FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 12, 2005.]

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK,

FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA.
MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L.
GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V.
MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK,
MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA
E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L.
MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R.
MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK,
JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE
HERNANDEZ, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision 1 of the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177;
and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision 2 of the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners'
TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-
210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution 3 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals 4 are as follows:

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late

Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the
name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted
the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate
tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property.
 Upon being notified of the petition for administrative
reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title
TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest is spurious.
jurcd06

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer,

denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 5 on grounds that:

1. Â Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of

171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT
No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an
area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the
name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;

2. Â The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as

categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated
February 19, 1997. 6

Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied in an order 7

dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required
the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate certificate of
title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with
the owner's duplicate certificate of title. 8 The LRA further declared:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established

by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the
time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective.
Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of
Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and
authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the
effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June
1988 . . . .

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and

boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to
the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . .
as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form
No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . .

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity,

authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established
indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such
circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course
and the same is mandatory. 9
 xxx xxx xxx

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of

Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive,
Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful
repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital
Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by
the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and
Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by
Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-
96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to
Atty. Bustos . . . confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is
on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office.
Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty.
Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997

that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is
belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by
the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered
into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been
assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary
Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said
computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt . . . .

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as
it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian
thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too
overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the
fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19
February 1997 letter. . . . 10

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners' title was

fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently
reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents' title may only be
reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners' title was void and
should therefore be cancelled. 11
The dispositive portion of the LRA's decision reads: CcAIDa

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that

reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 12

Petitioners' filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by

respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
respondents' prayer for immediate reconstitution were denied. 13

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review 14 with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the LRA
be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being
subjected to the condition that petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. 15 Petitioners
likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision 16 on September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed

Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the
petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED. 17

Respondents moved for reconsideration. 18 On November 7, 2003, the

Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby

reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents
and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners'
valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 19

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-

G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied, 20 hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No.
162605.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision 21 on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of

the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 22

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the
LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution
since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents' title.
23

Â
 Respondents' motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED
and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to
reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED. 24

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for
review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335,
respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN

ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS' EXISTING TITLE,
CONSIDERING THAT:

a. Â THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE

FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A
RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. Â THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. Â THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE

DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE,
SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE
ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING
A "SHORT CUT", THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE
PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF

THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO , CONSIDERING
THAT:

a. Â IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING

OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE
RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING
TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.

b. Â I N ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE

 SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS' PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA'S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN
THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION
OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING. 25

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. Â THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO
CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY
COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH
AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS
EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER
THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION
19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE
TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. Â THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS
CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004
DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK'S TITLE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF,
REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. Â THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE
CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97]
VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY
AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT
PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING
COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. Â THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT
ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK
SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS
HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND
FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE
CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND
SPURIOUS TITLE.
 V. Â THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME. 26

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated

with the petition in G.R. No. 162335. 27
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul
their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents' Torrens title would be a
collateral attack on petitioners' existing title; (c) they were not given the
opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their
Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA,
has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners' title; and (e) the
ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have
confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the
reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26 28 clearly provides: SDHETI

Section 3. Â Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted

from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available,
in the following order :

(a) Â The owner's duplicate of the certificate of

title;

xxx xxx xxx

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted
in support thereof the owner's duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax
receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than
sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26
which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the
hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the
same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and
technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is
Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. Â . . . Provided, That in case the reconstitution is

to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or
3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same
property. 29

Since respondents' source of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate

certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require
the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that
the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of
sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give
more weight and preference to the owner's duplicate certificate of title over
the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic,
genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as
affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before
this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even
finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no
longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule
that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions . . . are
accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration
that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts. 30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or
whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing
and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions
of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and
analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may
be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents
presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of
protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of fact.
Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule,
confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth. 31 A
petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable. 32
I n Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, 33 this Court
categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a
factual finding that petitioner's title to the land is of doubtful
authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is

bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. . . .

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case

to the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents',
is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed
by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
Â
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative
reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is
adjudicatory in nature — it can properly deliberate on the validity of the
titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or
spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration,
then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the
reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the Court of
Appeals. 34
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from
the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and
existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.
Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed
only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction
over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or
final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC
to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter
appeal the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and
the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that
petitioners' title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 35 we ruled that:

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of

sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos' favor should
be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the
Government. However, since all the facts are now before this
Court, and it is not within de los Santos' power in any case to
alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made
inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time
that cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to
de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and
would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy
at bar, . . . . This Court will therefore make the adjudication
entailed by the facts here and now, without further
proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an

issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised
again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of
the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand thereof. 36
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The
doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et
al. 37 does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

. . . [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens

Titles . . . cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first
securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . .
The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands
that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names
of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of
title over the same land to two different holders thereof. . . . 38

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens
title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the time
the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said
that petitioners' title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid
considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is
sham and spurious.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas
in refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared in
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco: 39

