FW

the standard is consistency with hedonistic utilitarianism.

Prefer:
1] Actor specificity –
A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side
constraints freeze action.
B] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part
of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.
C] No act-omission distinction – governments are culpable for omissions cuz their
purpose is to protect the constituency – otherwise they would have no obligation to
make murder illegal.
Actor spec o/w – different agents have different ethical standings that affect their
obligations and considerations.

2] Weighability – only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a

promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying
person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why
the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the
foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are
most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.
 1AC
Plan: The United States ought to substantially reduce its military presence in West
Asia.

Solves terror blowback and recalculates US grand strategy in a shift towards offshore
balancing and the Indo-Pacific
Manning and Preble 21 [Robert, Atlantic Council senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and
Security. Christopher, co-director of New American Engagement Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy
and Security.] “Reality Check #8: Rethinking US military policy in the Greater Middle East,” Atlantic
Council, June 24, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-8-
rethinking-us-military-policy-in-the-greater-middle-east/ TG

Given these realities, the United States should substantially reduce the number of US forces
permanently stationed in the region and scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments to the
Persian Gulf. Occasional joint exercises in and around the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the
Red Sea could include ships on Mediterranean or Indo-Pacific deployments, but the anachronistic
requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf poses an unnecessary burden on a
US Navy that is already strained to the breaking point.

The United States should conduct a zero-based review, seeking to trade bases for places: instead of
maintaining fixed assets and permanent air and naval facilities, Washington should renegotiate and
extend access arrangements with local partners. Greater investments in intelligence and early warning,
as well as continued close coordination with regional states—and other countries with an interest in
preserving a regional balance of power—will be equally important. In exchange, the elimination of the
permanent carrier presence would help the US Navy divert its scarce shipbuilding resources away from
those legacy platforms to new technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial and subsurface vehicles, as well as
enhanced missile defenses).

The biggest changes to US force posture and force requirements, however, pertain to vulnerable US
Army and Air Force bases. This on-the-ground presence dates back to the first Gulf War, and terrorist
groups have cited it as a key rationale for numerous attacks against the United States and US personnel.
These include the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996 and US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the al-Qaeda attacks
on September 11, 2001. The George W. Bush administration noted the linkage between a US military
presence and terrorism directed against the United States as a reason for wanting to remove troops
from Saudi Arabia. As then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified before Congress in
February 2003, resentment over the stationing of US forces there had “been Osama bin Laden’s
principal recruiting device.” Wolfowitz explained that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq would
enable the United States to withdraw from the region. “I can’t imagine anyone here wanting to . . . be
there for another 12 years to continue helping recruit terrorists.”

Although the al-Qaeda threat has greatly diminished, anger and resentment toward US forces in the
region—and Washington’s continued support for unpopular governments—remains. Meanwhile, Iran’s
ballistic and cruise missile capabilities are a new factor putting US forces at risk. It is therefore vitally
important to US security interests to end or reduce the permanent deployment of forces to Kuwait—the
legacy of a war that ended more than a decade before most of the US troops there were born—as well
as in other major bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman. These moves could allow for a permanent reduction
in the size of the active-duty force. Similarly, the US Air Force should terminate routine overflights in the
region, close many of the associated bases that support these operations, and redirect resources to
reflect the elimination of this unnecessary mission.

These fundamental changes to US deployments and the composition of US forces might strike some as
dramatic, but they are relatively modest given the changes that have occurred since the Carter Doctrine
was handed down over forty years ago. US policymakers need to understand the limits of American
power and align US resources to secure vital interests. In the Middle East, that means encouraging the
emergence of a regional balance of power. It also means combining a reduced US military footprint in
the region with robust diplomacy, particularly in facilitating a Sunni-Shia détente in the Gulf. This may be
aided by an element of exhaustion, as suggested by recent secret Saudi-Iranian talks held in Baghdad.

Pursuing this strategy will require proactive and creative diplomacy on Washington’s part to fashion a
sustainable, stable offshore-balancing role and a willingness to shift away from the military-centric
approach that has defined US policy for decades. The pace and scope of the transformation suggested
here will depend on diplomatic success with Iran.

