MIDTERMS POINTERS

-EUROPA CASE
-constitutional PROVISIONS
-SWEEPINGLY ON LAND ONLY FEW IPRA case, loc gov powers
-forestry code and chain saw act

-initial implication of state ownership is that

all titles agreements permits emanates from states and states regulates. ex. if you wnt to use a
water for commercial purposes. the state comes in, including ancestral domains.
-responsibility to effectively manage them and for future generation can also benefit.

-subsequent implications yung (MODES)

Four (4) modes of Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural Resources
(Shall be under the full control and supervision of the State

I. The state may directly undertake such activities

II. II. The state may enter into co-production, joint venture and production sharing
arrangement with
a. Filipino citizen Corporation or association at least 60% of whose capital is owned
by such citizen. It should not exceed 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years
III. Congress may, by law, authorize small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizen; (Congress may also authorize cooperative fish farming, with priority
to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.)
IV. The President may enter into agreements with foreign- owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils.

It should be based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country
In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered under this provision, within 30
days from its execution.
Management and service contracts are not allowed under this rule
Large-scale EDU pertains to area covered and not the amount of investment

-Explain why property has a social function

reflects social justice perspective.
IPRA and agrarian seeks to make sure that land (since they are source of conflict) it has been
related to property. state has a rule for it to be regulated and make sure it is for public use and
common good. regulating the use, means if property does not want to use the property, like mga
hectares ang lupa, hacienderos. addressing poverty and common good, beneficial to society as
a whole.

- give 5 instruments
Special land Use Permit
Forest Land Use Agreement
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism purposes
Forest Land Grazing Management Agreement
Protected Area Community based Resource management Agreement
Special use Agreement in Protected Areas

Nelson
- it can be illegal logging or violation of wild life.
-Rights of the IPS under IPRA 4 groups of rights.
the right to ancestral domain and lands,
right to self-governance and empowerment,
social justice and human rights, and
right to cultural integrity.
CLOA
- It is a rule that CLOA beneficiary is prohibited to sell, transfer or convey the right to use the land
he or she acquired. Lands acquired by him may only sold, transferred or conveyed to their children,
the government, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LandBank), or other qualified beneficiaries for 10
years. In the given facts, the DAR shall then have the right to cancel the certificate of beneficiary and
give it to another deserving

-Sarabia,
-make verification, ask lenos if he has tree cutting permit
what will you sue sarabia for?
-9175
what will you sue me lenos for?
-illegal logging, forestry code

-zenith
I will deny the application of Zenith Corp. because the area is identified as watershed and a
non-alienable and disposable area. Besides, Palm oil plantation has an advantage for increase
production of coconut by products however, it also has a negative impact which is is soil
erosion. It may occur due to land clearing to allow growing of oil palm. When site clearing is
carried out, removal of the protective vegetation cover and disturbance to soil surface will
inevitably bring about to soil erosion.
-Spouses azaro
Spouses Lazaro has no valid defense, what has been don eis considered illegal logging
Punished under
Violation PD 705 Section 43. Swamplands and mangrove forests. Strips of mangrove forest
bordering numerous islands which protect the shoreline, the shoreline roads, and even coastal
communities from the destructive force of the sea during high winds and typhoons, shall be
maintained and shall not be alienated. Such strips must be kept from artificial obstruction so that
flood water will flow unimpeded to the sea to avoid flooding or inundation of cultivated areas in the
upstream.

All mangrove swamps set aside for coast-protection purposes shall not be subject to clear-cutting
operation.

Mangrove and other swamps released to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for
fishpond purposes which are not utilized, or which have been abandoned for five (5) years from the
date of such release shall revert to the category of forest land.
Tagbanua Community Quarrying
-NO the corporation is not right because even if the Ips doesn’t yet have their CADT their rights
are given under the IPRA law. The said law aims to protect and develop the past, present and
future manifestations of IP cultures as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual
religious, and spiritual property taken without their free and prior informed consent or in violation
of their laws, traditions and customs.

-can IPs assert their right on free, prior and informed consent, even they dont have cadt.

