complainant react when accused told you or related information that she knows the stolen master key of
the car, who open the same?

A: The complainant revealed that she lost the key several months ago, ma'am.

Q: What happened after this information was given to you?

A: Together the complainant the accused led us in her room and in a cabinet she took from there the white envelope
which consists of [₱]16,000.00 and after that she also get the leather wallet which contained the master key of the
car which she stole several months ago, ma'am.

xxx 21

The records of the case reveal that Cabanada was brought to the CIU office for further investigation after she
admitted the crime and after Catherine expressed her desire to pursue the case against her. However, prosecution
witness PO2 Cotoner admitted that Cabanada was not apprised of her constitutional rights. He insisted that their
investigation has not yet concluded and that the accused was not yet arrested. Thus, in his direct testimony:

PROSEC. LALUCES:

xxxx
Q: How did the complainant react when the accused actually presented this [₱]16,000.00 as well as the leather
wallet which the wallet (sic) contained the key of the car?

A: She was so angry and she told us that she would pursue the case and we brought the accused to our office
together with the complainant, ma'am.

Q: For what purpose?

A: For further investigation, ma'am.

Q: After bringing the accused to the CIU for further investigation as you said, what happened next?

A: The accused continued talking, talking, crying and afterwards she told us that there were more pieces of jewelry
in their house at Panatag Compound Welfareville, Mandaluyong City, ma'am.

Q: Where did she actually tell you this?

A: Inside our office, ma' am.

Q: Which particular part of your office, was she already inside the detention cell?

A: No, ma'am, office of our chief, ma'am.

xxxx 22

Q: The accused practically admitted to you while she was still in the house of Catherine Victoria who having taken
the cash belonging to the complainant and reported to you by said Catherine Victoria. Why did you not give her the
rights at that time she made the admission so that she can secure the services of counsel?

A: Because at that time she was not arrested yet, ma'am.

Q: Why did you not arrest her at that time when she practically admitted to you of this thing?

A: Because we thought that the accused was covering up for someone we have not yet finished our investigation,
ma'am.

Q: You have not concluded your investigation?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxx 23

This Court elucidated that the Miranda rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressure of custodial
setting. In the case of Luz v. People citing Berkemer v. McCarty, it was explained that:
24 25 26

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself,"
"which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies. 27

The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls within the definition of
custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at that time, the fact remains
that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to produce the money from her room. The
investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry even if they contemplated that she was covering for
someone.

The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as having been done in a custodial
setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station for further investigation;
(2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3) PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada's
apology and admission to Catherine. The compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused
was brought to the police station along with Catherine.

In People v. Javar, it was ruled that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, whether
28

exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of
the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Cabanada's confession without counsel at the
29

police station, which led to the recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible.

Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not necessarily entitle her to a verdict
of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry is still admissible.

Theft is qualified under Article 310 of the RPC, when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence,
thus:

ART. 310. Qualified Theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner's consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 30

The following circumstances are established during the trial: Victor, who had the habit of leaving valuables inside his
car, left ₱47,000.00 in the glove compartment; he hid the car keys in the filing cabinet; Catherine's car keys were
missing since 2005; Cabanada worked as Victoria's housemaid for several years; she has unrestricted access to all
parts of the house including the master bedroom; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house when the family
went to Bulacan; the plantsadora, who only reported for work every Sunday, had no access to the house and the
car; Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; the next day, on April
13, 2009, Victor discovered that the money was missing; and there was no sign of forced entry or of an intruder
entering the house. In addition to the said circumstances, Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of
Catherine that she stole the money and led them to her room where they recovered the ₱l6,0000.00 cash and white
leather wallet containing the master key of Victor's car.

The above circumstances and Cabanada's admission, coupled with presentation of the money, albeit less than the
missing amount, establish the presence of the element of unlawful taking. The fact that the money was taken
without authority and consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the taking was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things, were also proven during the trial. Intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The taking was also clearly
31

done with grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada was working as a housemaid of the Victoria family since 2002. 32

From the foregoing, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article," while Article 309 of the RPC states:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The case of Cruz v. People is instructive as to the proper penalty for qualified theft if the value of the property
33

stolen is more than ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. Thus:

x x x In this case, the amount stolen was ₱15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and medium
is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10
years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16 years,
5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct.
However, the maximum period imposed by R TC should be increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days. 34

In this case, the value of the property stolen is ₱20,000.00. Applying the above pronouncement, Cabanada should
be sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05585, affirming the Decision dated
April 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-09-12269, which
found accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICIATION. Cabanada is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of Ten (10)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

On wellness leave
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
(now a member of this Court) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring, rollo, pp. 2-12.

2
Penoed by Acting Presiding Judge Ofelia L. Calo; CA rollo, pp. 22-28.

3
CA rollo, pp. 13-14.

4
Id. at 23-24.

5
Id at 24.

6
Id.

7
Id. at 28.

8
Rollo, p. 11.

9
Id. at 20.

10
CA rollo pp. 77-89.

11
Rollo pp. 33-34.

12
CA rollo pp. 53-54.

13
Id. at 84.

14
People v. Majello, 468 Phil. 944, 952-953 (2004).

15
People v. Andan, 336 Phil. 91, 106 (1997).
16
People v. Guting y Tomas, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA 334, 341.

17
306 Phil. 586 (1994).

18
People v. Marra, supra, at 594. (Citation omitted).

19
People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, 735 SCRA 728, 751.

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER

20

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING

AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF,
approved on May 15, 1992.

21
TSN, August 25, 2009, pp. 6-7.

22
Id. at 7-8.

23
Id. at 12-13.

24
People v. Chavez, supra note 19, at 750.

25
683 Phil. 399 (2012).

26
468 U.S. 420 (1984).

27
Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 410. (Emphasis ours).

28
297 Phil. 111 (1993).

29
People v. Javar, supra, at 118.

30
People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 906 (2011). (Emphasis supplied)

31
Matrido v. People, 610 Phil. 203, 212 (2009).

32
TSN, December 13, 2011, p. 4. Victor Victoria

Q: If you can remember, sir, when did she start to work for your family as part of your
household?

A: It was sometime I think in year 2002, ma'am.

33
586 Phil. 89 (2008).

34
Cruz v. People, supra, at 102-103.
 G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM,
CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, Petitioners, vs. GEN.
RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED
OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V.
BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B.
YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, Respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, Petitioners, vs. HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., Respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, Petitioners, vs. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO
A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY
A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, Respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail,
Petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT.
WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC,
2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM
2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, Respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson
Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey
Sarroza. chanrobles virtual law library

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim. chanrobles virtual law library

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros. chanrobles virtual law library

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison. chanrobles virtual law library

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro. chanrobles virtual law library

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo. chanrobles virtual law library

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador. chanrobles virtual law library

Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando. chanrobles virtual law library

Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio. chanrobles virtual law library

Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson. chanrobles virtual law library

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison . chanrobles virtual law library

Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot. chanrobles virtual law library
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena. chanrobles virtual law library

Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro. chanrobles virtual law library

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177. chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari
against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional
objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I chanrobles virtual law library

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the
charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO
DISMISS. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed
a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This
was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. - Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to
military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the
matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of
the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be
made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to
the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he
may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such
investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on
both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not
been able to submit their counter-affidavits. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After
considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14,
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later
also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons
with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and
intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and
void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the
applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing
charges before General Court-Martial No. 14. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as
intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The
petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

II chanrobles virtual law library

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation
was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had
been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned
counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit
controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
1
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, thus:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no
way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986
(1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is
article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards to
an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the
required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused.
But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments
wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that
the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory,
and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of
Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war
71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the
effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but
merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
2
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and
conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law,
after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the
reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on
record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the
manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in
the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted
by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing
so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners
were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked
Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory
questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. - The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding
officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any
such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall
be appointed by superior competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form
showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its
president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in
any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been
improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained
General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948,
to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. - Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time.
Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the
accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of
the court shall not be challenged except for cause.

3
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of
Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were
on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its
aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for
the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these
considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted
and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles
of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of
the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge
advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for
Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the
Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military
law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the
outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to
the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these
environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each
side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and
such other cases as may be referred to them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of
the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged
member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to
meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule
on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state
of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of
the cases pending therein. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of
the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom
of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial
Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
4
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not
to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings
of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion - what in the language of Rule 65
is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" - as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is
precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on
5
petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. In the absence of a law providing that the decisions,
orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise
similar jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied
in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.
All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political
system. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming
the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought
is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of
duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required
to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only
after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these
inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the
fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases,
command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge
Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then
Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be
reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War,
indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must
be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even
6
be punished as a court martial may direct. chanrobles virtual law library

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the
latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under
Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by
the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III chanrobles virtual law library

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71).
A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long
as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the
reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No.
96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered
released. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454,
the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he
would deny bail to accused military personnel. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only
exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
1
strong." The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of
2
habeas corpus is suspended." To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to
circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" - the coverage of the right. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I believe that military officers fall within "persons". chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with
3
a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." But would a scenario of
1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society? chanrobles virtual law library

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be
granted the same right. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I
submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we
are a government of laws, not tradition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he
would deny bail to accused military personnel. chanrobles virtual law library

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only
exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
1
strong." The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of
 2
habeas corpus is suspended." To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to
circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" - the coverage of the right. chanrobles virtual law library

I believe that military officers fall within "persons". chanrobles virtual law library

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with
3
a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." But would a scenario of
1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be
granted the same right. chanrobles virtual law library

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I
submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we
are a government of laws, not tradition. chanrobles virtual law library

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Endnotes:

1 28 SCRA 540,

2 168 SCRA 264. chanrobles virtual law library

3 32 SCRA 106. chanrobles virtual law library

4 186 SCRA 287. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Sec. 9l and Sec. 21(l), B.P. 129. chanrobles virtual law library

6 Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991. chanrobles virtual law library
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 April 6, 1995

RE: FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF HON. FERNANDO DE LEON, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

ALICIA A. BAYLON, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City, Respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The present administrative matter was initiated by a sworn letter-request of Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
1

Dagupan City, dated June 18, 1992, charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of Branch 40, Regional Trial
Court, Dagupan City, with utter disregard of judicial decorum by excessive display of interest in handling a case
assigned to and then pending in his branch. The said letter was sent to Chief State Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon
of the Department of Justice who, in turn, indorsed the same to this Court for appropriate action as requested
therein.

The records of this case show that on October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an
information for double murder against several accused which was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10678, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.," and thereafter raffled to respondent judge.

Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8, 1991 a petition for reinvestigation which was granted by the trial
court in an order dated November 20, 1991, and the Office of the City Prosecutor was given until December 23,
1991 to resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally concluded by the said prosecutor on March 31, 1992. A
petition for review interposed therefrom by the accused was later dismissed by the Department of Justice in a
resolution dated May 8, 1992.

During the pendency of the reinvestigation, however, the accused filed a petition for bail on December 21, 1991, a
Saturday, and requested that it be set for hearing on December 23, 1991, the immediately following Monday. On
this latter date, according to an order handed down by respondent judge on June 8, 1992 the prosecution filed an
2

opposition to the petition for bail signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted
by First Assistant City Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo, alleging inter alia, that the information was filed on the bases
of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes clear and strong evidence of the
guilt of all the accused; that to grant the petition for bail would preempt the outcome of the reinvestigation which was
then being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor at the instance of the accused, and also necessarily
defeat the purpose of said reinvestigation; and that the accused should at least wait for the outcome of the
reinvestigation, which they themselves sought, before any motion of the same import could be filed.

Nevertheless, on the very day and time specified by the accused, December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., a hearing on the
petition was purportedly held by the trial court. Then, reportedly on the basis of a joint counter-affidavit of the
accused, an affidavit of one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in the police blotter, and the position paper
submitted by the accused, and allegedly because there was no objection on the part of the prosecution which was
supposedly represented by Third Assistant Prosecutor Rosita Castro, the court forthwith granted bail for the
provisional liberty of each accused in the amount of P40,000.00.

A motion for reconsideration of said order of December 23, 1991 was duly filed by the prosecution but the same was
denied by respondent judge on January 10, 1992. In his aforecited order of June 8, 1992 reiterating his denial of a
motion for his inhibition, he maintained that he had granted bail ostensibly "after due hearing and after a careful and
deliberate consideration of the pertinent and affidavits and counter-affidavit, position papers arguments advanced by
the parties." Respondent judge further stated therein that the prosecution did not ask for an opportunity show that
the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

Significantly, the aforestated orders of respondent judge of December 23, 1991 granting bail, and that dated
January 10, 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition for certiorari filed by the
prosecution and were subsequently annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its judgment handed down in
CA-G.R. SP No. 28384 on January 19, 1993.

In the meantime, immediately after the court had issued its order granting bail, Roberto Untalan, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. D-10678, filed with the assistance of counsel on March 11, 1992 a motion for
respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case, contending that such act of respondent judge "had invited our
3

serious doubt and less expectation of (an) impartial disposition of this case," and "that the instant case had plunged
(sic) into (a) network of intrigue and distrust creating thereby an animosity between us (litigants-complainants) and
the judicial system represented by the Honorable Court and in the last analysis, our grievance of justice is in grave
peril.

In an order dated March 25, 1991 (sic, should be 1992), respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit on the ground
that during the hearing on the petition for bail, the prosecution was represented by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita
Castro who supposedly "interposed no objection to the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she
considered reasonable." He also argued therein that time was of the essence considering that all of the accused,
except for one Joel Doe, had been under detention since October 21, 1991 and that the City Prosecutor had not yet
terminated the reinvestigation as of December 23, 1991, hence "without determining whether the proper charge
could be double homicide," he granted said bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. 4

Private complainant moved for the reconsideration of said order contending that, aside from the court's non-
observance of the three-day notice rule before the hearing, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who happened
to be present during said hearing in Branch 40 was not duly authorized to appear for and in behalf of the
prosecution in Criminal Case No. D-10678 or to comment on the proceedings for bail, since she actually was sent
by her office to Branch 42 to move for the postponement of another case therein. Attached thereto was an affidavit
5

to that effect by said assistant prosecutor.6

On June 8, 1992, in an order of respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration and which has been earlier
adverted to, he insisted that in its opposition to the petition for bail and its motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail, the prosecution never asked for an opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong; that during the hearing on the petition for bail, the assistant prosecutor did not raise any objection and
instead left the matter to the sound discretion of the court; that the alleged lack of due process had been cured by
the filing of the motion for reconsideration and the motion to inhibit; that the motion to inhibit constituted forum
shopping; and that from the narration of facts and events, the prosecution failed to convince the court that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged with the now familiar malfeasance of granting bail in a non-
bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is averred that the prosecution was not given
notice of at least three days before the scheduled hearing on the petition for bail, in violation of the mandate under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and, worse, with two non-working days between the filing and the hearing
of the petition. It is likewise contended that during the controverted hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution,
which was not even duly represented, was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the
accused was strong.