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the

remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of
origin with instructions that Ortigas' and the Solicitor General's appeals
from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed,
be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the
appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by
petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting
Molina's theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this
Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be
pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for
Molina's cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be
unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already

discussed, the validity of respondents' and petitioners' title have been
squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et
al. , 40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title
over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein
is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. 41 There
was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the
property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject
of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of
"their property" without due process of law when the Court of Appeals
ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct
proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the
case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of
respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by
the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for
reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title,
petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting
officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to
pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered
by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the
essence of due process.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian: 42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous

petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced
in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said
petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their
respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that
the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a
proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of
ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on

petitioners' title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.
43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:
44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is

presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its
purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise

that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the
presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this
presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the
LRA report . . . that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis . .
.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her

certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not
create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing
and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a
land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies
only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of
the certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly

reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and
misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits. 45
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land
Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177; and in
G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special
Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents'
TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Â

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs.
Quisumbing, J., see dissenting opinion
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I concur in separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
QUISUMBING, J : p

I concur in the result reached by Ynares-Santiago, J., in her opinion and

I join Davide, Jr., C.J., and Azcuna, J., in the majority vote to DENY the
petitions.
While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial
Court would have been in order, remand of this case for trial at this late
stage would only be a time-consuming and pointless exercise. Prompt
resolution of the controversy is in order to avoid further delay.

AZCUNA, J :p

From the record it appears undisputed that, as the LRA ruled and the
CA affirmed, petitioners Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and
spurious. For one thing, the property is purportedly located in barrio Payong,
Quezon City, whereas no such barrio existed or exists therein. It is,
therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go though the exercise of proving this
matter again in the regular courts, as would ordinarily be required, since the
point is indubitable.
I thus find applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company
Limited Partnership v. Veloso , 1 as it would be unjust in the circumstances to
require respondents to undergo a time-consuming and pointless exercise to
cancel an evidently sham and spurious title.
 I, therefore, concur with Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and vote to
DENY the petitions.

CARPIO, J., dissenting:

I dissent because the majority opinion deprives petitioners of their
immensely valuable property — worth billions of pesos — without due
process of law.
The majority opinion cancels the Torrens title of petitioners in these
cases which originated from an administrative reconstitution petition
filed by respondents before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The
majority opinion patently violates Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree 1 which expressly states that a Torrens title " cannot be . . .
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in all civil actions, which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." 2
Thus, only the proper trial court, in an action directly attacking the validity of
a Torrens title, can cancel a Torrens title after trial on the merit.
Jurisprudence has aptly termed this hornbook doctrine. 3
In the present cases, there is no such direct attack on the Torrens title
of petitioners. And yet the majority opinion cancels petitioners' Torrens title,
covering thirty-four hectares of prime land located in Quezon City
conservatively estimated at more than One Billion Seven Hundred Million
Pesos.
The Cases
Before the Court are two petitions for review 4 filed by Severino M.
Manotok IV, Froilan M. Manotok, Fernando M. Manotok, Fausto M. Manotok III,
Ma. Mamerta M. Manotok, Patricia L. Tiongson, Pacita L. Go, Roberto Laperal
III, Michael Marshall V. Manotok, Mary Ann V. Manotok, Felisa Mylene V.
Manotok, Ignacio V. Manotok, Jr., Milagros V. Manotok, Severino Manotok III,
Rosa R. Manotok, Miguel A.B. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Ma. Cristina E.
Sison, Philipp L. Manotok, Jose Clemente L. Manotok, Ramon Severino L.
Manotok, Thelma R. Manotok, Jose Maria Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr.,
and Ma. Theresa L. Manotok ("Manotok, et al."), represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, against the Heirs of Homer L. Barque
("Heirs of Barque"), represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez ("Barque-
Hernandez"). The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2
August 2004. 5
In G.R. No. 162335, Manotok, et al. assail the 24 February 2004
Amended Decision 6 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The
Court of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") of Manotok, et al. and the Land
Registration Authority ("LRA") to reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.
In G.R. No. 162605, Manotok, et al. assail the 7 November 2003
Amended Decision 7 and the 12 March 2004 Resolution 8 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. 9 The Court of Appeals directed the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. and
the LRA to reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.
The Antecedent Facts
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. ("Barque, Sr.") represented
by Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT
No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall
on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax
Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos ("Atty. Bustos"), Reconstituting Officer and
Chief of the Reconstitution Division, LRA, wrote a letter dated 29 October
1996 10 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire ("Engr. Dalire"), Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo,
Manila. In the 29 October 1996 letter, Atty. Bustos requested Engr. Dalire for
a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D ("Fls-3168-D"). Atty. Bustos
wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys
Division of the Land Management Services, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, National Capital Region ("LMS-DENR-NCR"). 11
In his reply dated 7 November 1996, 12 Engr. Dalire informed Atty.
Bustos that the Land Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a
letter dated 28 November 1996, 13 Engineer Ernesto S. Erive ("Engr. Erive"),
Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos
that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and
Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engr. Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of
Fls-3168-D conflicted with the letter of Engr. Dalire that his office has no
record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2
December 1996 14 to Engr. Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter
dated 5 December 1996, 15 Engr. Dalire requested the Regional Technical
Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engr.
Dalire wrote:

In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2,

1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of
LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm)
issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on
September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we
have no record of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to us
the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the Chief of
Technical Records and Statistics Section reproduced a copy he issued
to LRA for our evaluation.

