Edward Levi -

Levi sets out to argue that the true mechanism of legal reasoning is not what the
pretense of legal reasoning would lead one to believe.
The pretense is that law is a system of known rules applied by a judge

on society.
The true mechanism of legal reasoning allows for differences of view and
ambiguities of words and provides for methods of resolving these in ways that
include participation of the community (through litigation).

So what is the mechanism of legal reasoning?

The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.
You begin by identifying a controlling case; the one that sets precedent to
be applied in the current case. This is done by noting similarities between
the facts of the first and the facts of the second; i.e., noting a relevant
analogy.
You then derive a rule of law inherent in the first case.
This rule is finally applied to the second case.
An example: In Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., a steamboat passenger
sued the owner after the theft of valuables from the rented cabin; neither
passenger nor owner had been negligent. The passenger claimed the owner
nonetheless was strictly responsible, regardless of any failure or compliance with
care, in light of prior case ruling that innkeepers were strictly liable for the theft of
boarders' valuables. The owner argued against strict liability and pointed to
precedents rejecting liability claims by passengers on open-berth sleeping trains.
For purposes of liability for theft from a passenger, should the steamboat owner
be viewed as more like the innkeeper or more like the train owner?
The court reasoned that "A steamer carrying passengers upon the water, and
furnishing them with rooms and entertainment, is, for all practical purposes, a
floating inn, and hence the duties which the proprietors owe to the passengers in
their charge ought to be the same."(13) The court noted that both innkeepers and
steamboat operators are entrusted with high levels of confidence in the face of
temptations by many to endanger guests. Given this parallel relationship to
guests, innkeepers and steamboat operators should bear the same kinds of
duties to guests.(14)
Another example: Is the income-enhancement value of a professional degree
the kind of property interest covered by a statutory rule of equal division of the
partners' property upon divorce?
The New York Supreme Court answered affirmatively in O'Brien v. O'Brien, after
analogizing the license to practice medicine to unmatured pension rights. Both
represent expected streams of earnings; both would have contributed to the
economic partnership of an ongoing marriage; both, reasoned the court, should
be part of the economic pool available to both spouses if the marriage ends.

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