Defenders of the status quo in the Middle East warn that pressure from Washington risks pushing Gulf
states toward the United States’ foreign rivals. However, as Senator Murphy notes, “this argument is a
red herring, one that plays on a misunderstanding of both the irreplaceability of military alignment with
the United States and the willingness of China and Russia to get their hands dirty in Middle Eastern
politics.”

The Greater Middle East holds limited interests for US national security and certainly none that require a
continued and de facto permanent military presence there. President Biden’s decision to remove the
remaining US forces from Afghanistan reflects a decision to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.
Recalculating US strategic priorities to reflect geopolitical trends is a wise move that should be repeated
elsewhere.

Advantage 2 is Deterrence –

Overextension in the Middle East creates gaps in critical US deterrence of revisionist

powers
Martin et al 10/27 [Peter, Defense Policy and Intelligence Reporter. Courtney Mcbride. Cindy Wang.]
“Allies Fear US Is Overextended as Global Conflicts Spread,” Bloomberg, Oct 27, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-27/mideast-ukraine-china-conflicts-raise-fears-of-
us-overreach TG

Joe Biden came to office declaring America is back. Now, facing hot wars in the Middle East and Ukraine
and a simmering cold one with China, the US is beginning to look overextended.
The US defense industry — Biden’s “arsenal of democracy” — is struggling to produce enough artillery
shells to ensure Ukraine can keep firing them at Russian forces. The Pentagon is bombing targets in Syria
as it rushes air defenses to the region to protect troops in case Israel’s war against Hamas prompts new
attacks by enemies. Taiwan, another American ally, has stepped up orders for American weapons as
China confronts it over strategic sea lanes.

In capitals across Europe and Asia, officials are growing worried that some partners might ultimately be
shortchanged as the surge in simultaneous challenges strains the US ability to respond and its defense
industry struggles to produce enough weapons for all these conflicts. Rivals in Beijing, Moscow and
Tehran, they fear, won’t miss the openings that creates.

Adding to the alarm is the presidential election just over a year from now that may return Donald Trump
to the White House with his talk of pulling out of alliances, making deals with Russia and openly
confronting Iran and China. Already, Biden’s $106 billion budget request for aid to Ukraine, Israel and
Taiwan is running into headwinds from Republicans in Congress.

Biden has raced to reassure leaders around the world that the US would be able to confront all the
threats at once and deliver on its promises of support.

Privately, however, administration officials concede that the crisis in the Middle East has upended what
had been a key tenet of their global approach – that the long-tumultuous region was finally heading into
a period where it wouldn’t require such a big US commitment, allowing Washington to focus more on
the threat from China. That eastward pivot is likely to be slowed, officials said.

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had to hastily recast the online version of his 7,000-word essay
for Foreign Affairs on “The Sources of American Power” this week to delete a reference to the Middle
East as “quieter than it’s been in decades.”

The US had been pulling resources out of the region to send them to confront China and Russia,
confident that Israel, having reached historic rapprochements with key Arab countries, would be able to
ensure its security without as big a presence from its main ally, according to a person involved in the
discussions. That’s now all in question and the US has pushed Israel to delay its ground offensive against
Hamas in the Gaza Strip as it shores up defenses in the region. Israel’s failure to detect the Hamas
assault and defend itself once it started has also raised questions about its vaunted military capability,
according to US officials.

Since the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, the US has been rushing forces back to the Middle East. Biden
dispatched two aircraft carrier groups and air-defense systems to the region, and put thousands of
troops on heightened alert, in what officials call a signal to Iran and other rivals in the region not to join
the fight when Israel launches a widely expected ground invasion of Gaza.

But that message of deterrence doesn’t seem to have gotten through. This week, the US sent warplanes
to strike targets in Syria – its first military action in the region since Oct. 7 – after a string of attacks by
Iran-backed militias had injured more than a dozen troops at US bases there and in Iraq.

Administration officials underline there are no plans at the moment to have US troops fight on the
ground in the Middle East. But Biden, who even as vice president was known for telling aides in the
Situation Room that superpowers don’t bluff, is fully aware of the risks that the American forces may be
drawn in if efforts to contain the conflict fail.