Required to comment thereon, respondent judge tried to justify his assailed orders by claiming that he honestly
believes that he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted the petition for bail because
the assistant prosecutor present at the hearing did not interpose any objection thereto; that the prosecution never
requested, either in its opposition to the petition for bail or in its motion for reconsideration of his adverse order, that
it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong but, instead, submitted the incident
for resolution; that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due hearing and
after a careful and judicious consideration of the pertinent affidavits, counter-affidavit, position papers and
arguments submitted by the parties; that the lack of previous notice was cured by the filing of the motion for
reconsideration since, in the application of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard; that the claim of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro that
there was no hearing held on December 23, 1991 is negated by the testimonies given in A.M. No. RTJ-92-822 by
defense counsel Atty. Constante Rueca, Officer-in-Charge Gloria Beltran, Court Stenographer Tripina Tigno, and
herein respondent; that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good
faith; and that the filing of the complaint is pure and simple harassment. 7
In a resolution 8 dated May 4, 1993, this Court referred the administrative matter at bar to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of this
case. However, it was only two (2) years thereafter, or on February 10, 1995 when, after repeated inquiries, the said
office submitted its report and recommendation with the explanation that it had to verify whether the issue raised in
the instant case is pertinent to another pending administrative case involving the same parties. It made no
manifestation or submission in the interim.

The Court views with displeasure and chagrin the chronology of events which, even if true, caused the
supervenience of a grossly unreasonable delay in the resolution of this simple administrative matter, to the
inevitable prejudice and frustration of the offended parties and the prosecution in the criminal case involved. This is
a situation which this Court has assiduously tried to avoid and obviate, since it tarnishes the judicial image, fuels
suspicions and speculations, and creates an unfair climate of misperception and distrust. We shall not clutter this
decision with the pointless mea culpae of the parties responsible, but this Court is not beyond expressing its
profound regrets for this distressing episode and shall redouble its efforts to prevent any repetition thereof.

Nonetheless, prescinding from the regrettably lackadaisical manner with which this case was handled by the Office
of the Court Administrator, we are constrained to agree with its finding that respondent judge is indeed guilty as
charged, as well as its recommendation for a much belated administrative sanction to be imposed on him.

Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the petition for bail at least three (3) days prior to
the scheduled hearing thereof . It bears emphasis that the petition for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof
served on the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on December 23,
1991, thereby giving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its opposition thereto. The
stratagem employed by the defense which virtually deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter
the representations in its petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same and
aggravated the situation by the unusual and precipitate haste with which the petition was granted by respondent
judge.

On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-observance of the
three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for bail is an
urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses and reveals a
distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to bail, does violence to the well-established rule of
law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Given this contingency, respondent judge should
9

have carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly
considering it outright as an urgent motion.

There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to support and justify his grant of bail to
the accused, namely, that time was of the essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October
21, 1991; and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the granting of bail and to ask for an
opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused.

We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient circumstances obtaining prior
to the grant of bail could not but have cautioned respondent judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and
resolving the petition therefor. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each of which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in the information
which was filed on the bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear
and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Third, at the time of the application for bail, there was still
10

pending a reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that the
reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any resultant delay caused by the conduct
thereof is naturally and logically attributable to them. And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for
bail on December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily
casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations alone, and even without the further elaboration correctly advanced by
complainant in representation of her office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to justify respondent's alacrity in
ordering the immediate release of the accused despite their somewhat extended confinement and, much less, could
respondent's pretensions validly support a grant of bail.
Respondent judge asseverates that he honestly believes that he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of
discretion. He hastens to add the handy and oft-invoked defense that he cannot be held administratively liable for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

Respondent should not hide behind that axiom so often resorted to, it may be now be said, to the point of abuse.
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge
of duty by those who are selected to fill the position of administrators of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to act with competence, integrity and independence and should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is true that, generally, a judge
11

cannot be held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or
decision rendered by him in good faith. However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record, as 12

we have hereinbefore demonstrated.

We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion of respondent
judge. But this does not mean, however, a lubricious and untrammeled exercise of such discretion. We have held
that admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided
by the applicable legal principles, to wit:

. . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion,
this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process,
and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. 13

Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be
exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused.
Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence
there of is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. 14

This brings us to the second and main contention of respondent judge. He would want to impress upon this Court
that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from the trial court to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, and that when it failed to do so in any of its pleadings filed with the court, respondent
judge was left with no other recourse but to grant the application for bail. He likewise asserts that the prosecution
failed to interpose an objection during the hearing on the petition for bail. Such arguments are deplorably specious
and lamentably absurd.

The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death, such as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a
hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court
resolves the motion for bail.15

It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence
so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. In fact, such a summary with his evaluation
16
of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.

The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory
for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.

Thus , in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., it was there held that even where the prosecutor refuses
17

to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the People's evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of
bail. This was reiterated in the recent case of Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc. where we said that the error
18

committed by the therein respondent judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the
prosecution to file a motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.

In Libarios vs. Dabalos, we emphasized that irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt
19

against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a hearing be conducted before
bail can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.

Where the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden of proof, but the
court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, it has been ruled in the early case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, et a1. 20

that, in the paramount interest of justice, the court must inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence
to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and,
therefore, in recommending bail.

Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas it was categorically stressed that although the provincial
21

prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the
latter was not really contesting the bail application. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also
necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
in fixing the amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself that these requirements have been
met can he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did conduct a hearing on December 23, 1991 is
belied by the fact that the order granting bail, the contents of which could merely be deduced after a careful perusal
of the records of the case and the other orders issued by him in view of the parties' failure to present the same,
leaves much to be desired. For one, it does not contain the requisite summary of the evidence presented by the
parties and necessary to support the grant of bail. What appears from the records is that the petition for bail was
granted on the basis merely of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and possibly of a witness, and the position
paper of the accused. The prosecution was not even given the chance to cross-examine the accused on their
counter-affidavit. Mere affidavits or recitals of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence,
hence they cannot legally form the basis of an order granting bail. 22

As a final note, we take judicial cognizance of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384,
promulgated on January 19, 1993, which annulled and set aside the orders dated December 23, 1991 and January
10, 1992 issued by herein respondent judge. The disquisitions therein of said appellate court serve to further
strengthen the merits of our findings and the necessity for the present administrative disciplinary proceeding.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will definitely be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to the personal records of respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison.

Considering that the offense involved in this administrative matter was committed way back on December 23, 1991,
this judgment is immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 4.

2 Ibid., 19-29.

3 Ibid., 12.

4 Rollo, 14.

5 Ibid., 16.

6 Ibid., 18.

7 Rollo, 58.

8 Ibid., 65.

9 Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended.

10 Order of June 8, 1992, 6; Rollo, 19.

11 Lardizabal vs. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994.

12 Libarios vs. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48.

13 Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206.

14 People vs. Nano, etc., et al., G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155.

15 Lardizabal vs. Reyes, supra, Fn. 11.

16 Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994; Carpio, et al.
vs. Maglalang, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78162, April 19, 1991; 196 SCRA 41.

17 Supra, Fn. 12.

18 Supra, Fn. 15.

19 Supra, Fn. 11.

20 76 Phil. 756 (1946).

21 A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.

22 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, et al., 77 Phil. 55 (1946).

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107,
RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND OTHER PURPOSES). His arrest was
made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the
parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been
contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner's room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon
City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioner's activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door
of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police
saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the
sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an
information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550. 1âwphi1.nêt

On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on
Which He is Charged.1

On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant,
Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants
who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual
intercourse."

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.

On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus Motion, as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his
arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules. He must therefore remain under detention
until further order of this Court;

2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post
bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the
following conditions:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases
shall proceed to trial in absentia;
 c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. 2

On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case
No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the
arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.3 Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. 4

On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty
to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997.
The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of Appeals, assailing
the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and
maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May 16, 1997, respectively.

While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against petitioner, bringing
the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated.

On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b), 5 of the May 23
[should be May 16], 1997 Order, are separable, and would not affect the cash bond which petitioner
posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification that those aforesaid conditions are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and May 23, 1997 Orders are
MAINTAINED in all other respects.6

The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to
petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the
approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that
when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been
released from detention." The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were
contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."

With respect to the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the informations against him, the appellate court held that
petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and
to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred 7 —

1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of petitioner's bail
bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment" is of no moment and has been rendered moot and
academic by the fact that he had already posted the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the
offenses;

2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only because it was made under
compelling circumstance which left petitioner no option to question the respondent Judge's arbitrary
action but also because it emanated from a void Order;
 3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner's motion to quash may not be impugned in a petition for
certiorari; and

4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly charged for violation of
Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several informations corresponding to the number of alleged acts
of child abuse allegedly committed against each private complainant by the petitioner.

We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated by petitioner.

First. As already stated, the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions for the grant of bail to
petitioner:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He
shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and
forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in
absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on
the ground that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with
respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner's
arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and that his
arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.

We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the conditions imposed in
the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioner's contention is that his arraignment was
held in pursuance of these conditions for bail.

In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if
petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial
until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment,
approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does
not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified,
since under Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial
court in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if
the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114,
§2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine
the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge
him with a crime and his right to bail.8
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after
arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial
court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present
at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114,
§2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such
case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at
certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, 9 (b) during
trial whenever necessary for identification purposes,10 and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light
offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. 11 At such stages of the proceedings,
his presence is required and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza,12 in an opinion by Justice, later
Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.

Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting himself from the
arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his absence. So it thought that to ensure
petitioner's presence at the arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment,
however, is that such court strategy violates petitioner's constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May 23, 1997 was
also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that
"approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is
invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is denied is not to
file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his
motion to quash during trial on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he
argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have
evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts
of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.

In Tano v. Salvador,13 the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash,
nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the
inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided
against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of sexual
acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether each
act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is
important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one
offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution
whether it is able to present only one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a
child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are presented during the trial.

The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of remanding this case to the
appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the issue now so that the trial in the court below can
proceed without further delay.

Petitioner's contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense of child abuse, regardless
of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve).
He argues that the act of sexual intercourse is only a means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual
intercourse/lasciviousness with minors attributed to him should not be subject of separate informations. He cites the
affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of
events," i.e., the first victim was the one who introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child
abuse is similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single offense regardless of the
number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions. In the alternative, he contends that, at the most, only
four informations, corresponding to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.
Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:

Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child,14 whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other
sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any
other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group.

Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances mentioned in Air. III, §5
of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under
the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate
information. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period;

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED declaring the
orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with
the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a
prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Petition, Appendix F; Rollo, pp. 78-85.

2
Id., Appendix B, pp. 18-19; id., pp. 65-66.

3
Id., Appendix J; id., pp. 115-122.

4
Id., Appendix I; id., pp. 111-114.

5
The conditions declared void were the following:
 a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases
shall proceed to trial in absentia;

6
Petition, Appendix A, p. 8; Rollo, p. 47.

7
Id., p. 14; id., p. 16.

8
Under Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7610, the offenses with which petitioner is charged are punishable by
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

9
Rule 116, §1(b).

People v. Avanceña, G.R. No. 37005, Oct. 13, 1933, 32 O.G. 713 (1934); Aquino v. Military
10

Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975); People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986).

11
Rule 120, §6.

12
77 SCRA 422 (1977).

13
278 SCRA 154 (1997).

14
Under R.A. No. 7160, Art. I, §3(a):

"Children" refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those but [sic] are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;. . . .

G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions
of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel
abroad.

For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed
provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to
Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that
petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was
violative of his right against excessive bail.

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the
Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of Accused-
Appellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin
Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand
(P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz. :

(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein
until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice
to the court;

(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold
departure order against accused-appellant; and

(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of
Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;

(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's
bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.5

A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but
was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the
provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.

The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and
travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right
to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the
amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the
Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the
amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be
posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he
posted during the trial of the case.6

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court
of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight
of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He
asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to
petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it
having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the
country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used
different names in his business transactions and had several abodes in different parts of the country.

As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of Appeals
requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioner's right to change abode for
as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence during the pendency of the appeal.

Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party.7

There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to
petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a
perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the country several times during the
pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.

The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. 8 The obvious rationale, as declared
in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the pronouncement that it will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to
bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.

xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious
avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to
 believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to
resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of
desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been
more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There
would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice
Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest
in a pauper's will." XXX11

At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the
following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is
certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail
bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of
his movements.12 In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the
case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-
departure order against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to
ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that
petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount
of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, 13 or whenever so required by the
Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.15 To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based
on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended
bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years
of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for
the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a
sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of
criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond
Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice. 17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not
precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide)
where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.

It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty
imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if
released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. 18 In the
same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised
with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial
court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be
denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.xxx20

Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to
the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --the maximum penalty for estafa
by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that
the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to
grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual
basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we
believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.

Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a certification/guaranty from
the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident
therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court",
claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines
unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order.21 In fact, the petition submits that "the hold-departure
order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the
court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary."22

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function
of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires
his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from
changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from
P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October 6, 1999
and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandova/-Gutierrez, JJ. , concur.

Footnotes

1
Branch 167, presided by Judge Alfredo C. Flores.

2
RTC Decision; Rollo, 33-34.

3
Comment of Solicitor General to Motion to Fix Bail; Rollo, 59.

4
Fourteenth Division, composed of Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona (Chairman and ponente),
Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, and Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.

5
CA Resolution dated October 6, 1999; Rollo, 18-19.

6
Petition; Rollo, 8.

7
See also Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1,
2000.

8
At Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights), the 1987 Constitution declares: "All persons except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." (Emphasis supplied).

9
41 SCRA 1 (1971).

10
21 SCRA 312 ( 1967). See also Chu vs. Dolalas, 260 SCRA 309 (1996).

11
Dela Camara vs. Enage. supra, at 9, 10.

12
Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975).

13
Almeda vs. Villaluz, supra.

14
Sec. 2, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

15
Villaseñor vs. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312 (1967).

l6
People vs. Resterio-Andrade, 175 SCRA 782 (1989).

17
Chu vs. Dolalas, supra.

18
Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 362 (2000); Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
281 (1997), citing People vs. Caderao and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 650
(1963).

19
Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
 ld., citing FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES -- CRIMINAL
20

PROCEDURE (1963), at 322.

21
SeeDefensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), where the Court held that the ex parte
issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the presiding court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused. See also Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760 (1991), where the Court upheld the
hold-departure order as a valid restriction on the accused's right to travel, as to keep him within the
reach of the courts.

22
Petition; Rollo, 11.

23
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1986).

G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent

Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest
can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the
reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders
dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted
bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently
and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this
 Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION
PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.

Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in
its Hold Departure List." 4

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez
into legal custody.

The Facts

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs
(SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the
RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this
Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of
Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation
of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12

Hence, this Petition. 13

Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to
go on provisional liberty because:

‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.

‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section
4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be
used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.

‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

extradition.

‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the
applicant of the existence of special circumstances.

‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on
bail.

‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance
by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled
‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-
G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled
before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition
for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the
Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that
will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1)
the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and
(4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition
is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the
parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have
a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all
other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will
render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity
to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that
have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this
nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration may be dispensed with.

Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there
are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:

[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has
been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:
Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et.
al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23

‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case.’

In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:

This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and
we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the same."

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem
it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which
there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since
PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,
26
understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from
one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and
crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only
regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try
them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and
the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial
limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32

In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:

 The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More
and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization
is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized
countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light
of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust,
each other’s legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on
an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the
basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be
given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take
place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a
class by itself -- they are not.

An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot
be invoked by an extraditee x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may
be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of
State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s
foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of
the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in
needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a
person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
 4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such
failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges
on reciprocity. 41

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as
set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the
treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and
the other government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in
a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in
the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to
flee. Indeed,

extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point
to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.
Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing

Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape
and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future
extradition cases.

On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting
forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in
court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:

SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon
the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of
 the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear
the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)

Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant
of arrest? We rule in the negative.

1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued.

By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early
stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1)
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB,
the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix"
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to
make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to
"best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:

In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused
to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word
"hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended,
the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have

intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused
from the requested state.

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause." 55

In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before
issuing a warrant of arrest:

Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest,

what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-
blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of
a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive
one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as
soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the
judge may

require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue
a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons,
including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present
case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary
nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.

On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail
to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for
the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.

No Violation of Due Process

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x
x x liberty x x x without due process of law."

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty
prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s
filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination
that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his
opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.
His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in
order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned
pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process
rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the
practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. 1âwphi1.nêt

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short
their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place
with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
 Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to
protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and
the need to fulfill international obligations.

Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now
discuss them.

1. Alleged Disenfranchisement

While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives.
On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not
persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled
thus:

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give
a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’ This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility
to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
 of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations

are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class." 73

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already
of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his
detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained
to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

2. Anticipated Delay

Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition
cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its
annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to
address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.

We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite
another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.

However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.

3. Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition
request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of
the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves
forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he
has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach
of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has
been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance
with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out.
The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial
court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC
set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.

This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not
normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted,
the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled
"Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was
Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.

A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again
hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal
propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no
need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it
lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.

In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions
written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant
questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very
delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the
merits, not a circuitous cop-out.

Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and
breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
potential extraditees.

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:

1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in
the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of
the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal
process may proceed therein.

2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability
and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
 3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.

4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally
examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately
issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to
appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have
a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is
not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case.

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is
sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the
answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.

7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority
and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only
inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith
with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent
Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is
directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter
of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(signed)

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. VITUG VICENTE V. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 74.

2
Id., pp. 122-125.

3
Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan.

4
Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; rollo, p. 125.
5
322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000.

6
Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on November 29, 1995.

7
In Civil Case No. 99-94684.

8
The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned by Justice Jose A. R. Melo
with the concurrence of Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo
A. Quisumbing, Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Sabino R. de
Leon Jr. Dissenting were Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.; and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V.
Mendoza, Artemio V. Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno
and Panganiban writing separate Dissents.

9
Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide; and Justices Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes and De Leon Jr. Dissenting were Justices
Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Buena and Santiago, with Justices Melo and Santiago writing
separate Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000).

10
Annex E of the Petition.

11
Annex M of the Petition.

12
Annex O (certified true xerox copy) of the Petition.

13
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 3, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of
respondent’s Counter-Manifestation. Earlier, on September 3, 2001, this Court received petitioner’s
Memorandum signed by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez and State Counsel Claro B.
Flores. Filed on August 23, 2001 was private respondent’s Memorandum signed by Attys. Mario
Luza Bautista, Nick Emmanuel C. Villaluz and Brigette M. da Costa of Poblador Bautista and Reyes.

14
Petition, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 10-11.

15
During the Oral Argument on August 14, 2001, the Court asked the parties to discuss three issues:
1) the propriety of the filing of the Petition in this case before this Court; 2) whether Mr. Mark
Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and 3)
whether the procedure followed by respondent judge in issuing the warrant of arrest and granting
bail was correct.

16
Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 4.

17
Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
v. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, and Nelson Marquez, CA-GR SP No. 61079,
promulgated on May 7, 2001.

18
Petition, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 4-5.

Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 215, 219, January 30,
19

1982; citing Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 April 11, 1972.

20
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637, January 22, 1999.

21
Malonzo v. Zamora, GR No. 137718, July 27, 1999, citing cases.

22
289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998, per Martinez, J.

23
190 SCRA 31, 38, September 24, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
 Philippine National Bank v. Sayo Jr, 292 SCRA 202, 232, July 9, 1999, per Davide, CJ, citing
24

People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, April 18, 1999; Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA
633, January 27, 1993; Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, September 1, 1994. See also Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, December 6, 2000; Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, GR No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001.

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 37, citing Macondray & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446,
25

July 16, 1937; Roldan v. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12, October 18, 1939; Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141,
September 21, 1931; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162, September 30,
1976; People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, November 29, 1922; Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051,
February 28, 1957; Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364, January 31, 1956.

26
Last "Whereas" clause of PD 1069.

27
See "Whereas" clause of PD 1069 and preamble of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

28
Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p.68.

In Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court defined fugitive from justice as
29

one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment or who, after being charged, flees to avoid
prosecution.

30
Bassiouni, supra, p. 21.

31
Id., p. 67.

32
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., pp. 19-20.

33
Supra, p. 392, October 17, 2000, per Puno, J.

Coquia, "On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty," The Lawyers Review, August 31,
34

2000, p. 4.

35
See Bassiouni, supra, p. 546; citing 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910).

36
Supra.

37
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.

38
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157.

39
Id., p. 545.

In line with the Philippine policy of cooperation and amity with all nations set forth in Article II,
40

Section 2, Constitution.

The United States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada: "In the Matter of the
41

Extradition of Charlie Atong Ang, a fugitive from the country of the Philippines," [the court] has
denied Mr. Ang’s motion for bail, per petitioner’s Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.

42
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.

43
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23, 1903.

44
See footnote no. 41, Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; rollo p. 19; Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
45
Persily, "International Extradition and the Right to Bail," 34 Stan. J. Int’l L. 407 (Summer, 1998).

46
Ibid.

39 CJS 875, citing People v. Blair, 33 NYS 2d 183, 190, 191; Amerada Petroleum Corporation v.
47

Hester, 109 P. 2d 820, 821, 188 Okl. 394.

48
Id., citing Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 S.W. 2d 767, 165 Tenn. 447.

49
Petition for Extradition, pp. 2-3; rollo pp. 49-50.

50
Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 3; rollo, 124.

51
In the questioned July 3, 2001 Order (p. 4; rollo, p. 125), respondent judge admitted that the
Annexes of the Petition for Extradition had been received by the court a quo on May 25, 2001; yet, in
its Order dated May 23, 2001 ( rollo, p. 74), it already set for hearing the issuance of the warrant of
arrest.

52
See §9, PD 1069.

Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, p. 87; citing 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law, (8th
53

ed., 1955), pp. 952-53.

54
280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997.

55
Id., p. 381, per Panganiban, J.

56
247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.

57
Ibid.; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994.

Prima facie finding, not probable cause, is the more precise terminology because an extradition
58

case is not a criminal proceeding in which the latter phrase is commonly used.

59
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment."

60
De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J. (later CJ).

61
§18, Art. VII, Constitution.

62
Paretti v. United States of America, 122 F. 3d. 758, May 6, 1997.

63
Garcia v. NLRC, GR No. 110494, November 18, 1996; Paat v. Court of Appeals, January 10, 1997.

64
See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 536, March 20, 1993.

65
Ibid. See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473, March 11, 1999.

Coquia, "On the Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty," supra; citing Kelso v. US
66

Department of State, 13 F Supp. 291 [DDC 1998].

 It states: "If the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the Requesting State, the
67

Requested State may surrender the person as expeditiously as possible without further
proceedings."

68
§1, Art. VIII, Constitution.

69
§5, Art. VIII, Constitution.

70
I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98.

Private respondent argues that the following cases -- In re Michell, 171 F. Rep. 289, June 30,
71

1909; United States v. Kirby, Brennan and Artt, 106 F. 3d. 855, February 27, 1997 and 158 F. 3d.
462, October 9, 1998. Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 460 F. Supp. 915, March 14, 1977; and 554 F. 2d 1,
April 6, 1977 -- should be treated as examples of special circumstances. In our view, however, they
are not applicable to this case due to factual differences. Hence we refrain from ruling on this
argument of Jimenez.

72
324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J.

73
Id., pp. 700-702.

74
The US request for extradition was dated June 16, 1999; and yet, to date, more than three years
later, the Petition for Extradition is still languishing in the trial court.

Separate Opinion

BELLOSILLO, J.:

While I do not absolutely disagree with the well-reasoned ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban, I prefer nevertheless
to surf with the reflections of Mr. Justice Puno expressed in his Separate Opinion which, in essence, espouse the
balancing of the duty of the State to faithfully comply with its commitments under a treaty on one hand, and its
responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens on the other.

I wish to express some concerns however, particularly the crucial issue of whether a potential extraditee may apply
for and be released on bail during the pendency of the extradition proceedings. This to me should not be ignored.

In Northern PR Co. v. North Dakota, 1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter intoned: "The cardinal article of faith of our civilization
is the inviolable character of the individual." Thus, fundamental rights

and civil liberties, although not unlimited, occupy a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of constitutional values.
These are among the most cherished privileges enjoyed by free men, of which it is the sacred duty of the State to
maintain and protect against the erosion of possible encroachments, whether minute or extensive, foreign or
domestic.

It is lamentable however that the position taken by the Government in the instant case amounts to an unpardonable
abdication of the duty of protection which it owes to all within its territory under the expediency of a treaty.

The Government maintains that an extradition court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law
conferring such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well as the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to
persons arrested and detained for violation of Philippine Laws, but not to extradition proceedings in which courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

The argument is as ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition
proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may only be granted under "exceptional circumstances." This,
quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel,
190 US 40 (1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v.
Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al., 106 F.3d 855(1996); which are also discussed extensively
by Mr. Justice Puno.

Apart from these cases, there is likewise a considerable number of authorities which support the general view that
the power to admit to bail is a necessary incident of the power to hear and determine cases. 2 In other words, one of
the inherent powers of the judiciary with regard to proceedings before it has been the admission of a prisoner to bail
where, in the exercise of his discretion, the judge deems it advisable. A fortiori, even in the absence of express
statutory grant of authority to courts, judicial power to admit to bail parties properly within their jurisdiction must be
deemed to exist. It must be mentioned, however, that this authority is not absolute for the Constitution, statutes and
the Rules of Court render it readily subject to limitations.

Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and the Philippine
Extradition Law (PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the power to grant bail. Had
the intention of the parties to the treaty been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition court on the
matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be
reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the treaty fails to even remotely suggest such judicial
limitation insisted upon by the Government.

Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or
that class of cases where courts must "render judgments of conviction or acquittal." Bail as a remedy is available
where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Go Siaco, 3 akin to the
situation confronting us, but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential deportee to post bail
although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in
deportation cases -

x x x x we see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the
defendant has committed no crime. In this particular case the defendant was born in this country, has lived here for
more than 35 years and is now living here with his mother, a native of the Islands. There is no reason to think that
his being at large will be any menace to the people in the locality where he resides, nor is there any reason to
believe that his attendance at court abide the judgment which may be entered against him cannot be secured by the
giving of bail as in ordinary cases. To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person is treated who has committed the
most serious crime known to the law, and while we do not intend to say that this is a criminal proceeding, we do say
that some of the machinery used for making the investigation required by Act No. 702 is the machinery of the
criminal law, and to it are applicable those provisions of General Orders No. 58, relating to bail.

Were we to adopt the view pressed upon us by the Government, it would restrict the reciprocal operation of the
treaty, and create a striking lack of symmetry between the rights of Filipinos subject of extradition and that of
American extraditees. Filipino citizens sought to be extradited by the United States government will be absolutely
denied of the chance at provisional liberty during the pendency of the extradition proceedings against them; while
American fugitives from justice sought to be extradited by the Philippine government could always exercise the right
to petition for bail, and consequently, enjoy better chances of avoiding the inconvenience of incarceration during the
pendency of the extradition proceedings. Certainly, there is no warrant for the discrimination. The Philippines and
the United States dealt with each other as equals. Their extradition treaty discloses the intention that they shall
stand on the same footing. The governing principles should always be reciprocity and equality.

We cannot curtail a citizen's right to freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable mechanisms
appropriate to address them. To my mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail. Trial
judges must henceforth weigh carefully and judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused during
the proceedings and right after, when he ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or
passports cancelled and hold-departure orders issued or border patrols heightened, in order that the extraditee may
not flee from our jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee's burden to prove the least
likelihood of flight, the extradition court is also entitled to presume that the executive branch has done all it can to
forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch cannot plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the
grant of bail to the extraditee.
In any event, all things being equal, the personal circumstances of respondent Jimenez would negate any idea of
flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow whose face is more frequently than others plastered in the tri-
media. His stature as representative for a congressional district in Manila makes escape from Philippine jurisdiction
not only embarrassing for him but also constitutive of the offense of abandonment of duty. His family and business
interests are said to be strategically placed in this country. Indeed, where respondent Jimenez has more to lose
from flight, the possibility thereof appears remote and speculative.

Equity especially tilts in favor of respondent Jimenez in light of our ruling in Montano v. Ocampo 4 where we allowed
bail to an elected senator of the country who was charged with the capital offenses of murder and frustrated murder.
In resolving to grant bail in favor of Senator Montano, this Court took special notice of the accused's official and
social standing as senator from which we concluded that flight was remote if not nil despite the capital crimes he
had to face. In the same breath, respondent Jimenez is a duly elected Congressman with personal circumstances
that will not risk the ignominy of flight, considering further the crimes he is charged with are far less severe and
ignoble, since most of them had something to do with election campaign contributions than the seemingly serious
indictment for murder and frustrated murder against Senator Montano.

If we grant for the sake of argument that the possibility of flight exists, still respondent Jimenez' detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution if the only purpose of the confinement is to eliminate a rare odd of danger
that is by no means actual, present and uncontrollable. After all the Government is not powerless to deal with or
prevent any threat by measures it has the ways and means to implement. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr.
Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in connection with the application for bail of ten (10)
communists convicted by a lower court for advocacy of a violent overthrow of the United States Government is
pertinent and elucidating in principle -

The Government's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their
claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they
have done since their conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act
helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by
the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice
that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as
those of which defendants stand convicted x x x x If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or
theoretical matters of principle, there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated - that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I should now send these men to
jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence
of a substantial question about a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience
lies hack of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the hazard of
unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our system of justice x x x x Risks, of course, are
involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am not naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities
of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the
short time it will take to end the litigation is preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated
case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization
of an evil force in the world to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk
is not to jail these men until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.

