PIEDMONT & VILLAGE Eds (2001) Research in The SOcial Scientific Study of Religion

Research in the Social Scientific Study
of Religion
Research in the Social
Scientific Study of Religion
Series Editors
RALPH L. PIEDMONT
ANDREW VILLAGE
VOLUME 22
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/rssr.

Research in the Social
Scientific Study of Religion
Volume 22
Edited by
Ralph L. Piedmont
Loyola University Maryland
and
Andrew Village
York St. John University, UK
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2011
Published with the kind support of Loyola University Maryland, USA.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
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LC control number 89650738
ISSN 1046-8064
ISBN 978 90 04 20727 1
Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

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CONTENTS
Preface ................................................................................................. ix
Acknowledgements ............................................................................ xiii
Manuscript Invitation ....................................................................... xv
A Spiritual Getaway: The Motivations, Experiences, and

Benefits of a Silent Retreat ........................................................... 1
William L. Smith and Pidi Zhang
Beyond Meaning: Spiritual Transformation in the Paradigm

of Moral Intuitionism. A New Direction for the Psychology
of Spiritual Transformation.
Introduction ................................................................................... 25
Part 1: Beyond Meaning-System Analyses ................................ 29
Part 2: A Moral Intuitionist Approach to Spiritual
Transformation ......................................................................... 77
G. Michael Leffel
A Good Man Is Hard to Find: Forgiveness, Terror

Management, and Religiosity ...................................................... 126
Keith M. Wilson and Ronan Bernas
Three Applications of the Theory of Postformal Thought:

Wisdom, Concepts of God, and Success in College ................ 141
Liza Benovenli, Elizabeth Fuller, Jan Sinnott, and
Sarah Waterman
SPECIAL SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY
Introduction to Special Section: Psychological Type and

Christian Ministry ......................................................................... 157
Andrew Village
Jungian Typology and Religion: A Perspective from

North America ............................................................................... 165
Christopher F. J. Ross
vi contents
Psychological Type Profile of Clergywomen and Clergymen

Serving in the Presbyterian Church (USA): Implications for
Strengths and Weaknesses in Ministry ..................................... 192
Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Keith Wulff
All are Called, but Some Psychological Types Are More Likely
to Respond: Profiling Churchgoers in Australia ...................... 212
Mandy Robbins and Leslie J. Francis
Gifts Differing? Psychological Type among Stipendiary and

Non-stipendiary Anglican Clergy ............................................... 230
Andrew Village
Psychological Type Preferences of Male and Female Free

Church Ministers in England ...................................................... 251
Leslie J. Francis, Michael Whinney, Lewis Burton, and
Mandy Robbins
Imagining Themselves as Ministers: How Religiously

Committed Baptist Youth Respond to the Revised Payne
Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2) ............................................... 264
Bruce G. Fawcett, Leslie J. Francis, and Mandy Robbins
Apprentice Clergy? The Relationship Between Expectations in

Ministry and the Psychological Type Profile of Training
Incumbents and Curates in the Church of England ............... 286
David Tilley, Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and
Susan H. Jones
Do Introverts Appreciate the Same Things as Extraverts

Within a Ministry Team? A Study Among Leaders Within
the Newfrontiers Network of Churches in the UK ................. 306
Mandy Robbins, Leslie J. Francis, and Andrew Ryland
The Role of Archetypes and Jungian Personality Typology in

Building Religious Community: Applying John Beebe’s
Eight Process Archetypal Model through a Case Study of
the Extraverted Intuitive Type with Introverted Feeling
(ENFP) ............................................................................................ 315
Christopher F. J. Ross
contents vii
Authors’ Biographies ......................................................................... 347

Manuscript Reviewers ....................................................................... 351
Subject Index ...................................................................................... 353
Names Index ....................................................................................... 358
PREFACE
The study of religion and spirituality continues to move forward at

a quick pace. A tremendous amount of research has been done over
the past 15 years across a wide array of topics. Such a vast literature
necessitates the field to begin to digest this information and to reflect
on its value and meaning. This year, 2011, will see the appearance of
a number of new text books, including two handbooks on the psy-
chology of religion that will provide syntheses of the literature from
a variety of perspectives. This is an important movement in the field
because it recognizes the need for larger conceptual models for under-
standing numinous constructs. Over the years, the field has addressed
issues of measurement and construct validity. It is clear that spiritu-
ality and religiousness can be adequately measured and that scores
from such scales are useful for predicting a wide array of mental and
physical health outcomes. The larger conceptual issues of meaning
and interpretation now present themselves for consideration. How do
numinous constructs fit in the larger psychological system of the indi-
vidual? What does spirituality represent about an individual? What
are those psychological systems that are involved in the development
and experience of the sacred? Thus, the field now begins to search for
the integration of spiritual and religious constructs within established
psychological models of functioning.
The current volume presents a number of studies that address such
questions. In reviewing this year’s offerings, all the reports aim to
contextualize numinous functioning within the stream of experience.
The authors provide a wide perspective on this endeavor, and it is
hoped that the reader will come away from this volume thinking more
paradigmatically about religion and spirituality. For the field to move
forward, it will need to provide a context for discussing and under-
standing its constructs. Their role, function, and purpose will need to
be explicated within larger models and processes of experience. The
general section opens with a paper by Smith and Zhang, who attempt
to identify the personal motivations that lead individuals to seek
personal growth through a directed retreat experience. The psycho-
spiritual value of such an experience is also explored.
x preface
An interesting set of papers is presented by Dr. Leffel. His work rep-

resents an important effort at conceptualizing spiritual transformation
within a moral intuitionist model. His work is significant for at least
three reasons. First, it represents a new force in the field for under-
standing spirituality as a component of a larger cognitive-personality
system. Second, his work is comprehensive and intriguing, which is
why two related papers are presented in this section. Third, although
theoretical in nature, Dr. Leffel’s work is careful in outlining specific
testable hypotheses, which are presented for each element of his pro-
posed model. Thus, his work should stimulate and support empirical
research in the field. He provides a seamless approach for matching
research to theory.
Wilson and Bernas examine spirituality within the terror manage-
ment framework (TMF). TMF is a model of understanding human
behavior from an analytical perspective that stresses humans’ need
to manage the reality of our mortality. The reality that one is fated
to die creates significant levels of anxiety that needs to be managed.
Research has shown that when mortality is made salient, individuals
(and groups) will alter their behavior in ways that will affirm a sense
of personal security. It would seem natural that any consideration of
death anxiety should include some consideration of spirituality or
religiousness as either a mediator or moderator of the TMF effect.
Further, TMF provides another conceptual model for interpreting the
psychological value of the numinous.
Dr. Jan Sinnott and colleagues present another paper on Postformal
Thought, which reflects an ability to use complex cognitions to inter-
pret, understand, and cope with one’s environment. Complex thinking
patterns allow for an individual to consider multiple perspectives con-
cerning an event, allowing for the development of a more sophisticated
and nuanced perspective. The end product of this cognitive structur-
ing is an ability to more effectively manage real events. This cogni-
tive style is hypothesized to influence how individuals conceptualize
the transcendent, operationalized as one’s Image of God (IOG). One’s
ability to think in a more differentiated manner about God may allow
individuals to construct spiritual relationships that are more robust
and emotionally satisfying. Or, perhaps one’s involvement with a tran-
scendent reality provides a stimulus to perceive the world in a more
sophisticated manner, thereby promoting cognitive and emotional
growth. Whatever the outcome of such an analysis, the current study
preface xi
does show the value of applying cognitive models to understanding

how individuals perceive the God of their understanding.
The special section was edited by Andrew Village and presents a
series of studies examining the role of psychological type as a useful
conceptual model for understanding Christian clergy and their work
in ministry. These researchers argue that Jung’s psychological theory of
type provides a useful theoretical model for understanding individuals
and how they approach their spiritual and religious motivations. As
these papers will demonstrate, there are distinct personality types that
appear relevant to ministerial involvement and satisfaction. No doubt
personal motivations, or personality styles, carry with them motiva-
tional implications for how spirituality interests will be expressed.
Readers interested in this type of analyses may wish to contrast these
findings with those employing other personality models, such as the
trait-based Five-Factor Model (FFM). Earlier issues of Research in the
Social Scientific Study of Religion (RSSSR) have outlined the value of
the FFM for understanding spiritual motivations and behaviors. Future
research may wish to compare directly the interpretive and predictive
value of these two models. Ultimately, though, research will need to
determine whether numinous constructs are the product of particular
personality styles or traits, or whether they represent their own sources
of motivation independent of these established constructs.
This is a very exciting volume because it provides a variety of con-
ceptual models for understanding, studying, and empirically describing
spiritual and religious constructs. The articles here attempt to infuse
numinous variables within cognitive, personality, analytical, and social
models. These different theoretical approaches provide conceptual
details that can be quite important for promoting new understand-
ings of numinous constructs in ways that facilitate their integration
within the mainstream of the social sciences. We have argued before
that spirituality and religiousness are essential, unique aspects of the
individual that any model of the mind ought to include if it is to be
comprehensive. The papers presented here demonstrate how easily
numinous constructs can be reconciled with established paradigms.
That spirituality can be interpreted as a significant construct from
multiple perspectives (e.g., cognitively, affectively, etc.) underscores
its centrality in the psychic system.
The papers presented here begin to provide the conceptual scaf-
folding essential for the development of a comprehensive model of
xii preface
spiritual/religious functioning. Most importantly, though, is that this

theory development can be empirically informed. The presence of so
much theory-driven data will allow for substantive dialogue as these
ideas develop. It is hoped that this volume of RSSSR will continue to
stimulate your own thinking and serve as a platform for new, innova-
tive research on spirituality and religiousness.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The editorial staff and I are grateful for the contributions and coopera-
tion of a large number of people without whom publication of RSSSR
would not be possible. Most obvious among them are the authors and
coauthors of the published articles. There were a number of research-
ers, scholars, and clinicians who have served as anonymous reviewers
of the manuscripts that were received for current publication. These
individuals are noted at the end of this volume. They not only have
functioned as professional referees evaluating the appropriateness of
the respective manuscripts for publication, but they also have given
the authors significant suggestions to improve the quality and scope of
their future research in this area. Their efforts helped to insure a high
quality among those reports that are published.
I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Andrew Village
for his wonderful work in managing the Special Section on Psycho-
logical Type and Christian Ministry. The series of papers presented
here make a significant, and substantial, contribution to the literature.
The variety of topics is very relevant for both researchers and clini-
cians. The articles presented here are informative and should provide
highly stimulating reading.
Teresa Wilkins has served as the editorial assistant for this volume.
Her experience, talent, and painstaking work contributed immeasur-
ably to the high standards of production. Throughout this process,
she was always patient and quick to smile. Although the work load
got very heavy at times, her commitment and diligence were always
in evidence, and she maintained a very high level of professionalism.
Thank You, Teri!
My own academic institution has provided many critical necessities
for the production of this volume. Loyola University Maryland, espe-
cially its graduate Department of Pastoral Counseling, has provided
office space, funds for the editorial assistant, telephone services, com-
puter technology, postage, access to its admirable support infrastruc-
ture, and related services. I am very grateful for both the Department’s
and Graduate Administration’s support for this worthy endeavor.
I am grateful, too, to the production staff of Brill Academic Press
who have efficiently published this attractive and useful volume. Brill’s
xiv acknowledgements
Sales department (www.brill.nl or e-mail brill@turpin-distribution.

com for R.O.W. and cs@brillusa.com for North America) is eager
to fill orders for either single volumes or on-going subscriptions to
RSSSR.
Please recommend RSSSR to your professional and academic col-
leagues. Also support its addition or continuation in your academic,
religious, research, and public libraries for its rich contents are rel-
evant to everyone, both lay and professional, who is interested in keep-
ing up with the rapidly expanding frontiers of scientific knowledge
about spirituality and religion.
Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Co-Editor

MANUSCRIPT INVITATION
For future volumes we welcome the submission of manuscripts report-

ing on research which contributes to the behavioral and social sci-
ence understanding of religion, whether done by members of those
disciplines or other professions. RSSSR is an annual interdisciplinary
and international volume that publishes original reports of research,
theoretical studies, and other innovative social scientific analyses of
religion. (However, we do not include studies that are purely histori-
cal or theological.) Manuscripts should be original contributions (not
reprints) based upon any of the quantitative or qualitative methods
of research or the theoretical, conceptual, or meta-analytical analysis
of research on religion in general or on any specific world religion.
They should not be under consideration for publication by any other
journal or publication outlet and should comply with the professional
ethical standards of psychology, sociology, and other social science
professions.
Manuscripts may be submitted at any time during the year, although
those received within the calendar year have the best chance of inclu-
sion in the next volume. Manuscripts must conform to the style
guidelines of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological
Association, Publication Manual 6th edition. Papers not in APA style
will be returned to the author un-reviewed. (Authors who lack access
to the Publication Manual may contact Dr. Piedmont for sample mate-
rials to help in the final preparation of their papers.) Send three copies,
double spaced on standard paper to:
Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Editor

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion
Department of Pastoral Counseling
Loyola University Maryland
8890 McGaw Road, Suite 380
Columbia, MD 21045 USA
Questions about suitability can be directed to Dr. Piedmont or Ms.

Wilkins electronically (rpiedmont@loyola.edu or tawilkins@loyola.edu).
Manuscripts that are judged by the editors as relevant to the cover-
age of RSSSR are reviewed anonymously for quality and then either
xvi manuscript invitation
accepted (usually along with constructive suggestions for revision) or

rejected. Manuscripts relevant to our subject that are not accepted for
publication also receive the benefit of critiques and suggestions that
can aid their improvement for submission elsewhere. Authors will be
required to complete a copyright transfer form giving Brill the rights
to publish the work.
RSSSR is also interested in developing “special topic sections” for
inclusion in future editions. Special topic sections would include a
series of papers (5–7) on a specific theme. These sections would be
“guest edited” by a single individual who would be responsible for the
solicitation of the manuscripts and their review. If you have a sugges-
tion for a special topic section or would be interested in editing such a
section, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Piedmont for details.
A SPIRITUAL GETAWAY: THE MOTIVATIONS, EXPERIENCES,
AND BENEFITS OF A SILENT RETREAT
William L. Smith* and Pidi Zhang
Abstract
Retreatants at a Jesuit retreat center in the Southeast were surveyed to assess their
motivations for going on retreat, the retreat experience itself, their evaluation of the
retreat, and its effect on them. The retreats were based on the Spiritual Exercises of
St. Ignatius which is a collection of prayers and contemplative practices designed to
enhance one’s spirituality. Meditating and spirituality were the most highly rated
motivations for going on retreat, and one-quarter of respondents indicated that as a
result of the retreat they gained knowledge about God. Factor and regression analy-
ses were used to further explore the relationships between background information,
motivation factors, and outcomes.
Sociologists of religion lack a well-developed framework for studying

religion and spirituality (Roof, 2003). A potential remedy or analytical
approach that addresses this deficit is to focus on lived religion or how
“religion and spirituality are practiced, experienced, and expressed by
ordinary people” (McGuire, 2008, p. 12). Lived religion is the result
of the practices people use to make sense of their everyday lives, and
these practices affect spiritual development (McGuire, 2008). A spiri-
tual retreat, such as the Spiritual Exercises, is one example of lived
religion.
Lived religion is also a topic of interest to theologians, particularly
among those who see theology as a practical rather than a theoretical
science (Volf, 2002). Theologians who are interested in lived religion
see the value in theorizing or thinking about God as well as the necessity
of understanding the ways in which religion is practiced. Theologians
* Author Note: William L. Smith, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,

Georgia Southern University; Pidi Zhang, Department of Sociology and Anthropol-
ogy, Georgia Southern University.
The authors are grateful for the assistance provided by Tina Hook.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William L. Smith,
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro,
GA 30460-8051. Email: wmlsmith@georgiasouthern.edu
Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011
2 william l. smith and pidi zhang
who use this approach define practices as “the human activities in and
through which people cooperate with God in addressing the needs
of one another and creation” (Dystra & Bass, 2002, p. 22). Practices
and beliefs are integrally connected to the extent that “Practices are
essentially belief-shaped, and beliefs are essentially practice-shaping.”
For most people, practices lead to beliefs in part because beliefs are
interwoven within practices (Volf, 2002, p. 256). The Spiritual Exer-
cises created by St. Ignatius of Loyola facilitates “a living religion in
us” (Rahner, 1965, p. 11).
Psychologists have concluded that behavior precedes attitudes, and
practices influence beliefs (Festinger, 1954). Religious practices serve
as a form of reinforcement that strengthen commitment to religious
worldviews, have beneficial consequences that have been linked posi-
tively to “life satisfaction, quality of life, general well-being, and pur-
pose in life,” and which aid people in “coping with life” (Spilka, 2005,
p. 372). For example, in the Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius presented a
“behavioral plan” or set of practices that could influence one’s attitudes
and beliefs which, in turn, could influence one’s religious practices or
behavior (Gomez, 2001). The Spiritual Exercises can be viewed as one
man’s inner struggle, conversion experience, and his view about reality
(Meissner, 1992). Various religious communities and traditions have
fostered the development of particular practices that nurture a “way of
life that supports spirituality” (Nelson, 2009, p. 392).
One venue where religion and spirituality are practiced, experi-
enced, and expressed is at retreat centers. Retreats for many people
are spiritual quests which also provide a restorative experience (Ouel-
lette, Kaplan, & Kaplan, 2005). Ouellette et al. studied retreatants at
a Benedictine monastery in Quebec, Canada and their motivations
for taking a retreat, the activities they participated in, and the effects
of the retreat on them. Their study in part influenced the focus and
direction of this study. By investigating people’s motivations for tak-
ing a retreat, the activities they participated in, and the effects of the
retreat on their lives, we can begin to assess the role retreats play in
fostering the relationship between practice and belief. This paper was
an attempt to study one example of lived religion, and it investigated
retreatants at Ignatius House Jesuit Retreat Center in Atlanta, Georgia.
The research questions answered were: (a) What were the retreatants’
motivations for going on retreat? (b) What did they do during the
retreat? (c) What was their evaluation of the retreat? and (d) What
was its effect on them?
a spiritual getaway 3
Research on Spirituality
A spiritual marketplace has developed in the decades following World

War II, contributing to the changing face of spirituality and religion
in America (Cox, 2009; Dillon & Wink, 2007; McCartin, 2010; Roof,
1993, 1999, 2003; Wuthnow, 1998, 2005, 2007; Zinnbauer et al., 1997).
The contemporary religious landscape is transitioning from what Cox
(2009, p. 14) described as “an expiring Age of Belief into a new but not
fully realized Age of the Spirit” where spirituality replaces formal or
institutionalized religion. According to the General Social Survey which
is a large, nationally representative survey of American adults, among
those with a religious preference, two-thirds were both religious and
spiritual, while 15% of those with no religious preference were at least
moderately religious, and 40% were at least moderately spiritual (Hout
& Fischer, 2002). Since the 1950s, spirituality has come to mean “spiri-
tual seeking” and religious as “church-centered religiousness” (Dillon
& Wink, 2007, p. 121). While it is common for people to indicate that
they are spiritual but not religious, “religion and spirituality are not
mutually exclusive” (Cunningham, 2002, p. 26).
In theory, religion and spirituality may not be mutually exclusive,
but in practice “spirituality has become decoupled from religion”
(Flory & Miller, 2007, p. 203). Recent sociological studies of spiritual-
ity revealed the strong impact individualism has on American culture
and the pursuit of a “private, individualistic, and non-institutionalized
form of spiritual fulfillment where the individual spiritual quest for
fulfillment takes precedence over membership in, or commitment to,
the religious community” (Flory & Miller, 2007, p. 203). In contrast to
these studies, Flory and Miller (2007) found an emerging form of spir-
ituality labeled expressive communalism that emphasized the blend-
ing of spiritual seeking and church-centered religiousness. Expressive
communalism may be more reflective of an earlier era prior to the
1950s and 1960s than a new form of spirituality. As Cunningham
(2002) stated:
Being a member of a religious tradition like Catholic Christianity, in
fact, nurtures a person who desires to become more spiritual. Contrary
to what many think, being religious is the larger concept, and being
spiritual but not religious is its pale cousin. (p. 26)
Religion has the capacity to nurture the spiritual and to broaden our
limited and narrow private lives (Jamison, 2006).
Dwelling, Seeking, and Practice-Oriented Spiritualities

While some people on a spiritual journey tend to distance themselves
from religious organizations and focus on developing spiritual practices
which enhance a personal style of faith, not everyone finds it neces-
sary to decouple spirituality from religion. Because Ignatian spiritual-
ity is rooted in the Christian tradition it can offer those on a spiritual
journey potentially something that other types of spirituality do not
offer. A practice-oriented spirituality, like Ignatian spirituality, offers
spiritual seekers what a dwelling-oriented spirituality and a seeking-
oriented spirituality do not, engagement “in activities that deepen their
relationship to the sacred” (Wuthnow, 1998, pp. 168–169).
A dwelling-oriented spirituality focuses on “a traditional spiritual-
ity of inhabiting sacred spaces,” while a seeking-oriented spirituality
focuses on “seeking partial knowledge and practical wisdom” of the
sacred (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 3).
While these three styles of spirituality are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, Wuthnow (1998) argued that a dwelling-oriented spirituality
and a seeking-oriented spirituality are not satisfactory on their own or
in combination with each other. A dwelling-oriented spirituality will
remain an important choice for those wanting a nonthreatening “safe
haven” in a post-modern society, while a seeker-oriented spirituality
will become even more appealing than a dwelling-oriented spiritual-
ity as people “make their own choices about how to understand the
sacred,” but neither style offers the depth and breadth of a practice-
oriented spirituality like Ignatian spirituality (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 15).
Ignatian Spirituality and the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius

Ignatian spirituality can be summarized in four brief statements: “find-
ing God in all things,” “becoming a contemplative in action,” “look-
ing at the world in an incarnational way,” and “seeking freedom and
detachment” (Martin, 2010, p. 10). Ignatian spirituality, like monas-
tic spirituality (see Carette & Ouellette, 2007; Hillery, 1992; Jamison,
2006; Merton, 1978; Nouwen, 1981; Ouellette et al., 2005; Smith,
2006; Wilkes, 1999), provides viable time-tested practices that lead to
a deeper relationship with the sacred. The best known monastic rule
or set of practices is The Rule of St. Benedict (Meisel & del Mastro,
1975). The incorporation of monastic practices (e.g., obedience, lectio
divina [sacred reading], stability, conversatio [reassessment of one’s
life], etc.) into one’s life is the responsibility of the individual, not the
community.
Similar practices are contained in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Igna-
tius of Loyola (Tetlow, 1987). Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), author of
the Spiritual Exercises and founder of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits),
wrote the Exercises in medieval Spain while recuperating from battle
wounds incurred in 1520. Ignatius understood spirituality to mean an
interior and personal search rather than the more public expressions
of organized, institutionalized religion (Jamison, 2006). The Exercises
“fashioned for the first time what is now popularly known as a retreat”
(Hansen, 2008, p. 32). The Spiritual Exercises is a manual for spiritual
growth that assists retreatants in “ways of meeting God and of discern-
ing in our experience what is of God and what is not of God” (Barry,
1991, p. 14). It is often thought of as a “book on spirituality” but it is
a “book of spirituality” (Meissner, 1992, p. 87). Included within the
Exercises are the Rules of Discernment which
are merely guides by which Christians might discern whether the inner
and outer movements that are a part of their lives are moving toward
greater love of God, neighbor and the world or are edging them toward
isolation and apathy. (Mueller, 1996, pp. 52–53)
In the first annotation or introductory commentary of the Exercises,
Ignatius stated that spiritual exercises include, “every method of
examining the conscience, of meditating, of contemplating, of pray-
ing vocally and mentally, and of other spiritual activities” (Tetlow,
1987, p. 3).
The Spiritual Exercises is
a series of meditations on select scripture passages which the retreatant
reads, ponders, and prays over, in order to be informed, impressed,
moved, and affected by them. The aim is to come (a) to understand
Christ’s mission: what it is for and what it fights against (“to know him
more clearly”), (b) to admire him (“to love him more dearly”), and (c) to
feel drawn to him in his struggle and to follow him on his mission (“to
follow him more nearly”). (Byron, 2000, p. 5)
The Exercises is a silent retreat that is usually conducted over 30 days
and in a condensed or modified version over an 8, 3, or 2 day period or
at home over several months. The 30 days are divided into 4 weeks (not
calendar weeks) or periods devoted to a particular theme. Retreatants
do not usually progress through these periods at the same pace. The
first week deals with developing a sense of trust with God based on the
revelation of one’s sins. Week two builds on week one and retreatants
seek to know Jesus better. Week three focuses on the passion and
death of Christ and week four on the resurrection (see Mariani, 2002
for his reflections on a 30-day retreat). The Exercises is “an oral tradi-
tion, intended to be ‘given,’ not read” (Silf, 2002, p. 180).
A silent retreat is one example of an odyssey experience. At its core,
an odyssey experience consists of “temporary withdrawal from one set
of routines and structures, a period of fluidity, and then an immersion
either in a new structure or with a different orientation to structure”
(Smelser, 2009, p. 209). The Exercises is, in essence, a developmen-
tal process where retreatants are involved in a process of destructing,
unstructuring or transforming, and restructuring their everyday lives.
Another way of looking at this experience is that the Exercises, like
culture, is a “tool kit” people use to “solve different kinds of problems”
(Swidler, 1986, p. 273).
Method
Participants
There are 24 Jesuit retreat centers in the United States, and Ignatius
House, which is sponsored by the Jesuit’s New Orleans Province, is the
only one in Georgia. Since one of us had previously studied the monas-
tic spirituality of lay Cistercian groups (Smith, 2006), it seemed only
natural to move beyond monastic spirituality and do a study of Igna-
tian spirituality. Ignatius House was selected for this study because it
was the only Jesuit retreat center in Georgia (where the authors reside)
and the executive director, staff, and board of directors were enthusi-
astic about participating in the research project.
Ignatius House is located on 20 wooded acres on a bluff overlooking
the Chattahoochee River. The Jesuits have been conducting retreats at
Ignatius House since 1961, and about 40 weekend group retreats are
held annually. Private or directed retreats are held in July. Approxi-
mately 1,300 people attend retreats annually at Ignatius House, 45 of
them in privately directed retreats. The 2-day silent retreats usually
include seven 30-minute talks or conferences based on the Spiritual
Exercises. Morning prayers and Mass are offered daily, and resident
priests are available for confession and spiritual direction.
The retreats are theme oriented, and most of them are sponsored by
Catholic parishes and Catholic organizations such as the Knights of
Columbus. Some retreats are designated specifically for women, men,

married couples, young adults, Spanish speakers, or AA (Alcoholics
Anonymous) members. The retreats for women are conducted by
the Cenacle Sisters. Retreat themes are often reflective of the various
liturgical seasons of the year. For example, a retreat conducted during
Advent was titled “Hope in the Midst of Darkness,” while a retreat
during Lent was titled, “Journey into the Desert,” and another dur-
ing Holy Week was titled, “Following the Whole Jesus.” Some of the
other retreat themes conducted during this study included: “Do Not
Be Afraid,” “Ignoring Our Inner Hurts,” “They Gathered Together,”
and “Come Follow Me.” Although the retreats might vary by theme, in
essence the structure and content of the retreats are very similar.
Only 23.2% of respondents were first-time retreatants. Most (76.8%)
were repeat visitors, which included 14.8% who went on a retreat two
times, 43.2% who visited from 3 to 9 times, 13.3% who visited 10 to
19 times, and the remaining 4.3% who visited 20 times or more. Most
were over 45 years of age, and the largest age group (40.1%) was 60
years and over. There were twice as many females (67.3%) as males
(32.7%). A large majority (61.4%) were married, although there were
13.1% who were divorced, 9.1% widowed, and 14.5% never married.
Only .9% were separated. Most retreatants were well educated, with
27.5% having college degrees, 30.0% having graduate degrees, and
another 10.4% with graduate school experiences.
Measures and Procedure

A five-page, 25 question survey was delivered to Ignatius House on
August 28, 2008. The survey consisted of both closed-ended and open-
ended questions including demographic questions (e.g., race/ethnicity,
age, sex, religious preference, marital status, education, occupation)
and those measuring respondents’ motivations for taking the retreat
(e.g., How much did the following items [items such as contributes to
my spirituality; be far from daily responsibilities; allows me to feel the
presence of God, etc.] influence your decision to go on a retreat? ), the
retreat experience itself (e.g., During your retreat, how often did you
pray, meditate, rest, read, study, and do nothing?), their evaluation
of the retreat (e.g., How helpful were the talks based on the Spiritual
Exercises of St. Ignatius in assisting you to “know him [Christ] more
clearly,” “to love him more dearly,” and “to follow him more nearly?”;
How satisfied are you with this retreat?), and its effect on them (e.g.,
Table 1. Retreatant Demographics

Variable N %
Age
18–29 23 3.3
30–45 142 20.5
46–59 251 36.2
60+ 278 40.1
Sex
Male 225 32.7
Female 463 67.3
Race
White 531 76.5
Black 93 13.4
Indian/Native American 1 0.1
Asian/Pacific Islander 17 2.4
Hispanic 29 4.2
Multi-Racial 8 1.2
Other 7 1.0
Marital Status
Never Married 100 14.4
Married 423 61.0
Living Together 7 1.0
Separated 6 0.9
Divorced 90 13.0
Widowed 63 9.1
Education
Elementary School 3 0.4
Some High School 5 0.7
High School Diploma/ 49 7.1
GED
Post-Secondary School 18 2.6
Some College 141 20.3
College Degree 191 27.5
Some Graduate School 72 10.4
Graduate Degree 208 30.0
Occupation
Religious 18 2.6
Professional 181 26.1
Managerial 114 16.4
Manual 59 8.5
Clerical 24 3.5
Retired 175 25.2
Other 102 14.7
Has something dramatic and important happened to your spiritual life

as a result of this retreat? For example, did you gain any insights about
God, yourself, and your relationship with God and others?). Staff mem-
bers distributed the survey along with a cover letter which explained
the project and assured the respondents of their anonymity on each
of the Sunday mornings of the retreat beginning September 14, 2008
and ending July 12, 2009. The staff strongly encouraged retreatants to
complete the survey in the privacy of their own rooms at the retreat
center and deposit it in a sealed envelope in a designated drop box
before departing Ignatius House later that afternoon. Staff members
mailed the completed surveys on Monday. Eight hundred and fifty
surveys were distributed at 26 retreats (11 during 2008 and 15 during
2009) from September 14, 2008 until July 12, 2009 and 694 retreatants
completed and returned the survey for an 82% response rate.
Results
Motivations for the Retreat

Motivations for going on a retreat were assessed by a questionnaire
with 23 items using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all through
4 = very much. Table 2 provides detailed results from factor analysis.
Two items (Relieves stress and Affordable cost of the retreat) were
dropped because they did not meet the factor loading requirement. Six
factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 67.4%
of the total variance. Meditating (μ = 3.72) and Spirituality (μ = 3.71)
were the two factors with the highest means followed by Beauty (μ =
3.35) and Being away (μ = 3.02). Fascinating (μ = 2.54) and Solution
(μ = 2.75) had the lowest means. Spirituality had the highest rated
items: Contributes to my spirituality (μ = 3.84), Allows me to feel the
presence of God (μ = 3.82), and Replenishes spirituality (μ = 3.76).
Although the Varimax rotated principal components were the highest
for Being away from daily responsibilities (factor loading = .88) and
Not have to be responsible for anyone (factor loading = .81), the actual
means of these two items were among the lowest (μ = 2.87 for Being
away, μ = 2.45 for Not responsible).
Six clusters, according to the number of factors, were imposed in
a K-Mean cluster analysis. The clusters essentially recaptured the fac-
tors that emerged in the factor analysis. A composite measure was
Table 2. Factor Loadings of Motivations

Motivations
ay
ng
ion
ity
aw
ati
ual
n
at
tio
y
cin
dit
ing
aut
rit
u
Me
Fas
Spi
Sol
Be
Be
Replenishes spirituality .79 .20 .16 .01 .03 –.02
Feel the presence of God .70 .09 .11 .08 .22 –.08
Contributes to my spirituality .66 .35 –.11 .03 –.15 .29
Know myself better .54 –.10 .39 .13 .10 .38
Provides an opportunity to .08 .77 .10 .07 .11 .21
meditate
Provides an atmosphere of .22 .73 .09 .12 .02 .08
contemplation
Devote time to prayer .47 .51 .11 –.01 .28 –.23
Be close to nature .12 .06 .77 .19 .17 .26
Appreciate the beauty of the .13 .16 .77 .22 .12 .14
setting
Provides rest .03 .20 .63 .43 .11 .05
Explore a wonderful place .15 –.03 .60 .25 .25 .47
Experience a moment of silence .17 .49 .49 .25 .02 –.08
Be away from daily .04 .11 .17 .88 .09 .13
responsibilities
Not responsible for anyone –.06 .02 .16 .81 .16 .22
Take time for myself .13 .05 .31 .76 .01 .14
Removes me from agitation and .11 .18 .22 .55 .33 .04
turmoil
Ask a favor of the Lord .06 .03 .11 .20 .83 .20
Pray for those in need .09 .15 .24 .04 .78 .14
Provides a solution to a problem .12 .02 .04 .21 .57 .42
Do something fascinating –.04 .09 .20 .26 .22 .74
Gives a sense of unity with the .04 .18 .23 .13 .26 .73
world
Mean 3.02 3.35 3.71 2.75 2.54 3.72
Variance .20 .10 .04 .04 .02 .01
Cronbach’s α .83 .83 .66 .77 .77 .64
Note: Two items were dropped because they did not meet the factor loading requirement, although
the communalities were close to an acceptable level (.49 for “Relieves stress” and .48 for “Affordable
cost of the retreat”). Loadings greater than .30 are in bold.
constructed for each of the clusters from the included items to explore
the reasons responsible for deciding to go on a retreat. Multiple regres-
sion analysis was used to examine the independent variables that might
be predictors for each of the motivation factors.
Retreatants were asked to report how often they engaged in reli-
gious/spiritual activities. On a scale ranging from 1 = not at all through
7 = daily, Prayer displayed the highest mean of 6.48. The activities with
the next highest means were Attend religious services (μ = 5.25), Self-
reflection (μ = 5.13), and Reading sacred texts (μ = 5.00). In the mid-
dle were Meditation (μ = 4.68), Other reading on religion/spirituality
(μ = 4.86), and Religious singing/chanting (μ = 3.83). Yoga, Tai Chi,
or similar practice displayed the lowest mean of 1.91. These activities
along with education, occupation, and demographic measures were
used as predictors in the multiple regression analyses. As correlations
between some predictors were high (ρ = .58 between Reading sacred
texts and Other reading on religion/spirituality, ρ = .52 between Self-
reflection and Meditation), Self-reflection and Other reading on reli-
gion/spirituality were dropped from the list of predictors. The results
from multiple regression analyses are reported in Table 3.
Religious/spiritual activities varied in predicting retreatants’ moti-
vations for going on retreat. The activities positively related to Spiri-
tuality were Prayer (b = .25, β = .16, t = 3.57, p < .01) and Reading
sacred texts (b = .11, β = .13, t = 2.54, p < .05). Reading sacred texts (b
= .13, β = .18, t = 3.74, p < .01) was positively related to Meditation.
Reading sacred texts and Other reading on religion/spirituality were
highly correlated, while those who were very engaged in Other reading
on religion/spirituality appear to be seeking Spirituality, Fascination,
and Beauty in their retreat experience to a greater degree than those
who were very engaged in Reading sacred texts. On another dimen-
sion, Prayer seemed to be only positively related to Spirituality, nega-
tively related to Fascinating (b = –.15, β = –.08, t = –1.85, p < .10, but
when Other reading on religion/spirituality was controlled the statis-
tics improved: b = –.21, β = –.11, t = –2.58, p < .05), and unrelated to
Meditation. It should be pointed out that (a) the composite measure of
meditative motivation for going on the retreat, (b) Meditation activi-
ties before the retreat, and (c) Meditation activities during the retreat
were not highly correlated (ρa,b = .18, df = 658; ρa,c = .34, df = 667; ρb,c =
.34, df = 667), so using Meditation before the retreat as a predictor
for the motivation theme of Meditation should be methodologically
Table 3. Multiple Regression Models of Motivation Factors a

Predictor Variable
in g
ion
y
alit
on
nat
tat
y
ritu
uti
aut
ay
di
ci
Aw
Fas
Me
Spi
Sol
Be
White –.20 –.09 –.29 –.67* –1.3*** –.81***
(–.05) (–.03) (–.04) (–.08) (–.21) (–.17)
Male –.26* –.08 –.70** –1.05*** –.12 .11
(–.08) (–.03) (–.10) (–.14) (–.02) (.03)
Age –.01* –.01 –.01 .00 .01 –.01
(–.10) (–.08) (–.03) (.00) (.05) (–.03)
Married .07 .04 –.22 .24 –.46** –.17
(.02) (.01) (–.03) (.03) (–.09) (–.04)
Catholic .12 –.01 –.46 –.36 .47 .12
(.03) (–.00) (–.05) (–.04) (.07) (.02)
Repeat retreatant –.02 .27** .72** –.09 –.14 –.13
(–.01) (.08) (.09) (–.01) (–.02) (–.03)
Education (Less than college degree as comparison group)
College degree –.08 –.03 –.34 –.29 –.36 –.13
(–.02) (–.01) (–.05) (–.04) (–.07) (–.03)
Graduate degree –.14 .20 –.88** –.70* –.55** –.39*
(–.04) (.07) (–.12) (–.09) (–.10) (–.09)
Occupation (Manual and others as comparison group)
Religious .22 –.08 .06 –.27 –.25 .08
(.02) (–.01) (.00) (–.01) (–.02) (.01)
Professional .14 .03 –.09 .06 –.10 –.05
(.04) (.01) (–.01) (.01) (–.02) (–.01)
Managerial .33 .03 –.18 .18 .08 –.16
(.08) (.01) (–.02) (.02) (.01) (–.03)
Retired .06 –.15 –.60 –1.13** –.17 –.29
(.02) (–.05) (–.08) (–.14) (–.03) (–.06)
Religious/Spiritual Activities Before Retreat
Prayer .25*** .07 –.20 –.20 –.12 –.15*
(.16) (.05) (–.06) (–.06) (–.05) (–.08)
Meditation .00 .06** .08 .09 .13** .14***
(.00) (.09) (.04) (.05) (.10) (.14)
Yoga, Tai Chi, etc. .02 .02 .28*** .13 .09 .26***
(.02) (.02) (.14) (.06) (.06) (.22)
Religious singing –.04 –.05* –.06 –.05 .01 –.04
(–.05) (–.08) (–.03) (–.03) (.01) (–.04)
Reading sacred texts .11** .13*** .04 .03 .04 –.02
(.13) (.18) (.02) (.02) (.03) (–.02)
Attend religious services .01 .04 –.10 –.10 –.01 –.07
(.01) (.04) (–.04) (–.04) (–.00) (–.05)
N 643 644 639 647 629 645
R2 .08 .10 .08 .09 .09 .14
F 2.84† 3.74† 2.99† 3.20† 3.06† 5.29†
Notes: a The dependent variables are the composite measures of each motivation factor/cluster.
Reported are unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) regression coefficients.
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 † Model is significant at the 99.9% level.
acceptable. Yoga, Tai Chi, or similar practices tended to stand out by

playing a particularly large role in the motivation themes of Beauty
(b = .28, β = .14, t = 3.34, p < .01) and Fascinating (b = .26, β =
.22, t = 5.57, p < .01). However they were not related to Spirituality
and Meditation, suggesting that they were less about spirituality or
meditation-related experiences for the respondents. The motivation
themes of Beauty and Fascination shared a similar positive relation-
ship with Yoga, Tai Chi, or other similar practices and Other reading
on religion/spirituality but not with Reading sacred texts. Two activi-
ties with high means (Attend religious services with a mean of 5.25,
Self-reflection with a mean of 5.13) before going on the retreat were
not related to any of the motivation themes.
Other predictor variables displayed some distinct patterns. The
level of educational attainment was negatively related to most of the
motivation themes except Meditation and Spirituality. The pattern
appears rather consistent with statistically significant regression coef-
ficients for Graduate degree and the lack of significance for College
degree. Whites were negatively related to all the motivation themes,
with Solution (b = –1.30, β = –.21, t = –4.99, p < .01), Fascination (b =
–.81, β = –.17, t = –4.17, p < .01), and Being away (b = –.67, β = –.08,
t = 1.91, p < .10) statistically significant. Males also displayed negative
relationships with some of the themes, with Being away (b = –1.05,
β = –.14, t = –3.51, p < .01), Beauty (b = –.70, β = –.10, t = –2.39, p <
.05), and Spirituality (b = –.26, β = –.08, t = –1.82, p < .10) statistically
significant. Occupation failed to be significantly related to any of the
themes with the exception of the retired, who displayed a substantially
reduced need to be away compared with others (b = –1.13, β = –.14,
t = –2.55, p < .05). Repeat retreatants were more attracted by Beauty
(b = .72, β = .09, t = 2.12, p < .05) and Meditation (b = .27, β = .08,
t = 2.00, p < .05).
Retreat Experiences and Their Impact

The retreatants were asked how often they prayed, meditated, rested,
read, studied, and did nothing during the retreat on a 4-point scale
from 1 = not at all through 4 = very often. Pray (μ = 3.51) and Medi-
tate (μ = 3.37) attained the highest mean scores, followed by Read (μ =
3.19) and Rest (μ = 3.13). Study (μ = 2.63) and Do nothing (μ = 2.10)
displayed the lowest mean scores. Relatively high correlations existed
between Read and Study (ρ = .53, df = 676, p < .001), and Rest and
Do nothing (ρ = .43, df = 665, p < .001). To avoid multicollinearity,
Study and Do nothing were dropped from the activities that were used
as independent variables to assess the effect of the practice-oriented
retreat at Ignatius House. Other independent variables included the
religious/spiritual activities before the retreat and the demographic
measures used in Table 3.
The retreatants were also asked to rate on a 4-point scale from 1 =
not at all helpful to 4 = very helpful the helpfulness of the Spiritual
Exercises in assisting them “to know him (Christ) more clearly,” “to
love him more dearly,” and “to follow him more nearly.” The three
measures were highly correlated (with all the Pearson correlation coef-
ficients close to .8), but they were still used as dependent variables
separately. In addition to the personal activities during the retreat,
also used as independent variables were retreat type, religious/spiritual
activities before the retreat, education, occupation, and demographic
measures. The results of regression analysis are reported in Table 4.
Also reported in this table are the results of the measure of satisfaction
regressed on the same independent variables.
As can be expected, the three models with highly correlated depen-
dent variables displayed great similarities. It should be pointed out
that similar behaviors such as praying (ρ = .26, df = 683, p < .01),
meditation (ρ = .34, df = 674, p < .01), or reading (ρ = .02, df = 674,
non-significant) before and during the retreat did not display exces-
sively high correlations. Religious/spiritual activities before the retreat
and personal activities during the retreat were used separately as well
as simultaneously as independent variables to avoid possible compli-
cations caused by potential multicollinearity. However, separate and
combined regression analyses yielded similar results. In contrast to
the general lack of significance for religious/spiritual activities before
the retreat with the exception of Reading sacred texts or Other reading
on religion/spirituality, personal activities during the retreat played an
important role (see Models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4). Pray (b = .15,
β = .14, t = 3.07, p < .01 for To know him more clearly; b = .14, β =
.13, t = 2.89, p < .01 for To love him more dearly; b = .11, β = .11, t =
2.48, p < .05 for To follow him more nearly) and Meditate (b = .12,
β = .14, t = 3.04, p < .01 for To know him clearly; b = .13, β = .15, t =
3.29, p < .01 for To love him more dearly; b = .07, β = .09, t = 2.03, p <
.05 for To follow him more nearly) during the retreat achieved strong
positive relationships with the three dependent variables. Read during
retreat was also strongly related to the dependent variable To know
Table 4. Multiple Regression Models of Helpfulness a and Satisfactionb at the

End of Retreat c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent To know him To love him To follow him How
Variable more clearly more dearly more nearly satisfied
White –.08 (–.05) –.06 (–.03) –.11 (–.08)* .01 (.01)

Male –.06 (–.04) –.02 (–.02) –.05 (–.04) –.01 (–.01)
Age .00 (.02) .00 (.03) –.00 (–.03) .00 (.06)
Married .02 (.01) –.07 (–.05) .02 (.02) .08 (.08)*
Catholic .21 (.11)** .34 (.19)*** .21 (.12)*** –.04 (–.03)
College degree –.05 (–.04) –.05 (–.04) –.06 (–.05) –.05 (–.05)
Graduate degree –.12 (–.08) –.14 (–.10)* –.08 (–.06) –.08 (–.08)
Occupation (Manual and others as comparison group)
Religious .05 (.01) –.01 (–.00) –.02 (–.00) –.14 (–.05)
Professional .04 (.02) .04 (.03) .06 (.04) .01 (.01)
Managerial –.03 (–.01) –.05 (–.03) –.08 (–.05) .00 (.00)
Retired .07 (.05) .06 (.04) .08 (.06) –.02 (–.02)
Retreat Type
By a Jesuit –.07 (–.05) –.11 (–.08)* –.09 (–.07) –.16 (–.17)***
By a Cenacle Sister –.08 (–.04) –.02 (–.01) .01 (.01) –.16 (–.13)***
Repeat retreatant –.07 (–.04) –.11 (–.07) –.06 (–.04) –.01 (–.01)
Personal Retreat Activities
Pray .15 (.14)*** .14 (.13)*** .11 (.11)** .06 (.09)*
Meditate .12 (.14)*** .13 (.15)*** .07 (.09)** .03 (.05)
Rest .06 (.07)* .05 (.07) .06 (.08)* .03 (.05)
Read .10 (.12)*** .04 (.05) .05 (.07)* .02 (.04)
Prayer .01 (.01) –.00 (–.00) .02 (.04) .00 (.01)
Meditation –.01 (–.03) .00 (.00) –.01 (–.02) –.01 (–.03)
Yoga, Tai Chi, etc. .02 (.05) .03 (.08)* .02 (.06) .02 (.06)
Religious singing –.01 (–.02) .01 (.03) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Reading sacred .05 (.15)*** .03 (.08) .05 (.15)*** .02 (.06)
texts
Attend religious –.02 (–.03) .01 (.01) –.01 (–.01) .01 (.04)
services
N 624 622 621 651
R2 .13 .14 .12 .06
F 3.64† 3.72† 3.22† 1.71††
Notes: a The first three dependent variables are the Likert measures from the question
“How helpful were the talks based on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius in assist-
ing you (1) to know him more clearly, (2) to love him more dearly, and (3) to follow
him more nearly?”
b
Likert scale measure from the question “How satisfied are you with this retreat?”
c
Reported are unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) regression coefficients.
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
†
Model is significant at the 99.9% level.
††
Model 4 is significant at the 95% level.
him more clearly (b = .10, β = .12, t = 2.91, p < .01). It is interesting

to note that although religious/spiritual activities before the retreat in
general did not seem to affect the retreat outcomes, Reading sacred
texts before the retreat appeared almost as important as Read during
the retreat for To know him more clearly (b = .05, β = .15, t = 2.99,
p < .01) and for To follow him more nearly (b = .05, β = .15, t = 2.86,
p < .01). This is a strong indication that, probably more than anything
else, a reading of religious/spiritual materials contributed to an intel-
lectual rather than an emotional attachment to God, as indicated by
the lack of significance of the variable for the model of To love him
more dearly.
Being Catholic had a significant positive relationship with the
dependent variables (b = .21, β = .11, t = 2.53, p < .05 for To know
him more clearly; b = .34, β = .19, t = 4.15, p < .01 for To love him
more dearly; b = .21, β = .12, t = 2.76, p < .01 for To follow him more
nearly), although Catholics did not display any higher level of satis-
faction with the retreat. Consistent with the finding that those with
advanced degrees reported less motivation to take the retreat, the
education variable displayed a tendency toward negative relationships
with the retreat outcome measures although almost all regression coef-
ficients for education failed to be significant. The variable Graduate
degree (b = –.14, β = –.10, t = –1.90, p < .10) was significant with
the dependent variable To love him more dearly. This finding may
strengthen the argument that reading religious/spiritual material con-
tributes to an intellectual rather than an emotional attachment to God.
As a matter of fact, most of the retreatants were well educated. Over
40% had at least some graduate education or a graduate degree. Inter-
estingly, better educated retreatants had a greater tendency to attend
retreats even though they rated motivational items lower.
Retreatants were also asked to describe themselves at the end of
the retreat using a 4-point scale from 1 = not at all through 4 = very
much in relation to the listed adjectives. The mean score for Alert
was 3.33, Tormented 1.13, Efficient 2.51, Irritable 1.11, Rested 3.44,
Clear-headed 3.46, Comfortable 3.57, Disorganized 1.19, Attentive
3.30, Positive 3.70, Distracted 1.26, Patient 3.29, Relaxed 3.62, and
Competent 3.17. A factor analysis yielded three factors that reflected
three differing combinations of two broad conditions: (1) Effective and
Not Troubled that included those who scored high on the items that
indicated intended outcomes: Alert, Efficient, Rested, Clear-headed,
Comfortable, Attentive, Positive, Patient, Relaxed, and Competent

but scored low on the items that reflected troubled feelings: Tor-
mented, Irritable, Disorganized, and Distracted; (2) Ineffective but Not
Troubled that included those who scored low on both the items for
intended outcomes and the items for troubled feelings; and (3) Effec-
tive but Troubled that included those who scored high on both the
items for intended outcomes and troubled feelings. With a K-Mean
cluster analysis, the adjectives were then classified into three catego-
ries, which were then coded into three mutually-exclusive dummy
variables used as additional measures of the effect of the retreat in
logistic regression analyses. As the three dependent dummy variables
were coded from the same variable that contained these three catego-
ries, the comparison group for each dummy variable consisted of the
remaining two categories.
One open-ended question at the end of the survey asked about
whether anything dramatic had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual
life as a result of the retreat. The responses from 77% of the respon-
dents who answered the question were classified into eight categories:
“feel renewed/love/peace” (18.9%), “gained knowledge about God”
(24.2%), “connected with God” (12.1%), “gained insight about rela-
tionships with others” (9.5%), “not certain/no” (6.1%), “prayer” (1.0%),
and “other” (1.6%). Three dummy variables, Renewed, Closer to God,
and Uncertain, were coded also to be used as measures of the effect of
the retreat in logistic regression analyses. The comparison group for
the dummy variable Renewed consisted of the response of Closer to
God, Uncertain, as well as the other responses. Similarly the compari-
son group for the dummy variable Closer to God included Renewed,
Uncertain, and the other responses. The comparison group for Uncer-
tain included Renewed, Closer to God, and the other responses. The
results of all logistic analyses are provided in Table 5.
Again, personal activities during the retreat played a large role in
attaining the intended outcomes. Pray, Meditate, Rest, and Read dur-
ing the retreat were all strongly related to Effective/Not Troubled,
meaning that those who engaged in these activities were likely to
have achieved the intended retreat outcomes and were not likely to
have troubled feelings at the end of the retreat. Praying during the
retreat had the greatest relationship with Effective/Not Troubled (b
= .53, Wald = 11.72, odds ratio = 1.70, p <.01) and Ineffective/Not
Troubled (b = –.57, Wald = 13.20, odds ratio = .57, p < .01), followed
Table 5. Logistic Regression Coefficients of Retreat Effect a

Independent Variable
rou e/
d
d
rou /
ble
ble
t T tive
t T tiv
ub e/
No ffec
n
l ed
d
Tro ectiv
No Effec
Go r to
tai
we
Ine
cer
ne
se
d
Eff
Clo
Re
Un
White –.35 .44* –.39 .07 –.17 .01
Male –.06 –.01 1.01 .04 –.51** .63*
Age –.01 .01 –.02 .00 –.02*** –.01
Married .17 –.11 –.47 –.30 .40** –.51
Catholic –.02 –.03 –.04 .10 .25 –.83*
College degree –.23 .41* –1.64** .31 .19 –.17
Graduate degree –.27 .39 –.55 .24 .04 .24
Occupation (Manual, clerical and others as comparison group)
Religious .59 –.99* 1.95* –.46 –.69 .25
Professional .72*** –.66*** –.54 –.21 .26 –.08
Managerial .34 –.22 –1.50 –.25 .39 –.49
Retired .66** –.78*** .86 –.50 .25 1.06**
Retreat Type
By a Jesuit –.31 .24 .21 .01 –.37* .64
By a Cenacle Sister –.29 .26 .50 –.05 –.55* 1.25**
Repeat retreatant –.03 .09 .58 –.54** .10 .20
Personal Retreat Activities
Pray .53*** –.57*** .54 .35* –.06 –.25
Meditate .26** –.30** .63 –.14 .39*** –.40*
Rest .40*** –.42*** .17 –.20 .13 –.23
Read .30*** –.37*** .55 .03 –.07 –.02
Prayer –.08 .13 –.40* .04 –.03 .14
Meditation .02 –.03 .08 .00 –.13** .09
Yoga, Tai Chi or similar practice –.07 .00 .38*** .07 .00 –.03
Religious singing/chanting –.05 .02 .22 .15** –.04 –.16*
Reading sacred texts .04 –.03 –.03 –.03 .08 .02
Attend religious services .10 –.01 –.49** –.03 .05 –.03
N 632 632 632 497 497 497
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness of fit .56† .04†† .72† .36† .10† .96†
Cox & Snell R2 .12 .14 .08 .04 .08 .05
Notes: a The first three dependent variables are dummy variables coded from the three categories
that emerged from a cluster analysis of 14 items measuring the retreat result (Question 4 of Survey).
The last three dependent variables are dummy variables coded from the open-ended question about
something important or dramatic that happened after the retreat (Question 23 of Survey).
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
†
Goodness of fit > .05: Model is significantly different from the null-model.
††
Goodness of fit < .05: Model is not significantly different from the null-model.
by Rest (b = .40, Wald = 13.56, odds ratio = 1.50, p < .01 for Effective/
Not Troubled; b = –.42, Wald = 14.47, odds ratio = .66, p < .01 for
Ineffective/Not Troubled), Read (b = .30, Wald = 7.86, odds ratio =
1.35, p < .01 for Effective/Not Troubled; b = –.37, Wald = 11.95, odds
ratio = .69, p < .01 for Ineffective/Not Troubled), and Meditate (b =
.26, Wald = 4.15, odds ratio = 1.30, p < .05 for Effective/Not Trou-
bled; b = –.30, Wald = 5.54, odds ratio = .74, p < .05 for Ineffec-
tive/Not Troubled). Professional occupations were positively related
to Effective/Not Troubled (b = .72, Wald = 8.88, odds ratio = 2.06,
p < .01) and negatively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = –.66,
Wald = 7.26, odds ratio = .52, p < .01). Retired was positively related
to Effective/Not Troubled (b = .66, Wald = 5.36, odds ratio = 1.94,
p < .05) and negatively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = –.78,
Wald = 7.16, odds ratio = .46, p < .01). Whites were negatively related
to Effective/Not Troubled (b = –.39, Wald = 2.96, odds ratio = .68, p <
.10) but positively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = .47, Wald =
4.11, odds ratio = 1.60, p < .05) when Other reading on religion/spiri-
tuality was controlled, but the significance levels diminished, as shown
in Table 5, when the variable was replaced with Reading sacred texts.
To a substantial degree, the signs of the regression coefficients for the
independent variables are exactly the opposite for the two models, and
even the regression coefficients and statistical significance levels mir-
rored each other between the two models.
The third model with Effective/Troubled as the dependent vari-
able stood out by itself. The religious/spiritual activities before the
retreat, which displayed little impact in the first two models that stood
in striking contrast to each other, had more pronounced impact on
Effective/Troubled. Attend religious services (b = –.49, Wald = 5.74,
odds ratio = .61, p < .05) had a negative relationship with Effective/
Troubled, which indicates that those who attended more religious ser-
vices tended to feel that the retreat was not very effective but that
they were less likely to leave with troubled feelings. It is interesting
to note that Yoga, Tai Chi or similar practices (b = .38, Wald = 9.80,
odds ratio = 1.46, p < .01) was strongly related to Effective/Troubled,
meaning retreatants who engaged in those activities tended to report
the retreat brought about those intended outcomes discussed above,
but at the same time they were also likely to have troubled feelings at
the end of the retreat.
Findings about Renewed, Closer to God, and Uncertain provided

additional information to complement the picture. Repeat retreatants
were less likely to feel renewed (b = –.54, Wald = 4.61, odds ratio = .58,
p < .05) probably because retreats for them were no longer a novelty,
and the retired were also less likely to feel renewed (non-significant)
probably because of their age and most (85.7%) of the retired were also
repeat retreatants. Religious singing or chanting (b = .15, Wald = 5.72,
odds ratio = 1.16, p < .05) before the retreat was positively related to
Renewed.
The most dramatic difference made by Other reading on religion/
spirituality and Reading sacred texts was that the former had a strong
relationship (b = .13, Wald = 5.45, odds ratio = 1.14, p < .05) with
Closer to God whereas the latter failed to reach significance. Meditat-
ing (b = .39, Wald = 9.08, odds ratio = 1.45, p < .01) during the retreat
was related to feeling closer to God. Meditating (b = –.40, Wald =
2.87, odds ratio = .67, p < .10) was also related to being less uncertain.
It is interesting that meditation (b = –.13, Wald = 6.24, odds ratio
= .88, p < .05) outside of the retreat seemed to be negatively related
to Closer to God, in contrast to the positive relationship of medita-
tion during retreat. Other variables that seemed to reduce feelings of
uncertainty included Catholic (b = –.83, Wald = 3.37, odds ratio = .43,
p < .10) and Religious singing/chanting outside of the retreat (b =
–.16, Wald = 3.35, odds ratio = .85, p < .10). Males (b = .63, Wald =
2.80, odds ratio = 1.88, p < .10) had a greater tendency to have feelings
of uncertainty. Those whose retreats were directed by Cenacle Sisters
(b = 1.25, Wald = 5.53, odds ratio = 3.50, p < .05) were more likely to
have feelings of uncertainty.
Discussion
This study contributes to the scholarly literature primarily by examin-

ing what Ignatian spirituality offers those on a spiritual journey. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, a practice-oriented spirituality like
Ignatian spirituality offers spiritual seekers “activities that deepen their
relationship to the sacred” (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 3). The present study
investigated an example of lived religion and found that personal
retreat activities including prayer, meditation, and studying played a
major role in retreatants knowing him (Christ) more clearly, loving
him (Christ) more dearly, and following him (Christ) more nearly.
Personal retreat activities also influenced how satisfied retreatants

were with the retreat, whether at the end of the retreat they described
themselves as effective/not troubled, ineffective/not troubled, or effec-
tive/troubled, and if they felt renewed, closer to God, and/or uncer-
tain. Nearly 20% of the respondents felt renewed, loved, and at peace,
and almost 25% of them indicated that they gained knowledge about
God as a result of the retreat.
While there are many similarities between our study and Ouellette
et al. (2005), their study was psychological, focusing more on the
restorative benefits of the monastic environment, whereas our study
was sociological and focused more on the relationships between
background, motivations, and outcomes. Both studies found a high
satisfaction level with retreats: theirs found a mean of 4.75 on a
5-point scale, while this study found a mean of 3.82 on a 4-point scale.
Theirs found four factors (Spiritual, Beauty, Compatibility, and Being
away) in their analysis of the motivation to go on a retreat, while this
study found six factors (Spirituality, Meditation, Beauty, Being away,
Solution, and Fascinating). The factor analysis of this study strongly
indicated that Meditation was a separate factor distinctive from
Spirituality and that Fascinating was a separate factor distinctive from
Beauty or Being away.
There are several major differences between these two studies, besides
the fact that the present study included both men and woman, whereas
Ouellette et al. (2005) surveyed only men. The first major difference
between the studies was that the present study was concerned with
the effect of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius on the retreat
outcomes. The activities conducted during the retreat had a much
more significant effect than the religious/spiritual activities before the
retreat on the outcomes. Another difference was that in their study,
stress relief (among other items) was an important motivation for
going on retreat, while it was not in the present study.
As previously mentioned, overall the respondents were very satisfied
(μ = 3.82 on a 4-point scale) with the retreat whether it was conducted
by a Jesuit, a Cenacle Sister, or a lay person. That said, the data revealed
that respondents who participated in retreats led by lay persons (90.9%)
were slightly more likely than those who participated in retreats led by
the Jesuits (82.4%) or the Cenacle Sisters (81.7%) to indicate that they
were very satisfied with the retreat. What might explain this outcome?
We have no data that directly answers this question, but we can
offer one plausible explanation. Retreatants might have just felt more
comfortable with lay leaders because almost all of the retreatants were
lay people. The lay leaders might have simply just related better to
the retreatants. Some retreatants might have expected more from the
Jesuits and Cenacle Sisters just because they were clergy and vowed-
religious, while some retreatants might have been intimidated in some
way because they were clergy and vowed-religious. Again, we want to
reiterate that retreatants were very satisfied with their retreat experience
no matter who conducted it. It might be worth noting that 34.4% of
the retreatants preferred that the Jesuits conduct the retreats, 11.2%
preferred a joint effort between the Jesuits, Cenacle Sisters, and lay
persons, 8% preferred the Cenacle Sisters, 4.4% preferred lay persons,
and 41.9% had no preference.
As previously mentioned, nearly 20% of the respondents felt
renewed, loved, and at peace, and almost 25% of them indicated that
they gained knowledge about God as a result of the retreat. Some
people might consider these proportions very low, but one should
remember that these proportions are indicative of the responses to
an open-ended question that asked whether anything dramatic and
important had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual life as a result of
the retreat. If this question had been in a closed-ended format with
response categories, it is quite possible these proportions and the other
ones reported earlier in the paper would have been higher. One other
issue might have impacted how people responded to the question. The
choice of the word “dramatic” as in whether anything dramatic and
important had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual life as a result of
the retreat might have been misconstrued by some of the respondents
and thus influenced them to omit commenting on less than dramatic
happenings.
Conclusion
A limitation of the present study was that retreatants were asked to

report on the outcomes of the retreat during the closing hours of the
retreat. Some of the respondents probably did not have sufficient time
to reflect on the effect of the retreat on their spiritual lives. More accu-
rate data could be collected on the effect of the retreat on their spiri-
tual lives after some time has passed. To compensate for this concern,
we are in the process of conducting a follow-up study of retreatants,
including those who participated in the present study and those who
attended retreats at Ignatius House prior to the present study. Future
research will investigate the relationship between religiosity and spiri-
tuality and their influence on retreat outcomes. In addition, the effect
of retreatants’ self-reported religiosity and spirituality on retreat out-
comes will be investigated.
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BEYOND MEANING: SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION
IN THE PARADIGM OF MORAL INTUITIONISM
A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION
INTRODUCTION:
CATALYZING A NEW SCIENCE OF SPIRITUAL
TRANSFORMATION
PART 1:
BEYOND MEANING-SYSTEM ANALYSES
PART 2:
THREE COGNITIVE SYSTEMS OF SPIRITUAL
TRANSFORMATION: A MORAL INTUITIONIST MODEL
G. Michael Leffel*
Introduction: Catalyzing a New Science

of Spiritual Transformation
Within the psychology of religion, the study of spiritual transfor-

mation has always been a major area of theory and research (e.g.,
Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Paloutizian & Park, 2005). At the pres-
ent time, meaning-system analyses dominate the empirical approach to
the study of spiritual transformation (e.g., Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009,
especially Chapter 2). In brief, meaning-system analyses argue that the
primary function of spiritual transformation is epistemic, i.e., the for-
mation and transformation of a frame of reference (perhaps “story”)
in which to situate one’s life, prioritize one’s beliefs and values, and
direct one’s personal strivings. Typically, meaning-system models
have emphasized upper- and mid-level personality domains related to
* Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene

University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to G. Michael Leffel,
Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University, 3900 Lomaland Drive,
San Diego, CA 92130. Email: michaelleffel@pointloma.edu

26 g. michael leffel
meaning (e.g., purpose, personal identity, life narrative, beliefs, val-

ues, personal strivings), more than lower-level constructs related to
motivation (e.g., moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and
vices), although in principle they do not exclude them. Thus, by most
reviews, the meaning-system approach as presently conceived is not
sufficient to capture the dynamics of “moral motivation” as under-
stood in contemporary moral psychology (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005).
Nor is it entirely consistent with the objective of most religious mean-
ing-systems themselves, i.e., the prescription of particular virtues and
practices for acquiring those virtues (e.g., Armstrong, 2009).
Consequently, in the psychology of religion today, we do not pos-
sess a theoretical model of spiritual transformation that synthesizes
two of the most important sociomoral functions of religion: moral
meaning (what to do and why to do it) and moral motivation and
capacity (how to do it). This conceptual disjunction between mean-
ing and motivation is one reason that Emmons and Paloutzian (2003)
urged the development of “a new multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm”
(p. 396; emphasis in original) that might provide a more comprehen-
sive framework for integrating constructs in the psychology of religion
with theory and research in cognate fields. They described their vision
of a multilevel interdisciplinary framework this way: “This paradigm
recognizes the value of data at multiple levels of analysis while making
nonreductive assumptions concerning the value of spiritual and reli-
gious phenomena” (p. 395). They suggested such an approach would
draw on fields such as evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philoso-
phy, anthropology, and cognitive science so that “developments in the
psychology of religion take into account and build upon advances in
these related scientific disciplines” (p. 395). In response to this recom-
mendation, this two-article series has two primary objectives: a) to
argue the need and rationale for an alternative framework for con-
ceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation than
the presently dominant meaning-system approach, and b) to outline
a moral intuitionist approach that derives from but also extends the
“Social Intuitionist Model” of morality (Haidt, 2001).
Specifically, these articles propose that recent thinking in the “new
paradigm of moral personhood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008, p. 333) offers
a useful resource for conceptualizing a multi-domain, personality-
based, process model of spiritual transformation. At the heart of
the proposed approach is the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) first
offered by University of Virginia moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt
introduction: catalyzing spiritual transformation 27
and recently expanded to incorporate contemporary virtue theory

(Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). Within the literature on spiritual trans-
formation, while the SIM has been commended as a potentially helpful
way to re-conceptualize the nature and processes of spiritual change
(Markham, 2007), it has not yet been systematically applied. The cen-
tral assumption of the proposed moral intuitionist approach, in dis-
tinction from but not opposition to meaning-system analyses, is that
spiritual transformation is less a “search” (Pargament, 2006, p. 21) for
a health- and happiness-enhancing meaning system than it is a “quest”
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 219) to embody the virtues that motivate and
enable the capacity for “moral sociability” (Casebeer, 2003, p. 121).
While the latter objective likely has been implied in the former, virtue
formation itself has yet to become a focus for programmatic research
in the psychology of spiritual transformation, despite recent calls in
the literature to do so (e.g., Worthington & Berry, 2005).
In an effort to achieve these aims, the overall objective of Beyond
Meaning is to help catalyze a new empirical approach to the study
of spiritual transformation that places moral motivation (more than
meaning) at the heart of the process. Part 1 first reviews and critiques
the dominant meaning-system approach, and it outlines central fea-
tures and potential contributions of a moral intuitionist approach.
Part 2 then outlines a personality-based, process model of spiritual
transformation conceptualized within a moral intuitionist and social
functionalist paradigm. The eventual goal of this project is a prac-
tical model of intentional spiritual transformation that has implica-
tions for character education theory and praxis, emotion-focused
psychotherapy, and practical theologies centrally concerned with vir-
tue formation.
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A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL
TRANSFORMATION
PART 1:
BEYOND MEANING-SYSTEM ANALYSES
G. Michael Leffel*
Abstract
This article highlights a conversation at the interface of the psychology of spiritual
transformation (cf. Paloutzian & Park, 2005) and the emerging paradigm of moral
intuitionism in contemporary moral psychology (Shweder & Haidt, 1993). It argues
the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature
and processes of spiritual transformation than the presently dominant meaning-sys-
tem approach (e.g., Paloutzian, 2005), and it outlines central features and potential
contributions of a moral intuitionist model. At the heart of the proposed approach
is the “Social Intuitionist Model” (SIM) of moral functioning first offered by moral
psychologist Haidt (2001) and recently expanded to encompass contemporary virtue
theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). The article first proposes an alternative social
functionalist definition that re-conceptualizes spiritual transformation as intentional
expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability, understood primarily
in terms of Erikson’s (1964) construct generative care. Second, it critiques the prevail-
ing meaning-system approach, offering five conceptual and empirical reasons to doubt
the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate moral sociability. Third, it intro-
duces a moral intuitionist model of spiritual transformation that synthesizes three
sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning) and corresponding cognitive
systems (types of knowledge) that are hypothesized in spiritual transformation: a) an
Intuitive System (serving the function referred to as motivation and capacity); b) a
Reasoning System (responsible for moral direction); and c) a third system called Ideo-
logical Narrative (responsible for existential meaning). This model is further detailed
in Part 2 of this article series.
Keywords: Spiritual transformation, multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm, meaning-

system analyses, moral intuitionism, Social Intuitionist Model, moral sociability

University.

True spirituality gives attention to the moral dimen-

sion in our lives. It is false thinking then to separate
morality from spirituality; there can be no moral
development without a spirituality to sustain it and
deepen it, and a spirituality divorced from morality
only fosters the illusion of righteousness.
—N. Symington, Emotion and Spirit, p. 48
If anything is going to answer to the name moral
psychology, it ought to be an inquiry into how the
formations (and transformations) of the psyche help
one to lead a good life in a world with others.
—J. Lear, Radical Hope, p. 104
To really understand how human morality works . . . it
may be advisable to shift attention away from the
study of moral reasoning and toward the study of
intuitive and emotional processes.
—J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail,
p. 825
In recent years, the relationship between religion and morality has
received a great deal of popular and scientific attention, particularly
the role that religion may play in promoting or obstructing the devel-
opment of prosociality. For example, Norenzayan & Shariff (2008)
concluded their review of the literature on the origin and evolution
of religious prosociality with the recommendation that: “the relation
between religious prosociality and moral intuitions and reasoning is
ripe for further investigation” (p. 62). Likewise, in their recent review
of moral psychology, Haidt & Kesebir (2010) proposed that in the
years to come “the psychology of religion should become an impor-
tant part of the psychology of morality” (p. 821). While this recom-
mendation very well may be a constructive direction for future theory
and research, Beyond Meaning argues the merits of an inverse strat-
egy: The psychology of morality should become an important part of
the psychology of religion. Why so? For one, if recent evolutionary
(Boyer, 2001) and game theoretic (Wright, 2009) analyses of religious
progress are even partially on target in suggesting that the “moralizing
big gods” of religion “evolve” as the human beings who interpret their
Gods make moral progress, then it would seem that the mechanisms of
moral development should be a fundamental focus for the psychology
of religion. For example, Wright’s recent book The Evolution of God
(2009) provided a number of illustrations of how evolution of the God-
concept in the three Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity,
part one: beyond meaning 31
and Islam seems to follow from “non-zero-sum” moral progress made

by the people. Second, and more germane to the present project, there
is reason to believe that the emerging new paradigm of moral intu-
itionism (see Shweder & Haidt, 1993 for an overview) could offer an
important new theoretical tool for modeling the nature and processes
of spiritual transformation. Specifically, as outlined in this article and
further detailed in Part 2, this emerging paradigm promises to offer the
psychology of spiritual transformation “a new multilevel interdisciplinary
paradigm” (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003, p. 396; emphasis in original)
that could integrate constructs historically emphasized in the psychol-
ogy of religion (related to meaning) with new constructs highlighted in
intuitionist models (related to motivation). In an effort to achieve that
aim, the current article draws on some of the most promising empiri-
cal and theoretical trends in moral psychology today to articulate: a)
the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualiz-
ing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation than the pres-
ently dominant “meaning-system” approach (Paloutzian, 2005), and b)
a moral intuitionist approach that derives from the “Social Intuitionist
Model” of morality (SIM: Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007).
The present article addresses a central question in spiritual transfor-
mation theory: What is the goal of spiritual transformation? That is,
what is the nature or “ultimate concern” (Emmons, 1999) of spiritual
transformation? The article begins by framing the central issue under
discussion, re-conceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual
transformation within a moral intuitionist and social functionalist
paradigm. Second, it offers a new construct, moral sociability, and a
revised definition of spiritual transformation that follows from this
construct. Next, as further background for the proposed model, the
third section reviews recent developments in the “new paradigm of
moral personhood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008, p. 333), particularly in
social intuitionist theory, in order to offer a new direction for theory
and research in the psychology of spiritual transformation. In light of
these trends, a fourth section then provides a more extended critique
of the prevailing meaning-system approach that focuses on its concep-
tually “thin” theory of moral motivation (i.e., factors hypothesized to
motivate prosociality and diminish selfishness). Five conceptual limi-
tations of the meaning-system approach are offered, including empiri-
cal reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate
prosocial action. Finally, a fifth section sketches a moral intuitionist
model of spiritual transformation to be described more systematically
in the second article. Part 2 then outlines a personality-based, process

model of spiritual transformation that details specific processes and
empirical hypotheses for future theoretical development and research.
The overall objective of Beyond Meaning is to suggest how this moral
intuitionist and social functionalist framework could be translated into
a systematic program of empirical research. But, first consider why the
psychology of spiritual transformation might be interested in a moral
intuitionist approach.
Framing the Issue: Re-Conceptualizing the Nature

Recently, scholars in the psychology of religion have joined personality

and social psychology (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004), moral philoso-
phy (e.g., MacIntyre, 1999), religious ethics (e.g., Herdt, 2008), and
moral psychology (e.g., Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) in the interdisciplin-
ary effort to define the “goods” that constitute and promote “a good
life in the world with others” (Lear’s epigraph above). Emmons (1999)
has referred to this renewed interest in subjective and psychological
well-being as “the psychology of ultimate concerns.” With this des-
ignation, Emmons follows existential theologian Paul Tillich (1963)
in suggesting that religion, in its broadest sense, is the pursuit of an
“ultimate concern.” Tillich defined faith as the state of being focused
on concerns that have a sense of urgency unparalleled by other moti-
vations: “the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern
which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself con-
tains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life” (p. 4).
Among the old issues resurrected in this new debate is the question
of moral telos: What is the ultimate goal of a good (“flourishing”) life,
and what is the role of religion in this pursuit?
By various reviews, in the psychology of religion today, the “need
for meaning” is regarded as a central if not the ultimate concern to
which human beings aspire, a good “that religion is uniquely capable
of helping to provide” (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, p. 12). A definition
of religion representative of the meaning-system approach is offered
by Baumeister (1991):
Religion deals with the highest levels of meaning . . . it can interpret each
life or each event in a context that runs from the beginning of time to
future eternity. Religion is thus uniquely capable of offering high-level
meaning to human life. (p. 205; emphasis added)
Consistent with this definition, meaning-system analyses argue that

the central function of religion is global meaning formation and trans-
formation; that is, the acquisition and development of a frame of refer-
ence (“story”) in which to situate one’s life, to order one’s beliefs and
values, and to give direction to one’s personal strivings. In the most
recent edition of their textbook on the psychology of religion, Hood
et al. (2009) offer three reasons that meaning is believed to be so fun-
damental to religion, and they liken religious conversion or spiritual
transformation to a “search” for these three inter-related goods: a) the
cognitive search for meaning (the epistemic functional need to know
and experience transcendent truth); b) the motivational search for
meaning (the intrapsychic functional need for mastery and for con-
trol of life’s ambiguities); and c) the social embeddedness of meaning
(the social functional need for relationships and moral community).
At the present time, meaning-system analyses dominate the empiri-
cal study of spiritual transformation or religious conversion (see Hill,
2002; Paloutizian & Park, 2005 for examples). As described below,
meaning-system analyses argue that the central function of religion is
the provision of “high-level meaning,” and that “the thing that under-
goes transformation in a religious conversion is the person’s meaning
system” (Paloutzian, 2005, p. 333). In these articles, as in Paloutizian’s
(2005) discussion of meaning-system research, the terms “religious
conversion” and “spiritual transformation” are considered “function-
ally equivalent” (p. 333). Typically, meaning-system analyses have
emphasized global- and mid-level personality constructs related to
meaning (e.g., narrative identity, life purpose, beliefs, values, personal
strivings) more than lower-level constructs related to motivation (e.g.,
moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and vices), although
in principle they do not exclude them (cf. Park, 2005).
The objective of this article, however, is to offer arguments against
the primacy of meaning as the central locus of spiritual change and
to propose a theoretical strategy for development of an alternative
approach. Thus, the importance of the question: If not primarily
about meaning, how else could we conceptualize the ultimate concern
of spiritual transformation? This section introduces two general argu-
ments for re-considering the central telos (aim, objective) of spiritual
transformation from the perspective of a social functionalist approach.
The first argument derives from Haidt and Kesebir’s (2010) recent dis-
cussion of different types of functionalism, and the second argument
from historian of religion Armstrong’s (2009) discussion of the moral
core of religious meaning. The next section then outlines a social
functionalist construct and definition of spiritual transformation that

follows from these two arguments.
Which Functionalism and Why?