In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by

LRA) from the copy of that office issued to LRA, the said copy
on file in your office did not emanate from this Office. The
stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the
Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not the same stamp we are using.
 Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.
(Emphasis supplied)

A letter dated 2 January 1997, 16 purportedly from Engr. Dalire,

addressed to the LRA Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the
LRA General Records Section on 7 January 1997. The letter states:

In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be

informed that the copy of the subject plan was forwarded to this office
by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical Section of the National
Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per
verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was
found out that they are identical and bore the same stamps and initials
used in this office.

In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply

letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated the status thereof
because we failed to verify from our index cards then for our
last result, hence, this case be given due course for
Administrative reconstitution (sic). (Emphasis supplied)

Interestingly, barely three days after his purported letter of 2 June

1997, Engr. Dalire wrote a letter dated 5 January 1997 17 addressed to the
Regional Technical Director, LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:

This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December

1996 to that Office in connection with the letter of clarification dated
December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief
Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to
the certified reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that
office (signed by Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records and
Statistics Section) on September 23, 1996 to Teresita Hernandez and
our letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have no records
of Fls-3168-D.

The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us

with machine copy of Fls-3168-D reproduced from the copy
issued by that Office and we found out that the copy of Fls-
3168-D file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this Office.
We reiterate that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.

May we request you again to please forward to us the

said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on file in your office for our
evaluation and comment. (Emphasis supplied)

Engr. Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 18 to the LRA
Administrator. The letter states: TEcHCA

In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative

Reconstitution of the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr.,
Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested
us to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of
plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does not have a record of the same. In
that letter, you attached for our reference the following:

1. Â Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D,

issued by the TRSS, NCR;

2. Â Reply letter of Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28,

1996;

3. Â Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter

dated October 29, 1996

In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on

December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2,
1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from
where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our
office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our
evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a
follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and
requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment.
It is regretted, they did not respond.

Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by

DENR-NCR, it is certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan
which may have been inserted in the file. We requested for the copy in
their file last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997 but until this
writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication as required by
DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come
from this Office. The reasons are:

a. Â Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our

Microfilm Computer list of plans available for
decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-
3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.

b. Â The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it

is a spurious copy.

1) Â The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece

stamp. The certification and the signing official are
separate. Ours is one-piece.

2) Â The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi,

and Chief in the syndicates (sic) stamp differ from
our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our
stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the "s" plural.

3) Â We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate

did on the copy.

4) Â The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not

for Registration/Titling For Reference Only" is smaller
than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic)
Stamp, in addition to the above is "of ________".

5) Â The copy bears forged initials of my section

 officer and myself. I sign completely
certification.

6) Â The name of the claimant is very visible to have

been tampered in the master copy.

7) Â Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not

have copy of Fls-3168-D.

In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished

your Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it
should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious
sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of
Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the
spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create
land problem involving prime lots in that area.

Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to

whom lot 823 (or portion thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.
(Emphasis supplied)

In a letter dated 13 February 1997 19 to the LRA Administrator, Engr.

Dalire explained that the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly written by him,
was forged. Thus:

In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received

today, please be informed that as per the inventory of approved
surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the
microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions,
that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among
the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our
file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital
Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November
1996 (copy attached).

With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox

copy attached to your letter, this letter definitely did not come
from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that
the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical
Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until
now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in
compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996
and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06
February 1997 (copies attached).

With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy

attached to your letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed findings
tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been discussed in our
letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.

Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR

for investigation and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order
No. 40, s. 1991. (Emphasis supplied)
 Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997, 20 Engr. Dalire requested
Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious, thus:

In reply to your query whether or not

a) Â the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot

823, Piedad Estate as surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;

b) Â the letter dated 07 November 1996, and

c) Â the letter dated 02 January 1997

are authentic and really coming from this office.

The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that

this Bureau has no records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory
Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially
filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that
we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.

The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December

2, 1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the
copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:

1) Â We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we

issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?

2) Â The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and

at lower half. This is not our practice;

3) Â The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for

the certification and another for the signing official. We use
one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words
of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this
spurious plan;

4) Â The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans

with the initials of my action officers and their codings
below my signature. These are not present in the spurious
copy of plan;

5) Â The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR

REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY" is smaller
than our rubber stamp;

6) Â The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry

our rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE
SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF __________________ "This
is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all
microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We
have shown you our rubber stamps to prove that the copy
of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious plan.

I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated

02 January 1997 stating that copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D)
 was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and
Statistics Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the
plan is identical to the microfilm and that the case be given
due course for administrative reconstitution. Certainly this is
not true. This is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be
when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for
validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory
under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of our
letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and
06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this letter was
never prepared and issued by this Office. Our record books and
file attest to this. We do not use letterheads for letters
involving this topic.

Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was

intercepted and did not reach you.