In Ukraine, the US has been adamant from even before Russia’s February 2022 invasion that it wouldn’t
get directly involved in the fighting, instead marshaling allies and providing military and financial support
that’s been essential to Kyiv’s ability to push back Moscow’s forces.

Beyond stopping Russia from taking over its neighbor, that effort sent a signal globally, helping dispel
any illusions that China may have had that US power was on the decline after highly visible setbacks like
the chaotic pullout from Afghanistan in 2021, one US official argued.

But now, with Ukraine’s counteroffensive this year making slow progress against Russia’s defenses and
questions in Congress growing about the continued commitment to support Kyiv as the war settles into
a standoff, the global message looks less clear. The Kremlin, for its part, is betting that it will be able to
outlast the US and its allies.

Already, Moscow seems to be winning the race in artillery shells, which have become a key weapon in
the conflict. Ukraine has depleted limited US and allied stocks and efforts to escalate production,
especially in Europe, have faced setbacks.

The conflict in Ukraine has “exposed the fragility” of the US’s defense supply chain, the Army Science
Board warned last month, saying that the US is “struggling to ramp up the production of munitions.”
Recent war games, some of them classified, have shown that that US stocks of key precision and
standoff weapons could be exhausted in as little as a few days in the event of a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan, the report said.

Now, Israel is also seeking some of the same kinds of shells Ukraine needs for its war against Hamas.
Taiwan, at the same time, has ordered some of the same air-defense weapons that both Israel and
Ukraine use.

“Our industrial base was not prepared to have to restock so many different types of weapons for
multiple different partners at the same time,” said Michèle Flournoy, a former undersecretary of
Defense for policy. “In all three cases, our ability to equip train and support these partners is really the
primary means by which we can safeguard our own interests,” she said.

With military spending at the lowest level as a share of the economy in more than two decades, the
defense industry isn’t ready for a sudden buildup. There are now only five so-called prime contractors,
the top of the defense food chain. In 1993, just after the end of the Cold War, there were 51.

Even if the stars were to align in Washington for a major boost in expenditures on defense, US
government finances are already under intense pressure with borrowing costs rising.

“The US risks overreaching at a dangerously complicated and uncertain time in the world during a time
when we see historic American dysfunction, incompetence and division in our ability to govern,” said
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.
Failure to quickly reinvest military resources in the Indo-Pacific greenlights China’s
invasion of Taiwan
Kavanagh and Cohen 11/21 [Jennifer, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace + Jordan Cohen] “The True Military Assistance Tradeoff Is
Between Israel and Taiwan,” War on the Rocks, Nov 21, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-
true-military-assistance-tradeoff-is-between-israel-and-taiwan/ TG

As our analysis shows, the most significant potential tradeoff isn’t between Ukraine and Israel, which
have different armament needs, or between Ukraine and Taiwan, which have more overlap but still have
different priorities. Rather, the tradeoff that Washington should be focused on is between Israel and
Taiwan. In the best-case scenario, if the Israel-Hamas conflict remains limited, Washington may face no
tradeoff at all. But if fighting expands to include Hizballah or direct conflict with Iran, the United States
will be unable to avoid making hard choices about how to allocate arms transfers and military aid
between Ukraine, Israel, and allies in the Indo-Pacific.

While there are important areas of overlap between the military needs of Taiwan and Ukraine —
especially when it comes to air defense and uncrewed aerial systems — their many differences made
resourcing both marginally sustainable. Ukraine’s highest-priority needs include heavy artillery,
ammunition, tanks, short-range missiles, and mobile air defense, while Taiwan has much more need for
anti-ship missiles, naval mines, long-range missiles, and more advanced, longer-range air defense
systems. Adding aid to Israel changes this calculus. Israel’s needs overlap somewhat with Ukraine’s but
more extensively with Taiwan’s and those of other Indo-Pacific allies. This means that a commitment to
fully aiding Israel could leave Taiwan and other U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific facing longer
delays for systems they require and could leave U.S. forces ill-equipped to counter China.