-last slide
a. False, not yet
b. false
c.false
d. fasle

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

FACTS: Petitioners Minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents against
original defendant Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., [Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)] which he holds in trust for the ben efit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations petition to prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforest s and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support system s and
continued rape of Mother Earth - granted timber license agreements ('TLA's ') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares fo r commercial logging purposes
thus, at the present rate of deforestation, i.e. a bout 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour, the Philippines will b e bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade,
if not earlie r. clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entit led
to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State: (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions un der which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with eac h other;(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present an
d future generations of Filipinos and; (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977) Constitutional
policy of the State to: a. effect "a more equitable distribut ion of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of nat ural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution); b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid); c. "conserve and promote
the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.); d. "protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article I I, id.) Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on 2 gro unds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government - granted further ruling that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of con tracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land. Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 to set aside
dismissal order
ISSUE:
1. whether or not the minors have locus standi - yes
2. W/N the TLA should be cancelled
HELD: Petition is granted 2. Yes. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (NOT Bill of Rights), it doe s not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political right s enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation-the advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need NOT even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. Explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and t o health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
high lighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative du ty to refrain from impairing the
environment. even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations [June 1977:
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code)] Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state all licenses may
thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization a nd disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dicta
ted by public interest or public welfare as in this case the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest. With respect to renewal,
the holder is NOT entitled to it as a matter of right.

MMDA, ET AL. VS. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY,

FACTS:

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically PD.. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

Respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast
Guard , PNP Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly
with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment
Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the
trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.

RULING:

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial
duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an
act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite
duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on
one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial
duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from
operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the
effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty
to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition.
The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up
a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or
not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its
solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing
not to perform these duties.

TANO VS. SOCRATES

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

CONSTI

ARTICLE 2

SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

ARTICLE 12

SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership.

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law,
the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.

SECTION 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific
limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground.
Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be
increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such period as
it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed
areas.

SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

SECTION 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish,
and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to
participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall
provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and
adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates
which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and
other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against
foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization
of marine and fishing resources.

SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of
the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for
their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

Urban Land Reform and Housing

SECTION 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services
to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners.

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate

consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.
“Sustainable development is a guiding principle in environmental management. Good governance is the
foundation of sustainable development”

This study examines the effects/impact of ecotourism to the local community and the importance of natural
resource to the tourism industry. This study likewise examines the effectivity of local government’s
management.

The Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park- Management Office (PSRNP-PAMO) is a program
under the City Mayor’s Office of the City Government of Puerto Princesa that has a function of overseeing
and managing the day to day operations of PPSRNP. Aside from the park management office, PPSRNP is
also managed by the City through a multi-sect Protected Area Management Board (PAMB), a policy
making body that provides policy directions and other oversight functions.

Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park (PPSRNP) is a World Heritage Site and declared as 1 of
the New 7 Wonders of Nature and is among the country’s premier eco-tourism destination. It known for
intact old growth forest, interesting wildlife, beautiful white sand beaches, impressive caves systems and
unspoiled natural beauty. Through a sustainable tourism program, it provides its visitors a genuine
wilderness experience. It is also declared as a UNESCO World Heritage and Ramsar site. It is a home to a
large number of bird species, including the endemic Palawan hornbill, Palawan peacock pheasant and
Philippine cockatoo, all of them threatened species. Wildlife law enforcement initiatives afford protection to
commonly traded endemic mammal species taking refuge here, such as the Palawan
pangolin, porcupine and bearcat.1

The 22,202-hectare park features the 8.2-kilometer underground river as its main attraction. 2 Pre-
pandemic, it was reported that the park received an average of 1,000 to 1,200 (maximum capacity) guests
a day. This revealed that undoubtedly the tourism industry in the area has been the source of income for
most of the householders. It is also seen that more establishments were established in the area since the
boost of the tourism industry of Puerto Princesa, and due to the growing number of visitors in the area. In
addition, it had caused high influx of people because of work opportunity. Some degradation of the site’s
biodiversity values by tourism pressure, illegal activities and exploitation by the local community is also
recognized. As well as zoning of the sites and on-going land claims and control of tourism are the issues
being dealt by the park management.

