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IMPACT ON PAKISTAN
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on Pakistan's diplomatic, economic, and security dynamics is essential to understanding potential
shifts in alliances, trade relations, and security arrangements.
1.2 Objectives of the Study:
The following are the goals this study seeks to accomplish:
Provide an in-depth analysis of the historical context of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations,
highlighting factors fueling their rivalry over the years.
Examine recent signs of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, including
diplomatic-engagements, economic collaborations, and regional cooperation.
Assess the potential impact of the Iran-Saudi rapprochement on Pakistan, considering
various dimensions such as security, trade, energy, and religious influences.
1. How have historical factors and events shaped the rivalry between Iran and Saudi
Arabia?
2. What are the underlying motivations for these diplomatic overtures, economic
collaborations, and regional cooperation efforts?
3. How might the potential rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia impact Pakistan
in terms of security considerations, trade relations, energy cooperation, and religious
influences .
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This revised version aims to retain the original meaning while avoiding plagiarism. Always ensure
to properly cite and reference your sources when presenting information obtained from external
works.
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Chapter 2:
Historical Background:
Iran and Saudi Arabia have a long and complex history that covers several centuries and has been
influenced by a wide range of geographical, political, and religious factors. Competition between
Sunni and Shia groups gave rise to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Saudi Arabia
has Mecca and Medina, Iran has the largest Shia majority in the world. Most people who live there
are Sunnis. This theological divide has greatly influenced their historical interactions.
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goals. Iran’s determination to keep an ally with a Shiite majority in the area is the fundamental
reason for its unwavering support for the Assad government. By accomplishing this, Iran
strengthens a corridor of Shiite dominance by securing an important geopolitical foothold and
extending its influence along an arc from Tehran to Beirut. Iran’s larger regional agenda revolves
around this strategic alignment, which supports its goal of dominating the Middle East.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia sees the Syrian war as a chance to reduce Iranian influence.
Aiming to reduce Iran’s influence in the area, Riyadh has aggressively backed a number of Sunni
rebel groups, including those that want Bashar al-Assad to be overthrown. The competition is
heightened by the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict, as Saudi Arabia supports Sunni interests
in opposition to the Shiite-led Assad regime. In addition to making the humanitarian situation in
Syria worse, this sectarian division widens the rift between the two regional powerful rivals.The
success of Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s proxy wars is also being tested in the Syrian conflict. Iran’s
commitment to upholding the Assad government is demonstrated by the country’s deployment of
Shiite militias like Hezbollah .
Thus, the struggle for influence in Syria shows up not just in the form of military backing but also
in the capacity to influence the political environment that emerges after battle. Moreover, Iran has
been able to take advantage of its relationship with Russia, another significant regional player, as a
result to the Syrian conflict. Iran’s strategic depth has increased due to Moscow and Tehran’s tight
coordination in supporting the Assad regime, which has an impact on the balance of power in the
region. In addition to strengthening Iran’s geopolitical position, this partnership calls into question
the conventional roles of outside parties in the Middle East and helps to reshape alliances.
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politicising the situation and using it to weaken their regional power, while Iranian media depicted
Saudi Arabia as careless and unqualified to oversee the Hajj.
The stampede event damaged mutual trust between the two nations, making it much more
challenging for them to have fruitful conversations and settle outstanding issues. Because some
saw the incident as an attack on Shia pilgrims, it also heightened sectarian tensions between Sunnis
and Shias. This deepened the divide between Saudi Arabia, a country with a majority of Sunnis,
and Iran, a country with a majority of Shia citizens.
Concerned about pilgrims’ safety, the international community scrutinised Saudi Arabia’s Hajj
operations more closely. This increased pressure on Saudi Arabia to upgrade its infrastructure and
safety protocols. As a unifying event for all Muslims, the Hajj’s future as a result of this occurrence
is a cause for concern. It also weakened Muslim solidarity. The stampede in Mecca in 2015
contributed significantly to the escalation of hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It acted as a
sobering reminder of both the perils of politicising religious events and the brittleness of regional
security. Even if the tragedy cannot be held entirely responsible for the rivalry's continuation, it is
unquestionably still a major source of discontent and a representation of the two states’ long-
standing differences.