To avoid putting Indo-Pacific allies in this position, Washington should confront the resource constraints
and necessary tradeoffs it faces on military aid. The Indo-Pacific is America’s top defense priority,
according to Biden’s National Defense Strategy, and Washington faces greater medium to long-term
escalation risks there if it cannot effectively deter China. Moreover, the military threat posed by China is
substantially greater than that of Hizballah or Iran. What’s more, Taiwan’s current military capabilities
fall well below Israel’s.

As a result, Washington should place clear boundaries on its aid to Israel to preserve capabilities that are
essential to deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. First, the United States should take off the table key
systems needed by Taiwan, other Asian allies and partners, and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. These
include long-range precision and anti-ship missiles, air defense systems like Stingers, Patriots, and
terminal high-altitude area defense, and a substantial percentage of uncrewed aerial and naval systems.
Second, the United States should be explicit with Israel in private about the hard limits of U.S. materiel
support, including capabilities, amounts, and duration, thereby allowing Israel to develop sustainable
defense plans. Finally, policymakers should define an exit strategy for eventually winding down the
additional emergency aid provided to support Israel in this crisis period.
Scenario 1: A Limited Gaza Incursion

If Israel’s campaign in Gaza remains limited to a multi-month offensive targeting Hamas, the United States will have little trouble supporting it without compromising aid to Ukraine or Taiwan.

With few exceptions, the capabilities in demand in Ukraine are not needed by Israel for operations in Gaza, and the overlaps that do exist are probably manageable. Israel has so far relied most heavily on its Iron Dome air defense
system with Tamir interceptor missiles and air-launched precision-guided munitions including small diameter bombs and gravity bombs equipped with joint direct attack munition kits to conduct thousands of airstrikes on targets in
the Gaza Strip. The United States has provided additional quantities of these weapons to Israel in recent weeks, but they have not come at the cost of Ukraine or other U.S. foreign policy priorities.
Israel is the only country operating the Iron Dome system, and Ukraine does not have the F-15 aircraft required for air-launched small diameter bombs. The United States has promised a ground-launched version of the small
diameter bomb to Ukraine (and Taiwan), but these are a new capability and have not arrived. Ukraine uses joint direct attack munitions, which turn unguided weapons into guided ones, but they are relatively cheap and easy to
produce in large quantities. As it continues its airstrikes, Israel might use other air-launched precision-guided munitions, such as the Hellfire missile – which the United States has also reportedly provided in recent aid shipments –
but with excess capacity and the proven ability to surge production, it should not be difficult to meet Israel’s needs for this weapon.

For a conflict confined to the Gaza Strip, Israel should have little need for most capabilities in shortest supply and highest demand in Ukraine. For example, advanced air defense systems like the Patriot have missiles that are too
expensive to expend on Hamas’ less sophisticated rockets. Ground-launched precision-guided weapons, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, have a range longer than what is needed for strikes in Gaza. Israel could make use
of Stinger missiles, which have been in high demand in Ukraine, but these are in such short supply in U.S. stocks that the United States is unlikely to be able to provide them to any partner in the near term. On the other hand,
requests for additional tanks, artillery, armed drones, or aircraft are unlikely. Even if the Hamas-Israel conflict expands to include ground incursions, the Israel Defense Forces likely have sufficient systems of their own.

A more extensive ground operation into the Gaza Strip will create additional defense needs. This includes increased demand for the 155mm shells that Ukraine burns through at a rate of 6,000 per day — far above U.S. production
capacity of 28,000 per month. Compared to Ukraine, however, Israel’s 155mm ammunition requirements are likely to be limited. For example, in the 51-day Israeli operation in Gaza in 2014, the Israel Defense Forces reported using
about 35,000 artillery shells. This is comparable to rates of fire for U.S. forces operating in urban environments against the Islamic State.

Washington has already provided Israel with of tens of thousands of these shells, though the Pentagon pushed back onclaims these were rerouted from Ukraine to Israel. Combined with a sizeable ammunition order Israel placed
earlier this year and access to what remains in the U.S. stockpile prepositioned on Israeli territory, this may be enough to meet Israel’s needs in Gaza. Meeting Israel’s ammunition needs may come at some marginal cost to
Ukraine’s operations, but given that Ukraine’s counteroffensive is largely stalled, these effects should be small and temporary.