Nevertheless, the park management of PPSRNP, sets out relevant objectives and programs and provides
zoning within the park’s boundaries wherein different management regimes apply. Management of the
property is very effective, reflecting strong local political support and enabling the provision of reasonable
funding and staffing. Its key directive is to conserve the underground river and the forest ecosystem in their
most natural state possible. The management had identified and still implementing eighth (8) Management
Programs. They are Habitat and Ecosystems Management, Protection and Law Enforcement, Research
and Monitoring, Information and Public Awareness, Development and Community Participation, Tourism
and Visitor Management, Regional Significance, Institutional Organization, Development and
Administration.3

1
https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/652/
2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Princesa_Subterranean_River_National_Park
3
https://undergroundriver.puertoprincesa.ph/
All of these mentioned effort and system shows that our local government shall share with other pertinent
agencies as well as to the communities, the sustainable management and development of our natural
resources. The local government has a power to require permits and issue guidelines and policies to
control the use of our resources and to have a concrete management plan where threats from activities
such as forest clearing and agriculture are being addressed. Water quality in the underground river,
invariably affected by upstream activities in the catchment area, as well as concerns about pollution inputs
to the river. Also, the regular awareness campaigns at the level of the barangays, they are also needed to
ensure natural values of the park are conserved within their jurisdictions and the establishment of an
integrated land use plan to ensure long term conservation of the natural values of the park.

To conclude, we can say that good governance promotes accountability, transparency, efficiency and rule
of law at all levels and allows efficient management of human, natural, economic and financial resources
for equitable and sustainable development.
TANO VS SOCRATES (278 SCRA 154)

In this case, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court ruled that the mentioned ordinances are constitutional since one of the devolved
powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out
such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

My insights in this case are, first, it is true that such ordinances created and implemented by the local
government are just and valid, because in the exercise of such powers by the local government, it helps in
insuring that our water resources specifically, the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells, remain healthy
for the future generation. Second, there has always been a dispute between rights and laws and in this
case, the petitioners are contending that these ordinances had deprived them of their livelihood. This is not
true, because if activities like what is being implemented in the ordinance, are not regulated and not
prevented, the result is that they will lose their livelihood since they will no longer be able to catch any fish
after the resources had depleted. Lastly, it should be noted that the local government have the full
responsibility and the right to provide a balanced and healthful ecology to its people, and it carries with it a
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 129546, DEC 13, 2005).

This case stemmed from an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) granted by The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources – Environmental Management Bureau to Metro Manila Authority
(MMA) for the operation of a two-an-a-half-hectare garbage dump site in the municipality of San Mateo.
The Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo and various concerned citizens raised serious objections
to the operation of the open dumpsite for health and ecological reasons. The Sangguniang Bayan of Saan
Mateo Rizal issued a resolution expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of the landfill
operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the draft Presidential
Proclamation segregating 71.6 hectares from Marikina Watershed Reservation for the landfill site in Pintong
Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal. However, despite objections, the President issued Proclamation No. 635
excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation certain portions thereof for use as a sanitary landfill
under the Administration of the Metro Manila Development Authority.

Justifying the proclamation, the DENR pointed out that the landfill site is part of the Public domain, and that
neither the province of Rizal nor the Municipality of San Mateo has the power to control or regulate its use
since properties of this nature belong to the national, and not to the local governments.

The court ruled in this case in favor of the petitioners. The court said that these concerns are addressed by
Rep. Act No. 9003. "The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000" which was enacted pursuant to
the declared policy of the state "to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage
resource conservation and recovery." It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste
Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling,
composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and
public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects. The said law mandates the
formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, among other things,
the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from
effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer,
groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the
minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with
the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where
the landfill’s operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers,
groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

My insights in this case are, first, the dumping site really affected the ecological balance and environmental
factors of the community based on the mentioned investigations by DENR-Regional Office. Thus, it is just
right for the local government, since they are closer to their constituents, they are in a better position to
secure resources and to turn the theory of sustainability and ethics of equality into real activities. Second, it
was mentioned in the case that under the law, the National Government is required to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions." Likewise, it requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by
government authorities and the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained. This statute is valid and just
since the local government plays a major role in a community's development. It has a function to provide
the links between the people and government, address its community's problems and concerns, enforce
policies and hold influence over its communities. Also, relying only on state laws may not do a complete
job.Lastly, it is true that the local government is the one who has the main responsibility as to its
constituents and the management of the resources within the area of its jurisdiction, it must be noted that
rather than pointing fingers to people who are irresponsible in terms of solid waste, we would rather act on
it. No one level of government can be effective on its own. It takes a cooperative effort.

INSIGHTS/REVIEW ON CASES RELATING TO IPRA LAW

1. UNDURAN, ET AL. VS. ABERASTURI, ET AL. (G.R. 181284; JUNE 2017)

In this case, Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of
the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located at
Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their
forefathers.

On the other hand, respondents, claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an
unregistered parcel of agricultural land, with an area of 105.7361 hectares, which
appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Later,
respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with
Damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo.

Petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer, alleging that respondents have no
cause of action against them. The rest of the petitioners contended that under Republic
Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), it is
the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) not the regular courts, which
has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous Peoples (IP’s). In their
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that the NCIP as quasi-
judicial agency, provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the
State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights; The NCIP has the
competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of justice with
respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and Recognition and
enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's
obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the
jurisdiction over the disputes and controversies involving the ancestral domain
of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties involved, not the NCIP.

It was held that, the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and
decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasihelical function. In contrast, a
court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special whether or not the Regional
Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes and controversies involving the
ancestral domain of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties involved not the NCIP
powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting
in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only
such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or
special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be
exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
It is important to note in this case that the court provides the jurisdiction of the NCIP, the
court said that its jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two important
issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under
customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be
punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.

Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint
in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is
well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses
raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.

In this case, I’ve learned that The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
was enacted in order to protect and promote the rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, creating a National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, establishing implementing mechanisms, appropriating funds therefor,
and for other purposes. It provides for the recognition of the traditional rights of
Indigenous Peoples over their ancestral domains.

With regard to resolving disputes, Par. h, Sec.7, Chapter III of IPRA Law, provides
that, the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the
area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts.

Section 66 of the same act provides that, The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICC/IPs: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elder/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition with the NCIP.

The salient point of this case is the applicability of Customary law only among
IPs, because such law forms an intrinsic part of social and economic systems
and the way of life of indigenous peoples and local communities. It also differs
from place to place, even within one ethnic or language community. It is central
to the very identity of indigenous peoples and local communities, defining rights,
obligations and responsibilities of members relating to important aspects of their
lives and cultures. It can also relate to use of and access to natural resources,
rights and obligations relating to land, inheritance and property, maintenance of
cultural heritage and knowledge systems, and many other matters.

To conclude, Continuing use of traditional knowledge by indigenous peoples and

local communities, development of policies is needed for the long-term
protection of traditional knowledge. Adoption of legislation and development
policies which empower indigenous peoples and local communities to exercise
control over their traditional knowledge in accordance with customary law is also
crucial.

2. LIM, ET AL. VS. GAMOSA, ET AL. (G.R. 193964; DEC. 2, 2015)

As a summary of this case, Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of

Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan filed a petition before the National Commission
on Indigenous People (NCIP) against petitioners for “Violation of Rights to Free and
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with
Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO.” Despite a motion to dismiss
being a prohibited pleading under NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, petitioners
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, among others, that NCIP lack jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition because petitioners are not members of the
ICC/IP. The NCIP, however, resolved to deny the motion to dismiss. Likewise, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the NCIP’s denial and reasoned out that from the wording of
Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP was bestowed with an all-encompassing grant of
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and that the
requirement in the proviso contained in the section i.e. obtaining certification from the
Council of Elders/Leaders that the parties had exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary law prior to the filing of an action, applied only to instances where both
parties were members of an ICC/IP. In all, the Court of Appeals upheld that when a
claim or dispute involves rights of the ICCs/IPs, the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case
regardless of whether the opposing party is a non-ICC/IP. Petitioners thus filed this
petition for review on certiorari.

The issue is whether the NCIP have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
instant case.

The Court held in negative and said that Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary,
specifically excluding disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where opposing party is a
non-ICC/IP. This provision reflects IPRA’s emphasis of customs and customary law to
govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that customs
and customary law cannot be applied to non-ICCs/IPs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as
a distinct sector of the Philippine society.

The court further provides that the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP is confined
only to a special cause involving ICCs/IPs, and it can only be exercised under the
limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute. The court emphasized the
primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIP’s limited and
special jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute resolution. The proviso in
Section 66 of the IPRA limits the jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs where both parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and
customary law cannot be made to apply to non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the
NCIP’s limited and special jurisdiction. Clearly, the phraseology of “all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs” does not necessarily grant the NCIP all-
encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard
to the status of the parties, i.e, whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.

