WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as
Provincial Governor of Rizal v. THE SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.
December 29, 1960 | CONCEPCION, J.:. | Taxation
PETITIONER: WENCESLAO PASCUAL
RESPONDENTS: SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS
SUMMARY: The provincial governor of Rizal, Pascual,
questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA 920,
it being not for a public purpose. The lower court
dismissed the petition. SC ruled that incidental gains
by the public cannot be considered "public purpose"
for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the
government
DOCTRINE: Where the land on which projected
feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a
private person, an appropriation made by
Congress for that purpose is null and void, and
a donation to the Government, made over five
(5) months after the approval and effectivity of
the Act for the purpose of giving a "semblance
of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure
the basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede
the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
FACTS:
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for
declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act
appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig
feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision.
Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a
member of the Senate of the Philippines.
Respondent Zulueta offered to donate the said feeder roads to the
municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject
to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an
agreement to change the names of two of the street.
However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to
write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA
920.
The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that
inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time
of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the
construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio.
Petitioner Pascual, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the
alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional.
LC: The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality because the same does not affect
him directly. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
WoN incidental gains by the public be considered "public
purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the
government?
RULING: No. SC reversed the LC decision.
RATIO:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax,
and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of

public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the
public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage
of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public.

In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder

roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or
private property when the bill was passed by congress or when
it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and
void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation;
therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not
precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
appropriation.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances

surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners act justify
petitioners action in contesting ion in contesting the
appropriation and the appropriation and donation in quest
donation in question; that this ion; that this action should not
have been dismissed by the lower court; and court; and that the
writ of preliminary that the writ of preliminary injunction should
have been maintained.