The Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure After Fifty Years What Lessons Can Be Learned

Intelligence and National Security
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The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty

years: what lessons can be learned?
Itai Shapira
To cite this article: Itai Shapira (2023) The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years:
what lessons can be learned?, Intelligence and National Security, 38:6, 978-1002, DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2023.2235795
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2235795
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INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
2023, VOL. 38, NO. 6, 978–1002
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2235795
ARTICLE
The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years: what lessons
can be learned?
Itai Shapira
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Extensive research has been published about the failure of Israeli intelli Received 27 May 2023
gence in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, mainly in the context of flawed Accepted 6 July 2023
analysis and strategic surprise. Fifty years after the war, the current article KEYWORDS
uses an intelligence studies lens to describe major lessons which can be Intelligence Failure;
learned from this failure of early warning. Such lessons include the Intelligence Methodology;
required focus of strategic intelligence on identifying change rather Early Warning; Israel;
than continuity, the need for explicit analytical methodology beyond Strategic Surprise; Lessons
inductive reasoning, the importance of integrating assessment of adver
sary intentions and capabilities, the risk of over-reliance on raw informa
tion, and the need for a culture encouraging contrarian thinking.
Introduction1
On October 6, 1973, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar known as ‘Yom Kippur’ (the day of
atonement), Egypt and Syria initiated a surprise military attack against Israel. Israel was not only
caught by surprise but faced what some of its leaders perceived as an existential threat.2 More than
2,600 Israeli soldiers and officers were killed, and thousands were injured. In this war, Israel suffered
the consequences of the hubris created by its swift military victory over Egypt and Syria just six years
earlier, in the Six Days War.3
Although the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) gained a military victory after 19 days of fighting, with
Israel receiving substantial assistance from the US,4 the Yom Kippur War is considered a trauma for
the Israeli national security establishment and society.5 In the years leading to the war, the IDF relied
on early warning from a military attack by Egypt and Syria, provided by its intelligence system.
However, in the absence of such early warning during Yom Kippur, the IDF did not mobilize its
reserve forces in time to adequately defend from the Arab attack, and the Israeli leadership was
caught in a mindset of surprise.6 The common perception, therefore, is that flawed intelligence and
specifically flawed analysis was the main reason for the war catastrophe.
After the war, the Israeli government formed a state commission of inquiry, the Agranat
Commission.7 Many of this commission’s observations, published in 1974, related to intelligence
matters, and especially to the flawed analysis conducted by Israeli military intelligence (referred to
hereafter as IDI, Israeli Defense Intelligence, AMAN in Hebrew).8 Moreover, most of its recommenda
tions to oust individuals from their assignments referred to intelligence officers, such as the IDI
director Eli Ze’ira, the head of IDI’s Research and Analysis Department (which later became a division,
referred to hereafter as RAD) Arieh Shalev, and the head of IDI RAD’s Egyptian Branch, Yona
Bendmann.
Israel’s ‘watchman’, as Bar-Joseph has referred to Israeli intelligence services and specifically to the
IDI, ‘fell asleep’ during Yom Kippur.9 Moreover, the IDI did not only fail to provide early warning. As
CONTACT Itai Shapira itaishap@gmail.com

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INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 979
Gelber has claimed, it also failed to recognize the deterioration of Israel’s deterrence, i.e., the
Egyptian and Syrian willingness to initiate another war after their loss to Israel in 1967.10
Yom Kippur is considered one of the seminal intelligence failures in modern history and is accord
ingly one of the most heavily researched topics in intelligence studies.11 It was first studied through the
framework of strategic surprise, emanating from a flawed analysis and failure to identify denial and
deception – such as in Operation Barbarossa (1941), Pearl Harbor (1941), and the Cuban Missile Crisis
(1962).12 This research focuses on the IDI’s adherence to an intelligence assessment, also known as the
‘conception’, assigning low probability to war during Yom Kippur. The ‘conception’ was effectively a
fixated paradigm which caused the IDI to ignore information showing that a surprise attack was
emanating,13 and to overlook the Egyptian denial and deception.14
Declassification of archival material allowed deeper study of the reasons for the intelligence
failure.15 This is best illustrated through the extensive research of Bar-Joseph, the leading scholar of
Yom Kippur, who relied on primary sources, focusing his research on personality and psychological
traits of the Israeli leadership and of the IDI leadership.16
Although new works about Yom Kippur continue to be published,17 a comprehensive study of the
lessons that can be learned from this war is still absent.18 The current article addresses this gap,
applying intelligence studies frameworks to study extant research and findings. Although five
decades have passed since the Yom Kippur War, some of the lessons described in this article are
still relevant for intelligence scholarship and practice. However, studying the way in which lessons
were effectively implemented in the Israeli intelligence system is beyond the article’s scope.
The article adds a current and scholarly perspective to the extensive study of Yom Kippur and
Israeli intelligence. Furthermore, by discussing the specific case of Israeli intelligence in the Yom
Kippur War, it can contribute to broader debates about lessons which can be learned from intelli
gence failures.
The article opens with an overview of the literature about Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur
War. It then provides brief background on the Agranat Commission report, which set the foundation
for the initial process of lesson learning from Yom Kippur. The core of the article then uses
intelligence studies frameworks to analyze failures of Israeli intelligence as described in the extant
literature and the lessons drawn. The article concludes by reviewing these lessons and suggesting
avenues for further research.
The Yom Kippur war: the literature

Reflection on Israeli intelligence performance in the Yom Kippur War is extensive and broad. It is to
be found in scholarly work,19 professional studies (many of them published only in Hebrew),20
professional conferences,21 public conferences,22 popular culture platforms,23 and public statements
of acting and former Israeli practitioners.24 Most work focuses on the national and strategic levels,
with only few studies discussing tactical-level intelligence.25 Furthermore, although most work
discusses failures prior to the war, some has also studied intelligence successes during the war.26
The empirical evidence underpinning research into the Yom Kippur War includes both primary
and secondary sources.27 The former category comprises original IDI analytical documents and
managerial correspondence, transcripts of IDF and Israeli government meetings where IDI and
Mossad personnel provided their professional views and recommendations.28 Many of these docu
ments were published by the Agranat Commission in 1974.29 Moreover, many testimonies before the
commission have become publicly available.30 The latter category comprises memoirs of and inter
views with acting intelligence officers during the war.31 It also comprises memoirs written by senior
Egyptian and Syrian individuals.32
Most research into lessons learned from Yom Kippur relates to the failure of strategic early
warning and therefore to ways of avoiding of strategic surprise.33 For instance: Israeli former
practitioners, some of them serving in key positions in the IDI during Yom Kippur, have discussed
ways to consider diverse adversary courses of action (COAs) while not remaining fixated on an
980 I. SHAPIRA
analytical paradigm, to improve the interaction between intelligence and decision-making, and to
nurture a culture of contrarian thinking and doubt.34
Bar-Joseph studied lessons regarding the interaction between intelligence and decision-making
and the management of the intelligence community.35 In some of his other studies, such as with
McDermott, Bar-Joseph describes traits required of intelligence professionals and especially analysts
based on Yom Kippur lessons.36 He also focuses on the issue of early warning.
Brun, however, claimed that the focus on early warning prevented Israeli intelligence from
learning other lessons. Such fields, according to Brun, include targeting intelligence, intelligence
for force design, and operational-level intelligence.37 Such topics are beyond the scope of the
current article.
The Agranat Commission report38

