Pimentel vs. LEB to admit.

According to petitioners, the LEB cannot issue penal

regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees and the ban
G.R. No. 230642|Sept. 2019|Yu on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due
Petitioner: process.
Respondents:

4. In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the

Recit-Ready:
argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to
law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to
Doctrine:
regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different
from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court
already upheld as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal
case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.

ISSUES: W/N the Philsat, as a requirement for the admission into law
school, is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, and whether or not it
infringes upon academic freedom of law schools.

RATIO:
FACTS:
1. Assailed herein by petitioners is Section 7(e) on minimum
standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT issuances
2. Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to
prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e)
received the strongest objection from the petitioners. Section 7(e),
provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and
minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Petitioners contend that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as
it interferes with the law school's exercise of freedom to choose who
1. The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when
expressly recognizing the complementary roles played by the public
and private schools in education, reiterated that these educational
institutions are subject to State supervision and regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of
public and private institutions in the educational system and
shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
2. As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and
private schools in education is complementary in relation to each
other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is only
empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police power
in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content
of Section 4(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. 198 The exercise
of police power over education must merely be supervisory and
regulatory.
3. In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory
power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a supportive power, that
is, the power of oversight over all educational institutions. It includes
the authority to check, but not to interfere.
4. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.
5. The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion
to decide for itself who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall
be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic freedom.
The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and
regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.
6. 4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer
an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the
minimum standards for law admission, an aptitude test may be
administered by the LEB although such is not made mandatory
under the law.
7. The avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of
legal education by evaluating and screening applicants to law school.
As elucidated, the State has an interest in improving the quality of
legal education for the protection of the community at-large, and
requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In
other words, the State has the power and the prerogative to impose
a standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner
and extent that the State can do so in medical school when it
prescribed the NMAT.
8. However, The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT
for the fundamental reason that these aptitude exams operate
differently.
9. While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT
score is evaluated by the medical schools in relation to their
own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score
is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an
examinee may be admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is
only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating applicants for
admission to a college of medicine.
10. Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much
weight should be assigned to an NMAT score relative to the schools'
own admissions policy. Different medical schools may therefore set
varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different medical schools may
likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows
medical schools to consider the NMAT score along with the other
credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not constrain
medical schools to accept pre-selected applicants; it merely provides
for a tool to evaluate all applicants.
11. Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and
absolutely disqualify an applicant from being admitted to
medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only
increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking
the NMAT, thus, expands the applicant's options for medical
schools; it does not limit them.
12. In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an
applicant may be admitted to law school or not, the PhiLSAT being
strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the
prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law school. It
qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the
schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a
totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the
consequent actions of the applicant-student and the school solely
dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.
13. With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an
aptitude test, passes the test of reasonableness, there is no rea on
to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a
calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar
as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking
thereof within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law
school which, on its face, run directly counter to institutional
academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from
any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect,
especially in view of the separability clause therein contained.