A first way to understand the logic of the meaning-system approach is
to consider the type of functionalism favored in these models. Haidt
& Kesebir (2010) outlined three kinds of functionalism that can be
observed in psychology generally (p. 808), and in the psychology of
religion (also see Graham & Haidt, 2010). They argued that a first step
in any functionalist analysis is to specify the larger structure within
which a component and its effects are implicated. In epistemic func-
tionalism the larger structure is a person’s “representation” of the
world and one’s place in it. Applied in the psychology of religion,
epistemic functionalism thus suggests that the central objective of reli-
gion is to improve the accuracy and completeness of one’s knowledge
of the Sacred and how to approach the Sacred. Corresponding to this
emphasis, theory and research in the psychology of spiritual transfor-
mation has emphasized this epistemic function, and this can be seen
in the favored definitions and research programs in the psychology
of religion. For example, this epistemic focus is apparent in the lit-
erature on “intrinsic” religiosity (focusing on individual practices and
beliefs) versus “extrinsic” religiosity (encompassing social aspects such
as collective rituals). Another example is the research on religiosity
as “quest” (Batson, Denton, & Vollmecke, 2008) in which religious
belief is sometimes characterized as a personal existential struggle
often marked by disengagement from the community in order to find
one’s own understanding of the sacred. While these meaning-related
approaches certainly do not deny the importance of other aspects of
religiosity, such as communal worship and ritual practices, they do
seem to suggest that meaning comes first and is the central function
of the practices. Thus, the primary goal of a meaning-system analysis
is to explain how “global meaning” (Park, 2005, p. 299) is formed and
transformed across the life course and how “meaning making” (p. 298)
works to restore global life meaning when it has been disrupted or vio-
lated by some unpleasant life event. In brief, an epistemic functionalist
approach suggests (or at least implies) that beliefs, rituals, and other
aspects of religious practice are best understood as means (methods)
for finding meaning (perhaps “truth”).
In intrapsychic functionalism, the larger structure is the psyche, and

religion serves the function of procuring intra-personal “goods” such
as minimizing intrapsychic conflict or maintaining positive moods or
self-esteem (Cialdini et al., 1987; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Many models
in the psychology of religion take this approach, attempting to explain
how a meaning system, once formed, functions to provide personal
benefits such as health- and happiness-enhancement. For example,
belief in God has been studied as a way to experience a sense of security
and affiliation with God, who may serve as a substitute or “compen-
satory” attachment figure (Kirkpatrick, 1998). Belief in God, or in an
afterlife, has also been studied for other palliative effects, for example,
as a way to explain injustices in this world or to understand existential
fears about death and meaninglessness (e.g., Kay et al., 2008; Jonas &
Fischer, 2006). Other intrapsychic functionalist research has focused
on the religion-health connection, such as studies that documented the
reciprocal relationships between religion and coping (e.g., Pargament,
Ano, & Wachholtz, 2005), stress and immune system functioning (e.g.,
Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001), and mental health and psycho-
pathology (e.g., Miller & Kelley, 2005). In brief, intrapsychic function-
alists suggest that beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice
are best understood as means to achieve some ideal of subjective well-
being, and (perhaps) also for finding meaning.
Third, in a social functionalist approach, the larger structure is the
social agent embedded in a still larger social order, and religion serves
the function of strengthening the moral community (e.g., Dunbar,
1996). Consistent with this approach, Haidt and Kesebir (2010)
recently offered this social functionalist definition of morality: “Moral
systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, iden-
tities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanism
that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social
life possible” (p. 800). Haidt suggested that religion should also be
studied as a complex system with many social functions, one of which
is to “bind people together into cooperative communities organized
around deities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140). In this view, mean-
ing and beliefs about God are important but primarily as they serve
to strengthen moral bonds in one’s family, the religious community,
and in the larger world. In their article, Graham and Haidt summa-
rized a variety of empirical findings that collectively suggested that
while religious meaning systems do serve epistemic and intrapsychic
functions, most of the well-being benefits of religion appear to come

from participation in a religious congregation (i.e., the social function-
alist hypothesis). For example, measures of social support have been
found to consistently mediate the relationship between religiosity and
well-being (Salsman, Brown, Brechting, & Carlson, 2005). Addition-
ally, studies of “social capital,” measured by self-reported trust of those
in the immediate community, such as neighbors, co-workers, fellow
church congregants, etc., have demonstrated that it positively pre-
dicted amounts of both religious and secular charitable giving (Wang
& Graddy, 2008). In brief, the social functionalist approach to religion
suggests that beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are
best understood as means to create moral community and are not
simply ways to understand the Sacred or to procure personal benefits.
What’s the “Meaning” of Religious Meaning?

Historian of religion Armstrong (2009) seems to favor the third
approach, and in her recent book The Case for God argues for a return
to and greater appreciation of the social functionalist understanding
of spiritual transformation (although she did not use the language of
functionalism). She began by observing that a strange irony and sur-
prising paradox surrounds the study of religion. The irony is that reli-
gious meaning systems, ostensibly about the Sacred and one’s relation
to the Sacred, turn out to be, upon further review, far less about the
Sacred Other and far more about the nature of inter-human moral
interactions than the seeker may have expected (see Chapters 1 and
5). In particular, she noted that most religious meaning systems are fun-
damentally concerned to teach believers, primarily through narratives,
exemplars, and other practices, how to transform less noble and lower
(perhaps innate) motives and vices into higher motives and virtues. Arm-
strong observed that moral philosophers, comparative religious mythol-
ogists, and theologians from diverse wisdom traditions seem to express
near-unanimous agreement that mature religion contains a moral core
at the heart of its teachings. These teachings prescribe a set of precepts
and practices that promise to elevate the devotee to a higher plane of
moral consciousness and action (also see Smith, 1992). They consist not
only of prohibitions against immoral (vice-related) actions but also offer
prescriptions for moral relationships and practices for the development
of virtues required for such relationships. In brief, Armstrong argued
that religious meaning has far more to do with human moral interac-
tions than it does with doctrinal knowledge about the Sacred or how to
attain some experiential sense of the Sacred. This is where the surprising
paradox of religious meaning becomes evident.
As Armstrong suggested, believers begin to discover that:
The [epistemic] truths of religion are accessible only when you are pre-
pared to get rid of the selfishness, greed, and self-preoccupation that,
perhaps inevitably, are ingrained in our thoughts and behavior but are
also the source of so much of our pain. (2009, p. 20)
In other words, epistemic knowledge follows from social functional
moral progress, not (necessarily) the other way around. For example,
one comes to discover the truth of the profound love of God for all
the world as one more fully experiences love for and from human oth-
ers, and also from the profound difficulty of attempting to love “the
stranger” as oneself (Riceour, 1992). Thus, Armstrong noted that in
many pre-modern religious traditions, dogmatic “knowledge” (scien-
tia) about the Sacred and practical “wisdom” (sapientia) about moral
relationships could not be bifurcated in the manner that we some-
times observe today; that is, presumed distinctions between moral-
ity, spirituality, and religion (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, especially
Chapter 1). She suggested that religion, at least before the Enlighten-
ment, was not primarily something that people believed in and rea-
soned about but rather something they did. It was a practice-based
craft or “way” which guided persons in the formation and transfor-
mation of “new capacities of mind and heart” (p. xiii), where these
capacities were understood as necessary means for living a good life
in a world with others. Thus, in pre-Enlightenment religion, moral
skill-making was the ultimate concern of most religious meaning sys-
tems, not conceptual knowledge that promised dogmatic clarity about
God or how to cope with life’s ambiguities and absurdities (e.g., see
Mitchell, 1989 on the apophatic wisdom of the book of Job).
To summarize, the suggestion here is that meaning-system models
have tended to favor the epistemic and intrapsychic functionalist defi-
nitions of religion to the relative exclusion of the social functionalist
perspective. A social functionalist approach, in distinction from but
not necessarily in opposition to current meaning-system accounts,
would focus less on the formation and transformation of high-level
meaning per se, and it would place greater emphasis on the develop-
ment of what we might refer to as moral sociability. A clear definition
of the construct of moral sociability is therefore needed.
Moral Sociability as Ultimate Concern

Various ideas in moral philosophy, personality-social psychology, and

social cognitive neuroscience suggest a conceptual convergence around
a construct that moral philosopher Casebeer (2003) has referred to
as “moral sociability” (p. 121). This section selectively reviews several
constructs related to moral sociability and then offers a more precise
definition of moral sociability and spiritual transformation in terms of
Erik Erikson’s (1964) concept of generative care.
The Construct of Moral Sociability: A Selective Review

of Related Concepts
Casebeer (2003) defined moral sociability as “both our basic desire
to be with other human beings and our ability to skillfully infer what
others are thinking so as to engage in social cooperative action” (p.
121). He suggested that the former refers to our primal and basic wish
to be with others and not merely because their presence is instru-
mental to the satisfaction of our functional needs. The latter refers to
our ability to theorize about other persons’ minds in order to build
cooperative, mutually satisfying relationships with one another (i.e.,
a theory of mind). Likewise, Wright’s (2009) recent account of the
evolution of religion offered the term non-zero-sum as a related idea
that refers to the moral capacity to engage in win-win, interdepen-
dent, and cooperative relationships with other persons, both ingroup
and outgroup others. He argued that this human moral capacity is
the causal mechanism responsible for the (perceived) moral growth
of the God of the Abrahamic religions. Each of these terms is simi-
lar to Goleman’s (1996) construct emotional intelligence. Goleman has
argued that self-awareness and empathy (along with self-mastery and
social skills) are moral capacities essential for flourishing relationships
and family life, as well as success in work and leadership. Likewise,
these three constructs overlap with Emmon’s conception of spiritual
intelligence (1999, especially Chapter 8), defined as “competencies and
abilities” (p. 177) that facilitate adaptive problem solving in the social
world. Notably, included on Emmons’ list of the “core components of
spiritual intelligence” is “the capacity to be virtuous” (p. 164).
Several other constructs are even closer in meaning to moral socia-
bility as envisioned in this social functionalist approach. Mindsight
is the core construct in Siegel’s (2010) interpersonal neurobiology

approach to the science of personal transformation. He argued that
moral relatedness requires the capacity for both intra- and inter-per-
sonal attunement, understood as the ability to be attentive in here-
and-now interactions with others, and to regulate the shape and flow
of our emotional exchanges with others. He proposed that “feeling
felt” by another person is the subjective experience of attuned inter-
personal exchanges, and it is likely the emotional environment in
which new skills and capacities are developed (also see Stern, 2004).
Siegel regards mindsight as a learnable skill that allows us to see into
the internal workings of our own minds, and as “the basic skill that
underlies everything we mean when we speak of having social and
emotional intelligence” (p. xii). He argued that the cultivation of this
practical moral capacity is at the heart of nearly all religious traditions,
and it is central to the process of spiritual transformation (see his dis-
cussion of “transpiration” on pp. 255–261).
Like the concept of mindsight, Westen (1991) offered the construct
emotional investment capacity as the central telos of moral formation.
He defined emotional investment as: “a capacity to endow shared goals
with personal significance such that one’s emotional state becomes a
partial function of the relative attainment or nonattainment of those
goals” (p. 437). In another place, he defined it as “the ability to care
about another person for more than what that person can give or what
desires that person can gratify” (Westen, Gabbard, & Blagov, 2006,
p. 351). In other words, to emotionally invest in another person means
to care about another person’s goals, or goals shared with another,
in such a way that the attainment of those goals becomes a motivat-
ing end; unsatisfactory attainment leads to negative affect like sad-
ness, and relative success leads to positive affect such as joy. Westen’s
concept of emotional investment posited the central importance of a
sociomoral developmental process involving a shift away from need-
gratifying relational representations to more mature representations
of others that are based on respect and concern for the well-being of
others. Westen’s approach emphasizes that what often accounts for
the lack of caring is not the absence of explicit-declarative (concep-
tual, propositional) knowledge about the right values or rules of inter-
action (e.g., “I should be empathic”); rather, it is often that a person
is diminished in his or her capacity to emotionally invest in the feel-
ings, rights, and interests of others due to deficits in the necessary
procedural (“how-to”) skills. In other words, the dilemma is about

motivation and capacity (how to do it), not high-level meaning (what
to do or why to do it).
Finally, virtue ethicist MacIntyre (1999) referred to (something
like) mindsight and emotional investment with his term “independent
practical reasoning” (p. 99). Like Siegel and Westen, he argued that
such a capacity enables persons to care for one another in a complex
social world. But, MacIntyre also followed the Aristotelian-Thomistic
tradition in suggesting that human flourishing depends upon the
development of a complex capacity for phronesis (i.e., practical “how-
to” wisdom). And, like Erikson’s position reviewed below, MacIntyre
argued that this higher-order human capacity is both motivated and
enabled by virtues, understood as “wise emotions” of character (Sher-
man, 2000, p. 319).
To summarize, what these concepts seem to share in common is
some understanding of moral sociability as an emergent capacity for
moral relatedness, whereby one person acts to facilitate the good of
another and where that good is understood as the other’s unrealized
potential. Therefore, it is not just sociability (e.g., cooperation) but
moral sociability (i.e., cooperation aimed at development of the other’s
potential) that these constructs are seeking to capture. However, what
these concepts do not clarify is the central place of virtues in “energiz-
ing” (the issue of motivation) and “enabling” (the issue of capacity)
moral sociability. Moreover, none of these constructs approaches the
kind and quality of moral interaction to which Erikson (1964) gave the
name generative care. Therefore, in the discussion below, the construct
generative care is offered as a more precise conception of moral socia-
bility, and as an ultimate concern of spiritual transformation.
Generative Care as Model of Moral Sociability

Recent ethical analyses of generativity posit that Erikson’s theory of
moral formation offers a more relational (less stage- and age-related)
understanding of caring and virtue formation than subsequent theory
and research have yet to capture (Browning, 2006; Leffel, 2008). In
particular, in his article entitled “The Golden Rule in Light of New
Insight” (Coles, 2000) Erikson offered a normative principle for mature
moral relationships that might be referred to as mutual strengths-
development (pp. 454–456):
I would call mutuality a relationship in which partners depend on each

other for the development of their respective strengths . . . Understood
this way, the [Golden] Rule would say that it is best to do to another
what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen him—that is, what
will develop his best potentials even as it develops your own.
In his commentary on this passage, Erikson suggested two things:
a) generative caring (irrespective of age) should be understood, fun-
damentally, as the motivation and capacity to invest in the strengths-
development of others, and b) virtues are biologically-based but
socially-constructed capacities which emerge (or not) in the life course
that facilitate such caring (Erikson’s model of phase-specific psychoso-
cial virtues). Based on Erikson’s interpretation of generativity, and in
light of Westen’s idea of emotional investment, the following defini-
tion of generative care has been proposed: Generative care is the moti-
vation and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development
of others (Leffel, 2008, p. 174). Accordingly, in Erikson’s model of
relational morality, what Browning (1987) referred to as “genera-
tive mutuality” (p. 228), each person in the relationship is obligated
(hence, the morality of the model) to participate in the creation of a
relational environment (social ecology) where one another’s strengths
are cultivated, not simply a place where subjective happiness is sought.
In this model of morality, caring is the master skill that is required to
craft such an environment. Second, caring interactions depend upon
and necessarily recruit the virtues that have accrued in the course of
each partner’s development, and they are the principal means by which
persons build each other’s strengths (i.e., through trusting, empathic,
compassionate, forgiving, etc. interactions). Thus the significance of
the question: Which virtues, and why? However, despite impressive
advances in generativity theory and research in recent years (de St.
Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004), researchers have yet to articulate and
empirically document a set of virtues that may be constitutive of and
instrumental to generative care. To this end, Part 2 in this article series
proposes a specific model of virtues that current theory and research
suggests (but has not yet demonstrated) may prove fundamental to a
flourishing capacity for moral sociability; that is, an emergent capacity
for generative care.
To summarize, the proposal here is to adopt the construct moral
sociability as a central goal (outcome variable) of spiritual transforma-
tion. Conceptualized as generative care, moral sociability is not simply
about mindful cooperation with others but has a more specific moral
telos: to emotionally invest in and “take care of ” the strengths-devel-
opment of others (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986, p. 50). Likewise,
conceived in this manner, moral sociability has a moral objective that
extends beyond the mere enhancement of happiness for self and others
(Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005).
Re-Defining Spiritual Transformation in View of Moral Sociability

Spiritual transformation conceptualized in a moral intuitionist and
social functionalist paradigm thus suggests the need for a revised
definition, one less concerned with meaning formation (i.e., what to
do and why to do it) and more concerned with moral motivation
and capacity (i.e., how to do it). The following working definition is
proposed:
Spiritual transformation encompasses intentional movement toward a
moral ideal, aimed primarily at the expansion of one’s motivation and
capacity for moral sociability, as envisioned within some meaning system,
and whether or not that meaning system is explicitly religious.
While a more complete description of the advantages of this definition
must await future conversations, the following preliminary commen-
tary is offered.
By this definition, spiritual transformation is not primarily: a) a
quest to “know” or subjectively “experience” the Sacred (epistemic
function), or b) a way to “cope” and enhance happiness and well-
being (intrapsychic function), or c) simply an evolved technology for
creating a less selfish moral community (Haidt’s social functionalist
definition). Rather, it is conceived as intentional, practice-based move-
ment toward a narrative-informed moral ideal that equips persons to
become increasingly capable of enacting the moral sociability that
most (if not all) religious meaning systems prescribe (also see Needle-
man’s, 2007 discussion of intermediate morality). Envisioned in this
definition, spiritual practices would emphasize three central objectives:
a) developing one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability; b)
strengthening the virtues that energize and enable moral sociability,
and diminishing the vices that obstruct or inhibit enactment of the
virtues; and c) practicing virtue mimesis as a central causal mecha-
nism of virtue acquisition; that is, intentionally imitating virtuous
persons (see Zagzebski’s, 2004 exemplarity virtue theory). Note that
in this approach, meaning is still important, but it is secondary to the
task of expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability

(generative care) itself. Further, a central assumption of this approach,
perhaps in distinction to meaning-system models, is that meaning for-
mation and moral motivation are not the same processes, and they
likely require different practices.
The following section, as further background for the moral intu-
itionist model introduced below and detailed in Part 2, reviews four
recent trends in contemporary moral psychology that suggest a new
trajectory for a social functionalist approach to spiritual transforma-
tion, one that takes moral sociability (more than meaning) as its ulti-
mate concern.
Recent Trends in Moral Psychology And Why They Matter

for Spiritual Transformation
The study of morality is not what it used to be (see Blasi, 2009; Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2008 for overviews). By most reviews, the field is under-
going a multi-disciplinary renaissance in an intellectual climate of
“consilience” (Wilson, 1998) that Haidt (2007; 2008) refers to as the
“new synthesis” in moral psychology. But moral psychology is also a
discipline between conceptual paradigms. While it is now generally
recognized that Kohlberg’s Rationalist moral psychology has proved
inadequate for bridging the “judgment-action gap” (roughly, why per-
sons do not act congruently with their stated moral principles), the
construction and implementation of a “new paradigm of moral person-
hood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008) remains a work in progress. Since moral
intuitionism and the SIM are relatively new developments in psychol-
ogy, and have only recently drawn the attention of moral philosophers
(e.g., Flanagan, 2007) and theological ethicists (e.g., Browning, 2010),
this section reviews four recent developments in moral psychology with
an eye for what they might contribute to spiritual transformation. Each
of these developments is then integrated into the moral intuitionist
model introduced later in the article and elaborated in Part 2.
The Centrality of Moral Motivation

Moral psychology through the 1970s focused on the study of moral
judgment and the roles played by factors such as moral values and
other “cold” cognitive abilities (Kohlberg’s “stages” of reasoning) that
were believed important for motivating moral choice and action (e.g.,
Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). In general, the Rationalist approach followed
the Kantian-Kohlbergian dictum that assumes good moral judgment

and behavior are achieved primarily through the process of conscious,
language-based reasoning and reflection (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer,
1983). However, in a series of articles over the past ten years, Haidt
(2001, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) and others have argued
that recent empirical research no longer unequivocally supports this
assumption. In view of these critiques, several important conceptual
shifts have begun to emerge in moral psychology. A first shift is an
increased recognition that moral motivation processes must play a
more central role in theories of moral functioning (Blasi, 2001; Hardy
& Carlo, 2005; Shulman, 2002). Moral motivation is a relatively new
area of theory and research that addresses the question of what per-
sonality factors energize or provide “sources of moral motivation”
(Shulman, 2002, p. 499) for prosocial action. This literature endeav-
ors to describe the nature and functioning of distinct but inter-related
component processes (domains) of motivation, which collectively
enable persons to act congruently with their self-endorsed moral val-
ues and beliefs (Batson et al., 1997). In recent theorizing, the focus has
moved away from moral meaning and reasoning to encompass ques-
tions about the complex relationships among other domains, includ-
ing moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and vices, moral
identity, and moral willpower (see Bergman, 2002; Frimer & Walker,
2008 for reviews). In particular, recent thinking in the “positive psy-
chology of morality” (Haidt, 2003a) gives greater priority to the role
of positive and moral emotions in motivating prosocial action (e.g.,
Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Fredrickson, 2004; Keltner, 2009).
New empirical research has begun to document that certain “emo-
tions/virtues” (Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11), such as gratitude,
function as “moral motives” for prosocial action (McCullough, Kilpat-
rick, Emmons, & Larsen, 2001, p. 252). The goal of this new direction
in theory and research is a clearer understanding of these multiple
motivational sources, and the implications they hold for practices of
moral formation and character education (e.g., Graham, Haidt, &
Rimm-Kaufman, 2008).
In particular, one new topic in moral motivation is an interpersonal
phenomenon referred to as prorelationship motivation (Finkel & Rus-
bult, 2008). Since the moral intuitionist model described in Part 2 may
be seen as a model of prorelationship motivation (i.e., variables that
“energize” and “enable” moral action), a brief description of this idea
is in order. Finkel and Rusbult define prorelationship motivation as
“behavioral preferences that are driven by the desire to benefit one’s

relationship or partner, despite the fact that enacting such behavior
conflicts with one’s immediate, gut-level behavioral impulses” (2008,
p. 547); for example, Haidt’s moral intuitions. The desire to forgive pro-
vides an example of prorelationship motivation. Forgiveness becomes
relevant in a relationship when, for example, one partner betrays the
trust of the other, betrayal defined as “the perceived violation by a
partner of an implicit or explicit relationship-relevant norm” (Finkel,
Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002, p. 957). Because the betrayed
partner likely experiences such norm violations as moral transgres-
sions, immediate intuitions for retaliation and revenge are activated.
Thus, to move beyond immediate, intuitive retaliatory impulses, a
capacity for forgiveness is required, defined as “the tendency to forgo
vengeance and other destructive patterns of interactions, instead
behaving toward the perpetrator in a positive and constructive man-
ner” (Finkel et al., 2002, p. 958). Prorelationship motivation theory
predicts that while betrayal naturally leads to retaliatory impulses (the
intuition to enact revenge), prorelationship motivational factors can
override these impulses in favor of forgiving intuitions and responses.
Thus, an important question for the psychology of spiritual transfor-
mation is this: Do we have an account of spiritual transformation
that models those processes and corresponding practices that might
promote growth in prorelationship motivation? The suggestion here
is that moral intuitionism offers one conceptual approach that could
move us in that direction.
“Two-System Morality”
Second, deriving from the literature on dual-process models of infor-
mation processing, another development in moral psychology argues
that there are two kinds of moral cognition—moral intuition and
moral reasoning—and that each system is important in moral for-
mation. Haidt and Kesebir (2010) recently suggested that the “modal
view” in moral psychology today is that: “reasoning and intuition both
matter, but that intuition matters more” (p. 18). They refer to this
assumption as the principle of “intuitive primacy (but not dictator-
ship)” (p. 801). This principle elsewhere is referred to as “two-system
morality” (Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2006, p. 562) or “multiplex”
morality (Appiah, 2008, p. 145). Since the proposed model of spiritual
transformation builds on the principle of intuitive primacy, further

clarification is in order.
It is now widely accepted in social and cognitive psychology that
there are two systems involved in cognitive functioning, higher or
“cold cognitive” and lower or “hot cognitive” (affect-laden) processes,
and these two systems are often at work when a person makes judg-
ments or solves problems. Because these two systems a) may run in
parallel with each other, b) can be dissociated from one another, and
c) likely have different biological bases, these models are usually called
dual process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Dual-process explana-
tions of behavior posit that the “affective” and “cognitive” (Zajonc,
1980) or “hot” and “cool” (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) systems are
to some extent separate systems and that this dual system architec-
ture can be explained in evolutionary terms. It is important to note,
however, that the contrast between these two systems is not primar-
ily between “cognition” and “emotion,” rather between two cognitive
processes, one of which usually has an affective component (see Haidt
& Kesebir, 2010, pp. 800–802). Westen (1998) summarized the sig-
nificance of this view when he suggested: “nothing guarantees that an
individual’s wishes, fears, values, or goals will be in harmony, because
these motives, or components of them, may be processed by relatively
independent neural circuits” (p. 345).
Specifically, what are these two systems? Haidt (2001) referred to
moral intuition as fast, automatic, and usually affect-laden (“hot”) pro-
cesses in which an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike about
the actions or character of a person appears in consciousness with-
out any awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing
evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral reasoning, in contrast, is a
controlled and “cooler” (less affective) process; it is conscious mental
activity that consists of manipulating information about people and
their actions in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. Thus, in
the moral intuitionist paradigm: “moral intuition is a kind of cogni-
tion, but it is not a kind of reasoning” (p. 814). There is now growing
empirical evidence that moral judgment and moral motivation work
like other kinds of cognitive processes, in which most of the action
lies in the “hot” automatic, affect-laden system (see Haidt & Kesebir,
2010 for a summary of 10 empirical literatures that support the idea of
intuitive primacy). For example, in terms of moral judgment, research
has demonstrated that many morally relevant behaviors, such as altru-
ism, racism, or rudeness, can be caused by automatic processes that
are triggered by subtle environmental cues of which people have little

or no awareness (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). In terms of moral
motivation, recent research has revealed that nonconscious activation
of desired behavioral states, including morally-relevant goals such as
helping and understanding the other, promotes motivated activity to
accomplish these states, a phenomenon referred to as “automatic goal
pursuit” (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003).
Until quite recently, dual process models have had little impact
on theory and research in morality, mostly because most research-
ers have focused their efforts on understanding the reasoning pro-
cess. But this distinction is now being integrated in various models
of moral functioning. For example Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) have
proposed a social-cognitive model of morality that, although diverg-
ing from Haidt on several points, distinguishes “deliberative” versus
“automatic” moral judgment. Margolis (1987) has also described the
difference between these two systems as “reasoning-why” (delibera-
tive) and “seeing-that” (automatic). The challenge for the psychology
of spiritual transformation is to model an approach that appreciates
and incorporates the contributions of each system, but (perhaps) high-
lights the priority of intuitive processes. One model that further clari-
fies the nature of these intuitive domains is Haidt’s Social Intuitionist
Model, and these domains are incorporated into the moral intuitionist
model introduced below.
Haidt’s “Social Intuitionist Model” (SIM)

In his clever 2001 article entitled “The Emotional Dog and Its Ratio-
nal Tail,” Haidt offered the SIM as one version of the emerging new
synthesis in moral psychology. The SIM outlines a model of moral
judgment that links together theoretical insights and empirical find-
ings from several fields, particularly social psychology, social cognitive
neuroscience, and (selective aspects of ) evolutionary theory. Following
research on the automaticity of social judgment and behavior and dual
process models (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Zajonc, 1980), Haidt’s
theoretical objective was to relocate the central causal locus of moral
judgment from the cold cognition of moral reasoning to the hot cog-
nition of intuitive processes. With this shift of emphasis, Haidt effec-
tively challenged much traditional moral psychology, claiming that
it had been pursuing the wrong mechanism of moral judgment and
development (i.e., language-based moral reasoning).
It is important to note that the original SIM was designed to cap-

ture the phenomenology and causal processes of moral judgment, not
moral motivation and action. However, in recent writings Haidt and
colleagues acknowledged that the SIM may be expanded to address
questions about the complex relationships between moral intuitions,
moral emotions, and moral virtues (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt &
Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). They outlined three
conceptual tools that are necessary to build an intuitionist model
of moral motivation: first, the notion of moral intuition as affect-
laden cognition; second, moral emotions as prosocial motivators; and
third, virtues as social skills (especially see Haidt & Joseph, 2007, pp.
385–388).
Here is a synopsis of their account of how moral intuitions, moral
emotions, and moral virtues interact to motivate prooscial action.
First, various features of a sociomoral situation activate consciously
or unconsciously a moral intuition. The output of an intuition is an
affect-laden experience (like or dislike) that sensitizes the person to
various features of a situation. This perception provides first informa-
tion about whether the object in question should be approached or
avoided (Frijda, 1986). Thus, moral intuitions provide the first link
in the chain of moral motivation, providing perceptual sensitivity to
opportunities for (and moral violations of ) prosociality. But at this
point in the temporal sequence, persons are not necessarily conscious
of what features have evoked a perception, or why they intuitively
reacted the way they did. Note, too, intuitions are rather non-specific
(i.e., they do not spell out how one should approach or avoid). Thus,
while a moral expert is one who has the proper perceptual sensitivity
to ethically relevant events and states of others, one still needs knowl-
edge of how to interact in particular situations (i.e., the notion of vir-
tues as social skills).
Second, intuitions are then amplified by moral emotions. In many
situations, an intuitive affective flash will “trigger” the firing of other
facets of a moral emotion or set of moral emotions, such as physio-
logical reactions, facial expressions, subjective experiences, and “cold”
cognitive appraisals (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60). Thus, through the
amplifying effects of these processes, moral emotions boost the inten-
sity of an initial intuition and set in motion some behavior that is
expressive of the initial intuition. Through this process of emotion
amplification, the likelihood that a person will engage in moral action
is thus strengthened. Moral emotions, therefore, are responsible for

the sociomoral function referred to as motivational intensity.
Third, moral emotions set in motion the enactment of an intuition-
related social skill (i.e., procedural knowledge that scripts “how-to” act
in a particular situation). In the SIM, these intuition-expressive, emo-
tion-related social skills are referred to as moral virtues. Consistent
with the connectionist understanding of neural systems (Churchland,
1998; Westen, 2002), the virtues that are activated in a particular situa-
tion are those chronically accessible, defined as the activation potential
of available procedural knowledge (see Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005 for
a similar account). The more frequently a virtue has been activated,
the more accessible it is for use. Thus, while moral intuitions “trig-
ger” non-specific action tendencies to approach or avoid, and moral
emotions “amplify” motives, virtues (and virtue complexes) shape how
the object in question will be interacted with. Moral virtues thus pro-
vide a third sociomoral function that can be referred to as procedural
action skills.
Finally, the SIM posits that these three domains then interact with
other “cold” cognitive domains: moral values, moral reasoning, moral
will, and moral identity. These “higher-level” meaning domains pro-
vide additional direction (but not primarily motivation and capacity)
for moral action. And, in some cases, these colder directional domains
can also act back on old intuitions so as to modify the potency of ini-
tial intuitions and/or help build new intuitions (Haidt & Bjorklund,
2008). Thus, an important implication of the SIM is that moral devel-
opment is accomplished by tuning-up (activating) moral intuitions,
amplifying (intensifying) moral emotions, and strengthening (expand-
ing) moral virtues, more than by “learning” explicit rules or principles.
This approach conceptualizes moral competence as a set of skills that
are cultivated gradually by real-world practice, and helped along by
moral stories (narrative) and role models (in vivo virtue exemplars).
Therefore, a third direction for future theory in spiritual transforma-
tion is to model how these moral intuitions, moral emotions, and
virtues are strengthened in order to build the capacity for moral socia-
bility. Part 2 offers specific and testable hypotheses about how each
of these domains may promote spiritual transformation, understood
as “expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability”
(definition above).
“Connectionist” Model of Virtue

Implied in the above discussion, a fourth trend concerns how to
conceptualize a moral virtue. Recent social intuitionist virtue theory
suggests a new way to think about the nature of a virtue, and this
understanding, in turn, sheds further light on the motivational signifi-
cance of virtues (and vices). It commends the adoption of the “con-
nectionist” approach to virtue (Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998;
Westen, 2002) that conceptualizes virtues as biologically-prepared but
socially-constructed prosocial capacities, rather than as global tenden-
cies to act in a particular way across varying circumstances (“traits”).
Three ideas summarize this new social cognitive neuroscience model
of virtue. First, virtues are understood as multi-faceted capacities that
link together skills related to perception, emotion, and action. For
example, to be capable of compassion is to have an acquired incli-
nation: 1) to see certain features of sociomoral situations (perceptual
sensitivity), 2) to feel and be moved by these perceptions (motivational
intensity), and 3) to act in particular ways in response to these feelings
(procedural skills as “how-to” knowledge). In other words, a virtue
is a superordinate construct that connects a moral intuition, moral
emotion, and procedural skill. Neurophilosopher Churchland (1998)
conceptualized these neurological connections as neural systems or
moral associative networks in the brain-mind that link together percep-
tions, emotions, and procedural skills (also see Flanagan, 2007). These
affectively valenced knowledge systems are hypothesized to comprise
the core of the moral self and to provide the most immediate and
proximate causal mechanisms for moral motivation and action. Thus,
a central claim of connectionist virtue theory is this: Virtue-related
actions (procedural skills) are activated to “go on line” when persons
are energized by the emotions connected to (associated with) these
skills in the network, not primarily by a conscious motive to duty or
by force of willpower.
Second, virtues are biologically-prepared in the sense that human
beings come equipped with an innate preparedness to feel flashes of
approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving
other human beings; that is, innate moral intuitions. One model of
these moral intuitions, “moral foundations theory” (Graham, Haidt,
& Nosek, 2009), posits Care/Harm (the intuition to alleviate suffer-
ing and provide care) as one of perhaps five evolutionary ancient,
automatic, emotion-laden intuitions that humans are biologically pre-
disposed to “moralize” in social communities (along with intuitions

to Fairness/Reciprocity, Hierarchy/Respect, In-group/Out-group, and
Purity/Sanctity). This model argues that culture-specific virtues related
to each of these systems emerge from and are shaped by these five
innate intuitions.
Third, consistent with classical Aristotelian theory, connectionist
virtue theory argues that while virtues are biologically-prepared, they
are socially-constructed in moral communities, through exposure to
and efforts to emulate exemplars of the virtues valued by a particular
culture and narrative. This kind of virtue formation cannot be replaced
with top-down learning, such as adherence to a principle (e.g., the
Golden Rule or Kant’s “categorical imperative”) or to a specific narra-
tive and rational deduction of specific responses from it.
To summarize, this fourth trend highlights the need for a model of
moral motivation that emphasizes the centrality of intuition-expressive,
moral emotion-related, procedural action skills (e.g., virtues), understood
not simply as behavioral dispositions (traits), but as biologically-prepared,
socially-constructed capacities that energize and enable prosocial action.
Thus, an additional question for future theory and research in spiritual
transformation is this: Which virtues and why? A specific model of Vir-
tues of Moral Sociability is offered in Part 2. The next section of this
paper, now in light of these developments, further considers the logic
and limitations of meaning-system analyses as presently conceptualized
in the psychology of spiritual transformation.
Meaning-System Analyses: Review and Critique

for Redirection
There can be no doubt that the meaning-system approach has inspired

important research that demonstrates how religion provides “global
life meaning” (Park, 2005, p. 299) to its adherents and confers sig-
nificant health and mental health advantages to those who endorse
a meaning system. But, the meaning-system approach, with its root
metaphor of spirituality as “search,” can be critiqued on a number of
conceptual, methodological, and empirical grounds, particularly the
issue of how high-level meaning actually energizes and enables the
moral action prescribed by one’s meaning system. Thus, to further
argue the need for a moral intuitionist approach, this section does
three things. It briefly reviews: a) the meaning-system approach as
presently conceived, especially b) the “levels” (domains) of personal-

ity highlighted in meaning-system models and empirical research, and
it then offers c) five conceptual and methodological limitations of the
meaning-system approach, including empirical reasons to doubt the
sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate prosocial action.
Spiritual Transformation in the Meaning-System Approach

Hill and colleagues (2000) proposed the following definition of spiritu-
ality, some version of which seems to have become the modal view in
the psychology of religion (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, pp. 12–17):
Spirituality refers to the search for the sacred, where the term “sacred”
refers to “a person, object, principle, or concept that transcends the
self ” (p. 64). Following from this epistemic functionalist definition,
related conceptions of spiritual transformation based on the search for
high-level meaning have been offered. For example, Paloutzian (2005)
defined a meaning system as a “dynamic set of mental processes whose
operation cannot be understood as independent from some element
of faith” (p. 335), and spiritual transformation as “a change in the
meaning system that a person holds as a basis of self-definition, the
interpretation of life, and overarching purposes and ultimate con-
cerns” (p. 334). Likewise, Pargament (2006) suggested that spiritual
transformation “refers primarily to fundamental change in the place
of the sacred or the character of the sacred as an object of significance
in life, and secondarily to a fundamental change in the pathways the
individual takes to the sacred” (p. 21). Pargament further conceptual-
ized spiritual transformation as a life-long process that involves three
movements: a) an initial “search,” b) efforts to “conserve” or sustain
a relationship with the sacred once discovered, and then c) continu-
ing efforts to “transform” that relationship in response to internal or
external trauma and transition (p. 21). In sum: The ultimate concern
of spiritual transformation in the meaning-system approach is taken
to be the formation, and subsequent conservation and transforma-
tion, of high-level meaning across the course of a person’s life. Nota-
bly absent in this understanding, however, is any reference to: a) how
meaning is activated to “go on line” to motivate moral action and b) a
model of the processes and corresponding practices by which persons
could develop the moral virtues prescribed by a meaning system. A
clearer understanding of the logic of the meaning-system approach
is achieved by further considering the levels of personality typically

highlighted in these models.
“Levels” of Personality in Meaning-System Models

A fundamental tenet of the “integrative science of personality”
(McAdams & Pals, 2006, p. 204) is the assumption there are three
qualitatively distinct levels of personality. Level 1, the lowest level,
consists of dispositional traits understood as global, de-contextualized
characteristics such as those measured in the Five Factor Model (e.g.,
Agreeableness) that can be assessed with little regard for what else is
going on in a person’s life. Level 2 refers to characteristics adaptations
which, in contrast to Level 1 traits, are contextualized and conditional.
In McAdams’ model these include: values, goals, attachment styles,
defense mechanisms, personal and moral strivings, conditional pat-
terns, and domain-specific skills and talents. These constructs are often
empirically related to Level 1 traits. For example, religious strivings for
“spiritual purity,” the fifth foundation in Haidt’s moral foundations
theory, might be stronger for a person who has a high score on disgust
sensitivity than another person (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). The
third and highest level of personality is comprised of what McAdams
called “integrative life stories” or “narrative identity” (p. 209). Among
other things, McAdams and Pals noted that these stories often describe
the reasons (cosmological or theological beliefs) a person may hold for
believing it is important to be a moral person, and thus these stories
influence a person’s behavior (further described below).
To date, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the empiri-
cal literature on spiritual transformation was organized around the
central question: Does religious conversion cause personality change?
(Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). These authors reviewed
existing literature in terms of these levels of personality, and con-
cluded that meaning-system analyses tend to emphasize constructs
related to Level 3 (overall purpose, self-definition and identity, life
narrative, beliefs and attitudes, ultimate concerns, self-definition) and
Level 2 (personal strivings, specific goals, values and attitudes) more
than lower-level constructs (like those emphasized in the SIM). To
get a clearer sense for what these constructs mean, Paloutzian pro-
vided the following examples (p. 332). Level 3 includes the domains
of overall purpose (“to fulfill God’s mission”), self-definition and
identity (“before I was agnostic, now I am a Jew”), and life narra-

tive (a story that highlights how an important turning point in one’s
life has had positive consequences). Level 2 includes the domains of
personal strivings (“to minister to other people in order to bring them
into the family of faith”), specific goals (“to do my job well as evidence
of faith”), and values and attitudes (“I want to be a good Muslim”).
Level 1 includes “core” traits, especially as measured by the Five Factor
Model (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness,
and Neuroticism).
In terms of the impact of spiritual practices on personality change,
what does the existing empirical literature suggest? Again, for pur-
poses of their review, these authors regarded the overlapping concepts
of religious conversion and spiritual transformation as distinct but
“functionally equivalent” (Paloutzian, 2005, p. 333). Their general con-
clusion was that some levels of personality seem to change following
religious conversion and spiritual transformation, while others do not.
First, they suggested that data do not support the idea that religious
conversion results in changes to the whole person. Specifically, there
is little evidence that “core personality traits” (Level 1) change across
time, whether a person converts from no religion to some religion or
from one religion to another. They concluded that present data seem to
indicate that there is little substantial change in one’s core (FFM) char-
acteristics over and beyond normal and expected developmental shifts
(Costa & McCrae, 1994). Other reviews indicate that the size of the
associations between religion and Five Factor traits is usually weak; for
example, not exceeding .20 for the FFM factor of Agreeableness (e.g.,
McCullough & Worthington, 1999). Second, what does seem to change
following religious conversion is not the magnitude of Level 1 traits
(e.g., from less to more Agreeable), but the tradition-specific way these
traits may be expressed (i.e., consistent with one’s new religious belief
system). For example, following religious conversion, one’s character-
istic level of Agreeableness may be extended to those in one’s immedi-
ate circle of faith but not necessarily to outgroup others. Notably, there
is no evidence that persons become more Agreeable (or lower in Neu-
roticism, etc.), even toward one’s own ingroup, than they were before
conversion. Saroglou’s (2006) review of the literature also concluded
while there is reason to believe religious persons may be more proso-
cial, it is a rather selective and restrictive “minimal prosociality” that
is normatively limited to those closest to us and only rarely “extended
to universal and unconditioned altruism” (p. 2). Third, with respect to
the other levels of personality, Paloutzian’s review suggested that the

personality domains that seem to change are global-level (Level 3) and
mid-level (Level 2) constructs. For example, goals and behaviors con-
sistent with Emmon’s construct of “personal strivings” (1999) appear
to change. Likewise, converts to religion sometimes report changes in
specific goals, such as problematic behaviors related to addictions, use
of tobacco, sexual activity, and other moral behaviors (see Hood, Hill,
& Spilka, 2009, Chapter 12 for a review).
In a later comment on this review, Paloutzian (2005) argued that
since these data seem to indicate it is a person’s high-level meaning,
not “what the person is like in some basic sense” (p. 332) that is most
likely to change, present empirical research supports the view that
meaning-system models best describe the outcome studies on spiritual
transformation. This conclusion is consistent with other research that
seems to question religion’s potential to motivate non-egoistic proso-
cial behavior (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; McCullough & Willoughby,
2009; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Saraglou et al., 2005 for reviews).
For example, while correlational studies sometimes reveal an associa-
tion between self-reports of religiosity and prosociality, experimental
designs that measure religiosity and actual prosocial behavior suggest
that this association emerges primarily in a context where reputational
concerns are heightened (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Similarly, while
some research seems to support the general hypothesis that religios-
ity predicts enhanced prosociality, particularly when using standard
self-report measures, there are many counter-indications, or at least
findings that imply an “intriguing discrepancy” (Saraglou, 2006, p. 2)
between the values espoused by believers and their observable pro-
social action.
Brief Statement of the Problem and Rationale for New Direction

Viewing these data and conclusions from the vantage point of reli-
gious meaning-systems, these findings do not come as good news. This
is so primarily because as many religious (Armstrong, 2009) and some
“naturalistic” (Flanagan, 2007) meaning systems argue, one of the
ultimate concerns of spirituality is to change lower-level motivational
domains; that is, to strengthen moral virtues that facilitate prosocial
action and to weaken vices that maintain selfishness. Thus, what does
it mean that FFM Agreeableness, a scale designed to measure (some-
thing like) the trait of compassion (NEO-PI subscales of Altruism and
Tender-mindedness), does not appear to change as a result of involve-

ment in spiritual practices? Further, in terms of negative traits, since
FFM Neuroticism loads heavily on nearly everything undesirable in
relationships, why would we not find at least some relative change
as a result of spiritual practices, over and beyond mean-level stability
shifts across the adult years? While these questions raise both meth-
odological and conceptual issues, the following discussion is intended
to draw attention to the lack of systematic measurement of lower-level
motivational constructs, not to the psychometric issues involved in the
assessment of traits.
In response to this question, five alternative interpretations of the
Paloutzian’s conclusion are offered below, including conceptual and
empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of meaning to effect changes
to prosocial action. Argued below, the issue is not the veracity of the
extant empirical findings but rather that existing research, as Paloutz-
ian (2005) himself acknowledges, is only “as good as far as it goes”
(p. 332) in addressing the multiple processes that are likely involved in
spiritual transformation. The central idea proposed here is that future
research should focus on a different kind of lower-level personal-
ity construct than traits and that a moral intuitionist model of these
constructs could help us conceptualize such an approach (i.e., moral
intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues/vices). The working
hypothesis would be that spiritual practices that focus on intuitions,
emotions, and virtues/vices will more reliably produce the behavioral
changes expected than will interventions that target global- and mid-
level personality domains. However, before reviewing these argu-
ments, it should be noted that several authors of the meaning-system
approach have already anticipated this issue, and they have urged the
development of multi-layered models of personality that better cap-
ture lower-level motivation domains in their nomological networks.
After describing the logic of the meaning-system approach, Paloutzian
& Park (2005) commented:
Of course, the meaning-system approach is not without limitations. For
one, the role of emotions may get short shrift in this framework . . . it is
true that human beings may be more ruled by their passions than by
their intellects. A broad perspective on meaning can encompass both
emotions and cognitions . . . Therefore, researchers must be careful not
to yield to the temptation of applying a purely cognitive framework to
phenomena within the psychology of religion. (p. 556)
Conceptual and Methodological Limitations

of the Meaning-System Approach
This discussion focuses on five limitations of meaning-system models
as presently conceived. Because each issue raises a conceptual, meth-
odological, or empirical issue not fully addressed by existing data, the
following critique is offered only as a guide for thinking about how
meaning and motivation could be integrated better in models of spiri-
tual transformation.
1. Methodological “restriction of range.” The first and most obvious
observation is that empirical research conceived within the meaning-
system approach may have focused too much on high-level meaning
and not enough on lower-level motivation constructs. In so doing,
they may have missed a central concern of many religious meaning
systems, namely, that virtue formation is a major objective of spiritual
transformation. Thus, it could be argued that a primary reason the
extant empirical data appear to fit best a meaning system explanation
is that investigators have not adequately modeled important moti-
vational sources that are likely involved in spiritual transformation,
particularly those highlighted in the SIM. It is possible that research-
ers have yet to adequately design and conduct intervention and out-
come studies that could demonstrate real-time motivational changes
that do occur in the process of spiritual transformation. To facilitate
such research, what is needed is a theoretical model that more system-
atically describes multiple domains of meaning and motivation, and
then delineates processes and related practices that differentially target
these domains of personality. Part 2 offers such a model.
2. The question of spiritual praxis. Another way to interpret the
above conclusion relates to the nature of spiritual practices. It may be
that religious or spiritual persons are not really “practicing” to pro-
mote expansion of their motivation and capacity for prosocial action
(e.g., to strengthen one’s capacity for empathy). Existing studies of
spirituality, especially those based on outcome measures that primarily
assess frequency of religious behaviors (e.g., prayer, attendance, read-
ing Sacred texts) do not make it clear what level of personality devel-
opment persons are practicing (i.e., whether on upper- and mid-level
meaning or lower motivational domains). This is important because,
as discussed below, there is growing reason to believe that meaning
formation and motivation activation are not the same processes, and
they likely require different practices. For example, Fredrickson (2002)
has hypothesized that religious practices work because of the posi-

tive moral emotions they likely activate and amplify. Drawing on her
“broaden-and-build” theory of the positive emotions, she outlined the
multiple links that lead to efficacious religious practices in this manner:
religious practices—positive meaning—positive and moral emotions—
broadened mindsets—augmented personal resources—improved health
and well-being (2002, p. 211). If this is true, it suggests that religious
practices (e.g., prayer) that involve activation of positive and moral
emotions should become an important part of religious disciplines,
practiced primarily because moral emotions function as prosocial
motivators (#4 below), not simply as means to search for or to sense
the Sacred. Thus, future research should give greater attention to the
primary focus of particular practices, whether they target changes to
the motivational or meaning domains of personality.
3. The “judgment-action gap.” Third, even if we knew persons were
systematically practicing to strengthen meaning-system domains (e.g.,
personal strivings that express their religious beliefs), there is reason
to hypothesize that these practices alone are not sufficient to energize
and enable moral action (#4 below). Thus, in focusing on upper- and
mid-level constructs, meaning-system models may commit (or imply)
the “rationalist fallacy,” the Platonic-Kantian assumption that “to
know the good is to do the good.” In moral philosophy, this problem
is referred to as the “Thought/Action” problem, and it is described
by philosopher Locke (1983) as: “the problem at once philosophical
and psychological, of explicating the relationship between what a per-
son says he ought to do, or even what he thinks he ought to do, and
what he actually does” (p. 160). In moral psychology the problem of
akrasia (weakness of will or the failure to conform one’s behavior to
one’s moral principles) is known as the judgment-action gap (Blasi,
1980). As discussed by Haidt and others, Rationalist models in moral
psychology that have emphasized the role of reasoning and delibera-
tion (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) have been unable to account for this gap,
which is believed to exist in most people to some degree (Baumeister,
1997). Moral psychology today is nearly univocal in recognizing that
more than right judgment (meaning) and moral willpower is necessary
in order to hold moral thought and action together in a causal way
(Lapsley, & Power, 2005). Thus, it is now addressing the judgment-
action gap with new theories and research concerned with a variety of
motivational variables, and this research may have important implica-
tions for how persons practice to enhance moral sociability. Therefore,
if not right moral reasoning and strong willpower, what motivates

moral action?
4. The moral emotion-action link. One of the most important litera-
tures to emerge in recent years concerns the role of moral emotion
in motivating prosocial action. Haidt (2001, p. 823) summarizes this
principle as follows: Moral action covaries with moral emotion more
than with moral reasoning (also see Batson, 1987; Blasi, 1980; Haidt,
2003b; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007 for reviews). Various litera-
tures in social and moral psychology and social cognitive neuroscience
now converge to argue for the primacy of emotion; that is, that emo-
tional processes are necessary to order to energize higher meaning and
motivate prosocial action. First, there is a literature that directly exam-
ines the relationship between moral reasoning and prosocial action.
In general, it concludes that there is a rather weak link between moral
reasoning and positive moral action (e.g., helping). For example, while
Blasi (1980) found some support for the claim that high-scorers on
Kohlberg’s scales of moral reasoning were more likely to help others,
recent studies have raised doubts about such findings (Thoma, Nar-
vaez, Rest, & Derryberry, 1999). The general consensus today is that
the relationship between moral reasoning ability and prosocial behav-
ior appears to be weak and inconsistent, especially when the variable
of intelligence is partialed out. Emotional and self-regulatory factors,
such as the ability to delay gratification, seem to be more power-
ful determinants of actual behavior (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;
McCullough & Willoughby, 2009).
Second, in social cognitive neuroscience, there are literatures that
have examined what happens when moral reasoning and moral
emotions become dissociated, either through inadequate psychoso-
cial development (in the case of sociopaths; Hare, 1993) or through
brain damage (in the case of frontal lobe damage; Damasio, 1994).
For example, Damasio and colleagues have found a consistent pattern
of changes associated with damage to the ventromedial area of the
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, the area behind the bridge of the nose).
Patients with damage restricted to the VMPFC show no reduction in
their reasoning abilities and seem to retain full knowledge of moral
rules and social conventions. But when faced with real life decisions,
they show poor judgment, are indecisiveness, and appear irrational in
their behavior (e.g., the case of Phineas Gage). Damasio referred to
this pattern of affect loss combined with intact reasoning as “acquired
sociopathy.” His research demonstrated that when emotion is removed
from decision-making people do not become more reasonable or ethi-

cal; they become unable to “feel” the rightness and wrongness of simple
decisions and judgments. He concluded that higher (“cold”) reasoning
processes seem to require affective (“hot”) channeling mechanisms,
and moral emotions provide this source of motivation. Likewise, other
neuroimaging research is beginning to offer a brain-based account of
moral reasoning and motivation that emphasizes the critical role of
positive and moral emotions as motivators of moral action (see Gaz-
zaniga, 2005; Greene & Haidt, 2002 for reviews).
A third literature documents a strong link between specific moral
“emotions/virtues” (Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11) and proso-
cial action. The most frequently cited illustration of this effect is the
empathy-altruism hypothesis which states that moral emotions (e.g.,
compassion) aroused by the perception of someone’s suffering evokes
an altruistic motive (i.e., a moral intuition) that is directed toward
reducing the other’s suffering (e.g., Batson, 1987). More recent research
shows that other moral emotions likewise motivate prosocial action,
such as moral elevation (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), trust (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2001), gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2004), and compas-
sion (Crocker & Canevello, 2008). For example, Crocker & Canevello
(2008) found that when friends self-consciously enacted (relatively)
more “compassionate goals” (actions intended to care for the well-
being of the other) versus “self-image goals” (to enhance the self ),
both friends over time displayed increased levels of mutual trust and
support of each other. Further, these persons were found to have a
“non-zero-sum” view of relationships (win-win interactions), greater
self-compassion, secure attachment style, and to exhibit less narcis-
sism. Likewise, for gratitude, Algoe and Haidt (2009) found that the
characteristic response to the experience of gratitude was a felt desire
to return the favor to the benefactor (reciprocity), and second, a desire
be closer to and to emulate the virtuous actions of the other (also see
Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Tsang, 2006).
Collectively, these literatures suggest that high-level meaning alone
(i.e., upper- and mid-level constructs) cannot motivate prosocial
action, and may require the energizing effects of positive and moral
emotions. These findings, in turn, argue that the psychology of spiri-
tual transformation is in need of a conceptual model that gives greater
attention to the role of positive and moral emotions “both as motiva-
tors of change and potential consequences of change” (Emmons, 2005,
p. 247). The notion that high-level meaning and low-level motivation
can and should be integrated into a more comprehensive approach is

precisely what the Social Intuitionist Model is intended to do, but, to
date, we have not yet applied this model to the analysis of spiritual
transformation. The model outlined below and detailed in Part 2 offers
one way to do so.
5. Distinctions between declarative/procedural knowledge and auto-
matic/controlled processing. There is perhaps an even more compelling
reason to argue that high-meaning cannot energize and enable moral
action: Recent theory and research in social cognitive neuroscience
suggests that “cold” meaning and “hot” motivational domains may
represent different types of knowledge in the brain-mind. In recent lit-
erature, two important distinctions are made (e.g., Siegel, 2007; Wes-
ten, 2002). First, the declarative/procedural distinction refers to the
manner in which knowledge is represented in the brain (as a concept
encoded in a linguistic mode or as a skill encoded in a sensory-motor
mode). Declarative knowledge, knowledge of facts (events, abstractions,
details), is information that can be “declared” and is usually conscious
(or can be made conscious). Juxtaposed is procedural knowledge that
encodes skills that are usually expressed without conscious awareness,
and they may even be disrupted if the person tries to perform them
using conscious control (e.g., skilled musicians producing notes faster
than they can consciously read them). Current thinking holds that
declarative and procedural knowledge may be represented in two sep-
arate, parallel, and partially independent systems (e.g., Westen, 2002).
In this light, it is important to note that many classical approaches to
virtue (e.g., Aristotle and Mencius) compared the acquisition of vir-
tue to the slow practice needed to develop “virtuosity” on a musical
instrument (Aristotle, 1893/2004; Flanagan & Williams, 2010), not to
the rote learning of conceptual principles and rational calculation of
behavioral responses from it.
A second distinction refers not to the type of knowledge but to the
way knowledge is accessed and activated. Bargh (1994) has recast dual
process models as a continuum from fully “automatic” to fully “con-
trolled” processes. Automatic processes cause cognitive and behavioral
changes in response to the environment without any need for conscious
reflection or even awareness. Automatic processing can involve declar-
ative knowledge (such as words that are used to prime subjects), but
more often involves nonconscious activation of procedural knowledge
(e.g., environmental cues that prime the moral intuition to Care/harm
and associated moral emotion of compassion). Controlled processes,
in contrast, are mental processes that occur more slowly, are more
conscious, and are more easily separated from perception. Controlled
processing can involve procedural knowledge (such as coping strate-
gies, which are skills for regulating emotions), but more often involves
declarative knowledge (such as thinking about moral quandaries).
How are these distinctions important to spiritual transformation?
In recent theory, values are often conceptualized as a type of “declara-
tive” (know-what) knowledge (e.g., Westen, 1985), while virtues are
instances of “procedural” (how-to) knowledge (e.g., Casebeer, 2003).
Thus, while a person may consciously declare that he/she “values” a
particular virtue, it is not necessarily the case that the person possesses
the capacity to enact the procedural skill signified by the word “virtue”
(e.g., empathy). Further, it is likely that different kinds of knowledge
structures are acquired through different processes. One of the central
tenets of virtue theory is that the virtues are acquired inductively, both
through exposure to narratives and exemplars (persons) that represent
the virtue in question, and through efforts to emulate the virtue in
real-world practice (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Narratives and virtuous
persons embody information about many aspects of a sociomoral situ-
ation, including the motivations of the protagonists, how they perceive
the situation, what emotions have been elicited (compassion, gratitude,
anger, etc.), and the specific skills they have employed in response to
the situation. By observing and emulating more experienced others,
the moral learner over time comes to recognize what information is
important to notice and how to respond (Haidt & Keseber, 2010).
In short, one of the more important insights to emerge from this
recent literature can be stated as follows: Declarative knowledge can-
not empower that which procedural memory has not acquired. That is,
declarative propositional knowledge about the moral good (know-what
knowledge), even accompanied by a command and will to do it, is not
sufficient to enable the value without the procedural skills (virtues)
which make it possible (how-to knowledge). These procedural skill-
like virtues, first embodied in moral others, likely become embedded
within procedural memory through virtuous interactions experienced
with others (Garrels, 2006; Iacoboni, 2008).
To summarize this section, the foregoing trends in moral intu-
itionist thought, together with the above limitations of the meaning-
system approach, argue for the importance of an alternative approach.
Consistent with Emmons and Paloutizian’s (2003) proposal for a new
multilevel and interdisciplinary paradigm, the model outlined below

offers a framework that synthesizes constructs related to higher-level
meaning and lower-level motivation into a single comprehensive
model.
Overview of Three Cognitive Systems of Spiritual

Transformation
As described above, in general, the psychology of religion has followed

social psychology in treating spirituality and/or religiosity as a meaning-
system comprised of constructs such as beliefs, values, and strivings.
But, argued here, high-level meaning is only one kind of knowledge
system that is involved in the complex multi-dimensional process of
spiritual transformation, especially when viewed from the social func-
tionalist perspective. The central idea of the proposed moral intuition-
ist approach is straightforward: Spiritual transformation encompasses
the systematic, intentional expansion of moral sociability (the motiva-
tion and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of
others), as envisioned within some religious or “naturalistic” meaning
system. Thus, in this model, both higher-level meaning and lower-level
motivation are important, but they play different roles in promoting the
ultimate concern of moral sociability. This section provides an overview
of the proposed model and preliminary definitions of basic terms, to be
followed by a more detailed description in Part 2. Figure 1 presents a
schematic representation of the framework.
Overview of the Model

The primary objective of this framework is to conceptualize the rela-
tionships between three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral
functioning), corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge),
and domains of moral personality (sources of motivation and meaning)
that comprise each system. The central assumption of this approach is
that growth in moral sociability optimally arises from the interaction
between three qualitatively different cognitive systems or levels of per-
sonality that are likely involved in spiritual transformation. The three
sociomoral functions are designated: a) motivation and capacity for
moral sociability (the issue of how-to); b) moral direction (the issue
of know-what); and 3) existential life meaning (the issue of what-for).
System 3:
Ideological Narrative
(Meaning)
System 1:
Intuition
(Motivation)
Spiritual Moral
Transformation Sociability
System 2:
Reasoning
(Direction)
Figure 1. Three-System Model of Spiritual Transformation in the Moral

Intuitionist Paradigm.
The model hypothesizes three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral function-
ing) and corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge) are involved in form-
ing and transforming moral sociability: 1) the Intuitive System (primarily) responsible
for motivation and capacity; 2) the Reasoning System responsible for moral direction;
and 3) the Ideological Narrative responsible for existential meaning.
The corresponding cognitive systems that subserve these functions are

referred to as Intuition, Reasoning, and Ideological Narrative. These
terms are intended to capture contrasts between different cognitive
systems made by various moral philosophers and psychologists in
recent years (e.g., Lowenstein & Small, 2007). Consistent with the
SIM, Intuition, Reasoning, and Ideological Narrative are all forms of
cognition, but are different types and modes of knowledge that dif-
ferentially contribute to the “moral functioning of mature adults”
(Blasi, 2009). Further, as in McAdams’ multilevel model, each system
is comprised of various domains of moral personality that provide a
more specific function in the system. In overview, the Intuitive System
is comprised of moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, and
moral vices, and these domains are hypothesized to provide motiva-
tion and capacity for moral sociability. Three domains comprise the
Reasoning System, and are believed to provide moral direction: moral
values, moral reasoning, and moral willpower. The third cognitive
system, Ideological Narrative, is comprised of a single domain referred
to as moral identity, and is believed to provide existential meaning for
moral sociability.
Table 1. Three Cognitive Systems and Associated Moral Functions of Spiritual

Transformation
System Function Type of Knowledge Mode of Knowledge
System 1: Moral how-to knowledge automatic-quasi-
Intuition motivation and procedural
capacity
System 2: Moral direction know-what knowledge automatic-
Reasoning declarative
System 3: Moral meaning what-for knowledge controlled-Ideological
Narrative declarative
Table 1 summarizes each system in terms of its hypothesized

sociomoral function, type of knowledge, and mode of knowledge (i.e.,
distinctions between automatic/controlled and declarative/procedural
reviewed above). Since each system is conceptualized as an essential
and complementary domain of moral sociability, this model argues
that spiritual transformation must encompass practices that differen-
tially target the formation (and transformation) of each system. Thus,
it must be stressed that the proposed model is not anti-meaning:
It simply says that moral choice and action is likely not the direct
result of conscious, language-based processes (Reasoning and Ideo-
logical Narrative Systems), and that the transformation of moral moti-
vation and capacity (Intuitive System) is the more central and (likely)
more difficult task in spiritual transformation. The following discus-
sion summarizes the model in terms of three theoretical propositions.
The specific domains that comprise each system are described in
Part 2.
Proposition 1: The Intuitive System Provides “Motivation

and Capacity” for Moral Sociability
In the proposed framework, the Intuitive System is comprised of four
domains of moral personality that collectively provide motivation
and capacity for moral sociability: moral intuitions, moral emotions,
moral virtues, and moral vices. Together these domains comprise a
cognitive system that provides the “hot” cognitive (how-to) knowledge
necessary to enact the moral meaning prescribed by one’s meaning
system (and, in the case of vices, obstruct enactment of the virtues).
The contrast between Intuitive and Reasoning systems, it must be
repeated, is a contrast between two cognitive processes, one of which

usually has an affective component (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, pp.
801–802). It is hypothesized that this system represents procedural or
“quasi-procedural” (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 80) knowledge that
is typically activated by “automatic” (implicit) processes, more than
controlled processes. The term quasi-procedural denotes that moral
intuitions (“feelings of knowing,” p. 80) and moral emotions have
content or meaning (they are a “what”), but they are also automatic
procedures (they are a “how”). Moral intuitions and moral emotions
are the automatic processes that “push” the person to express his or
her moral virtues. Without this system, a person may know and even
value particular meaning-system religious precepts (e.g., “love one
another”) yet may not possess the motivation and capacity to perform
the principle.
Proposition 2: The Reasoning System Provides “Direction”

for Moral Sociability
The second system, termed the Reasoning System, is comprised of
three domains that collectively provide direction for moral sociability:
moral values, moral reasoning, and moral will. Together these domains
comprise a cognitive system that provides “cold” cognitive know-what
knowledge that prioritizes one’s moral values, and it provides direction
about when to apply one’s principles in various life circumstances. It is
hypothesized that this system represents declarative knowledge that is
sometimes activated by automatic processes (e.g., values can be non-
conscious) but that also requires considerable controlled (deliberative)
processing (e.g., “what should I do in this situation?”). Moral reason-
ing and moral willpower are the controlled processes that contextual-
ize and then “pull” the person to express his or her moral values. In
the language of meaning-system models, the Reasoning system cor-
relates with middle-level personality constructs (e.g., beliefs, values,
and personal strivings). However, conceptualized in this model, this
system alone cannot motivate and enable moral sociability. A person
may possess know-what knowledge (direction), but still may not pos-
sess the how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity) to enact context-
specific prosocial virtues.
Proposition 3: Ideological Narrative Provides “Existential Meaning”

for Moral Sociability
Third, Ideological Narrative represents a third cognitive system
involved in spiritual transformation. Depicted in Figure 1 as the circle
surrounding the other two systems, this system provides a “narra-
tive envelope” (Browning, 2006, p. 25) that clarifies and informs the
other two systems. A person’s ideological narrative is comprised of
language-based, declarative knowledge that is often structured in the
form of a narrative. The term “ideological narrative” as used in recent
social intuitionist theory (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009) is similar
to McAdams’ integrative life stories but “are grander than life sto-
ries, often reaching back centuries or millennia for their ‘once upon a
time,’ casting larger groups and forces as the actors” (Haidt, Graham,
& Joseph, 2009, p. 115). In the present model, Ideological Narrative
is hypothesized to provide existential (cosmological) meaning about
one’s place and significance in the universe. Its unique role in spiri-
tual transformation is to provide what-for knowledge (i.e., what moral
sociability means in terms of some ‘big picture’ narrative, and why it is
important for a good life and the common good). Because such knowl-
edge provides an additional reason to move toward moral sociability,
it is modeled as a major dimension of spiritual transformation.
In comparison to meaning-system models, Ideological Narrative
corresponds to upper-level meaning constructs; that is, narrative
meaning, life purpose, self-definition. However, conceived in this
model, this system is the basis for an eighth domain of moral person-
ality, termed moral identity, or more precisely moral identity situated
in a cosmological story. This system represents declarative knowledge
that is typically activated by controlled (deliberative) processes, more
than automatic processes. However, as with the Reasoning System, the
assumption is that this system alone cannot motivate and enable moral
sociability. That is, a person may know what-for (existential meaning),
yet may not possess know-what knowledge (moral direction) neces-
sary to navigate complexities of the social world, nor possess how-
to knowledge (motivation and capacity) to perform the necessary
prosocial skills. Thus, a fundamental claim of this model is that while
upper-level (Ideological Narrative) and mid-level (Reasoning System)
domains can provide meaning and direction for moral sociability, they
cannot alone provide the motivation and capacity to enact the skills
required of moral sociability.
What Then is Spiritual Transformation?

To summarize, in an effort to complement (not contradict) meaning-
system analyses, this model conceptualizes spiritual transformation as
the integration of three systems that work together to motivate and
enable moral sociability. From this perspective, the spiritually mature-
ing person is one who acts from existential meaning (Narrative), with
deliberative direction (Reasoning), and is increasingly motivated and
enabled by prosocial capacities (Intuition) that motivate and enable
moral sociability. However, consistent with research that suggests
emotions/virtues function as critical “moral motives” for prosocial
action (McCullough et al., 2001), this model places greater theoreti-
cal and practical priority on the multiple domains that energize and
enable moral sociability (i.e., the Intuitive System). Stated in terms of
virtue ethics, this model proposes that when these three inter-related
systems interact in an ideal fashion, we observe an approximation
to the Aristotelian eudaimonic ideal of a person who does the “right
things and with the right aim, in the right way and at the right time”
(Lear, 2000, p. 63). Thus, these systems and their constitutive domains
may be seen to articulate a vision of the “teleologically structured
life that exemplifies distinctively human flourishing” (MacIntyre,
2004, p. 34). This moral ideal, while always a work-in-progress, nev-
ertheless provides an organizing framework for the selection and
implementation of practices of spiritual transformation that dif-
ferentially target each sociomoral function and system of spiritual
transformation.
Specifically, as further detailed in Part 2, this three-system model of
spiritual transformation offers an expanded social intuitionist model
that encompasses eight domains of moral personality, and related pro-
cesses: 1) tuning-up moral intuitions, 2) amplifying moral emotions,
3) strengthening moral virtues, 4) weakening moral vices, 5) clarifying
moral values, 6) sharpening moral reasoning, 7) building moral will,
and 8) integrating moral identity. Further, with respect to the Intuitive
system, this model delineates four hypotheses about how to practice
expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability (genera-
tive care): “tuning-up” moral intuitions (selective attunement hypoth-
esis); “amplifying” moral emotions (emotion amplification hypothesis);
“strengthening” moral virtues (skill rehearsal hypothesis); and “weak-
ening” moral vices (expressive disclosure hypothesis).
Summary
The primary goal of this article was to argue the need and rationale
for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature of spiri-
tual transformation than the presently dominant meaning-system
approach (Paloutzian & Park, 2005) and then to outline general fea-
tures of an alternative moral intuitionist approach. First, it outlined
arguments for the more systematic integration of contemporary moral
psychology with the psychology of spiritual transformation and sug-
gested that moral psychology should become an important part of
the psychology of religion and spirituality. In particular, it offered a
social functionalist definition of spiritual transformation that places
the construct moral sociability (more than meaning) at the heart of
spiritual transformation. Following Erikson’s (1964) interpretation
of the Golden Rule, moral sociability was defined as the motivation
and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of
others and the wider world, and spiritual transformation as intentional
movement toward this moral ideal.
Second, as background for an alternative model, the article outlined
four recent trends in moral psychology: the centrality of moral moti-
vation, two-system morality, the SIM model of moral motivation, and
a connectionist model of virtue. Third, in light of these developments,
it provided a more systematic critique of the logic and assumptions of
meaning-system analyses. Specifically, it sketched five conceptual and
methodological limitations of the meaning-system approach, includ-
ing empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to
motivate prosociality. The article concluded with the suggestion that
what is required to build a model of moral personality that is useful for
theory and research in spiritual transformation is a multilevel frame-
work that better captures the interplay between the multiple sources
of meaning and motivation that likely work together to “energize”
(the issue of motivation) and “enable” (the issue of capacity) moral
sociability.
Finally, the article sketched three propositions that outline a spe-
cific model of spiritual transformation that derives from but also
extends the Social Intuitionist Model. This model suggests that spiri-
tual transformation involves changes to three sociomoral functions
and corresponding cognitive systems: a) an Intuitive System (primar-
ily responsible for moral motivation and capacity); b) a Reasoning
System (responsible for moral direction); and c) an Ideological Nar-

rative (responsible for existential meaning). This three-system model
argues that spiritual change requires practices that target different
types of knowledge systems, which collectively motivate and enable
moral sociability: how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity), know-
what knowledge (direction), and what-for knowledge (existential or
cosmological meaning). While each level or system is important, this
model places greater theoretical and methodological priority on the
Intuitive System.
The purpose of Part 2 in Beyond Meaning is to spell out more system-
atically the domains that comprise each system and to outline corre-
sponding spiritual transformation processes (not yet specific practices).
For each system, suggestions for continued theoretical development of
the model and for empirical research are offered. Collectively, then,
these systems and processes promise to offer a new multilevel inter-
disciplinary model of spiritual transformation as conceived within the
moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm.
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A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL
TRANSFORMATION
PART 2:
THREE COGNITIVE SYSTEMS OF SPIRITUAL
TRANSFORMATION: A MORAL INTUITIONIST MODEL
G. Michael Leffel*
Abstract
This article outlines a personality-based, process model of spiritual transformation con-
ceptualized within a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm. Following from
the three-system model of spiritual transformation introduced in Part 1 (Intuition, Rea-
soning, Ideological Narrative), this article more systematically details the domains (fac-
ets) of moral functioning that comprise each system. It outlines eight domains of moral
personality and corresponding developmental processes that derive from but also extend
the “Social Intuitionist Model” (Haidt, 2001) of morality: 1) tuning-up ethical intuitions,
2) amplifying premoral emotions, 3) strengthening moral virtues, 4) weakening moral
vices, 5) clarifying moral values, 6) sharpening moral reasoning, 7) building moral will,
and 8) integrating moral identity. In particular, this model highlights the critical motiva-
tional roles played by the Intuitive System and its constitutive domains: ethical intuitions,
premoral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices. For each Intuitive System domain, a
testable empirical hypothesis about the process of spiritual transformation is stated and
an example of representative research is reviewed. The article discusses this model as a
multilevel interdisciplinary (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003) framework that offers five con-
tributions to spiritual transformation theory. Specific questions for continued theoretical
development and empirical research on the model are suggested throughout the article.
Keywords: Multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm, moral intuitionism, domains of

moral personality, intentional growth processes
The virtues, then, come neither by nature, nor

against nature, but nature gives the capacity for
acquiring them, and this is developed by training.
—Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 25

University.

