Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works

110 PHIL 331 (1960)

Facts: (Kamo na bahala sa facts po :)

Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for

declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act
appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is
owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of
the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to
the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council,
subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads
and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However,
the donation was not executed, which prompted Zulueta to write a
letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920.
The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter
that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at
the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the
construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner,
prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of
donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the
case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appropriation of funds stipulated in the “Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works” is constitutional, considering the
petitioner’s contention that the property included in the appropriation
is of private property of the herein respondent, and considering
further the respondent’s contention that a law passed by Congress
and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress
is the source of all laws.

HELD:
No, the appropriation in this act is unconstitutional.
 As regards to the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for
a public purpose, the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this: It
is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything, but a public purpose. The taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money
raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not
for the advantage of private individuals.

It is the essential character of the direct object of the

expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax,
and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring
the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public. The State exists primarily for
the promotion of the general welfare.
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of
the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public
or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when
it became effective. The land which was owned by the respondent,
which is private, hence, null and void. The donation did not cure
the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of
a said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.

(copy paste :)
HELD:

No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a

private purpose.

The subsequent donation of the property to the government to

make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The
fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money
raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not
for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to the respondent, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.