If the commentary is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal
application. If only to preserve our regime of civil liberties and stem a precedent where bail is unscrupulously
disallowed, respondent Jimennez may be placed under the surveillance of the authorities or their agents in such
form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he will be available anytime when the Government is
ready to extradite him, although the surveillance should be reasonable and the question of reasonableness should
be submitted to the court a quo for remedial measures in case of abuse. He may also be required to put up a bond
with sufficient surety or sureties to ensure that his extradition is not thwarted.

In our society - and even in the United States, I am sure - freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core
of the civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an individual by reason of
an unfounded fear of being unable to fulfill treaty obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the dignity of
the human person, thereby destroying something of what is noble in our way of life. Certainly, if civil liberties may be
safely respected without imminently or actually impairing faithful compliance with treaty obligations, as in this case,
then there is no valid reason for disregarding them.

I wish to emphasize, however, lest the best of my intentions be misconstrued, that it is not my purpose here to
encourage, much less foment, dishonor of the treaty duly entered into by our Government. By all means we have to
fulfill all our international commitments, for they are not mere moral obligations to be enforced at the whims and
caprices of the State. They create legally binding obligations founded on the generally accepted principle in
international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been adopted as part of the law of our land. But, in so doing, we
must be ever conscious of the need to balance in one equation our commitments under the treaty, and the equally
important right of the individual to freedom from unnecessary restraint.

As the vast powers and enormous resources of both the United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines are marshalled against a puny individual that is respondent Jimenez, he is certainly entitled to some
measure of protection to ensure that no unwarranted intrusions or undue curtailment of his liberty is committed.

I vote to REMAND the petition to the court a quo to ensure that proper safeguards are afforded respondent in the
course of the extradition proceedings.

JOSUE N. BELOSILLO

Footnotes

1
236 U.S. 585.

2
United States v. Evans, 6 Cir., 1880, 2F. 147; In re Gannon, D.C. Pa. 1928, 27 F.2d 362; In re
Chow Goo Pooi, 9 Cir., 25 F. 77; In re Ah Kee, 9 Cir., 1884, 21 F. 701; Whitfield v. Hanges, 8 Cir.,
222 F. 745; Ewing v. United States, 6 Cir., 1917, 240 F. 241.

3
12 Phil. 490.

4
L-6352, Reso. dated 29 January 1953, 49 O.G. 1855.

Separate Opinion

PUNO, J:

This is a case of first impression involving not only the state’s interest to comply with its extradition treaty with the
United States but also its equally imperative duty to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens to liberty and to
due process. Our decision will affect important rights of all our citizens facing extradition in foreign countries.
Personalities should not therefore bend our decision one way or the other for the protection of the Bill of Rights
extends indifferently to all alike.

We begin with the unfudged facts. The records reveal that when the private respondent learned of the filing of the
petition for extradition against him and before the extradition court could issue any summons, he filed a motion to be
furnished a copy of the petition and to set for hearing petitioner’s request for the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Alternatively, he prayed that he be allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty. Respondent judge granted private
respondent’s motion. After hearing, he issued a warrant for the arrest of private respondent but allowed him to post
bail.
Petitioner assails the orders of the respondent judge and submits the following issues for resolution by this Court:

I.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069.

II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:

1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law that provides
for such power.

2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Constitution and section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which were relied upon, cannot be used as bases
for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.

3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

extradition.

4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading

to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the
applicant of the existence of special circumstances.

5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public

respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on
bail.

6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance
by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

8. The Court of Appeals resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled
‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17 Manila,’ CA- G.R.
SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled
before the issuance of the subject bail orders."

The substantive issues are shortlisted as follows: (1) whether or not the private respondent is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued; and (2) whether or not he is entitled to post bail for his
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

With due respect, I offer the following views on the issues as hewn above, viz:

I.

The right to notice and hearing of private respondent as an extraditee.

The first issue demands a two-tiered analysis based on the following questions:
 (1) Can the private respondent, as potential extraditee, demand as a matter of right, that he be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition before the summons and/or the warrant of arrest are
issued by the extraditing court?

(2) Can he demand a hearing for the purpose of determining the necessity and propriety of the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest?

The majority opinion submits that neither P.D. No. 1069 nor the Constitution authorize respondent judge to give the
private respondent a copy of the petition for extradition and immediately set for hearing the request for a warrant of
arrest against the latter.

I beg to disagree. There can be no disagreement that P.D. No. 1069 deserves an interpretation that would blend
with the purpose of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, i.e., the minimization of flight risk and the facilitation of an
extraditee’s surrender to the requesting state. But this stance should not be taken to mean that this Court can cast a
blind eye to the private respondent’s constitutional rights to life, liberty and to due process. While this Court is
obliged to accord due respect to the state’s interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot also shirk from its
duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens. Thus, a full and careful weighing of these warring interests is
imperative as we did in its predecessor case Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion. 1 With due respect, it is my humble
submission that the majority failed to allocate the proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the private
respondent to life, liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded in the civilized world as universal in
character and it was never the intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to trivialize their significance.

It bears emphasis that this Court’s ruling in Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion did not per se negate the constitutional
rights of a potential extraditee to liberty and due process. If we rejected private respondent’s invocation of these
rights in said case, it was only because (1) the threat to his liberty by provisional arrest has already passed; 2 and (2)
the threat to his liberty upon the filing of the petition for extradition was merely hypothetical. 3 At that time, the
government of the United States has not requested for the provisional arrest of the private respondent. Likewise, the
petition for extradition has not yet been filed before the extradition court. Thus, after carefully balancing the
conflicting interests of the parties at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, we upheld the state’s
interests under its extradition treaty with the United States, viz:

To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration, involving as it does his
primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also
be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of
interests approach which is a ‘fundamental postulate of constitutional law.’ The approach requires that we ‘take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given type of situation.’ These
interests usually consist in the exercise of the individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the
government’s promotion of fundamental public interests or policy objectives on the other.

In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent’s claim to due process predicated on
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that ‘No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law…’ Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a
civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it
deserves.

This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our
national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition of its laws. Petitioner also
emphasized the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to
weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers.

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right
being claimed by private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we
accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice." 4

We stressed that the denial of the private respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceeding is merely a soft restraint on his right to due process, viz:
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, we stress that it is not ruling that the private respondent
has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due
process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated
otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are not at all due and when
they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss."
5

The extradition process against the private respondent has, however, moved away from the stage of evaluation of
documents by the executive officials of the Philippine government. A formal petition for the extradition of the private
respondent has now been filed with our court of justice. With this development, the competing interests of our
government and of the private respondent have developed new dimensions and they need to be rebalanced. In re-
adjusting the balance, I respectfully submit the following propositions, viz.

(a) A potential extraditee has the right to be notified of the filing of the petition for extradition.

It is my humble submission that from the moment the petition for extradition is filed before the extradition court, a
potential extraditee has the right to demand that he be furnished a copy of the petition. This right inheres from the
duty imposed by P.D. No. 1069 to the extradition judge to summon a potential extraditee to appear and answer the
petition "as soon as practicable." It is a mandatory duty that should be carried out by the extradition judge; the law
does not give him any discretion.

This submission is in accord with our ruling in Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 6 where we held that: "P.D. No. 1069
which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of
the petition for extradition as well as the supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the extradition in the extradition
court."

(b) The need for a hearing to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against an extraditee is
addressed to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.

The majority opinion holds that the private respondent extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It relies on section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:

Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer,
or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge
shall hear the case or set another date for hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the accused." (emphasis supplied)

The majority interprets this provision as follows:

It is significant to note that section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word ‘immediate’ to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to hearing can no longer be
considered ‘immediate.’ The law could have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should issue."

Clearly, the opinion leans heavily on the use of the word "immediate" which qualified the arrest of an extraditee. It
holds that "the qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant."
Again, I beg to disagree. I submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee and hear him before
ordering his arrest should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear from section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 which provides:

x x x He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
serve the ends of justice." (Italics supplied)

Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is dependent on a big "if," or to an all important condition - -
- if it will serve the ends of justice. The determination of whether a warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve
the ends of justice is certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the appreciation of highly contentious facts, both
objective and subjective in nature. Their appreciation requires a judicial mind honed in the law of evidence. The
history of extradition will reveal that, initially, the task of determining whether an extraditee should be immediately
arrested was given to the executive authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in other words, was treated
purely as an executive function but unfortunately, the practice was given to abuses. Recognizing that certain human
rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether a potential extraditee should be
immediately arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to judges. The office of the judge was
called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee. The extraditing judge is not to
act as a stamp pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant. Under our law on
extradition, P.D. No. 1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on whether to order the arrest of the
extraditee is guided by the following consideration - - - whether the arrest will serve the ends of justice. The grant of
this judicial discretion will be rendered naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to unnecessary fetters.
With due respect, the view that the extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to notify and hear a
potential extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge. I
submit that we should give the extraditing judge more discretion on the matter. If the extraditing judge feels that the
notice and hearing will allow an extraditee to flee, I have no doubt, he will immediately order his arrest. If, however,
he believes that notice and hearing will not pose such danger and that he needs to hear the parties to make a better
determination on whether the immediate arrest of an extraditee will serve the ends of justice, let us not deny him the
discretion to do so. The essence of discretion is freedom of action and we negate that essence when we impose
needless limits on the judge’s freedom of action.

Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also subscribe to the submission of the majority that the phrase "if it
appears" in section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message that accuracy is not as important as speed in issuing a
warrant of arrest against a potential extraditee. We are concerned here with the priceless right to life and liberty, with
the right to due process before one’s liberty is taken away. We are not dealing with chattels. We should not lay down
the doctrine that speed should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds recklessness and we cannot be reckless
with our right to life and liberty.

I agree that the trial court should not be expected to make an exhaustive determination of the facts of the case
before issuing a warrant of arrest. To be sure, that is not expected of any judge, not even from a judge of a criminal
case. In the case at bar, however, the extraditing judge ordered the hearing only to have a better basis for
determining whether the immediate arrest of the private respondent will best serve the ends of justice. A careful look
at the petition for extradition will show that it does not provide enough basis for the extraditing judge to determine
whether the immediate issuance of warrant of arrest will serve the ends of justice. I quote the opinion on the
documents attached to the petition for extradition, viz:

Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1)
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage – trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB,
the Exhibit I ‘Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers’ and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J ‘Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix’
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L ‘Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward’ and enclosed Statements in two volumes."
Even a cursory reading of these documents will not sustain the thesis that "it is evident that the respondent could
have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether
the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice.

The documents are evidence tending to prove the guilt of the private respondent in regard to the cases filed against
him in the United States. They are not evidence, however, to prove that the private respondent will flee the
Philippine jurisdiction while his extradition petition is being heard. In other words, the petition for extradition may be
in due form but it does not establish sufficient factual basis to justify the immediate issuance of warrant of arrest
against the private respondent. The probability of his flight from our jurisdiction is central to the question of whether
he should be arrested. In the absence of evidence establishing that private respondent will flee, I cannot join the
ruling that the respondent extraditing judge gravely abused his discretion in calling for a hearing so that the parties
can adduce evidence on the issue.

Likewise, it is postulated:

Moreover, the law specifies the court’s setting a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to
answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word ‘hearing’
is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law
could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings."

Once more, I beg to disagree from this reading of our law on extradition. The law, it is true, did not provide that the
extraditing judge must hold a hearing before he issues a warrant of arrest. The call for a hearing is not mandatory
but neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before issuance of warrant of
arrest is addressed to the discretion of the extraditing judge. The exercise of this discretion depends on the
configuration of the facts of each case.

II.

The right to bail of a potential extraditee during the pendency of the petition for extradition.

I respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his right to bail in our Constitution. The mere silence of our
extradition treaty with the Unites States and our extradition law (P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right to bail of a
potential extraditee. Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs and practices support an extraditee’s right to bail.
But while an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and convincing evidence that
the extraditee will not frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction. Again, I proffer the following
propositions:

First. The right to bail inheres from the rights to life, liberty and to due process.

Our Constitution jealously guards every person’s right to life and liberty against unwarranted state intrusion; indeed,
no state action is permitted to invade this forbidden zone except upon observance of due process of law. 7 Like the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail gives flesh to the guarantee to liberty, without which, the right
to liberty can prove meaningless, and due process will only be an empty slogan.

However, unlike the privilege of habeas corpus which is principally a remedy against illegal restraint on liberty, 8 the
right to bail is available even when the reason for the detention is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a person
the rigors of prolonged imprisonment until the main case against him is resolved, and at the same time, insure his
attendance when required by the authorities. 9 It is the prospect of prolonged detention, not the detention itself,
which offends the constitutional right to due process.

In Teehankee vs. Rovira, 10 this Court rejected the view which limits the right to bail to persons charged with criminal
offenses. We ruled that the constitutional right to bail applies to all persons, viz:
"This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has
already been filed; it lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged
with capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have either been
arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty may have the occasion to seek the benefit of said provision.
But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by
officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence against him is strong. Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the
precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just
reason for denying its benefit to one against whom the proper authorities may yet conclude that there exists no
sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. If there is presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with a criminal
offense, a fortiori this presumption should be induced in favor of one yet so charged although arrested or detained."
(emphasis supplied)

In United States vs. Go-Siaco, 11 this Court held that while deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature, an
alien deportee may avail of the constitutional right to bail, viz:

The order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense which that word is often
applied to the expulsion of citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return
to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the
Government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has
determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; and the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury and
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.

It will be seen that this declaration is not inconsistent with the view that while the proceeding is not a trial or
sentence of a crime or offense, it may in so far use the machinery of the criminal law as to admit of application the
provisions in such law relating to bail x x x.

x x x We see no reason why bail should not be allowed in this class of cases. As is said by the Supreme Court, the
defendant has committed no crime x x x To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to the law, and while we do not intend to say that this is a criminal proceeding, we do say that
some of the machinery used for making the investigation required by Act No. 702 is the machinery of the criminal
law x x x."

This ruling is reiterated in United States vs. Benito 12 and in Pagado vs. Aldanese. 13

The case of Ong Hee Sang, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration and Portugal 14 is not a departure from our
previous rulings on the right to bail of a deportee. In said case, the Court ruled that the grant or denial of an alien’s
application for bail lies within the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation pursuant to section
37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which states: "Any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under a bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner
of Immigration." 15 The Court ratiocinated as follows:

The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees considering that
deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and the order of deportation is not a punishment for a
crime, it being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could
continue to reside with our borders."