For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D
and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious
documents. (Emphasis supplied)

On 14 April 1997, Manotok, et al. filed their formal opposition to the

petition for reconstitution upon learning of the petition.
The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer
In an Order dated 30 June 1997, 21 Atty. Bustos denied the
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:

1. Â Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of

171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered
by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad
Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by
TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok,
et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated
February 01, 1991;

2. Â The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as

categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire , Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his
letter dated February 19, 1997. (Emphasis supplied)

Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated

10 February 1998, 22 Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Heirs of Barque filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin.
Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998, 23 the LRA gave due course to the
appeal. The LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13, 24 only the owner's or
co-owner's duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title could be
used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, the LRA ruled that
Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the
owner's duplicate of the TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engr. Dalire failed to
deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2 January
1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official
communication from Engr. Dalire. Finally, the LRA ruled that Manotok, et al.'s
TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious, thus:

It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in

question, is located at Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several
documents submitted by oppositors particularly the several Deeds of
Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real estate tax
receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at
Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79",
"84" and "85" of Opposition] which is grossly inaccurate. The map of
Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position Paper] would show that
there is no such barrio as Payong. It must likewise be noted that there
is a Barrio Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio
Matandang Balara and they do not adjoin each other. Quite perplexing
though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for payments made
after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June 1988 would
show that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio
Matandang Balara [Annexes "91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition],
while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to "114" inclusive
of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property
in question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular.
The said real estate tax receipts also reflect the tax declarations of the
property covered thereby. It is highly irregular that the tax declaration
numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations which
appear to have been canceled would again be revived.

The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and
without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in question
indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same is
being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of the tax map
over the property in question issued by the Quezon City Assessor's
Office [Annex "H" of Petitioners' Position Paper]. Said tax map shows
that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in
question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting
arguendo that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been
subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of original survey in 1907, it
is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot
822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when
at the time of the original survey, there were no such Psd's yet.

Examination of the technical decription and boundaries

appearing in TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would show that the same do
not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which
are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the
Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners' Position Paper].
There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor Tuazon Estate as
the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all
adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12,
 1923 as per certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L"
Petitioners' Position Paper]. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Lot
822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481
[372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not it was Lot 822
of the Piedad Estate. 25

However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 could only be
reconstituted after a court of competent jurisdiction has cancelled TCT No.
RT-22481 [372302]. The dispositive portion of the LRA Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that

reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of [the] Manotoks upon order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 26

Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14

June 2001, 27 the LRA denied the motion.
Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66642 before the Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution
and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Heirs of Barque filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700 praying for the modification of the 24 June 1998 Resolution and
14 June 2001 Order of the LRA. The Heirs of Barque prayed for the
immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of
TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA-G.R. SP No. 66642
The Court of Appeals initially dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 in the
Resolution of 23 October 2001 28 for failure to show that Rosa R. Manotok
had authority to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration
filed by Manotok, et al., the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition in the
Resolution of 27 November 2001. 29
In its Decision of 29 October 2003, 30 the Court of Appeals denied
Manotok, et al.'s petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998.
However, upon motion for reconsideration of the Heirs of Barque, the Court
of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004, 31 the
dispositive portion of which reads: CASIEa

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED
and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to
reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED. 32
 Manotok, et al. appealed to this Court for relief. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 162335.
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 33 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Heirs of Barque's petition and affirmed the LRA
Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Heirs of Barque moved for reconsideration
of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, 34 the
Court of Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby

reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents
and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners'
valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 35

Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended

Decision. In its Resolution of 12 March 2004, 36 the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.
Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 162605.
The Issues
In their Memoranda, 37 Manotok, et al. raise a number of issues which
may be summarized as follows:

1. Â Whether the Land Registration Authority has jurisdiction to

rule on the validity of Manotok, et al.'s title.

2. Â Whether the Court of Appeals may assume equity

jurisdiction over the cases.

3. Â Whether the Court of Appeals, applying Ortigas &

Company Limited Partnership v. Ve lasco, 38 may order
the cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title and the
reconstitution of the Heirs of Barque's title.

Administrative Reconstitution under PD 1529

Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 39 ("PD 1529"), as
amended by Republic Act No. 6732, 40 governs the administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. Section 110 of PD
1529 provides:

SEC. 110. Â Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original of

Torrens Title . — Original copies of certificate of titles lost or destroyed
in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances
 affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted
judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act
No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. The procedure
relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate
prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss
or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as
determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority:
Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged
should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the
possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further,
That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or
damaged be less than five hundred (500).

Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution

shall be furnished the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is
situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No
order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title
shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by
the Register of Deeds and the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal
having [been] filed by any such officials.

The LRA, in reversing Atty. Bustos' Order, ruled that Atty. Bustos
blatantly disregarded LRA Circular No. 13 41 when he required the
submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
210177. The LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos should have confined himself to TCT
No. 210177. The LRA cited paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13, thus:

4 . Sources of Reconstitution . — Only the owner's or co-owner's

duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a
source of administrative reconstitution.

However, paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13 should be read in

conjunction with its paragraph 8, which states:

8. Order of Reconstitution . — If the Reconstituting Officer or the

Register of Deeds of another registry, after appropriate
verification, is convinced that the certificate of title may be
reconstituted, he shall issue an order of reconstitution. Otherwise, he
shall deny the petition, stating his reasons therefor. The Register of
Deeds concerned and the petitioner shall be furnished with copies of
the order. (Emphasis supplied)

When Atty. Bustos requested Engr. Dalire to furnish his office with a
copy of Fls-3168-D, it was part of the verification process prior to
reconstitution of the title. Considering the numerous petitions for
reconstitution due to the destruction of the Quezon City Hall, Atty. Bustos
was merely exercising caution to avoid the reconstitution of spurious titles.
Atty. Bustos conducted a verification of TCT No. 210177 pursuant to
paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13. Hence, the LRA erred in ruling that Atty.
Bustos should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
210177.
 Section 3 42 of Republic Act No. 26 43 ("RA 26") enumerates the
sources for reconstitution of transfer certificates of title. For administrative
reconstitution of title, the only source documents are the owner's duplicate
of the certificate of title and the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's
duplicate of the certificate of title. Section 12 44 of RA 26 does not apply in
the present cases since Section 12 refers to judicial reconstitution of title.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title is far from being a ministerial
act. In an administrative reconstitution, the petitioner must submit the
owner's or co-owner's duplicate of the certificate of title as required by
Section 3 of RA 26 and paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13.
Â
However, the submission of the source documents does not mean that
the reconstituting officer must forthwith grant the petition for reconstitution.
It does not also mean that the reconstituting officer must confine himself
with the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of the certificate of title. In
accordance with paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13, the reconstituting
officer or the Register of Deeds shall issue an order of reconstitution only
after appropriate verification which means that he must be convinced that
the certificate of title is genuine and not spurious. Thus, the reconstituting
officer must go beyond the owner's or co-owner's duplicate certificate of title
to determine whether the title is genuine. The process of verification allows
the reconstituting officer to countercheck with other government agencies to
determine the validity of the title to be reconstituted.
When Atty. Bustos requested for a copy of Fls-3168-D, he was not only
exercising caution but more importantly, it was part of the verification
process under paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13. The Heirs of Barque filed
the petition for reconstitution only in 1996, eight years after the alleged
destruction of the original TCT in 1988. The reconstituting officer should not
be blamed for verifying if he should grant the petition for reconstitution.
Paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13 mandates that Atty. Bustos shall issue an
order of reconstitution only after appropriate verification.
The Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Authority
Section 6 of PD 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land
Registration Commissioner, 45 as follows:

SEC. 6. Â General Functions —

(1) Â The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the

following functions:

(a) Â Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final

judgments of the courts in land registration
proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers
of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;

(b) Â Exercise supervision and control over all Registers

of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;
 (c) Â Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on
appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;

(d) Â Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of

court and personnel of the Court of First Instance
throughout the Philippines with respect to the
discharge of their duties and functions in relation to
the registration of lands;

(e) Â Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees

promulgated relative to the registration of lands and
issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;

(f) Â Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and

consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties
titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D.
No. 957. (Emphasis supplied)

The LRA has jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions on petitions for

reconstitution. However, it is not within its powers and functions to declare a
title void. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ("BP Blg. 129"),
"Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in
all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein." The LRA, in its 24 June 1998 Resolution, recognized
that only the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") could declare a title fraudulently
reconstituted. The LRA declared:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is noted that although TCT No.

RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks is alleged to cover a
property with an "expanded area" and that the same was fraudulently
reconstituted, the same is existing as a reconstituted title at the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. It is thus presumed valid until
ordered declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. A
title issued under the Torrens system enjoys the presumption of
validity (Ramos vs. Rodriguez , 244 SCRA 418). Although it is now being
claimed that the title of the Manotoks was wrongly reconstituted, it is
only the Regional Trial Court which can declare that the same was
fraudulently reconstituted. Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of
title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D. 1529; Calalang vs.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88, 106). . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It must likewise be stressed that questions affecting title to real

property fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts as
expressly provided for under B.P. Blg. 129, particularly Section 19(2)
thereof . . . . 46

Clearly, LRA's jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution

does not include the power to declare a title sham or spurious or to order the
cancellation of a certificate of title.
AHCTEa
 The settled rule is a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral
attack. 47 A certificate of title may only be altered, modified or cancelled in a
direct proceeding. 48 Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:

Section 48. Â Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A

certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

To allow the cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title in an administrative

reconstitution proceeding will permit an indirect attack on the certificate of
title in violation of Section 48 of PD 1529.
The LRA exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et
al.s' title is sham and spurious. The LRA itself acknowledged that only the
RTC could declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. By ruling on the validity
of Manotok, et al.'s title, the LRA assumed the function of the RTC. The LRA
also preempted whatever decision the RTC may render on the matter.
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of
Barque in view of the existing Torrens title of Manotok, et al. No court, much
less an administrative body, can entertain a petition for reconstitution of lost
or destroyed title if the land is already covered by a Torrens title in the name
of another party, unless there is a final judgment first cancelling such
Torrens title. The only exception is when the Torrens title has been issued for
less than one year, 49 which is not the situation in the present cases.
To allow such reconstitution is to allow a collateral attack on the
existing Torrens title in violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. Such
reconstitution will result in an anomalous situation where two Torrens title in
the name of two different owners cover one property, a situation anathema
to the very concept of stability and indefeasibility of a Torrens title. In
Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela 50 the Court ruled:

