B.
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT (TRO), had the authority to impose subsequent
The idea is that freedom from prior restraint
would be meaningless if there were unrestrained
threats of subsequent punishment. Opinions on
public issues, even if novel or controversial,
cannot be punished upon publication. However,
this doesn't grant publishers immunity from laws
against scandalous or obscene content, seditious
writings, libel, or insulting words. The freedom of
the press includes the right to truthfully discuss
matters of public concern without prior restraint
or fear of subsequent punishment, but this
discussion must be truthful, concern matters of
general interest, and not endanger important
social ends protected by the government.
(Source: Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 2009)
281. MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V. CA, GR
127930, DECEMBER 15, 2000
FACTS: On January 19, 1995, Miriam College
dismissed and suspended several students
allegedly involved in the publication of materials
deemed offensive. The affected students filed a
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), challenging Miriam College's
disciplinary actions. In response, the RTC issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on May 19,
1995, enjoining Miriam College from enforcing
the dismissal and suspension.
The Court of Appeals (CA) later granted the
students' petition, declaring the RTC Order and
the students' dismissal and suspension as void.
Miriam College appealed to the Supreme Court,
questioning the CA's jurisdiction to entertain the
case and asserting its authority to impose
disciplinary actions.
ISSUE: Whether Miriam College, after the
expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order
administer
punishment, specifically the dismissal and
suspension of students involved in the
publication of offensive materials.
RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld
Miriam College's authority to impose disciplinary
actions after the expiration of the TRO. The Court
emphasized that the TRO issued by the CA had a
limited life of twenty days from the date of issue,
and no preliminary injunction was issued.
Consequently, the TRO automatically expired,
and Miriam College was no longer restrained
from enforcing the dismissal and suspension.
The Court further asserted that Miriam College,
as an educational institution, had the right to
discipline its students based on academic
freedom, maintaining an orderly educational
environment, and developing discipline in the
students. The decision did not explicitly address
the concept of subsequent punishment as a
distinct legal issue but implied its validity in the
context of Miriam College's authority to enforce
disciplinary actions after the lapse of the TRO.
DOCTRINE: In the Miriam College vs. Court of
Appeals case, the doctrine on subsequent
punishment emerges implicitly, emphasizing that
the expiration of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) does not negate the educational
institution's inherent authority to impose
disciplinary actions. The court underscores the
institution's academic freedom and disciplinary
powers, stating that the limited duration of the
TRO does not diminish the school's right to
regulate conduct, maintain order, and create a
conducive learning environment. While not
explicitly labeled as a doctrine, the case
establishes a precedent affirming that
educational institutions retain the prerogative to
subsequent punishment for
disciplinary violations even after the lapse of
injunctive measures.
282. ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, 527 SCRA 446
FACTS: Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N.
Pastor, the petitioners, filed motions for
reconsideration in consolidated cases against
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr. et al. The Supreme
Court, through resolutions, denied their motions
for reconsideration and other subsequent
pleadings related to the case. Subsequently, Atty.
Roxas wrote a letter to Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario, expressing strong criticism of the Court's
decision, accusing the Court of injustice, and
making contemptuous remarks. The Court, per
resolution, ordered Atty. Roxas to explain why he
should not be held in contempt of court for his
letter.
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent punishment,
including a ₱30,000 fine and a warning of more
severe penalties, imposed on Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas for his critical remarks expressed in a letter
to Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, was justified.
RULING: The Court found Atty. Roxas guilty of
indirect contempt of court for his defamatory
and contemptuous statements directed at Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario and the Supreme Court.
It upheld the ₱30,000 fine and warned of more
severe penalties for a repetition of similar acts.
The ruling emphasized the need to balance
freedom of expression with the duty of lawyers
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts.
The Court considered Atty. Roxas's statements as
an abuse of his right to free speech and a
violation of legal ethics, warranting disciplinary
action.
The decision underscored the importance of
respecting the judiciary and maintaining public
confidence in the administration of justice. It
affirmed the Court's inherent power to cite
individuals, including lawyers, in contempt for
actions that undermine the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. Atty. Roxas's
criticism, while permissible within bounds of
respect and propriety, crossed the line into
contemptuous behavior, justifying the imposed
penalty and warning.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine established in the case
of G.R. No. 152072 and G.R. No. 152104
emphasizes the delicate balance between
freedom of expression and the duty of lawyers to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. It
reaffirms the inherent power of the judiciary to
cite individuals, including lawyers, in contempt
for actions that undermine the integrity and
independence of the judicial system. The
doctrine underscores that while criticism of court
decisions is permissible within bounds of respect
and propriety, any expression that crosses into
defamatory or contemptuous behavior may
warrant subsequent punishment. This case
highlights the judiciary's commitment to
maintaining public confidence in the
administration of justice, acknowledging the
need for disciplinary measures to curb actions
that go beyond the limits of acceptable criticism
and compromise the dignity of the legal
profession.