The Court explained the difference of the Go Siaco case as follows:

The case of U.S. vs. Go Siaco is not in point because said case was a proceeding brought under the provisions of
Act No. 702 which falls, by provision of said law, under the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. The case at bar is
deportation proceeding under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which expressly vests in the Commissioner of
Immigration the exclusive and full discretion to determine whether an alien subject to deportation should or should
not be granted."
It is apparent, therefore, that the ruling in the Ong Hee Sang does not negate the right to bail. It merely meant that
the standard for granting or denying bail under the Constitution is different in deportation proceedings. It is different
because there is a specific law which provides for such standard in deportation proceedings, i.e., Commonwealth
Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Neither did the case preclude the grant of bail on due process
grounds as in the case Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 16 where this Court held that while "temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion and expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for
his deportation, the Government has a right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length
of time, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus" 17 and entitle an alien to be released
on bail, viz:

The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality x x x

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3), the Philippines ‘adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the Nation.’ And in a resolution entitled ‘Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’ and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member at its
plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in degree and
rights’ (Art. 1); that ‘Everyone is equal and is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or
social origin, property, birth, or other status’ (Art. 2); that ‘Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law’ (Art.
8); that ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’ (Art. 9, etc.)" 18

It must be noted that the Mejoff case was decided when C.A. No. 613 was already in effect. Similarly, in Chirskoff
vs. Commission of Immigration 19 the Court released the alien deportee on bail because his prolonged detention
violates his right to liberty, viz:

"[F]oreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order
issued, may not be indefinitely kept in detention; that in the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the theory on which the court is given
power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been executed, is functus officio and the alien is being
held without any authority of law; and that the possibility that the petitioner might join or aid disloyal elements if
turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the
order of release and exact bail in reasonable amount with sufficient sureties."

In the case of Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court again held that although a deportation proceeding does not
partake of a criminal action, the constitutional right of a person to due process should be protected therein, viz:

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is
a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional
right of such person to due process shall not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is
sufficient cause to charge respondent for deportation. The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without a warrant
and service of warrant should be in accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure;
search warrants issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so
the matter of bail, motion to quash, trial, among others." 21 (emphasis supplied).

There is no reason why an extraditee should be denied the right to apply for bail. While an extradition proceeding is
not criminal in nature, it is a harsh and extraordinary process. It may involve a restraint of liberty that under some
circumstances can be greater than in an ordinary criminal case. 22 For in extradition proceedings, the extraditee will
be transported and tried to another jurisdiction of which laws he may be unfamiliar. 23
Second. The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be treated in light of our other treaty obligations,
especially those concerning the promotion and protection of human rights. 24

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Philippines is a party, a treaty shall be interpreted
"in their context and in the light of its object and purpose," 25 taking into account the "relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties." 26

As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and the United States have the responsibility to uphold
fundamental human rights, and the dignity and worth of the human person. They are mandated to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained. 27

Being signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 28 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 29 both countries are committed to protect and promote the right of every person to liberty and to due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention, and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 30

Although the right to liberty is a relative right and may be suspended or derogated in exceptional circumstances, 31 it
is a generally accepted principle in international law that the presumption lies in favor of the existence of the right,
and the burden lies with the authorities to justify the lawfulness of the arrest or detention. This presumption creates
an obligation on state authorities to make effective remedies available to every person under detention for the
enjoyment of his fundamental right to liberty.

Third. There is no customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in extradition cases.

At present, there is no customary norm prohibiting bail in extradition cases. On the contrary, most countries,
including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Pakistan, among others, allow a potential
extraditee to be released on bail. Members of the European Union have recently ratified the European Convention
on Extradition, which also provides a procedure for bail.

Fourth. Even the United States grants bail to an extraditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances.

In the United States, the ruling case law upholds the right of a potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Wright vs. Henckel, 32 recognized the authority of the circuit courts to receive
application for and grant bail in certain exceptional case, thus:

We are unwilling to hold that the circuit courts possess no power in respect of admitting to bail other than as
specifically vested by statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily granted in cases of foreign extradition,
those courts may not in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief."

This dictum planted the seeds of the current federal common law on bail in international extradition proceedings. 33 It
recognized the existence of the right to bail based on "exceptional circumstances" 34 which the extraditee must
prove. The following are some of the instances which were considered "special circumstances" to warrant the grant
of bail:

(a) age, background of defendant, and lack of any suitable facility to hold him; 35

(b) parity with other defendant on similar charge, granting bail would promote harmony among factions in x x x
dispute, likelihood of delay, and pending constitutional challenge to the extradition statute; 36

(c) need to participate in litigation in which entire fortune depended; 37

likelihood of delay and bailable offense in seeking extradition; 38 and

provisional arrest justifies grant of bail and disparity of treatment of persons on same charge. 39
The trend in recent years is for courts to liberalize the bail standard as they place primary emphasis on the
accused’s risk of flight. 40 The rationale of this trend was succinctly laid down in Beaulieu vs. Hartigan, 41 to wit:

"In none of the cases dealing with the issue of bail in an extradition setting was a district judge who granted bail
subsequently reversed by a reviewing court. Analysis of these cases leads me to the conclusion that the ‘special
circumstances’ doctrine of Wright, though still viable, must be viewed, in the light of modern concepts of
fundamental fairness, as providing a district judge with flexibility and discretion in considering whether bail should be
granted in these extradition cases. The standard scrutiny and concern exercised by a district judge should be
greater than in the typical bail situation, given the delicate nature of international relations. But one of the basic
questions facing a district judge in either situation is whether, under all circumstances, the petitioner is likely to
return to court when directed to do so. Fundamentally, it is a judgment call by the district court based on the totality
of circumstances, including extremely important consideration of the country’s treaty agreements with other nations;
a district judge should approach the bail situation in an extradition case with an added degree of caution, given the
additional factor of an international treaty."

Fifth. While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the ends
of justice.

In extradition cases, the extradition court does not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused. Neither does
the court measure the injury caused to the community, as the offense was not committed within its jurisdiction. The
court, therefore, cannot base its decision to grant or deny bail on the gravity of the offense, as it could in criminal
cases. Rather, it should base its decision on whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The risk of flight of an
extraditee is an important factor to consider in determining whether his bail will frustrate justice.

Whether or not a potential extraditee is a flight risk is determined by two factors: (1) capacity to flee; and (2) intent to
flee. The combination of these two factors determines the degree of risk that the trial court must assess and weigh.
While there is no mathematical formula to guide the court in gauging the precise risk posed by a particular
combination of these two factors, it is commonsensical to assume that one without the other would not result to any
risk at all. For while one has the capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee, the fear of flight would be for naught,
and vice versa.

Sixth. The burden of proof to justify the arrest and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests on the
petitioning executive authorities.

Under our extradition treaty and law, a potential extraditee may be arrested and detained under any of the following
circumstances: (a) upon the receipt of the request for the arrest of the potential extraditee and even before the filing
of the request for extradition; (b) upon the filing of the petition for extradition before the extradition court; or (c)
during the hearing of the petition for extradition.

In all the above circumstances, the issuance of a warrant of arrest depends on a showing that it will serve the ends
of justice. Initially, it is the burden of the petitioning executive authorities to prove that the warrant against the
extraditee will serve the ends of justice.

Seventh. After the warrant of arrest is issued, the burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on the
potential extraditee.

In criminal cases, the presumption lies in favor of granting bail. This is so because of the constitutional presumption
of innocence, which is not overturned by the finding of probable cause upon which the warrant of arrest against the
accused was issued.

However, the presumption of innocence, from which the ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is
inoperative in extradition cases. The issuance of the warrant of arrest in extradition cases is not based on the finding
that the accused is probably guilty of the offense for which he was charged in the requesting State. The warrant is
predicated on the finding that it will serve the ends of justice. Once issued, it raises a presumption of the continuing
presence of the circumstances upon which the issuance of the warrant was based. More often than not, this
circumstance is the probability that the extraditee will flee from the jurisdiction of the extraditing court. The burden of
proving admittance to bail is thus shifted to the extraditee.
It should be underscored that due process, which is the basis of bail in extradition proceeding, merely grants the
potential extraditee the opportunity to avail of the remedy of bail; it does not give him the right to demand that he be
released on bail under any circumstance. What the right to due process prohibits is the outright denial of the remedy
of bail; it does not prohibit a reasonable denial of the application for bail after carefully weighing all the
circumstances at hand.

III.

There is need to remand the case at bar to the extradition court

in fairness to the parties.

I respectfully submit that in fairness to both parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so that the
proper procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the extradition
court nor to the parties in this regard for we are still developing our jurisprudence on extradition. There is need for
remand for the following reasons, viz:

First. As aforediscussed, the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against the private respondent will serve the ends of justice. This burden of proof can not be satisfied by the
petitioner in the case at bar by merely relying on the petition for extradition and its annexes. The petition and its
annexes do not prove that the private respondent is a flight risk. They only show that he has been indicted in the
court of the United States.

Second. On the issue of whether the private respondent is entitled to bail, the petitioner cannot rely on the
presumption against bail in extradition proceedings. The presumption against bail in extradition proceedings is
founded on the assumption that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Thus, it was explained in Beaulieu vs.
Hartigan, 42 viz:

"The vast majority of fugitives from justice in foreign countries fled from those countries knowing that charges have
been, or were likely to be, brought against them. Thus the typical subject of an extradition request has a
demonstrated propensity to flee rather than face charges and in general is likely to continue his flight if released
pending extradition." 43

The presumption against bail therefore arises only when the extraditee is a "fugitive from justice." To avail of this
presumption, it is a condition sine qua non that competent evidence be proffered that the extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.

In Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 44 we ruled that the term fugitive from justice "includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." 45 In
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 46 we clarified that this definition indicates that "the intent to evade is the compelling factor
that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction." 47

From the records, it appears that the claim of the petitioner that the private respondent is a fugitive from justice is
based on the following allegations: (a) that an investigation for the charges against him was then on going; and (b)
that upon learning that he was about to be charged, he fled from the United States. Thus, petitioner alleged:

Learning that an investigation involving his violations of United States federal laws was about to be terminated and
that he was about to be charged, Jimenez fled the United States jurisdiction. Under United States law, he is
therefore a fugitive from justice. A "fugitive from justice" is a person who commits a crime within a state and
withdraws himself from such jurisdiction (Ex Parte Montoya, 135 P.2d 281, 282, 170 Or. 499). Because he has fled
once, there is a greater likelihood that he will flee to another jurisdiction once more and frustrate extradition. Thus,
he poses a serious risk flight. The interest of justice will be best served if he is arrested and detained pending
extradition proceedings, which after all, is summary in nature." 48
It is clear, however, that the warrant of arrest in connection with Indictment No. 99-00281-CR-SEITZ against the
private respondent was issued on April 15, 1999. 49 Private respondent claims that he was already in the Philippines
when the indictment against him was filed and the warrant for his arrest was issued. During the oral argument of the
case at bar, the following exchange between the counsels of the parties took place, viz:

USec Gutierrez: It may be mentioned that the proposed extraditee stands charge (sic) of several charges from
the United States of America and a warrant of arrest was issued against him and he fled the jurisdiction of the
United States of America to evade prosecution and there would again be another risk of plight (sic) and to ensure
the proposed extraditee will be present during the extradition proceeding, therefore this request on the part of the
petitioner for the issuance of warrant of arrest. 50

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Bautista: The Honorable Counsel has declared gratuitously that Mr. Mark Jimenez is a fugitive from the United
States, left the United States because of the indictment against him. That is totally false. The petition itself says that
a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Jimenez was issued in the United States in April 1999. Mr. Jimenez was here in the
Philippines on May 1998 and he has not left the country since then. So he left the United States long before, a year
before the warrant of arrest was issued, so how can we say that he is a fugitive from justice?" 51

That private respondent arrived in the country on May 10, 1998 is evidenced by the records and is not contradicted
by the petitioner. 52 On the other hand, petitioner’s claim that private respondent knew of the ongoing investigation as
well as of the existence of the charges against him when he fled from the United States is devoid of evidence.
Therefore, it would be fatal for the petitioner to rely alone on the presumption against bail in extradition cases to
justify the denial of bail of the private respondent.

In Rodriguez, petitioner arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985 and the complaint in Los Angeles was filed on
November 2, 1985. We ruled that "it was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant - much less conviction- to speak of yet at such time." We rejected the contention that
Rodriguez would have known the on-going investigation, viz:

It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by the private respondent to show Rodriguez’ intent to evade the law.
This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an investigation report on the alleged crimes
committed which led to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing
the fact that it was impossible for the petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude.
Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or
prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest
of those who would be charged." 53

Furthermore, we held that "the circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez’ departure that
charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests
nothing more than the sequence of events, which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner’s purpose cannot
be inferred from the objective data at hand in absence of further proof to substantiate that claim."

Third. In granting bail to the private respondent, the standard used by the extraditing court is not clear. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis, hence, neither the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases can apply. Thus, in Lantion, 54 we
explained:

We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

‘An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal
trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.’
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding
is summary in nature while a criminal proceeding involve a full blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite."

With humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible
extraditee. The higher standard is demanded by the fact that our extradition treaty obligates us to assure that an
extraditee will not abscond from our jurisdiction. Failure to comply with this obligation will expose our country to
international embarrassment. It will defeat the purpose of extradition treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes,
especially transnational crimes to which the Philippines is very vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard
of clear and convincing evidence which is higher than mere preponderance of evidence but lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If this new and stricter standard would be adopted, it ought to follow that the parties should be
given a chance to offer evidence to meet the same. Contrary to the claim, the voluminous pleadings already filed by
the parties are insufficient to resolve the issue of whether the private respondent is entitled to bail. These pleadings
proffer legal arguments but not proof of facts. The remand of the case at bar is therefore not a cop-out but is proper
and it will not delay the proceedings. The extradition court can be ordered to finish the hearing on the limited issue
of bail within one (1) week. After all, extradition proceedings are summary in nature.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I offer the following views:

First. The filing of a petition for extradition does not per se justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against an
extraditee. The petition, in some instances, may not contain sufficient allegations and proof on the issue of whether
the possible extraditee will escape from the jurisdiction of the extraditing court.

Second. When the petition for extradition does not provide sufficient basis for the arrest of the possible extraditee or
the grant of bail as in the case at bar, it is discretionary for the extradition court to call for a hearing to determine the
issue.

Third. An extraditee has the right to apply for bail. The right is rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution. It
cannot be denied simply because of the silence of our extradition treaty and law on the matter. The availability of the
right to bail is buttressed by our other treaties recognizing civil and political rights and by international norms,
customs and practices.

Fourth. The extraditee may apply for bail but its grant depends on the discretion of the extraditing court. The court
must satisfy itself that the bail will not frustrate the ends of justice.