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first
securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . .
The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such
third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners.
The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under
the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance
of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders
thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual
notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the
land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges who
disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly
accountable therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has repeatedly reiterated this ruling in subsequent cases. 51
By cancelling the TCT of Manotok, et al., and upholding the TCT of the
Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals resolved in the administrative
reconstitution case the issue of ownership over the property in dispute. This
is grave error because ownership is never in issue in a petition for
reconstitution of title. As this Court ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,
Inc. 52 :

Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself,

does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-
issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the
original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land
or estate covered thereby. (Emphasis in original)

In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the

issuance of a reconstituted title because the reconstituting officer's power is
limited to granting or denying a reconstituted title. The reconstituting officer
has no power to decide questions of ownership. A Torrens title, even a
reconstituted title, is "evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein." 53 Certainly, the
reconstituting officer in an administrative proceeding has no authority to
deprive a third party of his property by cancelling his Torrens title to the
property. In a petition for reconstitution, such third party is not even required
to be impleaded as a respondent.
Equity Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Court of Appeals
held that Manotok, et al.'s title is presumed valid until annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction. In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Court of Appeals
originally ruled that the LRA is without jurisdiction and cannot determine
which of the two titles is valid.
Â
Yet, in the two Amended Decisions, the Court of Appeals sustained as
conclusive the LRA's finding that the title of the Heirs of Barque is the
genuine and authentic title. Moreover, in the Amended Decisions, the Court
of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel Manotok, et al.'s TCT No.
RT-22481 even without a direct proceeding before the proper RTC as
mandated by Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. Clearly,
the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due
process of law.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals insists that it may decide the
cases on the merits based on the records before it "in the pursuit of
expeditious administration of justice." In other words, the Court of Appeals
assumed equity jurisdiction over the cases.
Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a
court of law is unable to render judgment to meet the special circumstances
of a case because of the limitations of its statutory jurisdiction. 54 However,
equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still
apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law. 55 Where the law
prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court
cannot, by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than
the law allows. 56 Thus, the Court ruled:

As for equity, which has been aptly described as 'a justice

outside legality,' this is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail
over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 57 (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, the Court of Appeals may not extend jurisdiction to the LRA
where the law has not granted such jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals may
not also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or
before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. The present cases
involve a vast tract of land in a prime district. The property in question
contains an area of 342,945 square meters. At a conservative estimate of
P5,000 per square meter, the value of the property amounts to
P1,714,725,000. The documents submitted by the parties are conflicting.
The parties question the authenticity of each other's documents. Manotok, et
al. claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 1919 while the Heirs of Barque allegedly
have never set foot on the property.
The determination of the authenticity of the documents and veracity of
the claims of both parties requires a trial on the merits. The LRA exceeded
its jurisdiction when it made a conclusive finding on the validity of the titles
of the parties. Such function falls under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of
the RTC under Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. The Court of Appeals should not
have resolved the factual issues by adopting as its own the LRA's finding.
This Court accords respect, if not finality, to factual findings of an
administrative body. However, this rule does not apply when the
administrative body has no jurisdiction to make a conclusive factual finding
particularly when the findings might conflict with findings of the tribunal or
agency which has jurisdiction on the matter.
Respondents claim that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City.
Respondents point to the 24 June 1998 Resolution of the LRA stating that
Barrio Payong is non-existent. However, the Decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court
Appeals and Macaya, 58 shows that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located
at Barrio Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City. 59 Indeed, the Court of Agrarian
Relations made an ocular inspection of the property, thus: aDHScI

On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk
of Court to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question,
 which is as follows:

"Conformably with 'Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection'

filed with this Court on even date and as stated in paragraph 2
thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby direct to conduct an ocular
inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong,
Quezon City, which as agreed upon between them is set on
June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock A.M. (sic), wherein the parties shall
meet at the site of said landholding and to determine.

(a) Â Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the

plaintiff and/or his children;

(b) Â Portions of the property where the rice paddies are

located;

(c) Â Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and

vegetables;

(d) Â Portions of the property where the houses of the

plaintiff and/or his children are built and located;

(e) Â Portion of the property which, according to the

defendants, had been, before the filing of the complaint in this
case, worked on by Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the
defendants, through Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of
more or less one hectare;

(f) Â Portions burned by the plaintiff."

Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby

directed to submit his report as well as his sketch plan for further
disposition of the Court.

