institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school
CASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 &
242954. SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of
R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993
which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners
particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the
creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums
establishing law practice internship as a requirement for
taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a
system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2)
and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and
implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test
known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the
PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of
RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on
LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power
of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal
education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to
Bar Examination embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant
to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal
education embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to
Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had
been historically and consistently exercised by the political
departments. The historical development of statutes on
education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by
the political departments of the power to supervise and
regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal
education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire
Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because
it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however,
is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and
withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of
the political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that
the Court has the regulation and supervision of legal
education:
First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the
power to supervise and regulate legal education as a
necessary consequence of its power to regulate
admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart
from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal
education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal
anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it
cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power that is
not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates
the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void
RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates
legal education and place it under its supervision and
control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a
highly improper form of judicial activism.
As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power
under the Constitution covers the practice of law and not
the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997
Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court
directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely
provides academic competency requirements for those
who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State
in the exercise of its police power that has the authority to
regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and
this includes legal education.
2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be
allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court.
Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer
confined within the parameters of legal education but now
dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is
direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority
to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and
should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal
education” unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the
legal education of those who are already members of the
bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the LEB deems
necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power
to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which
includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the
teaching of law is considered the practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of
the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards
for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an
aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the
applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such
other admissions policy that the law school may consider,
is such minimum standard. However, the PhilSAT
presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s
aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail
exam, dictates upon law schools who among the
examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When
the PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision
and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom,
becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.
CASE BRIEF ON PIMENTEL V. LEGAL EDUCATION exclude, qualify and restrict admissions to law schools, the PhiLSAT