Fifth. In deciding whether to grant bail or not to a possible extraditee, the extraditing court must follow a higher and
stricter standard. The extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he will not flee from the
jurisdiction of the extraditing court and will respect all its processes. In fine, that he will not frustrate the ends of
justice.

As emphasized, the case at bar has entered a new stage and the competing interests of the state and the rights of
the private respondent as an extraditee need to be rebalanced on the scale of justice. These competing rights and
interests have to be rebalanced for they have developed new dimensions and some facts may have to be accorded
greater or lesser weights to meet the more paramount interest of our people. This paramount interest is always in
motion as it is affected by the inexorable changes wrought in time both by man and machine.
In rebalancing these conflicting interests, we should take care not to diminish to a disturbing degree an extraditee’s
fundamental rights to life, liberty and due process. These rights have evolved as universal rights and extradition
treaties for all their utility were never meant to disparage, let alone, derogate them to inutility.

Likewise, in rebalancing these interests, we should not weaken the role of courts in tempering the harshness of
extradition proceedings. We should not therefore dilute the discretionary power of courts to determine whether a
hearing should be called before ordering the immediate arrest of a possible extraditee.

In counter-balance, we should not be soft on extraditees who are facing charges in countries where we have
extradition treaties. While rights are being universalized, so too are crimes being internationalized. We should not
allow our country to be the sanctuary of criminals who demand rights but deny the rights of others. Thus, there is
need to impose a higher and stricter standard before we grant bail to potential extraditees.

We are in the difficult step by step process of developing our jurisprudence in extradition. In Lantion, our first
extradition case, we held that an extraditee has no right to demand examination of the documents of extradition
while the request for extradition is just being processed and evaluated by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and
Justice. In the case at bar, our second extradition case, we have the opportunity to impose a higher and stricter
standard that will govern a plea for bail of an extraditee. I urge the Court to seize the rare opportunity for this can
well be our humble contribution to man’s relentless search for elusive peace.

Prescinding from all these premises, I vote to remand the case at bar to the extradition court so that it can follow the
proper procedure and higher standard in determining the right to bail of the private respondent.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Footnotes

1
343 SCRA 377 (2000).

2
Id., p. 389. "Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private
respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our
DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the
DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested for private respondent’s
provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondent’s liberty has passed. It is more
imagined than real."

3
Id., p. 390. "It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary
detention of the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge
of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition is still in the
evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be
filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondent’s liberty is merely
hypothetical."

4
Id., pp. 390-391.

5
Id., pp. 392-393.

6
Supra note 1.

7
1987 Constitution, Article III, section 1. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
8
The writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by a court directed to a person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the person whose liberty is being restrained at a designated
time and place, and asking him to show sufficient cause for the continued custody of the person so
detained. See Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court.

9
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 (1995), citing Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
(1975).

10
75 Phil. 634 (1945).

11
12 Phil. 490 (1909).

12
37 Phil. 53 (1917).

13
42 Phil. 415 (1921).

14
114 Phil. 368 (1962).

15
Tiu Chuan Hai, et al., vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 (1958).

16
90 Phil. 70 (1951).

17
Id., p. 72.

18
Id., pp. 73-74.

19
90 Phil. 257 (1951).

20
180 SCRA 756 (1989).

21
Id., pp. 762-763.

22
A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition Cases," 86 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 607
(1987).

23
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 296 (1978). The US Supreme Court opined: "The extradition
process involves an extended restraint of liberty following arrest even more severe than that
accompanying detention with a single State. Extradition involves, at a minimum, administrative
processing in both the asylum State and the demanding State, and forced transportation in between.
It surely is a significant restraint on liberty."

24
In Europe for instance, a State Party to an extradition treaty may refuse extradition on the ground
that the basic human rights of the fugitives will be violated by the requesting state if he is extradited.
The primacy of human rights norms over extradition treaties arises from the notion of jus cogens---
or those peremptory norms which the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties acknowledges to be
superior than any treaty obligation because they form part of the ordre public of the international
community or of a particular region. See Article 53 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See
also, J. Dugard and C. Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights," 92 AJIL 187-212
(1998).

25
Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

26
Id., Art. 31 (3) (b).

27
Preamble, United Nations Charter. Concern for human rights is also embodied in Article 13, par. 1
(b), Article 55 (c) and Article 62(2) of the U.N. Charter.
28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter cited as UDHR) was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Although not a treaty, the principles of
freedom contained in the UDHR have been generally regarded as customary, hence, binding among
the members of the international community. See Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, supra.

29
The UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter cited as ICCPR) on December 16, 1966. The Philippines signed the convention on
December 19, 1966 but ratified it only on October 23, 1986. On the other hand, the United States
signed the convention on October 5, 1977 but ratified it only on June 8, 1992.

30
The UDHR provides that:

"Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights;

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status;

xxx xxx xxx

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law;

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"

Similarly, Article 9 of the ICCPR provides:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him;

3. Anyone arrested or detained in a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
reasonable time or to release.

4. Anyone who was deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that such court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

5. Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable
right to compensation.

31
Absolute rights are those which may not be suspended or derogated in any circumstance.
Examples of absolute or non-derogable rights are freedom from torture and arbitrary killing. On the
other hand, relative or derogable rights are those which may be suspended or derogated under
circumstances such as the occurrence of public emergency or commission of an offense.

32
190 US 40 (1902).

33
Persily, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J. Int’l. L 407, 408 (1998).

The ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail is modified when a person faces a warrant of
34

extradition. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146, 3184.

 35
Hu Yau-Leung vs. Soscia, 649 F. 2d 914 (1981).

36
In re Kirby, et al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996).

37
In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289 (1909).

38
In re Gannon, supra.

39
Hall, Bail in International Extradition, supra at 604.

40
Ibid.

41
430 F. Supp. 915 (1977).

42
554 F. 2d 1 (1977).

43
Persily, supra, p. 429, citing Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on H.R.
2643 Before the Subcommittee On Crime of the House Committee On Judiciary, 98th Cong. 42-43
(1983).

44
243 SCRA 538 (1995).

Id., p. 542, citing Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 300 by F. B. Moreno; Black’s Law
45

Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs.
PFlanz, 138 F. 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 P. 2d 792.

46
259 SCRA 296 (1996).

47
Id., p. 307.

48
Petitioner’s Memorandum Re: Prayer for Jimenez’ Arrest, Rollo, p. 87.

49
Petition for Extradition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 54-55.

50
TSN June 5, 2001, pp. 11- 15; Rollo, pp. 267-271.

51
Id., pp. 24-25; Id., pp. 280-281.

52
Sworn Statement, Rollo, p. 195.

53
Supra note 1, p. 308.

54
Ibid.

Separate Opinion

VITUG, J.:

"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." 1

The proposal to curtail the right of an individual to seek bail from the courts of law, acting in extradition cases, as
well as his right to notice and hearing before being arrested, brings to mind the not so distant past of the Spanish
Inquisition and an uneasy realization that we have yet to totally free ourselves from the grip of a dark page in
history.

My reservation on the draft ponencia is premised on the following theses – first, it would ignore constitutional
safeguards to which all government action is defined, and second, it would overstep constitutional restraints on
judicial power.

Treaty laws, particularly those which are self-executing, have equal stature as national statutes and, like all other
municipal laws, are subject to the parameters set forth in the Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and
a circumscription of government authority by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its
limitation upon which an act of government is justly measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the
government and any act in opposition thereto can only be struck down as being invalid and without effect. 2 When the
great Charter gives a mandate, the government can do no less than to accept it; its rejection would be an act of
betrayal. The edict in its Bill of Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is
clear. No statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its language and its intent.

The draft ponencia would assume that the Constitution confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal cases,
and that it has no application to extradition proceedings. This assumption would have reason for being if it were
solely in criminal cases that a person could face an imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for
indeed, it is this threat, rather than case nomenclature, that must be the focus and it would be superficial to think
otherwise. While defying a neat definition, extradition has all the earmarks of a criminal process --- an extraditee
would suffer deprivations, be denied his freedom and restricted in his movements, not much unlike a criminal
indictee. Extradition proceedings involve an extended restraint of liberty following arrest, peculiar to an accused in a
criminal case, which can even be more severe than an accompanying detention in a single state, for, at a minimum,
it can mean protracted proceedings in both the asylum state and the demanding state and a forced transportation in
between. 3 In Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 4 the Court observed that bail is constitutionally available to all persons,
even those against whom no formal charges are filed.

"Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or
information, there seems no legal and just reason for denying its benefits to one against whom the proper
authorities may not even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more
favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offenses ... a fortiori, this presumption should be
indulged in favor of one not yet so charged although arrested and detained."

xxxxxxxxx

"We reiterate now that under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so
charged with any criminal offense, 'shall before conviction be bailable,' the only exception being when charge is for a
capital offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong."

Notably, our extradition law (P.D. 1069, paragraph. 1, Section 9 thereof), expressly provides that in the hearing of
the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 114, of our Rules of Criminal
Procedure is unequivocal ---

"All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with capital offenses or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and the time of the application
for bail, is punished by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."

Nowhere in the Extradition Treaty with the United States is the grant of bail mentioned but so also it is not
prohibited. This obscurity must not be held to negate the right to bail; on the contrary, it should be viewed as
allowing, at the very least, the evident intendment and spirit of the fundamental law to prevail.

A Constitution does not deal with details, but only enunciates general tenets that are intended to apply to all facts
that may come about and be brought within its directions. 5 Behind its conciseness is its encompassing
inclusiveness. It is not skin-deep; beneath that surface is what gives it real life and meaning. It can truly be said that
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibbling over patchwork but proceeds from its gut
consciousness and dynamic role as a brick in the ultimate development of the edifice. 6

Resort to overly rigid procedures is being justified as a need to keep in line with our treaty obligations. Verily, comity
in our relations with sovereign states is important, but there are innate rights of individuals which no government can
negotiate or, let alone, bargain away.

Analogy between extradition process and proceedings where the right to bail is said to be unavailing, i.e.,
deportation proceedings and proceedings before a military tribunal, would not at all be apropos. Deportation
proceedings are no more than inquiries and just involve the simple fact of whether or not an alien has an authorized
entry within a named country or, if authorized, whether or not he has complied with the conditions for a continued
stay thereat. A subject found to be illegally staying in a country is merely transported back to his place of origin.
Most importantly, such a person is not considered to be under judicial custody. Proceedings before a military
tribunal, upon the other hand, are confined to members of the military organization who give consent to its
jurisdiction. The stringent proceedings before such tribunals place emphasis on summary procedures, a speedy
resolution of the case being vital in maintaining discipline, obedience and fitness among the ranks 7 that cannot
obviously be compromised in any sound military establishment.

The draft ponencia would rely heavily on foreign jurisprudence, notably American cases, to belabor the point that
the right to bail is extraneous to extradition proceedings. The citation, particularly of the jurisprudence obtaining in
the United States, could be predicated on the Eighth Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This amendment
however, recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by simply disallowing excessive bail; it does not expressly
provide for the grant of bail. 8 Individual states have incorporated into their own state constitutions various versions --
some give it as a matter of right and some do not – a fact which partially explains the lack of uniformity in state
jurisprudence on the matter. Where some states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the same is almost
invariably viewed as affording a greater right than that provided in the federal charter. 9

In contrast, the Philippine Constitution strongly and clearly mandates that, except for those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is an undeniable right of every person ---

"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." 10

Thus, grappling in this jurisdiction with the compatibility of the grant of bail in extradition proceedings with basic
constitutional guarantees has not been and should not be a predicament. Absent any standard, except for the
constitutional limitation that the same be not excessive, the grant of bail in the United States largely rests on judicial
discretion under the umbrella of judicial power. And so it has been so regarded in Wright v.

Henkel, 11 the primary case governing access to bail in United States extradition proceedings, where the Court has
held:

"We are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no power in respect of admitting bail other than as
specifically vested by statute or that, while bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition, those
courts may not, in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief."

Henkel, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1903, has been criticized to have imposed an amorphous standard
and has resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent approach to bail. 12 While the clamor for its re-examination
appears to be getting persistent by the day, 13 it has nevertheless become the forerunner in the judicially-prescribed
"special circumstances" standard in deciding whether the bail should be granted or denied. 14 These "special
circumstances" vary – from reasons of ill-health to material prejudice – depending on the peculiarities of the case.

In In re Mitchel, 15 to cite an example, the court there caused the release of an extraditee who was charged with
larceny by the requesting state based on the assertion that his continued detention rendered him incapable of
consulting with his counsel. The court was careful to emphasize that it had become imperative for him to obtain
advice of counsel because his entire fortune depended upon his doing so. The court then added that while he had
knowledge for a long time of the extradition, he had made no attempt to flee. 16

But Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions. The absoluteness of the
constitutional grant under Section 13, Article, III of the Constitution precludes any need for further standards than
those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is confined to the issue of whether or not the offense charged is a
capital crime and a determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be too
simplistic but it is the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable in developing a "special
circumstances" standard on the basis of mere pro hac vice pronouncements from elsewhere. In Herras Teehankee
vs. Director of Prisons 17 , this Court has expressed unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of
restraint against unwarranted judicial adventurism that can otherwise easily get out of hand. 1âwphi1.nêt

Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err, let alone commit a grave abuse of discretion, in the grant of bail to the
extraditee.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition.

JOSE C. VITUG

Footnotes

1
Section II, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

2
Bernas, 1987 Constitution, 1st Edition, Bk. 2, p. 1.

3
Jeffrey A. Hall, "A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition Cases," Michigan
Law Review, December 1987.

4
66 SCRA 38, 43.

5
16th AmJur 2d.

6
See the writer’s opinion in G.R. No. 146710-15.

7
Reid vs. Covert, 354 U.S. 683, 694 (1969), cited in Bernas, Ibid. p. 370.

8
U.S. ex. re. Keating vs. Bensinger, D.C. Ill. 1971, 322 F. Supp. 784, Mastrian vs. Hedman, C.A.
Minn. 1964, 326 F2d 708, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 1128,376 U.S. 965, 11 L. Ed. 2d 982. The eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Federal Constitution merely provides –

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted."

9
Ray vs. State, 679 N.E. 2d 1364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

10
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

11
190 U.S. 40 (1903).

12
Jeffrey Hall, Ibid.
 13
Ibid.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, "International Extradition United States Law and Practice," Vol. II, November
14

1987, Oceana Publications, Inc., p. 535.

15
171 F, 289 (S.D. N.Y 1909), cited in Bassiouni, Ibid., at p. 535.

16
Ibid.

17
76 Phil 756, 769.

Dissenting Opinion

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

With all due respect, I am disturbed by the majority opinion’s disregard of basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition. The majority opinion is too sweeping and dogmatic for a case of first impression. I find the views on the
indiscriminate denial of fundamental rights too open-ended and heedless of entrenched jurisprudence on Bill of
Rights protections.