Scenario 2: An Expanded War with Hizballah

An expanded conflict that includes Hizballah, however, would dramatically increase Israel’s military
requirements and potential requests for assistance from the United States. This would put real but not
unmanageable strain on aid to Ukraine. However, in this scenario, the impact on military assistance and
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be the primary concern.
Hizballah is thought to have somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters and a stockpile of around 150,000 missiles, including relatively advanced precision-guided and short-range ballistic and anti-ship missiles and drones that
could overwhelm Israeli air defenses and devastate critical infrastructure. In its 2006 war against Hizballah in southern Lebanon, Israel relied primarily on long-range fires — hitting as many as 7,000 targets using 19,000 bombs and
2,000 missiles — supplemented by a more limited ground campaign and naval blockade with sea-based strikes. Facing a stronger and better armed Hizballah today, the Israel Defense Forces would almost certainly respond with
increased airstrikes and artillery fire, creating additional demands for precision-guided munitions and ammunition. Israel has also surged tank units to its northern border, suggesting a ground operation might be possible as well.

The United States could probably supply Israel with the short-range weapons it would need to take on Hizballah. But a longer or more intense campaign than in 2006 — a likely reality, given that Hizballah is stronger than in 2006 —
could strain existing stocks, especially for systems like the Hellfire that have relevance in both Ukraine and Taiwan. Tradeoffs would become more difficult if Israel requests longer-range air-launched systems such as the joint air-to-
surface standoff missile or the joint standoff weapon to strike Hizballah targets in Syria, where more modernized air defenses are capable of intercepting Israel’s fighter jets and air-launched munitions. Israel might not need many
of these longer-range missiles. But they would be central to any Indo-Pacific campaign, and U.S. stockpiles are quite limited — by some estimates already below what would be needed for a Taiwan contingency — so even a minor
diversion could detract from both deterrence and warfighting capability in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Meeting additional demand for 155mm ammunition would be harder. Over the course of the 34-day 2006 war with Hizballah, Israeli forces fired nearly 150,000 artillery rounds, including 155mm and other variants. With Hizballah
stronger now, the Israel Defense Forces might need to increase their rate of artillery fire. At the very least, a ground operation that takes several months could increase Israel’s 155mm ammunition needs by over 100,000 rounds,
which would undoubtedly force tradeoffs with supplies sent to Ukraine. Once again, the stalemate in Ukraine and Israel’s smaller needs should be factors in allocating resources across the two countries.

Israel’s need for air defense is also likely to increase if the war expanded to include operations against
Hizballah. To protect against Hizballah’s larger and more advanced arsenal of missiles, Israel relies on
layered air defenses that include the David’s Sling and the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile. But even these
advanced systems might be overwhelmed by Hizballah’s likely high rate of fire and cruise missiles. Both
systems are produced in Israel, so the United States would not be able to backfill these systems directly.
To fill any gap, however, Israel might request U.S. Patriot air defense systems — which are already
in short supply. Not only are they needed in Ukraine, but they are also high on the list of capabilities
required in the Indo-Pacific, whether for Taiwan’s asymmetric defense or for U.S. installations in the
region. Sending them to Israel instead would leave both vulnerable.

Finally, as it did in 2006, Israel also might try to blockade Lebanese ports to limit the flow of weapons
into Lebanon. Israel has a supply of domestically produced anti-ship missiles it could use to support this
operation, but depending on the scope, it might request more, like the Harpoon missiles that Israel
previously purchased from the United States. With Taiwan waiting for 800 Harpoon missiles and other
allies in the Indo-Pacific region interested in this capability, meeting an Israeli request for this or similar
systems would create difficult tradeoffs.