BOARD AND ABAYATA V. MEDIALDEA AND LEGAL goes beyond mere supervision and regulation and violates institutional
academic freedom for being unconstitutional. Hence, in the dispositive
EDUCATION BOARD (2019) CONCERNING THE
portion of the ponencia, Sec. 9 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016:[2]
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION TEST (PHILSAT) “The PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an
Posted on April 10, 2020 by Amicus Brief under Academic Freedom, Constitutional
applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam,
Law
dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be
admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude,
This case brief summarizes the ruling of the Supreme Court concerning
qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
the constitutionality of the Philippine Law School Admission Test
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation,
(PhiLSAT) in the case of Oscar B. Pimentel, et al. v. Legal Education
violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
Board and Jose Lean L. Abayata, et al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea and
therefore, unconstitutional. In strking down these objectionable clauses
Legal Education Board.[1]
in the PhiLSAT, the State’s inherent power to protect public interest by
improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised.
On September 10, 2019, the Supreme Court en banc in Pimentel v.
Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine
LEB struck down Sec. 9 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, as void and
for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is
unconstitutional.
merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes
with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical,
Specifically, the majority opinion penned by Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.,
arbitrary, or gravely abused.
the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that when the PhiLSAT is used to
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted
under its charter should be nullified for being ultra vires.” (Underscoring
and emphasis supplied)
The body of the decision indicates that the PhiLSAT excludes, qualifies,
and restricts admission to law schools, which is violative of academic of
freedom. The ponencia, however, is silent as to whether the taking of
the PhiLSAT should be mandatory and therefore, integral to admission.
If the taking of the Philsat is integral to admission then this would clearly
be violative of institutional academic freedom.
A careful reading of the separate opinions of Senior Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, who is
joined by Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justices Benjamin
S. Caguioa, Alexander G. Gesmundo, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., taken
together with the majority opinion, reflect the view that the PhiLSAT is
an optional law admission test. Thus, any government regulatory
agency which prescribes minimum standards for admission to law
school cannot be arbitrary and unreasonable in its issuances relating to
admission since they are required to show a compelling State interest to
do so, which must be reasonable, and for a public purpose. Any form of
government regulation must therefore pass the constitutional test of
reasonableness, as measured against the four principles of academic
freedom, specifically, the freedom of law schools to determine who to
admit for the study of law.
To ensure that institutional academic freedom is preserved and
protected, the Honorable Supreme Court recognizes the right of an
institution of higher learning to have the exclusive prerogative to admit
students and provide that “atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevails the ‘four essential freedoms’ of a university — to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”[3]
Law schools play a major role in the sphere of legal education within the
structure of institutions of higher learning. In their exercise of academic
freedom, law schools must have the liberty to decide for themselves
their “aims and objectives and how best to attain them”. They must be
“free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint, and a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.” Academic
freedom, as held by this Honorable Court, “is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion, for that would be to frustrate
its purpose, or nullify its intent.”[4]
The relevant portions of the following separate opinions in Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board are reproduced to show that the PhiLSAT is
optional, because to consider it mandatory would make law school
admissions exclusionary, qualifying and restrictive, and thus, contrary to
the academic freedom of law schools to determine who to admit for the
study of law in our respective institutions.
Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, in her separate
concurring opinion, succinctly discusses why the provisions of Legal
Education Board (LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016
(LEBMO No. 7-2016) that mandatorily require the passing of the
Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a pre-requisite for
admission to any law school violate institutional academic freedom and
hence, unconstitutional:[5]
“In this case, while the policy of the State to ‘uplift the standards of legal
education’ may be characterized as a compelling State interest, the
means of achieving this goal, through the PhiLSAT, together with its
mandatory and exclusionary features as above-discussed, do not
appear to be narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means for
achieving this interest. There is no concrete showing why the
implementation of a standardized but optional State aptitude exam,
which schools may freely adopt in their discretion as a tool for their own
determination of who to admit (such as the National Medical Aptitude
Test for medical schools or the Law School Admission Test in the United
States of America), would be less of a “sifting” measure than a
mandatory and exclusively State-determined one (such as the
PhiLSAT). This is especially so since, as conceded by LEB Chairperson
Emerson B. Aquende during the oral arguments in this case, there is no
statistical basis to show the propensity of the PhiLSAT to improve the
quality of legal education. Furthermore, no other study or evaluation
regarding the viability of the PhiLSAT was shown to this effect. It is true
that in a general sense, the PhiLSAT operates as a basic aptitude exam
which seeks to test skills that have rational connection to the field of
law, i.e., communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, and
verbal and quantitative reasoning. However, because the test was
solely crafted by the LEB, it completely excludes the law schools’ input
and participation, and worse, even puts their very existence in jeopardy
should there be non-subservience. Verily, an absolutist approach in any
facet of academic freedom would not only result in an overly restrictive
State regulation, it would also be practically counterproductive because
law schools, being at the forefront, are the quintessential stakeholders
to the mission of improving legal education. Again, by constitutional fiat,
the State’s role is limited to reasonable supervision, not control. For
these reasons, the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 on the PhiLSAT
clearly transgress institutional academic freedom.” (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied)
In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
is clear and categorical that all aspects of the Philippine Law School
Admission Test, and for that matter, any national admission test – even
if not made mandatory, is unconstitutional for being an infringement of
academic freedom. Justice Leonen’s opinion, joined by no less than
Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, further makes a distinction between
the Philippine Law School Admission Test and the National Medical
Admission Test:[6]
“The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion
into this essential freedom. The government’s imposition of a passing
score as a bar to admission violates the educational institutions’
academic freedom to determine who to admit to study. The existence of
the Legal Education Board, on the other hand, interferes with the right
of academic institutions with respect to how to teach and who to teach.”
(Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
...
“As found by the majority, the Philippine Law School Admission Test,
unlike the National Medical Admission Test, violates institutional
academic freedom insofar as it prescribes a passing score that must be
followed by law schools. Failure to reach the passing score will
disqualify the examinee from admission to any Philippine law school.
This is because a Certificate of Eligibility is necessary for enrollment as
a first year law student. Respondent Legal Education, which
administers the test, only allows law schools to impose additional
requirements for admission, but passing the test is still mandatory. The
failure of law schools to abide by these requirements exposes them to
administrative sanctions.
In contrast, failure to achieve a certain score in the National Medical