On June 27, 1977, the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT",

which is as follows:

"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated

June 20, 1978, undersigned together with Mr. Victor Flores of this
Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23,
1978, to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding involved
in this case. . . ." 60 (Emphasis supplied)

The findings of the LRA that Barrio Payong does not exist is based
merely on LRA's evaluation of the documents. In contrast, the findings of the
Court of Agrarian Relations that the property of the Spouses Tiongson is
located in Barrio Payong, Quezon City, is based on ocular inspection. The
majority opinion adopts the findings of the LRA. This issue, however, should
be threshed out by the proper trial court in an action directly attacking the
validity of the Torrens title of Manotok, et al.
The Applicability of Ortigas & Company
Limited Partnership v. Velasco
In ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel Manotok, et al.'s title and
the LRA to reconstitute the title of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals
relied on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco . 61 The
Court of Appeals ruled that it would be unjust to the Heirs of Barque to
initiate a new proceeding before the RTC for the sole purpose of seeking the
cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title.
The Heirs of Barque claim that the pendency of the cases for a long
period of time justifies the application of the Ortigas case in their favor. On
the other hand, Manotok, et al. argue that if ever the Ortigas case is
applicable, it will apply in their favor since this Court in a prior decision 62
involving tenancy relationship affirmed their right to the property in
question.
The Ortigas case is not authority to deprive Manotok, et al. of their
right to a direct proceeding before the proper court concerning the validity of
their Torrens title. In Ortigas, the Court ruled that a remand of the case
would be pointless and unduly circuitous, and that to defer adjudication on
the matter would be unwarranted and unjust. This is because the records
showed that Ortigas' titles had already been upheld and affirmed in three
other cases, involving either the original registration or direct attacks on the
titles, decided in 1906, 1985 and 1987. 63 The Court ruled that Ortigas'
documents of ownership have been passed upon, sanctioned and sustained
by the Court more than once. This peculiar circumstance is absent in the
cases before us.
However, the Ortigas case, which the Heirs of Barque insist applies to
the present cases, is authority to hold that the Register of Deeds, the LRA
and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque. The Court held in Ortigas: 64

. . . So, too, this Court has stressed "that lands already

covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance
under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject
of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles filed by third parties without first securing by final
judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . . ."
(Emphasis supplied)

This is the specific ruling in Ortigas that applies to the present cases.
In summary, the Heirs of Barque filed before the Register of Deeds an
administrative petition to reconstitute their allegedly destroyed TCT. The
Register of Deeds, as reconstituting officer, denied the petition of the Heirs
of Barque because, based on official records, the property involved is
already registered under the Torrens system in the name of Manotok, et al.
The LRA affirmed the Register of Deeds, stating that only the proper trial
court could cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. although the LRA believed that
the TCT of Manotok, et al. was a sham. The LRA recognized that in an
administrative reconstitution, the decision of the reconstituting body is either
to deny or approve the reconstitution of the applicant's title, never to cancel
the Torrens title of a third party. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
declared the TCT of Manotok, et al. void and the TCT of the Heirs of Barque
valid. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property
without due process of law. The Court of Appeals blatantly disregarded
Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 which confer on the
proper trial court exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title in an
action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title. The Court should not
countenance this gross injustice and patent violation of the law.
Â
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petitions and set aside the 24 February
2004 Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and
the 7 November 2003 Amended Decision and the 12 March 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. The Land Registration
Authority must defer its ruling in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97] until after
the proper Regional Trial Court shall have rendered a final judgment on the
validity of the titles of the parties.
CASaEc

Â
Footnotes

1. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo
G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-
Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.

2. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R.
Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., dissented.

3. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.

4. Â In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.

5. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.

6. Â Id.

7. Â Id. at 87.

8. Â Id. at 90.

9. Â Id. at 91.

10. Â Id. at 92.

11. Â Id. at 94.

12. Â Id. at 95.

13. Â Id. at 97.

14. Â Id. at 99-121.

15. Â Id. at 119.

16. Â Id. at 236-240. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R.
Bello, Jr.

17. Â CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 240.

18. Â Id. at 273-293.

19. Â Id. at 65.

20. Â Id. at 73.

21. Â CA-G.R SP No. 66642, Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 106-111. Penned by
Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices
Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.

22. Â Id. at 110.

23. Â Id.

24. Â Id. at 117.

25. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 22-23.

26. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 35-37.

27. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 386.

28. Â AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF

TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED.

29. Â Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:

   Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such

of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:

   (a)  The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

   (b)  The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the

certificate of title;

   (c)  A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by

the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

   (d)  The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry

of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy
thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which
the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

   (e)  A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the

property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original had been registered; and

   (f)  Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is

 sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.

30. Â Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corp. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 193, 204
[1997].

31. Â Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636-
637.

32. Â Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA
439, 449.

33. Â G.R. No. 133465, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58, 62-63.

34. Â Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

35. Â G.R. No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508, 514.

36. Â Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91385,

January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29.

37. Â 201 Phil. 727 [1982].

38. Â Id. at 744.

39. Â G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 500-501.

40. Â 215 Phil. 430 [1984].

41. Â Id. at 436.

42. Â 149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].

43. Â Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].

44. Â Supra at 63 & 66.

45. Â Jose v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA
735, 741.

AZCUNA, J.:

1. Â G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455.

CARPIO, J.:

1. Â Presidential Decree No. 1529.

2. Â The Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction when the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds P20,000 or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
the value exceeds P50,000.

3. Â Ladignon v. Court of Appeals , 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).

4. Â Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, p. 386.

6. Â Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices
Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam concurring. Rollo , G.R.
No. 162335, pp. 113-118.

7. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66.

8. Â Ibid., pp. 71-73.