True religion is right tempers [virtues] towards God

and man. It is, in two words, gratitude and benevo-
lence; gratitude to our Creator and supreme Bene-
factor, and benevolence to our fellow-creatures. In
other words, it is in loving God with all our heart,
and our neighbor as ourselves. This is religion, and
this is happiness, the happiness for which we were
made.
—J. Wesley (in Hildebrandt & Beckerlegge), p. 269
Does gratitude, over time, build people’s skills for
loving? Does it build their skills for expressing love
and kindness so that, even outside the context of
gratitude, people who have been frequently grateful
know how to show their love and compassion?
—B. Fredrickson, Gratitude, Like Other Positive
Emotions, Broadens and Builds, p. 160
As hinted in the epigraphs above, despite other differences, virtue eth-
ics, religious moral psychology, and the positive psychology of reli-
gion sometimes share a common assumption about the motivational
dynamics of the moral life, namely that certain “emotions/virtues”
(Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11) such as gratitude act as causal
mechanisms for benevolent (loving) action. But how do persons “prac-
tice” in order to develop such virtues? In an effort to better organize
and highlight the growing “consilience” (E. O. Wilson, 1998) between
morality, spirituality, and religion, particularly the study of psycho-
logical processes that mediate spiritual transformation, Emmons &
Paloutzian (2003) urged the development of “a new multilevel interdis-
ciplinary paradigm” (p. 396; emphasis in original) that would provide
a framework for integrating constructs in the psychology of religion
with theory and research in cognate fields. They described their vision
of a multilevel interdisciplinary framework as one that: “recognizes the
value of data at multiple levels of analysis while making nonreductive
assumptions concerning the value of spiritual and religious phenom-
ena” (p. 395). They suggested such an approach would draw on fields
such as evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology,
and cognitive science such that “developments in the psychology of
religion take into account and build upon advances in these related
scientific disciplines” (p. 395). In light of their recommendations, the
objective of this article is to propose one version of such a framework.
Specifically, the article outlines a moral intuitionist model of spiritual
transformation that derives from Haidt’s original “Social Intuition-
part two: moral intuitionist model 79
ist Model” (SIM: Haidt, 2001) of moral functioning, and from recent
updates of social intuitionist theory made by Haidt and colleagues over
the past ten years (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Bjorklund,
2008; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007).
The theoretical yield is an expanded conceptual framework that syn-
thesizes multiple sources of meaning and moral motivation hypoth-
esized in the complex process of spiritual transformation.
The first section of this article offers working definitions of moral-
ity, moral intuitionism, and spiritual transformation, and it provides
background for the moral intuitionist model described herein. The sec-
ond section provides an overview of the proposed model that encom-
passes three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning)
and corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge) hypoth-
esized to be involved in spiritual transformation: a) an Intuitive Sys-
tem (primarily responsible for the function referred to as motivation
and capacity); b) a Reasoning System (responsible for moral direction);
and c) a third system referred to as Ideological Narrative (responsible
for existential meaning). This three-system model argues that spiritual
transformation requires the intentional formation and transformation
of three types of knowledge (not just “meaning”) and that these sys-
tems work together to motivate and enable moral sociability: how-to
knowledge (motivation and capacity), know-what knowledge (moral
direction), and what-for knowledge (existential or cosmological mean-
ing). A central assumption of this model, perhaps in distinction to
meaning-system models, is that global meaning formation and moral
motivation are not the same processes, and they likely require differ-
ent practices. The next three sections of the article then successively
describe each system. The third section describes the domains of the
Intuitive System, followed by abbreviated discussions of the Reasoning
System and Ideological Narrative. The sixth section then discusses the
proposed model as a multilevel interdisciplinary framework and offers
five potential contributions of the model to spiritual transformation
theory and research.
Framing the Issue: Strengthening the Role of Moral

Motivation in Spiritual Transformation
Part 1 in this series addressed the issue of how to re-conceptualize the

nature (goal, objective) of spiritual transformation in light of recent
developments in moral psychology, especially the Social Intuitionist
Model. The present article now addresses a second related question:

What processes mediate spiritual transformation? The overall objec-
tive of Beyond Meaning is to strengthen the role of moral motivation
in theory and research on spiritual transformation. In an effort to
achieve this aim, there are three subsidiary aims.
A New Definition of Spiritual Transformation

Moral psychologist Haidt has recently proposed a new social func-
tionalist definition of morality as a tool for theory and research in
moral psychology and in the psychology of religion (Haidt & Kesebir,
2010): “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms,
practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psycholog-
ical mechanism that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness
and make social life possible” (p. 800). Haidt suggested that religion
should be studied as a complex system with many social functions,
one of which is to “bind people together into cooperative communities
organized around deities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140). In effect,
Haidt’s definition of religion places moral formation (“to suppress or
regulate selfishness and make social life possible”) at the heart of reli-
gious practices, while it does not reduce religion only to moral devel-
opment (Graham & Haidt, 2010).
Following from Haidt’s definition and recommendation, in place of
the presently dominant meaning-system definition of spiritual transfor-
mation as “search for the Sacred” (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, p. 64),
Part 1 offered the construct “moral sociability” as a central goal of spiri-
tual transformation and a new definition of spiritual transformation:
Spiritual transformation encompasses intentional movement toward a
moral ideal, aimed primarily at the expansion of one’s motivation and
capacity for moral sociability, as envisioned within some meaning system,
and whether or not that meaning system is explicitly religious.
This definition proposes three things. First, it suggests that a central
objective of spiritual transformation is growth toward some prescribed
moral ideal. Moral sociability, defined primarily in terms of Erikson’s
construct of generative care, was proposed as one such moral ideal.
Thus conceived, spiritual transformation involves intentional, sys-
tematic efforts to expand one’s motivation and capacity to emotion-
ally invest in the strengths-development of others (see Part 1, section
entitled Moral Sociability as Ultimate Concern of Spiritual Transfor-
mation). Second, this definition proposes that spiritual transformation
would focus on expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral

sociability. This places the locus of spiritual growth on the formation
and transformation of how-to knowledge (motivation and capac-
ity), more than know-what knowledge (moral direction), or what-for
knowledge (existential meaning). Third, it acknowledges that some
meaning-system (religious or naturalistic) will likely be required to
give existential (cosmological or theological) meaning to one’s concep-
tion of moral ideal. Thus, as detailed below, while the meaning-system
approach is adequate to conceptualize the high-level meaning com-
ponents of spiritual transformation (what to do and why to do it), it
is not sufficient to insure that persons have developed the motivation
and capacity to actually enact meaning-system values (how to do it).
This is where moral intuitionist theory, particularly the Social Intu-
itionist Model, can help.
A Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Motivation

As described in Part 1, “moral motivation” refers to the processes by
which a person is “energized” (motivation) and “enabled” (capacity)
to enact the moral percepts prescribed by one’s meaning-system. The
premise of this article is that moral intuitionism in general, and the
Social Intuitionist Model in particular, offers an important new model
of critical “sources of moral motivation” (Shulman, 2002, p. 499). What
is moral intuitionism, and how could it contribute to the psychology of
spiritual transformation? Described by Haidt (2001), moral intuition-
ist approaches in moral psychology argue that, in contrast to previous
Rationalist approaches which have emphasized language-based mean-
ing and reasoning (especially Kohlberg and Piaget), moral intuitions
and moral emotions come before reasoning, and they directly cause
moral judgments, choices, and actions (also see Kagan, 1984; J. Q.
Wilson, 1993). Haidt and Joseph (2007) stated the central premise of
moral intuitionism this way:
The first draft of the moral mind has diverse moral content that was
specified in advance of experience, but this innately given content gets
revised and greatly extended during the course of development as chil-
dren actively construct their moral knowledge within a cultural context
that uses narrative to shape and guide the development of specific vir-
tues. (p. 391)
In psychology today, the SIM is the foremost representative of the moral
intuitionist hypothesis (Flanagan & Williams, 2010). It argues that
moral choice and action is best explained in terms of intuition-based

moral foundations, conceptualized as evolutionary ancient, fast act-
ing, affect-laden input-output programs, that are energized more by
moral emotions and less by language-based reasoning than previously
thought. One model of these moral intuitions, “moral foundations
theory” (MFT: Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009), posits Care/harm (the
intuition to alleviate suffering and provide care) as one of perhaps
five automatic, emotion-laden intuitions that humans are biologi-
cally predisposed to “moralize” in communities, congregations, and
families (along with intuitions to Fairness/reciprocity, In-group/loy-
alty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity). Care/harm is conceptual-
ized as a perceptual-emotional-behavioral system that equips human
beings to detect signs of suffering in others and then moves persons
to relieve that suffering and to otherwise provide for the development
of others.
Further, recent thinking in social intuitionist theory argues that
both moral judgment and moral action are grounded in and subserved
by different innate moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral vir-
tues, where virtues are understood as procedural skills or capacities
not simply as traits (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). In this view, virtues
are prosocial capacities that possess characteristics like other proce-
dural skills that have been modeled as instances of the modular mind
(Sperber, 2005), such as language, basic emotions, and multiple intel-
ligences. An important assumption and practical implication of this
approach is that moral formation is accomplished primarily by shap-
ing motivation-related intuitions, emotions, and virtues, more than
by the rote learning of meaning-related principles or beliefs. Stated
in briefest form, then, the significance of moral intuitionism for spiri-
tual transformation is that it offers a new way to conceptualize certain
sources of moral motivation that may prove critical for motivating and
enabling moral sociability; that is, the “domains” of moral intuitions,
moral emotions, and moral virtues (and vices). The purpose of this
article is not to debate the veracity of this view, since there are now
a number of excellent critiques of moral intuitionism (Appiah, 2008;
Blasi, 2009; Browning, 2010; Frimer & Walker, 2008). Rather, the goal
is to discuss how this approach might complement the presently dom-
inant meaning-system approach and offer new direction about how
persons acquire the motivation and capacity to fulfill the moral ideal
prescribed by one’s meaning-system.
A Multi-domain, Multi-process Model of Spiritual Transformation

The Social Intuitionist Model suggests a corresponding process model
of transformation but one that has yet to be systematically developed.
Historically, in the psychology of spiritual transformation, the notion
of a process approach to the study of religious conversion or spiritual
transformation is not new (e.g., Rambo, 1993). For example, in Ram-
bo’s multidimensional model: “conversion is approached as a series of
elements that are interactive and cumulative over time” (p. 17). His
model consists of seven “stages” or elements (context, crisis, quest,
encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences) that endeavor
to describe interrelated processes involved in spiritual transformation.
However, what may be new in the literature on spiritual transforma-
tion is a model of spiritual transformation that derives its processes
from the multiple levels or domains that comprise moral personality.
In moral psychology today, much theoretical and empirical atten-
tion is being given to the construction of models of moral personality
that synthesize multiple domains of functioning (see Bergman, 2002;
Frimer & Walker, 2008 for reviews). There are now a number of multi-
domain models that might prove useful for modeling spiritual trans-
formation. For example, Rest (1994) argued that moral action consists
of a least four different domains of moral functioning: a) moral sensi-
tivity (interpreting the situation), b) moral judgment (judging which
action is morally right/wrong), c) moral motivation (prioritizing moral
values relative to other values), and d) moral character (having cour-
age, persisting, overcoming distractions, implementing skills). How-
ever, until recently, most research has focused mainly on the second
component, moral reasoning, while other components have received
relatively little attention. Thus, a limitation of even some of the multi-
domain models is that they still tend to under-emphasize the critical
roles of moral motivation processes, such as those highlighted in the
SIM (see Part 1, section entitled Recent Trends in Moral Psychology for
a more complete discussion of moral motivation).
In light of this limitation, the major objective of Beyond Meaning
is to integrate the moral intuitionist and meaning-system approaches
in order to offer an integrative model that more systematically delin-
eates how meaning and motivation may be related. This article
details a multi-domain, multi-process model of moral personality
that synthesizes eight sources of meaning and motivation discussed
in contemporary moral psychology: moral intuitions, moral emotions,

moral virtues, moral vices, moral values, moral reasoning, moral will,
and moral identity (cf. Frimer & Walker, 2008; Narvaez & Lapsley,
2009). However, for limitations of space, the present article highlights
the critical motivational roles played by the first four domains (moral
intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices). For each
of these Intuitive System domains, in order to provide a guide for
future empirical research, a theoretical proposition about the devel-
opment of the domain is stated in the form of a testable conceptual
hypothesis and an example of representative research is offered.
Overview of a Multi-domain Model of Moral Functioning

(for Spiritual Transformation)
Figure 1 (top panel) depicts a new moral intuitionist model of moral
personality. It is similar in kind to Berkowitz’s model of moral anatomy
(Berkowitz, 1997) described as “an attempt to tease apart the constitu-
ent parts of moral personhood” (Berkowitz, Sherblom, Bier, & Battis-
tich, 2006, p. 690). Corresponding to each domain, the bottom panel
Personality Moral
Domains Virtues
(Skills)
Ethical Premoral Moral Moral Moral Moral
Intuitions Emotions Values Reason Will Identity
Moral
Vices
1. Tuning-Up
8. Integrating
2. Amplifying 5. Clarifying 7. Building
3. Weakening
6. Sharpening
4. Strengthening
Developmental
Processes
Figure 1. A moral intuitionist model of eight domains of moral personality and

corresponding developmental processes.
(Eliciting Situation)—
System 1 Ethical Intuitions—Premoral Emotions—Moral Virtues—
Moral Vices—
System 2 Moral Values—Moral Reasoning—Moral Will—
System 3 Moral Identity—
(Moral Sociability)
Figure 2. A Three-System, Multi-domain Model of Eight Domains of Moral

Personality.
of Figure 1 names a developmental process hypothesized to facilitate

meaning and motivation for moral sociability (generative caring).
In overview, these domains and associated developmental processes
are designated: 1) “tuning-up” ethical intuitions; 2) “amplifying” prem-
oral emotions; 3) “strengthening” moral virtues; 4) “weakening” moral
vices; 5) “clarifying” moral values; 6) “sharpening” moral reasoning;
7) “building” moral willpower; and 8) “integrating” moral identity.
Consistent with the logic of Haidt’s (2001) original model of moral
functioning, these eight domains are hypothesized to describe a tem-
poral sequence leading from situation perception (eliciting situation)
to moral action (moral sociability) that can be diagrammed as follows
(Figure 2):
There are three preliminary things to notice about this model. First,
consistent with the “connectionist” approach to moral personality
(e.g., Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998; Westen, 2002), each system
(or level) relates to and subserves a different sociomoral function of
personality. System 1 domains, referred to as ethical intuitions, prem-
oral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices, designate moral moti-
vational sources hypothesized to provide motivation and capacity for
moral sociability. System 2 domains, designated moral values, moral
reasoning, and moral will, are believed to provide moral direction
for moral sociability (more than motivation and capacity). And, the
System 3 domain designated moral identity is hypothesized to pro-
vide existential (or cosmological) meaning for moral sociability (more
than motivation and capacity and moral direction). Following Wes-
ten (1985), these inter-related systems and domains are understood
as “constellations of functionally related processes” (p. 97) that col-
lectively enable three sociomoral functions of personality.
A second objective of this model is to describe these systems and

domains in terms of the type of knowledge and mode of cognitive
processing which they likely represent; that is, distinctions between
declarative versus procedural “types” of knowledge and automatic
versus controlled “modes” of processing (Westen & Gabbard, 2002,
especially pp. 73–92). Following recent discussions of these contrasts
(see Part 1, sub-section entitled Distinctions between Declarative/Pro-
cedural Knowledge and Automatic/Controlled Processing), each of these
domains can be described as (relatively) more automatic-procedural
or more controlled-declarative in nature. In the proposed model, Sys-
tem 1 motivational domains (“how-to” knowledge) are hypothesized
as the most automatic-procedural in nature. More precisely, follow-
ing Westen and Gabbard’s discussion, ethical intuitions (“feelings of
knowing,” p. 80) and premoral emotions can be considered quasi-
procedural. They are declarative in that they have content or meaning
(they are a “what”), but they are also automatic procedures (they are
a “how”). The same can be said for moral virtues and vices, although
Westen did not treat virtues in his discussion (but see Casebeer, 2003
for a description of virtues as procedural). Second, System 2 direc-
tional domains (“know-what” knowledge) are those believed to be
automatic-declarative in nature. For example, a moral “value” may
function without awareness yet may be declared when persons are
asked to describe one’s values. And, the System 3 existential mean-
ing domain (“what-for” knowledge) referred to as moral identity is
hypothesized to be the most controlled-declarative in nature, as it is
dependent upon conscious deliberation for its continued formation
and transformation. These domain distinctions are important because
they carry major implications for how one practices spiritual trans-
formation (i.e., whether one is practicing to expand motivation and
capacity, to gain direction, or to find meaning). However, since these
knowledge distinctions remain relatively new to theorizing in moral
psychology (see Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005 for related discussion), and
even more so in the psychology of religion, they should be regarded as
working hypotheses rather than as established facts.
Third, readers familiar with social intuitionism will notice two vari-
ances in terminology between the present model and the SIM, related
to the terms ethical intuitions and premoral emotions. Haidt and col-
leagues sometimes used the term “ethical intuitions” (cf. Haidt &
Joseph, 2004) but more often “moral intuitions” (cf. Haidt & Joseph,
2007) in reference to innate intuitions of the moral mind. And, they
always used the term “moral emotions” when discussing emotions

believed to intensify the intuitions. However, in the present model, the
terms ethical intuitions and premoral emotions replace their preferred
terms. Why so? One of the recent criticisms of the SIM is that it may
confuse important distinctions between ethics and morality (Appiah,
2008; Browning, 2010). Following the moral anthropology of Riceour
(1992) and others, Browning has proposed that we maintain a dis-
tinction between ethics (strivings to attain certain “premoral” goods
of life) and morality (the concern to adjudicate inevitable conflicts
between these goods). He argued that while moral intuitionism may
well describe certain psychobiological needs and tendencies that make
up the fundamental nonmoral or premoral goods of life (e.g., Haidt’s
moral intuitions and moral emotions), these goods are not necessar-
ily fully moral goods, and they cannot themselves resolve conflicts
between goods and the persons seeking these goods (see Browning,
2010, especially Chapter 3). Browning suggested that moral reflec-
tion does this by employing “deontological tests” (p. 75) about which
of the biologically-based foundational goods, emotions, and related
virtues are universalizable, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, the
Golden Rule, or principle of neighbor love (also see Flanagan & Wil-
liams, 2010 on the normativity of Haidt’s moral foundations). Thus,
in terms of the present model, intuitions and emotions are referred to
as premoral (not moral) goods (i.e., they are ethical goods necessary
to motivate and enable moral sociability), but they depend upon the
higher “moralizing” influence of tradition-shaped values and practi-
cal reasoning to provide direction (i.e., the Reasoning System). Moral
virtues (and vices) thus begin the domain of morality proper, since
in attempting to develop certain virtues, cultural and religious mean-
ings have already adjudicated and prioritized the virtues to be prized
and vices to be avoided. The proposal here is that this distinction
between ethics and morality does not necessarily discourage Haidt and
colleagues’ “relentlessly” descriptive (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140)
strategy for exploring the full array of moral concerns (beyond caring
and justice), and it allows us to better conceptualize the potential role
of narrative-shaped traditions to re-form innate ethical intuitions (see
Haidt’s, 2003c discussion of how “old dogs learn new tricks”). In the
next three sections, each system is detailed.
System 1: The Intuitive System (Motivation and Capacity)
Considered in the nomenclature of “two-system morality” (see Part

1, section entitled Recent Trends in Moral Psychology), the Intuitive
System is comprised of four domains of moral personality: ethical
intuitions, premoral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices (left side
of Figure 1). These four domains and corresponding developmental
processes form the core of the proposed moral intuitionist model.
Again, these domains are hypothesized to subserve the sociomoral
function referred to as moral motivation and capacity. In current
social cognitive neuroscience models, this system is believed to con-
sist of quasi-procedural knowledge (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 80).
The term quasi-procedural (or quasi-declarative) denotes that while
such knowledge may not be immediately conscious (in active “work-
ing” memory), it can be made conscious and reflected upon if atten-
tion is focused on the domain. It is sometimes also referred to as the
experiential system (Schultheiss, 2002). Because the Intuitive System
is the focus of the proposed approach, more must be said about how
these domains work together to energize and enable prosocial action
(especially moral sociability defined as generative care).
Domain 1: Ethical Intuitions

What is the primary motivational unit of moral personality? In the
SIM, ethical intuitions provide the first link in a chain of events that
motivate prosocial action as they function to sensitize persons to ethi-
cal features of social situations. Haidt’s most recent definition of an
ethical intuition reads:
The sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of conscious-
ness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character
or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone
through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.
(Haidt & Bjorkland, 2008, p. 188)
In most cases, this flash of feeling (affect) leads directly to the conscious
condemnation (or praise) of the person in question, often including
declarative thoughts (“That was rude; I can’t believe he said that”). This
experience of affect, together with a felt conviction of the rightness or
wrongness of the act, is what Haidt referred to as the moral judgment
(or evaluation). However, this is not an evaluation arrived at by moral
reasoning but rather through a more tacit intuitional process.
A first claim of the SIM, then, is this: People form initial intuitive
evaluations of persons and situations almost instantly, and these eval-
uations are difficult to inhibit or change by conscious willpower alone
(Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). According to the SIM, ethical intuitions are
believed to occur rapidly and without awareness of their causes, or
assistance from conscious reasoning, and convey information about
the moral rightness or wrongness of certain human behaviors. Fur-
thermore, even when people engage in moral reasoning after the onset
of these initial evaluations, they do so “in a mental space that has
already been prestructured by intuitive processes, including affective
reactions which prepare the brain to approach or avoid the person or
proposition being considered” (p. 803). To illustrate, upon perceiving
a child in distress or fear, most persons will automatically generate
a good-bad evaluation, which in turn activates an associated action
tendency to approach. In other words, the Care/harm ethical intu-
ition will be activated, thus beginning the process of energizing proso-
cial action. Haidt and Joseph (2004) suggested that in “strong cases”
(p. 60) an intuition will also “trigger” activation of other facets of the
moral emotion, such as facial expressions, physiological changes, sub-
jective feelings, and “cold” cognitive appraisals. In this example, the
moral emotion of compassion would likely be triggered, thus intensi-
fying the initial action tendency to respond to the perceived suffering
of the child (i.e., the person would feel “energized” to act). Empirical
evidence for the speed and ubiquity of affect-laden ethical intuitions
can be found in the following reviews (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2007;
Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Lieberman, 2000).
Moral foundations theory. What are some of these ethical intuitions?
There are now a number of methodological strategies and systems that
seek to identify and classify ethical intuitions or moral “heuristics” (see
Blasi, 2009 for a review). One approach, “moral foundations theory”
(MFT: Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), conceptualizes ethical intu-
itions as the basic building blocks of the moral mind (also see Haidt
& Joseph, 2007). According to MFT, five perceptual categories provide
the foundation for evaluating the character and actions of others: Care/
harm (issues related to harm, suffering, and care); Fairness/Reciprocity
(equality, fairness, and justice); Ingroup/Loyalty (in-group affiliation
and preferential favor); Authority/Respect (hierarchy, authority, and
obedience); and Purity/Sanctity (issues related to the purity and sanc-
tity of the human body and “sacred” spaces of meaning). Haidt and
Joseph (2004) likened these ethical intuitions to “bits of input-output
programming” (p. 60) connecting the perception of a pattern in the

social world (often a virtue or vice) to an evaluation and, in many cases,
to a specific moral emotion (e.g., anger, contempt, admiration).
A second way to think about the moral foundations is like an audio
equalizer with five slider switches (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
Each switch—Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and Purity—can be
thought of as an independent parameter of moral functioning, thus
producing a wide variety of patterns depending on the settings of
each of the switches. Applying this analogy, these authors have used
their Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) to assess individual life
stories, as well as collective narratives about political ideologies, like
right-wing authoritarianism (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). More
recently, Graham and Haidt (2010) have commended moral founda-
tions theory as a way to study both individual- and group-level moral
preferences within different religions. Thus, one appealing feature of
MFT, and potential application to the psychology of spiritual trans-
formation, is that it claims to offer a universal psychosocial baseline
for comparing and contrasting moral orientations across cultures,
religions, and (perhaps) even interpretive traditions within a particu-
lar religion (see Flanagan & Williams, 2010 for an illustration of this
approach). A second implication of MFT for spiritual transformation
rests on its assertion that these innate but modifiable mechanisms
(Marcus, 2004) are the perceptual foundations upon which other
domains of moral personality are constructed, especially virtues and
values. For example, in the case of the intuition to Care/harm, the
SIM posits that the virtues of empathy, compassion, and love become
constructed on top of (“connected to”) the intuition to relieve suffer-
ing and provide care (Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008). Thus,
ethical intuitions provide the perceptual ground or floor for moral-
spiritual development.
How are these ethical intuitions practiced so as to better sensitize
persons to important sociomoral cues in the environment? Consis-
tent with MFT, the following hypothesis concerning the role of ethical
intuitions in promoting moral sociability is suggested.
Selective attunement hypothesis: “Tuning-Up” ethical intuitions. Proso-

cial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that tune-up
(activate) ethical intuitions related to moral features of social situations
(e.g., Care/harm). In the SIM, a primary function of ethical intuitions
is to provide “perceptual sensitivity” to certain features of sociomoral
situations (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, p. 386). Therefore, in the proposed

model of spiritual transformation, a first process is “tuning-up” ethi-
cal intuitions that a particular family, culture, or religious narrative
(meaning system) wishes to reinforce in its members. Haidt (2001)
thus suggested that the SIM account of moral development begins
with something of an unexpected twist. It posits that since ethical
intuitions are innate, the most important developmental question is
not: “How do they get into the child?” but rather, “How do they get
out?” (p. 826). Drawing on the work of Fiske (1991), Haidt argued
that sociomoral development should first be thought of as a process
of externalization (not internalization) of innate intuitions that natu-
rally manifest themselves as part of normal maturation (also see Haidt
& Bjorklund, 2008). In the connectionist model of moral character
(Churchland, 1998), ethical intuitions can also be viewed as part of a
moral associative network in the brain-mind that gets tuned up gradu-
ally by experience (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, pp. 375–376). Over time, and
with appropriate training, the brain-mind does a progressively better
job of recognizing important patterns of input and then responding
with the appropriate pattern of output.
By extension, applied to spiritual transformation, a first task in
expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability is to
assist the tuning-up of innate ethical intuitions through their activation
and repetition in real-world experiences. Consistent with both classi-
cal (Aristotle) and contemporary “connectionist” theory (Churchland,
Casebeer), this kind of tuning-up cannot be replaced with top-down
learning, such as the rote learning of rules (deontological principles).
Rather, moral development of this sort calls for the immersion of per-
sons in environments rich in virtue exemplars (persons) and in narra-
tives that embody the ethical intuitions valued by a culture, religious
tradition, and family.
Representative research. In the extant empirical literature, is there
any evidence for the plausibility of this hypothesis? One line of research
and empirical strategy that may prove useful for exploring the selec-
tive attunement hypothesis has examined the impact of attachment
security on prosocial motivation and action (see Mikulincer, Shaver,
Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005 for an overview). In the SIM, the attach-
ment motive is considered an expression of the innate intuition to
Care/harm (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Based on applications of
Bowlby and Ainsworth’s attachment theory, Shaver and Mikulincer
(2001) have demonstrated that styles of attachment and experimen-

tally manipulated activation of the sense of having a secure base are
systematically related to compassion and altruism. For example, acti-
vating a secure base (both through conscious stimuli and subliminal
priming) has been shown to increase cognitive openness to others (i.e.,
to “hear” others) and to increase the salience of Schwartz’ (1992) self-
transcendent values “benevolence” and “universalism” (Mikulincer
et al., 2005). Second, different forms of insecure attachment (anxious
and avoidant) were related to deficiencies in empathy and altruism.
For example, people with an avoidant attachment style scored lower
on measures of self-transcendent values, while persons with an anxious
style felt more threatened by members of out-groups and were more
likely to express hostility toward them (Mikulincer et al., 2005). Third,
experimentally enhanced security has been found to attenuate negative
reactions to out-group others as well as negative reactions to people
who express negative or critical opinions about aspects of the other’s
worldview, such as national identity (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). Col-
lectively, this research demonstrates that the activation of an ethical
intuition related to Care/harm (i.e., attachment security) may at least
temporarily tune-up one’s motivation and willingness to help others.
Future research employing this paradigm could extend such methods
to explore other motives (intuitions) hypothesized to motivate vir-
tues related to caring; for example, reciprocity (related to gratitude;
Emmons & McCullough, 2003) and reparation (related to forgiveness;
McCullough, 2008).
Domain 2: Premoral Emotions

Recent reviews of the psychological literature concerned with the affec-
tive basis of spiritual transformation (e.g., Emmons, 2005) suggest that
while the role of emotion has long been acknowledged, there has been
no consensual model of how emotion facilitates spiritual development
and by what means. Proposing one direction, Emmons suggested that
future theory and research might profitably focus on the nature and
function of the positive and moral emotions, viewing them as both
“motivators of and consequences of spiritual transformation” (p. 247).
Consistent with this proposal, in the SIM, moral emotions provide the
essential motivational function of amplifying ethical intuitions (e.g.,
Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60). They provide the second link in a chain
of events that energize and enable moral action. Therefore, a second
major claim about moral motivation is this: Moral domain-specific

actions (e.g., actions that express Care/harm) are activated to “go on
line” when persons are energized by the moral emotions connected to
these actions, not primarily by “duty” or by force of willpower. Three
important issues in contemporary moral emotion theory serve to clar-
ify this hypothesis.
Moral emotions theory. First, what are moral emotions? Haidt
(2003b) defined moral emotions as emotions “that are linked to inter-
ests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other
then the judge or agent” (p. 276). Moral emotions provide the moti-
vational force (the power or energy) to do good and avoid doing bad
(also see Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Therefore, in referring
to certain emotions as “moral,” the suggestion is not that some emo-
tions are better than others, rather that certain emotions typically
amplify action tendencies (Frijda, 1986) intrinsic to the emotion. In
other words, moral emotions put the person into a motivational and
cognitive state in which there is an increased tendency to engage in
(or inhibit) prosocial goal-related actions. There are now a number of
slightly differing taxonomies of the moral or (sometimes) “social emo-
tions” (Damasio, 2003; Fredrickson, 2004; Haidt, 2003b). For example,
Haidt categorizes moral emotions into four major families or cate-
gories: Other-Condemning emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust);
Self-Conscious emotions (shame, embarrassment, and guilt); Other-Suf-
fering emotions (empathy, compassion/sympathy); and Other-Praising
emotions (gratitude and moral elevation).
A second question: Do moral emotions in fact motivate prosocial
action? Recent empirical research in social psychology and affective
neuroscience strongly argues for the primacy of moral emotions—
more than moral reasoning and high-level meaning—as central deter-
minants of prosocial action (see Part 1, section entitled The Moral
Emotion-Action Link). The emerging picture seems to be that these
emotions are part of a moral judgment-making and motivational appa-
ratus which facilitates prosocial action, and that emotional deficits lead
to “moral motivation deficits” in prosociality (Shulman, 2002, p. 509).
For example, there is evidence that the moral emotion of trust activates
an innate action tendency (motive) to affiliate or attach to other per-
sons (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001); gratitude to reciprocate the other’s
actions (Emmons & McCullough, 2003); empathy to engage in altru-
istic action (Batson, 1987); and guilt to repair or restore disruptions to
the relationship (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Other empirical
evidence for the role of moral emotions as motivators of prosocial

action can be found in the following reviews (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 2007;
Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Keltner, 2009).
A third question: How do moral emotions act as motivators of
prosocial action? One response to this question proposes that moral
affects serve as moral motives for prosocial action, providing a critical
link between moral judgments and moral behavior (McCullough, Kil-
patrick, Emmons, & Larsen, 2001). In the SIM version of the emotion
as moral motive hypothesis, persons are moved to moral action when
an eliciting stimulus situation activates the multiple components or
“facets” that comprise a moral emotion (e.g., facial musculature, phys-
iological changes, and feelings). Thus, activating (and intensifying) a
moral emotion can trigger a cascade of affective (feeling), motiva-
tional, cognitive, and behavioral processes. A second related response
to this question is that moral emotions function as “amplifiers” of
innate action tendencies (Tomkins, 1970, p. 101). Tomkins argued
that innate motives (“drives”) have insufficient motivational strength
and require “concurrent amplification” provided by the emotions.
A third response to this question, suggested by Fredrickson’s (2004)
“broaden-and-build” theory of positive emotions, is that emotions
activate prosocial actions by broadening the array of thought-action
tendencies (e.g., gratitude makes one more mindful of the other) and
by building personal and social skills that enhance the quality of rela-
tionships (e.g., gratitude energizes behavior to return the gift). Empiri-
cal research has confirmed both the “broaden” and more recently the
“build” hypotheses (cf. Fredrickson, 2004; Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey,
& Pek, 2008).
How are these moral emotions amplified so as to “energize” moral
action? Consistent with these assumptions, the following hypothesis
about the role of moral emotions in promoting moral sociability is
suggested.
Emotion amplification hypothesis: “Amplifying” moral emotions. Proso-

cial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that amplify
(intensify) moral emotions associated with ethical intuitions (e.g., com-
passion related to Care/harm). In this model, a second process of
spiritual transformation is “amplification” of the moral emotions that
energize prosocial action. The emotion amplification hypothesis pre-
dicts that through the systematic intensification of moral emotions,
over time, persons will more frequently and perhaps more quickly feel
the appropriate moral emotions in response to perceived Care/harm

situations, and therefore, be more likely to express caring actions. This
is so because in the connectionist understanding of emotion, various
facets of emotion (preconscious thoughts, physiology, facial expres-
sions, feelings, action tendencies, “cold” cognition) are believed to be
connected in such a way that the activation of any facet in the net-
work may activate other facets, a kind of cascade or reverberation that
ripples throughout the network once it is activated (cf. Frijda, 1986;
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Consistent with this explanation, in
the SIM, an ethical intuition is hypothesized to trigger other facets of
a moral emotion or set of moral emotions and, through this amplifica-
tion, to strengthen the probability that a person will engage in moral
behavior (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Thus, it is an ethical intuition plus
the intensifying actions of a moral emotion that is the primary motiva-
tor of moral action. Note this hypothesis also restates the position of
emotion theorist Tomkins (1970) who over 40 years ago argued that
emotions act as amplifiers of innate action tendencies. This hypothesis
is also consistent with research that demonstrates people frequently
rely on their moods and momentary flashes of feeling as guides to
moral judgments and decisions (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994)
and with cognitive neuroscience findings that moral judgment-making
and behavior is disrupted when persons have certain deficits in emo-
tional information processing (e.g., Damasio, 2003).
Representative research. One empirical strategy for exploring the
emotion amplification hypothesis has been demonstrated recently by
Fredrickson and colleagues (2008). Their study was designed to docu-
ment how compassion (and other positive emotions) might help build
resources related to love (epigraph above). It tested Fredrickson’s build
hypothesis by assessing the impact of practicing loving kindness medi-
tation (LKM) on various psychological skills. Specifically, the build
hypothesis predicts that, over time, as persons experience positive emo-
tions they will “build consequential personal resources” (p. 1045) that
enhance social functioning. They categorized these resources as: cogni-
tive (ability to mindfully attend to the present moment), psychological
(ability to maintain a sense of mastery over environmental challenges),
social (ability to give and receive emotional support), and physical
(ability to ward off the common cold). Over a period of 7 weeks, par-
ticipants engaged in daily practice of a tradition-neutral LKM which
involved: a) focused attention on the heart region and b) thoughtful
awareness of people toward whom the individual had warm feelings.
Participants were asked to direct these warm feelings first toward

themselves and then expand these warm feelings to an ever-widening
circle of others. Results showed that daily LKM practice increased the
experience of positive emotions which, in turn, produced increases in
a wide range of personal resources from each category (e.g., cognitive:
mindfulness, savoring the future; psychological: self-acceptance, pur-
pose in life; social: social support received, positive relations with
others; and physical: decreased illness symptoms). In turn, these incre-
ments in personal resources predicted increased life satisfaction and
reduced symptoms. Thus, this study provided one demonstration that
engaging in emotion amplifying practices can enhance positive moral
emotions which, in turn, may promote building skills that facilitate
moral sociability. Future research employing this paradigm could
assess other skills related to Care/harm (e.g., empathy), as well as other
practices that amplify moral emotions.
Domain 3: Moral Virtues

It is widely recognized that each of the major world religions, as well
as many secular spiritual traditions, teaches that authentic spiritual
transformation must result in prosocial virtues such as compassion,
love, forgiveness, gratitude, etc. (Vaillant, 2008). But what is a moral
virtue? In the SIM, ethical intuitions, moral emotions, and moral vir-
tues stand in critical inter-relationships with each other. Specifically, a)
while ethical intuitions tell a person whether he or she likes or dislikes
a person or situation, and therefore whether to approach or avoid, and
b) a moral emotion amplifies the intuition, thereby strengthening the
likelihood that a virtuous (or vicious) action will ensue, c) it is a moral
virtue that scripts how the person will act in a particular situation. To
be compassionate, for example, is not just to see certain features of
situations (intuition), or to feel compassion at the right time (emo-
tion), but also involves how-to respond in various situations (skills). In
the SIM, while ethical intuitions and moral emotions energize proso-
cial action, they are not themselves the skills that are motivated. Thus,
a third major claim of recent social intuitionist theory is this: While
ethical intuitions and moral emotions underwrite the virtues, they
are not virtues but are “essential tools in the construction of virtues”
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 63). Relevant to present discussion, the SIM
offers three insights about the nature and functioning of moral virtues
important for spiritual transformation theory and research.
Social intuitionist virtue theory. First, in the SIM, virtues are not
regarded simply as traits (Doris, 2002), understood as global ten-
dencies (dispositions) to act in a consistent way across varying cir-
cumstances. Rather, following connectionist models (Casebeer, 2003;
Churchland, 1998), moral virtues are modeled as quasi-procedural
(skill-like) knowledge structures that function like scripts that specify
how-to act in particular situations (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt &
Joseph, 2004; 2007). They are implicit associational networks in the
brain-mind that connect episodic knowledge (remembrance of spe-
cific events) and procedural knowledge (how-to knowledge or skills).
Stated another way, virtues are not semantic-declarative qualities that
persons “have” or know; but rather interactive skills that persons
“do” or perform (Cantor, 1990). These intuition-expressive, moral
emotion-related procedural skills make up a person’s nonconscious
repertoire of prosocial abilities. Without action skills in a particular
ethical domain, a person may comprehend the meaning of and even
value certain moral principles (to be “benevolent”), yet he or she may
possess only a minimal ability to perform the skills that express the
value (e.g., empathy).
Second, the kinds of virtues that persons are likely to develop in
moral communities are “partly constrained” and shaped by the nature
of the ethical intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 62). Virtues there-
fore are understood as biologically-prepared in the sense that human
beings come equipped with an innate preparedness to feel flashes of
approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving
other human beings (i.e., the ethical intuitions). Ethical intuitions thus
provide the foundations upon which virtues are constructed.
Third, consistent with classical Aristotelian theory, social intuition-
ist virtue theory argues that while virtues are biologically-prepared,
they are socially-constructed in moral communities, primarily through
exposure to and efforts to emulate exemplars of virtues that have
come to be valued by a particular culture and narrative. Thus, vir-
tues and virtue complexes are regarded as social constructions: “cul-
tural achievements built on and partly constrained by deeply rooted
preparedness-es to construe and respond to the social world in par-
ticular ways” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, pp. 62–63). A virtue complex
denotes a set of virtues that are highly valued by the culture at large or
sub-culture (family) and therefore are likely to vary between different
local settings and cultures. As noted, with respect to Care/harm, social
intuitionist virtue theory suggests that empathy, compassion, and love
are normatively developed in nearly all societies. But perhaps there are
other virtues instrumental to caring, especially when the meaning of
caring is broadened to encompass Erikson’s understanding of genera-
tive care.
Virtues of moral sociability: A provisional model. One of the criti-
cisms of virtue models has been that they do not always articulate a
clear conceptual rationale for inclusion of their virtues (Kohlberg’s “bag
of virtues” criticism). In light of this criticism, and the SIM assump-
tions outlined above, a critical question about the virtue domain is
this: Are there particular moral emotion-related virtues that enable
generative care? Recent research suggests indeed there may be a spe-
cific suite of emotions-virtues instrumental to caring action. Among
the candidates for inclusion in such a model are: trust (Shaver &
Mikulincer, 2001); love (Fredrickson, 2004); elevation (Haidt, 2003a);
empathy (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995); self-compassion
(Neff, 2008); compassion (Keltner, 2009); gratitude (Emmons &
McCullough, 2003); positive pride (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007);
guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007); forgiveness (Worthington,
Sharp, & Lerner, 2006); and humility (Sandage, 1999). Note that some
of these virtues retain the name of their associated moral emotions
(e.g., compassion, gratitude), while others imply the presence of a
moral emotion(s) but are not named by the emotion itself (e.g., for-
giveness and humility). Each of these emotions-virtues is sometimes
referred to as an other-regarding virtue (McCullough & Snyder, 2000)
or warmth-based virtue (Worthington & Berry, 2005). While each vir-
tue has its own literature, and has been studied in the context of its
contribution to subjective well-being (typically, happiness as the out-
come variable), far less research has explored its utility as a facilitator
of caring. But, to illustrate the value of this model to generate empiri-
cal research, a recent study demonstrated that gratitude—over and
beyond the motivational role of positive affect—significantly predicted
generative concern (a global measure of generative identity), as well
as generative caring in young adult friendships (a relationship-specific
measure of generative actions) (Oakes Mueller & Leffel, manuscript
in progress). The proposal here is that each of these virtues represents
a biologically-prepared, socially-constructed moral “good” that forms
part of the psychological foundation for an emergent master capac-
ity for generative care (not simply Care/harm as Haidt describes it).
Consistent with this suggestion, moral emotion researcher Tangney
(2002) has suggested that some such constellation of moral emotion-
related capacities may “form the core of a person’s moral motivational

system” (p. 97) and could provide a fruitful agenda for programmatic
empirical research.
How are moral virtues strengthened so as to expand one’s capacity
for moral sociability? The following hypothesis concerning the role of
moral virtues in promoting moral sociability is suggested.
Skill rehearsal hypothesis: “Strengthening” moral virtues. Prosocial

motivation and action is facilitated through practices that strengthen
(expand) intuition-related procedural skills (e.g., virtues related to
Care/harm). In the proposed model, whereas the first process involves
assisted externalization of innate ethical intuitions, and a second pro-
cess involves amplification of moral emotions connected to the intu-
itions, a third process involves “strengthening” skills (virtues) that are
expressive of an ethical domain (i.e., how-to express Care in particular
situations). In the SIM, this is accomplished primarily through inter-
nalization of moral exemplars and narratives that represent the skills.
Thus, to effect the formation and embodiment of intuition-specific
skills, the SIM argues it is helpful to espouse (deontological) rules and
principles about the behavior but only as an adjunct to more indi-
rect approaches that facilitate imitation and internalization of proce-
dural skills (i.e., virtue mimesis). In support of this hypothesis, Fiske
(1999) reviewed evidence from anthropology that suggests children
are declaratively taught surprisingly little in most cultures and that
they acquire most of their cultural knowledge and procedural expertise
by observing and imitating the practice of older children and adults.
He also suggested that researchers have generally underestimated the
importance of motor schemas and implicit knowledge in moral edu-
cation. Similarly, Westen (1986) has examined six separate meanings
of and processes related to moral internalization and suggested that
researchers more carefully model practices related to each of these
processes (also see Blasi, 2001).
Representative research. One line of line of research suggestive of the
skill rehearsal hypothesis concerns the virtue of empathy and related
skill of mindfulness (e.g., Baer, 2003) or mindsight (Siegel, 2010). In
Siegel’s cognitive neuroscience approach, empathy is conceptualized
as a capacity to create “images of other’s people’s minds” (p. 28), and
involves “focusing skills” (p. xii) that are part of mindful reflection or
mindsight. The capacity for empathy, sometimes erroneously depicted
as a moral emotion (see Haidt’s, 2003b distinction) is more accurately
described as a complex automatic-procedural skill. For example,

Feshbach (1975) defined empathy as a holistic response comprised of
three inter-related procedural skills: a) the ability to take another per-
son’s perspective (role-taking or perspective-taking); b) the ability to
discriminate or accurately read cues regarding another person’s par-
ticular emotional experience (affective cue discrimination); and c) the
ability to experience a range of emotions (because empathy involves
the sharing of another’s affective experience in one form or another).
As noted in Part 1, Siegel (2010) conceptualized mindfulness as a
“learnable skill” that allows us to see into the internal workings of our
own minds, and as “the basic skill that underlies everything we mean
when we speak of having social and emotional intelligence” (p. xii).
Consistent with this hypothesis, the empirical literature on various
mindfulness practices (see Baer, 2003 for a review), reminiscent of
some methods of contemplative prayer or meditation, demonstrates
that persons can improve their capacity for self-reflection and become
more attuned to their own emotions and therefore to the emotional
states of others (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003, study 3). Moreover, some
have argued that mindfulness represents an essential, if not the critical
procedural skill, that underlies all virtuous activity, and therefore it is
fundamental to the process of spiritual transformation (e.g., Good-
enough & Woodruff, 2001; Siegel, 2010). Thus, one important area
for continued theoretical development and empirical research is the
modeling of procedural skills that are constitutive of particular emo-
tions/virtues. For example, Emmons (2007) argued that gratitude is
more than a feeling, and it fundamentally involves the ability to per-
ceive that one has been the recipient of “undeserved merit” (p. 7).
Other emotions/virtues likewise could be modeled in terms of their
component procedural skills, and doing so may suggest virtue-specific
practices.
Domain 4: Moral Vices

In the proposed model, a fourth domain of moral personality and
spiritual transformation is moral vice. The notion that certain vice-
like dispositions of personality, or states of mind (Siegel, 2010), may
function to inhibit or obstruct one’s ability to express virtue has long
been an important assumption of religious wisdom traditions, both
religious and secular (Schimmel, 1997). For example, in the Buddhist
tradition, certain deadly emotions (Goleman, 2003) are conceived as
obstructions to the enactment of karuna (compassion). Similarly, vari-

ous Judeo-Christian traditions have attempted to identify the principia
vitia that obstruct love (e.g., DeYoung, 2009). But what is a vice? Aris-
totelian scholar Lear (2000) has cleverly coined the term “neurtue”
(neurotic virtue; p. 65) to represent the opposite of a virtue. He con-
ceptualized vice as a nonconscious tendency to perceive and respond
to persons and situations in a way that “distorts” present reality on the
basis of past experience and that obstructs the functioning of a virtue.
Likewise, Symington (1994) defined vice as “negative emotional activ-
ity” (p. 149) that inhibits the expression of love for self and neighbor.
These notions are consistent with connectionist theory (Casebeer, 2003;
Churchland, 1998; Flanagan, 2007; Westen, 2002) which re-defines
vices (and virtues) as neural systems that act as “attractor sites” which
prime persons to perceive, to feel, and to act towards self and others
in terms of past prototypes (neural patterns). Understood in this man-
ner, a moral vice can be provisionally defined as an intuition-specific,
emotion-related state of mind that obstructs the expression of a virtue.
For example, with respect to Care/harm, if empathy is conceived as
a virtue that facilitates “feeling with the other,” then a vice could be
viewed as a state of mind that inhibits or obstructs this process, either
a “deficit” (e.g., inattention to the other’s feelings) or “excess” (too
much distress at the other’s distress). Thus, the importance of the next
question: Which vices and why?
Vices of moral sociability: A provisional model. The present model
thus suggests that a useful next step in building a moral intuition
approach to spiritual transformation, one in keeping with the current
interest in the positive psychology of religion, would be the explora-
tion of emotion-related processes that oppose or inhibit specific virtues
(cf. Chang & Sanna, 2003). Specifically, future theory could attempt to
model some of the intuition-specific, emotion-related states of mind
(vices) which function to inhibit or obstruct virtues related to moral
sociability. Some of the vice-virtue antinomies which can be found
in the literature include: insecurity vs. trust (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2001); contempt vs. love (Haidt, 2003b); disgust vs. elevation (Algoe
& Haidt, 2009); personal distress vs. empathy (Eisenberg et al., 1989);
self-condemnation vs. self-compassion (Neff, 2008); entitlement vs.
gratitude (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2008);
hubris vs. positive pride (Lewis, 2000); shame vs. guilt (Tangney, Stu-
ewig, & Mashek 2007); and revenge vs. forgiveness (McCullough, 2008).
For example, Exline et al. (2008) found that narcissistic entitlement
(expectations of special treatment and preoccupation with defending

one’s rights) impedes forgiveness in ways not captured by other robust
predictors (e.g., offense severity, apology, relationships closeness, reli-
giosity, and Big Five personality factors). These authors proposed that
entitlement seems to “directly oppose” (p. 910) humility and/or a
grateful disposition.
How are moral vices weakened so as to permit greater freedom
of expression for the virtues? Consistent with the above theoretical
assumptions, the following hypothesis concerning the importance of
diminishing moral vices as a means for promoting moral sociability
is proposed.
Expressive disclosure hypothesis: “Weakening” moral vices. Prosocial

motivation and action is facilitated through practices that diminish
(weaken) the affective power of vices that inhibit expression of the vir-
tues. This model proposes that a fourth process of spiritual transfor-
mation is “weakening” intuition-specific, emotion-related vices that
act to inhibit or obstruct virtues. In connectionist terms, weakening a
vice involves diminishing the affective power of various nonconscious
associative networks that inhibit prosociality, particularly: (a) those that
trigger problematic emotional reactions (e.g., out-group prejudice),
(b) those that trigger problematic defensive strategies that obstruct
identification with others (e.g., dismissive avoidance), and (c) those
that underlie dysfunctional interpersonal patterns (e.g., entitlement).
Gabbard and Westen (2003) suggested that altering the functioning of
negative associational networks involves both strengthening connec-
tions in some networks (virtues) and weakening connections in the
other networks (vices). Concerning the weakening of vice, diminish-
ing the affective power of vice means weakening the links (“nodes”)
in the network that have been activated together, thus lowering their
accessibility to activation (i.e., the tendency to assimilate new experi-
ences and thus to influence present reality). Weakening thus refers to
the relative deactivation of problematic links in associational networks
such that a person will tend to find new, adaptive interactions and
persons more available. It is assumed that structural change of this
nature does not completely eliminate or replace old networks, which
is likely neurologically impossible (Westen & Gabbard, 2002). Rather,
it is understood that structural change of this nature is never final,
is always a matter of degree, and depends upon the regressive pull
of present circumstances, the pervasiveness of previous associative
networks, and the person’s capacity for conscious self reflection (see
Gabbard & Westen’s, 2003 discussion, pp. 827–829).
Representative research. One empirical strategy potentially useful for
exploring how to weaken moral vices is illustrated by the narrative
self-disclosure paradigm (cf. Pennebaker, 1997). This research program
has demonstrated that expressive writing about one’s negative life
experiences and emotions, such as worst life experiences, helps reduce
the impact of negative unexpressed emotions. In brief, Pennebaker
found that writing about problematic, unresolved episodes in one’s
life, especially in story form, has both long-term mental and physical
health benefits. Text analyses of the words used in these narratives
revealed that these benefits were predicted by increasing use of insight
and causal words, indicating that participants were deriving narrative
meaning from the events over the course of the study (Pennebaker,
Mayne, & Francis, 1997). This explanation suggests that self-disclosure
may facilitate the amplification (intensification) of emotions, especially
negative emotions, which then through the practice of insight-oriented
disclosure are integrated into a more coherent life story. Again, since
most of this research has relied on subjective outcome measures (i.e.,
happiness or physical well-being: Eid & Larsen, 2008), it is not clear
whether these interventions will be relevant to weakening intuition-
specific vices and to strengthening their virtue opposites. However, it
is reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that insight-oriented dis-
closure of hurt and resentment, over time, will activate the intuition
to forgive, intensify the emotion of compassion, and thus motivate
persons to exercise procedural skills to repair the relationship (e.g.,
McCullough, 2008).
System 2: The Reasoning System (Moral Direction)
Recently, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) have argued that the modal view
in moral psychology is that reasoning and intuition both matter, “but
that intuition matters more” (p. 807). They noted, however, that even
in the social intuitionist account, where intuitions have primacy, there
is room still for conscious reasoning to exert some “direction” (p. 807)
on moral action. In the proposed model, the Reasoning System is
comprised of three “cold” (less affect-laden) domains that subserve
the sociomoral function termed moral direction. These domains are
designated moral values, moral reasoning, and moral will (middle of
Figure 1). In current social cognitive neuroscience models (e.g., Wes-

ten, 2002), a moral value is believed to consist of semantic-declarative
knowledge that can be activated automatically (without awareness) but
that often requires the assistance of controlled processes to apply in
specific life situations (reasoning and will). This system is also some-
times referred to as the verbal-symbolic system (Schultheiss, 2002).
In the following discussion, less space is devoted to describing these
domains, since they have been the focus of much research in moral
psychology (e.g., Pizarro & Bloom, 2003) and in the psychology of
religion (e.g., Paloutzian & Park, 2005).
Domain 5: Moral Values

Most models of moral personality emphasize that persons acquire
propositional values about what is good and acceptable in terms of
how to treat others as well as other objects in the environment. In the
present model, following recent thinking, moral values are defined as
standards, rules, and goals (SRGs: Lewis, 2000) that guide such con-
duct. Collectively, they are hypothesized to provide direction for moral
sociability (i.e., knowledge about “what-to” do). Standards represent
abstract principles about relations with others (e.g., the Golden Rule
or categorical imperative); rules represent specific guidelines (e.g.,
moral prohibitions and prescriptions) that provide specific details; and
goals represent concrete ways that persons try to express or realize
their values (e.g., personal strivings; Emmons, 1999). Westen (1985)
referred to these constructs as a constellation of “functionally related
processes” which are involved in “imparting meaning to one’s life and
providing ideals to live by” (p. 97). In terms of the distinction between
declarative and procedural knowledge, moral values represent seman-
tic-declarative knowledge that one has acquired through socialization
(Westen, 1985), especially through the process of observing and imi-
tating significant others (Blasi, 2001). In empirical research, moral
values represent the kind of self-related (schematic) information elic-
ited in standard self-report measures that ask persons to: “Describe
yourself” or “How much are each of these statements true or not true
about you?” For example, Schwartz’s (1992) approach to values asked
the respondent to endorse the degree to which each of 10 primary
values is self-descriptive: Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction,
Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity,
and Tradition.
Corresponding to this domain, a fifth process of spiritual transfor-

mation therefore can be referred to as “clarifying” (prioritizing) moral
values. Clarifying and prioritizing moral values is what Kohlbergian-
style moral education attempts to do when students are presented with
moral dilemmas and asked to confront any contradictions between
their answers and universal principles of fairness (Kohlberg & Turiel,
1971). Much religious education is modeled (if only implicitly) after
this value-based approach to moral development. However, the pro-
posed model argues that while standards, rules, and goals set the direc-
tion for moral action, values alone cannot enable the realization of
these directives without a functional (procedural) capacity to do so
(i.e., virtues). Moreover, it predicts we should not be surprised to dis-
cover a value-behavior discrepancy (even) in religious people (cf. Sara-
glou, 2006), since the values that direct and the virtues that motivate
and enable likely represent different kinds of knowledge and therefore
may require different practices.
Domain 6: Moral Reasoning

A second domain of the Reasoning system is the ability to think and
reason about a particular course of action, particularly in light of one’s
moral values. In moral philosophy, this skill is referred to as practical
moral reasoning (e.g., Flesher & Worthen, 2007, pp. 195–199).
Practical moral reasoning thus comprises a second component in
the directional system of moral personality, providing the person with
an ability to deliberate about what-to-do in various sociomoral situa-
tions (e.g., ethical decision-making, choices about alternative courses
of action in relationships, etc.). In contrast to intuitive evaluations,
the SIM defines moral reasoning as “conscious mental activity that
consists of transforming given information about people (and situ-
ations) in order to reach a moral judgment” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).
Bargh (1994) conceptualized moral reasoning as a conscious process
that is intentional, effortful, and controllable, where the reasoner is
aware of what is going on. Kohlberg believed that moral reasoning
was the central mechanism by which moral values lead to moral action
and argued that “moral reasoning is the conscious process of using
ordinary moral language” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, p. 69).
In contrast, the SIM says that moral reasoning is rarely the direct
cause of moral judgments and moral motivation (Haidt, 2001). But
it also acknowledges three ways (“links” in the 2001 model) that “old
dogs can learn new tricks” (Haidt, 2003c, p. 197) and thus override
their immediate (perhaps erroneous or biased) intuitive responses and
build new intuitions (also see Haidt, 2007). First, we can use conscious
verbal reasoning such as considering the costs and benefits of each
course of action (“reasoned judgment” link; Haidt, 2001). Second, we
can reframe a situation and see a new angle or consequence, thereby
triggering a second flash of intuition that may compete with the first
(“private reflection” link). And, third, we can talk with people who
raise new arguments, which then trigger new flashes of intuition fol-
lowed by various kinds of reasoning (“social persuasion” link). The
SIM argues that the first two paths are rarely used and that most
change happens as a result of social interaction.
Corresponding to this domain, a sixth process of spiritual transfor-
mation can be referred to as “sharpening” moral reasoning. Following
Haidt, the present model suggests that old intuitions can be modified,
and perhaps new ones formed, by practicing each of the above three
processes. But the questions of which method is more typical and
which is more effective remain issues for future empirical research. In
the present model, as with moral values, the primary contribution of
moral reasoning is hypothesized to be directional, not motivational,
just as the steering wheel in one’s automobile can direct but it cannot
empower.
Domain 7: Moral Will

A third domain of the Reasoning system is referred as moral “will”
or “self-control” (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009, p. 72). There are
two ways to view the construct of moral will: a) the ability to inhibit
negative actions (the “stop” function), and/or b) the ability to initiate
positive actions (“go” function). Historically, Rationalist psychology
has tended to equate moral will with the “go” function, suggesting
that the primary locus of moral action lies in the ability to choose
among alternative courses of action (e.g., to help and not hurt others).
But the rationalist approach (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971) is prone to com-
mit the “rationalist fallacy” of assuming that “where there is a will,
there is necessarily a way” (i.e., that because I will it, I am capable
of doing it). Thus, in contrast to some authors who argue that self-
control constitutes “the master virtue” (Geyer & Baumeister, 2005,
p. 413) of spiritual transformation, the proposed model posits a more
limited role to willpower, emphasizing instead the priority of the Intu-
itive System (not Reasoning) to motivate and enable moral sociability.

As with moral values and moral reasoning, the primary contribution
of moral will is believed to be directional, not motivational. For exam-
ple, while a person can “will” to be empathic (e.g., to listen attentively
and compassionately), willpower cannot energize and enable skills that
the person has not sufficiently acquired.
In the proposed model, what then is the role of moral will in spiri-
tual transformation (conceptualized as intentional movement toward
moral sociability)? In recent social and moral psychology, “willpower”
is more often defined as the “ability to inhibit an impulsive response
that undoes one’s commitment” to a higher-order goal (Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999, p. 3). Similarly, “self-control” has been defined as “the
internal resources available to inhibit, override, or alter responses that
may arise as a result of physiological processes, habit, learning, or
the press of the situation” (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004, p. 86).
Defined in this manner, moral will refers primarily to one’s capacity
to inhibit or suppress negative emotions and actions, not to initiate
positive moral emotions and actions (i.e., the “stop” function). The
generic capacity for bringing one’s behavior back in line with a stan-
dard, termed self-regulatory strength (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004),
has been likened to a muscle that can be weakened through acute exer-
tion but that can also be strengthened through repeated use over time
(Geyer & Baumeister, 2005).
A recent review of the literature on religion, self-regulation, and
self-control (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009), offered three conclu-
sions relevant for present discussion (especially pp. 66–68). First, there
is some evidence that involvement in religious communities (perhaps
through their role as moralistic audience) promotes self-monitoring
and the inhibition of negative behavior (i.e., the “stop” function of
willpower). For example, studies show that some forms of meditation
affect the cortical regions that subserve self-monitoring. Second, there
is also some evidence that some religious rituals (meditation, prayer,
religious imagery, and scripture reading) can promote the “go” func-
tion of moral will. They found several experiments that support the
idea that religious cognition promotes self-monitoring, and perhaps
through the effect of self-monitoring, promotes behavioral change in
the direction of prosocial goals (e.g., honesty and generosity). Third,
these authors suggested there are few studies that demonstrate how
religious practices promote and enhance willpower. They encouraged
further research that addresses the question of which religious practices
build self-regulatory strength over time and how enhanced strength

promotes prosocial skills. Thus, in the present model, a seventh pro-
cess of spiritual transformation is designated “building” moral will-
power, and refers to an intentional process by which persons build
self-regulatory strength, both to “stop” and to “go.”
Future Research on the Reasoning System

What could the study of the Reasoning System, conceptualized in a
moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm, contribute to the
psychology of spiritual transformation? Haidt and Kesebir (2010) sug-
gested that the precise roles played by intuition and reasoning cannot
be established on the existing empirical evidence and that more work
on everyday moral judgment and motivation, compared to situations
involving moral quandaries (Pincoffs, 1986), is needed. A major assump-
tion of most religious education is that values-based moral reason-
ing results in “higher-order” deliberations (judgments) that effectively
suppress or override the influence of initial “first-order” evaluations
involving intuitions and emotions (see Appiah, 2008, pp. 116–120).
For example, it is assumed that reasoning about fairness/justice in
relation to out-groups will result in moral justifications that attenuate
one’s innate in-group bias and thereby motivate “expanding the circle”
of care to the wider world (Singer, 1981, pp. 139–140), but impor-
tant questions surrounding this assumption remain. Do higher-order
values really attenuate the prepotency of innate, intuitive evaluations?
Through what processes are initial intuitive evaluations revised? When
evaluations are revised, are first-order, affect-laden intuitions merely
suppressed only to return in the form of implicit attitudes (Wilson,
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) communicated through non-verbal chan-
nels (e.g., disgusted facial expressions and voice intonations)? How
stable are these higher-order reasons once formed? These questions
offer an exciting new frontier for future research in the psychology of
spiritual transformation.
System 3: Ideological Narrative (Existential Meaning)
In the proposed approach, following recent social intuitionist thought

(Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009), the term Ideological Narrative refers
to a third cognitive system involved in spiritual transformation. As
with the Reasoning System, Ideological Narrative is modeled as a sys-
tem that provides semantic-declarative information about the mean-

ing of moral goodness. Conceived here, Ideological Narrative goes
beyond the Reasoning System to provide more than moral direction.
It offers a response to the “higher” questions concerned with existen-
tial or cosmological meaning (e.g., why be good?). Thus, it is more
than a set of principles that prescribe what-to do in order to act mor-
ally (the province of the Reasoning System); it offers a “big” explana-
tion for why a particular set of virtues and values are important for a
good life and for the common good. Specifically, Ideological Narrative
serves three critical functions in moral personality. First, it provides
a tradition-informed rationale for prioritizing one’s virtues (Intuitive
System) and values (Reasoning system). Second, it offers a hermeneu-
tic that permits one to adjudicate conflicts between intuitions, virtues,
and values that may occur in everyday sociomoral situations (e.g., why
should Care take precedence over Fairness in this situation?). Third,
this system provides the basis for one’s moral identity, or more pre-
cisely, moral identity situated in a cosmic (existential) story.
Domain 8: Moral Identity Situated in a Cosmic (Perhaps)

Sacred Story
Three ideas are central to this domain. The first is that existential
meaning is typically transmitted to persons in the form of some meta-
narrative, some story about life, that holds together and offers justi-
fication for why some ethical intuitions, virtues, and values are to be
sought more than others. Drawing on the concept of narration in the
moral philosophy of Riceour (1992), religious ethicist Browning (2006)
referred to this dimension of moral personality as the “narrative enve-
lope” (p. 25), and argued that some kind of narrative envelope or mean-
ing framework surrounds each person’s conception of the moral good.
Conceived in this manner, ideological narrative is nearly identical to
the notion of global meaning referred to in meaning-system analyses
(e.g., Park, 2005), and it corresponds to Level 3 in McAdams’ (1995)
“life story” model of personality. Most recently, this construct has
been referred to as “ideological narrative” (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph,
2009, p. 115). As these authors used the term, a person’s ideological
narrative is like McAdams’ life story in some ways, but it is different
in other ways. Like a life story, an ideological narrative incorporates a
reconstructed past and imagined future, often telling a story of prog-
ress or decline, like the “redemption” or “contamination” narratives
common in the stories of adults in midlife (McAdams, 2009). But, as

Haidt and colleagues view them, ideological narratives
are grander than life stories, often reaching back centuries or millennia
for their “once upon a time,” casting larger groups and forces as the
actors, and justifying epic actions, reforms, and even violence as the way
to reach the denouement. (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 115)
Such a grand story need not be theistic, but in a religious context, it
would say something about the nature and action of God in relation
to the world and stipulate why one should, for example, follow some
version of the Golden Rule. Likewise, in a non-theistic framework, an
ideological narrative likewise would describe why a moral life is good
and offer its own principles and prescribed virtues for moral living.
For example, in Flanagan’s (2007) naturalistic spirituality, an ecologi-
cal narrative of human flourishing derived from Aristotle’s conception
of eudaimonia provides the explanation for what is good and why.
In brief, what is central to an ideological narrative is that it gives the
person some “final meaning to our means-end actions, our if-then
actions, our plans of life, and our images of the good life” (Browning,
2006, p. 51).
Second, an ideological narrative offers the person a tradition-
informed rationale (story) that allows one to adjudicate between con-
flicting intuitions (e.g., between caring and justice; Batson, et al., 1995).
Since this issue has not been systematically addressed by the SIM, and
it is the focus of recent criticism of intuitionism (cf. Appiah, 2008), the
following contribution to the conversation is offered. Moral founda-
tions theory makes both descriptive and normative claims about moral
systems. Descriptively, it argues persons possess (at least) five innate
intuitional foundations that are likely activated in most social environ-
ments and cultures, that these foundations can be developed, and that
they provide the basis for other moral constructs (e.g., virtues). Nor-
matively, MFT offers the minimal claim that we ought to recognize the
importance of all moral foundations and that doing so would improve
our comprehension and tolerance for differing religious and political
ideologies. A slightly stronger claim is that normal social competence
involves developing each of the foundations and integrating them.
One of the questions MFT raises is how to resolve conflicts that
arise between intuitions, virtues, and values as they arise in everyday
life. For example, what should one do when called upon to be com-
passionate (Care) and just (Fairness) to a “stranger” when at the same
time powerful Ingroup or Purity intuitions and emotions have been

activated? This is where one’s ideological narrative becomes important
in the moral life. Browning (2010) suggests that each religious system
and culture already contains implicit (or explicit) principles or meta-
phors that prioritize which intuitions should be tuned-up and prac-
ticed, relative to the others. For example, the Judeo-Christian principle
of “neighbor love” is often interpreted to highlight the priority of Care/
harm over that of Ingroup/loyalty and Purity/sanctity (e.g., Christ’s
story of the Good Samaritan). More importantly, the story offers a
justification for why caring should be favored. Neighbor love is to be
preferred because all persons are “children of God” (an inversion of
the traditional meaning of the Ingroup foundation) and therefore are
deserving of respect (Authority). Note that whether or not this theo-
logical claim is objectively true, and whether human beings are in fact
capable of “habituating” this higher-order motivation, is quite another
matter; these issues are secondary to the significance of the story. The
importance of the story may be its ability to activate and emphasize
particular ethical intuitions (e.g., Care/harm), premoral emotions (e.g.,
compassion), and moral virtues (e.g., kindness even to the “stranger”),
as well as to reinforce prohibitions against certain moral vices (e.g.,
out-group indifference or hatred).
The third idea suggested by the construct Ideological Narrative is
that when particular intuitions become central to one’s identity, it
heightens one’s sense of obligation and responsibility to live consis-
tent with these intuitions. In current moral psychology, moral identity
is hypothesized to be an important source of moral motivation (see
Hardy & Carlo, 2005 for a review). It is typically conceptualized as
the degree to which persons base their self-concepts on moral qualities
(e.g., being generous, compassionate, kind) and the degree to which
they find important moral versus non-moral values (e.g., being funny).
Further, moral identity is believed to be one of the components of
personality that enables persons to assume personal responsibility and
moral agency. For example, Blasi, (1995) suggested that a moral iden-
tity integrates various moral concerns (principles, values, goals) “with
one’s motivational and emotional systems; [and] are made the object
of agentic processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as
a basis for the construction of one’s self-concept and identity” (pp.
233–234). Other theorists also assume moral identity entails the unity
of self and moral systems (Colby & Damon, 1992), and involves “an
explicit theory of yourself as a moral agent—as one who acts on the
basis of respect and/or concern for the rights and/or welfare of others”
(Moshman, 2005, p. 121). Thus, the prevailing assumption in moral
psychology is that persons who self-consciously identify with some set
of preferred values are more likely to conform their behavior to those
moral directives; conversely, persons with a less differentiated and
conscious identity are more likely swayed by implicit, automatic, and
situation-specific influences (also see McClelland, Koestner, & Wein-
berger, 1989 on motive-behavior consistency). Accordingly, in the
proposed approach, an eighth process of spiritual transformation can
be designated “integrating” moral identity (right side of Figure 1).
Future Research on Ideological Narrative

The psychology of religion has long recognized that one of the func-
tions of a religious belief system is to provide “an ultimate vision of
what people should be striving for in their lives” (Pargament & Park,
1995, p. 15). So what could the study of ideological narrative (moral
identity) conceptualized in a moral intuitionist and social functionalist
perspective further contribute to the psychology of spiritual transfor-
mation? Recall that one of the distinguishing features of a social func-
tionalist perspective is its concern to understand how religions “bind
individuals into moral communities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140).
In future empirical work on ideological narratives, researchers may
want to consider the following inter-related questions: a) How do reli-
gious and cosmological narratives, such as the belief that all humans
are “children of God” work to tune-up intuitions and amplify emo-
tions, if at all? b) Do different religious ideological narratives interpret
the five moral foundations the same way? For example, with respect
to Care/harm, is Buddhist compassion (karuna) different from Chris-
tian love (caritas)? c) How do differing religious narratives prioritize
the “moral settings” of the five foundations? And what is the moral
principle used to prioritize one ethical foundation over another? d)
Do differences between interpretive traditions, even within the same
religious narrative, prioritize the moral settings differently and thus
build a different kind of moral community? McAdams and colleagues
(2008) study of liberal and conservative Christians is suggestive here.
Their study used qualitative methods to code the narrative statements
offered by Christians who were asked to narrate important events in
their lives (McAdams et al., 2008). In brief, they found that
conservatives told stories in which authorities enforce strict rules and

persons learn the value of self-discipline and personality, whereas liber-
als recalled autobiographical scenes in which main characters develop
empathy and learn to open themselves up to new people and foreign
perspectives. (p. 987)
Haidt and Kesebir (2010) suggested what researchers may find is that
different religious communities “are trying to build different kinds of
moral systems using different but overlapping sets of moral intuitions”
(p. 822). Research of this nature promises to help us shed further light
on how moral foundations influence the development of different
ideological narratives and, in turn, how narratives may differentially
prioritize the moral foundations (also see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek,
2009, study 4).
Catalyzing a New Science:

Contributions and Future Directions
The moral intuitionist approach to spiritual transformation described

in Beyond Meaning is more complex and comprehensive than many
models. Is the extra complexity necessary? Does the model do a better
job of describing some of the processes that mediate spiritual trans-
formation and relationships between such processes? These are ques-
tions that future research must decide. The following discussion offers
five contributions of the model and future directions for theory and
research in the psychology of spiritual transformation.
A “Multilevel Interdisciplinary” Model

First, this model offers one version of a multilevel interdisciplinary par-
adigm as encouraged by Emmons and Paloutzian (2003). It is interdis-
ciplinary in that it integrates insights from a variety of fields of study:
the meaning-system approach in the psychology of religion (e.g., Park,
2005), the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001) in moral psychol-
ogy, recent thinking about domains of moral personality (e.g., Frimer
& Walker, 2008), and the social cognitive neuroscience literature
concerned with different types and modes of cognition (e.g., Siegel,
1999). Second, it is multilevel in that it outlines a model that synthe-
sizes multiple sources of meaning (“cold” cognition) and motivation
(“hot” cognition) believed to be involved in multilevel personality
change (Gabbard & Westen, 2003). This model is also consistent with
McAdams’ (1995) multilevel framework for personality description.