My insights in this case are that, IPRA recognition of customary law is clear in
Sec. 15, IPRA: “The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly
accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions and peace building
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their
respective communities as may be compatible with the national legal system and
with internationally recognized human rights.”

Since two of the defendants in this case were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had
jurisdiction over the complaint in the case. Given this, the IPs are compelled to
litigate before regular courts for violation of their MoAs with Non-IPs.

Litigation is culturally, financially and geographically prohibitive for the IPs. The
adversarial nature of the litigation process is a totally alien concept to the IPs
being familiar only with the dispute resolutions of customary law. The
recommendations seek to provide arbitration services for IPs so they may settle
disputes with non-IP entities in a manner that is more accessible and culturally
appropriate than adversarial and highly technical litigation.

I’ve also found that the decision in d Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al was upheld
here, where it was ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA does not endow the NCIP
with primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso, the
Supreme Court held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes
occur only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP.
3. CRUZ AND EUROPA VS. NCIP, ET AL. (G.R. 135385; DEC. 2000).

In this case, Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The issue is whether provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.

The court held in negative, it said that the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at
the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which
is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

It is also important to note the opinion of Justice Puno: "When Congress enacted the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine
legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on
state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this
law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of
its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by
the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their
ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our
indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or

indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these
people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native
title.

What I’ve learned in this case is how the IPs/ICCs contribute in conserving and
preserving our natural resources. They serve as stewards of our natural
resources. Their ways of life and their livelihoods can teach us a lot about
preserving natural resources, growing food in sustainable ways and living in
harmony with nature. That’s why through IPRA Law, Indigenous rights are being
protected.

Although nowadays, there are number of cases where IPs/ICCs are being
reported to be engaged in illegal activities and conflicting interest, this also have
number of reasons why they resort to such. The indigenous peoples, to a large
extent “forgotten” by the government, are in the midst of problems. Physical
isolation does not shield them from being caught in the crossfire in the on- going
armed conflicts in the country, many suffered as internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and some killed or detained and tortured as suspected members of the
armed opposition groups. Lack of access to basic social services, education,
sustainable livelihood, farm-to-market roads, and health services contribute to
their continuing poverty. In many cases, the onslaught of commercialism and
modern culture came at the expense of maintaining their own culture and
tradition and thus their identity.

To conclude, the importance of legally protecting traditional indigenous lands

is an effective way of preserving natural resources and mitigating the effects of
the climate crisis.
 DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC

G.R. No. 73002 | December 29, 1986

FACTS

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the IAC
affirming a decision of the CFI of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of 5 parcels of land, acquired by it from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired
by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the
sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel
and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession
of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on
October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable
or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality when the Board of
 Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabelaon
and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon,
Isabela.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS:

● the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or
long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly
applicable law;

● and since section 11 of Article XIV OF 1973 Constitution prohibits private

corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.

PERTINENT PROVISION

Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a b o n a d e claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure . These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

ISSUE
W/N the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of
the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of
the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. - YES

RULING

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981.

● If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative

● If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.

If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for
that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed
in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question
of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the
1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing
or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that
type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

SUSI vs. RASON FACTS: Basilio and Apolonio Mendoza after having been in possession of the
subject land sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12. The possession and occupation of the
land in question has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption,
EXCEPT when Razon commenced an action in the CFI Pampanga to recover the possession of
said land. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Susi. Razon then applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase. Susi led an opposition asserting his possession of the land for twenty-
five years. The Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Susi and sold the land to Razon.
Susi filed a complaint in the CFI of Pampanga by against Razon and the Director of Lands. CFI
of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring that SUSI is entitled to the possession of the land. It
annulled the sale to Razon and cancelled the certificate of title issued to her. Director of land
filed an appeal. ISSUE: WHO IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OFTHE LAND? HELD: Valentin Susi
is the rightful owner of the land. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. An open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from
time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, to become private,
property. It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his
predecessor, since the year1880, that is, for about 40 years. When on August 15, 1914, Angela
Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin. Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four (34) years. And if it is taken into
account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on
December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the
doctrine lay down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariilo v
s .Government of the Philippine Islands (212U. S., 449 1 1), is applicable here. In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption established in paragraph (b) of section 45of
Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of

title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.