9. Â CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was decided by a Special Division of Five. The

amended decision was penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J.
Guerrero, with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz, and
Danilo B. Pine concurring, and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
dissenting. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 should have been consolidated with CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642, the latter having the lower number.

10. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162335, p. 131. The letter states:

   In connection with the examination/verification of the petition for

administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, supposedly registered in
the name of Homer L. Barque Sr., please furnish us with a certified copy of
subdivision plan Fls-3168-D, for our record and reference.

   Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.

11. Â Ibid., p. 133. The letter states:

   In connection with the examination/verification of the above-entitled

petition, please furnish us a certification as to the existence and authenticity
of plan Fls-3168-D, supposedly covered by TCT No. 210177, for our record
and reference.

   Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.

12. Â Ibid., p. 132. The letter states:

   In reply to your letter dated October 29, 1996 requesting for certified
copy of plan Fls-3168-D for reference in connection with administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177. Relative to the plan Fls-3168-D, please be
informed that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.

13. Â Ibid., p. 134. The letter states:

   In reply to your undated letter, please be informed that a microfilm

copy of Plan FLS-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of this Office.

14. Â Ibid., p. 135. The letter states:

   Relative to the above-entitled petition, we would like to clarify the fact

that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of Plan Fls-3168-D, while your
Office does not have a record of the same.

   Attached for your reference are the following:

   1.  Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by

the TRSS, NCR;
    2.  Reply letter of Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;

   3.  Your reply letter dated November 7, 1996.

   Your clarification is of utmost importance in the resolution of the instant

case.

15. Â Ibid., p. 136.

16. Â Ibid., p. 137.

17. Â Ibid., p. 138.

18. Â Ibid., pp. 139-140.

19. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162335, p. 142.

20. Â Ibid., pp. 144-145.

21. Â Ibid., p. 146.

22. Â Ibid., p. 147.

23. Â Penned by Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit. Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, pp.
88-95.

24. Â Re: Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Lost or Destroyed

Certificates of Title Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6732.

25. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, pp. 93-94.

26. Â Ibid., p. 95.

27. Â Penned by Administrator Senecio O. Ortile. Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, pp. 96-
97.

28. Â CA Rollo , CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, pp. 78-79.

29. Â Ibid., pp. 90-91.

30. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162335, pp. 106-111. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo
G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo
F. Sundiam, concurring.

31. Â Supra note 6.

32. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162335, p. 117.

33. Â CA Rollo , CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, pp. 244-248. Penned by Associate Justice
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.

34. Â Supra note 7.

35. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, p. 65.

36. Â Supra note 8.

37. Â Their lead counsel Atty. Felix B. Lerio filed a Memorandum. Their
collaborating counsel Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz filed another
Memorandum.

38. Â G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.

39. Â Property Registration Decree.

40. Â An Act Allowing Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of

Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and Other Force
Majeure, Amending for the Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential
Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine and Section Five of Republic Act
Numbered Twenty-Six.

41. Â Supra note 24.

42. Â SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

   (a)  The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

   (b)  The co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate of the

certificate of title;

   (c)  A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by

the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

   (d)  The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry

of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy
thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which
the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

   (e)  A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the

property, the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original had been registered; and

   (f)  Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is

sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.

43. Â An Act Providing A Special Procedure For the Reconstitution Of Torrens

Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed.

44. Â SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with
the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or
contain, among other things the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or if any had been issued
the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location area and boundaries of
the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
 the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduce in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Commissioner
of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of title covering the same property.

45. Â Now Land Registration Administrator.

46. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 162605, p. 94.

47. Â Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, G.R. No.

151440, 17 June 2003, 404 SCRA 193.

48. Â Ibid.

49. Â Section 32, PD 1529.

50. Â 201 Phil. 727 (1982). Reported as Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon.
Valenzuela, etc., et al.

51. Â MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., 209 Phil. 325 (1983); Serra Serra v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 34080, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482; Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 38.

52. Â Resolution, G.R. No. 130876, 5 December 2003 417 SCRA 115.

53. Â Caraan v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 140752, November 11, 2005.

54. Â Reyes v. Lim , G.R. No. 134241, 11 August 2003, 408 SCRA 560.

55. Â Arsenal v. IAC , 227 Phil. 36 (1986).

56. Â Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January

1990, 181 SCRA 252.

57. Â Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991,
200 SCRA 178 citing Zabat, Jr. v. CA, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).

58. Â 215 Phil. 430 (1984).

59. Â Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 167-209.

60. Â Ibid., pp. 174-175.

61. Â Supra note 38.

62. Â Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya, supra note 58.
The Tiongson case did not involve a direct attack on the Torrens title of the
petitioners in that case. In addition, the Tiongson case did not mention the
TCT number of the property although petitioners in the present cases are
also the petitioners in the Tiongson case. However, the Tiongson case also
involves a 34-hectare lot located in Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City which is
the same general area involved in the present cases. A reading of the
Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin, shows that the
property in the Tiongson case involves Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate,
containing an area of 34 hectares, located at Barrio Payong, Old Balara,
Quezon City. Rollo of G.R. No 162335, supra note 59.

63. Â The Court cited the Resolution in Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91797, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 360.

64. Â Supra note 38.