The Agranat Commission provided several conclusions regarding matters of intelligence. These
became the cornerstone of Israeli intelligence in the post-Yom Kippur era.39 First, the Commission
recommended ending the monopoly of the IDI in national intelligence assessments. Specifically, it
recommended strengthening the analytical capacities of the Mossad,40 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the regional commands in the IDF. This line of recommendations was later to be framed
as ‘pluralism’. Second, it recommended establishing a mechanism and nurturing a culture focused on
critical thinking, thus avoiding unitary assessments and groupthink inside the IDI. Third, it recom
mended establishing the role of an intelligence advisor to the prime minister, as a mediator between
the prime minister and intelligence agency directors.
The Agranat Commission’s conclusions have created substantial and enduring influence over the
Israeli intelligence system.41 The IDI, for instance, has conducted many professional conferences
about Yom Kippur over the years.42 IDI directors or heads of IDI’s RAD, when providing public
interviews, constantly refer to Yom Kippur and the way it has shaped their practice.43 Moreover, the
Agranat Commission’s conclusions, alongside those of other commissions of inquiry, have influenced
the Israeli idea of intelligence professionalism.44
Yom Kippur was also experienced by the Israeli intelligence system as a paralyzing trauma. An
acting IDF officer, for instance, wrote in 2005 that ‘the age of Agranat is over’, claiming that Yom
Kippur had constrained Israeli intelligence from adapting to new challenges along the years and that
the IDI has become fixated on early warning for war.45 Amos Yadlin, a former IDI director, claimed in
2013 that the trauma of Yom Kippur caused Israeli intelligence to be over-focused on early warning
for war for several decades, thus neglecting the realm of operational intelligence for warfare; that IDI
adopted a conservative and minimalist analytical approach, focusing on analyzing capabilities in fear
of once again erring in assessing intentions; and that IDI analysts have become hesitant and over-
cautions in their conclusions.46
What lessons can be learned from the Yom Kippur intelligence failure?
The fixated ‘conception’: the foundational cause of failure
Prior to Yom Kippur, the IDI leadership acted and thought in a dogmatic way, based on an analytical
paradigm formulated over several years. This paradigm was later known as ‘the conception’ and
proved in hindsight to be flawed, although it relied on high-quality and reliable information.47 In the
years leading to Yom Kippur, it was allegedly proven correct several times, thus increasing the Israeli
leadership’s confidence in its validity.48
According to this paradigm, Egypt was planning a grand campaign against Israel, intended for
substantial territorial gains in Sinai, a territory conquered by Israel in the Six Days War in 1967.49
Egypt assessed its own capability to conduct this offensive as limited, since it lacked the means to
mitigate the superiority of the Israeli Air Force and to strike targets deep inside Israel. The IDI
accordingly assessed that until Egypt was able to alter this balance of power, through advanced
strike airplanes or operational surface-to-surface missiles acquired from the Soviet Bloc, it would not
initiate a war.50 Furthermore, the IDI assessed that Syria would not go to war without Egypt.51
The adherence to this paradigm prevented the IDI from acknowledging an abundance of new
information which reflected Syrian and Egyptian preparations for war. Moreover, as will be discussed
in the next section, this information effectively reflected a new Egyptian strategy, unnoticed by Israeli
intelligence.52 It included: a reliable report provided by a Mossad elite spy codenamed ‘the Angel’,
later revealed as Ashraf Marwan, who met with the Mossad director in London the night before war
broke out53; warning of an Egyptian and Syrian planned attack provided by King Hussein of Jordan,
who met with Israeli prime minister Golda Me’ir several weeks before Yom Kippur in a meeting
orchestrated by Mossad54; high-quality IDI SIGINT (signals intelligence) which pointed at a with
drawal of Soviet advisors and their families from Syria and a removal of Soviet military assets from
Egypt, and even at a Soviet assessment regarding a possible Egyptian and Syrian attack; field
observations and VISINT (visual intelligence) illustrating the emergency deployment of Syrian and
Egyptian militaries along the borders with Israel; diverse information showing that Egyptian soldiers
had been allowed to break the fast during Ramadan; as well as many other potential indications and
warnings.55
All of this information, as an original RAD document from the days prior to Yom Kippur shows,
was collected and even brought to the attention of decision-makers yet dismissed as evidence of
Arab preparations for war.56 Moreover, another original RAD document shows that this paradigm
was embraced by the IDI leadership just several hours before war broke out, by which time the Israeli
political and military leadership was already acting in a mindset of war.57 The failure to acknowledge
the collapse of this analytical framework, as the next sections will show, has different facets.
Failure #1: overlooking a shift in Egyptian strategy a year prior to the war
One of the pitfalls which led the IDI to become fixated with its ‘conception’ was the failure to
understand and identify a shift in the strategy and calculus of Egyptian president Sadat which
occurred during 1972.58 This change has made the assumptions underpinning IDI’s analysis, and
therefore the ‘conception’, obsolete. Yet IDI was not aware of this issue.
Sadat effectively decided to initiate a limited war, with limited territorial gains in the Sinai
Peninsula, relying on improved air defence capabilities. This campaign was aimed at triggering a
political process which would bring back the land conquered by Israel in 1967. Sadat therefore
decided to rely on the extant equipment the Egyptian military possessed, not waiting for advanced
airstrike or surface-to-surface capabilities.59
While the Mossad director during Yom Kippur, Zvi Zamir, claimed that he provided information
about this new Egyptian strategy,60 Ze’ira, the IDI director during the war, denied this claim.61 In any
case, the IDI did not identify this change in Egyptian strategy. It continued to abide by its ‘concep
tion’, i.e., it assessed that Egypt was aiming for a grand war which was dependent on Egypt acquiring
advanced military capabilities. And since no such capabilities had been acquired, the IDI assessment
assigned war a low probability.
Applying intelligence studies frameworks highlights this colossal analytical failure. One of the
major roles of strategic intelligence is to identify shifts, discontinuities, and inflection points in
adversary strategic decision-making, or more broadly in the strategic environment, preferably as
they begin to emerge.62 In Yom Kippur, Israeli intelligence failed this ultimate test. It also failed this
test several years later, when Egyptian president Sadat decided to sign a peace agreement with
Israel: when Sadat landed in Israel in 1977 to initiate a peace process, the IDI still assessed that this
might be part of a deception plan.63
Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, strategic warning should be about more than
preventing surprise in a specific event.64 Surprise is also about an emerging change in an adversary’s
strategy and calculus.65 Strategic warning, as Chan has shown, should therefore be ‘concerned with
982 I. SHAPIRA
drastic departures from the customary behavioral pattern of one’s adversary’.66 As Garbo has shown
in her seminal study about surprise and early warning, strategic intelligence is about identifying
change and anomalies67 rather than merely about acknowledging continuity.
Second, prior to Yom Kippur, operational and tactical intelligence about adversary military
capabilities and readiness was analyzed per se and therefore allowed a fair understanding of
Egyptian and Syrian military capabilities and readiness for war. However, this information was not
used to understand which new strategy or emerging concept of operations it reflected. The IDI
assessment of adversary strategy had become a basic and unchallenged assumption68 through
which all tactical intelligence was interpreted.69 Tactical and operational intelligence, therefore, is
not only aimed at supporting warfighting.70 It should also contribute an operational perspective to
strategic analysis.
These lessons highlight the importance of integrating all levels of intelligence and the blurred line
between strategic and tactical intelligence.71 Intelligence analysis is therefore more about synthesis,
i.e., integration of different perspectives and sources.72 Only by doing so can it identify disconti
nuities and change.
Failure #2: lack of methodology for analytical processes, over-reliance on intuitive and
inductive reasoning
While the ‘conception’ stood at the heart of its findings, the Agranat Commission hardly addressed
issues of intelligence methodology, let alone theory, which underpinned the adoption of the
‘conception’. Moreover, IDI personnel testifying before the Commission hardly addressed methodo
logical issues, which were also overlooked in professional writings of senior IDI officers,73 including in
the memoirs of Ze’ira’s and Shalev’s which included extremely detailed descriptions of Israeli
intelligence during Yom Kippur.74 An exception is to be found in the writings and speeches of
Yo’el Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit during Yom Kippur (then codenamed 848 and
later 8200), who claimed that analysis in the IDI lacked doctrinal and methodological foundations,
unlike the discipline of SIGINT (which Ben-Porat himself was in charge of).75
Some practitioners and scholars have begun to bridge this gap in recent decades, claiming that
IDI’s analytical methodology, especially that regarding strategic analysis, was flawed during Yom
Kippur. IDI analysis, according to these arguments, relied solely on inductive reasoning and intuition,
with no structured methodology for the analytical process.
Lanir, for instance, provided a novel theoretical perspective on the Israeli surprise in Yom
Kippur.76 He asserted that Israeli intelligence wrongly used the inductive and empiricist approach,
suitable for tactical and operational intelligence, when producing strategic intelligence. Hence,
according to Lanir, Israeli intelligence failed to understand the emerging Egyptian strategy as
described in the previous section.77
Brun also claimed that the IDI applied a flawed analytical methodology during Yom Kippur, and
did not use deductive methods.78 More broadly, in his works as an intelligence practitioner-turned-
scholar, Brun continuously advocates the use of structured analytical techniques (SATs) and, speci
fically, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.79 The influence of Ben-Israel, a leading Israeli intelligence
practitioner scholar, stands out from Brun’s writings.80 Ben-Israel also claimed that a deductive and
Popperian-influenced approach might have been useful during Yom Kippur.81
Applying an intelligence studies perspective, therefore, highlights the fact that IDI analytical
assessments during Yom Kippur relied on analysts’ experience and intuition. Analytical methodology
and specifically epistemology was only tacit,82 with inductive reasoning being the dominant
approach to the creation of knowledge. Brun claimed in 2018 that such inductive reasoning is still
the dominant approach in Israeli intelligence.83
More broadly, Wasserman showed as early as 1960 that the inductive method is the traditional
approach in intelligence analysis.84 Bruce claimed in 2008 that it has remained so for decades.85
However, inductive reasoning can hardly assist in identifying shifts and inflection points, since it
focuses on continuation rather than on change.86 As George has claimed, the approach known as
‘alternative analysis’ is necessary for escaping the fixation on what he framed as analytical
‘mindsets’.87 Such alternative analysis was missing in the case of Yom Kippur.
What was also missing in IDI practice was also the use of abduction, known as ‘inference to the
best explanation’ for new and potentially surprising information as part of intelligence analysis.88
Ze’ira might have effectively (and implicitly) used abduction when receiving information regarding
the evacuation of Soviet advisors’ families from Syria, which the IDI intercepted on the night of
October 4th and 5th, more than a day before war broke out.89 Ze’ira, according to his own testimony,
was troubled by this information since he had no clear explanation for it. In other words, he felt this
information might contradict the ‘conception’. Yet Ze’ira did not go as far as adopting a new
paradigm and abandoning the extant one.
Applying another intelligence studies framework focusing on epistemology, the IDI leadership
lacked a structured methodology for analytical processes during Yom Kippur.90 It effectively relied on
evidentialism for justifying its analytical conclusions, i.e., justified the validity of the ‘conception’
through raw information. It did not rely on reliabilism, i.e., a reliable intelligence process, or
indefeasibilism, i.e., inability to refute the analytical conclusion. This is also reflected in the way
Ze’ira and Shalev tried to explain, in hindsight, the analytical failure. They blamed collection agencies
for not providing the most relevant information, rather than admitting a foundational problem in the
analytical process.91
Another issue arising from applying intelligence epistemology frameworks is the tension between
rationalism and empiricism as the best way to produce knowledge.92 Specifically, Ben-Porat claimed
that the foundation of intelligence should be high-quality raw information, i.e., that empiricism
outweighs rationalization.93 As will be shown later, analysis in the IDI had empiricist inclinations, yet
it also relied on rationalism for ‘turning information into intelligence’.94
Several major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, intelligence methodology, especially that of the
analytical process, should be explicitly discussed by intelligence leaders. Second, intuitive and
induction-based reasoning methods, despite their many strengths, are not sufficient to identify
emerging changes and inflection points. They should be augmented by deductive and abductive
methods, and more broadly by alternative analysis. Third, intelligence organizations should acknowl
edge the tension between empiricist and rationalist approaches, reflected through different cultures
of collection and analytical organizations: while the former discipline is naturally inclined towards
empiricism, the latter is naturally inclined towards rationalism. Philosophy, therefore, has much to
offer intelligence scholarship and practice.95
Failure #3: confusion regarding early warning (intentions or capabilities?)