The sheer novelty of the world’s only superpower asking that a Filipino be brought before it to face criminal
prosecution seems to mesmerize policy makers and this Court alike into depriving that citizen of constitutional
protections. The issue before the respondent court is a fairly innocuous one – whether or not the petition for
extradition is meritorious. We are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the respondent. He is presumed
innocent of the crimes charged until he is convicted by a foreign court. He is likewise presumed innocent of the
demands found in the request for his extradition. But the majority opinion has chosen to adopt a presumption of
guilt. It presumes that the petition calling for the forcible separation of the respondent from his homeland, family,
occupation, and friends is correct even before the merits are ascertained. It presumes that he will flee.

A person convicted of a crime, except for the most serious offenses, is allowed bail while an appeal is pending.
Respondent Jimenez has not been convicted of any crime. His guilt or innocence is not in issue before the
respondent court. The only legal affront he has committed is his refusal to leave the pleasures of life in his country
and go to a place where he fears the reception to him would be disagreeable and much less pleasant. Eventually
after trial in the respondent court, respondent may be compelled to undergo what he fears. But until that decision is
rendered and becomes executory, he must be presumed innocent of any crime or any affront to law or treaty. There
can be no deprivation of basic rights and freedoms merely because the case is one of extradition.

I submit that we must consider the implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the
accused must be protected, but in a case neither criminal nor civil, one which we call "sui generis," basic freedoms
become irrelevant and non-available. A non-criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society than
prosecution for crime, and where the penalty is only to be brought for trial before the court with jurisdiction, is
stripped of guarantees and protections given to hard-boiled recidivists pending arrest and trial.

We have denied a prospective extraditee the right to be informed before trial of the nature and cause of the charges
against him. 1 Due process is essential in all court proceedings – criminal, civil, investigatory, administrative, or even
sui generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to justify deprivation of that most elemental of rights, the right of
notice. 2 The Court has ruled that respondent Mark Jimenez or any other person sought to be extradited must first be
exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before he may be informed of what
the requesting State has against him. The right to notice before trial is denied.

The majority opinion states that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of
arrest can be issued against him. Worse, he is denied the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.
All the jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution 3 becomes inapplicable. The petition for extradition and its attachments take the place of probable
cause. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons including those not charged
with any crime. 4 But now, we create an unusual exception. It is not available to one who may be seized against his
will for possible extradition to a country where his innocence or guilt will first be determined. Arrest and
imprisonment will become virtually certain in extradition proceedings. The only thing required of the Court is to go
over the request for extradition and its supporting documents. Arrest is virtually assured because of the absence of
notice and hearing. It is inconceivable that the officials of a requesting State would be so dense or careless as to fail
to include in the request for extradition a prima facie showing that the respondent deserves to be seized and forcibly
brought to the foreign country for trial. According to the majority opinion, from the forwarded documents, we expect
the trial court to "merely xxx xxx xxx get a good first impression sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused." This novel doctrine justifying the near certainty of automatic arrest
and detention goes against this Court’s decisions, too numerous to mention, protecting citizens and aliens alike from
unreasonable arrests or seizures. Can we expect anything other than a "good first impression" to arise from the
mere reading of a request for extradition?

In criminal prosecutions, the judge must personally determine probable cause for the arrest. Facts and
circumstances must first be presented which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty of the offense. 5 In the majority opinion, the request
for extradition by the foreign country takes the place of a hearing for probable cause. After trial, it is possible that the
petition for extradition may be denied. Under the majority opinion, the possibility of a judgment of denial does not
influence the immediate arrest and indefinite detention of the respondent since notice and hearing before arrest are
not required. He must be jailed while the grant or denial of the petition is being considered.

The majority opinion gives five (5) postulates of extradition. With all due respect, I fail to see how compliance with
these postulates should result in a disregard for constitutional liberties.

I agree with the first postulate. It is a general proposition that extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of
crime and the Philippines should cooperate in facilitating the arrest and custodial transfer of a fugitive from one
State to another. However, I cannot see how compliance with the requirements for notice and hearing and the
ascertainment of reasonable cause would hamper the suppression of crime. If they do, why should they appear in
our laws and in the decisions of this Court? Does obedience to the dictates of due process and the prohibition
against unreasonable seizures mean any lesser determination to eradicate crime? Effective extradition
arrangements and deterrence of flight abroad by felons are not incompatible with fundamental liberties. The act of
according due process and reasonable seizures does not make the Philippines an isolationist state. The
employment of beneficial objectives to justify the repression of far more worthy values is pejorative in nature, one in
which the Court should not engage.

The second postulate is based on the apriorism that the two parties to an extradition treaty accept and trust each
other’s legal system and judicial processes. We trust the fairness of the American system of justice. However, why
should we assume that it is a breach of trust which the requesting country will look upon with disfavor if we accord
notice and hearing to the respondent before a warrant of arrest is issued? If bail is allowed while the extradition
petition is pending before the trial court, does this signify a lack of confidence on our part in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited?

The Constitution of the United States provides that "(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." 6 The offenses upon which the request for extradition is premised are relatively light.
Undoubtedly, bail will be given by the American courts on the basis of a presumption of innocence and the lack of
gravity of the offenses. If the alleged offenses themselves are bailable both here and in the United States, I see no
connection between the grant of the right against unreasonable seizures or the right of bail and the gratuitous
assertion of the majority opinion that this is an absence of trust and confidence in the American legal system and
judicial process.

The guarantees of the Philippine Bill of Rights are derived from American sources. Why should we withhold them
out of a misplaced fear that their grant may be interpreted as a lack of faith in the American judicial system?
The third postulate states that extradition proceedings are sui generis. It is a dogma pernicious in its consequences
to declare that a classification of sui generis lifts a court proceeding beyond constitutional protections. The trial
before the respondent court is not criminal in nature. It is less onerous than a criminal prosecution. Yet, the majority
opinion confers upon one accused of grave crimes far greater rights than an extraditee whose guilt of lesser
offenses is not even in issue. Classifying a proceeding as sui generis does not mean that procedural guarantees
available in criminal prosecutions, civil trials, or administrative proceedings are thereby waived or become irrelevant.
The classification should not mean exemption from notice or hearing for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It
cannot result in non-entitlement to bail.

The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt of an accused. The majority opinion states
that extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance to restore a person charged with crime to the
jurisdiction with the best claim to try him. If so why should the person sought to be extradited be imprisoned without
bail while the grant of assistance is pending? With more reason should constitutional protections be given to him.
The correctness of a decision to forcibly remove a person from his homeland, family, and friends should not be
taken lightly. In determining whether the extradition request complies with the extradition treaty, the trial court should
not be encouraged by a postulate to act in a cavalier manner or treat the proceedings as inconsequential in nature.

The majority opinion states as its fourth postulate that compliance with treaties shall be in good faith. If the
respondent court grants bail to the respondent in extradition proceedings, does this constitute a failure to fulfill our
obligations under the extradition treaty? I am not aware of any treaty which requires the incarceration of a
respondent while the court determines whether or not he falls under the treaty provisions. Why should the furnishing
of notice and the holding of a hearing for an arrest warrant paint a bad picture of our country before the world
community? There should be a contrary impression of adherence to fairness and justice. We cannot fault the trial
court for adopting procedural safeguards which help insure the correctness of its decision. If compliance in good
faith with the treaty requires that the respondent be immediately seized and confined in the national penitentiary,
why should an extradition trial still be held? We might as well give full faith and credence to the request for
extradition and without any trial or hearing, place the respondent in the next airplane leaving for the requesting
country. The discussion in the majority opinion of the postulates of extradition implies that the implementation of an
extradition treaty rarely or never results in a refusal to allow extradition and that the court proceedings do not
amount to anything more than a formality. Otherwise, why should he languish in the penitentiary while his extradition
case is pending?

The fifth and last postulate uses the underlying risk of flight. To say that all persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to be adopted as an axiom. In every criminal prosecution, the
prosecution can, with greater reason, argue that the accused will escape and go into hiding. But never has the
possibility of flight sufficed to always require incarceration while court proceedings are going on. The opposite
practice is the one we have adopted. The right to bail has been elevated into a constitutional guarantee. Only for the
most serious of offenses when evidence of guilt is strong may an accused be denied freedom upon the posting of
bail prior to his conviction. 7 In fact, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provide that any person
in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality
where he is held. 8 The respondent is not charged of any crime before our courts.

The five postulates of extradition outlined in the majority opinion are motherhood statements over which there can
be no quarrel. However, these postulates should be interpreted in a manner that preserves procedural safeguards
instead of being used to support the petitioner's intent to cut corners. Compliance with treaty obligations does not
mean unquestioning obedience to everything stated in a petition for extradition. The allegations will still be proved,
refuted, and determined. Much less does it result in instant seizure without notice and hearing or incarceration
without any recourse to legal methods of gaining provisional liberty.

Is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

The majority opinion agrees with the Department of Justice that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it informed the respondent that an extradition petition had been filed against him and that petitioner
was seeking his arrest. The opinion states that the exercise of discretion by the judge is a notice to escape and to
avoid extradition.

The truth is that long before January 18, 2000 when G.R. No. 139465 was decided, 9 respondent was fully aware of
the information which this Court now declares should not have been given to him. Respondent could have fled but
he did not do so. Instead, he made himself more visible; he ran for Congress and engaged in various civic activities
always in the public eye.

Paraphrasing the ruling in G.R. No. 139465 on the motion for reconsideration, the threat of private respondent's
flight from the Philippines has passed. It is more imagined than real at this time. 10

Petitioner states that the procedure requiring notice and hearing will set a dangerous precedent. The Court agrees
that those sought to be extradited – including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals – may invoke it in future
extradition cases.

To lump up respondent Jimenez and all persons in extradition proceedings with terrorists, mass murderers, and war
criminals is contrary to all rules of reasonable and valid classification. Respondent is charged before the district
court of Florida with conspiracy to defraud, attempted tax evasion, fraud through the use of radio – television, false
statements, and unlawful election contributions. There is absolutely no indication of terrorism, mass murder, or war
crimes against him. He is definitely not a candidate for confinement in the Guantanamo Prison Compound. The fear
of terrorists is not reason to deprive all subjects of extradition proceedings any and all constitutional protections.
Methods of dealing with terrorists should not be used against suspected tax evaders or violators of election laws.
The fact that terrorists are denied bail is not reason to deny this constitutional guarantee to persons being tried for
offenses where no individual is a victim.

It is error to expect that all persons against whom charges have been filed would voluntarily and cheerfully submit to
trial. There are procedural safeguards such as preliminary investigation intended to secure a person presumed
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials. 11 For both the State and the accused, there could be sound reasons to oppose or
avoid prosecution.

If there is reason in some cases for the State not to prosecute, there is greater reason for a prospective accused to
take all steps that would prevent his having to go before a criminal court. We may assume that any fears of
oppressive prosecution in the mind of the private respondent are unfounded and imagined. This should not lead the
Court to conclude that a natural aversion to criminal prosecution is always based on ignoble or indefensible
reasons. Neither should a natural desire to avoid unpleasant situations be used to deny basic rights and privileges.

I submit that it is a dangerous precedent for this Court to rule that the prima facie existence of probable cause for a
warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere reading of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents.
The determination of probable cause is effectively taken away from the judge and transferred to the Department of
Justice. Worse, the determination could come directly from an office not equipped to make it, namely the
Department of Foreign Affairs. In either case, the Constitution is infringed.

The majority opinion is overly influenced by the fear that a person sought to be extradited would be tempted to flee.
Of course, it is natural for any person facing court litigation of any kind to try to avoid it. An accused already being
tried in court or an appellant who appeals a judgment of conviction has greater reason to flee if possible. Yet, this is
not cause to deny him notice of proceedings or the right of provisional liberty while his case is pending. If bail is
going to be denied respondent Jimenez, it should be after a full hearing and with the application of all constitutional
guarantees.

The majority opinion states that under the Constitution only the complainants and the witnesses he may produce are
required to be examined. 12 It overlooks that in this case no complainant and no witness has been examined. A
warrant of arrest is ordered issued on the sole basis of documents. There may be no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before a warrant of arrest is issued. But neither is there any prohibition against the judge hearing an
accused before a warrant is issued; more so if he is already in court and strongly opposes his being arrested
pending trial. In his search for the truth, the judge should not be restrained in the exercise of sound discretion.

In this case, the petition has already been filed. The respondent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The motion to have him arrested and detained is an incident of the pending case. There is no need to take
him into custody in order to make him forthcoming for trial. 13 Mr. Jimenez appears to be more than willing and, in
fact, is already answering the request for extradition. He is not before the court to answer for any crime. But he is
there. Strangely, the court would deny him provisional liberty in a case not criminal in nature but which could make
him answer for alleged offenses in another country if the court should decide against him. What cannot be denied to
him in the criminal prosecution is denied in a case which may or may not lead to such prosecution.

The absence of logic behind the majority opinion’s denial of basic rights becomes clearer when it comes to the issue
on the right to bail. The reason given for the denial of the right to bail is not merely deceptive; it has dangerous
implications. It states that the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine Criminal Law. The reasoning states, that ergo, the right to bail does not exist in
non-criminal prosecutions. The absence of a constitutional provision on the right to bail of a person subject to
extradition is simply based on the fact that the idea of incarcerating a person for something other than crime never
occurred to the framers of the Constitution. There can be no forcible detention in non-criminal situations.
Incarceration for something not related to crime would be arbitrary detention or illegal detention. It could even be
slavery or involuntary servitude. In all these cases, the issue of bail does not arise. If we insist on classifying
extradition as a proceeding not covered by the protections given to accused persons, we should rule that bail is not
provided because the respondent is not supposed to be imprisoned. There is no need for bail because the detention
is illegal in cases not related to crime. Extradition cases may not be criminal in nature. But they assist and precede
criminal prosecutions.

The petitioner twists the right to bail out of context when it argues that the right available during criminal
prosecutions is irrelevant and should be disregarded when the court action is non-criminal in nature and, therefore,
it is not available in civil, administrative, regulatory, and extradition proceedings. The fallacy of the argument is
readily apparent.

I cannot go along with the proposition that a person who tries to avoid criminal prosecution is always a criminal,
coward, or weakling who prefers to run and hide. There are many reasons why people will fear trial in criminal
cases. It is not overprotection or excessively liberal treatment to enforce constitutional guarantees in extradition
cases. It is fairness and adherence to the rule of law. The judge has discretion on whether or not he should allow
bail. He should have a sound basis for the probability or likelihood of flight.

The majority opinion starts by asking two questions. (1) Are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing
before warrants for their arrest are issued? and (2) Are they entitled to bail and provisional liberty while extradition
proceedings are pending? The answer is a curt "No". By the brevity and terse nature of the answer, it seems
absolute and inflexible.

Towards the end of the majority opinion, 14 however, two exceptions are allowed. First, the applicant is not a flight
risk. Second, there exist special and compelling circumstances.