Further, while it has not been a central focus of discussion in these arti-
cles, this model highlights domains of personality emphasized in vari-
ous religious and philosophical anthropologies (e.g., moral emotions,
virtues, and vices in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; Browning,
2010). Third, this model situates the study of spiritual transformation
in an emerging new paradigm, moral intuitionism, that is at the heart
of the multi-disciplinary renaissance in the “new science of morality”
(Hauser, 2006).
A Personality-based, Process Model of Spiritual Transformation

Second, this model outlines a multi-process model of intentional
spiritual transformation that is comprised of eight processes or devel-
opmental pathways (depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1). To
summarize, four of these processes focus on the (relatively more)
automatic-procedural domains that enable moral motivation and
capacity: (1) tuning-up ethical intuitions; (2) amplifying premoral emo-
tions; (3) strengthening (or expanding) moral virtues; and (4) weak-
ening moral vices. Three processes relate to the automatic-declarative
domains that provide moral direction: (5) clarifying moral values; (6)
sharpening moral reasoning; and (7) building moral willpower. One
process relates to the controlled-declarative domain that provides exis-
tential meaning, referred to as: (8) integrating moral identity. Recent
thinking concerned with intentional self-development (Brandtstadter,
1999) suggests there are different dimensions of personality develop-
ment and practices specific to each type of growth. For example, Bauer
and McAdams (2004) defined “growth goals” (p. 115) as things that
people want in their lives and how they intend to obtain them. They
identified different growth goals related to the “social-cognitive matu-
rity” and “social-emotional well-being” dimensions of personality
development. Relating this idea to the present model, the domain-spe-
cific processes identified above can be understood as complementary,
inter-related intentional growth processes that collectively facilitate
growth toward moral sociability.
Thus, a first challenge for a new generation of psychologists of reli-
gion is to specify which practices facilitate growth in each domain of
moral personality. A first step would be to identity tradition-informed
practices that relate to each of these domains; for example, center-
ing prayer in Christianity (Keating, 2000), Buddhist mindfulness
meditation (Kornfield, 1993), etc. For example, there is now an active

research program which seeks to mine the riches of various religious
traditions for such spiritual practices, referred to as “mindful aware-
ness practices” (MAPS), at the Mindful Awareness Research Center at
UCLA (Siegel, 2007, especially Chapter 12). Identifying specific MAPS
related to the conceptual hypotheses outlined above promises to be an
exciting new area for theory and research.
Spiritual Transformation as Inter-systemic Integration

A third contribution of this model is its ability to distinguish three
fundamental functions (movements) of the spiritual life that may
have been blurred in previous thinking, namely, distinctions between
moral motivation and capacity (Intuitive System), moral direction
(Reasoning System), and existential meaning (Ideological Narrative).
One benefit of making these distinctions is that it allows us to avoid
the “rationalist fallacy” of assuming higher-level meaning can enable
moral action without proper development of lower-level motivational
sources. While the proposed model continues to affirm with the mean-
ing-system approach that directional domains do indeed shape and
give meaning to actions, it asserts that these domains alone cannot
motivate and enable moral sociability.
Thus, a third implication of this model for continued theoretical
development is the notion that spiritual transformation necessarily
involves intentional integration of the three systems that collectively
promote moral sociability: motivational sources (Intuitive Domains
1–4), directional sources (Reasoning Domains 5–7), and existential
meaning (Ideological Narrative Domain 8). Following Siegel’s (2010)
“mindsight” approach to personal transformation, moral-spiritual
transformation can be conceptualized as “neural integration” of the
processes that subserve these three functions (see Siegel’s discussion
on pp. 40–44). Siegel defined neural integration as “the linkage of
anatomically or functionally differentiated neural regions into an
interconnection of widely distributed areas of the brain and body
proper” (p. 41). These interconnections represent synaptic linkages
between different functional sub-systems that create coordination
and balance between systems. A new frontier for research in the
psychology of religion could be identifying which practices facili-
tate integration of the various domains and sub-systems of moral
personality.
The Centrality of Virtues (and Vices)

Fourth, consistent with classical Aristotelian and recent social intu-
itionist virtue theory, this model proposes that intuition-expressive,
moral emotion-related virtues (and vices) represent the fundamental
motivational units of moral personality. As described, virtues and vices
are conceptualized as biologically-prepared but socially-constructed
social skills that motivate and enable (or inhibit) prosocial action.
Thus, this model posits that without proper development of virtues
related to Care/harm, persons may value moral sociability but may
not yet embody the skills necessary to enact their moral convictions.
Further, this model commends the adoption and continued develop-
ment of a connectionist account of moral virtue that conceptualizes
virtues and vices as neural networks in the brain-mind that energize
and enable prosocial action (Churchland, 1998; Flanagan, 2007). On
the connectionist view, a central task of spiritual transformation is the
automatization of intuition-related prosocial capacities (virtues) and
the relative deactivation of inhibitory vices.
Thus, a further direction for future theory and research is the task
of identifying specific practices that facilitate strengthening of virtue
networks and weakening vice networks. For example, Siegel (2007)
suggested that mindfulness practices strengthen the resonance circuits
in the brain (mirror neurons plus the insula and superior temporal
regions) responsible for the procedural skills involved in empathy.
One important assumption of a virtue-based approach is that virtues
are habituated not primarily through teaching standards and rules but
by shaping intuitions, emotions, and associated procedural skills (cf.
Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). This prioritizes the importance of real-world
practice, rather than rote learning of propositional knowledge and
deliberative reasoning (cf. MacIntyre, 1999). Thus, it emphasizes it is
primarily through repeated exposure to narratives and the intentional
imitation of virtue exemplars that persons come to internalize a cul-
ture’s favored virtues.
Processes of Mimetic Virtue

Thus, consistent with the social emphasis in the SIM, a fifth contribu-
tion of this model is the suggestion that the process of virtue mimesis
(imitation) should become a more central focus of study (e.g., Herdt,
2008). Religious ethicist Herdt’s proposal for a re-constructed theory
of spiritual transformation, one congenial both to religious and natu-
ralistic forms of theorizing, is a return to the mimetic virtue tradition
as found within some of the great religions of the world, such as the
Erasmian-humanist virtues of philosophia Christi (Herdt, 2008) and
the Confucian virtues of jen (Keltner, 2009), as well as some secular
models of spirituality; for example, philosopher Flanagan’s (2007) vir-
tues of “naturalized spirituality” as envisioned in project eudaimonia.
The central notion in a mimetic approach is that spiritual transforma-
tion must encompass virtue formation and that virtue formation takes
place primarily through the emulation and internalization of virtue
exemplars, as represented in communities and narratives of moral
goodness, whether or not such persons and narratives are explicitly
religious.
Therefore, another direction for future theory and research would
involve integration of new scientific knowledge about mimetic pro-
cesses (e.g., Garrels, 2006) into our models of spiritual transformation.
Among the phenomena relevant to such a project are four automatic
nonconscious influence processes that relate to the “social persuasion
link” in the SIM, and to the Intuitive System described above: a) the
“chameleon effect” (mimicry of the postures and facial expression of
interaction partners, related to activation of ethical intuitions; Char-
trand & Bargh, 1999); b) “emotional contagion” (“catching” the good
or bad emotional states of others, related to emotion amplification;
Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994); c) “goal contagion” (mimicry of
the intentions and goal states of others, related to strengthening vir-
tues as social skills; Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004); and d) the role
of mirror neurons in connecting us to the thoughts and intentions of
other persons (Iacoboni, 2008).
Conclusion
The primary goal of Beyond Meaning was to outline a personality-

based, process model of spiritual transformation that derives from but
also expands the Social Intuitionist Model of morality. In response to
the challenge posed by Emmons and Paloutizian (2003) to construct
a multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm that could guide future theory
and research, these articles offered three primary contributions: a) a
social functionalist definition of spiritual transformation that places
moral sociability (more than meaning) at the heart of the process;
b) a conceptual and empirically-based rationale for integrating the
moral intuitionist approach with the meaning-system approach to
form a model that better synthesizes the dimensions of meaning and
motivation; and c) a specific moral intuitionist model that re-concep-

tualizes processes of spiritual transformation in terms of the multiple
domains of moral personality.
Epistemic functionalism and its implementation in the psychology
of religion in the form of meaning-system analyses was popular during
the “first cognitive revolution” in psychology (Westen, 2002), when
theorists assumed that the mind must first create accurate maps of
the world before it can decide upon a course of action. With recent
advances in the emerging science of morality, perhaps it is time once
again to restate the challenge Haidt (2001) issued over 10 years ago:
Now we know much cognition occurs automatically and outside con-
sciousness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999); now we know the moral mind
is not simply a blank slate upon which culture writes its story, but
is “organized in advance of experience” (Marcus, 2004, p. 40) and
contains innate ethical foundations upon which virtues and values
are socially constructed; and now we know emotions are not irratio-
nal (Frank, 1984) but are indispensable for motivating moral action
(Damasio, 2003). Perhaps we should take another look at what some
of the ancient wisdom traditions have been telling us for a long time:
“The mind of the moralist is located in the heart, which is, paradoxi-
cally, a cognitive organ, and it is through the heart that we come to
know moral truth(s)” (Shweder & Haidt, 1993, p. 364). To that end,
the moral intuitionist approach proposed in this article series offers a
new direction for theory and research in the psychology of spiritual
transformation that may further our scientific knowledge of how per-
sons deepen the quality and extend the range of their care for others
and for the wider world.
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https://wisdom.biola.edu/jpt/
A GOOD MAN IS HARD TO FIND:
FORGIVENESS, TERROR MANAGEMENT, AND RELIGIOSITY
Keith M. Wilson* and Ronan Bernas
Abstract
Forgiveness has often been associated with religiosity, and a few terror manage-
ment theory studies have suggested a link between existential anxiety and religiosity.
In the present study, 123 Midwestern University undergraduates were reminded of
their mortality and then asked to give their judgment of forgiveness in 10 different
hypothetical scenarios. Individuals higher on intrinsic religiosity exhibited more for-
giveness when reminded of their mortality than when they were not. This effect of
mortality salience was not evident among those lower on intrinsic religiosity. These
results extend the generality of a previous finding regarding forgiveness and existential
anxiety and demonstrate forgiveness as a religious value for the intrinsically religious
Christian. They also replicate findings that mortality salience can, in some circum-
stances, lead to an increase in prosocial behavior and attitudes.
‘She would have been a good woman,’ The Misfit

said, ‘if it had been somebody there to shoot her
every minute of her life.’
Flannery O’Connor—A Good Man Is Hard To Find,
p. 23
Forgiveness has increasingly become an area of interest in psychol-
ogy, including the psychology of religion and applied fields such as
clinical psychology. Indeed, research has found that forgiveness may
be associated with factors related to positive physical health, partic-
ularly sympathetic arousal and cardiovascular reactivity (Witvliet &
McCullough, 2007), and mental well-being, such as depression and
life-satisfaction (Toussaint & Webb, 2005). Additionally, a relation-
ship between forgiveness and religiosity would seem to be an obvious
one, and indeed it has received interest in the empirical literature over
the past few decades.
* Author Note: Keith M. Wilson, Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois Uni-

versity; Ronan Bernas, Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Keith M. Wilson,
Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920. Email:
kwilson@eiu.edu

forgiveness, terror management and religiosity 127
Forgiveness is generally reported to be a positive value in many reli-

gions, especially Christianity (Rye, et al., 2000). Findings have been
mixed, but dispositional measures of forgiveness typically correlate
positively with religiosity, while transgression-specific measures usu-
ally fail to reveal a relationship (McCullough & Worthington, 1999).
Transgression-specific measures ask the person to recall a particular
offense. Dispositional measures of forgiveness are more varied. For
example, some have measured participants’ valuing of forgiveness (e.g.,
Poloma & Gallup, 1991; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993). More recently, two
studies have measured individuals’ likelihood of forgiving hypothetical
offenses (Berry, Worthington, Parrot, O’Connor & Wade, 2001; Cohen,
Malka, Rozin & Cherfas, 2006); these too are considered to be disposi-
tional measures. However, Brown, Barnes, & Campbell (2007) demon-
strated that dispositional measures may not be interchangeable.
Interestingly, these studies, particularly the studies of dispositional
forgiveness, have utilized general measures of religiosity, such as the
frequency of church attendance (e.g., Berry et al., 2001). Such gen-
eral measures have unknown or limited reliability; moreover, in all
likelihood it is more informative to know how people are religious
than whether they are religious (see Hill & Pargament, 2003). Few for-
giveness studies have explored the relationship between forgiveness and
different religious orientations, such as the frequently used Allport and
Ross (1967) extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: intrinsic motivation
denoting religion as something around which one’s life is organized
and extrinsic religiosity denoting religion as a means (e.g., solace
or sociability). Few studies have explored intrinsic religiosity and
forgiveness.
Tate and Miller (1971) found that in active Methodists’ rankings
of various values, those high in intrinsic religiosity ranked forgiving
higher than those high in extrinsic religiosity. Moreover, forgiveness
was ranked second for the intrinsic group and third for the extrinsic
group. Meek, Albright, and McMinn (1995) examined self-ratings of
forgiveness of one’s self and forgiveness by God following an imag-
ined transgression. Those high in intrinsic religiosity had higher esti-
mations of likelihood of forgiveness by God and higher ratings of
self-forgiveness than those high in extrinsic religiosity. However,
as with Tate and Miller (1971), none of the measures involved for-
giving others. Thus although there is reason to believe that intrinsic
religiosity is related to forgiveness, nothing is directly known regard-
128 keith m. wilson and ronan bernas
ing the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and dispositional

forgiveness.
Moreover, little is known about how motivational or contextual
variables would impact the relationship between religiosity and for-
giveness. It is conceivable that dispositional measures that measure
self-ratings of forgiveness in various scenarios may be influenced by
motivational variables. One such potential motivational variable may
be existential anxiety.
It is generally recognized that religion deals with the overall mean-
ing of our lives and existence (e.g., Burke, 1996). Moreover, it has often
been proposed that for many persons, religion serves to alleviate exis-
tential concerns (e.g., Durkheim, 2001; Batson & Stocks, 2004). Addi-
tionally, studies have found that religiosity is inversely related to fears
of personal death (e.g., Spilka, Stout, Minton, & Sizemore, 1977).
Indeed, terror management theory (TMT) suggests that religion
serves to reduce existential anxiety brought about by awareness of
one’s mortality by providing the believer with a sense of meaning and,
for many religions, hope of immortality. According to TMT, mortality
salience increases the tendency to defend, embrace, and act upon one’s
worldview; one’s worldview serves to provide a sense of meaning and
a possible means for either symbolic or literal immortality. Hundreds
of studies have documented a variety of mortality salience effects, such
as responding more positively to others who support one’s worldview
and responding more negatively to those who challenge it (see Solo-
mon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004 for a review). For example, in a
classic study, individuals who viewed prostitution as a moral offense
set a higher bond for an alleged prostitute when reminded of their
own mortality (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon,
1989). In another study, mortality salience increased the tendency
to aggress against others who had disparaged one’s political views
by determining the amount of the hot sauce they were to consume
(McGregor et al., 1998). Finally, studies such as Greenberg et al. (1994)
have demonstrated that this effect takes place when thoughts of mor-
tality are no longer conscious (i.e., several minutes after the individual
is reminded of his mortality).
TMT research has typically, but not always (see Burling, 1993),
found a link between religiosity and terror management. For exam-
ple, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that people reminded of
their mortality reported more religiosity and belief in God and divine
interventions. Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon
(1995) found that Christians reminded of their mortality were less

likely to use a crucifix as a tool in a problem solving situation. Finally,
Vess, Arndt, Cox, Routledge, and Goldenberg (2009) found that for
fundamentalists with heightened concerns about their mortality, affir-
mations of the legitimacy of divine interventions in medical treatment
functioned to solidify a sense of existential meaning.
Starting with the premise that religion serves different functions for
different persons, Jonas and Fischer (2006) hypothesized that not all
religious beliefs would serve terror management functions. For those
high in intrinsic religiosity, religion is their master motive (Allport
& Ross, 1967). Jonas and Fischer thus reasoned that intrinsic reli-
giosity is particularly likely to serve a terror management function.
For example, they reasoned that individuals who were able to affirm
their intrinsic values would experience less existential anxiety and
thus would be less inclined to engage in world view defense when
reminded of their mortality. Indeed, individuals who scored high on
intrinsic religiousness did not react with worldview defense (giving
reduced ratings to authors of essays critical of their worldview) when
reminded of their mortality if provided with an opportunity to affirm
their beliefs prior to the mortality salience induction. As predicted, the
effect was not evident for those high in extrinsic religiosity. Moreover,
Jonas and Fisher found that affirming intrinsic religiousness prior to
mortality salience reduced death thought accessibility. Overall, Jonas
and Fischer concluded that individuals intrinsically vested in their reli-
gion derive terror management benefits from religious beliefs.
Terror management theory has shown that under conditions of
mortality salience, people act upon or defend only those domains
that are important to them (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002;
Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Given the above TMT findings, the central-
ity of forgiveness in Christian religious teachings, and the correlation
between forgiveness and religiosity (including the finding that Chris-
tians report valuing forgiveness highly), it seems reasonable to posit
that highly intrinsically religious individuals would be more forgiv-
ing following mortality salience. This is not likely to be true for those
who score high in general religiosity, often measured as frequency of
church attendance, in that this measure will reflect a variety of reli-
gious motivations, such as extrinsic religiosity, and as suggested by
Jonas and Fischer (2006) extrinsic religiosity may not serve a terror
management function.
In the following study, the relationship of religiosity to forgiveness

under conditions of mortality salience was explored. It was predicted
that individuals with the highest self-reported intrinsic religiosity
would demonstrate a heightened level of forgiveness under conditions
of mortality salience compared to those with high intrinsic religiosity
who were not exposed to their own mortality. The influence, if any, of
mortality salience on the forgiveness of those with less intrinsic reli-
giosity was less certain. Although to a lesser extent than the highly
intrinsically religious, forgiveness could conceivably be increased even
amongst the less intrinsically religious. However, given their lower
religiosity it was conceivable that the value of forgiveness would be
insignificant and thus under conditions of mortality salience their
behavior would be governed predominantly by the general tendency
to punish others whose transgression was in violation of their world
view. However, mortality salience could conceivably have no impact
if the transgressions were not judged to be in violation of their world
view, such as someone spilling a drink upon them. Finally, it was
predicted that mortality salience would not impact the forgiveness of
those high in general religiosity as such measures are both weak and
do not reflect how people are religious but simply measures whether
or not they are religious.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-three introductory psychology students at a Mid-
western university participated in the study (59 men and 64 women;
mean age = 19.3). Seventy-nine percent were Caucasian (white, non-
Hispanic), and 15% and 3% were African-American or Chicano/
Latino, respectively. The remainder identified themselves as either
Asian or “other.” Eight percent of participants reported no religious
faith; 3% reported being agnostic. Eighty-three percent were Christian,
and “other” was reported by 6%. Participants were randomly assigned
to either a mortality salience or dental pain condition. All received
partial course credit and were tested in small groups.
Measures/Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were informed
that they would be participating in a series of unrelated studies. The
first study was purportedly a study of personality and involved com-
pleting a packet containing a demographic questionnaire, a simulated
personality inventory, and then either a dental pain or mortality
salience questionnaire. The latter consisted of open-ended questions
asking participants to describe what would happen to them when they
die or when they experienced dental pain. After turning in that packet,
they were given the three-questionnaire packet for the second study,
a study of attitudes which consisted first of the Positive and Negative
Affect Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a brief
word search task. The PANAS is used to ascertain if the experimental
and control conditions are equivalent in their general effect on affect.
The two typically took 5 to 6 minutes to complete (TMT research has
shown that worldview defense takes place when death related thoughts
are accessible but outside of one’s focus of attention [e.g., Greenberg,
Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994]). The final item in the
packet was a forgiveness questionnaire which consisted of 10 ques-
tions randomly selected from the Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire
(Kanz, 2000). The FAQ consists of 26 items that describe situations in
which some interpersonal transgression has occurred, and it has dem-
onstrated preliminary evidence of internal consistency and construct
validity. Each question posed a hypothetical situation and asked the
participant to rate its likelihood of forgiving the transgression on a
1 to 7 Likert scale (1 = definitely not forgive and 7 = easily forgive);
for example: “A person spent several years as a member of a group
where he/she committed many hate crimes. After several years, the
person realizes the error of his/her ways and asked forgiveness of sev-
eral people hurt during this person’s time in a group. If this person
committed a hate crime against you, how would you respond?” Other
scenarios included seeing a girlfriend/boyfriend kissing another and a
waiter spilling juice on you at an important meeting.
The next and final “study” (a study on attitudes toward the men-
tally ill) allowed for the delayed measurement of religiosity so that
its measurement would not affect the forgiveness measure nor would
the measure of religiosity be affected by the mortality salience manip-
ulation itself. It first consisted of another filler task of 20 minutes,
which was comprised of a videotaped psychiatric interview and then
a questionnaire related to attitudes towards the mentally ill. Subse-

quently, the participants related how frequently they attended church
services (the measure of general religiosity) and completed the five-
item Religious Belief Salience scale (Blaine & Crocker, 1995). Blaine
and Crocker reported that the Religious Belief Salience scale items cor-
respond closely to five of the eight items in the intrinsic subscale of the
religious orientation scale (Allport & Ross 1967). Several studies (e.g.,
Gauthier, Christopher, Walter, Mourad, & Marek, 2006) have docu-
mented the reliability and validity of this instrument which measures
the importance of one’s religious beliefs in regard to one’s everyday life
and worldview. Items are answered on a 1 to 7 Likert-type scale and
consisted of questions such as “My religious beliefs are what lie behind
my whole approach to life.” Finally, participants were debriefed.
Results
Preliminary analyses showed that the forgiveness measure (the

amended Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire) was internally consis-
tent (alpha = .65) and correlated positively with the intrinsic religios-
ity measure (r = .15, p < .05 [one-tailed]) and the general religiosity
measure (r = .23, p < .01 [one-tailed]). The two correlations were not
significantly different (z = –.64, p > .05). The two religiosity measures
were also correlated (r = .53, p < .001). T-tests were used to see if
the mortality salience condition impacted the two PANAS scores and
the two measures of religiosity. There was no difference in PANAS
scores between the experimental and control group (positive affect
= 31.3 & 31.2, respectively; t[121] = .02, p > .025; negative affect =
17.6 and 18.6, respectively; t[121] = –1.04, p > .025). Intrinsic religiosity
scores between the mortality salience and dental pain groups revealed
no significant differences (19.7 and 21.7, respectively; t[121] = –1.25,
p > .025) nor did the general religiosity measure of services attended
per year (11.8 and 20.7, respectively; t[121] = –2.14, p > .025). Finally,
preliminary analyses reported no significant gender main effect or inter-
actions, thus the following analyses were collapsed across gender.
A median split formed the low and high intrinsic religiosity groups
(high religion > 22 and low religion ≤ 22). A mortality salience by
intrinsic religiosity (2 X 2) ANOVA revealed no main effect for mor-
tality salience (F[1,119] = 0.12, p > .05) or intrinsic religiosity (F[1,119]
= 0.84, p > .05) and a significant interaction for mortality salience by
40 39.50
39
38.00
38
37
36.10
36 35.40
Forgiveness
Mortality
35 Salience
34 Dental Pain
(Control)
33
32
31
30
Higher Intrinsic Lower Intrinsic
Religiosity Religiosity
Figure 1. Interaction effect of mortality salience and intrinsic religiosity on
forgiveness.
religiosity (F[1,119] = 6.08, p < .05). This interaction can be explored

further by examining the differential impact of mortality salience for
the higher and lower intrinsic religiosity groups (i.e., the simple effect
of mortality salience depending on intrinsic religiosity). Comparisons
supported the (one-tailed) hypothesis that highly religious individu-
als would be more forgiving under conditions of mortality salience
(M = 39.50, SD = 8.10) compared to the highly religious control group
(M = 36.10, SD = 5.90), (t[116] = 1.96, p < .05). There was no statis-
tically significant difference (two-tailed) between low religiosity par-
ticipants under mortality salience conditions (M = 35.40, SD = 6.50)
compared to the low religiosity/dental pain group (M = 38.00, SD
= 6.10), (t[116] = -1.09, p > .05). See Figure 1.
The same interaction can also be depicted by examining how higher
and lower intrinsic religiosity individuals differed under the two con-
ditions of mortality salience (i.e., the simple effect of intrinsic religios-
ity depending on the mortality salience condition). When made aware
of their mortality, the high intrinsically religious group was more for-
giving (M = 39.50, SD = 8.10) than the low intrinsically religious group
(M = 35.40, SD = 6.50), (t[116] = -2.41, p < .05, one-tailed). No sta-

tistical difference (one-tailed) existed between these high intrinsically
(M = 36.10, SD = 5.90) and low intrinsically religious groups (M = 38.00,
SD = 6.10) under the dental pain condition, t(116) = -1.52, p > .05.
A median split was used to create the low and high general reli-
giosity groups (high > 4 and low ≤ 4). A mortality salience by gen-
eral religiosity (2 x 2) ANOVA revealed no main effects for mortality
salience (F[1,119] = 0.06, p > .05) or general religiosity (F[1,119] = 0.40,
p > .05) and no significant interaction (F[1,119] = 0.86, p > .05).
Discussion
Previous investigations have linked religiosity and forgiveness by cor-

relating valuing forgiveness with religiosity and correlating religiosity
to self-reported tendency to forgive others. The present study found
intrinsic religiosity to be correlated with forgiveness. The present inves-
tigation also found that mortality salience increased the self-reported
tendency toward forgiveness of only the more intrinsically religious
individuals. Thus, this study extended previous findings linking reli-
giosity and forgiveness and suggested a motivational underpinning of
this relationship.
Previous research on the relationship between forgiveness and reli-
giosity has used a variety of measures. These studies have typically
used a general measure of religiosity such as frequency of church
attendance. The present findings extended and replicated previous
findings to the construct of intrinsic religiosity.
It might be noted that the correlation between intrinsic religios-
ity and dispositional forgiveness was relatively small compared to
the correlation with general religiosity and then one might conclude
that the correlation between intrinsic religiosity and forgiveness was
less robust. However, the correlation between forgiveness and intrin-
sic religiosity was not statistically less than the correlation between
forgiveness and general religiosity. Moreover, the typical correlation
between general religiosity and forgiveness ranges from .2 to .3 (e.g.,
Cohen, et al., 2005 and Hammond, Banks, & Mattis, 2006, respec-
tively) but has been reported as low as .11 (Exline, Baumeister, Zell,
Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008). However, the present investigation did yield a
significant difference between general religiosity and intrinsic religios-
ity as they relate to forgiveness.
This study demonstrated how existential anxiety could moderate the

relationship between religiosity and forgiveness in that existential anx-
iety increased the forgiveness of only the most intrinsically religious
individuals. Terror management theory has shown that under con-
ditions of mortality salience, people act upon or defend only those
domains that are important to them (e.g., Arndt, et al., 2002; Jonas &
Greenberg, 2004), and in this study, the most intrinsically religious
persons became more forgiving under conditions of elevated mortal-
ity salience. In that the intrinsically religious became more forgiving
under conditions of existential anxiety, and persons act upon domains
that are important to them under such conditions, this suggested the
particularly religious nature of forgiveness for some individuals. For
intrinsically religious individuals, it appeared that forgiving may at
times be a religious act.
Pargament & Rye (1998) stated that religion may influence forgive-
ness by providing religious role models and rationale, as well as reli-
gious coping strategies. Under conditions of existential anxiety, taking
actions that enable one to identify oneself with the sacred, such as God-
like attributes like forgiveness, may increase self-esteem and decrease
mortal anxiety. Moreover, Christianity indicates a blessed immortality
for those who follow religious prescriptions, a powerful motivation for
the religious when reminded of one’s corporeal impermanence.
On the other hand, given Norenzayan & Hansen’s (2006) find-
ing that mortality salience increased religiosity, it is possible that the
impact on forgiveness was due to an increased level of religiosity of the
participants. However, if that is the case, then arguably the less reli-
gious participants should also have increased their forgiveness as their
religiosity increased under conditions of mortality salience (almost all
participants reported some level of religiosity). This was not the case.
The lack of a significant interaction between mortality salience and
general religiosity suggests several points. First, it seems that not all
highly religious individuals necessarily become more forgiving under
conditions of mortality salience. People attend religious services
for many reasons (e.g., comfort or sharing a covenant with others).
Although these individuals may be more forgiving than those who are
less generally religious, they may hold these beliefs differently so that
they do not provide solace when confronted with their own mortal-
ity. For example, teachings on forgiveness may not be as seminal for
them as others and thus not as intensely tied to their self-esteem and
sense of worth.
This investigation demonstrated that under at least some conditions,

intrinsically religious individuals are more likely to self-report a ten-
dency to forgive. Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualized religiosity as
being comprised of extrinsic and intrinsic orientation. Would extrinsi-
cally religious individuals increase their forgiveness while experienc-
ing existential anxiety? Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that extrinsic
religiosity did not mitigate worldview defense nor did it reduce acces-
sibility of death related thoughts. The present investigation did not
find more generally religious individuals to be more forgiving under
conditions of mortality salience, although the highly intrinsically reli-
gious were. These findings suggest that the present relationship may
not hold for those whose religiosity is primarily extrinsic. However,
some individuals high in extrinsic religiosity are also high in intrinsic
religiosity so this bears empirical investigation. Further studies on for-
giveness and existential anxiety could explore this and other aspects of
religiosity, such as questing (Batson, 1976) and religious fundamental-
ism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).
Unfortunately, although most would report that they know forgive-
ness when they see it, there is no generally accepted definition of the
construct (Worthington, 2005). Additionally, this investigation uti-
lized a self-report measure of forgiveness in hypothetical situations;
thus the generality of these findings to other measures of forgiveness,
including other measures of dispositional forgiveness, such as valuing,
is unknown. Given the still unresolved nature of forgiveness, addi-
tional studies looking at constructs such as decisional or emotional
forgiveness (Worthington, Witvleit, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007) would be
worthy. Finally, examining the influence of mortality salience on the
relationship between religiosity and transgression-specific forgiveness
would be useful since studies typically fail to reveal a link between
religiosity and transgression-specific measures. Transgression-specific
measures of forgiveness may yield a link between religiosity and for-
giveness under powerfully motivating conditions such as mortality
salience.
The present investigation extends the findings of a recent, and only,
TMT study of forgiveness. Although TMT studies typically find that
mortality salience increases negative or destructive behaviors, Schimel,
Wohl, and Williams (2006) demonstrated that mortality salience can
increase forgiveness. They found that young adult Canadians who were
reminded of their mortality were more likely to forgive a person who
committed an act of inter-group aggression (a foul during a hockey
game) only if he was a member of the in-group (the regional hockey

team). However, the second experiment revealed that hockey fans with
high trait empathy were more likely to forgive following mortality
salience regardless of the transgressor’s group (team) membership.
The present investigation extends Schimel et al.’s (2006) findings by
showing the moderating influence of religiosity on the relationship
between terror management and forgiveness of others. Moreover, the
present findings extend Schimel et al.’s (2006) dependent variable from
forgiveness of a sports infraction against another to forgiveness of acts
committed against oneself.
Many people debate to what extent one can attribute Western cul-
tural values or practices, such as our legal code, to Western religions.
This study and others (e.g., Gorsuch & Hao, 1993; Berry, et al., 2001)
suggest that for many people in the U.S., forgiveness is, at least in part,
a religious practice and a possibly deeply held one. The present meth-
odology may offer a means of investigating the religious underpin-
nings and motivational influences of other common prosocial values
and practices such as charity and compassion.
On a final note several public intellectuals have recently criti-
cized the role of religion in public life. For example, Hitchens (2007)
argued that religion incites people to violence. The present study sug-
gests that under trying circumstances (i.e., confrontation with one’s
own mortality) a religious worldview may foster the nobler instincts
of our species. There may indeed be some grandeur in this view
of life.
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THREE APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF POSTFORMAL
THOUGHT: WISDOM, CONCEPTS OF GOD,
AND SUCCESS IN COLLEGE
Liza Benovenli,* Elizabeth Fuller, Jan Sinnott, and Sarah Waterman
Abstract
The ability to use complex cognition may be relevant in many aspects of life. These
present studies are a follow up to a recent study by Griffin et al. (2009) of the relation-
ship between postformal thought and complex concepts of god. These studies are also a
further exploration of postformal thought, wisdom, and college performance. The first
study reported here tested the relationship between postformal thought, as measured
by the Postformal Thought Scale (Sinnott, 1998), concepts of god, as measured by the
Concepts of God Scale (Griffin et al., 2009), and academic achievement, measured
by grade point average (GPA). The second study examined wisdom, as measured by
Ardelt’s scale (Ardelt, 2003), complexity of god concept, as measured by the Concepts
of God Scale, and postformal thought as measured by the Postformal Thought Scale.
It was predicted that participants with high levels of postformal thought would have
more complex concepts of god, higher GPAs, and greater levels of wisdom. In Study
1, results indicated a significant positive relationship between postformal thought
and the complexity of concepts of god. In Study 2, we found significant relation-
ships between some sub-dimensions of wisdom and postformal thought and between
concepts of god and postformal thought but no relation between postformal thought
and GPA. Results overall suggested that complex cognition may be to some degree
an influential component of several dimensions of thought and behavior. Image of
God is discussed.
The theory of complex postformal thought has been described and

validated in a considerable body of work and has been applied to
behavior such as couple, friend and family intimate relationships,
work roles, clinical interventions, teaching and learning, aging, and
many others. These ideas are summarized in a general way in Sinnott’s
1998 book and more specifically, for purposes of this paper, in work
such as Sinnott, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004ab, 2005, and Sinnott
* Author Note: Liza Benovenli, Psychology Department, Towson University; Eliza-

beth Fuller, Psychology Department, Towson University; Jan Sinnott, Psychology
Department, Towson University; Sarah Waterman, Psychology Department, Towson
University. Authors are listed alphabetically.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jan Sinnott, Psy-
chology Department, Towson University, 8000 York Road, Towson, MD 21252.
Email: jsinnott@towson.edu

142 benovenli, fuller, sinnott, and waterman
and Berlanstein, 2006. The idea is that complex cognitive operations

may be present as a cognitive basis for complex behaviors of all sorts,
although other factors such as emotions, personality, developmental
tasks, and social relations certainly play a crucial part. The general
question addressed in this paper is in what way complex cognition,
specifically postformal thought, may be related to other aspects of
adult behavior. The more specific questions revolve around consid-
erations of complex postformal thought as a positive concomitant of
wisdom, concepts of god, and success in college classes.
We have seen suggestions that postformal theory can be applied
to spirituality. Piaget’s theory describes how an individual moves
through four stages of cognitive development from infancy to ado-
lescence. The stages are as follows: sensorimotor, preoperational, con-
crete operational, and formal operational. Cartwright (2001) relates
this theory to spirituality and spiritual development. She outlines how
an individual’s spirituality is determined by his or her current level of
cognitive development. She also incorporates the theory of postformal
cognitive development into her discussion.
Stages of Piaget’s original theory can be applied to the development
of spiritual understanding. An external power is abstract and not
observable through sensory or perceptual means. Because individuals
in the sensorimotor stage understand their world primarily through
their senses, such abstract thoughts are not recognizable at this stage.
Therefore, a concept of spirituality cannot be expressed or incorpo-
rated into their reality. The preoperational stage is characterized by
“reasoning that is not yet governed by conventional logical principles”
(Cartwright, 2001, p. 217). Individuals, usually children, at this level
believe that events are caused by mythical powers and miracles. They
believe that an unexplainable Higher Power exists, but they are unable
to ask how or why. Once they are in the concrete operational stage,
individuals are able to address the how and why questions of spiritual-
ity. They look for conventional logical explanations when attempting to
understand their relationship with a Higher Power. Individuals in the
formal operational stage focus on the abstract principles which drive
their behavior in their relationship with a Higher Power. For example,
instead of focusing on the specific act of helping the needy, they focus
on the abstract ideas of benevolence and love for all humanity.
Originally conceived by Sinnott (1998), postformal thought is char-
acterized by the ability to consider and coordinate multiple logical sys-
tems of thought rather than simply considering a single logical system
postformal thought and wisdom 143
that characterizes formal operational thought (for example, see Gal-

upo, Cartwright, & Savage, 2009). Individuals capable of the cognitive
operations of postformal thought would be able to consider multiple
concepts of spirituality and decide which view is appropriate for them.
Logically, this would likely be shown in the complexity of their con-
cepts of god.
A recent study conducted by Griffin et al. (2009) examined how
postformal thought relates to various non-cognitive factors: personal-
ity, concepts of god, political opinions and social attitudes. Participants
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a list of adjectives
describing concepts of god, using Gough and Heilbrun’s (1965) adjec-
tive checklist methodology as a model (Griffin et al., 2009). No signifi-
cant correlation was found between postformal thought and concepts
of god. Because the closed-ended scale questions limited participants’
responses, investigators wondered whether that type of scale was an
accurate measure of respondents’ concepts of god. The following two
studies address this limitation by allowing participants to elaborate on
their concepts in response to an open ended question. In both studies,
we predicted that individuals with higher levels of postformal thought
would demonstrate more complex concepts of god.
Postformal thought has appeared to facilitate complex learning.
Therefore Study 1 also was designed to determine whether there is
a positive correlation between an individual’s level of postformal
thought and his or her level of academic achievement as measured
by GPA. Previous studies have linked academic achievement to many
factors, especially those related to cognition. For example, Sadowski
and Sami (1996) found that students who were high in need for cog-
nition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) were more likely to be academic
achievers than those low in need for cognition. A more recent study
on academic underachievement found that underachievers tended to
have low levels of need for cognition, achievement motivation, and
conscientiousness (Preckel, Holling & Vock, 2006). Pru, Abraham,
and Bond (2003) found that a student’s intention (or motivation) to
succeed is the strongest direct predictor of performance on university
level exams. The same study showed that openness to experience and
conscientiousness were direct predictors of intention and therefore
indirect predictors of academic achievement. High openness to expe-
rience and high conscientiousness are also positively correlated with
high levels of postformal thought (Griffin et al., 2009). It makes sense
then, that as these two factors are linked to both postformal thought
and academic achievement, students who are postformal thinkers

might also be more likely to be academic achievers.
Wisdom has always been considered to reflect a complex view of
the world. Therefore Study 2 addressed the potential three-way rela-
tionship between postformal thought, wisdom, and concepts of god.
Wisdom can be viewed in a variety of ways and often has multiple
definitions. Wisdom is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as
the “accumulated philosophic or scientific learning; ability to discern
inner qualities and relationships; good sense” (Merriam-Webster,
2010). According to Csikszentmihalyi and Rathunde, wisdom has
three basic dimensions of meaning: a cognitive process or a particu-
lar way of obtaining and processing information; a virtue or socially
valued pattern of behavior; and a good personally desirable state or
condition (Sternberg, 2003).
Ardelt created a scale based on qualitative and quantitative inter-
views of an older population of adults (aged 52 and older) to assess
wisdom. Using Ardelt’s scale, wisdom can be divided into three sub-
categories: cognitive, affective, and reflective. The cognitive measure
can be interpreted as one’s ability to fully grasp the meaning of life
which includes finding and comprehending the true significance of
the complexities in life (Ardelt, 2003). Ardelt describes the affective
measure as including positive emotions and behaviors towards others,
such as sympathy and compassion. The reflective dimension is con-
sidered a prerequisite for the development of the cognitive dimen-
sion of wisdom (Ardelt, 2003). Reflective thinking involves developing
self-awareness and self-insight by approaching situations with an open
mind and looking at them through different perspectives. Ardelt found
that the three dimensions of wisdom were correlated with each other
which indicates that the Wisdom Scale is a valid scale, coherent and
descriptive of the concept of wisdom.
We chose in the present study to use a younger adult population
and theory based on the idea of the Crystallized model of wisdom dis-
cussed by Jordan (Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). The Crystallized model
appears to describe the most accurate depiction of wisdom across the
lifespan in terms of empirical research. This model predicts that older
adults and younger adults can possess wisdom and that wisdom does
not systematically increase over the lifespan (Sternberg & Jordan,
2005). Simply stated, the population of the present study should have
an equally likely chance of obtaining the same level of wisdom as an
older population using Ardelt’s scale.
Some theorists have viewed wisdom as extending Piagetian con-

cepts and have used it interchangeably with postformal-operational
thinking. Thus, these researchers have proposed that wisdom is in
fact a level above Piaget’s formal operational stage. The present study
seeks to examine relations between the two (wisdom and postformal
thought) and, in addition, represent them as separate entities if war-
ranted. We predicted that the two would be related.
Study 1
Study 1 examined the relationship between postformal thought, con-

cepts of god, and academic achievement. We predicted that individu-
als with high levels of postformal thought would have more complex
concepts of god and higher GPAs.
Method
Participants. The study sample consisted of 97 participants: 79 females
and 18 males, with an average age of 20, dispersed between the 4 aca-
demic years as follows: 19 freshmen, 30 sophomores, 24 juniors, and
24 seniors. All participants were Towson University undergraduate
students with an age range of 18–28. Psychology was the predomi-
nant major among the participants; however, there was an array of
majors.
Materials. The resources included surveymonkey.com, a website that
allows users to post and participate in various surveys, and Towson
University’s Psychology Research Pool, a resource joining Psychology
Department research studies and Psychology Department study par-
ticipants. The scales used were the Postformal Thought Scale and the
Concepts of God Scale (derived from content analysis of responses
obtained by Griffin et al., 2009). The Concepts of God Scale was based
on reliable content analysis of open-ended responses to the question
“If you have a concept of ‘god’ what is it?” The Postformal Scale (Sin-
nott, 1998) was composed of degree of respondents’ endorsement of
10 statements reflecting 10 cognitive operations that together indicate
postformal thought. A short survey was given in addition. This sur-
vey consisted of nine questions regarding each participant’s age, gen-
der, major, current academic year, current GPA on a 4.0 scale, total
number of credit hours, and grades in the following classes: English,
math, science, computer science, communications, social sciences, and
art (visual and performing). The study was approved by the Towson
University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Research
Participants.
Procedure. The participants were recruited using both surverymonkey
.com and Towson University’s Psychology Research Pool. Before
being given the survey, participants viewed a short information let-
ter describing the details of the study. Proceeding on to the survey
signified that they understood their role and rights as participants and
gave consent to participate in the study. The first section of the survey
asked the participants to indicate their gender, age, current academic
year, total number of credit hours, major, and current GPA. They were
then asked to indicate what their typical grade (on letter scale of A–F,
with “not applicable” as an option) would be in the following subject
areas: math, computer science, science, social sciences, English, commu-
nications and visual and performing arts. An open-ended question that
asked the participants to describe their concept of god followed, and the
Postformal Thought Scale completed the survey. A message appeared
after the survey thanking the participants for their involvement.
Results
Pearson Product Moment Correlations with 95 degrees of freedom
were calculated to determine the relationship between scores on the
Postformal Thought Scale (and its component items), scores on the
Concepts of God Scale, and cumulative GPAs. We found a significant
positive correlation between total score on the Concepts of God Scale
and total score on the Postformal Thought Scale (r [95] = .231, p = .018
one-tailed). We also found significant positive correlations between
total score on the Concepts of God Scale and Postformal Scale question
4 (“There are many right ways to define a problem. I must make a final
decision on how I see the problem.”) (r [95] = .217, p = .025 one-tailed)
and Postformal scale question 8 (ability to create multiple solutions)
(r [95] = .240, p = .025 one-tailed). Pearson Product Moment Correla-
tion analyses were run again controlling for word count in respondents’
answers to the open-ended god question, and that analysis yielded a
significant relationship between the total score on the Concepts of God
Scale and Postformal Thought Scale question 8 (ability to create multiple
solutions) only (r [95] = .225, p = .021 one-tailed).
The decision was made to exclude the freshmen participants from
the analysis of GPA and postformal thought because, since the study
was conducted before the conclusion of the fall semester, no college
GPA could be obtained for freshmen. After excluding the freshmen,

the study consisted of 78 participants, 64 females and 14 males. The
age range was 18 to 28 with an average age of 20.5, and the aver-
age GPA was 3.13. When analyzing the data using Pearson Product
Moment Correlations, we found no significant correlation between
postformal thought and GPA.
Discussion
The results indicated that, as predicted, younger people with higher
levels of postformal thought have more complex concepts of god. This
makes sense because people with more complex concepts of god must
be capable of abstract thinking and understanding multiple viewpoints,
both characteristics of postformal thinkers. It is important to mention
that Postformal Scale question number 8, but only question number
8, had a significant relationship with total god score, when control-
ling for word count. Postformal question 8 stated, “I often see that a
given problem has several good solutions.” This relationship could be
attributed to the idea that individuals with higher levels of postformal
thought, specifically dealing with the ability to approach a problem
from different angles, have the capacity to think abstractly. This in
turn contributes to the complexity of their god concept and therefore
their total god score.
No relationship between postformal thought and GPA was found
when freshmen were excluded. This indicated that people with higher
levels of postformal thought do not necessarily have higher GPAs or
obtain better grades in their college courses. This was the most sur-
prising result. We had strongly believed that individuals with higher
levels of postformal thought would be more successful in an academic
environment because of the more sophisticated problem solving abili-
ties and conceptual thought processes that are characteristics of a
postformal thinker, supposedly essential in academic environments.
Possible reasons for the absence of this relationship could be the small
sample size used, the age of the participants tested, or other extraneous
variables. The age of the participants is important because postformal
thought processes might not develop until later in life. The human
brain is not fully developed until approximately the age of 24, and
the average age of the participants was only 21. It is noteworthy to
mention that an individual’s level of motivation could also be a con-
tributing factor to one’s academic success. Another possible and dis-
appointing explanation could be that the college courses being taken
did not require more complex thought for success. Since the Postformal
Thought Scale was validated in earlier studies, it does not seem likely
that the Scale is invalid overall. The most parsimonious explanation may
be that postformal thinking is not useful for college level class work.
There are many possible modifications to this research that could
enhance future studies and could produce more significant results.
One possibility is to use a larger sample size as well as an older pop-
ulation. An older population may be critical because it would allow
testing of individuals with more developed brains and more extensive
learning experience. One possible sample might be graduate students
because they would satisfy the need for an older population as well as
have a greater range of ages.
Another modification could be to alter the concepts of god question
to include a word count minimum and maximum. Word count was
problematic and finding a way to control word count would help to
eliminate an extraneous variable.
A future study might examine how postformal thought is related to
IQ and wisdom, knowledge of which would be beneficial when study-
ing a more mature population. It could be hypothesized that individu-
als with higher IQ and wisdom scores will also have higher levels of
postformal thought. A comparison of wisdom scores and postformal
thought in the present younger sample is presented below in Study 2.
An examination of IQ and postformal thought will be addressed in
future studies.
Study 2
The second study further elaborates on Study 1 and on earlier research

by examining the variables of postformal thought, wisdom, and con-
cept of god. In Study 1, a significant correlation was found between
postformal thought and complexity of concept of god. It was hypoth-
esized that the same significant relationship would be replicated in
Study 2. It was also hypothesized that postformal thought would yield
a significant positive correlation with wisdom.
Method
Participants. The present study had 61 participants: 46 females, 14
males, and 3 participants who did not specify gender. Forty-five par-
ticipants completed the survey in its entirety. All of the participants
were between the ages of 20 and 60+ and were enrolled in a graduate
program at Towson University. The predominant Graduate Programs
were Master of Education in Reading and Master of Occupational
Therapy.
Materials. The resources used in this study included Towson Uni-
versity’s Psychology Research Pool and a survey posted on survey-
monkey.com. The survey was comprised of Ardelt’s Wisdom Scale as
well as two used in Study 1, the Postformal Thought Scale and a part of
the Concepts of God Scale. The survey first asked eight questions, this
time questions regarding each participant’s age, gender, number of
graduate credits, and graduate program. Then the Wisdom Scale and
Postformal Thought Scale were given. Last was a short, open-ended-
answer question that asked the participants to describe their concept
of god. The study was approved by the Towson University Institu-
tional Review Board for the Protection of Research Participants.
Procedure. Before the participants were able to see the survey, they
viewed a short information letter describing the details of the study.
Proceeding on to the survey itself signified that they understood their
role and rights as participants and gave consent to participate in the
study. The first section of the survey asked the participants to indicate
their age, gender, number of graduate credits and graduate program.
They were then asked to describe their concept of god, if they had one.
The Wisdom Scale was the next part of the survey, and it comprised
two sections; section 1 had 15 questions, and section 2 had 24. The 10
question Postformal Thought Scale completed the survey. A message
appeared after the conclusion of the survey thanking the participants
for their involvement.
Results
Pearson Product Moment Correlations with 59 degrees of freedom
were calculated to determine the relationship between scores on the
Postformal Thought Scale, scores on the Concepts of God Scale, and
scores on the Wisdom Scale.
The results were complex. Regarding the Concept of God Scale, in
contrast to Study 1 we found no significant correlation between total
scores on the Concepts of God Scale and total scores on the Postformal
Thought Scale. However, we did find a significant positive correlation
between total score on the Wisdom Scale and Concepts of God Scale
question 2 (r [59] = .470, p = .002 one-tailed.) We also found a strong
significant positive correlation between total score on the Concepts

of God Scale and the affective sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale (r [59]
= .390, p = .005 one-tailed). The affective sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale
was correlated with total Concept of God Scale score (r [59] = .402,
p = .008 one-tailed), and the Concept of God Scale score for question
2 (r [59] = .395, p = .009 one-tailed). Concept of God Scale question
2 was correlated with the cognitive sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale (r [59]
= .373, p = .014 one-tailed) and the cognitive sub-scale of the Wisdom
Scale was correlated with degree of agreement with Postformal Scale
question 4 (“There are many right ways to define a problem. I must
make a final decision on how I see the problem.”) (r [59] = .316, p = .020
one-tailed.) We found no significant correlation between total score on
the Wisdom scale and total score on the Postformal Thought Scale.
Discussion
A primary goal for Study 2 was to control some of the previously men-
tioned extraneous variables from Study 1. We were not able to control
the first extraneous variable of sample size; however, both the age of
the participants and word count were addressed. By using participants
in graduate school, we were able to collect potentially more meaningful
data from an older population with an age range of 20 to 60+. Word
count was controlled by giving the participants a minimum and maxi-
mum of 30 to 75 words for their response to the open-ended concept
of god question. It is important to note that some of the participants
did not follow these guidelines and either fell short of or exceeded the
minimum or maximum word count requirements.
Our first hypothesis, stating that in this sample an individual’s level
of wisdom and postformal thought would be positively correlated, was
not supported. However, after performing a finer-grained analysis by
breaking down each variable into smaller components (individual
Postformal Thought Scale questions and sub-scale dimensions of the
Wisdom Scale), we found some significant relationships. Our second
hypothesis stating that an individual’s level of wisdom and complexity
of concept of god would be positively correlated was also supported
after dividing each variable into smaller items or sub-scales. There was
a significant relationship between god score question 2 and the total
wisdom score, as well as between the affective and cognitive sub-scale
dimensions of wisdom. The cognitive and affective dimensions of wis-
dom are associated with increased intellectual maturity and therefore
related to a larger wealth of knowledge. This wealth of knowledge

contributes to an individual’s ability to specify abstract thoughts and
further elaborate upon ideas. A higher score on the cognitive dimen-
sion of wisdom can also be interpreted as accepting many possible
outcomes for a given problem, hence the correlation with Postformal
Scale question 4 (“There are many ‘right’ ways to define a problem;
I must make a final decision on how I see the problem.”). The affec-
tive dimension of wisdom also had a strong correlation with total
god score. Individuals who scored high on the affective dimension of
wisdom seemed to have a more benevolent and intangible concept of
god. Our third hypothesis, stating an individual’s level of postformal
thought and his or her complexity of concept of god would be posi-
tively correlated was not supported.
It is a strong possibility that our results again were skewed by the
insufficient sample size and that a larger sample is needed. It is impor-
tant to note in the previous study, postformal thought and complexity
of concept of god were significantly related; however, in the present
study, no significant correlation was found. A possible explanation for
this discrepancy could be the subjectivity (in spite of acceptable reli-
ability) of the scale used to assess each participant’s answers to the
concept of god question. Another problem that arose while analyzing
the data was that 10 participants (nearly one fourth of the total par-
ticipants who completed the survey) selected more than one answer
on the Wisdom Scale for one or more questions. When evaluating
the data, it was decided by the researchers to average the participant’s
choices in these instances; however, this could create inconsistency in
the data analysis. Averaging these responses potentially skewed our
analysis and allowed for the creation of false responses. In future stud-
ies, it should be stressed to participants that only one choice should be
given per question.
General Discussion and Conclusions
In general, we found mixed results when measuring the relations among

each pair of the three variables of interest to us: postformal thought,
concepts of god, and wisdom. Examining sub-scale relations both clari-
fied and confused the interpretation of our results. Our hypotheses were
only partially supported. In each of the two studies, it was possible to
suggest some future changes that might clarify these mixed results.
Right now we are left with the conclusion that the pair relations
among the three variables of interest highlight certain aspects of
postformal thought, wisdom, and concepts of god that relate to one
another in the cognitive domain. Given that emotional, personality,
age, experience, and other factors do influence all three of the variables
of interest, this is not surprising. Future work using a longitudinal
design might help clarify how and when the several factors, items, and
subscales just listed might be related to the shared underlying cogni-
tive factors leading to postformal thinking ability, complex concepts
of god, and wisdom. Dimensions of postformal thought may relate
differently to behavior in varied domains.
What do results suggest about Image of God (IOG)? An underlying
supposition of this research was that the ability to think in complex
postformal ways, using a complex postformal logic, would be related to
having a complex IOG. It seems self-evident that any level of thinking
ability would be likely to generalize across many concepts, including
the IOG. There is no special reason to believe that an individual would
think in complex ways except as related to IOG. If there is utility in
being able to relate to others and to objects in cognitively complex,
creative, and wise ways, rather than having an inflexible, simplistic
set of potential responses, complex thought should be a bonus feature
of cognition. Metaphorically speaking, the individual with complex
thought is like a painter with a color palette that includes a wide vari-
ety of colors from which that artist can select, rather than a palette
with one or two colors. While a cognitively complex individual can
choose to hold a simple IOG, it is a choice for that person. There
would be no choice for a cognitively simpler person.
This brings us to the question, what is the psychological value, beyond
having choices, of having a complex postformal IOG? It would seem
that the individual with a complex IOG would be able to have a more
multifaceted relationship with any transcendent figure. This ability is
suggested in the work of those who study moral/ethical development
and discuss the decision- making of individuals facing moral/ethical
dilemmas. The person with a more simplistic reward/punishment ethi-
cal concept is not able to use the more nuanced reasoning of one able
to use universal ethical principles. If my IOG is more complex, I can
have a relationship with the divine on multiple levels. This flexibility,
in turn, lets me integrate and grow with the inevitable conflicts that
can occur among three main sets of emotionally salient relationships:
relations among my multifaceted sides-of-self; relationships with oth-
ers; and relationship with God (Sinnott, 2006).
Of course IOG involves variables other than cognition. Emotion,

attachment history, cultural practices, and personality, as well as the
depth of one’s psychological and spiritual journey, also intersect with
IOG. One’s cultural choice of religious practices to observe may be
lived on a superficial or on a deep level. Having a postformal ability
to conceptualize IOG may mean that there is overarching coherence
between what would seem to be the conflicted spiritual realities of
living in the world of mystical spirituality while being “of the world”
in everyday life (Sinnott, 2000). The concept of postformal thought
advances the field of understanding of IOG by potentially explaining
the complexity of an IOG and connecting it with the full functioning
of the relational person.
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.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wisdom
SPECIAL SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL SECTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL
TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY
Andrew Village*
This special section of RSSSR is devoted to the issue of psychological

type and religion and especially how psychological type can increase
our understanding of Christian ministry. As such it illustrates how
the social scientific study of religion is of interest not only to academ-
ics and theoreticians but also to those who may use research to help
them understand their profession or practice. The papers in the sec-
tion range from reviews of the field to reports of research on specific
religious groups. Together they give an insight into how psychological
type models of personality have made a significant contribution to the
field of religion and psychology.
That people differ in their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors is not
a disputed fact: Trying to explain these differences has kept philoso-
phers, theologians, biologists, and social scientists busy for a long time.
Among the many different ways of understanding human variation,
the idea of personality has proved to be both widely understood and
heuristically useful. Most people recognize that individuals have stable
characteristics that can be categorized in some way, even if they find
the array of variation rather overwhelming and difficult to describe.
Psychologists have attempted to simplify the variation by looking for
a few basic characteristics that together might adequately (if not com-
prehensively) describe human personality.
The model of psychological type first suggested by Carl Jung (1921)
arose from observations of the differences between people but before
the days of complex statistical modeling and the quantification of psy-
chological method. Jung drew on a wide range of historical sources and
his own experience to identify different personality types, and he tried
to explain these in terms of differences in psychological functioning.
* Author Note: Andrew Village, Theology and Religious Studies, York St. John
University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Andrew Village,
York St. John University, Lord Mayor’s Walk, York YO31 7EX, UK. Email: A.Village@
yorksj.ac.uk

158 andrew village
In its current form, as developed by Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs

Myers (Myers, 2006; Myers & Myers, 1980), the model includes two
orientations (introversion and extraversion), two perceiving functions
(sensing and intuition), two judging functions (feeling and thinking),
and two attitudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving).
Each orientation, function, or attitude is associated with characteris-
tic patterns of behavior and interaction, and the combination of four
independent pairs (E/I, S/N, F/T and J/P) gives 16 possible personality
types (ENFJ, INTP, etc.).
The two orientations are concerned with where individuals prefer
to function psychologically. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the
outer world; introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world. The
two perceiving functions are concerned with the way in which people
gather and process information. Sensing types (S) prefer to process the
realities of a situation as perceived by their senses; intuitive types (N)
prefer to process the possibilities of a situation as perceived by their
imaginations. The two judging functions are concerned with the way
in which people make decisions and judgments. Thinking types (T)
prefer to process information objectively; feeling types (F) prefer to
process information subjectively. The two attitudes toward the outer
world indicate which of the two sets of functions (that is, Perceiving
S/N or Judging T/F) is preferred in dealings with the outer world.
Judging types (J) actively judge external stimuli rather than passively
perceive them; perceiving types (P) passively perceive external stimuli
rather than actively judging them.
The conceptual basis of psychological type lies in the notion that
although these various aspects of psychological functioning are pres-
ent in everyone, different individuals tend to prefer some over others.
The analogy of “handedness” is often used to describe the way that
individuals draw on psychological functions: Most people can write
with either hand, but they tend to do so with only one. Writing with
our preferred hand seems easy and natural; writing with our non-
preferred hand requires more concentration and effort. In the same
way, it is argued, individuals have preferred orientations, functions,
and attitudes to the outer world that define their psychological type.
This is not the only way they operate, but it is the way that is preferred
and more prevalent.
Typological models such as this are often contrasted with trait-
based models such as the Five Factor Model (FFM) or “Big Five”
(Costa & McCrae, 1985) and the three-dimensional model developed
psychological type and christian ministry 159
by Hans Eysenck and others (H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, 1991;
H. J. Eysenck & Wilson, 1991; S. B. G. Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett,
1985). These models were developed using factor analyses of self-
reported questionnaire data to isolate independent dimensions that
are considered to be the minimum required to explain human person-
ality. Each person can fall anywhere along any of five or three dimen-
sions (depending on the model), and this helps to explain the rich
diversity of personality. Psychological type models are not as favored
in some circles as are models based on factor analysis, and there may
be several reasons for this (Bayne, 1997; DeVito, 1985; Leech, 1996;
Lloyd, 2007, 2008). Some of these relate to the origins of the psycho-
logical type or to its widespread use in the commercial world in the
guise of the Myers Briggs Personality Inventory (MBTI®). Others relate
to the underlying theoretical assumptions made about the relationship
between types and psychological functioning. While a detailed analysis
of these issues would not be appropriate here, a few points are worth
considering in relation to the validity and utility of the psychological
type model of personality.
Those who use trait models often criticize the theory that Jung and
others have used to explain the observed differences in types. The core
of this theory is that the psyche is responsible for functions related to
acquiring and evaluating information (which Jung called the irrational
and rational functions respectively). Few would dispute that these are
basic functions of the brain, and cognitive science has studied both the
perception of information and the mechanisms by which individuals
make judgments and decisions. The idea that perception can oper-
ate either through the senses or through the imagination is widely
understood and is part of the definition of the word itself. Similarly,
the notion of making decisions through rational decisions or through
value judgments (the “head” versus the “heart”) is also widely under-
stood. While this might seem a flimsy justification for recognizing the
possibility of such function differences, it is broadly similar to the the-
oretical basis used to formulate the FFM, which was built upon items
derived from terms widely used to describe personality (Digman, 1990;
Goldberg, 1992; John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 1988). Factor analy-
ses have been used to group the items into domains, but the stability
of these is variable across a range of samples. The theoretical under-
standing of the neurological origin of the five domains is very poorly
understood, but this has not stopped the model being accepted for its
utility in describing personalities. So a fully understood psychological
160 andrew village
basis for a personality model is not necessary for it to be useful as an

explanatory or predictive tool. This is certainly true of psychological
type models. Lloyd (2008) made a powerful argument for the utility
of the psychological type classification, even if its theoretical basis is
poorly understood.
Second is the criticism that the binary classification of the dimen-
sions of psychological type are unwarranted and that dimensions
should be understood as continuous traits (McCrae & Costa, 1989).
Some psychological type theorists have recognized the possibility of
using the dimensions in this way (Kummerow & Quenk, 1992), but
others have resisted the notion of using MBTI scores as a measure of
strength of preference (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Using type scores
can be justified, especially for research purposes, but it is important
to recognize the difference between theoretical and statistical argu-
ments for the use of dichotomies or continua. Theoretical arguments
relate to the nature of the different type dimensions and to the idea
that individuals generally develop preferences for particular modes of
functioning. For example, if the extraversion/introversion orientation
relates to the location of processing, then it is difficult to see how this
can be anything other than a dichotomy: It makes no sense to refer
to processing somewhere between the interior and the exterior world,
any more than a light switch can be other than on or off. Preference in
this case would be indicated by the frequency with which an individual
operated in these two modes. The statistical issue relates to whether it
is justified to dichotomize continuous scores and thereby lose infor-
mation (DeCoster, Iselin, & Gallucci, 2009). While this may be poor
statistical practice, there might be good reasons for choosing to do this
such as making it easier to use the model outside academic circles.
There is no doubt that this has been a great strength of psychological
type models but perhaps one that makes them objects of suspicion in
a psychological discipline dominated by quantitative empiricists.
These criticisms need to be set alongside evidence that the dimen-
sions of the psychological type model correlate well with a number of
domains of the FFM (Bayne, 1994; Crump, Furnham, & Moutafi, 2003;
Furnham, 1996; MacDonald, Anderson, Tsagarakis, & Holland, 1995;
McCrae & Costa, 1989) or Eysenck (Francis & Jones, 2000) models.
All three models seem to refer to the same dimension of extraver-
sion/introversion, despite the different theoretical formulations of this
construct. In addition, there have been several studies demonstrating
correlations between the psychological type judging functions and the
FFM dimension of agreeableness, between the psychological type atti-

tude to the outer world and the FFM dimension of conscientiousness,
and between the psychological type perceiving functions and the FFM
dimension of openness. The one dimension in trait models that is not
covered by type models seems to be that of neuroticism. This might be
seen as an argument for abandoning type in favor of the FFM (McCrae
& Costa, 1989), but others have argued strongly against this. The facto-
rial structure of trait-based personality models is still uncertain, and
abandoning psychological type as a tool for research would risk sepa-
rating the academic study of personality from those who might benefit
from it most.
Psychological type is not without its problems and weaknesses, but
these may be no more serious than those present in most models that
try to capture the diversity and complexity of human personality. The
contributors to this special section are well aware of these problems,
but they are also aware that using psychological type in the study of
religion has proved a rich and useful field of study. The collection of
papers presented here show that psychological type makes predictions
about the sorts of people who might participate in different kinds of
religious activity or organizations and that these predictions are often
supported by empirical evidence.
The papers originate mainly from studies in North America and the
United Kingdom. Observant readers will notice that one name, Leslie
Francis, appears more than once in author lists, and this is no accident.
Professor Francis has championed the application of psychological
type to the study of religion for many years, and he has worked with
Mandy Robbins and others to test theories in a wide range of Chris-
tian denominations and other religious traditions. Examples reported
here are the study of Presbyterian Church clergy in the United States
of America (Francis, Robbins, & Wulff, 2011), of Free Church min-
isters in the United Kingdom (Francis, Whinney, & Robbins, 2011),
of Anglican clergy in England (Village, 2011), and of churchgoers in
Australia (Robbins & Francis, 2011). Such studies show that congre-
gations tend to have distinctly different profiles from the populations
to which they belong, and clergy can have distinctly different profiles
from the congregations from which they are drawn. Studies of this
kind not only raise theoretical questions about what factors predispose
people to particular kinds of religious expression, but they also raise
practical questions about the ways in which religious organizations
may unwittingly exclude people with particular personality profiles.
162 andrew village
Other papers show how psychological type can help to explain inter-
actions between people in religious contexts. Tilley, Francis, Robbins,
and Jones (2011) show how type is associated with different expecta-
tions between trainee ministers and their mentors. Fawcett, Francis,
and Robbins (2011) show that young people’s perceptions of ministry
might be shaped by their own psychological type preferences. Robbins,
Francis, & Ryland (2011) demonstrate that extraverts and introverts
may have different perceptions of what makes a good ministry team.
Studies of this sort show how psychological type preferences can help
us to understand the way that religious people interact and why people
with similar beliefs and values may nonetheless perceive ministry in
quite different ways.
Most of the papers deal with dimensions of psychological type indi-
vidually, rather than looking in detail at the interaction of preferences
in each dimension (usually referred to as type dynamics). This per-
haps represents the way in which the application of type to research
in religion has concentrated on observable correlations rather than on
the more theoretical aspects of Jungian psychology. The special sec-
tion begins and ends with papers from Chris Ross, who has studied
type and religion for many years in Canada and North America. His
contributions anchor the use of type in the thought of Carl Jung. His
first paper (Ross, 2011a) gives an overview of the development of type
theory, and it summarizes a wide range of studies from a North Amer-
ican perspective. His second paper (Ross, 2011b) builds on the work
of John Beebe to show how a specific type can contribute to building
religious communities.
Taken together, these papers provide a snapshot of studies in psy-
chological type and ministry as they now stand. The gradual accumu-
lation of studies from different religious groups in different cultures is
enabling researchers to detect emerging patterns and clarify our under-
standing of how personality shapes religious expression. Psychological
type has proved a surprisingly durable model of personality that has
helped many individuals and organizations to understand themselves
better. It is certainly not an all-embracing or sufficient explanation of
personality, but study after study has shown that it does have some
power to predict religious affiliation and preferences. I thank all the
contributors for their work in this area and trust that this collection
will serve to spur further social scientific studies into psychological
type and religion.
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230–250.
JUNGIAN TYPOLOGY AND RELIGION:
A PERSPECTIVE FROM NORTH AMERICA
Christopher F. J. Ross*
Abstract
This analysis reviews the development of Jungian typology and the Myers Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI). It provides a survey of empirical studies of Jungian personality
type and religious phenomena and issues that use the Myers Briggs Type Indicator. It
documents a) how individuals relate to and experience religion, b) what they expect
from religious participation, c) how likely they are to affiliate with religious groups,
and d) suggests that the sensing/intuitive preference-set is the most salient to religion.
Sensing preferences were associated with sharper religious boundaries and discomfort
with religious doubt and change, judging preferences with attraction to the structure
of religion, and perceiving with religious experience. Sensing, feeling, and judging
preferences were more common among religious joiners. A history of the develop-
ment of Jung’s typology is provided.
Keywords: Jung, MBTI, Myers-Briggs, psychological type, religious expression
Swiss psychiatrist Jung (1875–1961), founder of analytical psychol-

ogy, developed a personality typology based on the assumption that
consciousness has a variety of orientations: Humans are always aware
with something as well as aware of something. The value of cherish-
ing and amplifying difference, a value that underlies Jung’s typology,
was also reflected in the title that Briggs Myers chose for her classic
text on her type indicator: Gifts Differing. Although Jung’s psycho-
logical reformulation of a religious orientation to life that permeates
and underlies his analytical psychology has received attention in the
sub-field of religious studies known as “psychology and religion,” his
work has been largely ignored in mainstream psychology, including
the psychology of religion. This may partly be because of the emphasis
* Author Note: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid

Laurier University.
The author wishes to thank colleagues and friends who read earlier drafts of the
chapter and particularly to Alexa Winchell who also assisted with the bibliographic
search, to Leslie Francis for later revisions, and to Lauren Price for final revisions.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Christopher F. J.
Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada. Email: cross@wlu.ca

166 christopher f. j. ross
within the psychology of religion on quantitative empirical methods,

which are largely absent from Jung’s studies, apart from his early
word-association experiments (Jung, 1904). Since the publication of
Jung’s Psychological Types in 1921, a number of measures have been
developed based on his seminal formulations of personality differ-
ences. Of these, the instrument developed by Briggs Myers has gener-
ated the most empirical research, and many type frequency studies
have been of people in religious settings. The purpose of the present
survey was threefold: a) to review the development of Jung’s original
theory of psychological types and connect this to the work of Myers
and Briggs Myers that led to the development of the Myers Briggs
Type Indicator (MBTI), b) to review empirical studies that have used
the MBTI in religious contexts, and c) to demonstrate the contribu-
tion that Jungian typology makes to our understanding of religion and
personality differences. Such an understanding has potential to reduce
conflict about religious issues within individuals, religious groups, and
society at large. The body of research and theory reviewed here shares
common ground with the postmodern concern for diversity and post-
structuralist attention to the construction of multiple subjectivities.
Jung’s Theory of Psychological Types
Jung published over a 60 year period from the heyday of European

modernist scientific optimism to the decade which saw the rise of
social liberation movements that are foundational to postmodern
concern over the complexities of difference. His work was immense
and diverse, ranging from the methods of experimental psychology
employed in his early word association studies to arcane studies of
alchemical symbolism in his middle and later years. Jung’s personal-
ity typology proved to be the part of his oeuvre that most influenced
mainstream psychology (Shamdasini, 2000), not least because it drew
on extremes that colored both his work and personality: intuitive spec-
ulation combined with an analytic orientation. Indeed, one measure
of the impact of Jung’s typology is the fact it can be used to under-
stand his own work: Jung’s scientific training strengthened his criti-
cal thinking function, but it could not subdue his stronger intuition.
Typologies, such as those from Hippocrates and Galen regarding the
four humors, have long attracted attention because they are a way of
both intuitively summarizing clusters of characteristics and providing
a framework for classification which spawns fresh predictions.
jungian typology and religion 167
There were many typologies at the start of the twentieth century.

James (1890) thought that Galton’s study of individual differences in
scientists’ mental imagery broke the mold of the uniformity assump-
tion in psychology, and in 1895, Binet founded the journal L’Anee
Psychologique, inaugurating individual psychology as a new branch
of psychology. Jung’s book Psychological Types, published in 1921,
was 17 years in the making. The earliest elements of his typology are
traceable to his word-association studies published in 1904 where,
following Binet’s lead, Jung applied Wundt’s experimental methods
to investigate individual differences. He classified individuals into
objective types who associated to a word’s objective meaning and
subjective-predicate types whose associations were affective. Jung first
used the term introversion in a paper on his own daughter (Jung, 1910)
that he prepared for the conference on child psychology organized
by Hall at Clark University, which he attended with Freud on their
first visit to the United States. In 1915, Jung re-engaged with issues
of typology, realizing these might answer some of the questions about
the workings of the unconscious that had not been addressed by his
explorations of comparative mythology published 2 years earlier in
Symbols of Transformation. He engaged in vigorous correspondence
with analysts Schmid-Guisan and Spielrein in Geneva, in which he
continued to conflate introversion with thinking and extraversion with
feeling. Jung’s first use of the term intuition was in 1916, when he
dismissed Speilrein as an intuitive-extravert who was too arbitrary.
However, it was analyst Moltzer who introduced the term “intuition,”
as Jung acknowledged (Jung, 1921, p. 454) and contrasted it to sensa-
tion at a presentation to the Psychological Club in Zurich in 1916. The
articulation of these additional functions, alternative ways of perceiv-
ing, enabled Jung to develop his full theory of type, in which any of
the four functions could be used either with an introverted attitude
of consciousness, where the object of consciousness is drawn into the
subject and momentarily reflected upon, or with the extraverted atti-
tude of consciousness where the experiencing subject is drawn into the
object (Shapiro & Alexander, 1975). In October of 1919, Jung wrote to
Spielrein that he had completed his book, and in it she would find her
questions answered (Baire, 2003).
Jung’s typology of personality was founded on the notion that
humans differ in relation to their preferences regarding two sets of
contrasting cognitive processes: the irrational, perceiving processes of
sensation and intuition and the rational (Jung, 1921), judging (Myers
& Myers, 1980), or evaluative (Beebe, 2004) processes of thinking and
feeling. Furthermore, Jung considered that each process or function of

consciousness, the term he preferred that stems from the Latin word
fungor and Sanskrit root wood bhuni, meaning “to enjoy” (Hillman,
1979), had an extraverted and an introverted form, yielding eight per-
sonality types distinguished by one of eight psychological functions.
More frequent use of one function accustoms individuals to experi-
ence different pleasures which, in turn, foster particular personal
characteristics. For instance, the frequent use of the thinking function
in an introverted direction to make novel internal distinctions pro-
duces someone likely to be described as analytical. Jung considered the
predisposition to use one function rather than another to be genetic.
Research in the psychology of individual differences confirms a genetic
component for most personality features that can be reliably mea-
sured (Plomin & Avshalom, 1999), including those related to Jungian
typology, such a sociability (extraversion-introversion), openness to
experience (intuition-sensing), agreeableness (feeling-thinking), and
conscientiousness (judging-perceiving) (McCrea & Costa, 1989).
The sensation function is concerned with “what is” (Jung, 1961,
p. 219). Introverted sensing resonates to the subjective impact of what
is perceived and reflectively compares and orders specific experiences.
With extraverted sensation, the sensing subject is drawn into the sensed
object and is associated with “compelling, often shared, experiences of
the textures, smells, sights, sounds and tastes of the world,” according
to Jungian analyst Beebe (2004, p. 96), who drew on both his clinical
experience and familiarity with theory and research associated with
the MBTI. The thinking function operates with language and concepts
to name, label, or define an experience which then becomes another
object of awareness in its own right. Extraverted thinking is interested
in definitions that hold true for everyone and proceeds to organize
that external world with that public definition, whereas introverted
thinking reflects on whether a particular construction accords with
the conviction of inner truth, regardless of what the received opinion
might be (Beebe, 2004). The feeling function is concerned to make
valuations, judgments, and decisions based on what the subject holds
to be of value; in short, “How do these phenomena agree with what
I value here?” Introverted feeling concentrates on values that matter
most to the individual, while extraverted feeling readily seeks connec-
tion and harmony with the feeling of others. Lastly, the intuitive func-
tion cognizes wholes (in contrast to details, which are the focus of the
sensation function) and works with patterns of meaning, which along
with the thinking function, often involves language and other symbol
systems. Beebe distinguished extraverted intuition as:
involved in picking up what was going on in other people’s minds, and
seeing possibilities that others might not have imagined; whereas intro-
verted intuition looked at the big picture in the unconscious, where the
gestalts that moved nations, religions, and epochs lay, even in the midst
of apparently “individual” experience. (Beebe, 2004, p. 96)
The subtitle of the 1923 English translation of Psychological Types was
The Psychology of Individuation. According to Baire (2003), a recent
biographer of Jung, Psychological Types was the main therapeutic guide
for Jungian analysts for the next 20 years:
By 1930 . . . there was one major constant: his work on typologies became
the starting point for both his writing and practice. The first stage in
therapy for anyone who made the pilgrimage to Zurich was to leave “no
doubt about [the analysand’s] personality type and function.” (p. 376)
However, following Jung’s increased attention to the collective uncon-
scious after World War II, Jungian analysts’ interests shifted from how
individuals became conscious toward a phenomenology of uncon-
scious contents and their cross-cultural expressions (Beebe, 2004).
Edinger (1984) and Beebe (2004), bucking neglect of consciousness
by the Jungian mainstream, argued that Jung’s formulations regarding
individual differences in conscious orientations provided direction for
understanding how best to access what is unconscious. Beebe elabo-
rated Edinger’s exposition of consciousness as knowing with (derived
from the Latin “cum,” “with,” and “scire,” “to know”). He argued that
Jung’s genius resided first in realizing that consciousness is always
knowing with something as well as knowing about something and
second in articulating the distinct ways in which individuals become
conscious of things. Jung charted the diverse ways and order in which
what is unconscious may most fruitfully be encountered in psycho-
therapy (Beebe, 2004).
Katherine Briggs, Isabel Myers, and the Development

of the MBTI
Two other measures of Jungian personality typology have been devel-

oped by Jungian analysts, Gray and Wheelwright (1946) and Singer
and Loomis (1984). Kirsch (2000) noted that the Gray Wheelwright
type test is still used in some training institutes of Jungian analysts;

reliability and validity studies are unavailable. The Singer-Loomis
Inventory of Personality (SLIP) shed the assumption of bi-polarity in
Jung’s typology (Loomis & Singer, 1980). Reliability and validity stud-
ies are lacking, as are empirical studies relating SLIP to religion. How-
ever, Loomis (1991) speculated about Jungian typology in relation to
North American Aboriginal religions.
Most researchers and practitioners interested in Jung’s typology
since the Second World War have been associated with the MBTI.
Briggs’ interest in personality sprang from her aspiration to create
convincing characters in the novels she wrote, as well as her desire to
figure out Clarence Myers with whom her beloved daughter, Isabel,
had fallen in love. In 1923, when Briggs read the English translation of
Psychological Types, she had already developed her own ideas regard-
ing personality differences. However, as Briggs’ biographer lamented,
“A woman ahead of her time, Katherine was caught in a restraining net
woven of sexism, cultural conditioning, and her own brilliance,” and
“burned her notes” when “she recognized the completeness of Jung’s
formulations of what she had only partially devised” (Saunders, 1991,
p. 59). Jung and Briggs corresponded from 1927, and, when they met
in New York in 1937, Jung expressed his regret that she had destroyed
her promising manuscript. It was left to her daughter, Isabel Briggs
Myers, to pioneer what would become the world’s most frequently
used personality instrument, with 2.5 million administrations annu-
ally since 2000 (M. Segovia, personal communication from Consulting
Psychologist Press, 2004).
In 1943, Briggs Myers copyrighted the MBTI, the product of her
resolve in the wake of Pearl Harbor, to contribute a people-sorting
test to the anti-fascist war effort, a test that would also be useful in
the eventual troop demobilization. The structure and assumptions of
the MBTI, however, differed from prevailing psychometric principles,
and thus only in 1975 did it become widely used following its transfer
to Consulting Psychologist Press from Educational Testing Services,
which had classified it as a research instrument only.
Jung explicitly suggested three distinctions foundational to human
personality difference: a) the introverted or extraverted attitude;
b) perceiving through the functions of sensing or intuition; c) judg-
ing or evaluating using the functions of feeling or thinking. His final
distinction, the fourth preference set of the MBTI, is implicit in dis-
tinctions b) and c): Jung termed the perceiving functions of sensing
and intuition as irrational processes by which he meant “not ordering,”

and designated the two ordering or judging functions of thinking and
feeling as rational processes. The structure of the MBTI follows Jung’s
distinctions, with E and I standing for extraversion and introversion
respectively, S and N for sensing and intuition, and T and F for think-
ing or feeling. The principal innovation that Myers made to Jung’s
own formulation of individual differences was to designate which pro-
cess or kind of function was extraverted for an individual: J represents
the preference for externally deploying a judging, evaluating, or ratio-
nal kind of function, while P refers to the preference for the external
deployment of a perceiving or irrational function.
Jung’s Personality Typology and Religion
Jung made few explicit applications of his typology to religion, under-

standable perhaps in view of the pervading syncretic conflation of
religion and psychology in his analytical psychology. While still sift-
ing through many typologies, Jung met James in 1909, during the last
months of James’ life. However, while Jung would draw on James’
(1890) distinctions between logical and symbolic thinking (Jung, 1912)
and between tough and tender minded (Jung, 1913), his conversations
with James centered on “the importance of para-psychology in provid-
ing access to the unconscious.” They also covered other topics in the
psychology of religion such as “spiritualism, faith healing, and other
non-medical applications of psychotherapy,” but they did not include
a discussion of their typologies in relation to these issues (Baire, 2003,
p. 167).
Most studies relating Jung’s typology to religion have used the
MBTI, although recently some studies have been reported using the
Kiersey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978) and the Francis
Psychological Type Scale (Francis, 2005). The Gray-Wheelwright type
test has been widely used only with trainee Jungian analysts. Loomis
(1991), the co-developer of the Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personal-
ity (SLIP), has written about Jungian typology in relation to North
American Aboriginal religions, but the SLIP has not been used in
empirical studies of religious groups and issues. Studies of type fre-
quency using the MBTI among religious groups are reviewed first, fol-
lowed by studies using type preferences as independent variables to
investigate religious orientation, beliefs, and practice.
Type Frequency Studies of Religious Groups

Myers operationalized Jung’s typology as a dichotomous set of four
preferences, and recording the pattern of type frequencies for specific
groups has been the prevailing method of applied research employed
by users of the MBTI, including those who have consulted and studied
religious groups.
Religious Affiliation
Carskadon (1981) found a sensing preference among Mississippi col-
lege students associated with affiliation to conservative religious groups
such as Baptists and found an intuitive preference with affiliation to
more liberal ones such as Episcopalians or Anglicans. Ross and Fran-
cis (2006) replicated this relationship with Welsh students, further
establishing that those of no religious affiliation were associated with
combined preferences for intuition and thinking. In their study, extra-
verted intuitives with auxiliary introverted thinking (ENTPs) were the
most frequent specific Jungian type and four times more frequent than
in the general population.
Table 1 indicates a) the percentage of type-related preferences for
active members of particular Christian denominations, b) the most fre-
quent specific Jungian type, and c) Keirsey and Bates (1978) tempera-
ment cluster, alongside norms for the US, UK and Canada. Keirsey, in
Please Understand Me (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), following Galen’s clas-
sification of the four humors, down-played the importance of extraver-
sion and introversion as determinants of personality and concentrated
on four temperaments.
The pattern of preferences among Christian denominations, with the
exception of the Canadian Anglican group and US Unitarian groups,
resembled that of the respective national samples, with introversion
more frequently preferred than extraversion; sensing than intuition;
feeling than thinking among women, thinking more frequent than
feeling among men; and with judging a more frequent preference than
perceiving. However, the Christian denominational groups included
an even higher proportion of introverted sensing types with auxiliary
extraverted feeling (ISFJs): 31% of female Canadian evangelicals, 10%
of male Canadian evangelicals, compared to Canadian norms of 11%
and 5% respectively (Bramer, 1996). ISFJs (20%) also predominated
among Canadian Catholic women (Ross, 1995) and among Catholic
priests (18%, see Table 2) (MacDaid, McCaulley, & Kainz, 1986).
Table 1. Meta Analysis of Percentage Jungian Type Preference among Active Members of Christian Denominations and Adult
Norms for USA, UK, and Canada
Group E I S N T F J P Preferences Most Most Frequent Most Frequent
Summary Frequent Keirsey Specific Jungian
Function Pair Temperament Type
Active Church Members

Anglicans
Canada (Ross, 1993) 38 62 36 64 31 69 59 41 INFJ NF 48 NF 48 INFP 18
Wales (Craig et al., 2003) 39 61 85 15 35 65 92 8 ISFJ No Data No Data ISFJ 30
England (Francis et al., 2007):
– Females 44 56 55 45 22 78 72 28 ISFJ SF 45 SJ 47 ISFJ 22
– Males 46 54 50 50 57 43 78 22 IxTJ ST 34 SJ 45 ISTJ 17
Unitarians: USA (Gerhard, 1983) 41 59 22 78 52 48 67 33 INTJ NF 40 NF 40 ENTJ 14
Catholics: Canada (Ross, 1995)
– Males 46 54 51 49 59 41 59 41 ISTJ ST 34 SJ 36 ESTJ 15
Evangelical Protestants: Canada
Francophone 29 71 88 12 62 38 62 38 ISTJ ST 58 SJ 56 ISTJ 27
(Delis-Bulhoes, 1990)
Anglophone (Bramer, 1996)
– Males 36 64 63 37 60 40 62 38 ISTJ ST 42 SJ 49 ISTJ 21
General Populations Norms
U.S. (Hammer & Mitchell, 1996)
jungian typology and religion

UK (Kendall, 1998)
– Males 47 53 73 27 65 35 55 45 ISTJ SF 50 SJ 44 ISTJ 20
Canada
Francophone (Casas, 1990)
173
– Females 40 60 58 42 54 46 66 34 ISTJ ST 32 SJ 45 ISTJ 16

Note: E = Extroversion; I = Introversion; S = Sensing; N = Intuition; T = Thinking; F = Feeling; J = Judging; P = Perceiving

174
Table 2. Percentages for the Most Frequent of the 16 Jungian Types among Male Christian Clergy and Rabbis
Averaged Type US US US Rabbis Welsh Anglican US Males UK Males
Frequency across Protestant Catholic Priests Priests
the Four Clergy Ministers
Groups (MacDaid et al., (Greenfield, 1969) (Francis et al., 2001) (Hammer & (Kendall, 1998)
(MacDaid et al.,
1986) 1986) Mitchell, 1996)
(N = 1,554) (N = 1298) (N = 319) (N = 427) (N = 599) (N = 748)
ISFJ 14 10 18 8 19 6 7
ESFJ 13.5 13 14 14 13 5 6
ENFJ 12 16 11 15 16 2 2
christopher f. j. ross
ENFP 11 14 12 8 9 6 5
INFJ 9 10 10 10 6 2 2
ISTJ 8 4 8 8 10 19 19
Note: The expected percentage would be 6.5 if all 16 types were equally represented.
In terms of Keirsey temperaments, sensing-judging (SJs), designated

guardians, were the most frequent temperament among the Christian
groups as in the general population, outnumbering artisan sensing-
perceivers (SP), idealist intuitive-feelers (NF), and rationalist intuitive-
thinkers (NT). SJs were also the most frequent temperament among
Christian lay leaders in the UK (44%: Francis & Robbins, 2002) and
members of the western Hindu Hare Krishna group (78%: Poling &
Kenney, 1986).
In contrast to the general population, the second most frequent tem-
perament among the church groups was the NF idealists, rather than
SP artisans who, along with NT rationalists, were under-represented.
Indeed, anecdotes from type and spirituality workshops I have con-
ducted in local churches indicated that an important dynamic within
a congregation is the tension between the large SJ guardian group ori-
ented to religious rules, conduct, and tradition and the NF idealist
group oriented to spirituality and personal growth. The few SP arti-
sans present were not vocal but wondered about all the fuss NF ideal-
ists were making, while the few NT rationalists, often sympathetic to
the concerns of the NF group, played an important mediating role by
developing strategies to put the conflict in perspective.
The presence among the female Canadian Catholics of a consid-
erable extraverted intuitive group with auxiliary feeling (ENFP), the
second largest group after the ISFJ women, constituted an important
difference between the Catholic and evangelical Protestants congrega-
tions. Temperament theorist Keirsey (1987) designated the ENFPs and
INFPs as idealist role informers. Furthermore, in a study of Anglicans
the INFPs, whose dominant function of introverted feeling is balanced
by an auxiliary function of extraverted intuition, were the largest type
in this liberal protestant denomination (Ross, 1993). Intuitives out-
numbered sensers in two liberal Protestants groups: Unitarians in
Texas (Gerhardt, 1983) and Anglicans in southern Ontario (Ross,
1993). This may reflect a particular liberal church culture attracting
intuitives, a minority in society at large but even more of a minority
in most evangelical congregations.
Other studies reporting on active members of Christian denomina-
tions included Francis, Duncan, Craig, and Luffman (2004); Francis,
Butler, and Craig (2005); Craig (2005); Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008);
and Village, Francis, and Craig (2009).
Ordained Christian Clergy and Members of Religious Orders