Scenario 3: A Direct Conflict with Iran

Iran has traditionally relied on proxies like Hizballah, but as Israel’s operations against Hamas
intensify, there is a risk the Israeli-Iranian “shadow war” may become more open. If this occurs,
additional Israeli military needs — for example long-range strike and air defense capabilities — would
impact some U.S. military assistance to Ukraine but could have devastating implications for
Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
Iran arguably has the most versatile and largest arsenal of rockets and missiles in the Middle East. This is
comprised of cruise and ballistic missiles, long-range missiles that can reach Tel Aviv, a large land- and
sea-based paramilitary force, and possibly advanced air defense systems acquired from Russia.

To overcome Iran’s advanced air defenses, Israel could request additional long-range precision-guided
munitions (most likely air- and sea-launched) from the United States, including the joint air-to-surface
standoff missile, Tomahawk, or Standard Missile-6, among others, along with advanced uncrewed aerial
systems with strike capabilities. To counter any threats from Iran’s sea-based paramilitary forces, Israel
might need additional uncrewed surface and underwater vessels and a sizable stock of anti-ship missiles,
including possibly the long-range anti-ship missile and Harpoon missiles. Finally, a direct conflict with
Iran would pose further air defense challenges. Since Israel would require time to build up its stockpiles
of Arrow 3 missiles, it might request U.S. Patriot systems or even temporary use of a U.S. terminal high-
altitude area defense system to protect against Iran’s arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Except for the Patriot air defense system, these capabilities are not in high demand in Ukraine, but they
are essential for the Indo-Pacific theater and in short supply there. For example, U.S. forces and allies
and partners would rely heavily on long-range strike assets to target Chinese air, naval, and potentially
mainland assets. The Pentagon has prioritized increasing its production of these weapons, in particular
the joint air-to-surface standoff missile and long-range anti-ship missile, but these efforts would be
undone by a diversion of substantial quantities of either to the Middle East. Uncrewed air and naval
systems will also be valuable for U.S. forces to counter a Chinese invasion fleet in the Taiwan Strait or
Chinese forces in the South China Sea. The same systems will be central to Taiwan’s asymmetric
defense. Finally, given China’s large stockpile of advanced weapons, air defense of all kinds will be at a
premium in the Indo-Pacific, and the loss of even moderate numbers of these systems to the Middle
East will have a negative impact on the U.S. posture in Asia.

The Rationale for Prioritizing Taiwan

There are two main reasons why military assistance to Taiwan should be prioritized over aid to Israel.
The most important is that the U.S. interests at stake in the Indo-Pacific are much greater than those in
Middle East. The Biden administration has repeatedly identified China as the most significant U.S.
competitor and prioritized the goal of deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific as the focus
of U.S. defense policy. The United States has significant economic interests in the region and a strategic
interest in deterring China from seizing Taiwan, which could shift the balance of power in Asia and put
pressure on U.S. alliances in the region. In contrast, U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle
East are considerably narrower, especially given greater U.S. energy independence. A deterrence failure
in the Indo-Pacific will have more severe consequences for the United States and should be more
strenuously avoided.

In addition, U.S. assistance is both more needed in the Indo-Pacific and likely to have a greater impact
on regional deterrence and escalation risks than it would in the Middle East. The military challenge
China poses to Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific allies is substantially greater than the threat presented to
Israel by Hizballah or Iran — especially since neither has shown much interest in escalation with Israel to
this point. This is true not only because China’s military capabilities greatly exceed those of Iran and its
proxies but also because Israel has an advanced and well-stocked arsenalof its own supplemented yearly
by nearly $4 billion in U.S. military assistance while Taiwan’s military capabilities are substantially
weaker and in need of much investment before they will be sufficient to defend against Chinese attack.
In this context, it makes sense to prioritize scarce resources toward the greater threat and need.

Credible deterrence is everything – perception of regional US capabilities makes or

breaks Xi’s decision in the SCS and Taiwan
Flournoy 20 [Michele A. Flournoy. M.Litt. in international relations (British PhD thing) from Oxford
University. Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors. From 2009 to 2012, she served as
U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.] “How to Prevent a War in Asia.” Foreign Affairs. June 18,
2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war-asia TG

Amid all the uncertainty about the world that will follow the pandemic, one thing is almost sure to be
true: tensions between the United States and China will be even sharper than they were before the
coronavirus outbreak. The resurgence of U.S.-Chinese competition poses a host of challenges for
policymakers—related to trade and economics, technology, global influence, and more—but none is
more consequential than reducing the risk of war. Unfortunately, thanks to today’s uniquely dangerous
mix of growing Chinese assertiveness and military strength and eroding U.S. deterrence, that risk is
higher than it has been for decades, and it is growing.