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blockade as an attempt to curb dissent, while Saudi Arabia depicts Qatar as an Iranian puppet. Both
sides used the situation to pursue their own interests.
A scary moment occurred in 2017 when Riyadh managed to intercept a ballistic missile that was
passing over the airport. Iran is said by Saudi Arabia to have supplied the missile to the Houthi
rebels in Yemen. Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince, told Boris Johnson of the UK that
Iran’s actions appeared to be an open declaration of war on the country.
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tensions and widened the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran accused the US and its regional
allies, Saudi Arabia included, of carrying out the strike, viewing it as a direct insult. Iran was even
more determined to fortify its regional relationships and fend off perceived foreign threats as a
result of this incident. Conversely, Saudi Arabia cautiously navigated the aftermath, expressing
concerns about escalating tensions but also emphasizing its commitment to regional stability .The
killing of Soleimani thus contributed to the intensification of the Iran-Saudi rivalry, adding another
layer of complexity to the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East.
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Chapter 3:
Khamenei’s regime aims to use the China-brokered deal not to promote peace but to disrupt it.
Their focus is on undermining the U.S.-negotiated Abraham Accords. The IRGC is actively
working to stop more Arab states from normalizing ties with Israel, which they see as a “cancerous
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tumor” that needs to be eradicated.The Iranian regime thinks the China-brokered deal achieves two
things: it slows down more Arab countries from joining the Abraham Accords and weakens the
influence of the United States in the Middle East.
The IRGC has set up secretive financial routes globally, including in South America, to evade U.S.
and European oil sanctions. Recent reports reveal their involvement in smuggling gold to and from
Venezuela. The resurgence of anti-U.S. sentiments in South America allows Khamenei’s regime to
expand its network beyond Venezuela. Despite the positive appearance of the China-brokered Iran-
Saudi deal, a closer look suggests that Khamenei and the IRGC are using it to harm the West,
Arab-Israeli peace efforts, and the U.S.-led international order. Their actions emphasize that a U.S.
withdrawal from the Middle East would create a vacuum, empowering anti-Western forces.
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serving several Middle Eastern countries. Stability in the region matters to China, as over 40% of
its energy comes from there.
Chapter 4:
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In the present circumstances, Pakistan is at risk of disturbances in the Strait, which may arise from
political unrest, marine security concerns, or conflicts within the region. The stability of this vital
sea route may be enhanced by a close connection between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan’s energy
supply may move through the region more safely if there is less hostility and cooperation.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s economic progress is better served by a stable Strait of Hormuz.
Continuous energy supplies promote the expansion of industry, lessen reliance on expensive
alternatives, and enhance the general stability of the national grid. Furthermore, a safe path for
energy supplies boosts investor confidence and draws in foreign capital that is essential for
economic development.
For Pakistan, energy security essentially means limiting the risks to development and the economy
that come with any disruptions, in addition to ensuring the safe passage of LNG and oil over the
Strait of Hormuz. With the possibility of better ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has a
rare chance to strengthen its energy security, promoting stability, economic expansion, and long-
term sustainability.
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Humanitarian issues and refugee crises are frequently caused by unstable environments. In the past,
Pakistan has struggled with the effects of unrest in the region, taking in and sheltering Afghan
refugees. A more stable and controlled environment for Pakistan would result from some of these
stresses being relieved in the wider region of the Middle East.
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the Middle East, is at a crossroads where opportunity and challenge abound. Pakistan faces plenty
of economic prospects as the possibility of better relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia grows.
This involves expanding trade alliances, working together on energy initiatives, building
infrastructure together, and improving regional connectivity. The economic implications, therefore,
transcend mere monetary gains; they hold the potential to shape the trajectory of Pakistan’s
economic development and resilience.
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Pakistan and its neighbours are laying the groundwork for a more connected and brighter future in
which infrastructure will be the foundation of a thriving economy and energy will flow freely.
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4.4(a) Sectarian Dynamics and Religious Harmony:
Pakistan may be affected differently in terms of religious impact by the possible reconciliation
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has long struggled with sectarian conflicts due to its
heterogeneous religious landscape. An improvement in relations between the two major Shia and
Sunni powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, might have a favourable effect on religious peace and foster
a more tolerant environment in Pakistan.
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