The clergy of a particular religion or denomination constitute an
important group who define the general ambience and character of
that religious group. Therefore, type proportions of the clergy may
play an important part in determining and maintaining a distinct reli-
gious orientation and culture.
Table 2 shows the percentage frequency of the six most frequent
types among four clergy groups, ranked by percentage frequency aver-
aged over clergy groups and compared to population norms. In terms
of Keirsey’s temperaments, three were sensing judging guardian types
who derive meaning from loyalty to tradition. The ISFJ type was the
most frequent among both the Anglican (19%) and Roman Catholic
priests (18%). Quiet kindness, conservatism, and practical dependabil-
ity characterize this type; these values and orientation toward religion
likely resonate with the numerous ISFJ members of their congregation.
In those congregations with ISFJ clergy, an ISFJ axis between clergy
and congregation may make for a distinct type culture of quiet kind-
ness and firm rules, which may feel claustrophobic to and deter other
types. The next most frequent clergy type was the closely related ESFJ,
extraverted feeling type with introverted sensing (Catholic priests 14%,
Rabbis 14%, Anglican ministers 13%), which corresponds to the ste-
reotype of the warm, friendly, practical, and well-organized minister
or rabbi.
After this sensing-feeling judging cluster, came a second cluster of
ordained men with a combined intuitive-feeling (NF) preference that
is three times more frequent among male clergy than in the general
male population. The most frequent specific Jungian types within this
cluster were extraverted feeling types with introverted intuition (ENFJs,
16% of US protestant clergy, and 15% of rabbis, and 2% of US males)
who have been described as warm, articulate leaders concerned with
harmony, followed by extraverted intuitives with introverted feeling
(ENFPs) who have been described as “spontaneous, flexible innova-
tors guided by inspirations often related to helping others,” and may
correspond to the “rebel” clergy stereotype (Pedersen, 1993, p. 62).
Because of their concern for holistic growth and personal develop-
ment (Richardson, 1996), NF clergy offer a contrasting approach to
the rule oriented disposition of their colleagues and of that large seg-
ment of their congregation with SJ preferences. This contrast between
members and leader may constitute a creative tension in the religious
community, and it may also lead to conflict in times of stress.
A total of 49% of the clergy in the four samples had extraverted feel-
ing as a dominant or auxiliary function, paralleled in their congrega-
tions by 44% of Canadian Catholics (Ross & Jackson, 1993) and 52%
of Welsh Anglicans (Craig, Francis, Bailey, & Robbins, 2003). Seven
studies of nuns and monks, reviewed by Ross (1993), indicated those
in Catholic religious orders have an even larger predominance of feel-
ing and judging types than clergy, with a clear majority of introverts
and sensing types. The friendliness and social support reported as one
of the psychological and health benefits of membership in a religious
group (Miller & Thoresen, 2003; Scheurich, 2003) may be associated
with the prevalence of the function of extraverted feeling with its con-
cern for harmony.
The preferences for feeling over thinking among both clergy, lay
leaders, and professed nuns and monks, those who might be expected
to be exemplars of their religious faith, is congruent with the inter-
pretation that the core of the Christian message is about loving rela-
tionships. However, studies of rabbis by Greenfield (1969) indicated
that the preference for feeling extends beyond the Christian tradition.
Indeed, the concern of extraverted feeling for relationship with others
is reflected in the Golden Rule found in most world wisdom traditions.
In view of this, it would be interesting to determine if extraverted feel-
ing predominates among those actively participating in other religions.
However, the finding of a clear, four-to-one proportion of thinking to
feeling types among members of the Hare Krishna group suggested
that there may be significant exceptions to the predominance of feel-
ing types in religious groups (Poling & Kenney, 1986). Charismatic
Christians, for example, tend to prefer thinking over feeling (Francis
& Jones, 1997).
Other studies reporting on ordained Christian clergy, bible college
students, missionary personnel, and lay church leaders included Craig,
Francis, and Robbins (2004); Craig, Horsfall, and Francis (2005); Fran-
cis, Craig, Horsfall, and Ross (2005); Craig, Duncan, and Francis (2006);
Francis, Craig, and Butler (2007); Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and
Slater (2007); Francis, Nash, Nash, and Craig (2007); Francis, Robbins,
Williams, and Williams (2007); Francis, Wulff, and Robbins (2008);
Kay and Francis (2008); Kay, Francis, and Craig (2008); Francis, Gubb,
and Robbins (2009); Francis, Hancocks, Swift, and Robbins (2009);
Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, and Castle (2009); and Francis, Robbins, and
Village (2009).
Jungian Typology and the Psychology of Individual

Religious Differences
The earlier type frequency studies of religious groups together with

numerous pastoral books on Jungian typology and Christian spiritual-
ity (listed in Francis & Jones, 1999b) have suggested specific associa-
tions between type categories and religious variables that have more
recently been studied directly.
Sensing-Intuition and Religious Differences

Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996), using the MBTI to explore the rela-
tionship of Jungian typology to religious differences, found the prefer-
ence for sensing or intuition the most salient of the four preferences to
religion. Subsequent studies confirmed that perceiving with the sens-
ing function which preserves sensory details, or with the function of
intuition which clusters patterns and cognizes wholes, may influence
how individuals approach a range of religious orientations.
Comfort with Complexity

Ross (1992) predicted from Jungian theory:
Intuitives are intrigued by complexity and are likely to have greater facil-
ity in construing phenomena in different ways. Therefore, doubting the
truth of religious beliefs or the value of certain religious practices is less
likely to be seen as a crisis. (pp. 92–93)
Intuitives were found to be more likely to accept “God is a mystery”
and as “not completely knowable” and to be more tolerant of religious
doubt compared to sensers, who endorsed such statements as “Doubts
about one’s faith should be avoided if at all possible” and “When it
comes to religion or spirituality it is very simple: either you believe in
God or you do not” (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson, 1996, p. 271). Francis &
Jones (1999a) found that intuitives accepted a higher degree of uncer-
tainty regarding key Christian beliefs.
Religious Boundaries
Sensers drew clearer boundaries between what is sacred and what is
not, affirming more strongly that “there are particular things that are
holy” (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson 1996, p. 271). This sensing tendency
toward clear demarcation is understandable because sensing is directed
toward identifying specific contents within a known context but link-

ing them only within that context (Francis & Ross, 1997; Van der
Hoop, 1937). Intuition has a wider focus, experiencing elements not
only in the immediate context but aware also of the variety of contexts
in which the immediate context occurs. Equipped with such awareness
of contextual layering, intuitives are disinclined toward fixed dichoto-
mous judgments based on sharp contrast.
Triggers for Religious Experience

Francis and Ross (1997) asked participants about triggers to their reli-
gious experiences. Sensing types identified more obvious religious trig-
gers: attending a church service, hymn singing, and personal prayer;
intuitives endorsed more items on the Scale of Experiential Spirituality
such as a fine sunset, looking at a painting, and reading poetry.
Change in Religious Contexts

Ross (1992) argued that intuitives, because of more permeable bound-
aries between the sacred and secular, are more likely to discern a spir-
itual dimension in secular phenomena, and they recognize worldly
aspects in conventionally religious phenomena. Such realism on the
part of intuitives about the human cultural element in religious forms
may render them less susceptible to over-idealizing a given religious
form and therefore make them less orthodox (Francis & Ross, 1997;
Lee, 1985; Meyer, 1966). By the same token, because they may be less
prone to idealize a facet of their religion, intuitives may be more open
to religious change, both at a personal and institutional level. In fact,
the intuitives among Canadian Anglicans (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson,
1996, p. 271) and Catholics (Ross & Jackson, 1993) were more likely
to agree that “For my personal faith to stay fresh I must be able to
find new meaning and insights; otherwise I feel my faith is sterile.”
Bremeier (1967) found among theological students that sensers tended
to stress spiritual ideas and resort to the authority of the Christian
Bible, whereas intuitives referred to contemporary theological sources
to support their opinions.
Different time orientations may explain variations in sensing and
intuitive attitudes toward change. Sensing is oriented to the present,
to what is (Jung, 1961). Moreover, introverted sensing types, with their
precise registration and strong memory of details, orient to a pres-
ent reality that is constantly compared to past happenings. However,
intuitives, delighting in the play of different scenarios mediated and

enhanced through the exercise of metaphor, orient to possibilities
that have not yet occurred. Hence intuition is phenomenologically
oriented toward, and comfortable with, the future. In fact, intuition
moves freely back and forth between past, present, and future. Thus,
for intuitives, these time zones are not separate categories; change,
therefore, is in a real sense nothing new, for the intuitive has already
imagined such change.
Conflict over change is a problem in many religious groups, in part
perhaps because of the prevalence of introverted sensing which reso-
nates to what is by comparing the present to what has been. The role
of intuitives in these religious groups is crucial. The intuitives in these
groups are able to interpret the new in terms of principles and beliefs
more familiar to the introverted sensing types, since SJs, because of
their concern for loyalty, are less likely to dismiss the opinions of
intuitives who belong to their religious group. NTs, with their facility
for abstraction and ability to withstand criticism, may be particularly
helpful as mediators. Their low frequency in most religious groups
should, therefore, be of concern. However, my experience is that NTs
are retained by religious groups when offered opportunities to apply
their specific competencies: gifts for abstraction, policy, strategy, and
education. Furthermore, large religious groups, such as the Catholic
Church and major Protestant denominations, may be able to survive
crises on account of a small but critical mass of NTs at higher echelons
in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Thinking-Feeling and Religious Differences

Jung (1913) observed that, when making judgments and decisions,
feeling and thinking types use their contrasting processes to order
and regulate their perceptions (derived from either intuition or sens-
ing): “In the same way that thinking organizes the contents of con-
sciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them according to value”
(p. 435). Whereas thinking distinguishes and discriminates, deploying
separative conceptual criteria to make decisions, feeling for its part
gathers subject and object into close proximity and then applies per-
tinent overlapping values to reach a decision. Feeling types, therefore,
must be personally engaged in order to bring the appropriate stack of
values to the phenomena that require decision. Thinking types, how-
ever, require detachment, carving out conceptual space in which to see
which criteria are most relevant. Because religious practices involve

making judgments, feeling and thinking types will likely differ in a
range of orientations to religious life.
Experiences of Suffering
Thinking types reported more struggles with cynical feelings, whereas
feeling types were more disturbed spiritually by insensitivity in and
conflict with others (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson, 1996). Because the feel-
ing function brings order by engaging with what is experienced, inter-
personal disruptions to the blending and harmonizing of experiences
were reported as producing additional suffering of a spiritual nature for
feeling types. Cynicism may be more common among thinking types
because it is a mere accentuation of the customary distance between
subject and object required for thinking to comfortably operate.
Experiences of Prayer
Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996) also found thinking types reported
more difficulty praying to a higher being, understandable because of
thinking types’ more frequent consciousness of themselves as sepa-
rate from others and perhaps from divinity. Feeling types claimed that
asking for help for self and others was an important part of praying.
On the other hand, there were no differences for feeling and thinking
types in regard to the practice of meditation, a religious practice less
wedded to awareness of a personal transcendental power.
Values and Religious Forms

Thinking types emphasised the need for rigorous analysis of sacred
texts, and for sermons to be “clear, reasoned, and articulate” (p. 273).
Feeling types’ concern for the personal emerged in their reported pref-
erence for narrative in sermons. They also chose sensitivity over objec-
tivity as a spiritual value. Thinking types claimed “desire for clarity
as an important part of my spiritual life” (p. 273) more strongly than
feeling types, who emphasised the personal implications of faith for
human relationships.
Mystical Orientation
Francis and Louden (2000), using a mysticism scale based on James’
formulations, found feeling and intuitive types more open to mystical
experience than the other types. A larger study replicated the associa-
tion with feeling (Francis, 2002). The thinking function’s attention to
separation, difference, and critique makes it harder for thinking types
to experience mystical states that involve ego-suspension. Moreover,
since those thinking types with intuition (INTPs and ENTJs) were as
open as the other types to mystical experiences, the separating effect
of dominant thinking seems potentiated when paired with sensing
(oriented to detail) and mitigated when paired with intuition. This
analysis with regard to the auxiliary function underlined the value of
larger studies, which permit the interpretation of type dynamics that
are considered important by Jungian analysts and type practitioners.
Judging-Perceiving and Religious Differences

Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996) found judging types oriented to the
structure provided by religion. Judging types acknowledged that “reli-
gion offers a sense of security,” that “following a routine is helpful
in regard to prayer and worship,” and that chaos and disorder are
aversive (p. 276). Judgers, compared to perceivers, favored discipline
more highly as a part of spiritual life. Perceivers considered “expe-
rience should come before rules in religious matters” (p. 276), were
more likely than judgers to see freedom as something religion should
foster, and considered development of spontaneity a spiritual value.
Compared to perceiving types, those facing the outside world with
a judging function seemed to have different needs and expectations
regarding religion and spirituality. Sensers and judgers rated struc-
tured prayer more highly than intuitive-feelers (Ware, Knapp, &
Schwarzin, 1989). Studies indicated, however, that religious organiza-
tions and their representatives are markedly judging rather perceiv-
ing in their preferences, with the exception of some liberal protestant
congregations and clergy and a cluster of extraverted intuitives with
feeling (ENFPs) among Catholic women.
Extraversion-Introversion and Religious Differences

The extraversion-introversion preference has the fewest reported
associations with religion-related variables. Ross, Weiss, and Jackson
(1996) found that introverts reported being spiritually refreshed from

time alone, and extraverts reported being recharged from fellowship
with others. Introverts acknowledged difficulty with people who did
not respect their need for privacy, while also confessing the need for
encouragement to participate. Sensitivity and caution may be needed
in dealing with introverted congregants on the part of the three large
groups of extraverted clergy (ESFJ, ENFJ, and ENFP). Emphasis on
fellowship and evangelizing may be oppressive to introverts, while the
cultivation of interiority featured in Catholic spirituality may be more
challenging for extraverts, especially in view of the difficulty extraverts
reported with being alone for a long time.
Jungian Typology and Religious Orthodoxy

Sensing and judging preferences were associated with doctrinal adher-
ence (Meyer, 1966), orthodoxy, and more frequent church attendance
(Lee, 1985), and sensing preferences with traditional or conservative
Christian belief (Francis & Jones, 1998). These findings accord with
the high frequency of SJs found in Canadian evangelical churches
(Bramer, 1996).
Jungian Typology and Religious Orientation

Few studies have been made of Jungian typology in relation to All-
portian approaches to religious motivation. Preliminary findings merit
further investigations: Burris and Ross (1996) found that SJs scored
higher on extrinsic religiosity than NPs, a finding that is consistent
with the characterisation by Thorne and Gough (1991) of SJs’ values
as pragmatic and functional and of extrinsic religious motivation as
oriented to comfort and status. Extraverted feeling types with sensing
(ESFJs) were particularly high on the extrinsic scale, while the intro-
verted feeling types with intuition (INFPs) scored lowest. Regarding
intrinsic religious motivation, commonly associated with devout per-
sonal commitment and unselfishness, ISFJs scored highest and the
ISTJs and ESTPs lowest. In view of the large number of ISTJ males
and ESFJ and ISFJ females in Catholic and evangelical protestant con-
gregations, more studies are needed to clarify whether the three types,
despite sharing the SJ guardian temperament, may be high religious
affiliators but for vastly different reasons.
NPs scored higher than SJs on a scale of religious immanence. The

Immanence scale of Burris and Tarpley (1998) conceptualized an
orientation toward religious immanence as “the mindful acceptance
of present experience” (pp. 56–57). NPs may be expected to be dis-
posed toward the experience of religious immanence, for they com-
bine intuition, which transcends categories of time and space to form
patterns of meaning, with a perceiving preference that orients to the
ever-changing flow of experience. NPs also scored higher than SJs on
Quest religiosity, predictable in view of Quest religiosity’s association
with readiness for change and facing existential questions.
Discussion
Empirical studies of Jungian typology in relation to religious issues

indicate that Jung’s approach to personality differences, based upon
how individuals habitually orient their consciousness, has implica-
tions for how individuals relate to and experience religion, what they
expect from religious participation, and how likely they are to affiliate
with religious groups. Thus, there is some empirical foundation for
the widespread use of Jungian typology in religious settings (work-
shops on spirituality and the MBTI are popular) and the proliferation
of pastoral books mentioned by Francis and Jones (1999b) that relate
Jungian typology and the MBTI to religion and spirituality (e.g. Rich-
ardson, 1996).
There are differences regarding the type composition of Christian
groups, the general population, and those with no religious affiliation.
Compared to the general population, evangelical Protestant and Catho-
lic groups tend to have more sensing-judging guardian types and liberal
Protestants more intuitive-feeling idealist types. The intuitive-thinking
rational types predominate among the religiously unaffiliated.
The perceiving preference set of sensing/intuition has the stron-
gest and widest-ranging connection to religious issues. Sensing types
tend toward sharper religious contrasts: They draw clearer boundar-
ies between what is sacred and what is not, associate religious experi-
ences with conventionally religious forms, and are more troubled than
intuitives by religious doubt. By way of contrast, intuitives have more
permeable boundaries between the sacred and the secular, are more
comfortable with doubt and change in their religious forms, and
more readily identify nature and art as sources of religious experience.
The judging-perceiving preference set, which indicates whether an

individual faces the external world with a judging or perceiving func-
tion, is the preference next most salient to religion, both as a separate
variable and in combination with sensing-intuition preferences. Judg-
ing types seem attracted to the structure religion may provide, and
they value discipline as a spiritual value. Perceiving types orient to the
experiential aspects of religion, value spontaneity in religious practice,
and are under-represented in Christian religious groups.
Some relationships have been found regarding individuals’ prefer-
ence for feeling or thinking judgment. Feeling types tend to be more
open to mystical experiences, espouse sensitivity as a spiritual value,
experience disharmony as a source of spiritual suffering, and enjoy
religious narratives. Thinking types, less frequent in religious groups
generally, struggle with feelings of cynicism. The fewest associations
have been found between religious variables and differences regarding
individuals’ extraverted or introverted source of energy.
Combined preferences seem to play a role in individual religious
differences. Most formal religious groups have a significant core of
members with introverted sensing combined with an extraverted form
of judgment, most frequently feeling. This is the case even among lib-
eral Protestant groups in which intuitive-feelers predominate. Sensing-
judging tends to be associated with a variety of indicators of religious
conservatism: doctrinal orthodoxy, reliance on biblical authority,
membership in an evangelical Protestant church.
The effects of the combination of all four preference sets and the
role of the auxiliary function may have significant religious import.
For example, extraverted intuitives with auxiliary introverted feeling
(ENFPs) are often the most common intuitive type in religious groups,
whereas the extraverted intuitives with introverted thinking (ENTPs)
are among the rarest in religious groups, and the most frequent spe-
cific type found among the religiously unaffiliated.
Intuitive-thinking types, introverted thinking types, and sensing-
perceiving types are under-represented in religious groups compared
to the general population. Awareness of, and taking into account the
contrasting needs of these types, particularly the perceiving minority,
may enhance the satisfaction that these types derive from organized
religious groups and attract more of these types to religious groups.
There are few studies connecting Jungian type with other fields of
the psychology of religion, and in view of the reported relationship of
type with a number of important religious variables, studies should
be made, for example, that intersect with issues raised by research on

god-images from psychoanalytic object relations perspectives, Allpor-
tian measures of religious motivation, and attribution theory from
social psychology. Type studies of religious groups other than Chris-
tian ones are also needed.
Because individuals with different Jungian type preferences seem to
have different needs, type awareness may be used to facilitate conflict
resolution within religious groups and indirectly between groups with
different ideologies. For example, sensing-judging types who may tend
toward polarization on a social issue, such as gay and lesbian marriage,
may be open to influence by “the facts of type” and listen to their
intuitive religious compatriots who may be better cognitively equipped
to interpret the society-wide debate and, in so-doing, may prevent iso-
lation of the religious group as a whole and the development of some
of the negative characteristics associated with religious extremism.
Jungian typology may be used to optimize interfaith and ecumeni-
cal dialogue by selecting participants who stand on common ground
regarding the orientation of their consciousness. Intuitive-perceivers
types, such as the ENFPs with their tolerance for complexity, porous
religious boundaries, and enthusiasm might be chosen from different
religious groups to start the dialogue.
Finally, with regard to methodology, empirical studies of Jungian
typology have used traditional tests of differential frequency of psy-
chological types or analyses of variance attributable to personality
type as an independent variable. In the future, qualitative methods to
analyze religious narratives generated by different psychological types
may replicate or modify the variety of associations between Jungian
typology and religious variables, while the possibility of experimental
manipulation of some of these variables should be also explored and
may attract the attention of a wider range of personality researchers
and psychologists of religion.
Conclusion
Jungian typology, in view of the empirical validation for aspects of the

theory, and the attendant belief that all eight ways of knowing, and the
qualities they nourish, are valuable and deserve development, contrib-
utes toward an empirically based post-modernism. Regarding religion,
Jungian typology encourages diversity and sympathy for the “other,”
both among those within formal religion, as well as those who pursue
the sacred ex ecclesia under the sobriquet of spirituality.
The studies reviewed both validate and challenge those who are
religious and the scholars who study them. They confirmed that indi-
viduals approach the sacred in markedly different ways and for differ-
ent purposes. It should be a matter of concern for those attached to
the religious groups studied here that too few of the sixteen types are
well represented. For a start, more sacred celebration of the delights of
the senses may interest those with extraverted sensing, while a more
welcoming attitude to critical analysis may attract those with intuitive
thinking and introverted thinking.
Finally, Jung saw his typology not as a means of “slotting” people
but as a critical psychology (Shamdasini, 2000, pp. 83–88) that would
help him and others understand the “personal equation” (p. 50) that
when not understood can impair good communication and rip rela-
tionships apart. It was not enough to explain conflict by reference to
trauma and unresolved neuroses. Understanding the profoundly dif-
ferent ways people differ in cognitively processing their world can
help prevent new trauma, perhaps both personal and cultural. It is
fitting, therefore, that his theory of personality type has gained accept-
ance and been applied in the domain of religion, which Jung saw as so
healing as well as potentially so destructive.
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http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PROFILE OF CLERGYWOMEN
AND CLERGYMEN SERVING IN THE PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (USA): IMPLICATIONS FOR STRENGTHS
AND WEAKNESSES IN MINISTRY
Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Keith Wulff *
Abstract
This study draws on two theoretical frameworks provided by the theology of indi-
vidual differences and by the Jungian notion of psychological type. Renewed interest
in the application of psychological type theory and empirical research among church
leaders and clergy in the UK from across diverse traditions has drawn attention to
three main findings: the distinctive psychological type profile of clergy compared with
the general population norms; the differences in psychological type profile between
clergymen and clergywomen; and the differences in psychological type profile between
Christian denominations. Building on this tradition, the present study discusses the
psychological type profiles of 561 clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA)
who completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS). The data confirmed
significant difference between male and female clergy, demonstrated significant dif-
ference between clergy profiles and the population norms for men and women in the
USA, and aligned the profile of clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) with
the profile of clergy serving in the Anglican Church in England (as relatively liberal
denominations). Among both clergymen and clergywomen in this sample, preferences
were recorded for introversion (I), intuition (N), feeling (F), and judging (J). Atten-
tion is given to those areas of ministry which may prove to be particularly difficult or
draining for clergy who display these psychological preferences.
Keywords: clergy, personality, population norms, Presbyterian, psychological type
During the latter part of the 20th century, a small number of studies,
conducted mainly within the USA, began to explore the application of
Jungian psychological type theory for illuminating the personality pro-
file of religious professionals. For example, Greenfield (1969) reported
on a sample of 319 Jewish rabbis, Cabral (1984) reported on a sample
* Author Note: Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick;

Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Keith Wulff, Presby-
terian Research Services.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis,
Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University
of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44
(0)24 7657 2638. Email: leslie.francis@warwick.ac.uk

clergy in the presbyterian church (usa) 193
of 150 professed Roman Catholic sisters, Harbaugh (1984) reported

on a sample of 60 Lutheran seminarians, Holsworth (1984) reported
on a sample of 146 Catholic seminarians, Bigelow, Fitzgerald, Busk,
Girault, and Avis (1988) reported separately on two samples of 47 and
641 Roman Catholic sisters, Nauss (1989) studied 310 Lutheran par-
ish pastors, and Irvine (1989) studied 147 Presbyterian ministers from
Scotland.
Renewed interest in this field of research emerged in the twenty-first
century with a cluster of studies, conducted mainly in the UK. These
studies included data provided by samples of 427 Church in Wales
clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001), 278 male and 213 female
Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), 57 evangelical
church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002), 164 male and 135 female
evangelical church leaders (Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), 92 male
missionary personal (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), 130 male and
192 female evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, &
Ross, 2005), 79 Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis,
2006), 155 male and 134 female Christian youth workers (Francis,
Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen serv-
ing within the Church of England (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, &
Slater, 2007), 81 evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, &
Butler, 2007), 190 male Assemblies of God theological college students
(Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008), 122 female Assemblies of God theologi-
cal college students (Kay & Francis, 2008), 134 lead elders within the
Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009),
389 experienced preachers (Francis, Village, & Robbins, 2009), 154
members of the leadership team within the Newfrontiers network of
churches (Ryland, Francis, & Robbins, in press), 101 Anglican health-
care chaplains (Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009), 622 cler-
gymen serving in the Church of England (Francis, Robbins, Duncan,
Whinney, & Ross, 2010), 83 clergywomen serving in the Church of
England (Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press), 148 male and 41
female Free Church ministers in England (Francis, Whinney, Burton,
& Robbins, 2011), 693 male and 311 female Methodist circuit minis-
ters in Britain (Burton, Francis, & Robbins, 2010) and 231 clergymen
serving in the Church in Wales (Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010).
Three main empirical findings emerge from this growing family of
studies. First, the data draw attention to the distinctive psychologi-
cal type profile of religious professionals compared with the general
population. Second, the data draw attention to significant differences
194 francis, robbins and wulff
in psychological type profile between clergymen and clergywomen.

Third, the data draw attention to significant differences in psychologi-
cal type profile between Christian denominations. These findings carry
implications for understanding strengths and weaknesses as well as
challenges and opportunities within Christian ministry and mission.
Psychological type theory provides an attractive tool for exploring
Christian ministry for three reasons: the theory is well established
within the psychological literature; the theory has been success-
fully operationalized by a set of psychometric instruments; and this
psychological theory has been clearly integrated within a broader
theologically-grounded discussion of individual differences. These
three issues will be examined in turn.
Psychological type theory has its roots in the pioneering and origi-
nal thinking of Jung as set out in his classic book Psychological Types
(Jung, 1971). The theory has been subsequently developed and modi-
fied in dialogue with the family of measures that have extended and
operationalized Jung’s ideas. In the present extended form, psycho-
logical type theory is concerned with four key aspects of the human
psyche that are defined as the orientations, the perceiving processes,
the judging processes, and the attitudes.
The orientations are concerned with identifying the sources of
psychological energy. In this area, the two discrete types are defined
as extraversion and introversion. For extravert types, the source of
energy is located in the outer world of people and things. Extraverts
are exhausted by large periods of solitude and silence, and they need
to re-energize through the stimulation they receive from people and
places. Extraverts are talkative people who feel at home in social con-
texts. For introvert types, the source of energy is located in the inner
world of ideas and reflection. Introverts are exhausted by long peri-
ods of social engagements and sounds, and they need to re-energize
through the stimulation they receive from their own company and
tranquility.
The perceiving processes are concerned with identifying ways in
which individuals take in information. For Jung, the perceiving pro-
cesses were described as irrational processes because they were not
concerned with data evaluation but simply with data gathering. In
this area, the two discrete types are defined as sensing and as intu-
ition. For sensing types, the preferred way of perceiving is through the
five senses. Sensers are motivated by facts, details, and information.
They build up to the big picture slowly by focusing first on the com-
ponent parts. They are more comfortable in the present moment rather
than in exploring future possibilities. They are realistic and practical
people. For intuitive types, the preferred way of perceiving is through
their imagination. Intuitives are motivated by theories, ideas, and con-
nections. They begin with the big picture and gradually give attention to
the component parts. They are more comfortable planning the future
than making do with the present. They are inspirational and visionary
people.
The judging processes are concerned with identifying ways in which
individuals evaluate information. For Jung, the judging processes were
described as the rational processes because they were concerned with
data evaluation and with decision making. In this area, the two dis-
crete types are defined as thinking and as feeling. For thinking types,
the preferred way of judging is through objective analysis and dispas-
sionate logic. They are concerned with the good running of systems
and organizations and put such strategic issues first. They are logical
and fair-minded people who appeal to the God of justice. For feeling
types, the preferred way of judging is through subjective evaluation
and personal involvement. They are concerned with the good relation-
ships between people and put such inter-personal issues first. They are
humane and warm-hearted people who appeal to the God of mercy.
The attitudes (often more fully expressed as the attitudes toward the
outer world) are concerned with identifying which of the two processes
(judging or perceiving) individuals prefer to use in the outer world. In
this area, the two discrete types are defined by the name of the pre-
ferred process, either judging or perceiving. For judging types, their
preferred judging function (either thinking or feeling) is employed
in their outer world. Because their outer world is where the rational,
evaluating, judging, or decision-making processes are deployed, judg-
ing types appear to others to be well-organized, decisive people. For
perceiving types, their preferred perceiving function (either sensing or
intuition) is employed in their outer world. Because their outer world
is where the irrational, data gathering process is deployed, perceiv-
ing types appear to others to be laid-back, flexible, even disorganized
people.
Most current models of personality work in terms of locating indi-
viduals at points along a set of psychological continua, as illustrated by
the Sixteen Personality Factors operationalized by Cattell, Cattell, and
Cattell (1993), by the Big Five Factor model operationalized by Costa

and McCrae (1985), and by the Major Three Dimensions operation-
alized by Eysenck and Eysenck (1991). The distinguishing feature of
psychological type theory is that it conceptualizes the four key aspects
of the human psyche (orientations, perceiving processes, judging pro-
cesses, and attitudes toward the outer world) in terms of polar oppo-
sites. This distinguishing aspect of the theory has been operationalized
in a series of psychological tests, the best known of which in terms of
empirical research among religious professionals are the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Kiersey Temperament
Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type
Scales (Francis, 2005). Each of these three instruments has its own
distinctive strengths.
The application of this kind of psychological theory and measure-
ment within the field of Christian ministry has been located by Francis
(2005) within a broader consideration of the theology of individual
differences. Beginning with a strong doctrine of creation grounded
in a reading of Genesis 1:27, Francis (2005) argued that the divine
image reflected in sex differences may be equally reflected in ethnic
differences and in psychological type differences. According to this
account, introversion and extraversion, sensing and intuition, think-
ing and feeling, and judging and perceiving are as strongly rooted in
the intentionality of the divine creator as sex differences and ethnic dif-
ferences. Francis (2005) proceeded to distinguish between the notion
of psychological type and the notion of character. According to this
account, it is character that is damaged by the fall and transformed by
the saving work of Christ. While it is appropriate for the pious Chris-
tian soul to repent, to seek forgiveness, and to pray for transformation
of character, it is not appropriate to repent of one’s biologically given
sex, ethnicity, or psychological type. According to this account, psy-
chological type theory offers profound insight into what it means to
be human, into the God in whose image men and women are created,
and into leadership within the Church of God.
Against this background, the aim of the present study was to profile
the male and female clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA).
This aim extended previous research in two ways. It extended recent
research conducted largely within the UK to the USA, and it extended
recent research conducted across a number of denominations to the
Presbyterian Church. Building on the insights generated by the recent
studies, it was hypothesized that there would be significant differences
between the personality profile of clergy serving in The Presbyterian

Church (USA) and the wider USA population, and male and female
clergy would share many psychological type characteristics in com-
mon. It was also hypothesized that there would be features in com-
mon between the personality profile of these clergy and the personality
profile of Anglican clergy serving in the Church of England, since, in
their different ways, both groups of clergy represent fairly broad and
liberal church traditions.
Method
Participants
As part on an on-going representative panel study, 561 clergy serv-
ing in The Presbyterian Church (USA) responded to the invitation
to complete a measure of psychological type. The respondents com-
prised 413 clergymen and 148 clergywomen. Among the clergymen,
12% were under the age of forty, 25% were in their forties, 41% were
in their fifties, 20% were in their sixties, and 2% were aged seventy or
over; 95% were currently married, and 5% were not currently married.
Among the clergywomen, 18% were under the age of forty, 34% were
in their forties, 35% were in their fifties, 12% were in their sixties, and
1% were aged seventy or over; 63% were currently married, and 37%
were not currently married.
Measures
Psychological type was assessed by the Francis Psychological Type
Scales (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This is a 40-item instrument comprising
four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four com-
ponents of psychological type: orientations (extraversion or introver-
sion), perceiving processes (sensing or intuition), judging processes
(thinking or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world (judging
or perceiving). Recent studies have demonstrated that this instrument
functions well in church-related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig,
and Hall (2008) reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76
for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale.
Data analysis
The research literature concerning the empirical investigation of psy-
chological type has developed a distinctive method for analyzing,
handling, and displaying statistical data in the form of type tables. This
convention has been adopted in this paper in order to integrate these
new data within the established literature and to provide all the detail
necessary for secondary analysis and further interpretation within the
theoretical framework afforded by psychological type. Type tables have
been designed to provide information about the 16 discrete psycho-
logical types, about the four dichotomous preferences, about the six
sets of pairs and temperaments, about the dominant types, and about
the introverted and extraverted Jungian types. Commentary on this
table will, however, be restricted to those aspects of the data strictly
relevant to the research question.
Type tables are also designed to test the statistical significance of
differences between groups (in the present study specifically between
clergy and the general population). This is calculated by means of the
selection ratio (I), an extension of the chi-square.
Results
Table 1 presents the type distribution for the 413 clergymen who
participated in the survey. These data demonstrated that clergymen
serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) displayed preferences for
introversion (53%) over extraversion (47%), for intuition (55%) over
sensing (45%), for feeling (66%) over thinking (34%), and for judg-
ing (74%) over perceiving (26%). In terms of dominant types, 32%
were dominant feeling, 31% dominant intuition, 24% dominant sens-
ing, and 13% dominant thinking. The most frequently occurring types
were ESFJ (13%), INFJ (12%), ISFJ (11%), and ENFJ (10%).
Table 1 also compares the type distribution for the clergymen
with the type distribution for males in the USA national represen-
tative sample (N = 1,478) published by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck,
and Hammer (2003). These data demonstrated that the clergymen
displayed a significantly higher preference for intuition than men in
general (55% compared with 28%), a significantly higher preference
for feeling (66% compared with 44%), and a significantly higher pref-
erence for judging (74% compared with 52%). Clergymen and men
Table 1. Type Distribution for Clergymen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA),
Compared with the USA Male Population Norms
N = 413
The Sixteen Complete Types Dichotomous Preferences
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 194 (47.0%) I = 1.02
n = 41 n = 44 n = 50 n = 34 I n = 219 (53.0%) I = 0.98
(9.9%) (10.7%) (12.1%) (8.2%)
I = 0.61*** I = 1.32 I = 9.42*** I = 2.48*** S n = 184 (44.6%) ***I = 0.62
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 229 (55.4%) ***I = 1.96
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++
+ ++ T n = 141 (34.1%) ***I = 0.60
F n = 272 (65.9%) ***I = 1.51
J n = 306 (74.1%) ***I = 1.42

P n = 107 (25.9%) ***I = 0.54
ISTP ISFP INFP INTP Pairs and Temperaments
n=2 n = 11 n = 28 n=9
(0.5%) (2.7%) (6.8%) (2.2%) IJ n = 169 (40.9%) ***I = 1.41
I = 0.06*** I = 0.35*** I = 1.64* I = 0.45* IP n = 50 (12.1%) ***I = 0.48
+ +++ +++++ ++ EP n = 57 (13.8%) ***I = 0.60
++ EJ n = 137 (33.2%) ***I = 1.44
ST n = 66 (16.0%) ***I = 0.38

SF n = 118 (28.6%) I = 0.95
NF n = 154 (37.3%) ***I = 2.77
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 75 (18.2%) I = 1.23
n=2 n = 10 n = 35 n = 10
(0.5%) (2.4%) (8.5%) (2.4%) SJ n = 159 (38.5%) I = 0.89
I = 0.09*** I = 0.35*** I = 1.32 I = 0.61 SP n = 25 (6.1%) ***I = 0.21
+ ++ +++++ ++ NP n = 82 (19.9%) I = 1.03
++++ NJ n = 147 (35.6%) ***I = 3.99
TJ n = 118 (28.6%) I = 0.85

TP n = 23 (5.6%) ***I = 0.24
FP n = 84 (20.3%) I = 0.81
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 188 (45.5%) ***I = 2.46
n = 21 n = 53 n = 41 n = 22
(5.1%) (12.8%) (9.9%) (5.3%) IN n = 121 (29.3%) ***I = 2.17
I = 0.46*** I = 1.71*** I = 6.11*** I = 1.97** EN n = 108 (26.2%) ***I = 1.77
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ IS n = 98 (23.7%) ***I = 0.59
+++++ +++++ ES n = 86 (20.8%) ***I = 0.67
+++
ET n = 55 (13.3%) ***I = 0.57
EF n = 139 (33.7%) ***I = 1.50
IF n = 133 (32.2%) ***I = 1.53
IT n = 86 (20.8%) ***I = 0.63
Jungian Types (E) Jungian Types (I) Dominant Types

n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 43 10.4 0.75 I-TP 11 2.7 0.20*** Dt. T 54 13.1 0.48***
E-FJ 94 22.8 2.49*** I-FP 39 9.4 0.81 Dt. F 133 32.2 1.55***
ES-P 12 2.9 0.23*** IS-J 85 20.6 0.84 Dt. S 97 23.5 0.64***
EN-P 45 10.9 1.05 IN-J 84 20.3 4.42*** Dt. N 129 31.2 2.08***
Note: + = 1 % of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 2. Type Distribution of Clergywomen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA),

Compared with the USA Female Population Norms
N = 148
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 64 (43.2%) *I = 0.82
n=6 n = 23 n = 25 n=9 I n = 84 (56.6%) *I = 1.20
(4.1%) (15.5%) (16.9%) (6.1%)
I = 0.59 I = 0.80 I = 10.34*** I = 7.16*** S n = 53 (35.8%) ***I = 0.48
++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 95 (64.2%) ***I = 2.55
+++++ +++++ +
+++++ +++++ T n = 29 (19.6%) I = 0.80
+ ++ F n = 119 (80.4%) I = 1.06
J n = 101 (68.2%) **I = 1.21

P n = 47 (31.8%) **I = 0.72
n=2 n=2 n = 16 n=1
(1.4%) (1.4%) (10.8%) (0.7%) IJ n = 63 (42.6%) ***I = 1.48
I = 0.57 I = 0.14*** I = 2.33*** I = 0.38 IP n = 21 (14.2%) I = 0.76
+ + +++++ + EP n = 26 (17.6%) *I = 0.70
+++++ EJ n = 38 (25.7%) I = 0.94
+
ST n = 11 (7.4%) ***I = 0.40
SF n = 42 (28.4%) ***I = 0.50
NF n = 77 (52.0%) ***I = 2.71
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 18 (12.2%) **I = 2.05
n=0 n=4 n = 20 n=2
(0.0%) (2.7%) (13.5%) (1.4%) SJ n = 45 (30.4%) ***I = 0.61
I = 0.0* I = 0.27** I = 1.40 I = 0.56 SP n=8 (5.4%) ***I = 0.21
+++ +++++ + NP n = 39 (26.4%) *I = 1.43
+++++ NJ n = 56 (37.8%) *I = 5.68
++++
TJ n = 24 (16.2%) I = 1.08
TP n=5 (3.4%) *I = 0.35
FP n = 42 (28.4%) I = 0.83
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 77 (52.0%) **I = 1.26
n=3 n = 13 n = 16 n=6
(2.0%) (8.8%) (10.8%) (4.1%) IN n = 51 (34.5%) ***I = 3.88
I = 0.32* I = 0.52** I = 3.31*** I = 4.43*** EN n = 44 (29.7%) ***I = 1.83
++ +++++ +++++ ++++ IS n = 33 (22.3%) ***I = 0.58
++++ +++++ ES n = 20 (13.5%) ***I = 0.37
+
ET n = 11 (7.4%) I = 0.59
EF n = 53 (35.8%) I = 0.90
IF n = 66 (44.6%) *I = 1.25
IT n = 18 (12.2%) I = 1.02
n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 9 6.1 0.85 I-TP 3 2.0 0.49 Dt. T 12 8.1 0.72
E-FJ 29 19.6 0.97 I-FP 18 12.2 0.83 Dt. F 47 31.8 0.91
ES-P 4 2.7 0.21*** IS-J 29 19.6 0.74 Dt. S 33 22.3 0.57***
EN-P 22 14.9 1.23 IN-J 34 23.0 9.26*** Dt. N 56 37.8 2.60***
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

in general displayed similar levels of preference for introversion (53%

and 54% respectively). In terms of dominant types, compared with
men in general, among the clergymen there were higher levels of dom-
inant feeling (32% compared with 21%), higher levels of dominant
intuition (31% compared with 15%), lower levels of dominant sens-
ing (24% compared with 37%), and lower levels of dominant thinking
(13% compared with 27%). In terms of the 16 discrete types, compared
with men in general, among the clergymen there were significant over-
representations of INFJ (12% compared with 1%), ENFJ (10% com-
pared with 2%), INTJ (8% compared with 3%), ESFJ (13% compared
with 8%), and ENTJ (5% compared with 3%).
Table 2 presents the type distribution for the 148 clergywomen who
participated in the survey. These data demonstrated that clergywomen
serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) displayed preferences for
sensing (36%), for feeling (80%) over thinking (20%), and for judging
(68%) over perceiving (32%). In terms of dominant types, 38% were
dominant intuition, 32% were dominant feeling, 23% were dominant
sensing, and 8% were dominant thinking. The most frequently occur-
ring types were INFJ (17%), ISFJ (16%), and ENFP (14%).
Table 2 also compares the type distribution of the clergywomen
with the type distribution for females in the USA national represen-
tative sample (N = 1531) published by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck,
and Hammer (2003). These data demonstrated that the clergywomen
displayed a significantly higher preference for intuition than women
in general (64% compared with 25%), a significantly higher prefer-
ence for judging (68% compared with 56%), and a significantly higher
preference for introversion (57% compared with 48%). Clergywomen
and women in general displayed similar levels of preference for feeling
(80% and 76% respectively). In terms of dominant types, compared
with women in general, among the clergywomen there were higher
levels of dominant intuition (38% compared with 15%) and lower lev-
els of dominant sensing (22% compared with 40%), but there were
comparable levels of dominant feeling (32% and 35% respectively) and
comparable levels of dominant thinking (8% and 11% respectively).
In terms of the 16 discrete types, compared with women in general,
among the clergywomen there were significant over-representations of
INFJ (17% compared with 2%), INTJ (6% compared with 1%), INFP
(11% compared with 5%), ENFJ (11% compared with 3%), and ENTJ
(4% compared with 1%).
Table 3. Type Distribution of Clergymen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA),

Compared with Clergywomen
N = 413
n = 41 n = 44 n = 50 n = 34 I n = 219 (53.0%) I = 0.93
(9.9%) (10.7%) (12.1%) (8.2%)
I = 2.45* I = 0.69 I = 0.72 I = 1.35 S n = 184 (44.6%) I = 1.24
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 229 (55.4%) I = 0.86
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++
+ ++ T n = 141 (34.1%) ***I = 1.74
F n = 272 (65.9%) ***I = 0.82
J n = 306 (74.1%) I = 1.09

P n = 107 (25.9%) I = 0.82

n=2 n = 11 n = 28 n=9
(0.5%) (2.7%) (6.8%) (2.2%) IJ n = 169 (40.9%) I = 0.96
I = 0.36 I = 1.97 I = 0.63 I = 3.23 IP n = 50 (12.1%) I = 0.85
+ +++ +++++ ++ EP n = 57 (13.8%) I = 0.79
++ EJ n = 137 (33.2%) I = 1.29
ST n = 66 (16.0%) **I = 2.15

SF n = 118 (28.6%) I = 1.01
NF n = 154 (37.3%) **I = 0.72
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 75 (18.5%) I = 1.49
n=2 n = 10 n = 35 n = 10
(0.5%) (2.4%) (8.5%) (2.4%) SJ n = 159 (38.5%) I = 1.27
I = 0.0 I = 0.90 I = 0.63 I = 1.79 SP n = 25 (6.1%) I = 1.12
++ +++++ ++ NP n = 82 (19.9%) I = 0.75
++++ NJ n = 147 (35.6%) I = 0.94
TJ n = 118 (28.6%) **I = 1.76

TP n = 23 (5.6%) I = 1.65
FP n = 84 (20.3%) *I = 0.72
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 188 (45.5%) I = 0.87
n = 21 n = 53 n = 41 n = 22
(5.1%) (12.8%) (9.9%) (5.3%) IN n = 121 (29.3%) I = 0.85
I = 2.51 I = 1.46 I = 0.92 I = 1.13 EN n = 108 (26.2%) I = 0.88
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ IS n = 98 (23.7%) I = 1.06
+++++ +++++ ES n = 86 (20.8%) *I = 1.54
+++
ET n = 55 (13.3%) I = 1.79
EF n = 139 (33.7%) I = 0.94
IF n = 133 (32.2%) **I = 0.72
IT n = 86 (20.8%) *I = 1.71
n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 43 10.4 1.71 I-TP 11 2.7 1.31 Dt. T 54 13.1 1.61
E-FJ 94 22.8 1.16 I-FP 39 9.4 0.78 Dt. F 133 32.2 1.01
ES-P 12 2.9 1.08 IS-J 85 20.6 1.05 Dt. S 97 23.5 1.05
EN-P 45 10.9 0.73 IN-J 84 20.3 0.89 Dt. N 129 31.2 0.83
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 3 compares the psychological type profiles of the clergymen with

the psychological type profiles of the clergywomen. The remarkable
feature of this table concerns the lack of statistically significant differ-
ences. In terms of the binary constructs, clergymen and clergywomen
shared comparable levels of preference for introversion (53% and
57%), for intuition (55% and 64%) and for judging (74% and 68%).
The statistically significant difference concerns the higher preference
for feeling among clergywomen (80% compared with 66%).
Table 4 displays the binary psychological type preferences of the
clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church
(USA) with the data provided by Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley,
and Slater (2007) on the psychological type preferences of 626 cler-
gymen and 237 clergywomen serving in the Church of England.
There were broad similarities between the two groups of clergy serv-
ing in different denominations and on different continents. In both
groups, both clergymen and clergywomen displayed clear preferences
for introversion, for intuition, for feeling, and for judging. The sta-
tistical tests demonstrated that there were no significant differences
between the clergywomen serving in the two churches. Among the
clergymen, however, there were higher proportions preferring feeling
and judging in the USA and higher proportions preferring intuition
in the UK.
Discussion
The present study set out to extend a growing body of research con-
cerned with exploring the application of Jungian psychological type
theory for illuminating the personality profile of religious profession-
als by focusing on clergywomen and clergymen serving in The Presby-
terian Church (USA). Data were provided by 561 clergy participating
within a representative panel survey. These data enabled three hypoth-
eses to be explored.
The first hypothesis was that religious professionals comprise a
highly distinctive subgroup of the population. Comparison with the
USA population norms provided by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck, and
Hammer (2003) supported this view. Four main features of the dis-
tinctive psychological type profile of clergy were of particular note.
First, both clergymen and clergywomen were much more likely to pre-
fer intuition than is the case among men and women in general. This
Table 4. Comparing Psychological Type Preferences of Clergy

in The Presbyterian Church (USA) and in the Church of England (UK)
clergymen clergywomen
USA UK I USA UK I
% % % %
Orientations
Extraversion 47.0 43.1 1.09 43.2 46.0 0.94
Introversion 53.0 56.9 0.93 56.8 54.0 1.05
Perceiving process
Sensing 44.6 38.3 1.16* 35.8 35.4 1.01
Intuition 55.4 61.7 0.90* 64.2 64.6 0.99
Judging process
Thinking 34.1 46.5 0.73*** 19.6 26.2 0.75
Feeling 65.9 53.5 1.23*** 80.4 73.8 1.09
Attitudes
Judging 74.1 68.2 1.09* 68.2 64.6 1.06
Perceiving 25.9 31.8 0.81* 31.8 35.4 0.09
Note: * p < .05, *** p < .001
finding is consistent with the view that religious ideas, principles and
visions for the future are more likely to attract intuitives. Second, both
clergymen and clergywomen were more likely to prefer judging than is
the case among men and women in general. This finding is consistent
with the view that organized religion and church life are more likely
to attract judgers. Third, in terms of the judging processes, clergymen
were much more likely to prefer feeling than men in general. Given
that feeling is par excellence a feminine characteristic (preferred in the
population as a whole by 44% of men and 76% of women), this finding
is consistent with the view that Christian ministry attracts men who
value the feeling or feminine judging function. Fourth, in terms of
the orientations, clergywomen were more likely to prefer introversion
than women in general. Given that introversion is a masculine char-
acteristic (preferred in the population as a whole by 54% of men and
48% of women) this finding is consistent with the view that the pre-
ferred ministry style of clergywomen emulates the longer-established
introverted ministry style of clergymen.
The second hypothesis was that male and female clergy would share
many psychological type characteristics in common. The data sup-
ported this view. In terms of the perceiving process, both clergymen
and clergywomen were much more likely to prefer intuition than men
and women in general. In this sense, in ministry both sexes shared this
visionary characteristic. In terms of the judging process, both clergy-
men and clergywomen were much more likely to prefer feeling than
to prefer thinking (and for male clergy this was a significant departure
from the profile of men in general). In this sense, in ministry both
sexes shared a calling to pastoral care and to building communities of
harmony and peace. In terms of the attitudes toward the outer world,
both clergymen and clergywomen were more likely to prefer judg-
ing than men and women in general. In this sense, in ministry both
sexes shared a commitment to structure, to order, and to discipline.
In terms of the orientations, both clergymen and clergywomen were
more likely to prefer introversion than to prefer extraversion (and
for female clergy this was a significant departure from the profile of
women in general). In this sense, in ministry both sexes showed a pref-
erence for an introverted style. The view that, overall, men and women
may bring significantly different gifts to ministry was not given much
support from this empirically-based perspective grounded in psycho-
logical type theory.
The third hypothesis was that there would be significant features
in common between the personality profiles of those clergymen and
clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) and
the personality profiles of clergymen and clergywomen serving in
the Church of England, since, in their different ways, both groups of
clergy represent fairly broad and liberal church traditions. In an earlier
study, Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) reported on
the psychological type profiles of 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen
serving in the Church of England. The similarities between the two
groups were pronounced. In both groups, both clergymen and cler-
gywomen displayed clear preferences for introversion, for intuition,
for feeling, and for judging. This distinctive profile distinguishes The
Presbyterian Church (USA) and Church of England clergy from other
religious professionals in interesting ways.
The perceiving process seems to be the key function in distinguish-
ing between the more liberal and the more conservative church tradi-
tions. For example, while 55% of male and 64% of female Presbyterian
clergy, and 62% of male and 65% of female Church of England clergy
preferred intuition, Kay, Francis, and Craig (2008) found just 26%
intuitives among male students attending British Assemblies of God
theological college, and Kay and Francis (2008) found 38% intuitives
among female students attending the British Assemblies of God theo-
logical college.
The judging process seems to be the key function in distinguish-
ing between pastoral and evangelistic ministry. For example, while
66% of male and 80% of female Presbyterian clergy, and 54% of male
and 74% of female Church of England clergy preferred feeling, Craig,
Horsfall, and Francis (2005) found 70% thinkers among male mis-
sionary personnel, and Ryland, Francis, and Robbins (in press) found
60% thinkers among leaders within the Newfrontiers network of
churches.
The orientations seem to be the key function in distinguishing
between the more contemplative traditions and the traditions that
emphasize an outgoing fellowship-focused approach. For example,
while 53% of male and 57% of female Presbyterian clergy, and 57% of
male and 54% of female Church of England clergy preferred introver-
sion, Francis, Gubb, and Robbins (2009) found that the proportion of
introverts fell to 48% among male lead elders in the Newfrontiers net-
work of churches, and Francis, Robbins, and Kay (in press) found that
the proportion of introverts fell to 30% among male leaders within the
Apostolic network of churches.
The attitude toward the outer world seems to be the key function
in distinguishing how tightly church communities are structured. In
some ways, The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Church of Eng-
land may occupy middle territory on this issue. Thus, 74% of male
and 68% of female clergy in The Presbyterian Church (USA), and 68%
male and 65% of the female clergy in the Church of England preferred
judging. The proportion rose even higher to 78% among male lead
elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, &
Robbins, 2009) and fell to 53% among male Christian youth ministers
(Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007).
Conclusion
The present study has enabled the psychological type profile of clergy
serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) to be set alongside the
normative type profile for the population of the USA and alongside
the type profile of religious professionals serving within other tradi-
tions. In common with clergy serving within the Church of England,
both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian

Church (USA) display clear preferences for introversion, for intu-
ition, for feeling, and for judging. Such preferences among the clergy
may help to explain distinctive strengths and weaknesses within
the mission and ministry strategies supported by these churches.
Recognizing these strengths and weaknesses, an understanding of
type theory can also identify ways in which clergy may be helped to
play to their strengths and also be better equipped to manage their
weaknesses.
First, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Pres-
byterian Church (USA) prefer introversion over extraversion. On the
one hand, introverted clergy may be energized by many aspects of
ministry such as private study and preparation, one-to-one encounters
in counseling and in spiritual direction, silent prayer and reflection,
and focusing deeply on interior spiritual issues. On the other hand,
introverted clergy may be drained by many other aspects of min-
istry, such as attending social events, speaking in public (especially
without preparation), talking with strangers as part of evangelism or
parish visiting, and assuming a high profile within the parish. Since
many aspects of the clerical profession tend to require an extraverted
approach to life, introverted clergy may need to be properly prepared
during their initial ministerial training and during their continuing
ministerial education to develop effective coping strategies that enable
them both to fulfill extraverted expectations and then afterwards to
create the personal space necessary to re-energize.
Second, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The
Presbyterian Church (USA) prefer intuition over sensing. On the
one hand, intuitive clergy may be energized by many aspects of minis-
try, such as the opportunity to speculate about meanings and possibili-
ties in scripture, drawing inspiration from the symbols and teachings
of the Church, welcoming change and experimentation in liturgy,
and developing a vision for the future of their church. On the other
hand, intuitive clergy may be drained by other aspects of ministry, such
as the value placed on tradition, encountering resistance to change,
the need to focus on practical realities, and the importance of details
and accuracy in church administration. Since many aspects of the
clerical profession tend to require a sensing approach to life, intui-
tive clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial
ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education
to develop their less preferred sensing function and to appreciate

how sensers perceive their environment.
Third, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Pres-
byterian Church (USA) prefer feeling over thinking. On the one hand,
feeling clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry, such as
spending time caring for others through visiting, counseling or pasto-
ral care, needing to support and empathize with those in need, and the
importance of interpersonal values in Christian teaching, such as love,
harmony, peace, and compassion. On the other hand, feeling clergy
may be drained by other aspects of ministry, such as having to look
at problems objectively and logically, the need to make tough deci-
sions which affect other people’s lives, the need to be critical when
necessary, and parish management. Since many aspects of the clerical
profession tend to require the detached and impartial stance char-
acteristic of a thinking approach to life, feeling clergy may need to
be properly prepared during their initial ministerial training and dur-
ing their continuing ministerial education to develop their less pre-
ferred thinking function and to appreciate how thinkers assess their
environment.
Fourth, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Pres-
byterian Church (USA) prefer judging over perceiving. On the one
hand, judging clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry,
such as the need for organization both in their own lives and in the life
of their parishes, arranging services and events well in advance, main-
taining efficient administrative systems, and managing local affairs.
On the other hand, judging types may be drained by other aspects of
ministry, such as the need to think on their feet, responding effectively
to unanticipated crises, and adapting to changing situations. Since
many aspects of ministry tend to require the flexibility, spontaneity,
and responsiveness characteristic of a perceiving approach to life,
judging clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial
ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education
to develop their less preferred perceiving attitude toward the outer
world and to develop strategies which enable them to function con-
fidently in situations for which they have not had time to prepare in
advance.
One effective way of addressing these issues during initial min-
isterial training and during continuing ministerial education is
through enhancing self-awareness by means of psychological type
workshops. Such workshops need to be operated, however, by staff
fully conversant with the theology of individual differences and with

the broader contexts of personality psychology, as well as with an in-
depth understanding of psychological type theory and the relevant
related research.
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ALL ARE CALLED, BUT SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES
ARE MORE LIKELY TO RESPOND:
PROFILING CHURCHGOERS IN AUSTRALIA
Mandy Robbins* and Leslie J. Francis
Abstract
A sample of 1,527 churchgoers (591 males and 936 females) from a range of differ-
ent Christian denominations completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales within
the context of the Australian National Church Life Survey. Compared with the data
held by the Australian Archive of the Psychological Type Research Unit, both male
and female churchgoers displayed significantly higher levels of preference for sensing,
for feeling, and for judging. Male churchgoers displayed significantly higher levels of
preference for introversion. The two predominant types among female churchgoers
were ISFJ (23%) and ESFJ (22%), compared with 13% and 8% respectively in the wider
population. The two predominant types among male churchgoers were ISTJ (29%)
and ESTJ (15%), compared with 21% and 16% respectively in the wider population.
In principle, churches proclaim their invitation to worship to all psychological types.
In practice, some psychological types appear more willing to respond.
Keywords: psychological type, religion, psychology, churchgoers, congregations,

Australia
The potential connection between personality and religion has long

been a topic of interest within the empirical psychology of religion, as
discussed by Argyle (1958). Integration of empirical research findings
in this field was frustrated, however, for a number of years by the way
in which individual studies employed widely diverse operationaliza-
tions and measures both of personality and of religion. The review
of the literature undertaken by Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence from extant studies to draw
any firm conclusions. Two decades later in their subsequent review,
Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) demonstrated just how much the
field of enquiry had matured, largely in light of a series of studies that
* Author Note: Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick;

Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick.

all are called 213
systematically explored the association between religion and the three

dimensions of personality identified and measured by the Eysenckian
model that conceptualized individual differences in terms of the three
orthogonal dimensions styled extraversion, neuroticism, and psy-
choticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). This body of studies routinely
demonstrated the connection between lower psychoticism scores and
higher levels of religiosity.
A second model of personality that has more recently emerged as a
powerful tool within the social scientific study of religion and empiri-
cal theology is psychological type theory, as originally proposed by
Jung (1971). Recent introductions to, and reviews of, this body of
research were provided by Francis (2005, 2009). In its current form,
developed from Jung’s original model, psychological type theory dis-
tinguishes between four aspects of personality: the two orientations,
styled introversion and extraversion; the two perceiving functions,
styled sensing and intuition; the two judging functions, styled feeling
and thinking; and the two attitudes toward the outer world, styled
judging and perceiving.
In Jung’s theory, the orientations are concerned with the primary
source of psychological energy. People who prefer introversion focus
their attention on the inner world of ideas and draw their energy from
that inner world. When introverts are tired and need energizing, they
look to the inner world. Introverts are reflective, may consider deeply
before acting, and they probe inwardly for stimulation. Introverts like
quiet for concentration. Introverts work best alone and may resent
distractions and interruptions from other people. People who prefer
extraversion focus their attention on the outer world of people and
things and draw their energy from that outer world. When extraverts
are tired and need energizing, they look to the outer world. Extraverts
like variety and action. Extraverts like to have other people around
them in the working environment, and they enjoy the stimulus of sud-
den interruptions and telephone calls. Extraverts like to act quickly
and decisively, even when it is not totally appropriate to do so. The
meaning of the terms extravert and introvert differ from the layper-
son’s view, as they are often taken to mean sociable and shy, respec-
tively. In Jung’s theory, extraversion and introversion are concerned
with the direction of psychological energy rather than sociability.
In Jung’s theory, the perceiving functions are concerned with the
way in which individuals take in information. People who prefer sens-
ing are practical people. They make good use of all of their five senses.
214 mandy robbins and leslie j. francis
They attend to practical and factual details, and they are in touch with
physical realities. They observe the small details of everyday life and
attend to step-by-step experience. They prefer to let the eyes tell the
mind. People who prefer intuition are imaginative people. They make
good use of their memory and seek to find patterns and associations
with previous experience. They see patterns and meanings and assess
possibilities. They are good at reading between the lines and project-
ing possibilities for the future. They prefer always to go for the “big
picture.” They prefer to let the mind tell the eyes.
In Jung’s theory, the judging functions are concerned with the ways
in which individuals make decisions and form judgments. People who
prefer to make judgments using feeling place people, relationships,
and interpersonal matters high on their agenda. They develop good
skills at applying personal priorities. They are good at weighing their
own values and motives, as well as the values and motives of other
people. They are characterized by qualities of empathy and sympathy.
They prize harmony and trust. People who prefer to make judgments
using thinking place justice, truth, and reason high on their agenda.
They develop good powers of critical analysis. They use objective and
impersonal criteria in reaching decisions. They follow rationally the
relationships between cause and effect. They develop characteristics
of being firm-minded and prizing logical order. They may sometimes
appear skeptical.
In developments of Jung’s theory, the attitudes towards the outer
world distinguish between individuals who extravert their preferred
perceiving function (sensing or intuition) and individuals who extra-
vert their preferred judging function (thinking or feeling). People
who use their preferred judging process in the outer world present a
planned and orderly approach to the life. They prefer to have a settled
system in place and display a preference for closure. They schedule
projects so that each step gets done on time. They like to get things
finished and settled, and they like to know that the finished product is
in place. They work best when they can plan their work in advance and
follow that plan. Judging types use lists and agendas to structure their
day and to plan their actions. They may dislike interruption from the
plans they have made and are reluctant to leave the current task even
when something more urgent arises. People who use their preferred
perceiving function in the outer world present a flexible and spontane-
ous approach to life. They prefer to keep plans and organization to a
minimum and display a preference for openness. They adapt well to
all are called 215
changing situations. They make allowances for new information and

for changes in the situation in which they are living or acting. They
may have trouble making decisions, feeling that they have never quite
got enough information on which to base their decision.
While psychological type theory begins by introducing the building
blocks of the four bipolar preferences, the real interest and power of
the theory comes from the way in which these four bipolar prefer-
ences generate 16 discrete psychological types. For example, one of
the authors of the present paper (Leslie J. Francis) prefers introver-
sion over extraversion, intuition over sensing, thinking over feeling,
and judging over perceiving. In terms of the typology, he is therefore
described an INTJ. In terms of type dynamics, an INTJ’s strongest
characteristics are described as dominant introverted intuition and
auxiliary extraverted thinking.
Psychological type theory has given rise to the development of a
family of psychological instruments capable of measuring preferences
for introversion or extraversion, for sensing or intuition, for thinking
or feeling, and for judging or perceiving. Three of these instruments
in particular have begun to generate fruitful streams of empirical
research concerned with applying psychological type theory to areas of
church life and the Christian community. There are the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament
Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type
Scales (Francis, 2005).
One stream of research has focused on charting the psychological
type profile of religious professionals training for ministry or serving
in ministry within a range of different denominations in the United
Kingdom. These studies included, for example, Anglican Church in
Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001; Francis & Payne,
2002; Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010), male and female Bible college
students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), evangelical church leaders
(Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male mis-
sionary personnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay
church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catho-
lic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis,
Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), evangelical Anglican seminarians (Fran-
cis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), Assemblies of God theological college stu-
dents (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008), Newfrontiers
lead elders (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009), Newfrontiers leaders
(Ryland, Francis, & Robbins, in press), Anglican health-care chaplains
(Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009), male and female Angli-
can clergy in the Church of England (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley,
& Slater, 2007; Francis, Robbins, Duncan, Whinney, & Ross, 2010;
Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press), Free Church ministers in
England (Francis, Whinney, Burton, & Robbins, 2011) and Methodist
circuit ministers in Britain (Burton, Francis, & Robbins, 2010).
Compared with the research invested in religious professionals,
currently much less is known about the psychological type profile of
church congregations. The nine published studies in this area have
all been conducted among relatively small samples, and integration
of the findings is made difficult by four features of these studies. The
studies have been conducted among different denominational groups.
The studies have been conducted in different countries. Some of the
studies present information for males and females separately, while
others analyze the two sexes together. The samples have been consti-
tuted in very different ways and may not be properly representative of
congregations as a whole.
Research in the United States of America was reported by Gerhardt
(1983) and by Rehak (1998). Gerhardt (1983) studied a sample of 83
adult Unitarian Universalists. Among this sample, the data revealed
preferences for introversion (59%), for intuition (78%), and for judg-
ing (67%). The balance was close between thinking (52%) and feel-
ing (48%). Rehak (1998) studied Evangelical Lutherans with a sample
of 76 active members. Among this sample, the data revealed prefer-
ences for introversion (68%) and for feeling (74%). Even balances were
found between sensing (50%) and intuition (50%) and between judg-
ing (51%) and perceiving (49%).
Research in Canada was reported by Delis-Bulhoes (1990) and by
Ross (1993, 1995). Delis-Bulhoes (1990) studied Francophone Roman
Catholics and Evangelical Protestants, with samples of 48 Catholics
and 154 Protestants. Among the Protestants, the data revealed prefer-
ences for introversion (71%), for sensing (88%), for thinking (62%),
and for judging (62%). Among the Catholics, the data revealed prefer-
ences for introversion (65%), for sensing (72%), for feeling (57%), and
for judging (67%). Ross (1993) studied Anglicans, with a sample of 116
individuals. The data revealed preferences for introversion (62%), for
intuition (64%), for feeling (69%), and for judging (59%). Ross (1995)
studied Anglophone Roman Catholics, with a sample of 175 individu-
als. The data were analyzed by sex. The women displayed preferences
all are called 217
for introversion (53%), for sensing (54%), for feeling (75%), and for
judging (61%). The men displayed preferences for introversion (54%),
for thinking (59%), and for judging (59%), and a balance between
sensing (51%) and intuition (49%).
Research in England was reported by Francis, Duncan, Craig, and
Luffman (2004) and by Francis, Butler, Jones, and Craig (2007). Fran-
cis, Duncan, Craig and Luffman (2004) profiled five typical Anglican
congregations in central England and reported on the data provided
by 116 men and by 211 women separately. Among the women, there
were preferences for introversion (56%), for sensing (74%), for feeling
(73%), and for judging (67%). Among the men, there were preferences
for introversion (66%), for sensing (68%), and for judging (70%), and
a balance between thinking (48%) and feeling (52%). Francis, Butler,
Jones, and Craig (2007) profiled 93 female and 65 male active mem-
bers of the Church of England. Among the women, there were pref-
erences for introversion (56%), for sensing (55%), for feeling (79%),
and for judging (72%). Among the men, there were preferences for
introversion (54%), for thinking (57%), and for judging (79%), and a
balance between sensing (49%) and intuition (51%).
Research in Wales was reported by Craig, Francis, Bailey, and Rob-
bins (2003) and by Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007).
Craig, Francis, Bailey, and Robbins (2003) profiled 101 churchgoers
from three Church in Wales benefices. The data recorded preferences
for introversion (61%), for sensing (85%), for feeling (65%), and
for judging (92%). Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007)
reported on data provided by 52 men and by 133 women separately.
Among the women, there were preferences for sensing (84%), for feel-
ing (76%), and for judging (87%), and a balance between introversion
(51%) and extraversion (49%). Among the men, there were prefer-
ences for sensing (77%), for feeling (63%), and for judging (90%), and
a balance between introversion (50%) and extraversion (50%).
Attempts to draw these disparate findings together suggest that there
may be significant differences not only between male and female con-
gregants but also between denominations and countries. At the same
time, however, there are two major weaknesses with this growing body
of research concerned with exploring the psychological type profile of
churchgoers. The first weakness is that each study is based on a rela-
tively small number of individuals. The second weakness is that only
one of these studies (Francis, Robbins, Williams, & Williams, 2007)
made a direct comparison between the type profile of churchgoers and

wider population studies. Such comparison is crucial in order to estab-
lish whether churchgoers are a distinctive subgroup of the population
or broadly representative of the population as a whole.
Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007) compared their
sample of rural Anglican churchgoers in Wales (N = 185) with the
United Kingdom population norms for men (N = 748) and for women
(N = 865) provided by Kendall (1998). Their data drew attention to
the significant over-representation of the combined preference for SFJ
among churchgoers and to the consequent under-representation of
other types. Among women, ISFJ accounts for 32% of churchgoers,
compared with 18% of the general population (p < .001), and ESFJ
accounts for 28% of churchgoers, compared with 19% of the general
population (p < .01). Among men, ISFJ accounts for 19% of churchgo-
ers, compared with 7% of the general population (p < .001), and ESFJ
accounts for 27% of churchgoers, compared with 6% of the general
population (p < .001).
Against this background, the aim of the present papers is to build
on and to extend previous research concerned with the psychological
type profiling of church congregations in three ways. First, existing
studies in this field have been based in Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America: The present study was based in Aus-
tralia. Second, existing studies have relied on relatively small samples
(the largest involving 327 individuals): The present study aimed for
at least 1,500 participants. Third, only one existing study compared
the profile of churchgoers with wider population profiles: The present
study drew on wider data available in Australia.
Three aspects of the context of the present study require further
clarification: the nature of the sample, the measure of psychologi-
cal type, and the provenance of the wider population data. First, the
opportunity to sample a broad range of church congregations within
Australia was made possible through the Australian National Church
Life Survey (NCLS) which has facilitated regular survey work among
church congregations over two decades (Kaldor, Bellamy, Correy, &
Powell, 1992; Kaldor et al., 1995; Kaldor, Bellamy, Powell, Castle, &
Hughes, 1999; Kaldor, Bellamy, Powell, Hughes, & Castle, 1997; Kal-
dor et al., 1999). The method employed by NCLS is to design a number
of different questionnaires that are randomly distributed throughout
the participating congregations. While the different questionnaires
all are called 219
incorporate the same body of core questions, each variant also contains
a number of distinctive questions. In the 2001 round of the NCLS, one
of the variants included a recognized measure of psychological type.
Second, the measure of psychological type included in the ques-
tionnaire was the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005).
This instrument was selected because, unlike the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the Keirsey Temperament
Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), it had been designed specifically for
application within the self-completion questionnaire-style survey. This
questionnaire has already been used extensively in surveys among reli-
gious professionals (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Rob-
bins, 2004; Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009; Ryland et al., in press;
Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009; Burton, Francis, & Rob-
bins, 2010; Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010), as well as in pioneering
surveys among church congregations (Craig, Francis, Bailey, & Rob-
bins, 2003; Francis, Robbins, Williams, & Williams, 2007).
Third, there has been no normative psychological type published
for Australia comparable with the norms published for the United
Kingdom by Kendall (1998). In the absence of such data, the Austra-
lian Archive held by the Psychological Type Research Unit at Deakin
University provides a useful point of reference (Ball, 2008). Currently,
the Archive holds data on 12,645 males and 9,513 females who have
completed Forms G, K, or M of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.
Method
Participants
In 2001, a total of 18 denominations participated in the Australian
National Church Life Survey. Of the male respondents, 7.9% were
under the age of 20, 10.2% were in their 20s, 14.3% were in their
30s, 20.8% were in their 40s, 17.2% were in their 50s, 16.3% were
in their 60s, and 13.3% were aged 70 or over. Over half of the male
respondents attended either a Catholic church (30.7%) or an Angli-
can church (23.5%). Other churches attended included the Uniting
Church (14.2%), Baptist (9.7%), Church of Christ (4.2%), Assemblies
of God (3.8%), and Lutheran (3.4%).
Of the female respondents, 6.9% were under the age of 20, 11.8%
in their 20s, 16.1% were in their 30s, 19.2% were in their 40s, 16.1%
were in their 50s, 16.3% were in their 60s, and 13.5% were aged 70
or over. Over half of the female respondents attended either a Catho-

lic church (30.7%) or an Anglican church (23.5%). Other churches
attended included the Uniting Church (14.2%), Baptist (9.7%), Church
of Christ (4.2%), Assemblies of God (3.8%), and Lutheran (3.4%).
Measure
Scales (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This is a 40-item instrument comprising
four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four compo-
nents of psychological type: orientation (extraversion or introversion),
perceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking
or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiv-
ing). Recent studies have demonstrated that this instrument functions
well in church related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig, and Hall
(2008) reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN
scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale.
Procedure
Twenty different forms of the Australian National Church Life Sur-
vey questionnaire were distributed among participating congregations,
and version U included a measure of psychological type.
Data Analysis
The research literature concerning the empirical investigation of psy-
chological type has developed a highly distinctive method for analyz-
ing, handling, and displaying statistical data in the form of type tables.
This convention has been adopted in this paper in order to integrate
these new data within the established literature and to provide all
the detail necessary for secondary analyses and further interpretation
within the rich theoretical framework afforded by psychological type.
Type tables have been designed to provide information about the 16
discrete psychological types, about the four dichotomous preferences,
about the six sets of pairs and temperaments, about the dominant
types, and about the introverted and extraverted Jungian types. Com-
mentary on this table, however, will be restricted to those aspects of
the data strictly relevant to the research question.
all are called 221
Results
The type distribution for the 936 female Australian churchgoers is pre-
sented in Table 1. These data demonstrated preferences for sensing
(81%), for feeling (62%), and for judging (87%), with similar levels
of preference for introversion (52%) and for extraversion (48%). The
predominant types among the female churchgoers were ISFJ (23%)
and ESFJ (22%). In other words, the SFJ preference accounted for
45% of the female churchgoers. The second most strongly represented
types among the female churchgoers were ISTJ (16%) and ESTJ (13%).
In other words, the STJ preference accounted for 28% of the female
churchgoers.
The type distribution for the 591 male Australian churchgoers is
presented in Table 2. These data demonstrated preferences for intro-
version (59%), for sensing (78%), for thinking (60%) and for judging
(88%). The predominant types among the male churchgoers were ISTJ
(29%) and ESTJ (15%). In other words, the STJ preference accounted
for 44% of the male churchgoers. The second most strongly repre-
sented types among the male churchgoers were ESFJ (14%) and ISFJ
(13%). In other words, the SFJ preference accounted for 27% of the
male churchgoers.
Greater meaning is given to these figures when they are contextual-
ized against the Australian Archive of the Psychological Type Research
Unit. Four main features emerge from the contextualization of the
binary preferences. First, in terms of the perceiving process, there is
a significantly higher proportion of sensers in church congregations
than in the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 81% pre-
fer sensing, compared with 52% in the wider population; among male
churchgoers, 78% prefer sensing, compared with 58% in the wider
population. Second, in terms of attitude toward the outer world, there
is a significantly higher proportion of judgers in church congregations
than in the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 87% prefer
judging, compared with 59% in the wider population; among male
churchgoers, 88% prefer judging, compared with 66% in the wider
population. Third, in terms of the judging process, there is a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of feelers in church congregations than in
the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 62% prefer feeling,
compared with 56% in the wider population; among male churchgo-
ers, 40% prefer feeling, compared with 22% in the wider population.
Fourth, in terms of the orientations, the findings are not so clear cut.
Table 1. Type Distribution for Female Churchgoers in Australia, Compared with Wider
Female Population Norms
N = 936

n = 148 n = 217 n = 38 n = 36 I n = 486 (51.9%) I = 0.96
(15.8%) (23.2%) (4.1%) (3.8%)
I = 1.63*** I = 1.82*** I = 0.68* I = 0.73 S n = 759 (81.1%) ***I = 1.55
+++++ +++++ ++++ ++++ N n = 177 (18.9%) ***I = 0.40
+++++ +++++
+++++ +++++ T n = 359 (38.4%) *I = 0.91
+ +++++ F n = 577 (61.6%) *I = 1.06
+++
J n = 814 (87.0%) ***I = 1.47
P n = 122 (13.0%) ***I = 0.32
n=9 n = 19 n=8 n = 11
(1.0%) (2.0%) (0.9%) (1.2%) IJ n = 439 (46.9%) ***I = 1.39
I = 0.35*** I = 0.42*** I = 0.10*** I = 0.29*** IP n = 47 (5.0%) ***I = 0.25
+ ++ + + EP n = 75 (8.0%) ***I = 0.38
EJ n = 375 (40.1%) ***I = 1.58
ST n = 287 (30.7%) ***I = 1.36