Neither Washington nor Beijing seeks a military conflict with the other. Chinese President Xi Jinping and
U.S. President Donald Trump both undoubtedly understand that a war would be disastrous. Yet the
United States and China could all too easily stumble into conflict, sparked by a Chinese miscalculation of
the United States’ willingness or capability to respond to provocations in disputed areas such as the
South China Sea or to outright aggression against Taiwan or another U.S. security partner in the region.

For the past two decades, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been growing in size, capability, and
confidence. China is also emerging as a serious competitor in a number of technological areas that will
ultimately determine military advantage. At the same time, the credibility of U.S. deterrence has been
declining. For Beijing, the 2008–9 financial crisis gave rise to an enduring narrative of U.S. decline and
Chinese superiority that has been reinforced by perceptions of U.S. withdrawal from the world—as well
as, more recently, by its perception of bungled U.S. management of the pandemic and societal upheaval
over systemic racism.

What’s more, Washington has not delivered on its promised “pivot” to Asia. U.S. troop levels in the
region remain similar to what they were a decade ago. The current administration discarded the Trans-
Pacific Partnership trade agreement its predecessor had so painstakingly negotiated. Senior diplomatic
positions in the region remain empty, and the United States is often underrepresented or entirely AWOL
from the region’s major diplomatic forums. There has been no U.S. answer to Beijing’s Belt and Road
Initiative, even as its influence expands through Asia and well beyond. And Chinese activities in the “gray
zone,” below the level of conflict—such as building militarized “islands” and using coercive measures to
enforce disputed sovereignty claims in the South China Sea—have gone largely unanswered by the
United States beyond the occasional diplomatic démarche or freedom-of-navigation operation.

All of this spells trouble for deterrence. The more confident China’s leaders are in their own capabilities
and the more they doubt the capabilities and resolve of the United States, the greater the chance of
miscalculation—a breakdown in deterrence that could bring direct conflict between two nuclear
powers. As tensions continue to rise and Chinese assertiveness in the region grows, it will take a
concerted effort to rebuild the credibility of U.S. deterrence in order to reduce the risk of a war that
neither side seeks.

Yes Taiwan invasion absent deterrence – Xi’s grand plan and China’s military buildup
Koffler 23 [Rebekah, president of Doctrine & Strategy Consulting, former DIA intelligence officer at the
Pentagon] “Why China appears ready to go to war with the US over Taiwan,” NY Post, Mar 18, 2023,
https://nypost.com/2023/03/18/china-could-go-to-war-with-the-us-over-taiwan/ TG

Last Friday, Chinese leader Xi JinPing won his third five-year term as president in a unanimous vote by
the National People’s Congress. Having secured his grip on power quite possibly for life, Xi is executing
China’s grand plan to re-establish control over Taiwan.

Indeed, so crucial is Taiwan – which broke away from communist China in 1949 – that Beijing appears
willing to tussle with Washington over its long-term fate.

As the only nation standing between China and Taiwan, US battle readiness has never been more vital.
But the US remains woefully unprepared even as every sign from Xi suggests he’s readying himself to
rumble.

First, the war drums – loud ones. In October, Xi installed a “War Cabinet” comprised of seven men, all Xi
loyalists, after removing advisors favoring reforms from the all-powerful Politburo.

The next month, during a visit to China’s operational command center, Xi directed his military to be
ready for war. “The entire military must . . . concentrate all energy on fighting a war, direct all work
toward warfare and speed up to build the ability to win,” Xi said. CIA Director William Burns estimates
Beijing wants to be conflict-ready by 2027.

Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan, head of Air Mobility Command, however, forecasts that the US and China
“will fight in 2025.” He suggests China will mount an attack on Taiwan while Americans are distracted by
the upcoming presidential election.