Admission Test no longer disqualifies an examinee from applying to all
medical schools. For one, test scores are reported with a corresponding
percentile rank that ranges from 1 to 99+. It “indicates the percentage of
[National Medical Admission Test] examinees who have [test] scores
the same as or lower than the examinee. This percentile rank is
evaluated by the medical schools against the cutoff grade that they
themselves determine. Hence, the percentile rank cutoff is only a
“minimum score that qualfies an examinee as a bonafide applicant for
admission into his/her preferred medical school. The test score only
determines the available medical schools where a person may apply;
the higher the score, the more options the applicant has.
Thus, I agree with the majority’s characterization that the Philippine Law
School Admission Test employs a “totalitarian scheme” that leaves the
actions of law schools entirely dependent on the test results. It usurps
the right of law schools to determine the admision requiremens for its
would-be students – ulitmately infringing on the institutional academic
freedom they possess, as guaranteed by the Constitution.”
Upon closer inspection, Justice Leonen observes that “the Philippine
Law School Admission Test does not merely recommend, but dictates
on law schools who are qualified to be admitted. By prescribing a
passing score and predetermining who may enroll in law schools, the
State forces its judgment on the institutions, when it has no business
doing so. Any fovernmental attempt to dictate upon schools the
composion of their studentry undermines their institutional academic
freedom.”[7]
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
states that the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom, and that the
State’s power over law schools is limited to supervision and regulation,
not control:[8]
“With respect to the academic freedom aspect of who may be admitted
to the schools, I reiterate my position that the ponencia is correct in
holding that the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom. Mandating
legal education institutions to reject examinees who failed to obtain the
prescribed passing score amounts to a complete transfer of control over
student admissions from the law schools to the LEB. To emphasize, the
permissible power of the State over institutions of higher learning is
limited to supervision and regulation, not control.” (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied)
In finding that the PhiLSAT should be set aside, Justice Alexander G.
Gesmundo further explains his view in his separate concurring and
dissenting opinion:[9]
“I concur with the ponencia that the LEB Memorandum Orders and
Circular, requiring the PhiLSAT as mandatory and exclusionary, are
unconstitutional.
Institutions of higher learning have academic freedom, under the
Constitution, and this includes the freedom to determine who may be
admitted to study. Such freedom may only be limited by the State based
on the test of reasonability. In this case, however, the assailed
Memorandum Orders fail to provide a reasonable justification for
restraining the admission of students to law schools based on the
following reasons:
First, by making the PhiLSAT mandatory and exclusionary, the LEB
significantly restricts the freedom of law schools to determine who shall
be admitted as law students. Only those who pass the said examination
shall be considred for admission to these institutions of higher learning.
Consequently, the LEB, through the PhiLSAT, first chooses the potential
law students, and only afterwards, shall the law schools be allowed to
choose their students from the limited pool of student-passers. The said
institutes of higher learning are barred from considering those students
who failed the examinations, regardless of their previous academic
grades and achievements.
Second, the LEB does not give any justification for the required passing
score of 55% and the format of the examinations. The studies cited by
the LEB were conducted by different organizations, for different
professions, and for foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, no concrete study
conducted in the Philippines for the legal profession was provided to
substantiate the passing score and the test format. It is not even clear
whether the consensus of the law schools in the country was secured
before the LEB imposed the PhiLSAT. Without any concrete basis for
the conduct of the examination, it would be unreasonable to impose the
same mandatorily and without exemption to the institutes of higher
learning.
Third, law schools are given no option other than to follow the LEB
Memorandum Orders and Circular. Failure to comply with these shall
result in administrative sanctions, ranging from closure of the law
school, phase-out of the law program, provision cancellation of its
recognition and/or liailityto pay a fine of P10,000.00 for each infraction.
Even without a valid reason for the impostion of the PhiLSAT
requirement, the LEB completely restricts the law schools from
accepting students who did not pass the said examination. The schools’
exercise of academic freedom to choose their students is restricted by
the threat of administrative and pecuniary sanctions.
Assuming arguendo that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular
were issued under the exercise of police power of the State to regulate
the rights of certain institutions, it does not justify the unreasonable
restriction on the academic freedom of institutes of higher learning.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own
limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense
of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
Here, the LEB failed to establish the reasonable means to limit the
academic freedom of the institutes of higher learning. Again, there is no
valid explanation provided on the mandatory and exclusionary
requirement of the PhiLSAT, its passing grade, and format of
examinations. Manifestly, to impose a penalty on law schools based on
an unreasonable policy that restricts academic freedom would be an
invalid exercise of police power.” (Undescoring and emphasis supplied)
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. [10]
agreed with the ponencia in striking as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7,
and all its adjunct orders, for being violative of the institutions’ and
students’ academic freedom, emphasizing that
“. . . it becomes all too apparent that LEBMO No. 7, insofar as it
imposes the PhiLSAT, is a constricting regulation that binds the hands
of the schools from choosing who to admit in their law program. The
LEB thrusts upon the law schools a pre-selected roster of applicants,
and effectively deprives them of the right to select their own students on
the basis of factors and criteria of their own choosing. Consequently,
the law schools are left with no choice but to elect from this limited pool.
Worse, they are forbidden from admitting those who failed to comply
with the LEB’s requirements, under pain of administrative sanctions.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the PhiLSAT is an oppressive and
arbitrary measure. The LEB is bereft of power to substitute its own
judgment for that of the universities’. Rather, the universities should be
free to consider other criteria (aside from the PhiLSAT) in determining
their prospective students’ aptitude and ability to survive in law school.
In fact, during the Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, amicus
curiae Dean Sedfrey Candelaria revealed that passing the law entrance
exam is not a guarantee that the student will survive through law school
...
Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State
must be reasonable. This “reasonableness” in no way grants a warrant
for the State to exercise oppressive control over the schools.”
(Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
At present, the case is still pending final resolution of the motions for
reconsideration that have been filed by the petitioners who are law
professors, and the respondent Legal Education Board.
[1] G.R. No. 230642 and G.R. No. 242954, 10 September 2019.
[2] Reyes, Jr., J., for the majority of the Court, in Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 230642 and G.R. No. 242954, 10
September 2019, at 102-103.
[3] University of the Philippines v. Ruben Ayson, G.R. No. 88386, 17
August 1986, 176 SCRA 571 citing V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law
(11th Ed., 1962) at 491 and the concurring opinion of Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
[4] Garcia v. The Faculty Admissions Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, G.R. No. 40779, 28 November 1975, 68 SCRA 277.
[5] Perlas-Bernabe, J., concurring, in Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, at 5.
[6] Leonen, J., dissenting and concurring, Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, at 1, 12-13.

[7] Leonen, J., dissenting and concurring, Pimentel v. Legal Education

Board, at 17.

[8] Caguioa, J., concurring, in Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, at 34.

[9] Gesmundo, J., concurring, in Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, at

7-9.

[10] Reyes, A. Jr., J., concurring, in Pimentel v. Legal Education Board,

at 9 and 16.