SF n = 472 (50.4%) ***I = 1.70
NF n = 105 (11.2%) ***I = 0.40
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 72 (7.7%) ***I = 0.40
n = 13 n = 32 n = 25 n=5
(1.4%) (3.4%) (2.7%) (0.5%) SJ n = 686 (73.3%) ***I = 1.91
I = 0.54* I = 0.89 I = 0.30*** I = 0.10*** SP n = 73 (7.8%) ***I = 0.56
+ +++ +++ + NP n = 49 (5.2%) ***I = 0.19
NJ n = 128 (13.7%) ***I = 0.66
TJ n = 328 (34.3%) ***I = 1.26
TP n = 38 (4.1%) ***I = 0.27
FP n = 84 (9.0%) ***I = 0.34
n = 117 n = 204 n = 34 n = 20
(12.5%) (21.8%) (3.6%) (2.1%) IN n = 93 (9.9%) ***I = 0.42
I = 1.63*** I = 2.66*** I = 0.75 I = 0.46*** EN n = 84 (9.0%) ***I = 0.37
+++++ +++++ ++++ ++ IS n = 393 (42.0%) ***I = 1.40
+++++ +++++ ES n = 366 (39.1%) ***I = 1.76
+++ +++++
+++++ ET n = 155 (16.6%) **I = 0.82
++ EF n = 295 (31.5%) ***I = 1.22
IF n = 282 (30.1%) I = 0.94
IT n = 204 (21.8%) I = 1.00

n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 137 14.6 1.19* I-TP 20 2.1 0.31*** Dt. T 157 16.8 0.88
E-FJ 238 25.4 1.95*** I-FP 27 2.9 0.22*** Dt. F 265 28.3 1.08
ES-P 45 4.8 0.75 IS-J 365 39.0 1.74*** Dt. S 410 43.8 1.52***
EN-P 30 3.2 0.22*** IN-J 74 7.9 0.70** Dt. N 104 11.1 0.43***
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

all are called 223
Table 2. Type Distribution for Male Churchgoers in Australia, Compared

with Wider Male Population Norms
N = 591
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 242 (40.9%) **I = 0.88

n = 172 n = 76 n = 29 n = 34 I n = 349 (59.1%) **I = 1.10
(29.1%) (12.9%) (4.9%) (5.8%)
I = 1.37*** I = 3.27*** I = 1.90*** I = 0.66** S n = 458 (77.5%) ***I = 1.34
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 133 (22.5%) ***I = 0.53
+++++ +++++ +
+++++ +++ T n = 352 (59.6%) ***I = 0.77
+++++ F n = 239 (40.4%) ***I = 1.81
+++++
++++ J n = 517 (87.5%) ***I = 1.33
P n = 74 (12.5%) ***I = 0.37
n =13 n=7 n = 10 n=8
(2.2%) (1.2%) (1.7%) (1.4%) IJ n = 311 (52.6%) ***I = 1.44
I = 0.39*** I = 0.61 I = 0.53* I = 0.21*** IP n = 38 (6.4%) ***I = 0.38
++ + ++ + EP n = 36 (6.1%) ***I = 0.36
EJ n = 206 (34.9%) **I = 1.19
ST n = 286 (48.3%) I = 1.02
SF n = 172 (29.1%) ***I = 2.79
NF n = 67 (11.3%) I = 0.96
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 66 (11.2%) ***I = 0.37
n = 13 n=7 n = 10 n=6
(2.2%) (1.2%) (1.7%) (1.0%) SJ n = 418 (70.7%) ***I = 1.60
I = 0.47** I = 0.83 I = 0.42** I = 0.15*** SP n = 40 (6.8%) ***I = 0.49
++ + ++ + NP n = 34 (5.8%) ***I = 0.28
NJ n = 99 (16.8%) **I = 0.77
TJ n = 312 (52.8%) I = 0.97

TP n = 40 (6.8%) ***I = 0.29
FP n = 34 (5.8%) ***I = 0.54
n = 88 n = 82 n = 18 n = 18
(14.9%) (13.9%) (3.0%) (3.0%) IN n = 81 (13.7%) ***I = 0.66
I = 0.94 I = 4.45*** I = 1.49 I = 0.36*** EN n = 52 (8.8%) ***I = 0.41
+++++ +++++ +++ +++ IS n = 268 (45.3%) ***I = 1.39
+++++ +++++ ES n = 190 (32.1%) ***I = 1.28
+++++ ++++
ET n = 125 (21.2%) ***I = 0.59
EF n = 117 (19.8%) ***I = 1.86
IF n = 122 (20.6%) ***I = 1.77
IT n = 227 (38.4%) I = 0.91

n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 106 17.9 0.74*** I-TP 21 3.6 0.30*** Dt. T 127 21.5 0.59***
E-FJ 100 16.9 3.28*** I-FP 17 2.9 0.56* Dt. F 117 19.8 1.92***
ES-P 20 3.4 0.55** IS-J 248 42.0 1.67*** Dt. S 268 45.3 1.45***
EN-P 16 2.7 0.25*** IN-J 63 10.7 0.94 Dt. N 79 13.4 0.60***
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Among male churchgoers, there is a significantly higher proportion of

introverts (59% compared with 54% in the wider population). Among
female churchgoers, and among the wider population, there are simi-
lar proportions of introverts, 52% and 54%.
These significant differences that emerge from the binary compari-
sons lead to some strong differences in the levels of certain psychologi-
cal types present in church congregations and in the wider population.
The two preference sets that are most visible in this regard are SFJ
and STJ: SFJ preferences account for 45% of the female churchgoers
(compared with 21% of the wider female population) and for 27% of
male churchgoers (compared with 17% of the wider male population);
STJ preferences account for 28% of the female churchgoers (compared
with 17% of the wider female population) and for 44% of the male
churchgoers (compared with 37% of the wider male population).
Conclusion
The present study set out to establish the psychological type profile
of churchgoers in Australia and to compare the profile of church-
goers with available data on the wider population. The data provided
by 591 male and 936 female churchgoers within the context of the 2001
Australian National Church Life Survey suggest the following conclu-
sion. While in principle churches proclaim their invitation to worship
to all psychological types, in practice some psychological types appear
more willing to respond. Looking at the key binary preferences, within
church congregations there are large over-representations of sensers
and of judgers and a more modest over-representation of feelers.
These main findings are broadly consistent with the cumulative pic-
ture that emerged from the nine earlier studies reported in the intro-
duction. Detailed comparison with these earlier studies would not be
particularly fruitful, however, in the light of their small sample sizes
and in the light of their general failure to distinguish between the pro-
files of male and female churchgoers.
The over-representation of preference for sensing characterizes a
community concerned with continuity, with traditions, with stability,
and with a God grounded in divine changelessness. Here is a commu-
nity concerned with guarding what has been handed down by previ-
ous generations. Such a community may tend to espouse conservative
social and moral values. However, a community shaped by such a
all are called 225
pronounced preference for sensing may be quite alien to individuals

who view the world through the lens of intuition. For this reason, some
intuitives may find it more difficult to access their local churches.
The over-representation of preference for judging characterizes
a community concerned with organization, with discipline, with
structure, and with a God who welcomes a regular pattern of wor-
ship (whatever that pattern may be). Here is a community concerned
with valuing regular commitment, advanced planning, and respect for
guidelines (implicit as well as explicit). Such a community may tend
to reject spontaneity and flexibility. However, a community shaped
by such a pronounced preference for judging may be quite alien to
individuals who view the world through the lens of perceiving. For
this reason, some perceivers may find it more difficult to access their
local churches.
The over-representation of preference for feeling characterizes a
community concerned with human values, with interpersonal rela-
tionships, and with a loving and caring God. Here is a community
concerned with peace and with harmony. Such a community may tend
to project a feminine profile, given the significantly higher levels of
preference for feeling reported among women than among men in
many national population studies (Kendall, 1998). However, a com-
munity shaped by a preference for feeling may be quite alien to indi-
viduals who view the world through the lens of thinking. For this
reason, some thinkers may find it more difficult to access their local
churches.
Looking at the discrete psychological types, where men and women
are counted together, the combined SFJ preferences account for almost
two out of every five churchgoers (38%). In her booklet Introduction to
Type, Myers (1998, p. 7) provided insightful profiles of the SFJ types:
ISFJ and ESFJ. The ISFJ profile was as follows:
Quiet, friendly, responsible and conscientious. Work devotedly to meet
their obligations. Lend stability to any project or group. Thorough,
painstaking, accurate. Their interests are usually not technical. Can be
patient with necessary details. Loyal, considerate, perceptive, concerned
with how other people feel.
The ESFJ profile was as follows:
Warm-hearted, talkative, popular, conscientious, born co-operators,
active committee members. Need harmony and may be good at creating
it. Always doing something nice for someone. Work best with encour-
agement and praise. Main interest is in things that directly and visibly
affect people’s lives.
The combined STJ preferences account for one out of every three
churchgoers (34%). The ISTJ profile provided by Myers (1998, p. 7)
was as follows:
Serious, quiet, earn success by concentration and thoroughness. Practi-
cal, orderly, matter-of-fact, logical, realistic and dependable. See to it
that everything is well organized. Take responsibility. Make up their own
minds about what should be accomplished and work towards it steadily,
regardless of protests or distractions.
The ESTJ profile was as follows:
Practical, realistic, matter-of-fact, with natural head for business or
mechanics. Not interested in abstract theories; want learning to have
direct and immediate application. Like to organise and run activities.
Often make good administrators; are decisive, quickly move to imple-
ment decisions; take care of routine details.
The present paper has reported the first large-scale published study
(N = 1527) concerned with establishing the psychological type pro-
file of churchgoers and comparing their profile with available data on
the wider population. There remain two important weaknesses with
this study. First, in spite of being the largest psychological type study
of churchgoers so far published, the database is not sufficiently large
to facilitate robust comparison between the wide range of denomina-
tions included in the survey. Second, although the data on the wider
population provided by the Australian Archive maintained by the
Psychological Type Research Unit at Deakin University has provided
a convenient basis against which the psychological type profile of
churchgoers can be assessed, no claims can be made that this database
is, in fact, representative of the Australian population as a whole.
Building on the foundations laid by the present study, the need now
is for a further study to conduct a larger survey of church congrega-
tions within a cultural context for which psychological type popula-
tion norms have been established. Given the data published by Kendall
(1998), the United Kingdom would provide a good context for such
a study.
all are called 227
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GIFTS DIFFERING? PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AMONG
STIPENDIARY AND NON-STIPENDIARY ANGLICAN CLERGY
Andrew Village*
Abstract
This paper tests the idea that clergy in different kinds of ministry have different psy-
chological profiles that relate to the kinds of jobs they may be required to do. Psycho-
logical type preferences of 529 male and 518 female clergy ordained in the Anglican
Church in the United Kingdom from 2004 to 2007 were assessed using the Francis
Psychological Type Scales. Overall, clergy showed a preference for introversion over
extraversion, feeling over thinking, and judging over perceiving, but they showed no
preference between sensing and intuition. After allowing for differences between the
sexes and between clergy of different church tradition, theological orientation, and
charismatic practice, there were significant differences in the psychological profiles of
stipendiary ministers (SMs), Non-Stipendiary Ministers (NSMs), and Ordained Local
Ministers (OLMs). SMs showed a stronger preference for intuition than NSMs or
OLMs, while OLMs showed a stronger preference for feeling than SMs or NSMs.
Implications of these findings for the changing nature of Anglican ministry are
discussed.
Keywords: Anglicans, Church of England, ministry, personality, psychological type
One of the key changes in many churches over the last few decades
has been a decline in the number ordained ministers. In the Church
of England, for example, there were 13,080 full-time stipendiary clergy
in 1970 but only 8,720 in 2000, a decline of a third (Brierley, 1999).
Declines of this magnitude, or more, are apparent in several other
denominations in England over this period. In the last few decades,
the overall decline in full-time ministers has been offset to some extent
by a growth in different sorts of voluntary or part-time ordained min-
istry. In the Church of England, such clergy are generally referred to
as Non-Stipendiary Ministers (NSMs), if they can be deployed within
* Author Note: Andrew Village, Theology and Religious Studies, York St. John
University.
I thank Leslie Francis and Mandy Robbins for generously allowing me to work on
a dataset that we collected together and Leslie for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of the manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Andrew Village,
York St. John University, Lord Mayor’s Walk, York YO31 7EX, UK.
Email: A.Village@yorksj.ac.uk

psychological type and ministry 231
and between dioceses, and Ordained Local Ministers (OLMs), if they

are licensed to a single benefice (Etherington, 2001; Heskins & Torry,
2006; Hodge & Mantle, 2001). Not all English dioceses have used
OLMs and, in some that have in the past, the distinction between these
two forms of ministries is rapidly diminishing in the face of demands
for flexible deployment. Figures published by the Church of England
suggest that part-time stipendiary clergy, NSMs and OLMs, made up
29% of the total clergy in 2007 (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). This
compares with a figure of 23% recorded in 2004 (The Archbishops’
Council, 2005), suggesting that these sorts of ministries are becoming
increasingly important in maintaining the life of the church.
Given that the type of ministry seems to be changing, it would be
useful to know what impact this might have on the church. The main
emphases in the debate to date seem to have been on the decline of
full-time clergy and how this will impact on the availability of minis-
ters for tasks that only clergy can do. Rather little has been said about
whether there are differences between clergy in different sorts of roles.
As might be expected, figures suggest that non-stipendiary forms of
ministry tend to attract older people, especially those who are at or
near retirement. In 2007, the average age of clergy in the Church of
England was 51 for stipendiary clergy, 53 for part-time stipendiary
clergy, 57 for NSMs, and 61 for OLMs (The Archbishops’ Council,
2007). There is also a difference in the sex ratio between ministries: In
the same year, 18% of stipendiary clergy were women compared with
54% of part-time stipendiary clergy, 48% of NSMs, and 53% of OLMs.
This difference may partly be historical because both the ordination of
women and the rise of non-stipendiary or part-time ministry are com-
paratively recent phenomena. Thus, while only 25% of incumbents in
post in 2007 were women, this figure rose to 37% for assistant curates,
most of whom were likely to have been ordained within the previous 4
years (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). The sex difference might also
be related to women having different opportunities or constraints from
men in relation to different ministries. For example, married men may
be more able than married women to move their families to take up a
stipendiary position, whereas unpaid part-time ministry may be more
possible for wives with working husbands than vice versa.
Differences in the structure of ordained ministry suggest that the
profile of the typical Anglican priest is changing. Whereas in years
gone by the typical parish priest was a young or middle-aged man who
trained full time in a theological college, now the typical parish priest
232 andrew village
is not so easily stereotyped. The ministry has become older, more

female, and more diverse. Alongside these changes we might expect
changes in the average personality profile of clergy. It is well known
that some personally traits or types are associated with a particular
sex (Ashmore & Sewell, 2004; Feingold, 1994). In terms of trait mod-
els of personality, women generally tend to be less emotionally stable
than men but more tender-minded (Lynn & Martin, 1997). In terms
of psychological type, the most marked and consistent difference is
that women are more likely to prefer feeling over thinking than are
men (Kendall, 1998; Myers, 2006). The empirical data seem to confirm
what most people might recognize in everyday life: Women tend (and
it is only a tendency) to have a greater capacity for empathy towards
others than do men.
Given these widespread sex differences, it might be assumed that
this is also true for clergy. The evidence is that while these population
differences do hold for many groups of clergy, the difference among
Anglican clergy is reduced somewhat by the tendency for male clergy
to display rather feminine characteristics and female clergy to display
rather male characteristics, compared to the general population (Fran-
cis, 1991, 1992; Robbins, Francis, & Rutledge, 1997). The strength of
these trends should not be overplayed, and in the case of women, it
may be a temporary finding that reflects the need for the pioneers of
women’s ordination to show tough-minded masculinity in order to
survive in what was then a very masculine environment. Even allowing
for these factors, women clergy do have a different sort of personality
to their male counterparts, so the average psychological profile of the
clergy should be changing simply by virtue of the change in sex ratios.
Despite the fact that many male Anglican clergy seem to be some-
what feminine in personality, the increase in the number of ordained
women means that Anglican ministry is likely to become even more
feminized. In some ways this is to state the obvious: Perhaps a more
interesting question is to ask if there are changes in psychological pro-
file that cannot be accounted for by the changing sex ratio of clergy. In
particular, do different sorts of ordained ministry attract or select peo-
ple of different psychological type? This paper sought to answer this
question by examining the psychological profiles of recently ordained
Anglican clergy from the United Kingdom.
Association of certain psychological profiles with certain sorts of
ministers might arise because psychological preferences influence
candidates to apply for particular ministries or because the church
preferentially assigns or selects people with particular psychological

preferences to certain ministries and not others. Psychological profil-
ing is rarely if ever used in selection to ordained ministry in the Angli-
can church in the UK, but this does not exclude the possibility that
particular characteristics associated with psychological type criteria are
used to select ministers or assign them to particular sorts of ministry.
In general, selection processes for SM and NSM have been different
from those for OLM, with the latter involving more discernment and
training at the local level, so selection might be one way in which
people of particular psychological profiles become linked to particular
sorts of ordained ministry roles.
The model of psychological type first suggested by Jung (1921) and
developed by others has proved a fertile way of explaining differences
between clergy and lay people or between different sorts of clergy
(Francis, 2001, 2005). The model seeks to describe various modes of
psychological functioning and how this functioning results in different
sorts of personalities. In its current form, as developed by Briggs and
Briggs Myers (Myers, 2006; Myers & Myers, 1980), the model includes
two orientations, two perceiving functions, two judging functions, and
two attitudes toward the outer world.
The two orientations are concerned with where individuals prefer
to function psychologically. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the
outer world, and much of their psychological functioning is done by
interaction with others, which they find stimulating and energizing.
They are usually open, sociable people who enjoy having many friends.
Introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world, and much of
their psychological functioning is done in periods of solitude, silence,
and contemplation, which they find stimulating and energizing. They
may prefer to have a small circle of intimate friends rather than many
acquaintances.
The two perceiving functions are concerned with the way in which
people gather and process information. Sensing types (S) prefer to
process the realities of a situation as perceived by their senses, attend-
ing to specific details rather than the wider picture. Their interests lie
mainly with practical issues, and they are typically down to earth and
matter of fact. Intuitive types (N), on the other hand, prefer to pro-
cess the possibilities of a situation as perceived by their imaginations,
attending to wider patterns and relationships rather than specific
details. Their interests lie mainly with abstract theories, and they are
typically imaginative and innovative.
234 andrew village
The two judging functions are concerned with the way in which
people make decisions and judgments. Thinking types (T) prefer to
process information objectively, attending to logic and principles
rather than to relationships and personal values. They value integrity
and justice, and they are typically truthful and fair, even at the expense
of harmony. Feeling types (F) prefer to process information subjec-
tively, attending to their personal values and relationships rather than
abstract principles. They value compassion and mercy, and they are
typically tactful and empathetic, even at the expense of fairness and
consistency.
The two attitudes toward the outer world indicate which of the two
sets of functions (that is, Perceiving S/N, or Judging T/F) is preferred
in dealings with the outer world. Judging types (J) actively judge exter-
nal stimuli rather than passively perceive them, so they tend to order,
rationalize, and structure their outer world. They enjoy routine and
established patterns, preferring to reach goals by following schedules
and using lists, timetables, or diaries. Perceiving types (P) passively
perceive external stimuli rather than actively judging them, so they
tend to avoid imposing order on the outer world. They enjoy a flex-
ible, open-ended approach to life that values change and spontaneity,
preferring to attend to the moment rather than plan too far into the
future.
Psychological type theory has been thoroughly criticized and evalu-
ated in terms of psychological conceptualization, empirical operation-
alization, and theological implications (Bayne, 1997; Francis, 2005;
Leech, 1996; Lloyd, 2007, 2008). In terms of psychological conceptu-
alization, type theory describes a limited but core range of individual
differences. Although not as comprehensive a description of individ-
ual differences in human personality as offered by the Eysenck three-
dimensional model (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) or the Five Factor
Model (Costa & McCrae, 1985), the areas it does deal with have been
shown to be correlated with trait-based personality measures (Bayne,
1994, 1997). In terms of empirical operationalization, type scales pro-
vide reliable measures in terms of the continuous scale scores under-
pinning the categorization procedures. Type sorters are less reliable
at assigning individuals to dichotomous categories, but using scores
and categories in research often yields similar results. Although a
trait-based approach may be a better way of describing the underly-
ing psychological processes (Bess & Harvey, 2002; Garden, 1991), the
advantage of categories is that they conform to the way the model

is most widely used, thereby allowing comparisons between studies
based on different instruments.
Some aspects of psychological type show strong correlations with
religious affiliation or religious practice (Francis, 2005). Those people
who attend church frequently, or who self-affiliate with a Christian
denomination, tend to be more likely to favor introversion over extra-
version compared with the population at large (Delis-Bulhoes, 1990;
Francis, Duncan, Craig, & Luffman, 2004; Ross, 1993, 1995). This
may reflect the fact that religious life often involves attention to an
inner spiritual reality, and introverts are more comfortable function-
ing in their inner world. The other consistent difference is that Chris-
tian affiliates or attendees tend to have a more marked preference for
judging over perceiving compared with populations at large (Delis-
Bulhoes, 1990; Francis, et al., 2004; Ross, 1993, 1995). This may reflect
the fact that the preferences associated with judging the outer world
tend to align with the demands of a belonging to church that requires
order, discipline, and routine. Other differences between religious
people and populations at large may be marked but less consistent.
For example, male congregation members of the Church of England
have a higher preference for feeling over thinking than expected for
the general population, but among women (who have a higher prefer-
ence for feeling anyway) the difference is less obvious (Francis, et al.,
2004; Kendall, 1998).
The perceiving function shows the most variation among religious
groups, and this may be because it is related to different types of Chris-
tian spiritual expression. For example, Francis and Ross (1997) found
that a preference for sensing was associated with more traditional or
orthodox beliefs, whereas a preference for intuition was associated
with a more ethereal spirituality gained from less directly “religious”
experiences such as watching a sunset or a starry night sky. Similarly,
Village, Francis, and Craig (2009) found that Anglo-catholic congrega-
tions in the Church of England tended to show a greater preference
for intuition than their evangelical counterparts, perhaps reflecting the
different role of the imagination in these two traditions.
Studies on Anglican clergy have shown that in some preferences,
they tend to show even more marked deviations from population
norms than do congregations. Comparing figures for the UK popula-
tion (Kendall, 1998), Church of England congregations (Francis, et al.,
236 andrew village
Table 1. Psychological Type Preferences of the UK Population, Church

of England Congregations, and Church of England Clergy
Population Congregations Clergy
% % %
(a) Men
I 53 66 64
N 27 32 67
F 35 48 56
J 55 70 73
(b) Women
I 43 56 54
N 21 26 65
F 70 73 74
J 62 67 65
Note: Figures for population norm from Kendall (1998), for congregations from Fran-
cis et al. (2004), and for clergy from Francis et al. (2007).
2004), and Church of England clergy (Francis, Robbins, Duncan,

Whinney, & Ross, 2010; Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press) illus-
trates this point (Table 1).
Clergy of both sexes are similar to congregations in being more intro-
verted than the population at large and in having a stronger preference
for judging. In these aspects, clergy are similar to congregations, but in
the perceiving functions, they are very different. Although congrega-
tions show slightly greater preference for intuition compared with the
population generally, they are still overwhelmingly people who pre-
fer sensing. Clergy, however, show a strong preference for intuition
over sensing, in marked contrast to their congregations. In the judg-
ing process, the difference between clergy and congregations varies
between the sexes. Around 70% of women in the general population,
in congregations, and among clergy show a preference for feeling over
thinking, whereas in men, there is a progressive increase in preference
for feeling from 35% in the population, to 48% in congregations, to
56% among clergy.
These figures suggest that the church, in selecting a particular subset
of people from congregations for ordained ministry, may have (per-
haps unwittingly) been selecting people who display different psycho-
logical types from their congregations and different again from the
population at large. This paper sought to examine whether this trend
was likely to be continued, reversed, or exacerbated by the move to
more reliance on ministry from priests who are not full-time and
stipendiary. In particular, it built on previous research by demonstrat-
ing a clear link between psychological type preference and particular
sorts of ministries among ordained clergy.
Method
Participants
Questionnaires were posted to all 2190 Anglican clergy ordained
between 2004 and 2007 in the United Kingdom, and 1061 (48%) were
returned, mostly from the Church of England. Of these, 1047 gave
answers to all the variables used in this study. The sample included
507 stipendiary ministers (SMs), of which 57% were men and 43%
women. In 2007 in the Church of England, there were 1273 stipendi-
ary assistant curates serving titles, of which 63% were men and 37%
were women (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). These two figures are
not entirely comparable because the present sample included some
curates from outside England, but they are sufficiently close to sug-
gest the sample was reasonably representative in terms of sex ratio.
The age distribution of stipendiary ministers in the sample could also
be compared with age distribution for all stipendiary curates in 2007,
and there was no statistically significant difference (χ2 = 12.2, df = 6,
NS). This suggests that this portion of the study sample at least was
likely to be representative of newly ordained clergy. The remaining
study sample consisted of NSMs and OLMs. Exact sex and age com-
parisons were not possible for these groups because the Church of
England published age data for these groups as a whole, combining
newly ordained and long-standing ordained clergy. However, the age
distributions in each case were similar but with slightly more older
clergy in the published data, as might be expected if some had served
for longer. This again supports the idea that the study sample was rea-
sonably representative of all newly ordained clergy over this period.
Dependent, Predictor, and Control Variables

The dependent variable was type of ministry, specified as either stipen-
diary (SM), non-stipendiary (NSM), or ordained local ministry (OLM)
and coded 1–3 respectively.
238 andrew village
The questionnaire included the Francis Psychological Type Scales

(Francis, 2004, 2005). These consist of 40 forced-choice items with 10
related to each of the four dimensions (E/I, S/N, F/T and J/P) of the
psychological type model. Items were presented in pairs and respon-
dents were asked to select the one in the pair that was closest to their
preference. Selecting one of a pair scored one for the function or atti-
tude it represented, while the unselected function or attitude scored
zero. Reliability estimates for this instrument have been published
for 248 Anglican clergy where alpha coefficients were .83 for the EI
scale, .76 for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale
(Francis, Craig, & Hall, 2008). In the current sample, alpha coefficients
were .85 for the EI scale, .77 for the SN scale, .72 for the TF scale, and
.81 for the JP scale, suggesting good internal reliability.
Choices were summed to give a score for each preference, and type
preferences were assigned according to which of the pair scored high-
est, with the few cases of ties assigned to I, N, F, or J. Using ties made
no substantial difference to the overall ratios but increased the valid
sample size by 16%. Categorized type preferences were used to com-
pare findings of this study with previous studies, while scores for I, N,
F, and J were used as predictor variables in a multiple regression to
test the relationship of type preference to ministry type.
Sex was included as a control variable because it was known to be
related to both psychological type preferences in the judging process
and to ministry type. Type preferences have been shown to be related
to preferences for religious expression and church tradition. There
may have been some relationship between these variables and min-
istry type because stipendiary ministry seemed to be more frequent
among evangelicals than among those from other traditions. Type
preferences therefore might have been related to ministry type in this
dataset solely because type influenced religious expression, and differ-
ent forms of religious expression were related to different forms of
ministry for reasons unconnected with psychological type. To control
for this, respondents were asked to self-identify their church tradi-
tion using a bipolar scale employed in a number of other studies of
Anglicans (Francis, Robbins, & Astley, 2005; Randall, 2005; Village
& Francis, 2009, 2010). This 7-point scale is anchored at one end as
catholic and at the other as evangelical and seems to be the most effi-
cient way of assessing tradition among Anglicans. The scale was used
to categorize respondents as Anglo-catholic or evangelical, using the
two outer responses at either end of the scale (1–2 = Anglo-catholic,
6–7 = evangelical ). Those responding to the middle three categories

were classed as broad and probably represented what are sometimes
referred to as “middle of the road” Anglicans. Some of these may have
veered towards more Anglo-catholic or evangelical practice or beliefs,
but most probably embraced features of both traditions.
Church tradition in Anglicans is related to a number of other fac-
tors. In particular, there is some correlation with liberal and conser-
vative beliefs because some sections of Anglo-catholic tradition are
associated with liberal theological beliefs, whereas most evangelicals
tend to be theologically conservative (Village & Francis, 2009, 2010).
Liberal–conservative theological belief was assessed on a similar bipo-
lar scale to church tradition, and the results used to assign individuals
as liberal (score 1–2), broad (score 3–5) or conservative (score 6–7).
Charismatic practice was based on responses to five items related
to the frequency of practices that included speaking in tongues, giving
words of prophecy, and the laying on of hands (Village, 2005, 2007).
Items were summed to give a score which was then categorized into
three equal-width bands labeled low, medium and high.
Analysis
Differences in the distributions of preferences against control and
predictor variables were tested using contingency analyses and the
chi-squared statistic. Multinomial regression was used to test for the
effects of psychological type preferences on ministry type indepen-
dently of sex, theological orientation, church tradition, or charismatic
practice. This type of regression model is used where the dependent
variable (in this case type preference) is categorized into more than
two groups. It uses the odds ratio to test the probability that particular
independent variables change the distribution of categories from that
seen in the overall data, after allowing for all other variables in the
model. Controls in the regression analysis were sex (categorized as
0 = male and 1 = female) and uncategorized scores for church tradi-
tion, theological orientation, and charismatic practice. Predictor vari-
ables were the uncategorized scores for introversion, intuition, feeling
and judging.
240 andrew village
Results
Associations Among Predictor Variables

The sex ratio in the sample was close to unity, with 51% being men
and 49% being women. SMs accounted for 48% of the present sam-
ple, NSMs 39%, and OLMs 13%. Equivalent figures for the Church of
England 2006 ordinands were 47%, 42%, and 11% (The Archbishops’
Council, 2006), suggesting the overall sample was likely to be repre-
sentative of the ministry types ordained by Anglican churches in the
UK during the study period. The sex ratio of ministers in the study
sample varied significantly with type of ministry, with women com-
prising 43% of SMs, 55% of NSMs, and 59% of OLMs (χ2 = 17.1, df = 2,
p < .001).
In terms of church tradition (as categorized from the bipolar scale),
27% were classed as Anglo-catholic, 44% as broad, and 29% as evangel-
ical. In terms of theological orientation, 31% were liberal, 51% broad,
and 18% conservative. In terms of the frequency of charismatic prac-
tice, 19% were classed as low, 42% as medium, and 38% as high. As
might be expected, there were significant associations between these
various categories, with around 60% of Anglo-catholics being classed
as liberal compared with less than 10% of evangelicals (Table 2a, χ2 =
290.4, df = 4, p < .001). There was also an association between church
tradition and the frequency of charismatic practice, with evangelicals
being much more likely to engage in charismatic practices than were
Anglo-catholics (Table 2b, χ2 = 160.4, df = 4, p < .001).
Table 2. Associations Between Church Tradition and (a) Theological

Orientation and (b) Charismatic Practice
Anglo-catholic Broad Evangelical
N= 282 464 301
(a) Theological orientation
% % %
Liberal 60 28 9
Broad 27 65 52
Conservative 13 7 40
(b) Charismatic frequency

% % %
Low 31 19 8
Medium 54 45 28
High 15 36 65
Table 3. Differences in the Type of Ministry by Church Tradition,

Theological Orientation, and Charismatic Practice
SM NSM OLM
N % % %
(a) Church tradition
Anglo-catholic 282 45 41 14
Broad 464 42 44 14
Evangelical 301 62 28 10
(b) Theological orientation

Liberal 327 45 44 11
Broad 531 47 39 14
Conservative 189 59 30 12
(c) Charismatic practice

Low 200 45 42 13
Medium 441 43 42 15
High 406 56 34 10
Note: SM = Stipendiary Ministers, NSM = Non-Stipendiary Ministers, OLM =
Ordained Local Ministers.
The frequency of the three different sorts of ministries varied with

church tradition, with stipendiary ministry being more frequent among
evangelical (Table 3a, χ2 = 31.1, df = 4, p < .001), conservative (Table
3b, χ2 = 13.1, df = 4, p < .01) and charismatic (Table 3c, χ2 = 17.2,
df = 4, p < .01) clergy than among others. This might have been because
evangelical churches (in which clergy and people are more likely to be
conservative and charismatic than in other traditions) tend to be large
and found in urban or suburban areas, and these sorts of churches are
more likely to have stipendiary curates than rural churches, which also
happen to be more likely to be broad-church rather than evangelical
or Anglo-catholic. This suggested that it was necessary to control for
these factors because previous studies have shown links between psy-
chological type preferences and these different facets of Anglicanism
(Francis & Jones, 1997; Village, 2005, 2007; Village, et al., 2009).
Psychological Type Preferences

Distributions of preferences among the four dimensions of the type
sorter are shown in Table 4 for men and women. Overall, clergy
showed a preference for introversion (59%) over extraversion (41%),
242 andrew village
Table 4. Psychological Type Preferences for All Clergy and for Men
and Women Compared
This study Previous studyc
Botha Men Womenb Men Women
N= 1047 529 518 626 237
% % % % %
E 41 42 40 36 46
I 59*** 58 60 64 54
S 50 52 48 33 44
N 50 48 52 67 56
F 61 54 68 56 74
T 39*** 46 32*** 44 26
J 79 80 78 73 65
P 21*** 20 22 27 35
Note:
a
Overall difference from unity tested with chi-squared with df = 1.
b
Differences between sexes tested with chi-squared with df = 2.
c
Figures for clergy taken from sources in Table 1.
*** p < .001
feeling (60%) over thinking (40%), and judging (79%) over perceiving
(21%), but they showed no overall preference between sensing (50%)
and intuition (50%). These trends were true in both men and women,
but clergywomen showed a significantly stronger preference for feeling
over thinking compared with clergymen. In terms of the 16 types, the
three most frequent overall were ISFJ, ISTJ, and INFJ, which together
accounted for 40% of the clergy in the sample.
Psychological Type and Ministry

Two statistically significant effects of psychological type preferences
on ministry type were apparent in both the overall data and in the
regression model after allowing for variations between ministries in
sex ratio and preferences in church tradition, theological orientation,
or charismatic practice (Table 5).
First, SMs showed a greater preference for intuition than for sens-
ing when compared with other ministers. In the overall data, the pro-
portion that preferred intuition to sensing was 57% for SMs, 45% for
NSMs, and 39% for OLMs (χ2 = 19.0, df = 2, p < .001). The equivalent
Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Ministry Type

Ministry Type
(reference = Stipendiary)
NSM OLM
Exp(B) Exp(B)
Sex (female = 1) .69* .54**
Evangelical .92 .91
Conservative .93 1.05
Charismatic .95* .93
Introversion 1.00 1.00

Intuition .88*** .85***
Feeling 1.08* 1.25***
Judging 1.03 1.02
Note: Figures are the odds ratio, Exp(B), with stipendiary ministry as the reference
category for the dependant variable. Values > 0 indicate independent variable was
higher compared with stipendiary ministry, values < 0 indicate independent variable
was lower compared with stipendiary ministry. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
figures for men were 56% SMs, 39% for NSMs, and 36% for OLMs
(χ2 = 16.7, df = 2, p < .001), and for women they were 58% for SMs,
51% for NSMs, and 42% for OLMs (χ2 = 6.5, df = 2, p < .05). The
multiple regression analysis showed that this was not simply an effect
of different church traditions or theological stance in the different
ministries and that the most striking pattern was the high number of
intuitive SMs.
Second, SMs showed a reduced preference for feeling than for think-
ing compared with other ministers. In the overall data, the proportion
that preferred feeling to thinking was 56% for SMs, 62% for NSMs,
and 76% for OLMs (χ2 = 17.6, df = 2, p < .001). The equivalent figures
for men were 50% for SMs, 53% for NSMs, and 77% for OLMs (χ2 =
14.1, df = 2, p < .01), and for women they were 64% for SMs, 68% for
NSMs, and 75% for OLMs (χ2 = 3.1, df = 2, NS). The multiple regres-
sion analysis showed that this was not simply due to variations in sex
ratio between the different ministries and that the most striking pat-
tern was the high number of preferred feelers among male OLMs.
244 andrew village
Discussion
Type Preferences in Comparison with Previous Studies

This study of a large sample of Anglican clergymen and clergywomen
allowed some comparison with previous studies that have examined
psychological type preferences of Church of England clergy. Francis,
Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) examined 626 clergymen and
237 clergymen (see Table 4) while follow-up studies among 622 cler-
gymen (Francis, Robbins, Duncan, et al., 2010) and 83 clergywomen
(Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press) confirmed the findings of the
original study. Comparing these findings with those studies mostly,
but not entirely, confirmed the patterns previously observed.
First, the findings in this study were similar to the previous ones
with regard to orientation to self and attitude to the outer world. In all
these studies, both clergymen and clergywomen showed a preference
for introversion over extraversion and for judging over perceiving. In
this regard they appear to be typical of the congregations from which
they are drawn in showing stronger preferences for introversion and
for judging than the population as a whole. Anglican clergy seem to
be typical of religious people who belong to Anglican churches: They
respond to the call to foster the inner life of prayer and contempla-
tion, and they fit well into a religious denomination that is ordered
and structured. The figures in this study differed from previous studies
in showing a slightly weaker preference for introversion in men and
a slightly stronger preference in women and in both sexes a stronger
preference for judging. This may reflect the difference between the
instruments used to measure type preferences.
Second, the findings of this study confirmed the patterns found in
the judging functions, where both sexes showed a preference for feel-
ing over thinking. For women this reflects the same sort of preference
found among congregations and among women generally in the UK.
Clergywomen seem to be typical of their sex in showing high levels
of empathy and a strong dependence on personal values when mak-
ing decisions. Clergymen, however, are unusual in showing a prefer-
ence for feeling, even though the preference is slight and the balance
between preferred thinkers and feelers fairly even. The preference for
feeling seems to be more marked among clergymen than among men
in congregations, where it is in turn more marked than in UK men
generally. This might suggest that the process of joining the church
and becoming more active in its ministry involves an increasing selec-

tion for those men who demonstrate a more typically feminine style
in their judging process. This tendency is strong, but the number of
preferred thinkers among clergymen is still relatively high compared
to clergywomen because of the low preference for feeling compared to
thinking among men generally.
Third, the present study seemed to contradict the earlier findings,
where clergy of both sexes showed a preference for intuition over sens-
ing in their perceiving process, especially among men. In the present
study there were no significant preferences for sensing or intuition
in either sex. The even split nonetheless represented a much stron-
ger preference for intuition compared with that found in congrega-
tions or in the UK population generally. In this regard, these findings
supported the notion that ministry in the Anglican Church seems
to attract an unusually high proportion of preferred intuitives. The
church hierarchy and congregations may place high value on the abil-
ity of intuitives to see the wider issues of church life, rather than to get
lost in details. They may also value the ability of intuitives to imagine a
different future and act as the prophets and seers for the church. Let-
ting vicars preach their visions might be better use of their time than
asking them to organize the church fete.
Type Preferences and Type of Ministry

A key finding of this study was that Anglican clergy in different sorts of
ministry have different psychological profiles and preferences. The two
key differences were associated with the perceiving and with the judging
processes. In the perceiving process, stipendiary clergy showed a stron-
ger preference for intuition over sensing than their non-stipendiary or
locally ordained colleagues. This trend was present in both sexes, but
it was particularly strong in men. This result might explain the dispar-
ity between this study and earlier studies, which were probably based
mainly on stipendiary clergy, and where a preference for intuition was
more marked (Francis, et al., 2007; Francis, Robbins, Duncan, et al.,
2010). When only stipendiary ministers were included from the pres-
ent sample, the results looked much more comparable with earlier
studies. This implies that the kind of visionary, prophetic role that
might be associated with intuitives is more characteristic of stipendiary
clergy than others. NSMs and OLMs are more like the congregations
from which they emerge in showing a greater propensity for sensing.
246 andrew village
This might be because these different ministries appeal to different

sorts of people, or it might be related to the way they are selected and
trained by the church. Uprooting self and family to train full time for
full-time ministry requires a willingness to break out of familiar pat-
terns and launch into an uncertain future. Intuitives are likely to find
this easier than sensors, which might explain why they appear to be so
frequent among stipendiary clergy. It may also be that the leadership
demands of incumbents appeal more readily to intuitives, whereas the
practical ministry of NSMs and OLMs that requires them to “roll up
their sleeves and get stuck in” is preferred by sensors.
The second key difference between ministry types was associated
with the judging process, where OLMs showed a much stronger pref-
erence for feeling over thinking than their stipendiary or NSM col-
leagues. This was true in both sexes, but statistically significant only
in men, possibility because women had such a generally high prefer-
ence for feeling anyway. Although there were only 56 male OLMs in
the sample, 77% preferred feeling over thinking, a remarkably high
proportion compared with the 35% measured in the UK population
as a whole (Kendall, 1998). The trend is in line with a ministry that is
particularly focused on pastoral care rather than theological teaching
or executive leadership. The evidence is that this ministry is attracting
distinctive types of people who may find it easier to relate to parishio-
ners than their stipendiary or even non-stipendiary colleagues.
The association between psychological type preferences and minis-
try roles reported here is probably due to a combination of candidate
choice and church selection. Association of psychological profile and
ministry might also occur if those whose profiles do not match their
ministry tend to drop out at a higher rate than those whose profiles
make them more suited to their ministry roles. The growing litera-
ture on clergy stress indicates that mismatch between psychological
type preferences and clergy roles might increase work-related stress
(Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, & Castle, 2009). If stressed clergy are more
likely to leave ministry, then this might in the long term produce an
association between psychological profile and ministry roles. Any such
association in this study of recently ordained clergy is unlikely to be
caused by this effect because there would have been relatively little time
for stress to develop to the point of causing dropout. Consequently,
any associations discovered are likely to be the result of candidate
preference or selection. However, the results do imply that the differ-
ent kinds of roles in Anglican ordained ministry are associated with
different sorts of psychological profile, and putting ministers in roles

for which they are psychologically unsuited may be detrimental to
their well-being. If this is so, then a study of the psychological profiles
of clergy who leave ministry might show they are different to the pro-
files of those who remain in ministry for longer.
Conclusions
This study has confirmed earlier findings that Anglican clergy generally
tend to display introverted, intuitive, feeling, and judging psychologi-
cal types. The key conclusions, however, relate to the way these prefer-
ences are distributed between different sorts of ministers. The idea that
Anglican ministry is an intuitive ministry needs some qualification:
This is certainly true for stipendiary ministry but not necessarily so
for other types of ministry. Furthermore, the trend for male clergy to
include a high proportion of feeling types is particularly true among
those ordained to local ministry. If these findings are confirmed, then
some important conclusions follow if the proportion of stipendiary,
non-stipendiary, and local ordained ministry continues to change in
the Anglican Church.
First, the overall psychological makeup of the clergy will change.
This will happen anyway with the growth in the number of women
because they will increase the proportion of feeling types among the
clergy. However, this move will be further heightened if NSMs and
OLMs make up a larger proportion of clergy. Although such a change
is not wrong in itself, it needs to be recognized, and the consequences
understood. In a church that is already perceived by many as rather
“feminine,” with two-thirds of the members being women, increas-
ing numbers of women clergy, and many clergymen with a feminine
psychological profile, some men may find it increasingly hard to relate
to the way that faith is expressed and decisions made in Anglican
churches. Greater efforts may be needed from clergy to prevent the
marginalization of men from within and beyond congregations.
Second, the roles of different sorts of ministry may diverge if people
are recruited to them with particular psychological profiles. This may
be a sensible way of using the gifts and abilities of different sorts of
people. Stipendiary clergy seem to have the sort of profile that might
enable them to offer the visionary leadership so urgently required
of incumbents in times of rapid change. NSMs and OLMs seem to
248 andrew village
have the sorts of profiles that might enable them to work alongside
lay people in getting tasks done and offering sensitive pastoral min-
istry. This is not simply a case of whether a minister is full-time or
part-time, male or female: Different sorts of men and different sorts
of women seem to be filling these roles and psychologically they seem
to be suited to them.
Third, it may be wrong for the church to imagine that the main
barriers to a merging of these three sorts of ministry are practical or
theological. Not so many years ago there was a sharp divide between sti-
pendiary and non-stipendiary ministry, which were treated practically
and theologically as two different sorts of vocation. The trend today
is to make the transition between stipendiary and non-stipendiary
ministry a matter of deployment rather than vocation. In a parallel
way, the rise of the OLM movement has been accompanied by a great
deal of theological work that sought to justify this kind of ministry
and make it distinctive from other ministry, be it stipendiary or non-
stipendiary (Etherington, 2001; Heskins & Torry, 2006; Jordan, 2008).
Recent moves on pragmatic grounds to merge OLMs and NSMs have
met with dismay in some quarters where such theological work seems
to be being undermined. Studies such as this would seem to suggest
that, either by design or self-selection, clergy in different ministries in
the Anglican Church in the UK have different psychological make-ups
associated with different gifts. A wise church would ensure that clergy
are in roles that allow them to use these gifts and that the gifts avail-
able span the needs of the whole church.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PREFERENCES OF MALE AND
FEMALE FREE CHURCH MINISTERS IN ENGLAND
Leslie J. Francis,* Michael Whinney, Lewis Burton,

and Mandy Robbins
Abstract
A sample of 148 male and 41 female Free Church ministers in England (Methodist
and Baptist) completed the MBTI Step One. Among both sexes, the data demon-
strated preferences for intuition (60% among the men and 68% among the women)
and for judging (74% among the men and 73% among the women). In terms of the
orientations, preference for introversion was expressed by 51% of the men and 59% of
the women. In terms of the judging process, preference for feeling was expressed by
45% of the men and 66% of the women. These data confirmed the findings of earlier
research among male and female Anglican ministers in England that there is less vari-
ation between the psychological type profiles of male and female clergy than between
the psychological type profiles of men and women in the general population.
Keywords: psychology, religion, clergy, Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Baptist,

Methodist
Psychological type theory, as introduced by Jung (1971) and developed

through instruments like the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (Myers &
McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates,
1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005),
distinguishes between the two opposite poles of four psychological
processes: two orientations distinguishing between introversion and
extraversion; two perceiving processes distinguishing between sensing
and intuition; two judging processes distinguishing between thinking
and feeling; and two attitudes toward the outside world distinguishing
between judging and perceiving.
* Author Note: Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick;

Michael Whinney, St. Mary’s Centre, Wales; Lewis Burton, St. Mary’s Centre, Wales;
Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick.

252 francis, whinney, burton and robbins
According to psychological type theory, orientation refers to the

area from which psychological energy is drawn. Extraverts (E) draw
their energy from the outside world of people and things, and they
focus their attention on that outer world. Introverts (I) draw their
energy from the inner world of ideas and reflections, and they focus
their attention on that inner world. The perceiving process refers
to the way in which people receive and process information. Sens-
ing types (S) focus on perceptions received through the senses, and
they are concerned with the actual, the real, and the practical. Intui-
tive types (N) focus on perceptions received through intuition, and
they are concerned with possibilities, meanings, and relationships. The
judging process refers to the way in which people make decisions and
judgments. Thinking types (T) make judgments based on objective,
impersonal logic, and they tend to value integrity and justice. Feeling
types (F) make judgments based on subjective personal values, and
they tend to value compassion and mercy. Attitude toward the outside
world is determined by which process (judging T/F or perceiving S/N)
is preferred for dealing with the outside world. Judging types (J) seek
to order, organize, and structure their outside world, as they actively
judge external stimuli. Perceiving types (P) are flexible, adaptable, and
open, as they more passively perceive external stimuli.
Jung’s theory of psychological type has generated important insights
and theories relevant both to pastoral psychology and to the empiri-
cal psychology of religion. In terms of pastoral psychology, psycho-
logical type theory has been applied to discussions concerning prayer
(Michael & Norrisey, 1984; Keating, 1987; Duncan, 1993), ministry
and leadership (Oswald & Kroeger, 1988), Christian growth (Gold-
smith & Wharton, 1993), communicating the gospel (Butler, 1999),
preaching (Francis & Atkins, 2000, 2001, 2002; Francis & Village,
2008), congregations (Edwards, 1993; Baab, 1998), and faith (Francis,
2005). In terms of the empirical psychology of religion, psychological
type theory has been employed to examine the psychological profiles
associated with distinctive expressions of the Christian faith, including
charismatic experience (Francis & Jones, 1997; Jones, Francis, & Craig,
2005), styles of believing (Francis & Jones, 1998), religious attitudes
(Jones & Francis, 1999; Fearn, Francis, & Wilcox, 2001; Francis et al.,
2003; Francis et al., 2004), tolerance for religious uncertainty (Francis
& Jones, 1999), mystical orientation (Francis & Louden, 2000; Francis,
2002; Francis, Village, Robbins, & Ineson, 2007), religious orientations
(Francis & Ross, 2000), dogmatism (Ross, Francis, & Craig, 2005),
free church ministers in england 253
biblical interpretation (Village & Francis, 2005), belief about the

Bible and the Holy Spirit (Village, 2005), prayer preferences (Fran-
cis & Robbins, 2008), cathedral visiting (Francis, Williams, Annis,
& Robbins, 2008), and Celtic Christianity (Francis, Craig, & Hall,
2008).
A particularly fruitful application of psychological type theory within
the context of the empirical psychology of religion in the United King-
dom has focused on the exploration of the profile of those engaged in
various forms of leadership within Christian ministry. These studies
have focused on Presbyterian Church of Scotland ministers (Irvine,
1989), male and female Bible College students (Francis, Penson, &
Jones, 2001), Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones,
2001; Francis & Payne, 2002), evangelical church leaders (Francis &
Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male missionary per-
sonnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay church lead-
ers (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests
(Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis, Nash,
Nash, & Craig, 2007), Church of England clergymen and clergywomen
(Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), evangelical Angli-
can seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007) and Assemblies of
God theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay
& Francis, 2008). One main conclusion to emerge from these studies
concerns the way in which the psychological type profile of religious
professionals differs from the psychological type profile of the popula-
tion as a whole.
According to the United Kingdom population norms published by
Kendall (1998), there are significant differences in the psychological
type profile of men and women. The most obvious difference is vis-
ible in the judging function, where just 35% of men express a prefer-
ence for feeling, compared with 70% of women, and where just 30% of
women express a preference for thinking, compared with 65% of men.
The second clear-cut difference is visible in the orientations where 47%
of men express a preference for extraversion, compared with 57% of
women, and where 53% of men express a preference for introversion,
compared with 43% of women. Although less pronounced, there are
also differences between the two sexes in terms of the perceiving pro-
cess and in terms of the attitudes toward the outside world. While just
27% of men prefer intuition, the proportion is lower, at 21% among
women. While 45% of men prefer perceiving, the proportion is lower,
at 38% among women.
According to a recent study conducted among 626 clergymen and

237 clergywomen serving in the Church of England, the clear differ-
ences between the psychological type profiles of men and women in
the general population are not so clearly replicated among Anglican
clergy. While in the general population the preference for feeling
stands at 35% among men and 70% among women, among Church
of England clergy, the gap is narrowed to 54% among clergymen and
74% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergymen are much more
likely to prefer the “feminine” judging function of feeling than men at
large. While in the general population the preference for introversion
54% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergywomen are more likely
to prefer the “masculine” orientation of introversion than women
at large. While in the general population the preference for judging
65% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergymen are more likely to
prefer the “feminine” attitude toward the outer world of judging than
men at large.
The most startling difference between the psychological type pro-
file of Church of England clergy and the general population occurs in
respect of the perceiving process. While 27% of men at large prefer
intuition, the proportion rises to 62% among Church of England cler-
gymen. While 21% of women at large prefer intuition, the proportion
rises to 65% among Church of England Clergywomen. Once again,
however, the difference between clergymen and clergywomen is small
(Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007).
During the 1990s when the Church of England was debating the
case for and against the ordination of women to the priesthood, one
of the issues considered concerned ways in which women might bring
different personal qualities to ministry (Francis & Robbins, 1999). In
the first study to explore this issue scientifically from the perspec-
tive of psychological type theory, the data provided by Francis, Craig,
Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) suggested that, at least as far as the
first generation of Church of England clergywomen are concerned,
the ordination of women to the priesthood has done little to chal-
lenge or to change the psychological type profile of the Anglican
clergy.
Against this background, the aim of the present study was to explore
whether the similarity in type profiles of Church of England clergymen
and clergywomen was replicated among male and female ministers
serving in the Free Churches in England where there has been a some-
what longer established acceptance of women in ministry. Specifically,
the study would focus on men and women engaged in the Methodist
Church and in the Baptist Church in England.
The histories of the recognized ministry of women within the Meth-
odist Church and the Baptist Church in England have followed some-
what different paths, partly as a consequence of the different polities of
the two denominations. Methodism has a central national authority,
in the form of the Methodist Conference, which determines the prac-
tices and the discipline that is binding on each local Methodist con-
gregation. Each local Baptist church, however, is autonomous, and the
authority lies with the members’ meeting. Local congregations may or
may not choose to affiliate with the Baptist Union of Great Britain.
Agreements and policies promulgated by the Union are advisory only,
leaving local churches free to respond to their understanding of how
God is calling them.
According to Woodman (2010), a Deaconess movement was estab-
lished in the Baptist Church in 1890, exercising the roles of pastoral
work in visiting and social outreach. Women seem to have been serv-
ing as recognized ministers in Baptist churches since the 1920s. When
a Special Committee to consider the Admission of Women to the Bap-
tist Ministry was appointed by the Baptist Union Council meeting of
1924, it was reported to that committee that three women had been
received as accredited ministers. This committee attempted to regular-
ize the position of women ministers and formulated the decision that
“The committee is clear that it would be contrary to Baptist belief and
practice to make sex a bar to any kind of Christian service” (Wood-
man, 2010, p. 4). Although it was clear that authority to call a woman
to ministry rested with the local church, discussion remained open as
to whether women should be placed on the national accredited list
of ministers. Although the deaconesses called by a local church were
fulfilling the role of minister, the situation did not find full recognition
until 1957, when the Baptist Union Council gave deaconesses accredi-
tation as pastors. Even then they were placed on a separate list and
only fully absorbed into the regular list of ministers in 1975. In spite
of this potential for recognition since the 1920s, by 2008 just 12% of
serving Baptist ministers were women (Woodman, 2010, p. 2). In the

same year, 25% of ministerial students were women.
Within some streams of Methodism, women exercised the ministry
of preaching from the early days of the movement, although mainly
in the Methodist Churches other than the main Wesleyan body (Vick-
ers, 2000). The Wesley Deaconess Order was established in 1890 as a
separate organization to enable the Church to engage in service to the
poor and needy in its general ministry (Aitchinson, 2003). Although
from 1937 there was a form of ordination for deaconesses, they were
classed as layworkers until 1988 (Vickers, 2000). The Wesleyan Church,
under the pressure of the shortage of male local preachers, opened its
pulpits to women with equal standing to men in 1918 (Milburn &
Batty, 1995). Discussions about the admission of women to ordained
ministry had taken place before the outbreak of war in 1939. The war
deferred further action. The Methodist Conference of 1945 decided to
refer the issue to the District Synods, but although further discussion
took place, no decision was made. There was also delay created by the
unwillingness of the Conference to make a decision in the matter due
to hesitation over what would be the result of the Anglican-Methodist
unity proposals in the late 1960s. When these failed, the Conference
of 1972 decided to admit women to the ministry of word and sacra-
ments in the Church. The first women ministers were ordained in 1974
and came to work as equals with men in the circuits (Vickers, 2000,).
There was something of a floodtide of women entering the ministry
in the years after 1972, including many Deaconesses who felt called
to presbyterial ministry. Since 1972, the proportion of women within
the ordained ministry of the presbyterate has grown steadily. In 2009,
women accounted for 52% of those ordained for ministry. In the same
year, women accounted for 75% of those who candidated for ministry
(Minutes of Conference, 2009).
Method
Procedure
Methodist and Baptist ministers serving in the West Midlands were
invited to complete the MBTI Step One (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk,
& Hammer, 1998). This is a self-completion questionnaire employing
forced-choice responses to distinguish between preferences for intro-
version and extraversion, sensing and intuition, thinking and feeling,

and judging and perceiving.
From a total of 197 Methodist ministers, the invitation was accepted
by 78 men and 31 women, making a response rate of (55%). From a
total of 202 Baptist ministers, the invitation was accepted by 70 men
and 10 women, making a response rate of (40%).
Data analysis
The scientific literature concerned with psychological type has devel-
oped a highly distinctive way of presenting type-related data. The con-
ventional format of the type table has been employed in the present
paper to allow the findings of this study to be located easily alongside
other related studies in the literature. The main method of significance
testing employed in type tables is the selection ratio index (I) as an
extension of the basic chi square statistic.
Results
Table 1 presents the type distribution for the 148 male Free Church
ministers serving in England. These data demonstrated preferences
for intuition (60%) over sensing (40%), for thinking (55%) over feel-
ing (45%), and for judging (74%) over perceiving (26%). There were
almost equal preferences for introversion (51%) and for extraversion
(49%). The most frequently represented type was ISTJ (14%), followed
by INTJ (12%), ENFJ (11%), and ENFP (10%).
Table 2 presents the type distribution for 41 female Free Church
ministers serving in England. These data demonstrated preferences for
sensing (32%), for feeling (66%) over thinking (34%), and for judging
(73%) over perceiving (27%). The most frequently represented types
were INFJ (17%), followed by ENFJ (15%), ENFP (12%), INTJ (12%),
and ISFJ (12%).
Table 2 also presents the selection ratio significance test for the dif-
ferences between the psychological type profiles of male and female
Free Church ministers. These data demonstrated that there were no
significant differences between the preferences of male and female
ministers in terms of the orientations (introversion and extraver-
sion), the perceiving process (sensing and intuition), and the attitude
Table 1. Type Distribution of Male Free Church Ministers in England

N = 148
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 73 (49.3%

n = 20 n = 13 n=8 n = 18 I n = 75 (50.7%)
(13.5%) (8.8%) (5.4%) (12.2%)
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ S n = 60 (40.5%)
+++++ ++++ +++++ N n = 88 (59.5%)
++++ ++
T n = 82 (55.4%)
F n = 66 (44.6%)
J n = 110 (74.3%)
P n = 38 (25.7%)

n=2 n=2 n=5 n=7
(1.4%) (1.4%) (3.4%) (4.7%)
+ + +++ +++++ IJ n = 59 (39.9%)
IP n = 16 (10.8%)
EP n = 22 (14.9%)
EJ n = 51 (34.5%)
ST n = 38 (25.7%)
SF n = 22 (14.9%)
NF n = 44 (29.7%)
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 44 (29.7%)
n=2 n=0 n = 15 n=5
(1.4%) (0%) (10.1%) (3.4%) SJ n = 54 (36.5%)
+ +++++ +++ SP n=6 (4.1%)
+++++ NP n = 32 (21.6%)
NJ n = 56 (37.8%)
TJ n = 66 (44.6%)
TP n = 16 (10.8%)
FP n = 22 (14.9%)
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 44 (29.7%)
n = 14 n=7 n = 16 n = 14
(9.5%) (4.7%) (10.8%) (9.5%) IN n = 38 (25.7%)
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ EN n = 50 (33.8%)
+++++ +++++ +++++ IS n = 37 (25.0%)
+ ES n = 23 (15.5%)
ET n = 35 (23.6%)
EF n = 38 (25.7%)
IF n = 28 (18.9%)
IT n = 47 (31.8%)

n % n % index n %
E-TJ 28 18.9 I-TP 9 6.1 Dt. T 37 25.0
E-FJ 23 15.5 I-FP 7 4.7 Dt. F 30 20.3
ES-P 2 1.4 S-J 33 22.7 Dt. S 35 23.6
EN-P 20 13.5 IN-J 26 17.6 Dt. N 46 31.1
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 2. Type Distribution of Female Free Church Ministers in England

Compared with Male Ministers
N = 41
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 17 (41.5 %) I = 0.84

n=3 n=5 n=7 n=5 I n = 24 (58.5 %) I = 1.16
(7.3 %) (12.2 %) (17.1 %) (12.2 %)
I = 0.54 I = 1.39 I = 3.16* I = 1.00 S n = 13 (31.7 %) I = 0.78
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 28 (68.3 %) I = 1.15
++ +++++ +++++ +++++
++ +++++ ++ T n = 14 (34.1 %) *I = 0.62
++ F n = 27 (65.9 %) *I = 1.48
J n = 30 (73.2 %) I = 0.98
P n = 11 (26.8 %) I = 1.04

n = 10 n=0 n=3 n=1
(0.0 %) (0.0 %) (7.3 %) (2.4 %) IJ n = 20 (48.8 %) I = 1.22
I = 0.00 I = 0.00 I = 2.17 I = 0.52 IP n=4 (9.8 %) I = 0.90
+++++ ++ EP n=7 (17.1 %) I = 1.15
++ EJ n = 10 (24.4 %) I = 0.71
ST n=7 (17.1 %) I = 0.66

SF n=6 (14.6 %) I = 0.98
NF n = 21 (51.2 %) **I = 1.72
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n=7 (17.1 %) I = 0.57
n=1 n=0 n=5 n=1
(2.4 %) (0.0 %) (12.2 %) (2.4 %) SJ n = 12 (29.3 %) I = 0.80
I = 1.80 I = 0.00 I = 1.20 I = 0.72 SP n=1 (2.4 %) I = 0.60
++ +++++ ++ NP n = 10 (24.4 %) I = 1.13
+++++ NJ n = 18 (43.9 %) I = 1.16
++
TJ n = 11 (26.8 %) *I = 0.60
TP n=3 (7.3 %) I = 0.68
FP n=8 (19.5 %) I = 1.31
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 19 (46.3 %) *I = 1.56
n=3 n=1 n=6 n=0
(7.3 %) (2.4 %) (14.6 %) (0.0 %) IN n = 16 (39.0 %) I = 1.52
I = 0.77 I = 0.52 I = 1.35 I = 0.00* EN n = 12 (29.3 %) I = 0.87
+++++ ++ +++++ IS n=8 (19.5 %) I = 0.78
++ +++++ ES n=5 (12.2 %) I = 0.78
+++++
ET n=5 (12.2 %) I = 0.52
EF n = 12 (29.3 %) I = 1.14
IF n = 15 (36.6 %) *I = 1.93
IT n=9 (22.0 %) I = 0.69

n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 3 7.3 0.39 I-TP 1 2.4 0.40 Dt. T 4 9.8 0.39
E-FJ 7 17.1 1.10 I-FP 3 7.3 1.55 Dt. F 10 24.4 1.20
ES-P 1 2.4 1.80 IS-J 8 19.5 0.88 Dt. S 9 22.0 0.93
EN-P 6 14.6 1.08 IN-J 12 29.3 1.67 Dt. N 18 43.9 1.41
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). There was, however,
a significant difference between male and female ministers in terms
of preference for the judging functions. While 45% of male ministers
preferred feeling, the proportion rose to 66% among female ministers.
While 55% of male ministers preferred thinking, the proportion fell
to 34% among female ministers. In terms of temperaments, this dif-
ference was reflected in a much higher population of NFs among the
female minsters (51%) than among the male ministers (30%).
Conclusion
This study set out to test whether the psychological type profiles
of male and female Free Church ministers in England reflected the
sex differences reported in the UK population by Kendall (1998) or
whether they reflected the findings of Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley,
and Slater (2007) among Anglican clergymen and clergywomen in
England, where the sex differences were much less pronounced than
among the general population. The data were much closer to the pro-
file of Anglican clergy than to the profile of the population as a whole.
According to the present data, no significant sex differences emerged
among Free Church ministers in terms of preferences for introversion
or extraversion, in terms of preferences for sensing or intuition, or in
terms of preferences for judging or perceiving. While significant sex
differences emerged in terms of preferences for thinking or feeling,
these differences were considerably less pronounced than among men
and women in the population as a whole. In the population as a whole,
preference for feeling was expressed, according to Kendall (1998), by
35% of men and by 70% of women. Among Free Church ministers,
preference for feeling was expressed by 45% of men and by 66% of
women.
Taken together, the findings of the present study and the findings
presented by Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) suggest
that the ministry of women may not have enriched greatly the range of
psychological types engaged in Christian ministry within the Anglican
Church and within the Free Churches in England. Rather, Christian
ministry, at least within these denominations, seems to appeal to simi-
lar personality types within both sexes.
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Union of Great Britain.
IMAGINING THEMSELVES AS MINISTERS: HOW
RELIGIOUSLY COMMITTED BAPTIST YOUTH RESPOND TO
THE REVISED PAYNE INDEX OF MINISTRY STYLES (PIMS2)
Bruce G. Fawcett,* Leslie J. Francis, and Mandy Robbins
Abstract
A sample of 545 religiously committed Baptist youth (who were participating in a
week-long mission and service program) were invited to imagine themselves serving as
ordained ministers and to rate their approach to ministry on the revised Payne Index
of Ministry Styles (an instrument based on Jungian psychological type theory). The
data demonstrated two main findings. First, while the young people’s own psychologi-
cal type colored their perception of ministry, this influence was not strong. Second,
ministry was conceived more strongly in extraverted terms than in introverted terms.
On the basis of these findings, the recommendation is made that religious vocations
among young people should be fostered by encouraging them to recognize that there
is room within ministry for different personality types to bring different gifts and to
exercise different ministry styles.
Keywords: psychological type, clergy, ministry roles, Baptist, Canada
A number of Christian denominations within the developed world are

experiencing difficulties in recruiting young candidates into ordained
ministry (see Astley & Francis, 2009). Even those denominations such
as the Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches in Canada that main-
tain thriving youth ministries, capable of recruiting significant num-
bers of young people to participate in mission and service programs,
struggle to convert such participation into sufficient numbers of young
adults preparing for ordained ministry (Fawcett, McDonald, & Nylen,
2005). Against this background, the aim of the present study was to
assess how religiously committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the
* Author Note: Bruce G. Fawcett, Acadia Divinity College, Acadia University; Leslie
J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Mandy Robbins, Institute of
Education, University of Warwick.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bruce G. Fawcett,
Acadia Divinity College, Acadia University, 31 Horton Avenue, Wolfville, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada B4P 2R6. Telephone (902) 585-2210, Fax (902) 585-2233. E-mail: bruce.
fawcett@acadiau.ca

imagining themselves as ministers 265
minister and to place their assessment within the theoretical frame-

work of ministry styles proposed by Francis and Payne (2002) and
operationalized by the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS).
Within the sociological literature, there is a long-established
research tradition concerned with the variety of roles that clergy fulfill.
This tradition is generally traced back to the pioneering work of Bliz-
zard (1955, 1956, 1958a, 1958b) who distinguished between six clergy
roles: teacher, organizer, preacher, administrator, pastor, and priest.
Blizzard’s analysis was adopted, among others, by Coates and Kistler
(1965), Jud, Mills, and Burch (1970), Towler and Coxon (1979), and
Brunette-Hill and Finke (1999). Other sociological analyses have been
advanced by Nelson, Yokley, and Madson (1973) who identified five
roles; by Reilly (1975) who identified six roles; by Davies, Watkins, and
Winter (1991) who identified seven functions; by Ranson, Bryman, and
Hinings (1977) who identified seven functions; by Francis and Rodger
(1994) who identified seven roles; by Tiller (1983) who identified eight
roles; by Lauer (1973) who identified 10 roles; and by Robbins and
Francis (2000) who identified 10 roles. Not only does the sociological
literature fail to agree on the number and definition of clergy roles or
functions, it also fails to generate a clear conceptual framework within
which these functions or roles can be differentiated.
In their discussion of the variety of ways in which ministers, clergy,
and priests express and fulfill their ministry, Francis and Payne (2002)
rooted their analysis not in the sociological literature but in the psy-
chological literature. They defined their concern to be with neither
ministry roles nor ministry functions but with ministry styles, and
they grounded their understanding of ministry styles within the Jun-
gian framework of psychological type.
Psychological type theory has its roots in the observations of Jung as
documented in his classic volume Psychological Types (1971). The the-
ory has also been developed and extended by a series of self-comple-
tion psychological tests, most notably the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
(Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey
& Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis,
2005). The core of Jung’s theory resides in the identification of two key
psychological processes, generally defined as the perceiving process
and as the judging process. The perceiving process is concerned with
the gathering of information. Jung termed this the irrational process,
since it is not concerned with evaluating or applying the information.
266 fawcett, francis, and robbins
The judging process is concerned with the evaluation and application

of information. Jung termed this the rational process.
The two functions of the perceiving process are defined as sensing
and as intuition. People who prefer and develop sensing gather infor-
mation by focusing on the facts of a situation, relying on and trusting
their five senses. Sensing types begin with the specific details rather
than with the overall picture. They are concerned with the actual, the
real, and the practical. They tend to be down to earth and matter of
fact. They may feel that particular details are more significant than
general patterns, and they prefer to stay with the traditional and with
the conventional. They tend to be reluctant to trust their hunches, to
resist following inspiration, and to stay with the known rather than
the unknown. They tend to live for today rather than for tomorrow. In
contrast, people who prefer and develop intuition gather information
by focusing on wider meanings and relationships, using their imagi-
nation and their ability to draw disparate insights together. Intuitive
types tend to focus on the overall picture rather than on specific facts
or details. They follow their inspirations with enthusiasm, if not always
with realism, and they tend to be attracted to ideals, to possibilities,
and to long-term goals. They often aspire to bring about innovative
change and to challenge established conventions. They tend to live for
tomorrow rather than for today.
The two functions of the judging process are defined as thinking
and feeling. People who prefer and develop thinking make decisions
by using objective, analytical logic. Thinking types value integrity and
justice, and they are often recognized for their truthfulness and for
their desire for fairness. They consider standing by principles to be of
more importance than cultivating harmony. They are often good at
making difficult decisions since they are able to analyze problems to
reach an unbiased and reasoned solution. When working with others,
they may consider it to be more important to be honest and correct
than to be tactful. They strive for truth rather than for peace. In con-
trast, people who prefer and develop feeling make decisions by using
subjective personal values and taking interpersonal relationships into
account. Feeling types value compassion and mercy, and they are often
recognized for their tactfulness and for their desire for peace. They
are more concerned to promote harmony, than to adhere to abstract
principles. They may be thought of as “people persons” since they are
able to take into account other people’s feelings and values in decision-
making and in problem-solving, trying to reach a solution that satisfies
everyone. They may find it difficult to criticize others, even when it is

necessary to do so. They find it easy to empathize with other people,
and they tend to be trusting and encouraging of others.
Alongside the two key psychological processes of perceiving (sens-
ing and intuition) and judging (thinking and feeling), psychological
type theory also distinguishes between two orientations and two atti-
tudes toward the outer world. The orientations are concerned with
the source and focus of psychological energy. The attitudes toward
the outer world are concerned with identifying the preferred spheres
in which the preferred perceiving process (either sensing or intuition)
and the preferred judging process (either thinking or feeling) are
exercised.
The two orientations are defined as extraversion and introversion.
Extraverts focus their energy on, and gain their energy from, the out-
side world of people and things. They enjoy communicating and thrive
in stimulating and exciting environments. They prefer to act in a situ-
ation rather than to reflect on it and tend to vocalize a problem or an
idea rather than think it through privately. They may be bored and
frustrated by silence and solitude. They tend to focus their attention on
what is happening outside themselves. They are usually open people,
and they are easy to get to know. They enjoy having many friends. In
contrast, introverts focus their energy on, and gain energy from, their
inner world of ideas and reflections. They may feel drained by events
and people around them, and they prefer to reflect on a situation for
some considerable time before acting on it. They enjoy solitude, silence,
and contemplation, and they tend to focus their attention on what is
happening in their inner life. They may appear reserved, detached, and
difficult to get to know. They may prefer to have a small circle of inti-
mate friends, rather than many acquaintances.
The two attitudes toward the outer world are defined as judging and
perceiving. Judging types use their preferred judging function (either
thinking or feeling) in the outer world. They present a systematic,
ordered approach to life. They prefer to follow schedules in order to
reach an established goal, and they tend to make good use of lists,
timetables, and calendars. They tend to be punctual, organized, and
tidy, and they may find it difficult to deal with unexpected disrup-
tions of their plans. They prefer to make decisions quickly and to stick
to their conclusions once formulated. In contrast, perceiving types
present a spontaneous, explorative attitude toward the outer world.
They enjoy change and spontaneity, and they prefer to leave projects
open in order to adjust and improve them. They may find plans and
schedules restrictive, and they tend to be easy going about matters like
punctuality, deadlines, and tidiness. They may consider last minute
pressure to be a necessary motivation in order to complete projects
and to bring things to fruition. They are often good at dealing with
the unexpected, although at times their behavior may appear to be
impulsive and unplanned.
Drawing on psychological type theory, Francis and Payne (2002)
suggested that diversity within approaches to ministry could be coher-
ently and cogently summarized in terms of the two orientations, the
two perceiving functions, the two judging functions, and the two atti-
tudes toward the outside world. The Payne Index of Ministry Styles
was designed to provide seven examples for each of the eight psycho-
logical type preferences.
The seven items concerned with an extraversion ministry style con-
centrated on gaining energy, being vitalized, or being refreshed from
outward stimulation, including visiting groups of people, preaching to
large congregations, meeting new people in the parish, leading large
group meetings, leading worship in large congregations, and being
out and about in the parish. This scale produced an alpha coefficient
of 0.76.
The seven items concerned with an introversion ministry style con-
centrated on gaining energy, being vitalized, or being refreshed from
inward stimulation, including spending time alone in prayer, giving
time to preparing sermons, reading around a theological topic, writing
in the study, engagement with a contemplative style of prayer, praying
for people, and conducting worship in small groups. This scale pro-
duced an alpha coefficient of 0.62.
The seven items concerned with a sensing ministry style concen-
trated on the practical aspects of ministry (such as getting on with the
things that need doing and giving a hand in decorating the church),
giving attention to detail (such as keeping accounts, ordering or reor-
dering the church, and ensuring that the fabric is kept in order), and
resisting change for change’s sake. This scale produced an alpha coef-
ficient of 0.59.
The seven items concerned with an intuition ministry style con-
centrated on having a vision for the future, finding solutions to new
problems, thinking up new ways of doing things in the parish, explor-
ing new angles on the faith, questioning religious traditions, and rais-
ing questions in people’s minds rather than trying to leave them with
settled answers. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.61.
The seven items concerned with a thinking ministry style concen-
trated on pursuing what is fair and just in dealing with parishioners,
being objective in pastoral crises, analyzing things in a logical man-
ner, settling disputes with parishioners objectively, and exploring the
logical consequences of actions. The thinking ministry style is able to
take tough decisions in the parish and believes that it is more impor-
tant to be effective than liked. This scale produced an alpha coefficient
of 0.63.
The seven items concerned with a feeling ministry style concen-
trated on getting alongside and becoming involved with parishioners’
lives, trying to consider the needs of parishioners above all else, and
dealing with parishioners’ emotional problems. The feeling ministry
style wants to deal sensitively with people, likes being in fellowship
with others in worship, and tries to respond to God in compassionate
acts. The feeling ministry style needs to work in a harmonious parish
atmosphere. The scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.69.
The seven items concerned with a judging ministry style concen-
trated on a commitment to planning an organization and ensuring
that things are planned down to the last detail, that services are well
thought through in advance, and that changes in the parish should be
carefully planned. The judging ministry style prefers to run the parish
according to a strict schedule and relies on drawing up and working
to lists. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.79.
The seven items concerned with a perceiving ministry style concen-
trated on having a commitment to flexibility and openness, preferring
worship not always to be tied to time and order, liking unpredictability
in pastoral ministry, enjoying having the routine disturbed, and appre-
ciating new and unexpected experiences in ministry. The perceiving
ministry style likes variety and values freedom in ministry. This scale
produced an alpha coefficient of 0.79.
The Payne Index of Ministry Styles offers three particular strengths
for developing further research concerning perceptions of ministry.
The first strength concerns the way in which the analysis is rooted in
a well-established psychological model of individual differences. Such
a model should be able to transcend theological and ecclesiological
differences and provide a valid point of comparison across traditions.
Such a model recognizes that the broad sociological definitions of
roles or functions are open to multiple interpretations or implemen-

tations. For example, Blizzard’s (1955, 1956, 1958a, 1958b) role of pas-
tor might be practiced very differently by introverts and extraverts,
by sensers and intuitives, by thinkers and feelers, and by judgers and
perceivers. In other words, the Payne Index of Ministry Styles may
get much closer to what is really the case in the minds and hearts of
clergy themselves.
The second strength concerns the way in which the analysis is
consonant with a much broader empirical research tradition that is
drawing on the insights and evidences of psychological type theory
to illuminate aspects of religious vocation and ministry. This research
tradition was established in the latter part of the 20th century with
studies among Jewish rabbis (Greenfield, 1969), Catholic religious sis-
ters (Cabral, 1984; Bigelow, Fitzgerald, Busk, Girault, & Avis, 1988),
Catholic seminarians (Holsworth, 1984), Lutheran seminarians (Har-
baugh, 1984), Lutheran parish pastors (Nauss, 1989), and Presbyte-
rian ministers (Irvine, 1989). This research tradition was revitalized
and extended at the beginning of the 21st century with studies among
Anglican clergy (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001; Francis, Craig, Whin-
ney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), Bible College students (Francis, Penson,
& Jones, 2001), evangelical church leaders (Francis, & Robbins, 2002;
Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), missionary personnel (Craig, Hors-
fall, & Francis, 2005), lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, &
Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006),
Christian youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), Angli-
can seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), Pentecostal theologi-
cal college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008),
lead elders within the New Frontiers network of churches (Francis,
Gubb, & Robbins, 2009), experienced preachers (Francis, Village, &
Robbins, 2009), and Anglican health care chaplains (Francis, Han-
cocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009).
The third strength concerns the way in which the analysis may help
to illuminate discrepancies between the ways in which ministry is con-
ceptualized and the personal preferences and strengths of individuals
either engaged in ministry or invited to contemplate a call to ordained
ministry. For example, if ministry were to be conceptualized largely in
extraverted terms, introverts already ordained may find the exercise of
ministry particularly stressful, and introverts contemplating a call to
ordained ministry may decide that the demands of the job are inap-
propriate for their preferred skills and disposition.
The major limitation with the Payne Index of Ministry Styles con-
cerns its brevity, with each of the eight styles operationalized by just
seven items. There is value, therefore, in building on the pioneering
work reported by Francis and Payne (2002) by developing and extend-
ing this instrument.
Informed by this review of the research field, the broad aim of
the present study (to assess how religiously committed Baptist youth
imagine the role of the minister) has been refined into three research
objectives. The first objective was to refine an expanded version of the
Payne Index of Ministry Styles in order to provide a richer and fuller
description of the ways in which Christian ministry may be concep-
tualized and expressed within the framework of Jungian psychologi-
cal type theory. The second objective was to examine how religiously
committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the minister within the
categories provided by the expanded Payne Index of Ministry Styles.
The third objective was to assess the extent to which the psychological
type preferences of the young people themselves color their perception
of the role of the minister and the extent to which their perception is
set by external rather than internal constraints.
The opportunity to operationalize these three research objectives
was provided by Tidal Impact, a biennial weeklong mission and service
experience sponsored by the Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches,
a denomination of approximately 500 Baptist churches in Canada’s
four eastern-most provinces. Tidal Impact invites young people, 12 to
18 years of age, to give up a week of their summer vacation, and pay
several hundred dollars, to serve the children and the marginalized
populations of communities in and around the small cities of Atlantic
Canada. The event has grown from 69 to 1,300 participants over its
two decades of existence. The event aims to allow young people to
grow in their faith through service, gift discovery, worship, and fellow-
ship with Christian youth from other communities.
Method
Participants
The present analysis was based on the 545 participants attending Tidal
Impact 2002 who completed the last battery of items in a detailed
questionnaire. The sample comprised 190 males, 353 females, and two
participants of undisclosed sex; 195 were under the age of 15, 191 were
between the ages of 15 and 18, 157 were over the age of 18, and two
participants did not disclose their age. The majority of the participants
self-identified as Baptist (95%) and as weekly churchgoers (92%).
Measures
Psychological type was assessed by the adolescent form of the Fran-
cis Psychological Type Scales (Fawcett, Francis, & Robbins, in press).
This 40-item instrument comprises four sets of 10 forced-choice items
related to each of the four components of psychological type: orien-
tation (extraversion or introversion), perceiving process (sensing or
intuition), judging process (thinking or feeling), and attitude toward
the outer world (judging or perceiving). Fawcett, Francis and Robbins
(in press) reported alpha coefficients of 0.82 for the EI scale, 0.67 for
the SN scale, 0.69 for the TF scale, and 0.79 for the JP scale.
Ministry styles were assessed by a battery of 191 items designed
to reflect and to extend the theory introduced by Francis and Payne
(2002) in the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). These items
were designed to present distinctive ministry styles consistent with all
eight Jungian functions (extraversion, introversion, sensing, intuition,
thinking, feeling, judging, and perceiving). Each item was rated on a
5-point scale: agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree
strongly. In the present study the young people were asked “to imag-
ine that you have responded to God’s call to become a minister. How
would you feel working as a pastor in a church? Read each sentence
carefully and think, ‘Do I agree with it?’ ”
Procedure
All the young people attending Tidal Impact 2002 held in New Bruns-
wick, Canada, were invited to complete a detailed questionnaire as
part of their participation at one of six afternoon Concerts of Prayer
held during the weeklong program. Following an explanation of the
nature of the survey and assurances of confidentiality and anonym-
ity, the young people were given the opportunity to excuse themselves
from the exercise. The overall level of interest with the topic meant
that the majority of participants completed the main body of the
questionnaire.
Results and Discussion
The first step in data analysis concerned examining the 191 ministry
style items (crafted to develop and to extend the 56 items of the Payne
Index of Ministry Styles) in order to generate an extended instrument,
the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2). Factor analyses,
correlational analyses, and reliability analyses were employed to select
13 items exemplifying each of the eight ministry styles (extraversion,
introversion, sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling, judging, and perceiv-
ing). The psychometric properties of these eight scales are presented
in Table 1. Seven of the eight scales achieved an alpha coefficient of
internal homogeneity reliability in excess of the threshold of 0.65 pro-
posed by DeVellis (2003), although the scale of sensing ministry style
fell just below this threshold. Each set of items has clear face validity
mapping onto Jungian psychological type theory.
The second step in data analysis concerned examining the image
of the role of the minister held by these religiously committed Bap-
tist youth as brought into visibility through the Revised Payne Index
of Ministry Styles (PIMS2). Each of the eight ministry styles will be
examined in turn.
First, it was clear from the data that ministry was conceived in
extraverted terms rather than introverted terms. Many aspects of the
extravert ministry styles (Table 2) were endorsed by around three-
quarters of the young people.
They maintained that meeting and talking with people would put
new life into their ministry (77%); that they would like to discuss
and share their ministry with other people (75%); that they would be
energized by meeting many new people in their ministry (74%); that
Table 1. Reliabilities and Mean Scale Scores Recorded on the PIMS2