To my mind, the issues in this case should be framed differently. On the first question, the present provisions of law
and decisions of this Court on arrests and seizures should be assumed and followed. On the second question, the
Court should apply the same principles on the right to bail found in the Constitution to persons facing trial for
extradition. Thus, all persons, except those where the probability of flight is clear and present or the crimes for which
extradition is sought are heinous, shall before judgment in the extradition proceedings, be bailable by sufficient
sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
where the requesting country is one with which the Philippines maintains strong ties. Excessive bail shall not be
required. 15

The majority opinion cites my ponencia in People v. Jalosjos. 16 Jalosjos was already convicted and his appeal was
pending when he was re-elected. The crime of statutory rape where a minor is involved is particularly heinous. The
evidence of guilt was not merely strong; it was beyond reasonable doubt as found in our decision.
Disenfranchisement of constituents is not reason for his release.

The case of Congressman Jimenez is an entirely different one. Respondent has not even faced trial as yet. There
can be no proof of strong evidence against him. All we have are still accusations.

Respondent is not charged with heinous crimes. The alleged tax evasion is at the stage of attempt. The
defraudation is part of a conspiracy. Perjury and illegal election contributions are relatively not so serious offenses
as to support denial of the right to bail.
The respondent’s being a Congressman should be viewed from the aspect of possibility of flight. Why should a
person run for Congress, campaign all over his district, and expose himself regularly to newspaper media and
television if he intends to flee the country? There is a hold-order against him found in all ports of exit and entry.
When his constituents voted Jimenez to Congress knowing fully well that an extradition case was or could be filed
against him, it was an expression of confidence that he would not run away. Their faith may be misplaced or proved
wrong later, but today, it must be taken at face value as against mere suppositions, fears, and apprehensions. The
rules on denial of bail where possibility of flight is established must be followed.

The request for extradition comes from the United States. In the course of the most perilous period in the life of that
nation, the American Supreme Court stated that "the constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. xxx
xxx xxx no doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the next of man than that its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." 17

The extradition of respondent is not an exigency of government. The provisions of the Bill of Rights of the two States
which entered into the treaty are fully applicable in extradition. If a person is to be arrested and detained, current
laws and procedures for arrests and detentions should be employed. The novelty of extradition cases in the
Philippines cannot result in any suspension or disregard of basic liberties whether here or in the United States. The
mantle of constitutional protections should cover persons covered by extradition requests.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Footnotes

1
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 (2000).

2
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 and Sec. 14(2); People v. Mencias, 46 SCRA 88 [1972].

3
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2.

4
Moncado v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1.

5
People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937); Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937); U.S. v.
Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914); Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984).

6
American Bill of Rights, Amendment No. IV of the U.S. Constitution.

7
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.

8
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 114, Sec. 17 (c).

9
328 SCRA 160 (2000).

10
343 SCRA 377, 389 (2000).

11
Salonga v. Hon. Pano et al., 134 SCRA 438 (1985).

12
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2.
 Rule 113, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines arrest as "the taking of a
13

person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."

14
Decision, p. 34.

15
See Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.

16
324 SCRA 689 (2000).

17
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866); 71 U.S. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281.

Concurring Opinion

Carpio, J:

I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Panganiban. I write this concurring opinion to afford extraditees in
this country the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, under the equity and rule making power of the Court. It is
the constitutional duty and power of the Court to protect and enforce the fundamental rights 1 of all persons in this
country. This should include, to the extent that the Court can grant under its power, the right of extraditees in this
country to avail of the same or similar remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners have accorded to
their own extraditees.

The right to bail is a constitutional right available to an accused in domestic criminal proceedings except in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher when evidence of guilt is strong. 2 An extraditee, however, cannot invoke
this constitutional right in international extradition because extradition proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
Extradition proceedings are like deportation and court martial proceedings where there is no constitutional right to
bail.

Thus, in the leading case of Ong See Hang v. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 the Court held that:

The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees, considering
that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action (Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682; U. S. ex rel.
Zapp, et al. v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, supra) and the order of deportation is not a
punishment for a crime (U. S. v. Go-Siaco, 12 Phil. 490; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32), it being merely for the return
to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders
(U. S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil. 397, Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, supra)."

This was reiterated in several cases, the most recent being In RE Andrew Harvey v. Santiago, 4 decided under the
1987 Constitution. Here, the Court ruled that:

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of
the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The
exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February
28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the
right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai, et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil.
949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra)."

In Commendador v. de Villa, 5 involving the court martial of military putschists against the Aquino Government, the
Court held that:
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No(s). 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that `the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist’."

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

`The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis
on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is
already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the
same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.’

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians."

Finally, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 6 the Court, speaking through Justice Reynato S. Puno, declared that:

We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

`An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a
criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.’

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding
is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited `upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite.

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not
akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."
Clearly, in this jurisdiction there is no constitutional or statutory right to bail in non-criminal proceedings like in
extradition. This doctrine is so well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that there is no need to belabor this point. Courts in
the countries of our treaty partners, however, have allowed bail to extraditees in their own countries even in the
absence of a constitutional 7 or statutory 8 right to bail. This places our own citizens who face extradition proceedings
in this country at a disadvantage in terms of available remedies. The United States, for example, allows bail to
extraditees when "special circumstances" 9 are present. Canada also allows bail under a similar rule. 10

This situation calls for equality in treatment by extending, in carefully limited exceptions, the right to bail to those
facing extradition proceedings in this country. Nevertheless, we must insure that we do not cripple the ability of our
Executive Department to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations under international law. This requires a
calibrated balancing, on the one hand, of the State’s interest in cooperating with our treaty partners in international
criminal law enforcement, and on the other hand, of the need to give our own citizens no lesser right and protection
than what our treaty partners so zealously provide to their own citizens.

Thus, following the emerging trend in the United States, 11 and guided by our own experience in combating
transnational crimes including international terrorism, the Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after the
arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he establishes that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to
the community, and there is no other special circumstance that would warrant denial of bail. The burden of proving
he is entitled to bail rests on the extraditee because by resisting the extradition to face a fair trial abroad, the
extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk. This is why courts have consistently held that the presumption is against
bail in extradition cases. 12

The development of extradition law is still in its infancy in this country. We are fortunate that the present Constitution
has empowered the Court to adopt rules to protect and enforce the fundamental rights of the people. In the United
States, the grant of bail to extraditees is still largely governed by the 1903 case of Wright v. Henkel, with only the
cryptic "special circumstances" as the standard prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court for extradition courts in the
U.S. to follow. 13 The instant case provides the opportunity for this Court to lay down a clear-cut guideline for our own
extradition courts to follow. This will insure that our Executive Department can comply promptly with extradition
requests as required by the nature of our treaty obligations while at the same time protecting the fundamental rights
of our citizens.

In essence, extradition is police assistance extended by a state to arrest a person charged with a crime in another
state and surrender him to the authorities of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting state is legitimized by a
treaty, which has the force of a statute 14 and forms part of municipal law. 15 The benefit of extradition is the mutual
assistance between states in criminal law enforcement across national boundaries. The assisting state acts as an
arresting agent and in some jurisdictions the extradition process is mainly an executive function. Even under our
extradition treaties, the final decision whether to extradite or not rests with the President of the Philippines, not with
the courts. 16 Thus, ordinarily an assisting state does not grant bail to the extraditee whose recourse is to apply for
bail before the court of the state where he is charged with a crime. The assisting state, however, for equity
considerations may choose to accord bail to the extraditee. One equity consideration is to put extraditees in one
country in equal footing with extraditees in the country of the treaty partner. Another equity consideration is to grant
the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, to preserve and enforce fundamental rights.

This rule will not change the situation for extraditee Mark B. Jimenez in the instant case because Jimenez has failed
to establish that he is not a flight risk. Having fled the United States just as he was about to be indicted for several
serious crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a flight risk for extradition purposes in this country. Jimenez has not
successfully rebutted this presumption before the extradition court. Jimenez has also refused to honor his
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, made in August 1998 through his U.S. counsel, to return to the
United States 17 where he faces a maximum prison term of not less than 100 years if convicted on all counts. 18 Given
his resources, and the gravity of the charges against him, Jimenez remains a serious flight risk.

The special circumstances" that Jimenez has alleged do not inspire confidence that he will not likely flee. Jimenez
claims that he has been admitted to the Witness Protection Program which shows his lack of intent to flee. The
Department of Justice, however, has disowned issuing to Jimenez a Certificate of Admission to the Witness
Protection Program. The Department of Justice should know who have been admitted to the Witness Protection
Program because the Department itself administers the Program. Under the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act, the issuance of the Certificate of Admission is the operative act that establishes admission to the
Program. 19 Unless he can present a Certificate of Admission, Jimenez’s claim should be rejected, and even taken
as an act of misrepresentation to the extradition court, in view of the statement by the Department of Justice that
there is no record of Jimenez’s admission to the Program. 2 20

For the same reason, Jimenez’s claim that he is a state witness in the plunder case against ex-President Joseph
Estrada, and that "his flight would strip him of (the) immunity he is entitled to," 2 21 cannot be given credence. Under
the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act, the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the
accused and his utilization as a state witness. 2 22 Without the Certificate of Admission, Jimenez is not entitled to
immunity under the Program. 2 23 The Department of Justice will issue the Certificate of Admission only if it is
satisfied with the proposed testimony of the witness as disclosed in his sworn statement. Since until now the
Department of Justice has not issued a Certificate of Admission to Jimenez, it could mean that the Department is
either not satisfied with what Jimenez is bargaining to testify against ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that Jimenez
may not be the least guilty. 2 24 Unless Jimenez presents to the extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this
he has not done, Jimenez’s claim of being a state witness against ex-President Estrada is baseless and self-
serving.

Jimenez claims that the Department of Justice knows his whereabouts because he is under 24-hour PNP protection.
Jimenez asserts in his Sworn Statement 2 25 that the Department of Justice has provided him police protection
because he "was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ on 2 March 2001." This is patently false.
The Department of Justice states that there is no record of Jimenez’s admission to the Witness Protection Program.
Jimenez has not presented a Certificate of Admission to the Program which under the Witness Protection, Security
and Benefits Act would entitle him to the benefits, protection and immunities of the Program.

That Jimenez enjoys the privilege of a 24-hour PNP security detail does not establish that he is a state witness
under the Witness Protection Program. As a member of the House of Representatives, Jimenez may have
requested the PNP to provide him a security detail for his own benefit and protection. In such a case, the PNP
security detail takes instructions from Jimenez and not from the Department of Justice. The 24-hour PNP security
detail would hardly be effective in preventing Jimenez from fleeing the country.

The other special circumstances" alleged by Jimenez, like his seven children residing in the Philippines, and his lack
of visas to travel to other countries, deserve scant consideration. Considering his age, Jimenez’s seven children are
all probably of age by now, and even if they are all still minors, they would hardly become public charges if left
behind in the Philippines. The lack of visas has never deterred the flight of fugitives from any country. Besides, any
Filipino can travel to any of our nine ASEAN neighbors without need of a visa.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Footnotes

1
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: (1) x x x (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, x x x."

2
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.

3
4 SCRA 442 (1962).

4
162 SCRA 840 (1988).

5
200 SCRA 80 (1991).
6
343 SCRA 377 (2000).

7
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required." The excessive bail clause did not establish a constitutional right to bail. In United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), attached as Annex "7", Memorandum for Private Respondent, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared: "The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing
merely that `[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’ This Clause, of course, says nothing about
whether bail shall be available at all."

8
The U.S. Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not grant the right to bail in extradition cases.

9
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), attached as Annex "2", Memorandum for Private
Respondent.

10
Canada v. Pitman, 1986 WL602917 (Ont. H.C.), Supreme Court of Ontario.

Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), attached as Annex "5", Memorandum for
11

Private Respondent.

12
United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996), attached as Annex "8", Memorandum
for Private Respondent.

U.S. lower courts have differed in their interpretation of the "special circumstances" standard. See
13

A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition Cases, Jeffrey A. Hall, Michigan Law
Review, December, 1987.

14
La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984); Ram Singh v. Insular Collector of
Customs, 38 Phil. 862. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000), the Court stated:
"Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect - a treaty may repeal a statute and
a statute may repeal a treaty."

Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. v. Blaylock Trans. Services Employees Association-Kilusan, 71

15

SCRA 621 (1976).

16
Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Letter dated August 23, 2001 written by Mr. John E. Harris, Director, Office of the International
17

Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, addressed to Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez of the

Philippine Department of Justice, attached to Petitioner’s Memorandum.

18
Page 17, Petition for Certiorari.

19
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: " x x x If after said examination of said person, his
sworn statement and other relevant facts, the Department is satisfied that the requirement of this Act
and its implementing rules are complied with, it may admit such person into the Program and issue
the corresponding certificate."

20
Pages 28-29, Petitioner’s Memorandum.

21
Page 46, Memorandum for Private Respondent.

22
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides as follows: "The certificate of admission into the Program by
the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is not
required to include the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to
petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state Witness. x x x."
 Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981 provides that "[a]dmission into the Program shall entitle such State
23

Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will
be given or used x x x."

24
Section 10, R.A. No. 6981.

25
Annex "A-1" of Private Respondent’s Comment.

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10,
2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity
of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to
Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was
then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire
to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3
the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of
the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions
to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed
the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and
the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, 664.

2
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
3
Sec. 2, Art. II states "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."

4
In cases involving quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, bail is not available.
See State v. Hutchinson, 18 So.2d. 723, 246 Ala. 48; Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So.2d. 267, 153 Fla. 571,
Baker v. Strautz, 54 NE2d. 441, 386 lll. 360.

5
12 Phil. 490 (1909).

6
Supra, footnote 2.

7
90 Phil. 256 (1951).

8
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US 276, 78 L. Ed. 315, 54 S. Ct. 101; Terlindon v. Ames, 184 US
270, 46 L.Ed. 534, 22 S.Ct. 484; Fong Yue Ting v. US, 149 US 698, 37 L.Ed. 905, 13 S.Ct. 1016;
Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F2d. 40; US v. Godwin, 97 F. Supp. 252, affd. 191 F2d. 932; Dominguez
v. State, 234 SW 701, 90 Tex. Crim. 92.

9
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.

10
US ex rel Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F2d. 955, cert den. 273 US 969, 71 L. Ed. 883, 47 S. Ct. 572.

11
State v. Chase, 107 So. 541, 91 Fla. 413; State v. Quigg, 108 So. 409, 91 Fla. 197.

Benson v. McMahon, 127 US 457, 32 L. Ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F2d.
12

547, stay den. 314 F2d. 649.

13
Spatola v. US, 741 F. Supp. 362, Affd. 925 F2d. 615.

Re Henderson, 145 NW 574, 27 ND 155; State ex rel Tresoder v. Remann, 4 P2d. 866, 165 Wash.
14

92.

15
Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1.