Xi is also banking on America’s inability to simultaneously prosecute a war with both Russia and China,
which is why he may act on Taiwan sooner rather than later – while the Russia-Ukraine war is ongoing.
Indeed, with Xi set to meet Vladimir Putin in Russia next week, China is paying close attention to
activities out of Moscow.

Meanwhile, as China augments its fighting prowess on the ground, it’s also beefing up defense
capabilities in space as part of its Taiwan-invasion toolbox. Between 2019 and 2021, China doubled its
number of orbiting satellites from 250 to 499, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. During
wartime, satellites deliver everything from missile warning and navigation to reconnaissance and
command-and-control efforts.

On Tuesday, US Space Force Chief Gen. Chance Saltzman revealed that over the past six months, China
launched dozens of spacecraft to target US forces. At the same time, the Chinese military is developing
and fielding weapons to attack US satellites and “blind and deafen” US forces. They include kinetic-kill
missiles, ground-based lasers, electronic warfare systems, directed energy weapons and orbiting space
robots.

Beyond space defenses, China is already looking to implement nuclear lessons learned from the Russia-
Ukraine war. The threat of nuclear annihilation breeds fear in US leaders, preventing Washington from
deploying forces into active theaters of war. In recent years, Beijing has accelerated the modernization
of its nuclear forces. By 2035, China will likely triple its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads, according to
the Pentagon.

Beijing’s other WMD programs include chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Beijing has missiles,
rockets and artillery that could likely be adapted to deliver CBW agents. Scientist’s at the People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) Fifth Institute of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences in Wuhan
are conducting coronavirus research as part of China’s national biological weapons program.

A weaponized engineered coronavirus could create another pandemic. And the notion of unleashing a
COVID-like virus on the US in the run up to a Chinese attack on Taiwan has already been linked to China.

Such an attack would require China to augment and upgrade its current forces in order to outmatch
their US counterparts in any cross-strait attack. And this is already happening. Existing PLA rockets can
almost certainly reach US forces and bases in the region. China’s 350 or so battleships now outnumber
those of the US by nearly a quarter. And the PLA is ramping up military drills in the South China Sea,
practicing tactics that would deny access to the US Navy.

Still, China knows the US wins big for technological superiority, and they’re hard at work trying to erode
Washington’s edge. Which is why China’s cyberattack strategy is so focused on disrupting US
computerized networks — which it apparently already has according to recent reports. A recent report
from the Department of National Intelligence warns that if Beijing feared an imminent conflict with the
US, it would “almost certainly” target “US homeland critical infrastructure and military assets
worldwide” with crippling cyber strikes. The goal is to impede US decision-making and induce social
panic, thus interfering with the deployment of US forces.

With its heavy reliance on high-tech weaponry, China believes that the US way of war is outdated,
leading to a “dead end.” Beijing is emboldened by its assessment of America’s unpreparedness for
“unrestricted warfare,” a concept developed by Chinese military theorists in the 1990s. Whether it
actually shoots the first missile, Chinese doctrinal writings make clear that Beijing is preparing to fight
and win a war with the US.

Goes nuclear
Pettyjohn and Wasser 22 (Stacie, and Becca, 5-20-2022, "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,"
Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-
nuclear) AG

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin
has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside
parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling
has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly
invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even
the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC
program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game
posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might
act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and
expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with
Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go
nuclear.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the
island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy.
Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it
finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending
Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve
that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep
the United States out of the conflict.

GEARING FOR BATTLE

China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese
President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to
Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able
to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American
military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing
nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting
capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.

China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year,
nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of
American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The
Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an
orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets
in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have
around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on
these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have
made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.

Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter
experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—
illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries
would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such
strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by
attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-
for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.
For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-
Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to
U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team
viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States
targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on
the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home
territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks
on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature
and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as
the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team
responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.

One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go
nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated
throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode
Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China
team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its
nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture
and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible
given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of
experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to
reinforce the credibility of its warning.

China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range
conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to
launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam
and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to
impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger
nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s
threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S.
homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use”
nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a
demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only
damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The
war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear
weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.