Alpha Mean SD
PIMS2 Extraversion .82 49.1 6.7
PIMS2 Introversion .66 45.4 5.7
PIMS2 Sensing .63 46.2 5.0
PIMS2 Intuition .71 48.2 5.3
PIMS2 Thinking .70 47.5 5.3
PIMS2 Feeling .77 47.8 6.0
PIMS2 Judging .80 44.6 6.7
PIMS2 Perceiving .76 39.1 6.9
Table 2. Index of Extraverted Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations

and Percentage Item Endorsement
r yes ? no
% % %
I would gain energy from leading worship .39 56 26 18
among large groups of people
I would be energized by meeting many new .48 74 20 6
people in my ministry
Meeting and talking with people would put .53 77 19 4
new life into my ministry
I could re-energize by getting out and .47 71 24 6
putting ministry into practice
I would gain energy from preaching sermons .40 51 34 15
to full churches
I would rather be doing things in my .45 61 29 10
ministry than thinking about them
I would be energized by ministering to a .50 51 33 16
large number of people at the same time
I would like to discuss and share my .53 75 21 4
ministry with other people
I would find it energizing to go out visiting .43 59 32 6
people in my ministry
Fellowship with others would recharge me .52 73 22 7
spiritually
I would like to find the congregation talking .40 73 21 7
with each other before the service begins
I would enjoy fellowship with others in .49 73 21 6
worship services
In my ministry I would like to be involved .42 66 26 9
in social events
fellowship with others would recharge them spiritually (73%); that

they would like to find the congregation talking with each other before
the service begins (73%); that they would enjoy fellowship with others
in the worship services (73%); and that they could re-energize by get-
ting out and putting ministry into practice (71%). None of the items
in this section was endorsed by fewer than half the young people. By
way of contrast, only two of the 13 introverted ministry style items
(Table 3) were endorsed by more than 70% of the young people: 73%
maintained that they would gain energy from quiet prayer on their
own, and 72% said that they would gain energy from spending time
alone in prayer. Four of the 13 items in this section were endorsed by
fewer than half the young people: 49% considered that they would pre-
Table 3. Index of Introverted Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations

r yes ? no
% % %
I would be refreshed in my ministry by .40 55 26 19
spending time alone
On public occasions in church life I would .12 36 28 36
prefer to be working in the background
I would gain energy from quiet prayer on my .44 73 18 8
own
I would gain energy from spending time alone .45 72 17 11
in prayer
I would gain energy from giving time to .29 55 32 13
prepare sermons on my own
Reading and writing in my study would put .43 57 30 13
new life into my ministry
I could re-energize by reading books about .34 52 32 16
ministry and theology
I would be energized by ministering to a small .29 64 28 8
number of people in depth
I would like to have my talk well prepared .20 68 24 8
before speaking in public
I would like the atmosphere in church to be .19 30 32 38
quiet and reflective before the service begins
I would like people to leave me in peace when .11 27 36 37
I arrive to lead the service
I would gain energy from working with a small .25 64 28 8
group of people whom I know well
I would prefer to talk with church members .23 49 34 16
individually rather than in a crowd
fer to talk with church members individually rather than in a crowd;

36% considered that on public occasions in church life they would
prefer to be working in the background; 30% considered that they
would like the atmosphere in church to be quiet and reflective before
the service begins; and 27% said that they would like people to leave
them in peace when they arrive to lead the service.
Second, in terms of the perceiving process, the data suggested that
the young people conceived of ministry as requiring both skills of
sensing and intuition. In terms of the sensing perspective (Table 4),
around three-quarters of the young people imagined that in their min-
istry they would like to focus on the things that need to be done here
and now (79%); that when preaching sermons they would like to leave
Table 4. Index of Sensing Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations

r yes ? no
% % %
In my ministry I would like focus on the things .22 79 15 6
that need to be done here and now
Practical action would be what counts in my .25 48 42 11
ministry
What would really count in my ministry is .25 45 38 17
getting the practical things done
When preaching sermons I would like to leave .33 72 22 6
people with something practical
I would like to be involved in the day-to-day .24 53 30 18
details of running the church
I would keep an eye on the church building to .30 60 27 13
ensure everything would be in good shape
I would prefer to work to concrete goals rather .30 43 43 15
than abstract visions in my ministry
When preaching I would like to concentrate on .20 51 38 11
the specifics in the Bible passage
I would want to help people become clear about .29 71 27 3
the basics of their faith
I would like to give practical guidance in a .38 62 32 6
specific situation
I would like to keep a regular pattern to the .22 37 38 25
services I lead
I would like to stick to what I have found works .23 41 43 16
in my ministry
I would notice quickly when things were out of .32 54 32 14
place in my church
people with something practical (72%); and that they would want to
help people become clear about the basics of their faith (71%).
In terms of the intuition perspective (Table 5), around three-quarters
of the young people imagined that in their ministry they would like to
focus on how things can be improved in the future (85%); that they
would like to show how the Christian faith could respond to new chal-
lenges (81%); that they would like to stimulate and encourage change
and experimentation in their church (77%); and that they would like
finding new solutions to problems in their ministry (72%).
Third, in terms of the judging process, the data suggested that the
young people conceived of ministry as requiring both the skills of
Table 5. Index of Intuitive ministry style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and

Percentage Item Endorsement
r yes ? no
% % %
In my ministry I would like to focus on how .30 85 12 4
things can be improved in the future
I would like to stimulate and encourage change .38 77 18 5
and experimentation in my church
I would like to show how the Christian faith .34 81 16 3
could respond to new challenges
What would really count in my ministry is .31 62 31 7
getting the vision right for the future
I would prefer to work in my ministry to a .16 39 40 21
broad vision rather than to specific goals
My job would be to reinterpret the gospel truth .30 48 39 14
in new ways
I would like stimulating people to discover new .41 69 26 5
meanings and insights for their faith
I would be confident to trust my hunches and .23 43 42 15
inspiration in my ministry
I would like providing insights into difficult .39 64 30 6
situations for people
I would like finding new solutions to problems .38 72 23 6
in my ministry
I would like to try many new patterns to the .38 58 33 9
service I lead
I would enjoy raising questions of faith others .35 48 39 13
which others find difficult to answer
I would like to experiment with new ways of .41 62 30 8
doing things in my ministry
thinking and the skills of feeling. In terms of the thinking perspective

(Table 6), at least three-fifths of the young people maintained that they
would really enjoy challenging people through their ministry (80%);
that they would like helping people to confront their doubts (68%);
that it would be most important for them to deal truthfully with peo-
ple in their ministry (68%); that they would want to be respected for
their principles in their ministry (68%); that they would try to respond
to God by calling people to act fairly (66%); and that they would work
hard to promote fairness and justice through their ministry (65%).
In terms of the feeling perspective (Table 7), at least three-fifths of
the young people maintained that they would try to respond to God
Table 6. Index of Thinking Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations

r yes ? no
% % %
To be at my best I would need to think issues .29 54 39 8
of truth and justice were being faced in my
church
I would find it most rewarding to settle .22 44 41 16
disputes with people with justice
I would try to respond to God by calling .26 66 27 7
people to act fairly
When people were living immoral lives, .30 59 33 8
I would believe in confronting them with
truth
I would preach frequently about God’s call .38 51 40 10
for truth and justice
I would really enjoy challenging people .37 80 16 4
through my ministry
I would approach pastoral problems by .23 46 41 13
analyzing things in a logical manner
I would like helping people to confront .41 65 25 10
difficult relationships
I would like helping people to confront their .39 68 24 7
doubts
It would be most important to me to deal .40 68 26 6
truthfully with people in my ministry
It would be as important to think about .19 43 43 14
theology and doctrine as to serve the needs
of others
I would work hard to promote fairness and .39 65 30 5
justice through my ministry
I would want to be respected for my .43 68 27 6
principles in my ministry
by showing compassion to people (86%); that they would find it very

easy to show sympathy to others in their ministry (69%); that they
would work hard to promote peace and harmony through their min-
istry (63%); that they would approach pastoral problems by finding
out how other people felt (62%); that their ministry would be really
improved when they felt that others appreciated it (62%); and that
opening their heart to others is what ministry is about (61%).
Fourth, in terms of the attitudes toward the outer world, the data
suggested that overall, the young people were somewhat more likely
Table 7. Index of Feeling Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and

r yes ? no
% % %
I would try to respond to God by showing .34 86 11 3
compassion to people
I would find it most rewarding to deal with .34 55 30 15
people’s emotional problems
I would preach frequently about God’s call .39 54 39 7
for mercy and compassion
I would try to consider feelings of other .36 53 27 20
people above all else
I would find it very easy to show sympathy .46 69 22 9
to others in my ministry
My ministry would be really improved .41 62 31 7
when I felt others appreciated it
I would approach pastoral problems by .38 62 30 9
finding out how other people felt
I would like to concentrate on human .46 53 35 13
feelings and interpersonal values in my
preaching
Being an example of sensitivity to others .46 58 34 8
would be the heart of my ministry
Opening my heart to others is what .45 61 28 11
ministry is all about
In my ministry I would become easily .36 54 36 10
involved with people and their problems
It would be most important to me to deal .39 59 33 8
sensitively with people in my ministry
I would work hard to promote peace and .32 63 30 7
harmony through my ministry
to endorse a judging model of ministry than to endorse a perceiving

model of ministry. In terms of the judging perspective (Table 8), over
half of the young people maintained that they would like to see that
everything is well-organized and kept in the proper place (65%); that to
be effective, changes in the church should be carefully planned (65%);
that they would like to help people see the value of a structured prayer
life (64%); that they would like to arrange the details of the worship
services well in advance (58%); that in their ministry they would want
to have important decisions settled well in advance (57%); and that
good leadership means careful planning in church life (53%).
Table 8. Index of Judging Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and

r yes ? no
% % %
In my ministry I would like to plan things .50 52 25 24
carefully down to the last detail
Being good and careful at administration .37 40 42 18
would hold the key to successful ministry
I would like to arrange the details of .51 58 28 13
worship services well in advance
I would like to see that everything is well .54 65 22 13
organized and kept in its proper place
To be effective, changes in church should be .41 65 26 10
carefully planned
I would prefer to organize my ministry .47 23 33 44
according to a strict schedule
I would like to structure my day with fixed .32 50 30 19
times of prayer and worship
I would like to prepare my sermons well in .49 49 34 17
advance
I would like to help people see the value of a .32 64 30 6
structured prayer life
In my ministry I would want to have .39 57 32 11
important decisions settled well in
advance
I would like to list things that need to be .43 42 35 23
done each day in my ministry and stick to
the list
Good leadership means careful planning in .42 53 37 10
church life
Reliable and regular routines would be .40 36 43 21
trademarks of my ministry
In terms of the perceiving perspective (Table 9), only two of the 13

items received endorsements by at least half of the young people: 66%
maintained that in their ministry they would like to be flexible and
not tied down by routine and plans, and 51% said that freedom and
flexibility would be trademarks of their ministry.
The third stage in data analysis concerned examining the association
between the psychological type preferences of the young people and
their perception of the role of the minister as reflected in the Revised
Payne Index of Ministry Styles. The Adolescent Form of the Francis
Psychological Type Scales achieved satisfactory levels of internal con-
Table 9. Index of Perceiving Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations

r yes ? no
% % %
In my ministry I would like to be flexible .31 66 19 15
and not tied down by routine and plans
I would rather leave it to others to see that .40 36 23 41
things are well organised in the church
Changes in the church often happen most .37 27 42 32
effectively on the spur of the moment
After a while, having fixed times for .40 28 25 48
personal devotions each day would be
boring
I would dislike having to think ahead and .50 28 25 47
having always to organize things in
advance
I would feel too constrained if I always .48 31 34 36
had to prepare my sermon well in
advance
I would like the unpredictability of pastoral .25 40 42 18
ministry
I would be happy to live with many loose .39 21 33 46
ends in my ministry
I would dislike having so much of my .47 29 41 30
ministry scheduled
I would not mind leaving important .45 23 34 44
decisions to last minute in my ministry
Good leadership means being able to get .37 38 35 27
things sorted out at the last minute
Freedom and flexibility would be .28 51 39 11
trademarks of my ministry
It would not bother me to leave letters .36 22 30 49
and messages unanswered
sistency reliability with the following alpha coefficients: for extraver-

sion and introversion .83; for sensing and intuition .67; for thinking
and feeling .69, and for judging and perceiving .78.
Although the associations between personal psychological type pref-
erences and the scales of the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles
were not generally strong, they were sufficient to indicate that personal
psychological type did help to shape how young people conceived of
ministry. Extraverts were more likely to emphasize the extravert min-
istry style (r = .23, p < .001). Introverts were more likely to emphasize
the introvert ministry style (r = .31, p < .001). Sensors were more likely
to emphasize the sensing ministry style (r = .23, p < .001). Feelers were
more likely to emphasize the feeling ministry style (r = .33, p < .001).
Judgers were more likely to emphasize the judging ministry style (r =
.50, p < .001). Perceivers were more likely to emphasize the perceiving
ministry style (r = .49, p < .001). On the other hand, there was no sig-
nificant association between thinking and the thinking ministry style
(r = .01, NS), and the association between intuition and the intuition
ministry style was weak (r = .11, p < .05).
Conclusion
The present study set out with three research objectives and has
achieved these goals. The first goal has been the development and
testing of the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles, providing 13
exemplars for each of the eight styles proposed by Jungian psychologi-
cal type theory. The instrument is now ready for further conceptual
critiques and for further empirical testing.
The second goal has been the examination of how religiously com-
mitted Baptist youth imagine the role of the minister within the cat-
egories provided by the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles. The
most striking finding from this examination concerns the way in
which ministry is conceived more strongly in extraverted terms than
in introverted terms. If the ideal minister is held to be an extravert,
this may prove to be a real disincentive against introverts hearing and
responding to a call to vocational ministry. The fact that the more
introverted aspects of ministry identified by the Payne Index of Minis-
try Styles do appeal more to introverts than to extraverts confirms the
view that introverts may bring distinctive and complementary skills to
ministry. If these introverted aspects of ministry were to be accorded
a higher profile within the Church, introverts may be afforded greater
opportunity to imagine themselves as ministers.
The third goal has been the assessment of the extent to which the
young people’s own psychological type colors their perception of the
role of the minister. The most striking finding from the assessment
concerns the limited impact of personal type preferences on the con-
ceptualization of ministry. If ministry is not seen to provide opportu-
nities for individuals to play to their personal strengths and to develop
their personal gifts in the service of God, the sense of being overawed
by or being inadequate for the task may prove to be a real disincen-

tive against some young people hearing and responding to a call to
vocational ministry.
If the insights of psychological type theory are accepted, and if it is
recognized that there is room for a diversity of gifts within ministry,
the nurturing of vocations among young people may perhaps be best
advanced in the following way. The aim should be helping young peo-
ple to deconstruct their stereotypes of the ideal minister and to explore
how their own personality and psychological type preferences could
equip them to bring highly distinctive and highly valuable gifts to an
increasingly pluriform and diverse church.
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APPRENTICE CLERGY? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EXPECTATIONS IN MINISTRY AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
TYPE PROFILE OF TRAINING INCUMBENTS AND CURATES
IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
David Tilley,* Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins,

and Susan H. Jones
Abstract
This study examined the relationship between the ministry expectations experienced
by newly ordained clergy in the Church of England and both their personal psycho-
logical type profile and the psychological type profile of the training incumbent along-
side whom they were apprenticed to learn the practice of ministry. Data were provided
by 98 curates who completed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and a set of
items designed to map their perception of the expectations placed on them by their
training incumbent. Analysis of these items generated the Tilley Index of Training
Expectations (TITE). The MBTI was also completed by the training incumbent. The
data demonstrated that the ministry expectations placed on curates were significantly
related to the psychological type profile of the training incumbents but not of the
curates. The implications of incumbents shaping curates in their own image (rather
than developing the curate’s own preferred predisposition for ministry) are discussed
for the long-term work-related psychological health of trainee clergy.
Keywords: Anglican Church, curates, MBTI, psychological type, training
Psychological type theory as introduced originally by Jung (1971) and

as developed through a series of self-report type measures, includ-
ing the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the
Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis
Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005), proposes four fundamental
individual differences distinguishing between two orientations (intro-
version and extraversion), two perceiving processes (sensing and
* Author Note: David Tilley, Diocese of Coventry, UK; Leslie J. Francis, Institute of
Education, University of Warwick; Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University
of Warwick; Susan H. Jones, Glyndŵr University.

apprentice clergy? 287
intuition), two judging processes (thinking and feeling), and two atti-
tudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). Psychological
type discusses individual differences not in terms of traits, dimen-
sions, or continuous factors, as employed in the models of personal-
ity advanced by Costa and McCrae (1985), by Eysenck and Eysenck
(1991), or by Cattell, Cattell, and Cattell (1993), but in terms of clearly
defined types. Taken together, these four bipolar preferences generate
16 discrete psychological types.
The two orientations are defined as introversion (I) and extraver-
sion (E). Introverts draw their energy from the inner world of ideas,
while extraverts draw their energy from the outer world of people and
things. Extraverts are energized by people and drained by too much
solitude, while introverts are energized by solitude and drained by too
many people.
The two perceiving processes are defined as sensing (S) and intu-
ition (N). Sensers perceive their environment through their senses and
focus on the details of the here and now, while intuitives perceive their
environment by making use of the imagination and inspiration. Sensers
are distrustful of jumping to conclusions and of envisioning the future,
while intuitives are overloaded by too many details and long to try out
new approaches.
The two judging processes are defined as thinking (T) and feel-
ing (F). Thinkers reach their judgments by relying on objective logic,
while feelers reach their judgments by relying on subjective apprecia-
tion of the personal and interpersonal factors involved. Thinkers strive
for truth, fairness, and justice, while feelers strive for harmony, peace, and
reconciliation.
The two attitudes toward the outer world are defined as judging (J)
and perceiving (P). Judgers use their preferred judging process (either
thinking or feeling) to deal with the outside world. Their outside world
is organized, scheduled, and planned. Perceivers use their preferred per-
ceiving process (either sensing or intuition) to deal with the outside
world. Their outside world is flexible, spontaneous, and unplanned.
A growing body of empirical research has begun to document the
power of psychological type theory to account for individual differ-
ences in the expression and practice of Christian ministry (Francis,
2005, 2009). One set of recent studies has mapped the similarities
and dissimilarities between individuals either serving in or training
to serve in a variety of Christian denominations. These studies have
included Presbyterian Church of Scotland ministers (Irvine, 1989),
288 tilley, francis, robbins, and jones
Anglican Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001),

male and female Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones,
2001), evangelical church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig,
Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male missionary personnel (Craig, Hors-
fall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig,
Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, &
Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007),
evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007),
Church of England clergy (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater,
2007), Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay, Francis, &
Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008), and Newfrontier lead elders (Fran-
cis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009).
Another set of recent studies has helped to illuminate how different
psychological type profiles are reflected in different approaches to min-
istry or in different expressions of personal spirituality among clergy.
For example, Francis and Payne (2002) described a model of ministry
preferences, based on psychological type theory and styled the Payne
Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). To develop this index, Francis and
Payne selected seven statements from a wider initial pool to opera-
tionalize each of the eight functions proposed by psychological type,
as illustrated by the following examples: I am energized by meeting
new people in the parish (extraversion); I feel energized by giving time
to prepare sermons (introversion); I examine the church fabric care-
fully to ensure that it is kept in order (sensing); I like to think up new
ways of doing things in the parish (intuition); I am usually objective in
pastoral crises (thinking); Dealing with emotional problems of parish-
ioners I find rewarding (feeling); I prefer to run my parish according
to a strict schedule (judging); I enjoy being spontaneous in services
(perceiving).
Building on the research traditions illustrated by Francis and Payne
(2002), Francis and Robbins (2008) described a model of prayer pref-
erences based on psychological type theory. To develop a set of prayer
preference scales, Francis and Robbins selected seven statements from
a wider initial pool to operationalize each of the eight functions pro-
posed by psychological type theory, as illustrated by the following
examples: Belonging to a prayer group energizes me (extraversion);
I am energized by praying in silence (introversion); My prayer life
is enhanced by an awareness of my posture (sensing); My prayer life
is enhanced by using my imagination (intuition); My prayer life is
shaped in my mind (thinking); My prayer life is shaped in my heart
(feeling); I often follow a set pattern of praying (judging); I often pray

what comes into my mind at the time (perceiving).
Against the background of this research tradition, the aim of the
present study is to test the power of psychological type theory to illu-
minate a crucial aspect of the way in which Anglican clergy are gener-
ally trained for parish ministry. Following initial training, either within
a full-time residential seminary or on a part-time non-residential
training course, the classic Anglican model is for the newly ordained
deacon to be located within a training parish and to be licensed as a
curate to learn from working alongside a training incumbent. This is
the apprenticeship model of clergy training. In spite of the significance
of this formative period in the lives of Anglican clergy, little empirical
research has been invested in this area. The small amount of research
evidence currently available, however, suggests that for many newly
ordained clergy, the experience of the training parish and working
alongside a training incumbent has been far from wholly successful.
The first major study concerning the experience of curates was
reported by Burgess (1998), based on a series of in-depth interviews
with 20 curates who had trained at Lincoln Theological College
between 1989 and 1994. It is difficult to know just how representative
this sample was of clergy trained at Lincoln Theological College during
this period, or indeed how representative ordinands trained at Lincoln
Theological College were of ordinands trained across the diverse range
of colleges and courses supported by the Church of England over this
period. The stark conclusion drawn by Burgess from his interviews was
that half of his sample believed that they had experienced an unsatis-
factory relationship with their respective training incumbents. In order
to interpret the basis for this failure in relationships, Burgess identified
what he described as five fundamental pathologies of training: a lack of
preparation before, and feedback by the incumbent after, a task; a lack
of personal organization and professionalism on the part of incum-
bents; unwillingness to share tasks or recognize curates’ abilities; the
inability of incumbents to create close personal relationships with a
colleague; and inappropriate attitudes in an adult colleague relation-
ship. In a subsequent study, analyzing written observations from more
than 50 curates, Tilley (2007) found continuing evidence for Burgess’
catalogue of pathologies but set alongside such evidence a wide range
of positive comments made by curates regarding the relationship with
their training incumbents.
In order to illuminate a key aspect of the relationship between

curates and their training incumbents, the present study proposed to
develop an index of training expectations based on psychological type
theory and then to examine the relationship between the curates’ per-
ceptions of their expectations and both their own psychological type
profile and the psychological type profile of their training incumbent.
It was hypothesized that a link between the curates’ own psychologi-
cal type profile and the expectations in training would suggest that the
training experience was emphasizing the ideal of enabling individual
curates to find their own preferred ministry style. On the other hand,
a link between the training incumbents’ psychological type profile and
the curates’ perceived expectations in training would suggest that the
training experience was emphasizing the ideal of shaping the curate in
the image of their training incumbents’ preferred ministry style.
Method
Participants
The sample of 98 curates on whom the analyses were based compro-
mised 45 clergymen and 53 clergywomen; 71 had been ordained into
stipendiary ministry and 27 into non-stipendiary ministry; 76 were
married, three divorced, three divorced and re-married, one widowed,
and 15 single; at the time of ordination, nine were under the age of
30, 33 in their 30s, 31 in their 40s, 19 in their 50s, and six aged 60
or over.
Measures
Psychological type was assessed by the 126-item Form G (Anglicized) of
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI: Myers & McCaulley, 1985).
This instrument uses a forced-choice questionnaire format to indicate
preferences between extraversion or introversion, sensing or intuition,
thinking or feeling, and judging or perceiving. Broad support for the
reliability and validity of the instrument is provided in the international
psychological literature, including studies by Tzeng, Outcalt, Boyer,
Ware, and Landis (1984), Thomson and Borrello (1986a, 1986b), Uhl
and Day (1993), Tischler (1994), Saggino and Kline (1995), and Francis
and Jones (1999). In the most recent of these studies, Francis and
Jones (1999) reported on the scale properties of Form G (Anglicized)
among 429 adult churchgoers. Reliability was supported by the fol-
lowing alpha coefficients: extraversion, 0.80; introversion, 0.79; sens-

ing, 0.87; intuition, 0.82; thinking, 0.79; feeling, 0.72; judging, 0.85; and
perceiving, 0.86.
Expectations in ministry were assessed by a pool of 115 items
designed to map onto the eight psychological type functions: extra-
version and introversion, sensing and intuition, thinking and feeling,
judging and perceiving. The items were introduced by the phrase “My
training incumbent expected me to. . . .” Each item was rated on a
5-point scale: agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree
strongly.
Procedure
Between 2000 and 2003, a detailed questionnaire was sent to curates
serving within the Dioceses of Oxford, Worcester, Leicester, and Cov-
entry whose personal psychological type profile, and generally also
whose training incumbents’ psychological type profile, was already
known from their participation in recent training events. Generally
the questionnaire was sent at the end of each curate’s first post or
during the first year of his or her second post in ministry. Partici-
pants in the project were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. A
total of 108 questionnaires were distributed, and 106 usable responses
were returned. After omitting the responses of one minister in secular
employment (MSE) and seven ordained local ministers (OLM), due to
their relationship with a training incumbent being quite different from
that of curates serving in conventional stipendiary ministry or non-
stipendiary ministry, the analysis was based on the responses made by
98 curates. Psychological type profiles were available for all 98 curates
and for 97 of their training incumbents.
Data Analysis
The data were analyzed by means of the SPSS statistical package,
employing the reliability, correlation, and factor routines.
Results
The psychological type literature has developed a highly distinctive

method for displaying type data in the format of type tables. The pres-
ent data are presented in this way in Tables 1 and 2 in order to facili-
tate clear comparison with other studies in the field.
Table 1. Type Distribution for Curates

N = 98
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E n = 46 (46.9%)
n=3 n=9 n = 14 n = 11 I n = 52 (53.1%)
(3.1%) (9.2%) (14.3%) (11.2%)
+++ +++++ +++++ +++++ S n = 30 (30.6%)
++++ +++++ +++++ N n = 68 (69.4%)
++++ +
T n = 32 (32.7%)
F n = 66 (67.3%)
J n = 70 (71.4%)
P n = 28 (28.6%)

n=2 n=1 n=8 n=4
(2.0%) (1.0%) (8.2%) (4.1%) IJ n = 37 (37.8%)
++ + +++++ ++++ IP n = 15 (15.3%)
+++ EP n = 13 (13.3%)
EJ n = 33 (33.7%)
ST n = 10 (10.2%)
SF n = 20 (20.4%)
NF n = 46 (46.9%
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT n = 22 (22.4%)
n=0 n=1 n=9 n=3
(0.0%) (1.0%) (9.2%) (3.1%) SJ n = 26 (26.5%)
+ +++++ +++ SP n=4 (4.1%)
++++ NP n = 24 (24.5%)
NJ n = 44 (44.9%)
TJ n = 23 (23.5%)
TP n=9 (9.2%)
FP n = 19 (19.4%)
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ n = 47 (48.0%)
n=5 n=9 n = 15 n=4
(5.1%) (9.2%) (15.3%) (4.1%) IN n = 37 (37.8%)
+++++ +++++ +++++ ++++ EN n = 31 (31.6%)
++++ +++++ IS n = 15 (15.3%)
+++++ ES n = 15 (15.3%)
ET n = 12 (12.2%)
EF n = 34 (34.7%)
IF n = 32 (32.7%)
IT n = 20 (20.4%)

n % n % n %
E-TJ 9 9.2 I-TP 6 6.1 Dt. T 15 15.3
E-FJ 24 24.5 I-FP 9 9.2 Dt. F 33 33.7
ES-P 1 1.0 IS-J 12 12.2 Dt. S 13 13.3
EN-P 12 12.2 IN-J 25 25.5 Dt. N 37 37.8
Note: + = 1% of N
According to Table 1, the sample of 98 curates showed preferences for

sensing (31%), for feeling (67%) over thinking (33%) and for judging
(71%) over perceiving (29%). The two predominant types were ENFJ
(15%) and INFJ (14%). Together the NFJ preferences accounted for
30% of the curates.
According to Table 2, the main differences between the type prefer-
ences of training incumbents compared with curates concerned a sig-
nificantly higher preference for thinking among training incumbents
(51%) compared with curates (33%) and a significantly lower pref-
erence for feeling among training incumbents (50%) compared with
curates (67%).
In drawing up items to access expectations of ministry in terms of each
of the eight psychological type functions, it was anticipated that some
items would be found to work better than others. From an initial pool
of 115 items, factor analysis and rest-of-test correlation analyses were
employed to select the best 10 items within each of the eight sets. These
resulting 10-item scales are presented in Tables 3 to 6, together with
the item rest-of-test scale correlations and percentage endorsements.
The item rest-of-test scale correlations (r) express the relationship
between each individual item and the sum total of the other nine
items. In order to simplify the presentation of data, the two responses
“agree strongly” and “agree” have been collapsed into the category
“yes,” the two responses “disagree” and “disagree strongly” have been
collapsed into the category “no,” and the response “not certain” has
been expressed as “?”
The alpha coefficients demonstrated that all but one of the eight
10-item scales functioned with satisfactory internal consistency reli-
ability in excess of the threshold of 0.65 proposed by DeVellis (2003):
introversion, 0.81; extraversion, 0.79; sensing, 0.82; intuition, 0.80;
thinking, 0.64; feeling, 0.81; judging, 0.92; perceiving, 0.83. The items
selected to comprise the eight 10-item scales were named the Tilley
Index of Training Expectations (TITE).
Tables 7 to 10 examine the association between the scores recorded
on the eight scales of ministry expectations against the relevant
personality constructs profiling both the curates and their training
incumbents.
The association was tested by comparing the mean scale scores
recorded on the ministry experience scales against the dichotomous
preferences recorded by the type indicator. This method was chosen
Table 2. Type Distribution for Training Incumbents Compared with Curates

N = 97
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ E 52 (53.6%) I = 1.14
n=9 n=7 n=3 n = 12 I 45 (46.4%) I = 0.87
(9.3%) (7.2%) (3.1%) (12.4%)
I = 3.03 I = 0.79 I = 0.22** I = 1.10 S 39 (40.2%) I = 1.31
+++++ +++++ +++ +++++ N 58 (59.8%) I = 0.86
++++ ++ +++++
++ T 49 (50.5%) **I = 1.55
F 48 (49.5%) **I = 0.73
J 64 (66.0%) I = 0.92
P 33 (34.0%) I = 1.19
ISTP ISFP INFP INTP
n=0 n=3 n=7 n=4 Pairs and Temperaments
(0.0%) (3.1%) (7.2%) (4.1%)
I = 0.00 I = 3.03 I = 0.88 I = 1.01 IJ 31 (32.0%) I = 0.85
+++ +++++ ++++ IP 14 (14.4%) I = 0.94
++ EP 19 (19.6%) I = 1.48
EJ 33 (34.0%) I = 1.01
ST 20 (20.6%) *I = 2.02
SF 19 (19.6%) I = 0.96
NF 29 (29.9%) *I = 0.64
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP NT 29 (29.9%) I = 1.33
n=2 n=3 n=9 n=5
(2.1%) (3.1%) (9.3%) (5.2%) SJ 31 (32.0%) I = 1.20
I = 0.00 I = 3.03 I = 1.01 I = 1.68 SP 8 (8.2%) I = 2.02
++ +++ +++++ +++++ NP 25 (25.8%) I = 1.05
++++ NJ 33 (34.0%) I = 0.76
TJ 38 (39.2%) *I = 1.67
TP 11 (11.3%) I = 1.23
FP 22 (22.7%) I = 1.17
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ FJ 26 (26.8%) **I = 0.56
n=9 n=6 n = 10 n=8
(9.3%) (6.2%) (10.3%) (8.2%) IN 26 (26.8%) I = 0.71
I = 1.82 I = 0.67 I =0.67 I = 2.02 EN 32 (33.0%) I = 1.04
+++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ IS 19 (19.6%) I = 1.28
++++ + +++++ +++ ES 20 (20.6%) I = 1.35
ET 24 (24.7%) *I = 2.02
EF 28 (28.9%) I = 0.83
IF 20 (20.6%) I = 0.63
IT 25 (25.8%) I = 1.26

n % I n % I n % I
E-TJ 17 17.5 1.91 I-TP 4 4.1 0.67 Dt. T 21 21.6 1.41
E-FJ 16 16.5 0.67 I-FP 10 10.3 1.12 Dt. F 26 26.8 0.80
ES-P 5 5.2 5.05 IS-J 16 16.5 1.35 Dt. S 21 21.6 1.63
EN-P 14 14.4 1.18 IN-J 15 15.5 0.61 Dt. N 29 29.9 0.79
Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 3. Training Expectations Indicative of Orientation Preferences

r Yes ? No
% % %
Items conforming to extraversion
My training incumbent expected me to . . .
easily and quickly turn embarrassment into a 0.37 30 39 31
joke
easily form friendships with many different 0.72 57 25 18
people
enjoy taking the spotlight in parish ministry 0.33 28 35 37
find it easy to meet a lot of new people 0.44 55 27 19
be an enthusiast 0.40 58 27 15
have an active social life to recharge my 0.47 36 28 36
batteries
help to get things going socially 0.50 49 19 32
remember names and faces easily 0.37 36 37 28
show interest in social interactions 0.46 66 19 16
talk easily to almost anyone in informal 0.60 74 13 26
situations
alpha: 0.79
Items conforming to introversion

work well in solitude 0.54 59 28 41
be private and self-contained 0.66 36 16 48
be careful about sharing my ideas and 0.48 40 22 38
thoughts
be energized by my inner resources 0.23 57 55 12
find things out by myself
(for example reading alone) 0.26 77 10 12
keep a certain distance from him/her 0.64 39 14 46
be hard to get to know in depth 0.69 21 25 54
prefer writing to talking 0.57 8 31 61
think deeply before formulating my answers 0.22 33 37 30
be slow to reveal my feelings 0.59 30 29 42
alpha: 0.81
Table 4. Training Expectations Indicative of Perceiving Preferences
r Yes ? No
% % %
Items conforming to sensing
be conventional rather than original 0.43 26 10 64
be meticulous 0.65 40 23 37
be practical in discussing ministry 0.45 74 19 7
take detailed interest in the fabric of the Church 0.44 21 15 65
focus on one thing at a time 0.59 15 25 65
have a common-sense rather than a visionary 0.55 39 24 37
approach
pay attention to detail 0.57 64 13 22
prefer to understand by starting with facts 0.42 41 40 19
respect Church regulations in pastoral situations 0.49 71 17 11
take a step-by-step approach 0.50 49 32 19
alpha: 0.82
Items conforming to intuition

admire original and individual people 0.48 43 32 25
be imaginative and speculative 0.63 61 19 21
be original 0.57 58 24 18
be primarily concerned with transforming the 0.29 19 26 55
world
enjoy exploring ideas and possibilities 0.53 76 14 10
preach in an inventive and tentative way 0.43 41 33 26
welcome visions for change 0.52 65 19 15
start from the overall idea first then look at the 0.47 44 37 20
parts
think in abstract rather than concrete terms 0.42 15 41 44
use images and symbols with ease 0.42 49 29 22
alpha: 0.80
Table 5. Training Expectations Indicative of Judgment Preferences

r Yes ? No
% % %
Items conforming to thinking
be clear about principles 0.12 63 25 12
be comfortable with skeptical analysis 0.26 42 30 29
be wary rather than trusting 0.21 26 22 53
be more focused on justice than peace 0.37 20 52 29
communicate truth more than enthusiasm 0.24 26 40 34
enjoy persuading people by arguments 0.28 29 39 32
not be influenced by my feelings about people 0.39 45 22 33
make judgments objectively 0.30 66 20 13
be more concerned with people’s rights than 0.50 15 49 37
their feelings
think in a detached and logical way 0.48 52 29 19
alpha: 0.64
Items conforming to feeling

be attentive to building good relationships 0.56 69 9 22
with people as a first priority
be gentle rather than tough-minded with people 0.57 58 19 23
be more aware of people’s strengths than their 0.43 45 33 22
limitations
be more interested in people’s feelings than 0.43 30 27 44
their ideas
be naturally gentle and understanding with 0.79 68 21 11
people
be pastoral more than prophetic 0.41 49 31 20
be always empathetic towards others 0.58 53 32 15
enjoy pleasing others 0.25 67 32 1
have a clear awareness of my personal feelings 0.32 46 35 19
value compassion above frankness 0.59 46 36 18
alpha: 0.81
Table 6. Training Expectations Indicative of Attitude Preferences

r Yes ? No
% % %
Items conforming to judging
be methodical 0.73 46 27 27
be organized and systematic 0.73 63 19 19
have things decided and settled in advance 0.72 36 22 42
keep to a schedule I had created 0.62 39 22 40
list and order the things to be done 0.69 36 24 40
plan a special job carefully in advance 0.60 68 15 16
be punctual about appointments 0.67 78 8 14
give him/her plenty of advance notice of
agreed plans 0.74 44 19 37
work best when there were clear schedules 0.76 47 25 29
find daily routine a comfortable way to do 0.67 41 35 24
things
alpha: 0.92
Items conforming to perceiving

be comfortable with a degree of chaos 0.72 51 17 33
be comfortable with postponing decisions 0.53 38 17 35
behave in an easy-going laid back way 0.50 33 30 37
discover what I needed to do as I went along 0.44 63 52 37
feel comfortable with unplanned supervision 0.53 54 17 30
sessions
pull things together well at the last minute 0.51 57 20 24
respond quickly to the unexpected or 0.34 78 17 5
unplanned event
not be upset by last minute changes 0.61 77 13 10
work flexibly and spontaneously 0.68 77 8 15
be prepared to change my plans 0.36 87 7 6
alpha: 0.83
Table 7. Mean Scores of Introvert and Extravert Ministry Expectations

by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Orientation Preferences
TITE Extraversion Introversion
Scales Mean SD Mean SD t
Incumbents’ preferences
introverted expectations 29.1 5.4 32.0 5.6 2.5*
extraverted expectations 34.3 4.4 31.3 5.7 2.8**
Curates’ preferences
introverted expectations 31.4 5.1 29.5 6.2 1.6
extraverted expectations 32.7 5.5 33.1 5.0 0.4
Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 8. Mean Scores of Sensing and Intuition Ministry Expectations

by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Perceiving Preferences
TITE Sensing Intuition
sensing expectations 32.7 5.7 30.1 5.7 2.1*
intuition expectations 29.0 5.5 34.4 4.6 5.1***
sensing expectations 29.5 5.3 31.9 6.1 1.8
intuition expectations 33.9 3.6 31.7 6.2 1.7
Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 9. Mean Scores of Thinking and Feeling Ministry Expectations

by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Judging Preferences
TITE Thinking Feeling
thinking expectations 32.6 3.7 30.0 4.4 3.1**
feeling expectations 31.5 6.9 34.1 4.1 2.3*
thinking expectations 31.8 4.5 31.0 4.2 0.9
feeling expectations 32.8 7.0 32.8 5.2 0.0
Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 10. Mean scores of judging and perceiving ministry expectations

by incumbents’ and curates’ attitude preferences
TITE Judging Perceiving
Incumbent’s preferences
judging expectations 35.2 6.9 27.4 6.0 5.2**
perceiving expectations 33.2 6.2 37.7 4.9 3.5***
judging expectations 32.0 7.6 33.4 8.4 0.7
perceiving expectations 35.7 5.8 32.7 6.8 2.2*
Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
because it is consistent with the basic principles of personality typol-

ogy and displays in an accessible way the differences between contrast-
ing personality types. The evidence generated by these four tables was
unambiguous. In every case, the ministry expectations experienced by
the curates were significantly related to the personality preferences
of their training incumbent. In other words, extraverted incumbents
were more inclined to place extravert expectations on their curate,
while introverted incumbents were more inclined to place introvert
expectations; sensing incumbents were more inclined to place sensing
expectations on their curate, while intuitive incumbents were more
inclined to place intuitive expectations; thinking incumbents were
more inclined to place thinking expectations on their curates, while
feeling incumbents were more inclined to place feeling expectations;
judging incumbents were more inclined to place judging expectations
on their curates, while perceiving incumbents were more inclined to
place perceiving expectations.
At the same times, Tables 7 to 10 demonstrate that in every case, the
ministry expectations experienced by the curates were not positively
related to the curates’ own personality profile. Indeed, the only statis-
tically significant association between the curates’ ministry expecta-
tions and their own personality profile was in the opposite direction.
In other words, perceiving curates were less likely to feel that they had
placed on them expectations that were consistent with a perceiving
ministry style.
Discussion and Conclusion
By drawing on psychological type theory, as originally proposed by

Jung (1971) and developed and operationalized by a series of self-
completion psychometric tests, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indi-
cator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter
(Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales
(Francis, 2005), the present study has advanced the empirical assess-
ment and psychological understanding of the experience of those
engaged in the apprenticeship model of ministry in the early years
after ordination in two ways.
The first advance concerns offering a new model for assessing diverse
ministry expectations in terms of the eight constructs derived from
psychological type theory. Drawing on data provided by 98 Anglican
curates during their initial years in ordained ministry, this study has
proposed a series of eight 10-item scales designed to assess the empha-
sis placed on different aspects of ministry. Together these eight scales
form the Tilley Index of Training Expectations (TITE). On the basis
of satisfactory alpha coefficients, this instrument can be confidently
commended for further application and development.
In terms of the two orientations, introverted ministry expecta-
tions are characterized by working well in solitude, being private and
self-contained, being careful about sharing ideas and thoughts, being
energized by inner resources, finding things out independently, and
thinking deeply before formulating answers. Extraverted ministry
expectations are characterized by easily forming friendships with many
different people, talking easily to almost anyone in informal situations,
easily and quickly turning embarrassment into a joke, enjoying the
spotlight in parish ministry, helping to get things going socially, and
finding it easy to meet a lot of new people.
In terms of the two perceiving processes, sensing ministry expecta-
tions are characterized by taking a step-by-step approach, being con-
ventional rather than original, being practical in discussing ministry,
taking detailed interest in the fabric of the church, paying attention
to detail, and preferring to understand by starting with facts. Intuitive
ministry expectations are characterized by using images and symbols
with ease, preaching in an inventive and tentative way, being imagi-
native and speculative, welcoming vision for change, starting from
the overall idea first then looking at the parts, and enjoying exploring
ideas and possibilities.
In terms of the two judging processes, thinking ministry expecta-

tions are characterized by being more concerned with peoples’ rights
than their feelings, enjoying persuading people by arguments, being
more focused on justice than peace, being comfortable with skepti-
cal analysis, being clear about principles, and communicating truth
more than enthusiasm. Feeling ministry expectations are characterized
by being gentle rather than tough-minded with people, being pastoral
more than prophetic, being always empathic towards others, having a
clear awareness of personal feelings, valuing compassion above frank-
ness, and enjoying pleasing others.
In terms of the two attitudes, judging ministry expectations are
characterized by finding daily routine a comfortable way to do things,
working best when there are clear schedules, being punctual for
appointments, having things decided and settled in advance, giving
plenty of advance notice of agreed plans, and being methodical. Per-
ceiving ministry expectations are characterized by working flexibly
and spontaneously, not being upset by last minute changes, pulling
things together well at the last minute, being comfortable with post-
poning decisions, behaving in an easy-going laid-back way, and being
prepared to change plans.
The second advance concerns the clear and unequivocal demonstra-
tion that the way in which curates perceive the ministry expectations
placed on them by their training incumbent reflects the personality
profile of their training incumbent but not of the curates themselves.
This finding suggests that, during the formative years of apprentice-
ship ministry, training incumbents seem to be shaping their curate in
their own image rather than enabling their curate to develop and to
express his or her own distinctive approach to ministry in harmony
with his or her own psychological type profile.
This finding raises important questions about the apprenticeship
model of clergy training and formation in the early years after min-
istry. These questions must start from the observation that there is
currently clear diversity in the way in which ministry is construed
by training incumbents, as reflected in the high standard devia-
tions on all eight scales of the Tilley Index of Training Expectations.
While the evidence suggests that training incumbents may be set-
ting out to shape curates in their own image, there is no evidence
to suggest that all training incumbents are looking to the same
model of ministry. In other words, a variety of training incumbents
are inclined to shape curates in the variety of their own images.
Two somewhat different lines of argument could follow from these

observations.
On the one hand, if training incumbents are indeed required by the
apprenticeship model to mould apprentice clergy in their own image,
they might well find this approach met with greater success if they
were assigned curates who shared their own psychological type prefer-
ences. At the same time, such a strategy might lead to fewer curates
feeling misunderstood and misdirected by their training incumbent.
Such a strategy, however, might lead to the unhelpful reinforcement
of type preferences without the critical challenge that is capable of
developing the less preferred aspects of the self.
On the other hand, if training incumbents are required by the
apprenticeship model not to mold apprentice clergy in their own
image but to draw out the distinctive strengths of each individual
apprentice entrusted to their charge, then training incumbents may
require a highly specialized form of training to achieve this end. Such
training might well profitably include programs designed to enhance
self-awareness in terms of personal psychological type preferences and
programs designed to broaden training skills in working with indi-
viduals reflecting diverse psychological type profiles. In other words,
psychological type awareness programs might play a very crucial
part in preparing training incumbents to fulfill the training functions
entrusted to them.
The present study proposed an innovative model of research designed
to test the usefulness of psychological type theory to illuminate the
experiences of curates during their initial years of ordained ministry.
The findings have been illuminating and could lead to improving cur-
rent practice. The study was, however, limited by the facts that it drew
on a small number of curates (98), drawn from a small number of dio-
ceses (3), over a few years (4). The appropriate scientific response to
these limitations would be to seek to replicate the study with a larger
and more representative sample.
The findings from the present study also pose another research
question. The evidence suggests that at present the psychological type
profile of the training incumbent is crucial in shaping the ministry
expectations placed on the curate. These ministry expectations would
be consonant with the preferences of the curate if the curate shared
the same psychological type profile as the training incumbent. The
overall experience of curacy would be most satisfactory, therefore,
for those curates who were in the situation of being matched (usually
unintentionally) with the psychological type preferences of their train-

ing incumbent. Here is a research problem that could be subjected to
empirical investigation. The research hypothesis would be that curates
who were in the situation of being matched with the psychological
type preferences of their training incumbent would be more satisfied
with the overall experience of their curacy than curates who were not
in this situation.
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DO INTROVERTS APPRECIATE THE SAME THINGS
AS EXTRAVERTS WITHIN A MINISTRY TEAM? A STUDY
AMONG LEADERS WITHIN THE NEWFRONTIERS NETWORK
OF CHURCHES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Mandy Robbins,* Leslie J. Francis, and Andrew Ryland
Abstract
The aim of this study was to identify the characteristics of a ministry team valued by
extravert leaders and to assess whether these characteristics were equally valued by
introvert leaders. Data were provided by 154 leaders within the Newfrontiers network
of churches in the UK who completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales with a
list of 55 qualities attributed to good ministry teams. These data identified nine key
characteristics that were rated highly by extravert leaders but less highly by introvert
leaders. These nine items cohered to produce a reliable scale of extraverted percep-
tions of a good ministry team (alpha = .71). The data supported the view that ministry
teams formed to work well for extraverts may appeal less strongly to introverts.
Keywords: extraversion, leadership, ministry, Newfrontiers Church, psychological type
Psychological type theory, as originally proposed by Jung (1971) and

subsequently developed through instruments such as the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the Kiersey Tempere-
ment Sorter (Kiersey & Bates, 1978), has in recent years begun to
make a useful contribution to pastoral and practical theology, through
both conceptual and empirical studies. The conceptual approach
has included studies of prayer (Michael & Norrisey, 1984), ministry
(Oswald & Kroeger, 1988), congregations (Baab, 1998), and preach-
ing (Francis & Village, 2008). The empirical approach has included
studies of Anglican clergy (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater,
2007), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth
* Author Note: Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick;

Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Andrew Ryland, Bea-
con Church, Runnymede, UK.

introverts and extraverts within a ministry team 307
ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007) and lead elders serv-
ing within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, &
Robbins, 2009).
Psychological type theory distinguishes between two orientations
(introversion and extraversion), two perceiving processes (sensing
and intuition), two judging processes (thinking and feeling), and two
attitudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). All four
distinctions have been shown to be related to certain key aspects of
church life or ministry. As the following review demonstrates, the ori-
entations may be of particular interest in the area of ministry studies.
The two orientations are concerned with where energy is drawn
from; energy can be gathered either from the outside world or from
the inner world. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the outside world;
they are energized by the events and people around them. They enjoy
communicating and thrive in stimulating and exciting environments.
They prefer to act in a situation rather than to reflect on it. They may
vocalize a problem or an idea rather than think it through privately.
They may be bored and frustrated by silence and solitude. They tend
to focus their attention on what is happening outside themselves and
may be influenced by the opinions of others. They are usually open
people, easy to get to know, and enjoy having many friends. In con-
trast, introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world; they are
energized by their inner ideas and concepts. They may feel drained by
events and people around them. They prefer to reflect on a situation
rather than to act on it. They enjoy solitude, silence, and contempla-
tion, as they tend to focus their attention on what is happening in their
inner life. They may appear reserved and detached as they are difficult
to get to know, and they may prefer to have a small circle of intimate
friends rather than many acquaintances.
In a study among 191 Anglican clergymen in Wales, Francis and
Payne (2002) demonstrated a significant link between the orientations
and preferred ways of doing ministry as conceptualized and assessed
through the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). Extraverted clergy
were significantly more likely than introverted clergy to value parish
visiting, visiting groups of people, preaching to large congregations,
meeting new people in the parish, leading large group meetings, lead-
ing worship with large congregations, and being out and about in the
parish.
In a study among 1,476 newly ordained Anglican clergy from
England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, Francis and Robbins (2008)
308 robbins, francis, and ryland
demonstrated a significant link between the orientations and pre-

ferred ways of praying as conceptualized and assessed by a specially
constructed prayer preference inventory. Introverted clergy were sig-
nificantly more likely than extraverted clergy to value praying alone,
praying in silence, listening to God in silence, and developing personal
stillness in prayer. Introverted clergy were significantly more likely
than extraverted clergy to give preference to meditative prayer over
open shared prayer.
In a study among 3,715 clergy from a variety of denominations in
Australia, England, and New Zealand, Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, and
Castle (2009) demonstrated a significant link between the orientations
and professional burnout as conceptualized and assessed by the Fran-
cis Burnout Inventory (FBI). Compared with clergy who prefer intro-
version, clergy who preferred extraversion displayed both higher levels
of satisfaction in ministry and lower levels of emotional exhaustion in
ministry.
A key aspect concerning the differentiation between introversion
and extraversion involves the interaction between the individual and
other people. In essence, introverts may often do their best work alone,
while extraverts may often do their best work alongside other people.
Introverts may need to get away from other people in order to think
clearly about their choices and strategies, while extraverts may need to
talk things through with other people in order to clarify their choices
and strategies. When things need to get done, introverts may prefer to
tackle the task alone, while extraverts may need to do so with the sup-
port of and in the company of others. Such fundamental differences
may carry profound implications for ways in which individual church
leaders function as part of a leadership team and for the characteristics
that they would find most desirable in a leadership team. No previous
research has as yet addressed this specific issue.
Church leadership functions in very different ways within different
understandings of Church life. The Newfrontiers network of churches
provides an interesting example of an emerging stream of growing
congregations in which church policy places high emphasis on identi-
fying, forming, and nurturing ministry or leadership teams. Two recent
studies have employed psychological type theory to profile the person-
ality of those called into leadership roles within Newfrontiers. In the
first study, Francis, Gubb, and Robbins (2009) set out to examine the
psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers net-
work of churches in the United Kingdom and to compare this profile
with the established profile of clergymen in the Church of England. A

sample of 134 Lead Elders completed the Francis Psychological Type
Scales. The study showed that Newfrontiers Lead Elders displayed
slight preferences for extraversion over introversion, for sensing over
intuition, and for thinking over feeling and a strong preference for
judging over perceiving. In the second study, Ryland, Francis, and
Robbins (under review) turned attention to the psychological type
profile of the wider leadership team. Data provided by 154 leaders sug-
gested that the leadership teams reflected rather than complemented
the strengths of the lead elders. Once again there were preferences for
extraversion over introversion, for sensing over intuition, for thinking
over feeling, and for judging over perceiving. Within the leadership
team, the combined STJ preference accounted for 40% of the leaders,
indicating a church that is well equipped with practical, organizational
management rather than inspirational pastoral care.
Extraverts may carry a particularly influential role in shaping the
way in which ministry teams function, and this is for two reasons.
Teams, and the social interaction on which they are based, are clearly
located in the outer world, the domain in which extraverts are most
comfortable. The processes and interactions from which teams derive
their identity are fields in which extraverts naturally display skills.
Against this theoretical background, the aim of the present study was
to identify the characteristics of a good ministry team valued by extra-
vert Newfrontiers leaders and to assess whether these characteristics
were equally valued by introvert Newfrontiers leaders.
Method
Participants
A total of 262 questionnaires were distributed to individuals serving
in leadership roles within local churches associated with the New-
frontiers network, including elders, staff, volunteer leaders, and highly
committed members sharing in leadership. The 154 respondents rep-
resented the satisfaction response rate of 59%. Of these respondents,
68 were male, 84 were female, and two failed to disclose their sex; 16
were under the age of 30, 27 were in their 30s, 49 were in their 40s,
37 were in their 50s, 17 were in their 60s, 7 were aged 70 or over, and
two failed to disclose their age.
Measures
Team perceptions were assessed by a set of 55 statements generated to
reflect different perceptions of what constitutes a good ministry team.
The items were generated by reflection on psychological type theory
and experiences of ministry teams by individuals engaged in various
ministries. Each item defined one proposed characteristic of a “good
team” to which participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale: agree
strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree strongly.
Scale (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This 40-item instrument comprises four
sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four components
of psychological type: orientation (extraversion or introversion), per-
ceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking or
feeling) and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiving).
Recent studies have demonstrated this instrument to function well in
church-related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008)
reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN scale,
.73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale.
Results
The items of the orientation scale demonstrated satisfactory internal

consistency reliability generating an alpha coefficient of .81 (Cron-
bach, 1951). Since the purpose of the present study was to examine the
correlation between the preferences for introversion over extraversion
and another continuous variable (perceptions of a good team), the
continuous scale for the two orientations was employed rather than
the discrete type categories that can be derived from this underlying
continuous score. This orientation scale score can range from 0 (high
introversion) to 10 (high extraversion). The other three scales also
generated satisfactory alpha coefficients: perceiving process (sensing
and intuition), .75; judging process (thinking and feeling), .76; attitude
toward the outer world, .80.
Step two of the data analysis correlated scores on the orientation scale
with each of the 55 items concerned with perception of the character-
istics that constitute a good ministry team. Nine of these correlations
were statistically significant. These nine items were then combined to
generate an index that distinguished between ways in which introverts
and extraverts perceive teams. These items, comprising the new Scale
Table 1. Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team:

Item-rest-of-test-correlations and Alpha Coefficient
r
Team meetings are always purposeful in a good team .43
Internal team relationships are always warm and happy
in a good team .45
There is frequent social contact among team members
(outside the team’s formal meetings) in a good team .35
Decisions are made almost unconsciously by consensus
in a good team .44
Although really committed to the vision, there is always
laughter and joking together in a good team .32
Team members express truthfully what they really think and
feel in a good team .32
Team members enjoy working through details of
implementation in a good team .19
Possible solutions to new threats and opportunities are
investigated and reported in writing in a good team .45
There’s no negativity among team members, and everyone is
positive and enthusiastic in a good team .35
alpha .71
of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team, are displayed in

Table 1, together with the item-rest-of-test correlations and the alpha
coefficient. The alpha coefficient of .71 demonstrated a satisfactory
instrument.
Step three in the data analysis confirmed the correlation between
the new Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team
and the orientation scale generated by the Francis Psychological Type
Scales (r = .329, p < .001). At the same time, no significant correlations
were found between scores recorded on the new Scale of Extraverted
Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team and the perceiving process
(r = –.045, ns), and the attitude toward the outer world (r = .015, ns),
although there was a significant negative correlation with the judging
process (r = –.206, p < .05).
Discussion and Conclusion
The present study set out to examine the hypothesis that views on
what constitutes a good ministry team varies between introverts and
extraverts. This hypothesis was supported by the data. Two main con-
clusions can be drawn from these findings.
First, the new Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry
Team helps to clarify those characteristics of a team that are more
likely to be valued by extraverts than by introverts. Compared with
leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches who prefer intro-
version, leaders who prefer extraversion give greater emphasis: to team
meetings being purposeful; to warm and happy internal team rela-
tionships; to frequent social contact among team members outside the
teams formal meetings; to decisions being made almost unconsciously
by consensus; to laughter and joking accompanying real commitment
to the vision; to team members expressing truthfully what they really
think and feel; to team members enjoying working through the details
of implementation; to possible solutions to new threats and opportu-
nities being identified and reported back; and to team members being
positive and enthusiastic without any negativity.
Second, the fact that these characteristics are less likely to be recog-
nized and endorsed by introverts as key qualities of a good ministry
team indicates that extraverts cannot expect their introverted col-
leagues to warm to the same experiences as they value themselves.
As a consequence, extraverted team leaders may need to be cautious
about building and nurturing teams entirely in their own extraverted
image. The problem is that introverts, by their very nature, may be
reticent about challenging extraverted leaders and then grow slowly
and silently in their discontent regarding the ways in which the min-
istry team is going and developing. In other words, not everyone will
see the strengths of the team in the same way, and the Jungian theory
regarding the two orientations (introversion and extraversion) clearly
goes some way to explaining why this discrepancy may be the case.
There were clear limitations with the present study, however, which
need to be addressed by future research building on these foundations.
Further thought needs to be given to extending the scale of extraverted
perceptions of a good ministry team and to developing a larger and
more richly nuanced instrument. The association between the Jungian
orientations (introversion and extraversion) and perceptions of the
characteristics of a good ministry team demonstrated in the present
study among a relatively small sample of leaders within the Newfrontiers
network of churches needs to be tested among larger and more diverse
samples of church leaders.
While the present study set out to examine the specific issue regard-
ing the extent to which introvert leaders valued the same things as
extraverts within a ministry team, a comparable study is now needed
to examine a parallel research question from the perspective of intro-
vert leaders.
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Manuscript submitted for publication.
THE ROLE OF ARCHETYPES AND JUNGIAN PERSONALITY
TYPOLOGY IN BUILDING RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY:
APPLYING JOHN BEEBE’S EIGHT PROCESS ARCHETYPAL
MODEL THROUGH A CASE STUDY OF THE EXTRAVERTED
INTUITIVE TYPE WITH INTROVERTED FEELING (ENFP)
Christopher F. J. Ross*
Abstract
Beebe’s eight process archetypal model for Jungian type development is described and
applied in a religious context through a portrait of an extraverted intuitive dominant
type with auxiliary introverted feeling (ENFP). The defining features of each mental
process in its most developed form are outlined. The eight developmental archetypes
are described in order of their developmental role and in terms of the inflexion given
to the mental process in that developmental position. The contributions and limita-
tions of ENFPs to a religious group are explored, including the dependability of their
enthusiastic connectivity, the nurturing aspect of inner valuing, the fluctuating nature
of their ability to organize, and the deepening significance afforded by attention to
specifics and details.
Keywords: archetypes, Jung, psychological type, type dynamics, religion
Jung’s theory of archetype does not conform to the empiricist assump-

tions of mainstream American psychology and may in large measure
account for the neglect of his Analytical Psychology in that main-
stream. By contrast, Psychological Types (Jung, 1921/1971) has become
the “acceptable face” of Analytical Psychology because it provided the
intellectual and descriptive foundation, along with the observations of
Myers and test development skills and insight of Briggs Myers, of the
Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), the most widely used person-
ality measure in the world today. Jungian analyst Beebe’s archetypal
model of type development is important because it brings together
* Author Note: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid

Laurier University.
The author is indebted to Leslie Francis who first imagined and suggested a project
with this scope and to Lauren Price who assisted with the final editing of the text.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Christopher F. J.
Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada. Email: cross@wlu.ca

two aspects of Jung’s analytical psychology. The purpose of this article

is to show how an archetypal approach to Jungian type development
may enhance application of Jungian typology to religious issues and in
particular to the development of community in a religious context.
This article outlines a) the eight psychological processes foundational
to Jung’s personality typology that the MBTI assays to measure; b) the
eight archetypes that Beebe claimed have a distinct influence upon the
role that a process may play in a particular personality type; and finally
c) the application of the model in a religious context through an explo-
ration of the functioning of an extraverted intuitive with introverted
feeling (ENFP) in a religious community.
Eight Mental Processes Foundational

to Personality Psychology
Because each of the eight mental processes (referred to by Beebe as

function attitudes) are most recognizable when they are the dominant
mental process, following the approach of Haas and Huniker (2006),
each mental process will be described when manifested at that more
differentiated level of development. According to Beebe’s model, the
dominant mental process is deployed by the archetype of the hero
enabling an individual to walk confidently down the path of life, reli-
ably solving most of the problems encountered, especially those met
in the early part of the human life cycle. In the third section with the
portrait of the ENFP, each process will be described where, depend-
ing on the order of development into consciousness, the effect of the
pertinent archetype may be illustrated for each of the eight mental
processes.
The Perceiving Processes

There are two kinds of perceiving, sensing and intuition, that may
operate in both the introverted and extraverted direction. Perceiving
processes are, according to Jung, irrational in that they have no ratio
(Latin for “order”) or ordering properties. Perceiving processes merely
register what is there: “They do not proceed selectively according to
principles, but are simply receptive to what happens. But ‘what hap-
pens’ is essentially irrational” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 539). Furthermore,
as Haas and Huniker explained in Building Blocks of Personality Type:
“Perception is considered to be irrational because no intentional
the role of archetypes 317
editing process is involved in selecting the information to be taken in”

(2006, p. 19).
Sensing Perceiving
Sensing is the function that “ascertains that something is there” (Jung,
1921/1971, p. 371). Sensing contributes clarity and simplicity to con-
sciousness:
Well developed sensation is a comprehensive impression of life as fil-
tered through the five senses. When well developed, this sensing occurs
with a purity and clarity that is accurate and clear . . . It is far more in
depth than a sheer interest in facts. (Anchors, 1989, p. 12)
It “is especially useful in relating to immediate reality” (Detloff, 1972,
p. 67).
Intuitive Perceiving
Intuition is a form of perceiving that allows us to “see” the unseen
(Ross, 1992, p. 84) by fading sensing details and drawing lines and
patterns between the dots. As Jung put it, “we must be grateful unto
heaven that we have such a function which gives a certain light on those
things which are around the corner” (Jung, 1966, p. 16). Intuition ori-
ents to the context and cognizes wholes, the overall configuration that
has some kind of meaning, and is concerned with possibilities. There
is an involuntary aspect to intuition: “You do not make an intuition.
On the contrary it comes to you; you have a hunch, it has to come by
itself ” (Jung, 1958, p. 41). Briggs Myers described intuitions as “coming
up from the unconscious with enticing visions of possibilities” (Briggs
Myers, 1980, p. 57). Often language is involved unconsciously in the
process of a natural clustering that forms in the perceiving awareness
of the individual.
Extraverted Sensing (Se)

Through extraverted sensing, an individual is drawn to and energized
by the external object, person, or situation just as a person when out-
doors is warmed by the sun (Haas & Huniker, 2006). Extraverted sens-
ing specifically connects individuals to the surrounding physical world,
enabling delight in the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and textures of the
five senses. Jungian analyst Loomis wrote:
With extraverted sensation, individuals connect to the physical aspects

of life, to the aromas and tastes, to the visual, tactile, and audible ele-
ments of our environment. It is through extraverted sensation that we
enjoy or abhor music, sexuality, food, weather, décor. It is allows one to
note details and to discriminate, for example, a pelican from a swan or
burnt toast from hot apple pie, without judging one to be better than
the other. (1991, p. 81)
For all personality types, extraverted sensation grounds individuals in
the physical aspects of life: “All interactions in the physical realm are
dependent upon the extraverted sensation function [which] keeps our
feet on the ground and our mind in the here and now” (Loomis, 1991,
p. 82).
Introverted Sensing (Si)

Introverted sensing is involved when an external stimulus is trans-
formed into a mental content. To explain introverted sensing, Si,
Jung used the example of several painters who paint the same garden
but produce a different picture. The subjective factor is at the core of
introverted sensing because the reactions of the perceiving subject are
elevated above the properties of the object that is perceived: “[B]esides
the sensed object, there is a sensing subject who adds his [sic] subjec-
tive disposition to the objective stimulus” ( Jung, 1921/1971, p. 378).
Thomson amplified this subjective element in Si: “Only some things
strike us as important, useful, familiar, or exciting [emphasis added]
enough to convert into mental content—that is into facts that we
retain over time” (1998, p. 169).
Briggs Myers regarded introverted sensing as providing stability
because it anchors the impression of the external object in the familiar
field of previous impressions and makes comparisons. “They habitu-
ally compare past and present situations” (1980, p. 105). Thus, she
concluded that those in whom Si is dominant “base their ideas on a
deep solid accumulation of stored impressions” (1980, pp. 104–105).
Thomson again underscored the hidden subjective element in Si:
“[T]he facts we acquire by way of Introverted Sensation are more than
information. They’re part of our self-experience. They define the spe-
cific nature of our passions and interests. They become our basis for
taking in new data” (1998, p. 170). Thomson added:
Knowing what matters provides a sense of continuity and security . . . [a]
direction in the midst of crisis [helping us] weather a loss of faith that
immediate feelings would not equip us to handle. All things flow away
like water; the ground of our self experience remains. (1998, p. 171)
She reminded us that through introverted sensation we are able to

“reconcile new impressions with enduring beliefs and commitments”
(1998, p. 171).
Extraverted Intuition (Ne)

Extraverted intuition, Ne, envisions possibilities in the external world
and experiences their irresistible pull (Briggs Myers, 1980). Ne “strives
to apprehend the widest range of possibilities inherent in the objective
situation in contrast to extraverted sensation that ‘seeks the highest
pitch of physical realism’ ” (Sharpe, 1987, p. 60). For Jung, extraverted
intuition seeks out “new possibilities, [whereas] stable conditions suf-
focate,” and it has “a nose for anything new and in the making” (Jung,
1921/1971, p. 368). Ne grasps “the sensory data as a pattern of chang-
ing [emphasis added] relationships” (Thomson, 1998, p. 197).
Projects are for extraverted intuition what responding to facts is
for introverted sensing. Extraverted intuition orients to the future, to
what is “not yet”: “it conjures up a future before we know very much
about the present” (Thomson, 1998, p. 197). Extraverted intuition
is driven to build future possibilities from the tangible data at hand
and to explore what could be. Every fact is explored for the potential
embedded within it: Through a series of associations triggered by the
external world, new possibilities are created.
For example, given enough elements to suggest a star . . . we have a hard
time not filling in the blanks and seeing the complete image of the star.
[However] intuition can be dead wrong and still feel like knowledge.
(Thomson, 1998, pp. 197–198).
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted intuition as 1) an
information gathering process that 2) focuses on the external world,
3) seeking connections and relationships between the objects, people
and events in the environment, with a view to 4) generating “real-
world possibilities” (2004, p. 53).
Introverted Intuition (Ni)

Introverted intuition orients to inner images, metaphors and other pat-
terns of meaning and conveys a sense of the backdrop of accumulated
human experience. The images are triggered by external objects but
become immediately and decisively detached from them (Jung, 1921/1971).
Introverted intuition “searches for grand patterns, themes, and systems in
order to understand the meaning and significance of everything” (Haas &
Huniker, 2006, p. 68). For Jung, the inner images were laid down in what
he called the collective unconscious, and they were mediated by arche-
types that represent the distillation of intense experiences repeated since
time immemorial. “[T]hese images of the unconscious, [are] produced
in such inexhaustible abundance by the creative energy of life . . . [Such
images] represent possible views of the world which may give life a new
potential” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 400). Experiences arising from Ni carry
great conviction of their own truth, giving rise to accusations of arrogance
from those who do not share the intuition.
Introverted intuition brings an inner vision of what may be possible
(Myers, 1980) and, in contrast to extraverted intuition, is not con-
cerned with “external possibilities but with what the external object
has released within [emphasis added]” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 399). Intro-
verted intuition provides an inner vision that transcends the present
moment and puts present trials and triumphs into a wider context.
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted intuition as (1) an
information gathering process that (2) focuses on the subjective, inter-
nal world of the unconscious (3) seeking connections and relation-
ships between the contents of the unconscious, in order to (4) discover
underlying significance, systems and meaning.
The Judging Processes
For both Jung and Briggs Myers, there were two ways of coming to a
conclusion or closure about what is perceived, one based on thinking
and one based on feeling. Furthermore, each was capable of expression
in the introverted or extraverted direction. Often we use these conclu-
sions in order to make a decision or to form a judgement. Accordingly,
Briggs Myers called these judging processes. Jung described these four
processes as rational processes because following the Latin etymologi-
cal root—ratio (order)—he considered that each of these processes
operated in different ways but with the shared aim of bringing order
to perceptions.
Thinking Judgment
The thinking function operates with language and concepts to name,
label, or define an experience which then becomes another object of
awareness in its own right (Ross, 2010). In describing thinking judg-
ment, Briggs Myers (1980) emphasised the impersonal and purely
logical basis on which thinking operates to bring order to percep-

tions. Jung wrote: “[B]y thinking I mean the function of intellectual
cognition and the forming of logical conclusions” (Jung, 1921/1971,
p. 518). Thomson described thinking as organizing multiple objects of
consciousness to “establish logical relationships between them” (1998,
p. 254). For Beebe (2004), defining by naming was the key activity of
the mental process of thinking.
Feeling Judgment
Jung described feeling as “a process, moreover, that imparts to the
content [of consciousness] a definite value . . . Valuation by feeling
extends to every content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may
be” (Jung, 1957/1977, p. 435). Feeling orders perceptions by assigning
them value in a particular context (Briggs Myers, 1980). Thus, feeling
is a general ordering function that extends beyond contents that have
an obvious affective or emotional component (Ross, 1992).
Extraverted Thinking (Te)

Extraverted thinking operates when a logical external orientation pre-
dominates (Jung, 1957/1977) and organizes the external world in a
logical way. Briggs Myers described Te as “naturally organizing or
regulating the external situation through the methodical application
of critical analysis” (1980, p. 85). Extraverted thinking proceeds by
inductive logic: a) evaluates the past: When “this” happened, then
“that” resulted. Therefore, now b) if I/we do “this,” “that” will hap-
pen again. If the “that” is a good (i.e., a chosen goal), then the “if we
do this” is transformed by our extraverted thinking into an “ought,”
a “should,” or even a “must.” Extraverted thinking enjoys developing
relevant standards to guide decisions, and for this reason feels a drive
to structure and organize the external world through a common sys-
tem of guiding rules. The most universal example might be the law of
reciprocity or golden rule that is expressed in most religions, including
Christianity: “Do to others what you would like them to do to you”
(Matthew 7: 12). Te pushes for equality with regard to basic universal
moral principles: “Equal treatment before the law” is a sine qua non
of extraverted thinking.
Te is more concerned with maintaining systems that effectively
take care of people than with direct one-on-one care. For extraverted
thinking, it is a matter of “responsibility, honor, and knowledge to
keep faith with certain principles of order” (Haas & Huniker, 2006,
p. 74).
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted thinking as (1) a deci-
sion making process (2) directed toward the external world, that seeks
(3) to institute systems of organization in order to (4) assign informa-
tion within an appropriate system, through (5) a process of compari-
son based on objective and preferably quantifiable criteria.
Introverted Thinking (Ti)

Jung emphasised the role of the subjective element at the start of his
description of introverted thinking: “Introverted thinking is primar-
ily oriented by the subjective factor” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 380). Beebe
amplified the subjective aspect of Ti: “Introverted thinking has to
reflect on whether a particular construction really accords with the
conviction of inner truth, regardless of what the received opinion
might be” (Beebe, 2004, p. 96).
When thinking is introverted, principles are distilled from a net-
work of logical relationships. These principles form the foundation of
the analytic framework, and they are applied to a range of phenomena.
Isabel Briggs Myers described Ti as “primarily interested in the under-
lying principles.” These principles organize concepts and ideas when
paired with intuition as the auxiliary or organize facts when paired
with sensing. Ti’s mode of operating is “analytical and impersonal.”
“Introverted thinkers use their thinking to analyze the world, not to
run it” (Briggs Myers, 1980, p. 89). Sharpe also contrasted introverted
and extraverted thinking:
[W]here extraverted thinking seeks to get the facts straight and then
think about them, introverted thinking is concerned with the clarifica-
tion of ideas . . . Both excel at bringing order to life; one works from the
outside in, the other [introverted thinking] works from the inside out.”
(1987, p. 70)
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted thinking as (1) a deci-
sion making process, (2) focused on the subjective, internal world of
precisely intersecting underlying principles and truths, and to that end
(3) creates original categories and systems, (4) assigning all informa-
tion to a place within an appropriate framework (5) based upon logical
analysis.
Extraverted Feeling (Fe)

Extraverted feeling, like extraverted thinking, is a rational, ordering
mental process oriented to the external world, that seeks to organize
whatever is perceived there (Sharpe, 1987). Both extraverted ratio-
nal processes help construct and, in turn, “adapt us to consensual
reality—the standards of reason that characterise a particular society,
which determines its conventions and expectations” (Thomson, 1998,
p. 317). However, unlike extraverted thinking which proceeds on the
basis of detached cause-effect analysis, the priority for extraverted feel-
ing is to make judgments and determinations in harmony with “gener-
ally accepted values of some kind” on the basis of human relatedness
(Thomson, 1998, p. 317). According to Jung, Fe automatically adjusts
us to the social situation (1921/1971), and so without extraverted feel-
ing, “a ‘civilized’ social life would be virtually impossible” (Sharpe,
1987, p. 50). Indeed Jung claimed: “This kind of feeling is very largely
responsible for the fact that so many people flock to the theatre or
concerts, or go to church, and do so with their feelings appropriately
adjusted” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 354), especially in relation to the feelings
of other people. Extraverted feeling actively “seeks to connect with the
feelings of others” (Beebe, 2004, p. 96) and “value[s], above all, harmo-
nious human contacts” and is invaluable “in situations where needed
co-operation can be won by good will” (Myers, 1980, p. 93).
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted feeling as a (1) deci-
sion making process, (2) focussed on the objective external world,
that (3) creates and draws upon systems of cultural values in which
(4) everything is assigned an appropriate place (5) based on a qualita-
tive and relational basis, so that (6) choices can be made and actions
initiated that optimize harmony in the outer world.
Introverted Feeling (Fi)