Early warning has been one of the core missions of Israeli intelligence since its early days in the
1950s.96 As the acting IDI director wrote in 1987, ‘When we refer to the essence of intelligence, we
first and foremost mean early warning for war’.97 Although the IDI tried to conceptualize and
institutionalize early warning for decades,98 the Yom Kippur failure reveals an absence of an
agreed-upon and coherent definition, specifically regarding the balance between adversary inten
tions and capabilities.
Writ large, assessment about intentions provided the foundation for early warning in Israeli
intelligence from its early days, although this led to several intelligence failures. In 1960, for instance,
Israeli intelligence failed to provide early warning of an Egyptian military deployment along the
Egypt-Israel border, despite an abundance of information about Egyptian military actions, since it
relied on a flawed assessment regarding Egyptian intentions.99 And in 1967, Israeli intelligence failed
to recognize the escalation process which later led to the Six Days War, relying on a flawed
assessment regarding Egyptian intentions.100
After Yom Kippur, and IDI’s failure to assess intentions, several IDF senior leaders claimed
that intelligence should focus on early warning of capabilities. 101 Ze’ira and Shalev,
984 I. SHAPIRA
attempting to clear their reputations, also claimed that the IDI provided accurate and timely
early warning regarding the capabilities and readiness of the Egyptian and Syrian militaries.
102
Ze’ira claimed this should have been sufficient for the mobilization of reserve forces, and
that the IDI was only committed to providing early warning about capabilities and prepara
tions for war rather than about intentions.103
Shalev admitted that intelligence should assess adversary intentions yet asserted that decision-
makers are also responsible for such assessments.104 Ben-Porat asserted that intelligence analysts are
inherently incapable of assessing adversary intentions.105 However, original documents show that
not only did the Israeli leadership expect the IDI to provide assessments about adversary intentions
prior to the war, but that the IDI’s senior leadership willingly and knowingly provided such assess
ments prior to Yom Kippur.106
The confusion regarding intentions and capabilities also stands out when studying the
interaction between the disciplines of collection and analysis in the IDI prior to and during
Yom Kippur. For instance: Aharon Yariv, the IDI director prior to Yom Kippur, sent a paper in
1972 to the IDF deputy chief of general staff, titled ‘intelligence early warning’.107 In this
paper, Yariv focused on collection rather than on analysis, mentioning that, ‘The capability of
collection units to provide early warning to the main Egyptian and Syrian scenarios was
tested’. Ze’ira sees this as proof that early warning is a matter of collection about capabilities
and not of analysis regarding intentions.108
The intentions-capabilities debate has endured in the Israeli intelligence system. Yadlin, a
former IDI director, mentioned in 2013 that Israeli intelligence must analyze adversary
intentions, otherwise Israel would constantly be in a state of alert. 109 In 2017, Moshe
Ya’alon, a former IDI director, IDF chief of general staff and Israeli Minister of Defense, also
pointed to the need for intelligence about intentions.110 This debate has also been discussed
in intelligence studies literature.111
This topic can also be seen as a reflection of the tension between tactical and strategic
intelligence, another topic heavily discussed in intelligence studies. On the one hand,
scholars have pointed at the limited influence strategic intelligence has over US foreign
policy and claimed that decision-makers expect intelligence to provide them mostly with
facts and information rather than with strategic analysis, i.e., with intelligence about
capabilities.112 On the other hand, intelligence organizations continue producing strategic
intelligence, and even broaden their areas of interest to topics beyond traditional military
ones.113
Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, the question of whether early warning should focus
on capabilities or on intentions has become partially obsolete. Although indications and warning
intelligence is perceived as focused on adversary military preparations and therefore capabilities,114
decision-makers still expect intelligence to provide strategic warning,115 which inherently involves
an assessment of intentions. An intelligence assessment on the national level, as mentioned earlier,
must incorporate both strategic and tactical intelligence.116 Moreover, although analysis of inten
tions, as Yarhi-Milo has shown, can rely on ‘indications of intention’, it can also be inferred from
military capabilities or doctrine.117
Furthermore, early warning challenges emanate not only from a surprise military or terrorism
attack,118 but also emerging threats and opportunities which are not the result of adversary decision-
making. These include, for instance, popular upheavals, global pandemics, and economic crises.119 In
these cases, the issue of intentions is irrelevant, as is the notion of capabilities. Moreover, since many
of these events are idiosyncratic, it is hard to construct an ‘indications and warning’ model relying on
past experience.120
Second, in foundational issues such as strategic early warning, intelligence systems must agree on
a coherent framework which not only guides their practice, but also enables a constructive dialogue
with decision-makers. During times of warfare or crises, the absence of such a framework might
result in policy and intelligence failure.
Failure #4: over-confident strategic analysis at the military general staff level
While the IDI leadership formulated its ‘conception’ at the strategic level of military decision-
making, i.e., at the IDF general staff level, it was unwilling to accept contrarian assessments
created in more operational levels and contexts. Such an assessment was also made by the
Mossad director, Zamir, although during Yom Kippur the Mossad lacked formal responsibility
for intelligence analysis.121
Furthermore, in the days prior to Yom Kippur, such assessments were created by the intelli
gence departments of the IDF Northern Command headed by Hagai Mann,122 and of the Israeli
Navy (IN) headed by Rami Luntz.123 Several officers in the Southern Command intelligence
department also assessed an Egyptian attack was being prepared, yet this assessment was
disregarded by the command’s intelligence officer, David Geddaliah, who fully embraced the
IDI’s ‘conception’.124 These alternative assessments were not brought to the attention of the IDI
leadership.
The intelligence departments in the IN and in the regional commands of the IDF allegedly had
two disadvantages compared to the IDI’s RAD. First, they were focused on operational and tactical
intelligence, lacking a strategic perspective. In other words, they focused on adversary capabilities
rather than on intentions. Second, because of compartmentalization, they were not exposed to all
sensitive and classified information which reached the IDI.125 Mann, for instance, was not notified of
Me’ir’s meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, mentioned earlier.126
In hindsight, these disadvantages might have effectively enabled a better assessment, not only
about military capabilities, but also about the intentions they reflected. The IN intelligence depart
ment followed changes in the Egyptian Navy and concluded these were part of preparation for war
rather than simply an exercise. The Northern Command intelligence department followed Syrian
reinforcements near the border with Israel and concluded these were part of preparations for war
rather than readiness to confront an Israeli attack. Moreover, since the IN and the Northern
Command intelligence departments were not aware of all sensitive sources of information used by
the IDI’s RAD, they were not dependent on such information for their analysis.127 The IDI and
specifically the IDI’s RAD were too dominant and therefore had a monopoly over national intelli
gence estimates.
The dilemma about IDI as a military intelligence organization engaging strategic matters has been
subject to debate since the early days of Israeli intelligence in the 1950s.128 For instance: Tamir Pardo,
writing in 2013 as Mossad director, claimed that an operational/military intelligence agency, namely
the IDI, cannot conduct national intelligence assessments.129 Even and Siman-Tov claimed in 2015
that the IDI’s status has waned regarding national intelligence estimates. Even claimed in 2017 that
directors of Mossad and Shabak have tried to deprive IDI of its responsibility for national estimates,
preferring that integration of assessments be conducted by the prime minister.130
However, Yom Kippur does not necessarily prove the inherent limitations of military intelligence
organizations conducting strategic and national assessments. A more important lesson is the risk
entailed in one organization having a monopoly over national assessments. This phenomenon was
exacerbated during Yom Kippur by the high level of competition between IDI and Mossad, and
specifically between the agencies’ directors, which effectively constrained Mossad’s influence over
national and military decision-making.131
The major lessons which can be drawn, therefore, are cultural as well as organizational. An
overarching intelligence assessment conducted by organizations on the national or strategic eche
lons should integrate operational and tactical perspectives, while strategic analysis organizations
must maintain fertile working relations with subordinate echelons. In Yom Kippur, this was not the
case. The IDI leadership was arrogant and unreceptive to contrarian assessments coming from
tactical-level echelons in the IDF or from Mossad. Mann, for instance, testified that the relationship
between him and the head of IDI’s RAD was flawed, and that the RAD was disconnected from the
mindset of the Northern Command intelligence department.132
986 I. SHAPIRA
Failure #5: over-reliance on high-quality raw information

As shown earlier, the Yom Kippur intelligence failure is usually considered as resulting from analysis
overlooking raw information. However, at least in two cases, Israeli leadership was over-dependent
on high-quality and intimate raw information, specifically that received through covert collection.
The first case pertains to the Mossad elite spy known as ‘the Angel’, Ashraf Marwan, who, as noted
earlier, provided a specific early warning the night before the war.133 This information caused the
Israeli leadership to mobilize reserve units and to consider (and reject) a preemptive strike, although
the IDI leadership was still not certain that a war was imminent. Intelligence officers serving in key
positions during the war reinforce the view of Marwan as an elite spy, providing intimate and rare
information for several years prior to Yom Kippur.134
Shlomo Gazit, the IDI director after Yom Kippur, has claimed that the Israeli leadership was
dependent on Marwan’s reports, and did not assess that war was imminent until Marwan provided
such explicit information. This claim was reinforced by the testimony of Avi’ezer Ya’ari, the head of
the Syrian branch in IDI’s RAD during the war.135 Shalev points at the over-reliance on elite HUMINT
sources, referring to Marwan’s reports over the years,136 while Ze’ira also highlights the dependence
of the Israeli leadership on this information.137
The second case pertains to the IDI’s ‘special means of collection’.138 Although Amos Gilbo’a
claimed that this episode bears no special lessons,139 the current article adopts a different approach,
claiming that this was another case of over-reliance on intimate raw information. This approach is
supported, for instance, by the testimony of Shabtai Bril, a senior officer in IDI’s SIGINT unit during
the war.140
Many details about the ‘special means’ are still secret. The partial information implies that
these were advanced battery-operated devices placed inside Egypt, aimed at identifying
signs of an imminent attack through sophisticated eavesdropping capabilities, allowing
Israel to listen to intimate Egyptian communication. Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s
SIGINT unit, assured Israeli prime minister Me’ir in 1972 that these ‘special means’ would
provide early warning were the Egyptians to initiate an attack.141 The ‘special means’ were
perceived by the Israeli leadership as an ‘insurance policy’ against a surprise military
attack.142
Ze’ira’s own testimony to the Agranat Commission illustrates the importance he attributed to the
‘special means’:
The question I ask myself is where is my insurance in case the analysts are wrong? My insurance rested with
certain means [with excellent accessibility and reliability]. And I told myself: Let’s say that they are wrong. Then I
must get an unambiguous indication that they are wrong through these means. This is the whole theory in a
nutshell. There is a concept, new facts must come and undermine it. I have here [excellent sources] through
which I will get the indications if this concept is valid or not.143
When operated just several days before the war, and only for several hours, these means indeed
provided no special signs of an imminent attack. Although Ze’ira denies this, scholars and former
practitioners contend that the ‘special means’ should have been operated much earlier, yet Ze’ira
refused to do this since he assessed that an Egyptian attack was not imminent and therefore did not
wish to put at risk the means’ operability.144
The extant research shows that the Israeli leadership indeed relied on the ‘special means’ for early
warning.145 And since Ze’ira reported no unusual communications intercepted through these
‘means’, decision-makers saw this as another reason to adhere to the ‘conception’ and assess that
the Egyptians were not on the verge of initiating a war.
Applying an intelligence studies perspective reveals several relevant lessons. Although according
to the ‘intelligence cycle’ model decision-makers consume only finished analytical products, while
analysts are the ones who consume collected raw information, this is clearly not the case in
practice.146 The literature acknowledges that decision-makers and intelligence senior leaders some
times prefer intimate raw information over complicated and ambiguous analytical assessments.147
However, direct access to raw information also has its pitfalls, and Yom Kippur marks an
extreme end of decision-makers’ reliance on raw information. The Israeli leadership not only
relied on the covert sources mentioned above but effectively became dependent on them.
Such a dependency might have prevented acknowledging other warning signs, provided by
more ‘standard’ sources.
Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, access of decision-makers to raw, intimate,
and covert information is inevitable. However, early warning should still be perceived as an
analytical product, i.e., of ‘all-source analysis’,148 since single-source intelligence bears many
pitfalls.149 This should be the case even if the raw information potentially provides decision-
makers with access to ‘the adversary national security rooms’ and allegedly makes intelligence
analysis redundant.
Moreover, the mere existence of a covert source does not necessarily mean this source can
constantly provide reports. This was the case with Marwan who provided early warning only 12
hours before the Yom Kippur War broke out. This was also the case with the ‘special means’, which
could not provide information when not activated.
The second lesson pertains to the balance between covert collection and open-source informa
tion or intelligence (OSINT), a topic extensively studied in recent years.150 More broadly, this pertains
to the balance between covert information with direct access to adversary centers of gravity, and
between information collected through more standard methods – such as websites, aerial photos, or
field reconnaissance – which do not necessarily allow access to core adversary circles. Covert
intelligence has a unique added value, yet early warning is an analytical product which should be
underpinned by all-source analysis.
Failure #6: misinterpretation of Arab culture

Another facet of the IDI analytical failure was its flawed understanding of foundational cultural and
social aspects of Egypt’s decision-making in the years prior to the Yom Kippur War. Specifically, the
IDI failed to acknowledge that Egypt was willing to take major risks to ‘erase the 1967 humiliation’, i.
e., to restore dignity and self-respect after the colossal loss to Israel in the Six Days War.151 US
intelligence also overlooked such cultural aspects,152 reflecting a broader phenomenon of failing to
understand Arab society and culture.153
Ze’ira explicitly testified in 2013 that he made a mistake during Yom Kippur by not
integrating into the IDI’s RAD individuals with an understanding of Arab culture.154 Shalev
explicitly mentions the mistake he made in analyzing Sadat’s personality: while the IDI’s RAD
assessed Sadat as a weak and incompetent leader, as reflected in a special analytical product
prepared in 1970,155 the Egyptian president altered Egyptian strategy and thus surprised
Israel.156 Dror Shalom, the head of IDI’s RAD in 2019, explicitly claimed that in Yom Kippur,
the RAD did not understand Sadat.157
Applying intelligence studies frameworks, this can be seen as a failure of cultural intelligence, i.e.,
intelligence which aims at understanding foreign cultures.158 Ben-Porat, already mentioned several
time in this article, explicitly accused the RAD of failing to understand Arab culture and language.159
A similar accusation was made by Bril, another senior officer in IDI’s SIGINT unit during the war.160
This failure of cultural intelligence can also be seen as ethnocentrism, i.e., assessing adversary
strategy through one’s own culture and calculus.161
The major lesson, therefore, is the imperative to incorporate cultural perspectives in all levels
of intelligence analysis, from tactical162 to strategic. This should not come at the expense of
military or technical intelligence, yet it should augment them and especially underpin strategic
intelligence.163 Understanding Arab cultures has been one of the major challenges facing Israeli
intelligence since its early days in the 1950s.164 Cultural intelligence is as important today as it
was in 1973.165
988 I. SHAPIRA
Failure #7: the ‘human factor’ – groupthink, cognitive closure, over-confidence, arrogance,
lack of moral courage in the face of hierarchy
Bar-Joseph and McDermott focused on the ‘human factor’ of the IDI and IDF leadership as one of the
major causes of the Yom Kippur intelligence failure and strategic surprise.166 For instance, they
describe the IDI director’s need for cognitive closure, and his authoritarian and decisive style, as
major reasons for the IDI’s inability to consider contrarian assessments and thus acknowledge when
the analytical paradigm pointing at a low probability of war had become obsolete.167 A similar line of
research focusing on cognitive closure was described by Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski.168
As mentioned earlier in this article, several individuals – such as Binyamin, an intelligence officer
from the IDF Southern Command169; Mann, the intelligence officer of the IDF Northern Command170;
Luntz, the head of the Israeli Navy (IN) intelligence department171; Ya’ari, the head of the Syrian
branch in the IDI’s RAD172; Albert Souda’i, the head of the political sector in the RAD’s Egyptian
branch173; and Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit174 – disagreed with the IDI’s assess
ment regarding a low probability of war. This was also the case with Mossad director, Zamir.175
However, all these individuals did not manage to change the formal IDI assessment, and their
assessments were not heard by the Israeli national and defence leadership.
The IDI, therefore, failed to develop a culture of openness, at least in the field of analysis. This
resulted in analytical over-confidence and arrogance. Many claim this culture was influenced by the
personal traits of the IDI director at the time, Ze’ira,176 who unlike his predecessor, Yariv,177 tended to
avoid conflicting assessments.178
The major lesson, therefore, regards intelligence professionalism and ethics. This pertains espe
cially to an openness to reassessing existing paradigms and being willing to abandon them and
adopt new ones,179 and a willingness to accept contrarian assessments. It is therefore a cultural and
managerial issue on top of a professional one.
Contrarian thinking received much attention after Yom Kippur. Many IDI directors and heads of
RAD, for instance, have mentioned in public appearances the Yom Kippur legacy and underscore the
open culture they cultivated as a result of the lessons learned.180 Avoiding groupthink and expres
sing moral courage have become a cornerstone of Israeli intelligence,181 as is the imperative to
express moral courage in the face of hierarchy.182 Moreover, the IDI director who replaced Ze’ira,
Gazit, gave much attention to developing a culture of openness, forming a department dedicated to
contrarian and critical thinking, named ‘the Review Department’ and mostly known as ‘the Devil’s
Advocate’.183 The department head, since the mid-1980s, has reported directly to the IDI director.184
The IDI director’s introduction to a book about the ‘Review Department’, published in early 2023,
illustrates the importance of a contrarian and critical mindset:
The year 2023 is unique and symbolic, since we mark 50 years since the Yom Kippur War and the IDI’s colossal
failure, as a national estimator, in its core missions: early warning for war and assessing adversary intentions . . .
The lessons of this war are substantially embedded in the IDI . . . The Review Department rose out of the great
failure of Yom Kippur . . . 185
The ‘Devil’s Advocate’ department is still active as of early 2023,186 and has broadened its respon
sibilities to include reviewing not only intelligence assessments but also intelligence processes.187
However, there are still debates regarding the effective contribution of this department to the
intelligence product.188
Conclusion
The Yom Kippur failure is considered one of the seminal intelligence failures in modern history. It has
received extensive scholarly and professional attention, mainly relating to early warning and strate
gic surprise. In the practice of Israeli intelligence, Yom Kippur has had an enduring and occasionally
even a traumatic influence.
In the first years after the war, scholars situated Yom Kippur in the broad context of strategic
surprise studies. This literature described the way Israeli intelligence adhered to an analytical frame
work, known as ‘the conception’, thus ignoring an abundance of indications and warning and not
revealing the Egyptian deception plan. As information was declassified, research has expanded to
focus on other explanations. Key to this has been the extensive research of Bar-Joseph, which mainly
focuses on the ‘human factor’, i.e., psychological and personality traits of Israeli intelligence and
national security leadership. The article builds on this literature and uses intelligence studies frame
works to show that additional lessons can be learned.
First, strategic intelligence should constantly look for changes in adversary strategy, operational
concepts, and calculus. The foundational mindset of strategic intelligence should be on change,
anomalies, and inflection points, rather than on continuation and confirmation. This is the corner
stone of strategic early warning.
Second, intelligence methodology, especially but not solely that of analytical processes and
epistemology, should be made explicit and not remain only tacit. This is intended to harness
intuition and augment it with more structured and scientific-influenced methods. Relating to the
previous lesson, intelligence should embrace and adopt the abductive method of reasoning, aimed
at providing ‘the best available explanation’ for new and surprising information. Absence of a
methodological foundation might cause a dependency on intuition alone. And intuition, especially
in times or circumstances of change in the strategic environment, is not enough.
Third, intelligence estimates, especially on the national level, must integrate analysis about
adversary capabilities and intentions. Providing decision-makers with just one of the two is not
sufficient for setting policy and strategy. Moreover, while analyzing adversary capabilities, intelli
gence should also deduce the intentions these capabilities might reflect. And while analyzing
adversary intentions, intelligence should deduce the capabilities required to implement such
intentions.
Fourth, national intelligence estimates, although usually produced by national agencies or at the
general staff level of military organizations, must integrate and incorporate analysis created by more
operational-focused and tactical-focused echelons. This directly relates to the previous lesson.
Intelligence agencies on the national level usually have the broadest perspective of available
sources, and since they interact with national decision-makers, they also have the broadest perspec
tive of national requirements. However, this does not mean that more operational perspectives
cannot provide their own added value.
Strategic and operational intelligence, therefore, can and should reciprocally contribute to each
other. Moreover, national intelligence organizations should avoid arrogance based on their broad
perspective. All-source analysis for national intelligence, therefore, should relate not just to different
collection methods but also to different analytical perspectives. It is therefore effectively synthesis
rather than analysis.
Fifth, while intelligence leaders and political decision-makers must read raw information acquired
by collection agencies, over-dependence and ‘addiction’ to such information might prevent a broad
analytical perspective. In other words, while intimate and raw information provides direct access to
the adversary, it reflects only a narrow perspective. It cannot be the sole foundation for strategic
assessment and decision making.
From a philosophical perspective, this can be seen as a tension between empiricism and
rationalism when producing knowledge. Decision-makers sometimes distrust strategic analysis
and therefore effectively rely on the former, i.e., on raw information provided by covert sources.
Collection agencies will also be inclined towards the former, while analytical agencies will rely on the
latter. Intelligence agencies must balance these two approaches, viewing them as complementary
rather than as mutually exclusive.
Sixth, cultural intelligence, i.e., intelligence aimed at understanding adversary culture, is crucial for
strategic analysis, and even for early warning. Such cultural intelligence relies on collection of open-
source intelligence (OSINT), as well as historical and social perspectives. Although the age of big data
990 I. SHAPIRA
as experienced in recent years makes intelligence more reliant on advanced technologies and
quantifiable data, qualitative methods and ‘soft’ analytical skills have not become obsolete. A cultural
perspective might not only augment strategic analysis, but also improve understanding of opera
tional and tactical phenomena.
Seventh, ‘it is all about people’. The personality traits of intelligence senior officers set the context
for their conduct and the organizational culture, and hence influence the intelligence product.
Cognitive closure, arrogance, over-confidence, lack of openness to criticism and contrarian opinions,
are all personality and psychological traits intelligence directors should avoid.
Intelligence directors must therefore constantly consider their potential mistakes. They should
reduce uncertainty for decision-makers through accurate and precise assessments, yet at the same
time they must acknowledge that intelligence assessments are inherently vague, and that knowl
edge produced by intelligence agencies is inherently partial. However, while organizational and top-
down solutions are important, they are not a panacea. The responsibility to develop and implement
an open and critical culture rests first and foremost on the individual intelligence professional.
Although fifty years have passed since Yom Kippur, some of the lessons described in the article
are relevant for current intelligence practice, beyond that of the Israeli intelligence system. The early
warning provided by the US and UK intelligence systems regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine in
2022, for instance, illustrates a successful synthesis of intentions and capabilities analysis, as well as
integration of covert sources and OSINT.189 The failure of US intelligence to provide adequate early
warning of the Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, as another illustration, was described as
a failure to identify change in adversary calculus.190 Some of the lessons discussed in this article are
also relevant for current intelligence scholarship – such as those relating to philosophical and
methodological issues,191 the functions of military intelligence,192 or organizational cultures of
intelligence systems.193
The article, which focuses on the specific case of Israeli intelligence in Yom Kippur, can contribute
to broader debates about lessons which can be learned from intelligence failures. Future research
can also study the effective implementation of Yom Kippur lessons in the Israeli intelligence system,
thus allowing comparative study of the influence of failures and traumas across different national
intelligence systems.
Notes
1. The author wishes to thank Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph and David Siman-Tov for their excellent remarks on an earlier
draft of this article.
2. Shamir, “Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War,” 1035–1052; Tsoref, “Golda Meir’s Leadership in the Yom Kippur
War,” 50–72; and Raz, “The Significance of the Reputed Yom Kippur War Nuclear Affair,” 103–118.
3. Gavriely-Nuri, Israeli Culture on the Road to the Yom Kippur War.
4. Tal, “A Tested Alliance,” 29–54.
5. Rodman, “Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War .” Lebel and Lewin, eds., The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping
of Israeli Civil-Military Relations; Inbar, Israel’s National Security; Navon, “From Kippur to Oslo, 1973–1993,” 1–40.
6. Bar-Joseph, “Strategic Surprise Or Fundamental Flaws? the Sources of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of
the 1973 War,” 509–530; and Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 1–33; and Golan,
“In the Shadow of Surprise,” 88–97.
7. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew).
8. For a description of the Israeli intelligence system see, for instance: Kahana, “Reorganizing Israel’s Intelligence
Community,” 415–428.
9. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep.
10. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli
Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973,” 546. Gelber himself served as a military and
scientific assistant to the Agranat Commission.
11. Ben-Zvi, “Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks,” 381–395. Ben‐
Zvi, “Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 227–242. Ben-Zvi, “The Study of
Surprise Attacks,” 129–149. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” 461–502. Shlaim,
“Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 348–380.
12. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of
the Cuban Missiles,” 455–467. Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,” 655–672.
13. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept,” 81–104.
14. Sheffy, ”vercoming Strategic Weakness,” 809–828; and Ze’evi, “The Egyptian Deception Plan (in Hebrew),” 431–438.
15. The most recent website containing declassified materials is: https://yomkipurwar.mod.gov.il/Pages/default.
aspx (in Hebrew)
16. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (in
Hebrew),” 1–33. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources Bar-Joseph, “The
‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War”, 531–546. Bar-Joseph and
Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,”
75–99. McDermott and Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor. Bar-Joseph also relied on
primary sources to study other aspects of the Yom Kippur War beyond those of intelligence, such as: Bar-Joseph,
A War of its Own: The Air Force in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew).
17. Even, “Forty-Five Years since the Yom Kippur War: Intelligence and Risk Management in the Thirty Hours
Preceding the War,” 141–165. Rom, Gilat and Sheldon, “The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking
Gun,” 357–373.
18. Bar Joseph has studied several lessons: Bar-Joseph, “Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era,”
70–83.
19. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” 461–502. Shlaim, “Failures in National
Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 348–380. Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and
Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 1–33
20. Such as: Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258. Gilbo’a,
Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew). Barka’i, Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew). Ya’ari,
“Intelligence Assessment in Israel’s Unique Conditions (in Hebrew),” 213–222. Ben-Porat, The Last Report: T Minus
90 (in Hebrew).
21. Intelligence Corps School, “20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of
Intelligence (in Hebrew)”. Shapira, Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War – Forty Years After (in Hebrew).
22. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
goXJn2WGRwA&list=PLCapdZwzDpNnAHl7KWycMHi-erPE0tUKX&index=20
23. Tel’ad. “The Silence of the Horns (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2J-gZVvzd8 Channel and
HOT. “And the Land Shall Not be Quiet (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUhIIRSJZZo&list=
PLx3PgeksmQeVpok2H3xNen8nUj1J3r6f4
24. Such as: Buhbut. “The ‘National Estimator’ in an Interview (in Hebrew)”, https://shorturl.at/byzDF
25. Bar-Joseph and Yossef, “The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational
Intelligence in the 1973 War,” 584–608. Dekel. “Revised Study of the Intelligence Failures in the Yom Kippur War
(in Hebrew),” https://bit.ly/3o0CjtI Asher, The Syrians are on the Fences: The Northern Command in the Yom Kippur
War (in Hebrew).
26. Sindawi and Kahana, “The Yom Kippur War: The Successes of Israeli Intelligence,” 762–774. McDermott,
Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor 216–234
27. Bar-Joseph, “Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Thirty-Year Perspective,” 251–266.
28. (in Hebrew)
29. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew)
30. https://archives.mod.gov.il/docs/agranat2/Pages/default.aspx (in Hebrew)
31. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew). Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur
War (in Hebrew). Gazit, Crucial Crossroads (in Hebrew). Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is
Israel Listening? (in Hebrew). Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew). Barka’i, An
Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew).
32. Such as: Heikal, The Road to Ramadan.
33. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources. Lev-Ran, “Surprise and Early
Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (in Hebrew),” 17–21.
34. Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258. Ya’ari, “The
Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Ya’ari, “Intelligence Assessment in Israel’s Unique
Conditions (in Hebrew),” 213–222. Lev-Ran, “Surprise and Early Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions
(in Hebrew),” 17–21
35. Bar-Joseph, “Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era,” 70–83
36. Bar-Joseph and McDermott, “Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence
Reform,” 127–145.
37. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 25–38.
38. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew)
39. Gazit, Between Early Warning and Surprise: On the Responsibility for National Intelligence Estimate in Israel (in
Hebrew). 12–23
992 I. SHAPIRA
40. Mossad is the Israeli foreign intelligence and special operations agency. In Yom Kippur, it was solely a collection
and operational organization with no formal responsibility for analysis.
41. Molchdesky, “The Conception in the Hand of Language (in Hebrew),” 34–64. Gazit, Between Early Warning and
Surprise: On the Responsibility for National Intelligence Estimate in Israel (in Hebrew). Ofer and Kober, eds.,
Intelligence and National Security (in Hebrew).
42. Intelligence Corps School, ’20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of
Intelligence (in Hebrew).
43. Limor. “’Israel has the Ability to Completely Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program’”, https://www.israelhayom.com/
2021/03/29/israel-has-the-ability-to-completely-destroy-irans-nuclear-program/. Limor, “We are Nearing the
Threshold of War (in Hebrew),” https://www.israelhayom.co.il/magazine/hashavua/article/8764533 Limor. “A
TikTok War and Weapons-Grade Enrichment,” https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/04/29/a-tiktok-war-and-
weapons-grade-enrichment/. Limor, “At the End of the Day, it’s all about Iran,” https://www.israelhayom.com/
2019/09/29/at-the-end-of-the-day-its-all-about-iran/. Har'el, ‘A First Glimpse into the Research and Analysis
Division of AMAN (in Hebrew)’, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1699717 Greenwood. “A Glimpse
into the Research and Analysis Division of AMAN (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/gBI67 Brun, Intelligence
Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes
44. Col. Itai, “The Minefield of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 78–95.
45. Lt. Col. Shay, “The Era of Agranat is Over (in Hebrew),” 106–109.
46. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew)”.
47. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew)
48. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew); Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the
Yom Kippur War 1973,” 87. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory
and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in may 1973,” 520–546.
49. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 198
50. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 59–78. Shalev, Failure and Success in
Early Warning (in Hebrew)
51. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,” 81–104
52. Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli
Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged
Intention to Open War in may 1973,” 520–546. Gilbo’a, Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew)
53. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel
54. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 89–92
55. The topic of indications and warning is one the most prominent in intelligence studies; for instance, see: Wirtz,
“Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,” 550–562.
56. https://archive.kippur-center.org/mid-southern-command/leket-modin-51073.pdf (in Hebrew).
57. Ben-Porat, The Last Report: T Minus 90 (in Hebrew)
58. Spofford and Warren L. Henderson, Anwar El Sadat and the Art of the Possible: A Look at the Yom Kippur War. Brun,
Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 29–30
59. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,” 84–85
60. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 678 Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings
(in Hebrew) 71–79
61. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 67
62. Shapira, “Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and using Conceptual Frameworks,” 283–299.
63. Stivi-Kerbis, “The Surprise of Peace: The Challenge of Intelligence in Identifying Positive Strategic-Political Shifts,”
448–466. Gazit. “The Egyptian Peace Initiative – the Intelligence Background (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Tyt77pX2pds
64. As in: Wirtz, “Theory of Surprise,” 97–111. Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” 1–56.
Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack : Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.
65. See also: Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse”, 781.
66. Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,” 172.
67. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. 31
68. Flawed assumptions are described in the literature as a typical pitfall of intelligence analysis; see: Davis, “Why
Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” 157–170.
69. Several similarities can be found to the flawed US intelligence assessment during the Cuban missile crisis, where
the national estimate assigned low probability for the Soviets placing offensive missiles in Cuba, even though
military force build-up was identified. The intelligence assessment and national decision-making changed only
after a reconnaissance flight revealed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, for instance: Wirtz,
“Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 120–149. Zegart, “The Cuban Missile
Crisis as Intelligence Failure,” 23–39. Merom, “The 1962 Cuban Intelligence Estimate: A Methodological
Perspective,” 48–80.
70. See, for instance: Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military
Intelligence?” 199–225.
71. Odom, “Intelligence Analysis,” 316–332.
72. Pili, “Deciphering Intelligence Analysis: The Synthetic Nature of the Core Intelligence Function,” 128–142.
73. Such as: Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Lev-Ran, ‘Surprise and Early
Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (in Hebrew),” 17–21. Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do
they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258
74. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew). Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur
War (in Hebrew)
75. Intelligence Corps School, “20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of
Intelligence (in Hebrew)” 30.
76. Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis (in Hebrew).
77. The issue of objectivity in intelligence is a broad one and beyond the scope of the current article. For an example
of an Israeli scholar who provided harsh criticism of objectivity in intelligence see: Amos Granit, “The
Development of the Intelligence Idea in America (in Hebrew),” Tel-Aviv University, 2006).
78. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 30–31
79. These topics have received extensive attention in recent years. For instance, see: Jones, “Critical Epistemology for
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses,” 273–289. Borg, ‘Improving Intelligence Analysis: Harnessing Intuition and
Reducing Biases by Means of Structured Methodology,” 2–22. US Government, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured
Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Artner, Richard S. Girven and James B. Bruce, Assessing the
Value of Structured Analytic Techniques in the U.S. Intelligence Community.
80. Ben-Israel, Dialogues on Science and Intelligence (in Hebrew). Ben-Israel, ‘Philosophy and Methodology of
Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process’, 660–718.
81. Col. Itzhak, “The Philosophy of Intelligence: The Logic of the Assessment Process (in Hebrew),” 145–182.
82. For a discussion of tacit knowledge in intelligence analysis see: Ormerod, “Michael Polanyi and the Epistemology
of Intelligence Analysis,” 377–391.
83. Brun, “Approaches to Intelligence Research in the Post-Truth Era,” 142–151.
84. Wasserman, “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” 156–159.
85. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 171–211.
86. Shapira, “Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and using Conceptual Frameworks,” 283–299
87. George, ”Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis,” 385–404.
88. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 141.
89. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 137–141. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell
Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 141–148
90. Whitesmith, “Justified True Belief Theory for Intelligence Analysis,” 835–849.
91. Bar-joseph, “The Intelligence Chief Who Went Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the
Identity of Israel’s Best Source Ever,” 226–248. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 122–123
92. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 139–143
93. Ben-Porat, “The Problematics of the Intelligence Estimate (in Hebrew),” 19–25.
94. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 30–33
95. Gaspard and Pili, “Integrating Intelligence Theory with Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue,” 763–776.
Quist, “What Philosophy can do for Intelligence,” 777–790.
96. Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,” 765–784
97. Shahak, “AMAN Director Introduction (in Hebrew),” 7–8.
98. Hershkovitz and Siman-Tov, “Analytical Early Warning, Agents Early Warning and Electronical Early Warning: The
Evolving Early Warning Concept in the 1950s (in Hebrew),” 258–279.
99. Sheffy, “Early Warning of Intentions Or of Capabilities? Revisiting the Israeli – Egyptian Rotem Affair, 1960,” 420–437.
100. Siman-Tov and Shmuel Even, “The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War,” 135–148.
Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,” 776–778
101. Tal, “Early Warning in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” (annex). Bar-Lev, “The Decision-Maker and Intelligence:
From a Decision-Maker’s Perspective (in Hebrew),” 489.
102. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur
War (in Hebrew)
103. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 73–84.
104. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 247.
105. Ben-Porat, ,”Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 223–250. Ben-Porat, Closure: The
Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew). Ben-Porat, “The Problematics of the Intelligence Estimate (in
Hebrew),” 19–25
106. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources
107. https://archive.kippur-center.org/mid-southern-command/atraa-modinit-june73.pdf (in Hebrew). Bar-Joseph,
“The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 535
994 I. SHAPIRA
108. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 78.
109. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew)”.
110. Ya’alon, “Intelligence from the Viewpoint of the Decision Maker (in Hebrew)”, 13–16.
111. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning 17–25
112. Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign
Affairs,” 1–45. Marrin, ‘Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,”
725–742.
113. For example, see: National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: Climate Change and
International Responses – Increasing Challenges to US National Security through 2040. Bowsher, Bernard and
Sullivan, “A Health Intelligence Framework for Pandemic Response: Lessons from the UK Experience of
COVID-19,”.
114. Wirtz, “Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,” 550–562
115. Gentry and Gordon, “U.S. Strategic Warning Intelligence: Situation and Prospects,” 19–53.
116. Such as in the US NIE (national intelligence estimate) regarding the Iranian nuclear project published in 2007:
Treverton, “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions
and Capabilities,” 164–175.
117. Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations.
Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of
Adversaries,” 7–51.
118. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism,” 31–55.
119. Barnea, We Never Expected that: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence .
120. For a discussion of the Israeli experience pertaining to the upheaval in the Middle East which emerged in 2010
see, for instance: Pascovich, “Intelligence Assessment regarding Social Developments: The Israeli Experience,”
84–114.
121. Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew)
122. Mann. “Northern Command Intelligence Prior to the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/gjsx4
123. Mertz, “Navy Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” 48–51.
124. Neta, Indications and Warning for War (in Hebrew).
125. Mertz, “Navy Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” 49–50
126. Mann, “On the Obtuseness in the Research Division in these Dark Days (in Hebrew),” 75.
127. Bril, “AMAN’s Research and Analysis Division was the One Who Ignored an Abundance of Indications and
Warnings (in Hebrew),” 85–93. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 186 Ya’ari, “The
Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 42
128. Siman-Tov and Hershkovitz, AMAN Out of the Shadows: The First Decade of the IDF Intelligence Directorate (in
Hebrew).
129. Shapira, Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War – Forty Years After (in Hebrew) 74–77
130. Even, ”From National Intelligence Assessment to National Risk Assessment (in Hebrew),” 23–32.
132. Mann. “Northern Command Intelligence Prior to the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” Mann, ‘On the Obtuseness in
the Research Division in these Dark Days (in Hebrew)’, 72–79
133. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel
135. Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 42.
137. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 91–95
138. Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 531–546
Raz, “The Hands of Ze’Ira and the Voice of Dayan (in Hebrew),” 162–213. Langotzky. ”The Truth about the ‘Special
Means’ (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/dkns1
139. Gilbo’a, Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew) 7.
140. Bril, “AMAN’s Research and Analysis Division was the One Who Ignored an Abundance of Indications and
Warnings (in Hebrew),” 85–93
141. Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War”, 536.
142. Ibid, 537–538. Aderet. “Military Intelligence Chief Misled Israeli Leaders Ahead of 1973 War, Declassified Doc
Reveals (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/apxO9
143. As edited by Bar-Joseph in: Bar-Joseph, ‘The “Special Means of Collection”: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the
Yom Kippur War’, 537.
144. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 97–104
145. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 148–149 Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special
Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 538
146. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,” 959–979.
147. Hulnick, ,”The Intelligence Producer – Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” 229. Rovner, Fixing the
Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence 24. A famous historical example for this is Winston Churchill:
Andrew, “Churchill and Intelligence,” 181–193. Aldrich and Cormac, ”From Circumspection to Centrality: Prime
Ministers and the Growth of Analysis, Co-Ordination, Management in the UK Intelligence Community,” 7–24.
148. Miller, “Improving all-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation,” 337–354.
149. Gibson, “Future Roles of the UK Intelligence System,” 918–921.
150. Eldridge, Hobbs and Moran, ”Fusing Algorithms and Analysts: Open-Source Intelligence in the Age of ‘Big Data’,”,
391–406. Miller, ‘Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): An Oxymoron?” 702–719. Williams and Ilana Blum, Defining
Second Generation Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the Defense Enterprise.
151. Goldstein, “The Six Day War: The War that no One Wanted,” 767–784.
152. Rezk, “Re-Evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis,” 470–495.
153. Rezk, “Orientalism and Intelligence Analysis: Deconstructing Anglo-American Notions of the ‘Arab’,” 224–245.
154. Ze’ira. “What did we Collect, what did we Assess (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
w3Dcw-CIUU8
155. Gilbo’a, Mr. Intelligence (in Hebrew) 576.
157. Limor. “We are Nearing the Threshold of War (in Hebrew)”.
158. Yelamos, Goodman and Stout, “Intelligence and Culture: An Introduction,” 476–478. Duyvesteyn, ,”Hearts and
Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?,” 445–459.
159. Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew)
160. Barka’i, Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 90–91.
161. Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism.
162. Dostri and Michael, “The Role of Human Terrain and Cultural Intelligence in Contemporary Hybrid and Urban
Warfare,” 87–88.
163. Shapira, “The Main Challenges Facing Strategic Intelligence,” 3–19.
164. Eyal, ,”Dangerous Liaisons between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel,” 653–693.
165. Milstein, “The Lack of in-Depth Understanding about Objects Researched by the Intelligence Community,”
67–77.
166. McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor
167. Ibid, 213
168. Bar-Joseph, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,”
75–99
169. Neta, Indications and Warning for War (in Hebrew)
170. Tochfeld. “Northern Command’s Intelligence Officer: I had Tons of Information (in Hebrew),” https://www.
makorrishon.co.il/news/528311/
171. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 99–100
172. Dvori. “The Officer Who Tried to Warn of War and Scorned Now Speaks (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/nFMX4
173. Mendel. “The Colossal Failure in AMAN (in Hebrew),” https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4423154,00.html
174. Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew)
175. Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew)
176. McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor
177. For a detailed analysis of Yariv’s career and personality see: Gilbo’a, Mr. Intelligence (in Hebrew)
178. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 48–49
179. Yariv, Ze’ira’s predecessor, was described as embracing a new analytical paradigm several weeks prior to the Six
Days War in 1967; see: Siman-Tov, “The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War,” 135–148
180. Buhbut. “The ‘National Estimator’ in an Interview (in Hebrew),” Limor. ‘At the End of the Day, it’s all about Iran,”
Limor. “A TikTok War and Weapons-Grade Enrichment,” Kochavi. “The Lesson from Yom Kippur: Nothing is Taken
for Granted (in Hebrew),” https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4132491,00.html
181. Shapira. “The Israeli Perspective on Strategic Intelligence,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3Q2XBPZtxM
182. Col. Itai, “The Minefield of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 78–95
183. Pascovich, “The Devil’s Advocate in Intelligence: The Israeli Experience,” 854–865.
184. The author of this article has also served as the head of this department.
185. Sternberg, David Siman-Tov and Doron Matza, Devil’s Advocate: A Journey through the Paths of Israeli Review (in
Hebrew). 6–7
186. Sternberg, Devil’s Advocate: A Journey through the Paths of Israeli Review (in Hebrew)
187. Col. and I., “Intelligence Supervision: Creating Relevance in the Present Era,” 121–130. Col., “A ‘Red Team’ for the
Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 48–56.
188. Kitri, “Summary of Workshop about ‘Iphcha Mistabra’ and Disruptive Thinking (in Hebrew)”.
189. Dylan and Maguire, “Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War” 33–74. Abdalla, Davies,
Gustafson, et al. ‘Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part 1’, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/intelligence-
and-the-war-in-ukraine-part-1/. Zegart, ‘Open Secrets: Ukraine and the Next Intelligence Revolution’.
996 I. SHAPIRA
190. Rovner. “Was the 2016 Election an Intelligence Failure?” https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/2016-election-

intelligence-failure/
191. Rønn, “The Multifaceted Norm of Objectivity in Intelligence Practices,” 1–15. Coulthart, “Why do Analysts use
Structured Analytic Techniques? an in-Depth Study of an American Intelligence Agency,” 933–948.
192. Baudet et al., Military Intelligence: From Telling Truth to Power to Bewilderment?, 1–22. Spoor and de Werd,
“Complexity in Military Intelligence,” 1–21.
193. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” 78–111. Jones and Silberzahn,
Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Itai Shapira is a PhD candidate at the University of Leicester, studying Israeli national intelligence culture. Itai has served
for more than 25 years in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI), in various roles on the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. He has published articles about intelligence and strategy on Intelligence and National Security, War on the Rocks,
Defense One, Strategic Assessment, The National Interest, 19FortyFive, Small Wars Journal, RUSI Commentary, and RealClear
Defense.
ORCID
Itai Shapira http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1635-8464
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ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

CONTACT Itai Shapira itaishap@gmail.com

The Yom Kippur war: the literature

The Agranat Commission report38

Failure #3: confusion regarding early warning (intentions or capabilities?)

Failure #5: over-reliance on high-quality raw information

Failure #6: misinterpretation of Arab culture

190. Rovner. “Was the 2016 Election an Intelligence Failure?” https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/2016-election-

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