DAVID TAYLOR v MANILA ELECTRIC

G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1970

Action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries

FACTS:
Defendant: a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway
and an electric light system in Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a
small island in the Pasig River (Isla del Provisor). It may be reached by boat or by
crossing a footbridge.

Plaintiff: 15 years of age, son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age since two years prior to the accident, he has spent four months
at sea as a cabin boy and late he learned mechanical engineering and drawing, and has
a considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. (A month after the accident, he
obtained employment as mechanical draftsman)

On September 30, 1905, Taylor with a boy named Manuel Claparols who is also a
minor, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
someone named Murphy who is an employee of Manila Electric. Murphy, however, was
not there. Since the kids are curious, they decided to wander around the company’s
premises. They walked across the open space in the neighborhood where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There, they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.

Caps: approximately the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite
and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.

The boys picked up as much as they could and brought the caps home. So, while on
their way home, they met a little girl named Jessie, who is then 9 years old then they
went to the home of Manuel. There, they made a series of experiments with the caps.

1st: they trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket – NO RESULT
2nd: they tried to break the cap with a stone – FAILED
3rd: Opened the caps with a knife – they found that it was filled with a yellowish
substance.

After that, they got matches and Taylor held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents causing it to explode. The explosion caused injuries to the three
kids.

Jessie – slight cut in the neck

 Manuel – burned and wounded hands
Taylor – struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule which injured
his right eye to such an extent that it needs to be removed by the surgeons.

Taylor filed a case against Manila Electric alleging that it is liable for
damages for negligently leaving the caps exposed to children

TRIAL COURT: Manila Electric is liable

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and

illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.

ISSUE:
Whether Manila Electric should be held liable
RULING:
No.

The SC mentioned the elements of quasi-delict:

1. Damages to the plaintiff;
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty; and
3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.

It is clear with the facts of the case that the accident could not have happened if the
fulminating caps had not been left exposed at the point where found or if the owner
had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. However, it is also
clear that the plaintiff would not have been injured had he not decided to enter the
company’s premises for his own pleasure and convenience. He even roamed around the
premises without permission of the defendant, and he also would not have been injured
if he had not deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a lighted match to it.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts
of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and
the cases based thereon.

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried
away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a
dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in
playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer
injury in playing with such machine.

The Court laid down several American jurisprudence which decides on the liability of
railroad companies for injuries received by infants/minor, who from mere curiosity or
amusement, enters upon the company’s premises, and was injured by reason of
something which was attributable to the negligence of the company.

Doctrine of implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for
children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his
premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or
obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from
entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to
roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least
equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or
unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if
the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of
a stranger without his express invitation or permission.

While the plaintiff’s unauthorized entry to the company’s premises do not relieve the
defendant from responsibility for the injuries incurred by the plaintiff, the Court held
that the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was
not the proximate cause of the injury. It is the plaintiff’s action of opening the caps with
a knife and putting a lighted match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and his injury. Therefore, Manila Electric is not civilly liable for the injuries he
incurred.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been
to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves
no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the
explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the
little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor
can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion
might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet
he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going
far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else
should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.