283. FORTUN V. QUISAYAS, 690 SCRA 623
FACTS: Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas was
involved in distributing copies of the disbarment
complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to
the media. The disbarment complaint was
related to Fortun's role as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case, a matter of
significant public interest. The media
subsequently reported on the filing of the
disbarment complaint.
ISSUES: The central issue in this case was
whether Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas should
be held in contempt for violating the
confidentiality rule outlined in Section 18, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. The court needed to
determine if Atty. Quinsayas' distribution of the
disbarment complaint to the media constituted a
breach of the confidentiality surrounding
disbarment proceedings.
RULING: The court found Atty. Prima Jesusa B.
Quinsayas guilty of indirect contempt for her
involvement in distributing copies of the
disbarment complaint to the media. The ruling
emphasized that such actions violated the
confidentiality rule, which is in place to protect
the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from baseless charges.
As a consequence of the contemptuous act, the
court imposed a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000) on Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas. The
fine was intended to serve as a penalty for
violating the confidentiality rule and
compromising the privacy of the disbarment
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: In this case, the issue of subsequent
punishment arises in the context of contempt
proceedings against Atty. Prima Jesusa B.
Quinsayas for her unauthorized distribution of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun to the media. The court's ruling
reflects the doctrine of proportionality in
contempt proceedings, emphasizing that the
punishment imposed should be commensurate
with the gravity of the contemptuous act. In this
regard, Atty. Quinsayas was found guilty of
indirect contempt, and a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000) was imposed as a
punitive measure. The doctrine underscores the
importance of aligning the punishment with the
severity of the conduct while considering the
principles of justice and fairness in the
administration of contempt proceedings.
C. SPEECH AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
284. SANIDAD V. COMELEC – 181 SCRA 529
FACTS:
1. Republic Act No. 6766, providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, was enacted.
2. A plebiscite for the ratification of the
Organic Act was scheduled, governed by
Comelec Resolution No. 2167.
3. Section 19 of Resolution 2167 prohibited
mass media columnists, commentators,
announcers, or personalities from
campaigning for or against plebiscite
issues during the campaign period.
4. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper
columnist, challenged the
constitutionality of Section 19, arguing
that it violated freedom of expression
and of the press.
ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, which prohibits media
practitioners from campaigning for or against
plebiscite issues during the campaign period,
violates constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression and of the press.
RULING: The court declared Section 19 null and
void and unconstitutional. The key points in the
ruling include:
 1. Comelec lacked statutory basis to
regulate the expression of media
practitioners during plebiscite periods.
2. Media practitioners during plebiscites are
not franchise holders or candidates, and
the restriction constituted an unjustified
limitation on freedom of expression.
3. Emphasized the importance of an
uninhibited discussion of plebiscite issues
for an informed public decision.
4. Granted the petition, making the
restraining order against the
enforcement of Section 19 permanent.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine established in the case
of Pablito V. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections
centers on safeguarding freedom of speech and
expression within the electoral process. The
court affirmed that during plebiscite periods,
media practitioners possess a fundamental right
to express their opinions and views without
undue restrictions. The ruling emphasizes that
such freedoms play a vital role in ensuring an
informed public discourse, particularly
concerning matters of public concern like
plebiscite issues. By nullifying Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, the court
underscored the principle that limitations on
speech must be justified by compelling reasons
and that the electoral process should foster
robust dialogue and the dissemination of diverse
viewpoints, ultimately promoting democratic
participation and informed decision-making
among the electorate.
285. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC – 207
SCRA 1
FACTS:
 Petitioners include National Press Club,  The court recognized the constitutional
Philippine Press Institute, and various importance of freedom of speech and
broadcasters representing mass media, the press in a democratic polity,
candidates, and voters. particularly during the electoral process.
 Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646  Section 11 (b) was deemed constitutional
prohibits the sale or donation of print as it aimed to equalize opportunities
space or airtime for political among candidates by preventing the
advertisements during election periods. undue advantage of wealthy candidates
 Petitioners argue that the provision through extensive campaign spending.
infringes on freedom of expression,  The court highlighted the limited
constitutes censorship, and limits voters' duration and scope of Section 11 (b),
access to information. applying only during election periods and
 The court considers the constitutionality specifically to the purchase and sale of
of Section 11 (b) in the context of its print space and airtime for campaign
impact on freedom of speech and the purposes.
press during the electoral process.  The decision emphasized that Section 11
(b) did not prevent media reporting,
ISSUE: commentary, or expression of beliefs
Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, about candidates, focusing solely on
which prohibits the sale or donation of print restricting paid political advertisements.
space or airtime for political advertisements  The petitions were dismissed for lack of
during election periods, is constitutional. merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
RULING:
 The court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 11 (b).
 The limitation on the sale or donation of
print space or airtime for political
advertisements is valid during election
periods.
 The provision seeks to address the
financial advantage of wealthier
candidates and promote equal
opportunities.
 The court emphasized that Section 11 (b)
does not restrict media reporting or
commentary on candidates and issues
but focuses on restricting paid political
advertisements.
Key Points in the Decision: