Academic Writing - Writing 3

Activity 1 Handout
Critically analyse the significance of ethnocentrism or cultural bias in the performance of
the Western intelligence community prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Outline

This essay will critically analyse the significance of ethnocentrism in the intelligence
failure identified in the 20 December, 1973 CIA report. First, it will examine the
various preconceptions held by the intelligence community; then it will examine
other contributing factors which cannot be explained by cultural bias; and finally, it
will discuss how these contributed to the ability of Egyptian and Syrian military
forces to achieve surprise on 6 October, 1973.

Thesis

It will be argued that, while there is evidence of ethnocentrism or cultural bias

existing and perhaps playing a role in the performance of the intelligence
community, it is only one of many biases and other contributing factors which
potentially influenced analytical assessments and should not be overstated. As
such, the recommendations in the report correctly emphasise the importance of
reviewing and adapting analytic systems and organisational structure to mitigate
the effects of biases generally.

A body paragraph
1
There are various contributing factors identified in intelligence reports which need
to be taken into account when considering the significance of ethnocentrism in the
intelligence failure prior to the 6 October, 1973. 2Some of these relate to
assessments of Israeli military preparedness and Arab military performance on 6
October and the days immediately following. 3For example, according to the
September 1975 CIA intelligence report, Israeli defences on the east bank of the
Suez Canal were intended only to delay an Egyptian offensive while reserves
deployed to a main line of defence 10 to 20 kilometres further east, which the
Egyptian forces never reached. 4Furthermore, while Syrian forces made territorial
gains somewhat further into the Golan Heights and inflicted heavy losses on the
Israeli air force, the advance was unsustainable. 5It was effectively stopped within
24 hours and defeated within 72 hours (Agranat Commission of Inquiry 1974). 6By
10 October, the Syrian forces had been pushed back to the 1967 cease-fire line,
with Israeli forces redeploying to the Sinai soon after and preparing for a canal
crossing into Egypt on 15 October (Rezk 2017). 7As such, pre-war assessments of
relative Israeli military capability, despite greater than expected losses in the first
days, were fundamentally sound and clearly not entirely based on an exaggerated
sense of superiority. 8An understanding of Israeli defence strategy in the Sinai also
serves to provide some perspective on reports of initial Egyptian military
successes and Israeli unpreparedness. 9This raises the question about the extent
to which preconceptions about Arab capabilities resulted in the failure of the
intelligence community to provide earlier warning of the attack.