“Still waters run deep” captures the hidden warmth that forms the core
of introverted feeling for Briggs Myers and is how Jung introduced
introverted feeling (1921/1971, p. 388). Briggs Myers was herself an
introverted feeling type and wrote:
Introverted feeling types have a wealth of warmth and enthusiasm, but
they may not show it until they know someone well. They wear their
warmth inside, like a fur-lined coat. Reliance on feeling leads them to
judge everything by personal values; they know what is most important
to them, and they protect it at all costs. (1980, p. 97)
According to Haas and Huniker (2006) introverted feeling is the most

subjective of the four decision making processes and the only one of
the eight mental processes that has a non-negotiable element. The
beliefs held by our introverted feeling are personal and not influenced
by the established value systems of their culture.
Introverted feeling cherishes inner harmony above all else. Work
and other activities are required to accord with basic values, with what
really matters as understood by the individual. Fi is loyal to inner val-
ues and the ideals they inspire. These values are non-negotiable, and
provide an inner certainty that is foundational to life, supplying it with
great direction, power, and purpose.
Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted feeling as (1) a deci-
sion making process, that is (2) focussed on the subjective internal
world of absolute personal value systems, and (3) assesses all things
based upon whether they uphold these values, conflict with them, or
have no impact, in order to (4) create and maintain inner harmony
and to be true to themselves.
Eight Archetypes Associated with Levels

of Type Development
The genius of Beebe’s eightfold archetype theory of type development

has been to draw on his 40 years of clinical experience as a Jungian
analyst and to reflect, over the course of his life cycle, on the intimate
disclosures and dreams of his clients and his own struggles toward
the Jungian vision of individuation, the human process of becoming
un-divided. Beebe selected eight archetypes that he believed best con-
veyed the nuance and nature of each level of function-attitude devel-
opment as each became differentiated from the unconscious through
conscious orientation. Each selected archetype epitomizes the role
played when a mental process is differentiated at a particular stage in
the life cycle. The process is used to respond and adapt creatively to
the demands of an individual’s internal and external environments at
that life-stage. As Beebe so eloquently put it, “the functions are car-
ried into consciousness on the backs of the archetypes” (Beebe, 2006b,
p. 40). Beebe’s assumption was that patterning capacities deep within
the human psyche and laid down through the collective unconscious-
ness register repeated human experience, and in turn organize and
shape the unfolding of eight core cognitive processes. The archetype

that carries the cognitive process into consciousness in this way will
give inflection and atmosphere to the unfolding of that process at a
particular point in the individual’s life cycle.
The Conscious Personality

The conscious personality is the term that Beebe applied to the psycho-
logical functional system described by traditional Jungian type theory
in terms of the dominant, auxiliary, tertiary, and inferior functions.
The Hero Carries the Dominant Function-Attitude (Mental Process)

In the western cultural tradition, humans are required to be singular,
unified individuals, and by the end of childhood and the transition to
adolescence, one of the eight psychological functions has been drawn
or commandeered into a heroic coping role. Life is frequently experi-
enced as a challenge, and part of the journey of the school-age child
is to come to rely on one function attitude to meet the challenge. The
stabilization of a dominant function enables the school-age child to
be seen as competent and gifted, and, in an acknowledging family, to
feel remarkable. Nonetheless, the heroic dominant mental process is
reliable rather than romantic (Beebe, 2007a). This also the period of
life when the child is not only told the heroic stories, of King Arthur,
St George, or the Biblical Ruth but develops the narrative memory to
recall them (Fowler, 1976). The dominant process has usually stabi-
lized by late childhood.
The heroic dominant function-attitude is appreciated by self and
others because it can be relied upon to cope with many of life’s chal-
lenges. Beebe stated “the heroic archetype is that part of the psyche
that welcomes facing challenges, that takes pleasure in recalling its
past successful exploits, that revels in its unflagging reliability” (Beebe
2007a, p. 3). However, the dominant process may succumb to mega-
lomania, thinking itself to be the “only game in town”; that is, the
only mental process available to consciousness. The hero entertains
the fantasy that it can function on its own and be a recipe for complete
stability in the face of any event or trial. Indeed, according to Beebe,
the heroic process can be somewhat of a bore: Prone to grandiosity, it
insists on being consulted at all times. Yet because it is always around,
the dominant process becomes invisible and so often goes unnoticed.
Asking an individual to experience or “see” our dominant function is

akin to asking a fish about water. What water? It is invisible because
it surrounds and permeates psychological life.
The Auxiliary Function-Attitude Acts as a Nurturing Parent

The second or auxiliary function balances out the effect of the domi-
nant function (Myers 1980). Whereas Beebe regarded the dominant
as forming part of our psychological spine around which forms our
sense of personal identity, the auxiliary process, for its part, constitutes
the “right arm: of our personality” (Beebe, 2007b, p. 22). The auxiliary
function gives us something helpful to offer others. The archetype that
carries the auxiliary function is best described as the “good” or nurtur-
ing parent. This second function to differentiate into consciousness,
usually in adolescence, is the means by which an individual reaches
out to others through relationship: how she or he nurtures, illumi-
nates, or protects others.
The mental process that develops second, usually in adolescence,
tends to have the quality of the emerging individual’s own inner nur-
turing parent, enabling greater functional autonomy from the actual
parents (Beebe 2007b). The nurturing parental qualities of empathy,
understanding, compassion, and caring coalesce in personalized form
in the collective unconscious and find common imagined expression
in varying forms in otherwise disparate cultures, such as the White
Buffalo Woman among North American First Nations and Mary the
Mother of Jesus in Christian Catholic and Orthodox cultures. By the
same token, the now slowly changing archetype of the good father is
incorporating the qualities of both care and protection.
The auxiliary process provides psychological balance. If the domi-
nant function is in the introverted attitude, then the auxiliary will be
extraverted, and vice versa. Furthermore if the dominant is a perceiv-
ing function, then the auxiliary will be a judging function, and vice
versa. The auxiliary mental process fills out the personality not only
because of its cognitive contrast (a judging versus perceiving process)
and direction (extraverted versus introverted) to the dominant func-
tion but also in regard to the archetypal energy that enfolds it. Finally,
whereas the dominant function anchors the individual’s identity, the
sense of self, auxiliary provides a basis for relationality: positive con-
nection to others (Myers & Kirby, 1998).
The Tertiary Function Is Carried by the Archetype of the Eternal Child

The tertiary function attitude is the mirror opposite of the auxiliary
function, and as such it forms the “other arm” of an individual’s psy-
chological relational life. Since the tertiary usually needs to follow on
from the development of the auxiliary, the earliest opportunity for its
differentiation into consciousness is usually when individuals are in
their 20s. Beebe considered that the psychological space or temenos in
which this third function develops is fostered by the archetype of the
eternal child, what Carl Jung and subsequent Jungian analysts referred
to as the puer aeturnus and puella aeterna (Von Franz, 1981). The
manner of development whereby this third process differentiates into
consciousness resembles that of a child who oscillates between wound-
edness on the one hand and creativity on the other hand (Beebe,
2006). Thus, the process in this position within the human psyche has
a complex bi-polar demeanor wherein delightful innocence mixes with
vulnerability. Often the tertiary process functions as if it needs the pro-
tection and the nurturing approval of another person’s good paren-
tal auxiliary function (Beebe 2007b). The tertiary process is painfully
aware of its need for admiration guidance and external strength, and
use of the tertiary function can also trigger regression to a wounded
child that has not fully healed from earlier trauma.
Though brilliant and winning, compared to the two previous more
experienced and conscious functions, the tertiary is quite volatile:
sometimes divine, frequently wounded, like Icarus in the Greek leg-
end, for whom Daedelus, his father, fashioned wax wings that melted
when overly enthusiastic Icarus flew too close to the sun and plum-
meted (Beebe 1988). For an ENFP (an extraverted intuitive type with
auxiliary introverted feeling), the tertiary function will be extraverted
thinking.
The Fourth or Inferior Function Is Carried by the Archetype

of the Soul-mate or Soul-friend
The fourth process to differentiate into consciousness, traditionally
known as the Inferior Function, is the mirror opposite of the dominant
function, both in regard to function and the direction of expression or
attitude (Jung 1921/1971; Von Franz 1979; Quenk 1993). This fourth
function is embedded in an archetype of contra-sexual energy, what
Jungian analysts have referred to as the anima in men and the animus
in women. According to Jung, particular images of the opposite sex
that vary from individual to individual possess the power to evoke a

certain energy that has been described as soul, reflected in such terms
as soul-mate or soul-friend, and they are associated with a sense of
profound connection that transcends mere contact between the egos
of two individuals.
In Beebe’s eight process model of personality type, the role of the
fourth function is elevated. In his view, the fourth process, when even-
tually made conscious, is no longer merely the inferior of the dominant.
The fourth, through its dynamic connection and conscious connection
to the dominant function, provides the foundational structure, the
psychological spine, for the whole conscious personality (composed
of the first four functions). Familiarity with the mental process that
occupies this basal position in the psyche, together with awareness
of the powerful currents of the contra-sexual archetypes, transforms
the personality. The rejected inferior becomes the foundation, as Jesus
declared: “The stone that the builders rejected has become the head
of the corner” (Mark 12:10, Psalm 118:22–23). The hitherto neglected
inferior function provides a sense of mission that has the capacity to
inspire the integration of the four functions of the conscious personal-
ity and provide passage to the shadow personality.
For the extraverted intuitive dominant with auxiliary introverted
feeling, the fourth mental process to develop will be the mirror oppo-
site of the dominant: introverted sensing, which will be described in
the final section of the article.
The Shadow Personality

Four mental processes (function-attitudes) make up the shadow
personality. As with the four function attitudes that comprise the
conscious personality, each function attitude tends to be embedded
within, and affected by, a particular archetypal pattern. The four arche-
types of the shadow personality contrast those of conscious personal-
ity. Until these shadow function attitudes are identified and brought
into awareness and used to orient an individual’s consciousness, these
shadow processes are known only indirectly, manifesting as problems
with other people, through the operations of the defense mechanism
of projection. Thus, during the first half of human life, these arche-
types of an individual’s later-to-emerge function-attitude operate in
their shadow aspect, tending to mislead and “fight dirty” to use Beebe’s
phrase (Beebe, 2004, p. 105).
The fifth mental process is the same function as the heroic dominant
function but directed in the opposite attitude. This process is drawn
into consciousness by the archetype of the opposing personality, and
it is often experienced as an adversary, opposed to how an individual
routinely operates, often manifesting as a clash of wills with another
person. The sixth function is managed under the archetypal auspices
of the forbidding or negative parent resembling the traditional Jungian
senex-witch archetype, which is the shadow aspect of the auxiliary func-
tion that is managed by the nurturing or good parent. The psychologi-
cal location of the seventh function is imbued with the archetype of
the trickster, who helps individuals escape double binds. This function
parallels the tertiary function associated with the eternal child, but it is
expressed in the opposite energetic direction. The last and most chal-
lenging function is mediated by the archetype of the demon/daemon
(angel) and is the opposite function of dominant function but operates
in the same directional world as the dominant function attitude. In its
unintegrated aspect, the eighth function attitude serves to undermine
the individual’s dominant way of operating.
The Opposing Personality: The Archetype that Manages

the Function-Attitude that Parallels the Dominant Function
but Is Expressed in the Opposing Attitude
The archetypal character of the opposing personality influences the
mental process that has the same function as the dominant but is
expressed in the opposite attitude or direction. The function attitude
in this position falls “into the blind-spot” of the dominant function.
Because of its obscured position it is hard to see in ourselves and so
tends to be projected onto others and their “bad” behavior. It acts as
an adversary toward the heroic dominant function, often embarrass-
ing it. Von Franz wrote:
Jung has said that the hardest thing to understand is not your opposite
type—if you have introverted feeling it is very difficult to understand an
extraverted thinking type—but it is even worse to understand [extra-
verted feeling] the same functional type with the other attitude! There
one feels that one doesn’t know how the wheels go round in that per-
son’s head, one cannot feel one’s way into it. (1979, p. 52)
As with the soul-figures that carry the fourth or inferior function,
the opposing personality is often represented in dreams and dramas
as a contra-sexual figure. However, the figure is oppositional and is
anything but soulful: It may be avoidant, passive-aggressive, and even

paranoid. The mental process in the opposing position in an individ-
ual’s psyche tends to be triggered when our heroic dominant func-
tion and “its most cherished values is [perceived to be] under attack”
(Beebe, 2007a, p. 5), or simply when the features of the function
in that position are called forth by the requirements of a particular
situation.
The Forbidding Negative Parent archetype, Senex or Witch, Carries

the Sixth Mental Process into Consciousness
The mental process that is usually the sixth one to be developed is car-
ried into consciousness by the archetype of the negative or forbidding
parent. This process shares the same cognitive function as the auxiliary
but is expressed in the opposite attitude, and so it lies in the shadow of
the auxiliary function that is influenced by the archetype of the good
or nurturing parent. If the auxiliary is expressed in the introverted
attitude, the sixth function will be extraverted and vice versa.
The function of the mental process in this position in the individual’s
psychological economy is to block and immobilize threats to survival
in the face of new energy and change, often by demoralizing the inspi-
rations of the soulful energy associated with the anima or animus.
At its most benign, the process occupying this archetypal position
presents and projects a protective wisdom that knows best. Shaming,
blaming, and other morally questionable methods of setting limits
and boundaries may be ruthlessly deployed. There is a “witch-like”
part in most individuals that is willing to use power, casting spells or
curses, if need be, in order to immobilize forces that seem to threaten
that individual’s survival. The equivalent male archetypal figure to the
female witch is the senex, an old man who dogmatically clings to the
tried and true and is even willing to arrogantly pull rank in order to
resist any change that is experienced as threatening to the status quo
in general and to his own personal privilege in particular. Pompous
condescension thwarts youthful exploits and creativity (Beebe, 2004;
2006b; 2007b). The effect on those who are experienced as threatening
is for them to “doubt the prudence of everything that they are doing”
(Beebe, 2007b, p. 25) as result of physical menacing, overt criticism, or
cold silence displayed by a senex figure.
The Trickster Archetype Nuances the Mental Process in the Shadow

Position of the Tertiary Function
The trickster archetype influences the expression of the mental process
that shares the same function as the mental process in the tertiary posi-
tion but is oriented in the opposite direction, extraverted when the lat-
ter is introverted and vice versa. The trickster archetype breaks cultural
rules: a) norms of “seriousness” by being playful, humorous, or simply
unpredictable; b) rules of ownership by stealing (fire, for example, by
Prometheus in Greek myth); c) customs of fidelity (e.g., Judas kissing
Jesus); or of d) gender by Coyote morphing between male and female
in the myths of the First Nations of the North American Plains.
The mental process under the archetypal influence of the trickster is
employed to help the individual escape double binds, which are them-
selves tricky situations that trap an individual and are often recogniz-
able by a thought such as “Someone or something is taking advantage
of me in this situation!” The mental process is used to turn the tables
and “reverse expectations” to foil compliance that is manipulatively
engineered (Beebe, 2007b, pp. 24–25).
The mental process in the trickster position may also actively lead
an individual into tricky situations. The process in this archetypal
position tends to be even less consistent and trustworthy than the
already volatile and unreliable child-like tertiary function. The trick-
ster process is able to deceive an individual into thinking something
is important and worth our attention when it is not (Berens & Nardi,
2004). By the same token, it can mislead individuals into skipping over
something when serious attention should in fact be given.
The Demonic/Daemonic Archetype Carries the Mental Process

That Is Usually the Last to Be Brought Into Consciousness
The mental process that has the opposite function of the dominant
mental process but shares the same attitude as the dominant is the
mental process that is most troublesome to the individual and to those
in that individual’s world. Beebe claimed: “The Demonic Personality is
usually the locus of our most unyielding and uncompromising flaws of
character. When we act beastly, it is often through this archetype and
its associated function attitude” (2007a, p. 5).
As the opposite of our dominant mental process but expressed in
the same attitude, our eighth function attitude clashes directly with the
operation of our dominant mental process. In its demonic aspect, the
eighth function-attitude directly undermines whatever is encountered.

Haas and Hunziker stated: “It is capable of great distortion, causing
confusion and chaos, and disrupting trust” (2006, p. 179). The effect
of the mental process deployed in this position is often destructive and
the source of regret in that person’s life.
Occasionally a daemonic or angelic aspect of the mental process
emerges effecting a surprising transformation (Berens & Nardi, 2004).
Sometimes the impact of the demonic mental process is softened,
when the function expressed in its opposite orientation, the fourth
mental process, becomes integrated with the help of the contra-sexual
soulful energy of the anima/us. The hitherto demonic mental process
transforms into a daemon and “becomes a source for the infusion of
redemptive spirit” (Beebe, 2006b, p. 42). Beebe interpreted the fairy
tale of Beauty and the Beast as depicting the dynamic relationship that
Beauty, the soul-connecting fourth function, has with our often oaf-
like eighth function, the Beast.
An Archetypal Type Portrait: What the Extraverted

Intuitive Leader with Introverted Feeling (ENFP) Brings
to Building Religious Community
The Conscious Personality

1st process: Heroic extraverted intuition, Ne (the dominant). When Ne
is the dominant mental process, it occupies the archetypal heroic posi-
tion in the psychological life of that individual. ENFPs rely on their
extraverted intuition, depending on their capacity to see patterns and
possibilities, and they use this mental process as an essential means for
coping with life, including their paid and volunteer activities. These
are usually extensive and may include religion; this type was the most
frequent intuitive type in a study of four Catholic congregations (Ross,
1995) and the fourth most frequent type among clergy (Ross, 2011).
For these types, Ne is a source of stability, a part of feeling normal,
and is so integral to everyday functioning that it is only noticed when
its use is stymied.
Extraverted intuitives make ideal leaders for building community in
a religious context, especially in changing circumstances, readily con-
necting with people, emerging situations, and the possibilities these
bring. They are “in the moment” (Thomson, 1998, p. 215), and defi-
nitely not guardians of the status quo, and so they serve as a natural
foil to the perspectives and priorities of the sensing-judging (SJ)

guardian types that often constitute the largest Keirsey temperament
subgroup (Keirsy, 1987) in Christian communities or in any religious
community (Poling, 1986). ENFP ministers will automatically see the
big picture for their church community. This will feel like a “breath of
fresh air” to other NF “idealists,” the next largest temperament sub-
group in liberal protestant and Catholic congregations. ENFP clergy
may be particularly appreciated by church members who are them-
selves ENFPs and also to INFPs, both of whom form significant sub-
groups in all but conservative evangelical congregations (Ross, 1993,
1995). Since ENFP leaders habitually use imagination to handle the
world, there may be pride, or even arrogance, that this is the only
open, natural way to face life’s challenges: to look beyond the imme-
diate facts of the situation and anticipate the implications. Berens
and Nardi (2004) warned that “they may overdo interpretations and
read other people’s minds without checking” for accuracy. They may
become “too fragmented with flights of ideas or want continuously to
make changes [in order] to incorporate their [emphasis added] latest
insights not settling on any long enough to see their ideas brought to
fruition” (p. 48). To other types, extraverted intuitives may seem to
lack realism and to underestimate the time, patience, and attention
to detail required for lasting change.
They tend to become bored and restless, especially in committees
when they cannot envisage or implement change. They pass over or
pass on details of administration, much to the frustration of the many
in a religious community with SJ preferences, especially the STJs who
may think her/him irresponsible. This sentiment may be shared by
those in the church hierarchy, such as presbytery chairpersons and
bishops who tend to be STJs, thus producing conflict and resistance.
This may restrict their impact and potentially immense contribution of
adaptation and response to emerging trends, much to the detriment of
the religious institution as a whole. Meanwhile, their peers, while sym-
pathetic to their creative projects, feel that their ENFP colleagues lack
the maturity or patience to deal with the frustrations of the politics
involved in renegotiating the rules and dealing with others insecurity
concerning change.
2nd process: Nurturing with introverted feeling, Fi (the auxiliary
process). For ENFPs, introverted feeling (Fi) is their auxiliary func-
tion. As the second mental process to develop, it is associated with
the archetype of the “good” or nurturing parent. Berens and Nardi
(2004) described the nurturing role introverted feeling in ENFPs in

these terms: “Like a supportive parent, they are helpful when they key
in on their values and stay with what is important to themselves and
other individuals” (p. 48).
Fi enables individuals to reflect upon their emotions and use them
to identify what matters to themselves and others and to connect these
to universally held values that transcend external conventions (Berens
& Nardi, 2004). When developed into consciousness, which usually
occurs in adolescence, Fi can function as the right arm of their per-
sonality, a way to reach out to others in a positive manner. Fi enhances
their role in a religious community since Fi enables ENFPs to hone in
upon their own and others’ deeply held values and nurture others by
quietly cherishing and respecting what each congregant holds dear.
The integration of introverted feeling provides stability and an inner
compass to the extraverted intuitive: It helps ENFP leaders develop
and maintain a firm inner integrity whereby their values are used to
guide their decisions. When auxiliary introverted feeling is adequately
developed, the welter of ideas, attitudes, and possible behaviors that
swirl in their extraverted intuition are able to be judged against inner
values. Without this inner compass, their heroic extraverted intuition
ENFP ministers may stray off into “the sky blue yonder” or a dar-
ing inner city project started without sufficient funding or political
support.
Through this mental process of deep sensitivity, ENFP ministers give
to others. Many congregants will be grateful for the deep caring of a
quiet presence that they feel one-on-one with an ENFP minister whom
hitherto they had only known through her or his effusive imaginative
enthusiasm. In fact, this deep valuing that is the essential process of
introverted feeling is what sustains a modulated and adaptive response
to all the myriad of possibilities picked up by the radar- like antennae
of the heroic ENFP’s extraverted intuition. This will be particularly
appreciated by the introverted feeling types in the community, a sig-
nificant subgroup in Canadian Anglican (especially INFPs: Ross, 1993)
and Catholic congregations (especially ISFPs: Ross, 1995). However,
these introverted feeling types may feel disconcerted when the intense
feeling focus is jerked away by the ENFPs’ extraverted intuitive radar
at the periphery of their minister’s vision.
3rd process: Extraverted thinking, Te, influenced by the eternal child
archetype (the tertiary). For extraverted intuitives with introverted
feeling, the third or tertiary process to develop is usually extraverted
thinking. In this third position of psychological development, it is

influenced by the archetype of the eternal child, puer or puella energy.
This archetype complements the archetype of the auxiliary function,
the good parent; whereas a nurturing parent is usually consistent, the
mark of children is a winning energy that oftentimes rapidly fades,
sometimes producing “unforgivable” behavior in its wake (Beebe,
2006b, p. 40). Extraverted thinking, therefore, in this position is quite
charming, but it is subject to fatigue, with its productivity being unre-
liable. Thus, volatility may characterize the use of Te by the ENFP
leader, at least until Te becomes more fully integrated into conscious-
ness. This archetypal energy means that the use of extraverted thinking
by ENFP leaders often has a disarming, even endearing, innocence but
can be exasperating in its unreliability.
Berens and Nardi (2004, pp. 48–49) described how Te emerges in
ENFPs. Sometime in their 20s or 30s, ENFPs start to “enjoy orga-
nizing data, space, or clutter to make life flow better,” detect when
something is not working, and “know where they are in a process.”
They show a renewed respect for testing their ideas, and they accept
the needs of others to have evidence and explanations for even small
decisions. Such patience may be particularly welcomed by community
members with TJ type preferences, those who have extraverted think-
ing as their dominant or auxiliary process: a subgroup forming up to
a third of the general church community (Bramer, 1996) or as high
as 44% among male Canadian Catholic men (Ross, 1995). Those with
extraverted thinking preferences will likely appreciate the ENFP leader
for the newfound concern for order and consistency regarding some
projects and will be impressed at the written plan that the inspirational
ENFP has put together. However, because tertiary Te is under the bi-
polar influence of childlike archetypal energy, these same TJ parish-
ioners may be dismayed at the sudden wane of interest on the part of
their ENFP leader, for example, when the time comes for revisions to
the plan, successive budget submissions, details of implementation, or
requests for periodic review and accountability. TJs’ trust is not deep-
ened when they sense or actually hear from the ENFP the impatient
reaction “Why don’t you trust me?”
Thomson amplified the double-edged aspect of ENFPs’ extraverted
thinking. When they use Te well:
[it] helps them set priorities and to respect the priorities of others. Mar-
shaled to protect an Intuitive [heroic] function under siege, however,
Extraverted Thinking is egocentric. It convinces ENFPs that others
should respect their priorities. From an Intuitive standpoint, of course,

a priority is whatever the ENFP is responding to right now. (1998,
p. 220)
However, when Te is deployed non-defensively, it allows the ENFP
leaders to bring more of their community members along with them
on their new project. When integrated, Te provides a second string to
their assertiveness, based on reason as well as inspiration.
4th process: Magically connective introverted sensing, Si (carried by
the contra-sexual anima or animus archetype). For extraverted intu-
itives with introverted feeling, the fourth or inferior process to develop
is introverted sensing, Si, characterized by a concern for facts and
details, and the mirror opposite of their dominant process (Quenk,
1993). In this fourth position of psychological development, Si is influ-
enced by the contra-gender archetype of the animus in women and
anima in men.
Before Si is integrated, it is usually experienced as a reaction to stress
(Quenk, 2000) and can be the source of shame (Beebe, 2007). ENFPs
are stressed by routine and attention to detail, along with over-close
supervision and rules that stifle intuition. Un-integrated Si comes into
play as a compensation for the overuse of intuition in mid-life, giv-
ing rise on occasion to un-realistic yearning for absolute stability and
security by ENFP (Thomson, 1998): a “future life that is set, with con-
ventional trappings” (Berens & Nardi, 2004, p. 49).
When in the grip of un-integrated inferior introverted sensing, the
usually positive and flexible ENFP leader may become a caricature
of an ISFJ or ISTJ, exhibiting an uncharacteristic pessimism, narrow
focus, and tunnel vision, described by one ENFP as “[a] sense of feel-
ing numb and frozen with no way out” (Quenk, 2000, p. 42). Other
signs of being “in the grip” are a) obsession with a few unrelated facts
which are catastrophized as blocking all future developments, and
b) “vacillation between over activity and withdrawal” (Quenk, 2000,
p. 43). ENFP leaders may become so preoccupied with their projects
that they neglect their physical health. They may then veer to the other
extreme of hypochondriasis, imagining any physical ache or pain as a
sign of a fatal disease.
Changes occur as introverted sensing becomes more conscious
and less shameful to the dominant extraverted intuitive. For example,
whereas before ENFP leaders may have neglected detailed work like
record keeping, they may gradually develop more “patience for careful
data gathering”. They may start to see some value in tradition, includ-
ing using “the work, ideas and examples of others who have come
before” and even develop a nostalgia for certain previously passed-
over customs or objects from their past that may now be suffused with
attractive mystery (Berens & Nardi, 2004, p. 49), and they may assign
a larger place and deeper significance for the components of ritual in
worship.
When integrated, the development of Si carries with it the possibility
of establishing a robust stability for the whole conscious personality,
in which a profound connection is made with the unconscious. This
provides a sense of mission that is able to sustain the trials of explor-
ing the shadow side of the personality. When an extraverted intuitive
minister is able to access the contribution of introverted sensing, s/he
becomes grounded and rooted in facts and less stressed by details. The
capacity for profound connection opens up even with congregants,
colleagues, and superiors who are quite different from him/her, par-
ticularly the numerous SJs who constitute an important sub-group of
most churches.
A beneficial effect of this broadening and deepening into sensing
perceiving with an expanded capacity for and patience with specifics
is to make inspiring projects far more effective and more sustain-
able. With such increased institutional support, the minister’s energy
becomes more directed and less rebellious yet without sacrificing any
of the intensity and integrity that s/he feared earlier in his/her devel-
opment and career. The intensity involved in the process of integra-
tion of introverted sensation is worthwhile, increasing the trust in the
community on the part of the large subgroup with introverted sensing
preferences that they may have for their inspiring and often activist
ENFP leader.
The Shadow Personality

The shadow personality of the ENFP leaders is composed of the same
four functions that comprise their conscious personality, but each pro-
cess operates in the opposite or shadow direction. Introverted pro-
cesses of the conscious personality will manifest extravertedly in the
shadow personality, and vice versa for extraverted processes.
While there is variability in the emergence of the shadow processes
into consciousness, shadow processes are seldom integrated before
an individual is in mid-life. Until such integration into consciousness
occurs, ENFP leaders rarely identify their shadow process as having
anything to do with themselves. On the contrary, the characteristics

of the shadow processes initially show up as problematic features of
other people and in their “bad” behavior.
Extraverted intuitive leaders do not have to wait for mid-life, for
even cognitive awareness of how each shadow function operates will
facilitate relational understanding and community building and will
reduce defensiveness when issues raised by engagement with these
shadow processes are triggered for each leader.
5th process: The opposing personality of introverted intuition, Ni.
The fifth process to develop for extraverted intuitive types tends to be
introverted intuition. Introverted intuition, Ni, lies in the shadow of
the dominant mental process, sharing the same function but expressed
in the opposite attitude. According to Berens and Nardi, ENFPs have
difficulty foreseeing implications and eventual effects, and “they may
become stubborn about their perceptions of how the future will be”
(2004, p. 49). In this position Beebe (2006b), described the fifth men-
tal process as falling under the influence of the archetype opposing
personality that, like the anima and animus, usually has a contra-
gender quality to its expression. Introverted intuition, therefore, tends
to show up in the psychological life of the ENFP with adversarial, pas-
sive aggressive, or paranoid qualities that are particularly triggered by
members of the opposite sex.
Until introverted intuition is assimilated into consciousness, these
aspects are not acknowledged as part of the extraverted intuitives
themselves but are projected onto others who are experienced as being
difficult or even persecutory. Such projections are more frequent in
encounters with those types who have introverted intuition as their
dominant mental process (INTJs and INFJs), who form a larger part
of most Christian church communities compared to the general popu-
lation (9% of Canadian Catholics: Ross, 1995; and 12% of Canadian
Evangelicals: Bramer, 1996). INTJs and INFJs are the most indepen-
dent of all types, and they may seem to the extraverted intuitives
as obstinate and uncooperative. The extraverted intuitive may feel
persecuted by the obscure vision that introverted intuitives seem to
“go on-and-on about” in community meetings, oblivious to the eye-
rolling incomprehension of many in the audience. ENFP ministers
may become furious that these usually subdued people hijacked and
ruined the church meeting causing, heaven forbid, members to leave
before the ENFPs had the opportunity to present their new project.
From the perspective of the introverted intuitive types in the commu-
nity, extraverted intuitive leaders may be seen as unstable and flaky,

because the latter’s extraverted intuition orients to the most promising
possibility in the changing external environment.
Early on in their careers, ENFP leaders in a religious context may
be able to shake off these occasional difficult encounters because they
have the energy and outward orientation that allows them to pursue
their projects. However, when the need for more long term planning
is realized with the onset of mid-life, along with hints of mortality
(e.g., a peer dying), the very long term view afforded by introverted
intuition may still be experienced as oppressive and alien but is harder
to avoid.
With patience and persistence, intuition in its introverted aspect
may come to feel less strange, and some of its benefits may be experi-
enced and appreciated. For example a) less dependence on the external
environment for stimulation; b) more acknowledgment by others who
discern an inner stability and depth of insight in the ENFP leader;
c) increased self-awareness because intuition inwardly directed can
yield profound insights; and d) appreciation by the ENFP leader that
adopting a longer term time-perspective reduces the need to rush
toward immediate results.
6th process: Extraverted feeling, Fe, influenced by the critical parent
archetype, the senex or witch. In ENFP leaders, the sixth process to
develop is usually extraverted feeling, Fe. It lies in the shadow of the
second or auxiliary process that is influenced by the archetype of the
good or nurturing parent. By this token, then, the process in the sixth
position falls under the influence of the negative or forbidding parent
that has been described in Jungian psychology in terms of the senex
archetype in male form and the witch archetype in female form. Fe,
therefore, often exhibits features of the critical and forbidding parent,
whose role is to block threats to survival by using shaming, blaming,
put downs, and other morally questionable tactics that are intended to
stop hostile force in its tracks (Beebe, 2007b).
At first blush, the activity of Fe in the critical parent mode seems
contradictory, for Fe is the mental process that attunes to how others
feel, their needs and those of the group: its culture, norms, and values,
and it seeks to satisfy these needs, automatically adjusting their own
bearing and behavior, as well as their own needs (Hartzler & Hartzler,
2005). Fe simply knows what is right and appropriate in a particu-
lar social context. However, Fe under the aegis of the critical parent
archetype becomes perplexing. According to Berens and Nardi, until
integrated into consciousness, the operations of extraverted feeling Fe

often take the form of being “disgruntled about the expectations and
norms of the group to the point of completely disengaging or rebel-
ling” (2004, p. 49). By the same token, extraverted feeling from others
who stress harmony with customs and convention may be experi-
enced by ENFP leaders or ministers as a threat and as blocking their
work and projects. They feel provoked to strong criticism. This may
surprise and offend not only the extraverted feeling types but others
in the group or congregation, especially when intractable argument
deteriorates into an “I will fix them” attitude by one or both parties.
Unless swiftly detected and diffused, this activity by the ENFP leader
can undermine the feeling of community.
Extraverted feeling types (ESFJs and ENFJs) are most likely to trigger
this reaction in the ENFP leader, which may happen quite often since
extraverted feeling types may comprise from 15% to 25% of women
active in Christian churches. The conflict may be mitigated between
ENFPs and ENFJs because both are NFs and share a concern for per-
sonal growth, facility with personal communication, and an interest in
a wider, more inclusive vision. These shared gifts may enable them to
contextualize their conflict and dialogue their way through misunder-
standing. However, ESFJs are more frequent in Christian communities
(10% among both Evangelical and Catholic Canadian women: Bramer
1996; Ross, 1995) and as sensing-judging types are tradition-oriented
and, therefore, are often already defensive in response to the change-
oriented programming pouring forth constantly from ENFP leaders.
A similar challenge may come from those with Fe as their auxiliary
process, especially the large number of ISFJs who constitute the largest
female group in many Protestant and Catholic congregation. There is,
therefore, good reason for ENFPs leaders to consciously engage with
this critical part of their personality.
Extraverted feeling can be an ally for the innovative ENFP minister.
With eventual awareness and conscious development of this process,
Berens and Nardi stated that such types can at times “magically con-
nect with the group and move it to a new place” (2004, p. 49). When
ENFP leaders integrate their Fe process, they become able to combine
their imaginative grasp of the project and the possibilities of the situ-
ation, with a concern and consideration for the culture and customs
of the group. Their enhanced awareness of the human implications of
any change that they are proposing will further build community sup-
port for their proposals among a variety of types for whom change is
not an automatic virtue.
7th process: “Trickster” introverted thinking, Ti. For ENFPs, intro-
verted thinking occupies the trickster position in psychological
structure of type development. Under the influence of the trickster
archetype, mistakes, error, and mischief accompany the operations
of Ti among ENFP leaders, especially before it is integrated from the
unconscious into consciousness. Such integration seldom starts before
individuals are 50, and it is rarely completed. For ENFP leaders, Ti
will often get them into, but also out of, tricky situations. Berens and
Nardi (2004) described how ENFPs who are not usually interested in
identifying principles or in abstract categorization may under stress
resort to following or defending some abstract principles, deceiving
themselves that this will solve the problem.
Ti is likely to be triggered in two ways for the ENFP leader: a) when
the demands of work or ministry require the services of this process
(i.e., logical categorization based on formal rather than personal con-
siderations) and b) when the ENFP leader directly encounters intro-
verted thinking types (INTPs and ISTPs). However, there are few
situations when introverted thinking is called for amidst the routines
of Christian ministry, and, by the same token, there are relatively few
introverted thinking types in Christian communities (7% of Catholics:
Ross, 1995; 10% of Evangelical Protestants: Bramer, 1996). Therefore,
introverted thinking remains a neglected mystery for most in Christian
communities. And so, as with most other types and their introverted
thinking, for most ENFPs leaders in a Christian context, learning to
deal with their tricksterish introverted thinking process is usually an
internal matter.
Often ENFP ministers and leaders have a naive view of this intro-
verted judging process. However, unlike the other introverted judg-
ing process, that of introverted feeling that is usually well developed
in this type and used to nurture self and others, the use of abstract
principles for categorization and analysis—the quintessence of Ti—is
poorly understood and clumsily misapplied. For example, the ENFP
leaders may offer rationales that are irrelevant to the proposals being
made or else may supply evidence contradictory to the argument they
are trying to make.
Nevertheless, when attention is given to introverted thinking,
ENFPs may find that it helps them escape tricky situations where they
feel caught in a double bind. For example ENFPs may feel trapped
between conforming to prevailing norms in order to please the many
in the community with extraverted feeling preferences, while still
honoring their own introverted feeling inner ideals. Their introverted
thinking, with its concern simply for detached consistency across com-
parable situations, may provide a suitable rationale that will facilitate
an original solution to the situation. Introverted thinking may enable
ENFP religious leaders to both satisfy their inner ideals and to articu-
late a rationale that is acceptable or at least comprehensible to others.
Gradually, ENFP leaders may become more familiar with how intro-
verted thinking operates if they take leisure moments to simply play
with abstract ideas and frameworks (Berens & Nardi, 2004), and so
learn to discriminate when these may be more useful, when devising
constitutional by-laws for example, and when more rarely appropriate,
as in a sermon.
8th process: The demon/angel of extraverted sensing, Se. The eighth
and last mental process that is likely to be integrated into conscious
for extraverted intuitives is extraverted sensing, Se. Extraverted sens-
ing clashes directly with the ENFP leaders’ dominant process of extra-
verted intuition: Both processes operate in the same extraverted world,
but they are opposing ways of perceiving and taking in information.
We can either see the roses or resonate to what roses open and por-
tend. However, one way of perceiving wipes out the other, at least
in that simultaneous moment. Beebe (2007a, pp. 5–6) found that the
undermining quality of the eighth process gave credence to the idea
of a “devil” or “demon” in every human psyche. It often is revealed as
an oaf or beast in dreams.
Extraverted sensing is the mental process that delights in a sin-
gularly “here and now” focus which allows us to “absorb tangible
details . . . through the senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch”
(Hartzler & Hartzler, 2005, p. 11) without evaluation. Through the
operations of Se we naturally adapt to, work with, and take pleasure
in the physical world as it is. Beebe, himself a dominant extraverted
intuitive, described his own demonic extraverted sensing:
The demonic personality, then, is that part of ourselves that operates in
the shadow to undermine others and ourselves. Certainly in my own
case that is extraverted sensation. My body language is often the oppo-
site of what I mean to convey. My relation to physical geography is such
that, when trying to find my way along an unfamiliar route, the opposite
of where I think I should be going is almost always the correct way.
(2004, p. 30)
By the same token, when the leader in a Christian community is an

ENFP, the physical side of life can be undermining, whether it is
neglecting physical care, unacknowledged sexual desire, or inattention
to physical hazard on a youth field trip. Berens and Nardi explained
the situation of extraverted sensing for the ENFP in this way:
When really stressed they [ENFPs] may get caught up in a binge of being
in the physical moment. This can result in excessively seeking stimula-
tion or following the urge to sleep or do nothing. They zero in on iso-
lated details, hastily acting on them in a chaotic disjointed way. (2004,
p. 49)
Specifically in a Christian religious context, there is little wisdom
about the extraverted sensing world from which to draw in Chris-
tian life and thought, just as there are few extraverted sensing types in
Christian communities. For example, ESFPs comprised only 2.3% and
ESTPs 1.7% of four evangelical churches in north Toronto (Bramer,
1996). Thus, as with the previous shadow process, trickster-like Ti,
the journey to consciousness of this process for the ENFP leader will
receive little external institutional support in terms of the surrounding
Christian cultural ethos. This makes problematic acting out of Se more
likely and also increases the likelihood that the community’s response
and way of dealing with it will be destructive or at least divisive.
Nevertheless, extraverted sensing, while often neglected, defamed,
or denied, when acknowledged and allowed to contribute can be trans-
formational and can provide stability to a community structure. The
relaxed at-homeness-in-their-body of extraverted sensing types, along
with their casual flexibility, can help defuse tensions and mitigate the
overweening intensity that occurs from time to time in a community
led by an ENFP. This possibility was the basis for Beebe’s hopeful
surmise:
The archetype associated with the most unconscious of regions of the
mind can deliver insights that are of the highest value, as well as depre-
ciating and undermining ones. It is truly an area of ourselves that is both
Devil and Angel. (2007a, p. 5)
Berens and Nardi optimistically concluded their portrait of devilish
extraverted sensing in ENFPs: “Yet on occasion they can tune in to
what’s tangible, using the physical world to transform and change”
(2004, p. 40).
Conclusion
Most applications of Jung’s personality typology to the psychology of

religion have used the traditional Jungian assumption of there being
four levels of type development. Because there are, in fact, eight pro-
cesses in Jung’s typology, this has led to a neglect of the four less devel-
oped processes within an individual or within a religious community
and a failure to differentiate different components of what Jungians
refer to as the shadow. Some intractable conflict experienced within
religious communities may be attributable to community members
projecting onto other community members of a particular type the
shadow aspects of their own poorly developed and un-integrated men-
tal processes.
Beebe’s use of key developmental archetypes helped to articulate
those characteristics of a mental process that may vary with different
levels of development and with the life cycle stage at which the mental
process undergoes most conscious development. The detailed devel-
opmental portrait of the extraverted intuitive type with introverted
feeling (ENFP), one of the more frequent intuitive types in a vari-
ety of Christian congregations, illustrates how Beebe’s eight function
archetypal model of type development may provide ways of reducing
type related defensive sources of community conflict. In particular, the
model differentiates the shadow into more specific descriptive terms
and allows us to sense the flavor of what disturbs, and, in so doing, it
may act as an antidote to divisive projection-fuelled hostility that saps
energy from community building and meaningful outreach.
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AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES
Liza J. Benovenli graduated from Towson University in 2009 with a Bachelor of Sci-
ence degree in psychology. During her undergraduate career, she gained experience
in the field by volunteering at several different units at the Sheppard Pratt Mental
Health Facility in Towson, MD and also participated in two research projects in 2006
and 2009. Currently she works at Kennedy Krieger Institute in Baltimore, MD as a
Program Aide, working one-on-one with children with various neurological disorders
and learning disabilities. Her future plans are to continue her education by pursuing
a master’s degree in either experimental or clinical psychology, focusing on research
concerning Autism Spectrum Disorders.
Ronan Bernas, Ph.D., is Professor at the Department of Psychology of Eastern

Illinois University. He received his Ph.D. in Psychology (Committee on Human
Development) from The University of Chicago. He also received graduate training
from the Committee on Research Methodology and Quantitative Psychology and was
a research assistant at the Methodology Research Center of the National Opinion
Research Center. His current area of research is on mindfulness, the dialectical self,
wisdom, and well-being.
Lewis Burton, Ph.D., is a retired Methodist minister who holds doctorates from the
University of London, University of Leeds, and University of Wales. Throughout his
ministry, he has had an interest in the sociology of the local church and has completed
research projects on this topic. He is a Research Fellow of St Mary’s Study Centre,
Wales and has recently been engaged in research projects concerning the Methodist
presbyterate and the diaconate, concerning the rural church.
Bruce Fawcett, Ph.D. (Wales), is Academic Dean, Director of Doctoral Studies, and
Associate Professor of Leadership at Acadia Divinity College of Acadia University in
Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada. His research interests revolve around Christian ado-
lescents and their youth leaders, including their spiritual practices and views on moral
and ethical issues and practices.
Leslie J. Francis, Ph.D., is Professor of Religions and Education at the Warwick

Religions and Education Research Unit at the University of Warwick, Coventry,
England, and Canon Theologian at Bangor Cathedral, Wales. He received his Ph.D. and
Sc.D. from the University of Cambridge, his D.D. from the University of Oxford, and
his D.Litt. from the University of Wales. His recent books include Faith and Psychol-
ogy: Personality, Religion and the Individual (2005), British Methodism: What Circuit
Ministers Really Think (2006), and Preaching with All Our Souls (2008).
Elizabeth Fuller graduated Magna Cum Laude from Towson University in Spring
2010 with a Bachelor of Science in Psychology. She gained a variety of experience in
the field through volunteer opportunities and internships with Johns Hopkins Hospi-
tal, as well as a substance abuse treatment facility at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical
Center. She also participated in two primary research projects spanning 2008–2010,
which presented at Towson University’s Graduate Student Research Expo. She is cur-
rently pursuing her Master’s degree in Psychology, with a concentration in Neurop-
sychology, at American University in DC and planning to specialize in Traumatic
Brain Injury research.

348 authors’ biographies
Susan H. Jones, Ph.D., is Canon Missioner at Bangor Cathedral, Director of the St

Seiriol Centre for Christian Discipleship and Ministry and Visiting Research Fellow
at Glyndŵr University, Wales. Her research field is concerned with the psychology of
Christian ministry, with special reference to psychological type theory.
G. Michael Leffel, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at Point Loma Nazarene Uni-

versity in San Diego, CA. His teaching, research, and writing interests include top-
ics in moral psychology and in the psychology of religion: generativity theory, virtue
formation, spiritual transformation, and practical religious ethics. He also specializes
in the integration of psychodynamic therapeutic theory and spiritual transformation.
He received his Ph.D. (Personality and Social Ecology) from the University of Illinois,
Champaign-Urbana.
Mandy Robbins, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Division of Psychology,

Glyndwr University, Wales, UK. She has a doctorate from the University of Wales.
Her current research interests include psychology of religion and the impact of indi-
vidual differences on the ministry and wellbeing of clergywomen. Her recent publica-
tions include Clergywomen in the Church of England: A Psychological Study (2008) and
an edited volume (with Leslie Francis and Jeff Astley) Empirical Theology in Texts and
Tables: Qualitative, Quantitative and Comparative Perspectives (2009).
Christopher F. J. Ross, Ph.D., C. Psych., is Associate Professor in the Psychology

of Religion in the Department of Religion and Culture at Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. His principal research interests are religion and personal-
ity and the psychology of individual religious differences. Recent publications include
“The relationship of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious orientations to Jungian
psychological type among churchgoers in England and Wales” in Mental Health Reli-
gion and Culture (2009), with L. J. Francis; “Principles of cultural psychology and the
Hindu avatar tradition: A study of Mother Meera through personal narratives” in
Culture and Religion (2010), with Lauren Price.
Andrew N. Ryland, graduated from Durham University with a degree in English

Literature. He has been in pastoral ministry for 24 years in the Newfrontiers fam-
ily of churches. He has served on leadership teams and led a church leadership team
himself for fifteen years. He now serves a group of churches west of London as part
of an apostolic team. He lectures on Newfrontiers training courses and serves as a
reader for the Newfrontiers Theological Forum. Andrew received his MA from Bangor
University.
Jan Sinnott is a Professor of Psychology at Towson University in Baltimore, MD,

where she has taught since 1978. She has worked to bridge the worlds of spiritual-
ity, teaching, research, and clinical practice since her workshop and Mystery School
experiences, her Postdoctoral Fellow and Guest Scientist experiences at the National
Institutes of Health, and her work with businesses and government as a consultant.
She is author of more than 100 publications, including a dozen books based on her
decades of research to create her theory of the development of Complex Postfor-
mal Thought. Her latest scholarly books are The Development of Logic in Adulthood:
Postformal Thought and Its Applications, published in 1998 (Plenum/Kluwer), Rein-
venting the University (with Lynn Johnson), published in 1997 (Ablex, now Elsevier-
Holland), and The Interdisciplinary Handbook of Adult Lifespan Learning, published
in l994 (Greenwood). She has been interviewed by many popular publications, for
example, Newsweek and the Washington Post. She is currently working on a book and
research related to the study of complex thought and development of the Self through
feeling connected in intimate relationships.
authors’ biographies 349
William L. Smith, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology

and Anthropology at Georgia Southern University. His latest research focuses on Irish
American identity, spiritual retreatants, and the academic attitudes of college students.
He is the author of Families and Communes: An Examination of Nontraditional Life-
styles (Sage Publications, 1999), Irish Priests in the United States: A Vanishing Subcul-
ture (UPA, 2004), and numerous articles in a variety of academic journals.
David R. Tilley was Continuing Ministerial Education Adviser in the C of E Diocese

of Coventry for nearly 20 years. He has worked with psychological type theory in most
of that time particularly in the in-service training of clergy. His research on type in the
supervisory relationship—a study of training incumbents and their curates—earned
him an M. Phil. in 2006 from the University of Wales. The findings of that research
are reported in Supporting New Ministers in the Local Church (SPCK 2007) which he
co-authored with Keith Lamdin.
Andrew Village, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Practical and Empirical Theology at

York St. John University, UK. He holds doctorates from the University of Edinburgh
and the University of Bristol. His current research interests include clergy and the
bible, beliefs about Creation and environmentalism among churchgoers, prejudice
and personality, and psychology and religion. His recent books include The Bible and
Lay People (2007), and (with Leslie Francis) Preaching with All Our Souls (2008) and
The Mind of the Anglican Clergy (2009).
Sarah J. Waterman graduated from Towson University in 2009 with a Bachelors

of Science degree in Psychology and English. During her undergraduate career,
Sarah participated in two ongoing research projects between 2007 and 2009. In 2009,
she received Towson University’s Psychology department’s award for Creativity and
Social Consciousness. She is also a member of Psi Chi, the national honors society for
psychology. She currently works for the United States federal government.
Michael Whinney has retired from full time ministry but is still active as an Hon-
orary Assistant Bishop in Birmingham. In 1981, as a mature student, he studied for
his Sacred Theology Masters (STM) at General Theological Seminary New York. This
included the study of psychological type, which he has used throughout his episcopal
ministry in the church, with students, the medical profession, and local authorities.
His research on type with clergy and ministers in the West Midlands was published
in 2004, and he continues research on the psychological type of church leaders with
St Mary’s Centre, Wales.
Keith M. Wilson, Ph.D., is a professor in the psychology department at Eastern Illi-

nois University and a licensed clinical psychologist. In addition to the psychology of
religion, his research interests include terror management theory, the impact of timing
of sexual abuse on sexual cognitions, and help-seeking behavior.
Keith Wulff, Ph.D., is the past President of the Religious Research Association and
recently retired as Director of the Research Office of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
He holds a doctorate from The University of Texas at Austin. He is currently looking
at how change in the content of clergy sermons may have affected denominational
membership. His recent journal publication was coauthored with Neil Krause. It is
“Church-Based Social Ties, A Sense of Belonging in a Congregation, and Physical
Health Status.” International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Vol. 15, No. 1:
pages 73–93.
350 authors’ biographies
Pidi Zhang, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and

Anthropology at Georgia Southern University. His research interests include network
exchange theory, the economic performance of ethnic groups, the transition from
high school to college, and religion & spirituality.
MANUSCRIPT REVIEWERS
In addition to the preceding authors, many scholars and scientists have made signifi-
cant contributions to the publication of this volume. They have anonymously screened
the initial versions of these and other submitted manuscripts for methodological rigor
and scientific significance. They also have provided the authors with invaluable sugges-
tions for improving their papers prior to the authors making their final revisions. Both
myself and the authors appreciate their expert services. Not only have they improved
the quality of the research reported here, they also have contributed to the quality of
the field of the social scientific study of religion.
Chris J. Boyatzis Anthony Scioli

Bucknell University Keene State College
Mark Cartledge Katarzyna Skrzypińska

University of Birmingham, UK University of Gdańsk
Gayle Civish William J. Sneck, S. J.

University of Denver Loyola University Maryland
Leslie J. Francis Joseph Stewart-Sicking

University of Warwick Loyola University Maryland
William Kay David Walker

Glyndŵr University, Wales Glyndŵr University, Wales
Mark J. Krejci Everett L. Worthington, Jr.

Concordia College Virginia Commonwealth University
John Lloyd David Wulff

Keele University, UK Wheaton College
Ralph L. Piedmont Andrew Village

Loyola University Maryland York St. John University
Jaroslaw Piotrowski Magdalena Zemojtel-Piotrowska

University of Gdańsk University of Gdańsk
SUBJECT INDEX
affiliation, religious 162, 172, 184, 191, Church of England clergy 205, 236,
235 244, 253–255, 288
age 7–8, 12, 15, 146–150, 197, 219, church tradition 191, 230, 238–243,
271–272, 309 250, 285
agreeableness 53–54, 161, 168 churchgoers 161, 212, 217–218, 224,
alpha coefficients 238, 268–269, 273, 226, 272, 348–9
293, 301, 310–311 female 212, 221–222, 224
Anglican churches 188, 219–220, 227, male 212, 221, 223–224
229, 233, 240, 244, 247 clergy 176–177, 192–193, 197–198,
Anglican clergy 209–210, 227–228, 201–207, 229–233, 236–237, 241–242,
232, 237–238, 244–245, 262, 284–285, 245–251
305–306 apprentice vi, 164, 286–287, 289,
Anglican clergywomen 210, 228, 249 291, 293, 295, 297 see also curates
Anglican congregations in England distinctive psychological type profile
188, 228, 249 of 192, 202
Anglican ministry 230, 232, 247 female vi, 192–194, 196–197, 201–208,
Anglicans 172–173, 175–176, 191, 230, 230, 244–245, 253–255, 348
238–239, 246, 250 stipendiary 231, 245–247
Anglo-catholic 238–241 clergy roles 246, 265
archetypes vi, 315–317, 319–321, community 5, 23, 34, 36, 224–225,
323–331, 333, 335, 337–339, 343–345 271, 337–338, 342–343
critical parent 339 moral 33, 35–36, 42, 51, 72, 97, 112,
Australian National Church Life Survey 121
212, 218–220, 224 congregations 161, 175–177, 229,
auxiliary 172, 185, 215, 315, 322, 235–236, 244–245, 268, 274,
325–328, 330, 334 306–307
auxiliary function 175, 177, 182, 185, consciousness 88, 167–169, 316–317,
326–327, 329–330, 333, 335 321, 324–327, 329–331, 334–335,
337–338
beauty 9–13, 21, 332 curates vi, 164, 237, 286, 289–294,
behavior x–xi, 2, 46–48, 55, 58–59, 299–300, 302–305, 349
94–5, 119–120, 141–142
beliefs 2–3, 23–25, 333–6, 209–210, dominant function 175, 325–330
227–29, 261–263, 283–285, 304–305 dominant types 198–202, 220,
boundaries, religious 165, 178, 186 222–223, 258–259, 293–294
dual process models 46–47, 61
Catholics 12, 15–16, 173, 190, 216,
229, 250, 345 emotions 50, 56, 59, 71–72, 87,
character 40, 46, 52, 71, 75, 119–120, 92–100, 103, 111–118
122–123, 196 self-conscious 93, 122, 124–125
charismatic practice 230, 239–242 empathy 38, 57, 62, 71, 90, 92–94,
Christian communities 333, 340–341, 96–101, 113
343 ethical intuitions 77, 84–92, 94–97, 99,
church congregations 216, 218–219, 109, 111, 114, 117
221, 224, 226 evangelicals 190, 215, 229, 238–241,
church leaders 177, 188, 192–193, 209, 243, 250, 253, 288
227, 261, 283–284, 304 existential anxiety 126, 128, 135–136
Church of England 188, 193, 204–206, existential meaning 29, 64–65, 67–68,
216–217, 230–231, 235, 237, 249–250 70, 79, 81, 86, 108–109, 114–115
354 subject index
experience ix, 5–6, 100–101, 143, 168, introverts 158, 183, 213, 224, 270,
180–182, 303–304, 319–320 281–282, 287, 306–313
mystical 182, 185 intuition 48–51, 108–111, 170–173,
odyssey 6, 24 178–180, 194–198, 213–217, 245,
religious 165, 179, 184, 235 251–254
extraverts vi, 183, 194, 213–214, Intuitive System 29, 64–65, 68–70, 77,
281–282, 287, 306–313 79, 84, 88, 109
intuitive types 158, 182, 195, 233, 252,
faith 4, 23, 52, 54, 125, 178–179, 181, 266, 315
276–277 IOG (Image of God) x, 141, 152–153
personal 139, 179
religious 130, 177 judging processes 194–197, 204–206,
feeling types 158, 177, 180–181, 185, 220–221, 245–246, 251–252, 265–266,
195, 234, 247, 252 287, 310
FFM (Five-Factor Model) xi, 54, Jung 159, 165–171, 187, 189–191,
158–161, 163 194–195, 265–266, 315–323, 345
forgiveness v, 45, 72, 92, 98, 101–102, Jungian psychology 162, 339, 344
126–131, 133–40 Jungian types 164–179, 183–187,
dispositional 127–128, 134, 136 189–191, 199, 222–223, 258–259, 292,
measures of 131–132, 136 294, 344–345
forgiving 41, 129, 133, 135–136, 140
formation, moral 39–40, 44–45, 80, knowledge 1, 21–22, 29, 61–67, 79, 86,
82, 91 97, 99, 104–105, 151
Francis Psychological Type Scales
(FPTS) 192, 196–197, 212, 215, local ministry, ordained 237, 249–250
219–20, 249, 284, 309–310
Free Church ministers 216, 258 MBTI (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator)
Free Churches 161, 216, 255, 260 163–166, 168–172, 184, 209–211,
functions, psychological 137, 158, 168, 248–251, 263, 285–286, 305–306
325 meaning system, religious 35–36, 57
meaning-system analyses v, 25, 27, 29,
gender 132, 139, 145–146, 148–149, 33–34, 51, 53, 68–69
188–189, 249–250, 331 meaning-system approach 26, 29,
God Scale 141, 145–146, 149–150 31–32, 34, 51–52, 56–57, 62, 69
gratitude 60, 70–72, 76, 78, 92–94, 98, meaning-system models 25, 37, 43,
120–121, 123 52–53, 55, 57–58, 66–67, 79
psychology of 71–72, 121 mental process, dominant 316, 325,
331–332, 338
Ideological Narrative 29, 64–65, 67, 70, ministers 231–233, 242–243, 247–248,
77, 79, 108–109, 111–112 255, 264–265, 271–273, 279–283,
Ignatian spirituality 4, 6, 20, 23 285
imagining vi, 163, 264–265, 267, 269, female 255, 257, 260
271, 273, 275 male 259–260
incumbents 231, 247, 289, 299–300 ordained 230, 264
Index of Feeling Ministry Style 279 stipendiary 230, 237, 241, 245
Index of Intuitive Ministry Style 277 ministry 207–210, 230–233, 237–243,
individual differences 138, 163, 167–169, 245–250, 254–256, 268–270, 273–284,
234, 249–250, 261–262, 287, 348 301–302
inferior function 325, 327, 329, 345 non-stipendiary 248, 250, 290
intrinsic religiosity 34, 126–129, ministry roles 231, 241, 245–248,
132–134, 136 264–265
introversion 171–173, 196–198, ministry styles vi, 228, 262, 264–265,
204–205, 215–217, 243–244, 272–273, 271–273, 284, 305, 313
290–291, 293, 307–310 ministry team vi, 164, 306–307, 309–313
subject index 355
moral action 44, 48–49, 51–52, 58–61, Non-Stipendiary Ministers see NSMs
71, 82–83, 85, 92–95, 103–106 NSMs (Non-Stipendiary Ministers)
moral development 30, 49, 74, 80, 91, 230–231, 233, 237, 240–243, 245–248
105, 119, 122
moral direction 29, 63–65, 67, 70, 79, OLMs (Ordained Local Ministers)
81, 85, 103, 109, 114–115 230–231, 233, 237, 240–243, 245–247,
moral education 27, 72, 99, 105, 121–122 291
moral emotions 44, 48–50, 58–60, Ordained Local Ministers see OLMs
64–66, 68, 73–74, 81–82, 92–99 ordained ministry 230–233, 236, 246,
moral identity 44, 49, 65, 67–68, 77, 256, 264, 270, 283, 301
84–86, 109, 111–112, 114 orientations 158, 194, 196–197,
moral intuitionism, paradigm of 29, 204–206, 213, 251–253, 267–268,
46, 64, 69 307–308
moral intuitionist 27, 31–32, 42–47, theological 230, 239–242
70, 77, 83, 108, 112
moral intuitionist approach v, 26–27, participation, religious 165, 184
31–32, 51, 63, 81, 113, 117–118 pastoral ministry 269, 281, 348
moral intuitionist model x, 25, 43–44, Payne Index of Ministry Styles
79, 84, 88, 118 see PIMS
moral intuitions 44–6, 48–50, 60–61, Revised 163, 273, 280–282
64–66, 68, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 113 perceiving ministry style 269, 281–282,
moral judgment 27, 43, 46–48, 73, 300
81–83, 88, 93–95, 105, 108 perceiving processes 194, 196–197,
moral motivation 26–28, 42–44, 47–48, 204–205, 220–221, 251–254, 265–266,
50–51, 65, 69–71, 79–83, 114–115 310, 316
moral personality 64, 67, 69, 83–85, personality 52–58, 70–76, 118–124,
104–105, 109, 114–116, 118–119 137–139, 152–153, 161–164, 187–190,
domains of 63, 65, 68, 77, 85, 88, 261–262
90, 113 personality characteristics 249–250
moral psychology 29–32, 43–45, personality domains 55, 57, 84
58–59, 69, 73, 75–76, 79–81, 121–124 personality types 157–158, 168–169,
moral reasoning 30, 45–47, 49, 59–60, 186–187, 189, 191, 260–264, 313–314,
65–66, 83–85, 89, 103–107 345
moral sociability 29, 37–38, 40–43, PIMS (Payne Index of Ministry
63–70, 79–82, 85, 87–88, 90–91, 94, Styles) 228, 262, 264–265, 268–273,
96, 98–99, 114–116 284, 288, 305, 307
moral values 43, 49, 66, 68, 77, 84–85, population norms 176, 192, 235–236
93, 104–107 positive psychology 70, 73, 75, 118,
moral vices 64–5, 68, 77, 84–85, 88, 121, 124
100–103, 111, 114 Postformal Thought Scale 141,
morality 30–1, 41, 43–44, 47, 73–74, 145–146, 148–150
77–80, 87, 121–123 prayer 10–15, 17–18, 23–24, 57–58,
mortality salience 126, 128–130, 181–182, 261, 263, 279–280
132–139 praying 5, 14, 17, 181, 268, 288–289,
motivation 1–2, 9–11, 31–33, 40–44, 308
57, 62–71, 79–86 prosocial action 31, 44, 52, 55–57,
motives 36, 46, 92, 94, 214 59–60, 68, 88, 93–94
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator see MBTI prosocial behavior 55, 59, 70, 75–76,
91–92, 95, 99, 119–120
National Church Life Survey (NCLS) psychological profiles 188, 209–210,
218–219, 228 227–228, 230, 232, 245–247, 249, 284
Newfrontiers network of churches 188, psychological type preferences
193, 206, 210–211, 228–229, 284, 162–163, 210, 228–230, 236–239,
306–308, 312–314 241–242, 262–263, 283–285, 303–305
356 subject index
female 190, 210, 229, 263, 285, 305 Social Intuitionist Model see SIM
Roman Catholic 209, 227, 261, 283, solitude 194, 233, 267, 287, 295, 301,
304, 313 307
psychological type profile of Anglican spiritual getaway v, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13
clergy 210, 228, 249 spiritual journeys 4, 20, 24, 153
psychological type profiles of men and spiritual practices 42, 54, 56–57, 115, 347
women 251, 254 spiritual transformation 25–29, 31–34,
psychological type theory 192, 194, 41–43, 51–57, 61–65, 67–70, 77–84,
196, 213, 215, 251–254, 264–265, 112–118
286–290 meaning of 28, 75
models of 46, 57, 68–69, 77, 83, 91,
religion, psychology of 24–28, 30–35, 117
71–73, 75, 78, 112–113, 120–123, multi-process model 83
348–349 processes of 26, 29, 31, 39, 57, 77,
religiosity v, 23, 34, 36, 55, 63, 75, 100, 105
126–139 psychology of 27, 29, 31–32, 34, 45,
extrinsic 34, 127, 129, 136, 183 47, 108, 112–113
religiosity measures 132 spiritual transformation theory 31, 77,
religious belief system 54, 112 79, 97
religious communities 3, 35, 107, 113, spirituality ix–xii, 1–5, 9–13, 23–24,
162, 164, 333–334, 344 30, 75, 119–121, 142–143
religious conversion 28, 33, 54, 75, 83, dwelling-oriented 4
123 monastic 4, 6, 24
religious expression 161–162, 165, 238 practice-oriented 4, 20
religious groups 133–134, 157, 162, seeking-oriented 4
165–166, 171–172, 176–178, 180, St. Ignatius 1–2, 4–5, 7, 15, 21, 23
184–187 see also Ignatian spirituality
religious meaning-systems 26, 42, 55
religious orientations 127, 139, 165, temperaments 172–173, 190, 198–199,
171, 178, 183, 187, 190 201, 203, 222–223, 258–260, 292, 294
religious practices 2, 24, 34–36, 58, 80, terror management v, 73, 126–129,
107–108, 137, 181 131, 133, 135, 137–139
religious professionals 192–193, 196, terror management theory (TMT)
202, 205–206, 216, 219, 253 128–129, 135, 139, 349
religiousness ix–xii, 138 thinking types 158, 180–182, 185, 188,
retreat 1–2, 5–7, 9, 11–24 195, 209, 227, 234
retreatants 1–2, 5–6, 9, 11–17, 20, 22–23 TITE (Tilley Index of Training
role models, religious 135 Expectations) 286, 293, 301–302
TMT see terror management theory
sacred 34, 36–37, 42, 58 training incumbents vi, 164, 286,
sacred texts 11–16, 18–20, 57, 181 289–293, 294–298, 300, 302–304,
self-concepts 111, 123 349
self-control 74, 106–107, 121, 123 type distribution 198–200, 221, 257
self-definition 52–53, 67 type models, psychological 157,
selfishness 31, 35, 37, 55, 80 159–160, 233, 238
sensing types 158, 177, 179, 184, 194, type patterns 188, 190, 227–229,
233, 252, 266 249–250, 345
sermons 181, 275, 280–281, 288, 342 type preferences 210, 238–239, 281,
silence 10, 194, 233, 267, 288, 307–308 285, 291, 303
SIM (Social Intuitionist Model) 26–7, types 61–5, 162, 173–177, 182–183,
29, 31, 47–49, 77–78, 81, 86–97, 185–187, 237–242, 340–341, 344–345
105–106 discrete 194–195, 200
SMs (stipendiary ministers) 230, 237, typologies 166–167, 169, 171, 187, 215,
240–243, 245 345
subject index 357
value systems, absolute personal 324 women clergy 232, 247

values 53–55, 104–105, 109–111, work-related psychological health 189,
209–210, 227–229, 261–263, 283–285, 249, 313
304–305 worldview 73, 92, 128–129, 132, 138
interpersonal 208, 279 worship 182, 212, 224–225, 268–269,
psychological x, 152 271, 274, 279–280, 307
spiritual 181–182, 185
vocations, religious 264, 270 yoga 11–13, 15, 18–19
youth ministers 215, 253, 288
Wisdom Scale 144, 149–151 youth ministry 189, 210, 228, 262, 284,
women, ordination of 231, 254 305, 313
NAMES INDEX
Ardelt, M. 141, 144, 153 Emmons, R. A. 25–27, 31–32, 38, 44,

Argyle, M. 212, 227 71–72, 77–78, 92, 120–121
Armstrong, K. 26–27, 36–37, 55, 70 Erikson, E. 29, 38, 40–42, 71–72, 80
Arndt, J. 129, 135, 137, 139 Eysenck, H. 159–160, 163, 196, 209,
Astley, J. 238, 249, 283, 348 227, 249, 287, 304
Bargh, J. A. 47, 61, 70, 72, 105, 119–120 Fawcett, B. G. vi, 264, 347
Batson, C. D. 34, 44, 59–60, 70, 94, 98, Finkel, E. J. 44–45, 72, 102, 120
119, 136–137 Foresman, S. 122
Baumeister, R. F. 32, 58, 71, 102, Francis, L. J. 188–193, 209–213,
120–121, 124, 134, 138 215–220, 227–230, 249–254, 260–265,
Bayne, R. 159–160, 163, 234, 248 283–288, 304–310
Beebe, J. 162, 167–169, 187, 315–316, Franz, Von M. L. 189, 327, 329, 345
321–328, 330–332, 335–336, 342–345 Fredrickson, B. 44, 57, 72, 78, 93–95,
Bellamy, J. 218, 228–229 98, 121
Benovenli, L. J. v, 141, 347 Fuller, E. v, 141, 347
Berens, L. V. 331–332, 334, 336–337, Furnham, A. 160, 163
342
Berkowitz, M. W. 84, 119 Girard, R. 72, 121
Berry, J. W. 28, 125, 127, 137 Graham, J. 34–35, 67, 72–73, 79–80,
Bjorklund, F. 48–49, 73, 79, 91, 94, 87, 89–91, 108–110, 112–113, 121
97, 121 Greenberg, J. 128–129, 131, 137–139
Blasi, A. 43–44, 58–59, 64, 71, 82, 89, Griffin, J. 141, 143, 145, 153
99, 119
Blizzard, S. W. 265, 270, 283 Haas, L. 316, 319–320, 322–324, 332,
Boyatzis, C. J. 351 345
Bramer, P. 172–173, 183, 187, 335, Haidt, J. 26–31, 42–50, 72–73, 77–82,
338, 340–341, 343, 345 85–101, 121–122
Briggs, K. 158, 165–166, 169–170, 315, Hill, P. C. 25, 28, 32–33, 37, 52, 55,
317–323 73, 80
Browning, D. S. 40–41, 43, 67, 71, 82, Hook, T. 1
87, 110, 119 Horsfall, T. 177, 188, 193, 209, 215,
Burgess, N. 289, 304 227, 253, 261
Burris, C. T. 183–184, 187 Hughes, B. 218, 228–229
Burton, L. vi, 251, 347 Huniker, M. 316, 319–320, 322–324, 345
Butler, A 175, 177, 188, 193, 217, 227,
252–253, 261 Jackson, L. 178–179, 181–182, 191
James, W. 167, 171, 182, 189
Cartwright, K. D. 142–143, 153 Jamison, C. 3–5, 23
Castle, K. 177, 189, 218, 228–229, 246, Johnson, L. 348
249, 308, 313 Jonas, E. 73, 129, 136, 138
Craig, C. L. 177, 188–191, 209–210, Jones, S. H. 162–164, 177–178,
215–217, 227–229, 252–254, 260–263, 183–184, 188–189, 227–228, 252–253,
304–307 261–262, 305
Joseph, C. 27–29, 48, 67, 81–82, 89–91,
Damasio, A. 59, 71, 93, 95, 118, 120 97–98, 108–110, 121–122
Duncan, B. 188, 193, 209–210, 215–217, Jung, C. 165–171, 187, 189–191,
227–228, 235–236, 244–245, 249 194–195, 265–266, 315–323, 327, 345
names index 359
Kaldor, P. 177, 189, 218, 228–229, 246, Quenk, N. L. 164, 211, 256, 263, 327,
249, 308, 313 336, 345
Kaplan, R. 2, 24
Kay, W. 177, 190, 205–206, 210, 229, Robbins, M. 161–164, 177, 188–189,
263, 285, 305 193, 209–211, 215–219, 227–229,
Kendall, E. 190, 218, 225, 229, 235, 261–262
246, 250, 253 Ross, C. J. 164–165, 172–173, 177–179,
Kesebir, J. 30, 34, 44, 46, 55, 66, 80, 89 181–183, 187–191, 215–216, 227–229,
Knopf, A. A. 27, 70 332–335
Kohlberg, L. 43–44, 58, 74, 81, 98, Rusbult, C. E. 44–45, 72
105–106, 122 Ryland, A. N. vi, 306, 348
Krause, N. 349
Schimel, J. 136–137, 139
Lamdin, K. 349 Shaver, R. 74, 91, 123
Lapsley, D. K. 47, 58, 74–75, 122–123 Shweder, R. A. 29, 31, 118
Lloyd, J. 159–160, 164, 234, 250, 351 Siegel, D. J. 39–40, 61, 76, 100–101,
Loomis, M. 169–171, 190–191, 318, 345 113, 115–116, 124
Simon, L. 128, 131, 138–139
MacDaid, G. P. 172, 174, 190 Sinnott, J. v, x, 141, 348
MacIntyre, A. 27–8, 32, 40, 68, 74, Smith, W. L. v, 1, 349
116, 122 Sneck, W. J. 351
McAdams, D. P. 41, 53, 64, 71, Solomon, S. 128, 131, 138–139
109–110, 112, 114, 122
McCullough, M. E. 35, 44, 68, 71–74, Tangney, J. P. 59, 76, 93, 98, 101,
102–103, 120–121, 123, 139 124–125
McNamara, P. 71, 120 Thomson, L. 290, 318–319, 321, 323,
Mikulincer, M. 91, 123 332, 335–336, 345
Myers, C. 170 Thoresen, C. E. 139, 190
Myers, I. 164, 171–172, 190, 210–211, Thornes, S. 163, 248
225–226, 229, 250, 345 Tilley, D. R. vi, 286, 349
Nardi, D. 333, 335, 338–341, 343 Vickers, J. A. 256, 263

Narvaez, D. 47, 59, 71, 74–76, 119, Village, A. 161, 164, 175, 177, 241,
122–124 250, 252–253, 262–263
Nash, P. 177, 189, 193, 206, 210, 215, Volf, M. 1–2, 23–24
228, 253
Nash, S. 177, 189, 193, 206, 210, 215, Walker, D. 27, 72, 121, 351
228, 253 Walker, L. J. 26–27, 31, 43–44, 72,
82–84, 113, 121
Ouellette, P. 2, 4, 21, 23–24 Waterman, S. J. v, 141, 349
Weiss, D. 178–179, 181–182, 191
Paloutzian, R. F. 24–29, 31, 52–56, Westen, D. 39–41, 46, 49–50, 61–62,
71–72, 75, 77–78, 120–121, 123 76, 101–102, 104, 125
Pargament, K. I. 24, 27–28, 35, 52, 73, Whinney, M. 193, 209–210, 216,
75, 123, 138–139 227–228, 236, 244, 249, 260–261
Park, C. L. 24, 28, 33–34, 51, 71, 75, Wilkins, T. xiii, xv
120–121, 123 Wilson, K. M. v, 126, 349
Payne, V. J. 189, 228, 262, 265, Woodman, S. 255–256, 263
270–272, 284, 288, 305 Worthington, E. L. 28, 74, 98, 125,
Pennebaker, J. W. 103, 123–124 127, 136–137, 139–140, 351
Piedmont, R. L. xiv–xvi, 351 Wulff, K. vi, 192, 349
Powell, R. 218, 228–229 Wuthnow, R. 3–4, 20, 24
Price, L. 165, 315, 348
Pyszczynski, T. 128, 131, 137–139

PIEDMONT & VILLAGE Eds (2001) Research in The SOcial Scientific Study of Religion

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Research in the Social Scientific Study

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/rssr.

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Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

A Spiritual Getaway: The Motivations, Experiences, and

Beyond Meaning: Spiritual Transformation in the Paradigm

A Good Man Is Hard to Find: Forgiveness, Terror

Three Applications of the Theory of Postformal Thought:

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

Introduction to Special Section: Psychological Type and

Jungian Typology and Religion: A Perspective from

Psychological Type Profile of Clergywomen and Clergymen

Gifts Differing? Psychological Type among Stipendiary and

Psychological Type Preferences of Male and Female Free

Imagining Themselves as Ministers: How Religiously

Apprentice Clergy? The Relationship Between Expectations in

Do Introverts Appreciate the Same Things as Extraverts

The Role of Archetypes and Jungian Personality Typology in

Authors’ Biographies ......................................................................... 347

The study of religion and spirituality continues to move forward at

An interesting set of papers is presented by Dr. Leffel. His work rep-

does show the value of applying cognitive models to understanding

spiritual/religious functioning. Most importantly, though, is that this

Sales department (www.brill.nl or e-mail brill@turpin-distribution.

Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Co-Editor

For future volumes we welcome the submission of manuscripts report-

Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Editor

Questions about suitability can be directed to Dr. Piedmont or Ms.

accepted (usually along with constructive suggestions for revision) or

William L. Smith* and Pidi Zhang

Sociologists of religion lack a well-developed framework for studying

* Author Note: William L. Smith, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22

A spiritual marketplace has developed in the decades following World

Dwelling, Seeking, and Practice-Oriented Spiritualities

Ignatian Spirituality and the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius

Columbus. Some retreats are designated specifically for women, men,

Measures and Procedure

Table 1. Retreatant Demographics

Has something dramatic and important happened to your spiritual life

Motivations for the Retreat

Table 2. Factor Loadings of Motivations

Table 3. Multiple Regression Models of Motivation Factors a

acceptable. Yoga, Tai Chi, or similar practices tended to stand out by

Retreat Experiences and Their Impact

Table 4. Multiple Regression Models of Helpfulness a and Satisfactionb at the

White –.08 (–.05) –.06 (–.03) –.11 (–.08)* .01 (.01)

him more clearly (b = .10, β = .12, t = 2.91, p < .01). It is interesting

Comfortable, Attentive, Positive, Patient, Relaxed, and Competent

Table 5. Logistic Regression Coefficients of Retreat Effect a

Findings about Renewed, Closer to God, and Uncertain provided

This study contributes to the scholarly literature primarily by examin-

Personal retreat activities also influenced how satisfied retreatants

A limitation of the present study was that retreatants were asked to

Introduction: Catalyzing a New Science

Within the psychology of religion, the study of spiritual transfor-

* Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22

meaning (e.g., purpose, personal identity, life narrative, beliefs, val-

and recently expanded to incorporate contemporary virtue theory

Keywords: Spiritual transformation, multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm, meaning-

* Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene