Wiley, International Society of Political Psychology Political Psychology

Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur
Surprise
Author(s): Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 75-99
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003
Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure:

On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise
Uri Bar-Joseph
Division of International Relations, Department of Political Science
University of Haifa
Arie W. Kruglanski
Department of Psychology
University of Maryland, College Park
This paper uses newly available evidence to shed light on the circumstances and causes
of the 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli
positions at the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. The evidence suggests that an impor-
tant circumstance that accounts for the surprise effect these actions managed to produce,
despite ample warning signs, is traceable to a high need for cognitive closure among major
figures in the Israeli intelligence establishment. Such a need may have prompted leading
intelligence analysts to "freeze" on the conventional wisdom that an attack was unlikely
and to become impervious to information suggesting that it was imminent. The discussion
considers the psychological forces affecting intelligence operations in predicting the initi-
ation of hostile enemy activities, and it describes possible avenues of dealing with the
psychological impediments to open-mindedness that may pervasively characterize such
circumstances.
KEY WORDS: Yom Kippur war, strategic surprise, need for cognitive closure
Along with the German attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941 (ope
ation "Barbarossa") and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 19
the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel on Yom Kippur, 6 Oct
1973, is considered a classic example of a successful surprise attack and a co
intelligence failure. The similarity of the three cases is obvious: Despite am
evidence concerning the ability and the intention of the initiator to launch
attack, the intelligence agencies involved failed to provide a timely and accu
warning. Expert analyses of the three cases, however, tend to impute them to
75
0162-895X ? 2003 International Society of Political Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing. Inc., 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ
76 Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski
ferent causes. Much of the puzzl

by a German deception plan that
until war with Britain was over,
an ultimatum (Whaley, 1973). Ot
Stalin's dictatorial style and th
before the war (Andrew & Gordi
contrast, surprise was largely ex
Pearl Harbor as the specific targe
essary compartmentalization tha
properly assessing the loomin
Wohlstetter, 1962).
Neither concealment nor decept
relevance for Israel's 1973 intellig
And although a number of work
Egyptian deception plan-at the c
preparations for war as a routin
poor. By 3 October the SIGINT un
gence (AMAN) collected sufficien
took place. By 5 October, this w
The same is true with regard to
Syrian attempts to prevent Israel
to war, on 2 October AMAN diss
plan (Bar-Joseph, 2001). The deta
in AMAN's possession since spr
lected hundreds of warning in
means. Mossad human sources
warnings about the intention to
official investigation of the war (
that preceded the Yom Kippur wa
had plenty of warning indicator
Collection Division and by other
translation). Most academic stude
conclusion (Bar-Joseph, 1995,
Betts, 1982; Handel, 1976, 1987
1985).
Consequently, the consensus among students of the subject is that the failure
was the outcome of human nature and errors. None of them, however, attempted
to penetrate the "black box" wherein the intelligence process took place. And none
linked specific dysfunctional behavior by specific officers to a specific result: the
creation of a misleading intelligence picture that did not properly reflect the avail-
able information, and the defective process whereby such information was
assessed by relevant AMAN analysts. The purpose of the present paper is to
address these issues.
Need for Closure and the Yom Kippur Surprise 77
In so doing, our major assumption is that an und

failure in the Yom Kippur case amounts to format
leading AMAN analysts. If so, the psychology of
highly relevant to events leading to the Yom Kippu
conception of such judgment-Kruglanski's (1989
to illuminate the process that led to misuse of the a
minated in its inappropriate assessment by highly t
competent intelligence specialists.
Our general argument and evidence are compatibl
in the study of surprise attacks (e.g., Betts, 19
Wohlstetter, 1962), whereby incorrect comprehensi
information before the attack-rather than the lack
is often the principal cause for this type of intelli
that explain judgmental misinterpretations in genera
nitive dissonance, biases and heuristics, the fundam
actor-observer differences in attribution) tend to ig
key individuals charged with the interpretive effor
such conduct and its psychological underpinnings m
insights into factors contributing to the successful
The applications of psychological notions to pol
often either predominantly cognitive or predominan
leading Levy (in press) to observe that "we know mo
of unmotivated and motivated biases than about
factors interact to shape judgment and decision."
A prominent example of a useful cognitive conce
ical decision-making was that of "operational codes
Holsti, 1977; Leites, 1951, 1953; Walker, 1977, 1995
much like the concept of a "schema" or a "script" (
a set of beliefs about rules of action that "serves as
ences the actor's perception and diagnosis of politica
norms and standards to guide and channel his choice
tions" (George, 1980, p. 45). The operational cod
important attempts to understand the belief syste
such as John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970) and Hen
Nonetheless, in the absence of its placement wit
ment and decision-making, the notion of operation
systems," "schemata," or "scripts") leaves a number
swered. Thus, it is possible to inquire about the var
given decision-maker's disposal, about the condition
codes over others, about the psychologically releva
tional codes that determine their impact on the dec
Motivational approaches to political decision-mak
had their limitations. Motivational biases were assumed to "refer to individuals'
needs to maintain their own em

and psychological stress"; as a c
ceptions based on needs or desir
thinking" was usefully applied
the First World War (Snyder, 1
the 1930s (Stein, 1993), and Ger
First World War (Fischer, 1988
tionally based effects on human
and cognitive effects (see Lev
tion more generally (see Fisk
instances of decision-making, o
and hence are free from motivational biases. This flies in the face of the common
realization that most decision-making is carried out for a purpose, and hence is
motivated. The question then becomes which motivations introduce biases of the
"wishful thinking" variety and which do not, and whether the latter motivations
are in fact "bias-free" (see Kruglanski, 1989a, 1999). Another fundamental ques-
tion is how-that is, through what process-motivations affect judgments. This
issue too is left dangling in common discussions of motivational biases and dis-
tortions in judgment and decision-making (see Kruglanski, 1996, for a review).
By contrast to the sequestered cognitive and motivational analyses above, the
theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989b), serving as our present analytic
framework, integrates cognitive and motivational mechanisms and elaborates
their conjoint functioning in judgment formation. A central construct in our analy-
sis is the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1998). Specifically, we argue that a major cause of AMAN's defec-
tive judgment was high need for closure on the part of two of its most influential
analysts: Major-General Eli Zeira, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and
an ex-officio government intelligence advisor, and Lieutenant-Colonel Yona
Bandman, his most trusted estimator for Egyptian affairs, head of Branch 6 of
AMAN in charge of intelligence coverage of Egypt and North Africa.
How Judgments Are Formed: A Theory of Lay Epistemics
The theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989b) has been refined over the
years and applied conceptually and empirically to a number of domains in social
cognition, such as persuasion, attribution, impression formation, and biases and
heuristics. (Only a brief theoretic summary can be given here; for a fuller dis-
cussion, see Erb et al., in press; Kruglanski, Erb, Chun, Pierro, & Mannetti, in
press.) According to the lay-epistemic theory, all human judgments are formed
through a process wherein inference rules to which the individual subscribes (not
unlike those derived from "operational codes") are applied to situationally present
evidence to yield conclusions (see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The judg-
mental process is assumed to be governed by a number of intersecting continua,
or "parameters," represented at some of their va

judgment.
The central parameter is that of subjective relevance. This is defined in terms
of degrees of belief in an "if/then" inference rule connecting the evidence and the
judgment in the decision-maker's mind, such that if the evidence were observed
(e.g., the Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal), the judgment (e.g., that they
are challenging Israel to a fight) would be warranted.
The remaining parameters affect the degree to which the evidence exerts its
effect on judgment as warranted by its degree of relevance. One such parameter
is the experienced difficulty of the judgmental task, determined by such factors as
the informational "signal-to-noise" ratio, mental accessibility of the inference rule
(see Higgins, 1996), length and complexity of the evidence, its ordinal position
in the informational sequence considered by the decision-maker, etc. In and of
itself, task difficulty obstructs information processing and hinders the realization
of the evidential relevance for the judgments at hand.
Another parameter is the magnitude of the processing motivation, that is, the
decision-maker's inclination to invest considerable effort in thinking about and
elaborating the information given. Obviously, the greater the task difficulty, the
more processing motivation is required to realize the evidential relevance of the
information given. Yet another parameter is the decision-maker's cognitive capac-
ity, determined by the press of other tasks (i.e., cognitive busyness or load), degree
of mental fatigue, etc. Again, the greater the task difficulty, the more cognitive
capacity is required to fully "digest" the evidence and realize its degree of rele-
vance to the judgment.
A final parameter is that of bias (motivational or cognitive) that may distort
the information's relevance in a given direction in accordance with (1) the desir-
ability to the decision-maker of the implied conclusion, defining a motivational
bias, and (2) this individual's prior expectancies, defining a cognitive bias. A
central assumption of the lay-epistemic theory is that the foregoing parametric
analysis applies to all kinds of judgments irrespective of their specific contents.
We revisit this point below.
The epistemic process of rule application and evidence gathering has no
natural or unique point of termination. In principle, it could go on indefinitely, for
one could always seek and probably find further and further information relevant
to one's considerations. Yet even the most "obsessive" persons ultimately cease
collecting data and proceed to make decisions and undertake actions. The pro-
cessing motivation and cognitive capacity parameters mentioned earlier determine
where such a "stopping point" might fall. A major motivation affecting individu-
als' willingness to further process information is the need for cognitive closure,
which has received a great deal of empirical attention in the last two decades (for
reviews see Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002; Kruglanski & Webster,
1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998).
The need for cognitive closure plays a key function in judgment formation
processes by bringing the info

eties of the need for closure ha
specific and specific. The nons
desire for a confident judgmen
to confusion and ambiguity. A
desire for a judgment of a par
desires. Thus, the specific need
process, as mentioned earlier.
Two points are noteworthy he
a specific need once a given jud
conception has been adopted be
ception (any confident concepti
by being specifically adhered t
for nonspecific and specific clo
ture of a given social situation. I
a given judgment (e.g., because
became motivated to defend (b
ensued), their dependent subor
for a specific closure to agree w
Antecedents of the Nee
According to the theory of la

for cognitive closure may vary
For reasons of cultural upbring
some individuals may develop
closure than would others. A
Kruglanski, 1994; see also Krugl
guages (Mannetti, Pierro, Krug
differences in the need for cog
The situational determinants
on the perceived benefits of clo
ski & Webster, 1996). A major b
ity and the guidance of action.
and/or predictability loom larg
vated. An important cost of la
enough to meet an important d
vasively found to elevate the n
1983; Kruglanski & Webster,
inaction may
as w spell disaster,
to be resolutely averted (e.g., i
for closure would be elevated b
lack of closure. Other importa
aversiveness of information processing-for exa

(Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), fatigue (Webst
1996), or dullness of the information-processing tas
induced situationally or assessed via a personality sc
found to have the very same psychological consequen
Consequences of the Need for Closure
When the need for closure is aroused (or is gener

ality trait), an individual may desire two things. Th
quickly as possible (we call it the urgency principle).
for as long as possible (we call it the permanence prin
under a heightened need for closure prompts "
providing cues. The quest for permanence prompts a
it is attained, and the tendency to stay impervious t
evant, information.
These general tendencies (of "seizing" and "freezi
express themselves in a variety of concrete behaviora
empirical research (for reviews see Kruglanski &
Kruglanski, 1998). Among these are (1) reluctance to
(particularly information inconsistent with one's pri
ception has been adopted (or "frozen" upon); (2) deni
inconsistent information in terms that match one's
a particular premium on clarity, order, and coheren
perspectives different from one's own; (5) consid
assuredness; (6) intolerance of pluralism of opinions a
ates; and (7) an authoritarian style of leadership and
In summary, lay-epistemic theory is an integrative
that accords a major role to cognitive factors (subje
rule accessibility, cognitive load, cognitive capacity)
(such as the needs for nonspecific or specific clos
manner both classes of factors interact in the judgm
sider how the foregoing notions apply to persons and
intelligence failure that led to the military setbacks
of the Yom Kippur war.
Need for Closure and AMAN's Processes of Ju
As already noted, our analysis assigns a major

disaster (from the Israeli perspective) of the early day
two highly competent and well-meaning officers: th
gence, Major-enneral Eli Zeira, and AMAN's prim
affairs, Lieutenant-Colonel Yona Bandman. Accordin
have had a particularly high deg

to "freeze" upon an early conce
was considered highly unlikely
sibility, coupled with their hig
and above, that allowed their o
contrary. But let us look at som
In October 1973, both Zeira a
tions. DMI Zeira entered office
the military attache in Washin
tion Division, commanded the
Forces (IDF), and served in var
quarters. In the mid-1950s he s
Dayan, and as a result, Dayan k
as the next chief of staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Yona Bandman entered office in
the summer of 1972. Earlier he had served in various positions in the Research
Division.
The importance of these two derived not only from their formal roles, b
also from what was believed in summer 1973 to be their earlier success, lend
considerable "epistemic authority" (Elis & Kruglanski, 1992; Kruglanski, 1989
to their pronouncements. Specifically, in April and May 1973, after a number
warnings, Israel's political-military elite (mainly Prime Minister Golda M
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Chief of Staff David Elazar) reached
conclusion that Egypt was likely to launch a war in the coming months. In c
trast, AMAN's official estimate, professed by Zeira and Bandman, was that t
likelihood of Egypt doing so remained low. As time passed, the validity of t
assessment became evident, and policymakers such as Dayan-who in M
ordered the IDF to prepare for a war in the summer-assessed in July that no
would take place within the next decade (Time, 1973). Consequently, the prof
sional prestige of Zeira and Bandman, who ardently believed that Egypt wou
not perceive itself as capable of launching a war in the coming years, reached
height in summer 1973. Their formal as well as informal high status-combin
with personal characteristics resembling those of individuals with a high need
closure, as well as particular beliefs about their professional duties-crea
unique circumstances that allowed them to exert considerable influence on oth
AMAN officers, on Israel's government, and ultimately on the entire country
is our thesis that those characteristics and beliefs reflected a personality struc
shared by Zeira and Bandman, one dominated by a high need for cogni
closure. Below, we detail our rationale for this assertion.
Zeira and Bandman's Personalities
Both Zeira and Bandman were highly intelligent, with excellent verbal
oral capabilities. Both also enjoyed "good chemistry" with one another, and
held in high esteem the professional skills of the other

as an estimator of international caliber (Ben-Porat, 199
Zeira as a decisive director who knew how intelligence
conveyed to consumers (interview with Bandman, 1998
characteristics, however, were ones that can be expect
need for cognitive closure. Both were highly confiden
and this imbued to a considerable degree their patterns
and action.
Mode of Estimation
Zeira and Bandman tended to view the complex Arab-Israeli environment in

terms of Popperian "clocks" (i.e., in highly precise, unequivocal terms) rather than
"clouds" (brimming with ambiguity and open to manifold possibilities) (Popper,
1972). This tendency was particularly apparent when it came to the traditional
conception of Egypt's military weakness. That conception (in force since the end
of the March 1969-August 1970 War of Attrition along the Suez Canal front)
stated that without a fighter force capable of attacking Israeli air bases, and
without surface-to-surface missiles with a sufficient range to reach Israel proper
(for deterrence purposes), Egypt would avoid a major military initiative. Such
conditions were not to be met for years. Consequently, Zeira and Bandman
assessed, at least since entering office, that the likelihood of an Egyptian attempt
to cross the Suez Canal was close to zero. In mid-September 1973 they assessed
that during the next 5 years, the Egyptians were unlikely to estimate "that they
have the capability to occupy the Sinai desert or a part of it, since this means an
overall confrontation with Israel" (Bar-Joseph, 2001, p. 239). Zeira and Bandman
never abandoned this conception and seemed to "freeze" upon it no matter what
further pertinent evidence became available, hence their persistent conclusion that
no war was possible.
Zeira and Bandman's unqualified adherence to the traditional conception
stands in stark contrast to the views of other experts who recognized the feasi-
bility of an Egyptian offensive under some conditions. Dayan, who understood
well that Anwar Sadat was under growing political pressure as long as the
"no war, no peace" situation persisted, believed (until summer 1973) that the
Egyptian leader might take military measures to alter the status quo. Major-
General Aharon Yariv, Zeira's predecessor, assessed in mid-1972 that the present
situation was likely to last until mid-1973. Then it was possible that Sadat would
perceive a limited military option as feasible. The head of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir,
estimated in April 1973 that the Egyptian army had bridged many of the gaps that
prevented it from launching a war and was now more capable than ever before to
take such action. And the chief of staff David Elazar estimated in August 1972
that, despite the expulsion of the Soviet personnel from Egypt, continuation of
the status quo would increase Sadat's frustration and that during 1973 he might
initiate a war (Bar-Joseph, 200

conception was not universally
need to avoid ambiguity and pr
Managerial and Organi
Individuals with a high need f

style (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglan
1994), and (2) for their tenden
tradict their own (Kruglanski &
ably the personality descriptio
authoritarian and decisive mana
open discussions and regarded t
who, in his opinion, came unpr
to say that those officers who es
not expect promotion. Bandma
used to express either verbally
of others. He was also known f
single word, even a comma, in
1998; Kaniazher, 1998; Levran
Neither Bandman nor Zeira w
other than their own. Consequen
there were
in AMAN contradic
intentions. is of interest to nIt
with Syrian affairs tended to e
war. But because the consensus
without Egypt-and because the
Bandman's opinion, was that Sa
war-the agency avoided provid
It is also noteworthy that the
lished mainly under Zeira's com
openness to divergent opinions;
with his own assessments but w
Beliefs About Professio
Common wisdom has it that th

consumers with the most preci
complexity. If the available in
picture, then he should describe
thought differently. As Zeir
members a few months before the war:
The chief of staff has to make decisions and his dec

The best support that the DMI can provide him
tively possible-is to provide him with an estima
as possible. It is true that the clearer and sharper
it is a mistake, it is a clear and sharp mistake-bu
DMI. (Agranat, 1975, p. 34)
Bandman viewed his duties in very similar terms.

sumers with all courses of action available to the e
he thought that an intelligence advisor's duty is to p
clearest possible estimate (interview with Bandman
belief, he insisted on 5 October 1973-24 hours befo
his personal assessment to AMAN's review of Arab m
40 of this report stated:
Although the mere emergency deployment at th

allegedly, an offensive initiative, to the best of o
took place in Egypt's assessment of the balance o
Therefore, the probability that they intend to r
(Agranat, 1975, p. 36)
In reference to this particular statement, Bandman e

tigative commission headed by Supreme Court Jud
I wrote the first version of this document with

felt that I had to add it. I felt that if I did not
would betray my duty. In other words, it is not en
and point out the information; I assessed that fro
spective I had all the indications needed for offen
far as intentions are concerned, my estimate remain
do not perceive themselves as capable of attac
hours later, but this is something else. (Agranat
The emphasis on clarity and coherence in Zeira's an

their professional duties is consistent with their pr
need for cognitive closure. Also consistent with tha
avoid or suppress information at odds with their ow
cal instance in which Zeira behaved this way took
the war broke out, when he decided to delay the d
about Soviet knowledge that Egypt and Syria inten
ing this decision, he told the members of the Agran
I saw no reason to alert the chief of staff at 11:00

there is such a message, and to add what we wrot
was not our most reliable one and that there we
should be remembered that [when making the d
chief of staff knew that the w

... This was how I felt that nig
felt similarly. ... So the chief of
would have said: fine.... But
(Agranat, 1974, p. 157)
When making this decision, Zeir

series of discussions earlier that d
putting the regular army on the
more war indicator in order to r
deciding to hold this warning fro
a chief of staff's decision. This, o
fessional discretion by most stan
warning only after the end of th
arrived, he would have taken cert
of the war (Ben-Porat, 1991).
Although denying his immedia
critical moments was, by itself, v
from Zeira's unusual perception o
Five or six days before the war
means of collection were operatin
defense asked him the same ques
of staff and minister of defense asked Zeira if all of AMAN's means of collec-
tion were operating. Senior officers in AMAN-specifically the heads of the co
lection and research departments and the commander of the SIGINT unit-aske
him to activate these means. What all of them had in mind were certain means-
sometimes referred to as "Israel's national insurance policy"-which were to be
operated at times of tension and were likely to collect high-quality warning ind
cators in case Egypt or Syria intended to launch an attack. Zeira led his superi
ors to understand that the "special means" were indeed activated. But in realit
believing that war was unlikely, he avoided ordering their operation (Bar-Josep
2001).
In acting this way, Zeira withheld critical information from his superiors. But
the real implications of his actions went even further. Because Dayan and Elazar
believed in the efficacy of those particular means, and because they believed them
to be operational yet to have produced no warnings, their belief that the
Egyptian and Syrian preparations did not portend war was strengthened. The chief
of staff himself said so, upon learning (after the war had ended) that the "special
means" remained inactive until a few hours before the outbreak of hostilities. The
Agranat commission found Zeira's behavior in this case a sufficient reason to ease
Dayan's responsibility for the fiasco (Agranat, 1975; Bar-Joseph, 2001).
These actions seem to be particularly puzzling. Here again, a combination of
Zeira's overconfidence, a unique weltanschauung of professional duty (with its
overriding emphasis on "clarity"), and dogmati

intentions-all indications of a high personal n
Zeira to ethically questionable and ultimately dam
Denial of Preconception-Inconsistent Inf
In an attempt to preserve their preconceptions,

for cognitive closure may deny, reinterpret, or su
with the preconceptions on which they are "fr
1996). There appears to be considerable evidence t
that. In some cases this was simply done by passi
only speculative assessments in defense of their pr
ing on 5 October that the Egyptian army was at its
added this assertion, without any hard informatio
The Egyptians continue to fear an Israeli i

("Tahrir") exercise and the Ramadan fast for a
These fears increased toward the morning of 5
lowing the air photograph sortie conducted by
October 4, and similar sorties on October 3. (B
Here, at least, Bandman did not have to contend w

with his "Egyptian fears" hypothesis. But four pa
activity on the front, he wrote in flagrant contrad
activity was observed this morning along the Can
p. 319). All the reports from Israeli observation p
told an opposite story: massive movements of he
to positions on the front line; senior Egyptian of
strongholds; large numbers of soldiers getting org
blackout in the town of Port Said in the northern
evening of Yom Kippur," a battalion commander t
became full to capacity" (Agranat, 1974, p. 405). B
this be considered "routine activity." Nor could i
exercise; activity in former Tahrir exercises was v
actions of the Egyptian army in early October 19
When asked why he disregarded these repo
answer: "The nature of the local command's colle
value. We (in the Research Division) analyzed t
spective and not from the perspective of the
(Agranat, 1974, p. 414). Post factum Bandman wou
lection sources by his own order of reliability: SIG
first, then open sources, and last HUMINT source
1998). In the case of Yom Kippur, the best warni
HUMINT sources, but they were never incorporate
cannot help but wonder whe

whether Bandman ranked HUM
tradicted his preferred concept
Very much like Bandman, wh
his conclusion and extant infor
latter, Zeira showed a similar pa
is the way he explained to Prim
why the Soviets were conductin
Specifically, Zeira suggested th
intends to attack... (2) the Sovi
intend to attack... (3) a crisis in
probably after realizing that neit
sense, he added: "The Soviets m
intend to attack since they don
pp. 76-77; Braun, 1992, p. 61)
military assistance, the notion
informing the Soviets first was
by Zeira when it did not suit h
In the early hours of Yom Kip
the Mossad, the chief of staff fi
start at around sunset. By now,
badly shaken. And yet, even
"war," he was reluctant to aban
there would be a war, emphasiz
ulated that if the Egyptians in
crossing the canal, implicitly be
bilities (Agranat, 1974; Bartov,
saying was that he saw no reason
be Sadat's mistake, not his.
Bandman was thinking alon
behavior in AMAN, he refused
now likely. Another officer had
prepared a new intelligence rev
He submitted it to Zeira, who,
predecessor Yariv, who had arr
dissemination, and Zeira accept
fact that he was willing to cons
everyone else accepted that wa
gearing for it-is a telling ind
utmost trust in Bandman's p
judgment.
If, as we assume, Zeira and Bandman had a high need for closure, this not
only may have caused them to personally "freeze" on the conventional precon-
ception about the low likelihood of an Egyptian

contributed to their influence on others in several
autocratic manner, and low tolerance for dissenting
pressed dissenting voices and contributed to a sense
a wider base of consensus than was actually the
Zeira's spring 1973 assessment regarding a low prob
lent his subsequent pronouncements added credibility
The assessment he offered, in and of itself, was opt
tionally desirable to many intelligence consumers. T
war with Egypt and Syria was unlikely meant that th
no lives would be lost, no costs would be incurred, a
able to carry on with "business as usual." These f
AMAN's consumers (at the level of the military com
government), as well as in AMAN's own personnel, a
specific closure" (Kruglanski, 1989b)-namely th
Bandman.
The Motivational Context of Intelligence Assessments
According to the lay-epistemic theory, no judgment or decision occurs in

motivational vacuum. It is therefore of interest to consider the kinds of motiva-
tional forces that may affect intelligence assessments about the likelihood of an
enemy's surprise attack. Some such motivations may stem from the assessors'
considerations of the decisional mistakes assessors' judgments might lead to, and
of their respective costs. Classic decision theory distinguishes between two types
of error: (1) accepting a given conception when it is false, and (2) rejecting it
when it is true. In the case of surprise attacks, the conception at stake is the assess-
ment that the peaceful status quo is likely to continue, and that no assault is im-
minent. The error of accepting it when false, referred to as a "miss" in
signal-detection theory, is what produces the surprise that makes surprise attacks
so devastating. Rejecting it when true results in a false alarm that may involve
unnecessary mobilization of forces and the disruption of a nation's routine activ-
ities. Even worse, it can provoke a security dilemma and, under extreme circum-
stances, might lead to an unintended war (Jervis, 1976, 1978). Both types of error
involve obvious costs, of which decision-makers are typically aware. At the
national level, a false alarm can lead to an intended crisis and war, and may have
prohibitive economic costs as well as dulling the state's future sensitivity to rel-
evant warning signs. At the decision-maker's level, it may deal a blow to the pres-
tige of persons sounding the alarm, and they may be perceived as insufficiently
tough and given to undue panic-typical symptoms of the "cry-wolf syndrome."
The costs of a successful surprise attack are the loss of lives and of strategic posi-
tions as well as an impetus it may give the enemy's offensive that may require
considerable war effort (or prove impossible) to undo.
In classic decision theory, the c

of a given course of action by a
ter in the value x expectancy
assumes that expectancy of an e
that both expectancy and value
in light of their consciously kn
contrast, the lay-epistemic theo
assessments of expectancy (the
(2) such influence generally tak
ness, and (3) there typically exi
vidual is unaware but nonethele
not only do the perceived costs
an enemy, or the mobilization c
sciously determine its assesse
2002), but also the perceptions
enced by the assessor's own mot
mism/pessimism) outside the a
This is important because it is
intelligence assessors are assum
to the decision-makers. Accord
objective and "rational," such a
ical." They are influenced by c
that an attack is likely versus u
sor's mind, the "winner" (i.e., t
assessments.
Because the costs of a successful surprise attack may seem

heavier than those of a false alarm, intelligence analysts often may
likelihood of an attack as high and may forecast the worst-case scen
sionally the opposite motivational forces may prevail, inducing th
portend a calming alternative, as may have been the case with major
casters on the eve of the Yom Kippur war. Zeira's and Bandman's p
in minimizing the probability of attack in May 1973 may have lent
diction the status of a "desirable closure" in October. Combined with
need for nonspecific closure, this constellation of motives may ha
considerable "freezing" on this preconception, as discussed above.
A strong situational circumstance contributing to the need for
combination of ambiguity and the potential for aversive consequen
fog" of the kind that prevailed on the eve of the Yom Kippur war fits
tion well. Where ambiguity is slanted toward the possibility of a d
comes to abhor it and to crave clarifying closure that would enabl
action. This aspect of the situation too may have fed the general ne
experienced by all (intelligence chiefs as well as their clients, the
intelligence) during the fateful days preceding the Yom Kippur atta
Note that the "need for nonspecific closure" as s

or against the prediction of a surprise attack. It foster
conception seems currently in place, be it the notion
or that its likelihood is low. The detrimental role th
in the judgmental process is not that it prejudges a
rather that it renders the individual's mind impervi
information whose consideration might have improv
Avoiding Premature Closure
The lay-epistemic analysis suggests several avenu

premature closure may be effected. Because the cru
consider rival alternatives to a currently received co
systematically generate such alternatives. This is n
present context, it appeared previously in several f
of appointing a member of the intelligence team to
(Janis, 1982) and the kindred idea of "multiple a
latter calls for opposing teams of intelligence analys
interpret the available data in contrasting manners,
to forge an optimistic assessment and the other trying
data in a pessimistic or alarming manner. The polic
decide between the two interpretations; however, thi
both are given an equal opportunity to be carefully
lated on the basis of the available information. These solutions can be effective
if implemented in an appropriately cautious manner. Primarily, it is essential th
both teams be equally motivated to produce compelling interpretations, and tha
neither team perform its job in a routine, ritualized manner. Experience gained i
AMAN's Research Division since the mid-1970s, when the function of the
"devil's advocate" was institutionalized, suggests that if the alternative point of
view is argued with less than complete seriousness, it can be readily dismissed,
hence strengthening belief in the original conception (Kam, 1988).
A more innovative proposal implicit in our analysis is to select people for
high-level intelligence posts who have a relatively low individual need for closure,
which would compensate and foster resistance to (without necessarily reducing)
the situational pressures in the direction of closure. As noted earlier, personality
tests (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) currently exist that enable such a selection.
Although such a proposal may appear far-fetched, it is directly suggested by the
notion that an elevated need for closure on the part of highly placed decision-
makers in the intelligence establishment may exert a profoundly biasing effect on
the way that intelligence is handled.
As a third possibility, intelligence analysts could be made aware (in the appro-
priate workshops and courses) of their own psychological vulnerabilities to pre-
mature closure. Specifically, they would be made aware of the role of motivation
in judgment formation, and the

vations likely to be operative in
ately correct for their potenti
might reduce, at least to some
assessment is driven exclusivel
to alternative interpretive poss
Concluding Remarks: Lay E
This paper used newly availab

in the early phases of the Yom
ing of the ample warning signs
degree to the behavior of two
lishment: the DMI, Eli Zeira, a
Bandman. On the basis of exte
uments, we proposed that the p
constituted a dispositional sy
closure. As individuals with a h
and Bandman (1) placed an unus
of their assessments, (2) exhibi
style of decision-making, and (3
mation inconsistent with their
outbreak of the war. It is thes
siderable formal and informal
for their influence on Israel's
for the general adherence in bot
with Egypt and with Syria was
It is true that our judgment o
take place before the war. Nor
not infer their epistemic motiv
tive) failure to see the Egyptian
tional states from a divergent a
and from others' impressions of
way they viewed the intelligen
ence, their boundless seemingly
ing opinions or to information
all indications consistent with a
empirical evidence collected ove
1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1
It would have been useful, eve
Closure Scale (Webster & Krugla
October 1973 drama and to corr
attitudes and opinions vis-a-vis the unfolding events

however, lies beyond the scope of the present analys
Lay Epistemics and Political Decision-Ma
It is of interest, in the present context, to ponder

epistemic theory to political decision-making, and c
notions previously brought to bear on this topic (se
discussed, unlike alternative conceptions that stressed
motivational aspect of human judgment, the lay-epist
Second, and no less important, the lay-epistemic theo
mental parameters assumed to hold across diverse con
trast, previous psychological models applied to politic
specific contents of judgment that they universalized
ples are the putatively general (1) proclivity to comm
tion error" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), that is, to make c
responsibility for actions or outcomes to the actor's d
uations; (2) stronger aversion to losses (i.e., judgmen
worse than is currently the case) than attraction to g
1979); (3) tendency to underestimate (the contents of
to prefer the contents of "representative" informat
1974); or (4) tendency of actors to make causal judgm
to the role of the situation, and of observers to locat
position. By now, ample empirical research demonstr
dencies is as fixed or as universal as has been su
attribution error seems readily reversible where
focused on the situation rather than the person (Kru
tendency to neglect the base rates is readily remedi
seen as more subjectively relevant (Bar-Hillel, 1
Sedlmeier, 1999) or when the individuals are motiva
Ginosar, 1988), the greater risk aversion with respec
to be reversed for individuals under a "promotion"
(Higgins, 1997), and the actor-observer differences ar
in perspective (Storms, 1973).
The lay-epistemic theory, by contrast, assumes a
model of the human knower that is not necessarily d
ously identified biases. More important, it affords
tional and cognitive) conditions under which each of
itself (see, e.g., Webster, 1993). It suggests that judgm
individuals' inference rules whose contents can vary
accessibility of such rules, and on the clarity of sit
those rules, the difficulty of the judgmental task, an
tive factors that may reveal, obfuscate, or distort t
specific contexts. The flexible

theory could offer a new fram
Rather than assuming a priori
certain tendencies (e.g., toward
rate neglect), it would call for
of the general judgmental para
determine what judgmental pr
(Kruglanski, 1992).
Alternative Cases of Su
As a general theory of judgm

of illuminating alternative inst
apparently prompted the Yom
Barbarossa and the Japanese at
available documentation concern
conception (fed him by the Ge
until the war with Britain was
submit an
ultimatum (Whaley
important to consider is issue
Stalin to adhere to this belie
Gorodetsky, 1999; Overy, 1997
vational bias on Stalin's part (n
with Hitler would not need to b
of the Red Army's inferiority
autocratic manner and his purg
war-both consistent with a hig
subordinates and prevented a
Gordievsky, 1990). Thus, Stalin'
misconception may have been c
whose expression was forestalle
despite vast surface dissimilari
bear greater resemblance to eac
this possibility is speculative at
for its corroboration.
In the case of Pearl Harbor, the classic study of this particular debacle traced
the main source of the problem to the fact that the indications of the Japanese
intention to attack ("signals") were collected alongside a great deal of irrelevant
or contradictory information ("noise"), which made the task of distinguishing
between the two extremely difficult (Wohlstetter, 1962). From the lay-epistemic
perspective, when the difficulty of the cognitive task is high, one requires corre-
spondingly high levels of compensatory processing motivation and cognitive
capacity to overcome the difficulty. Recent studies of the Pearl Harbor fiasco
suggest that, in fact, both cognitive capacity and processing motivation were in
short supply. The cognitive capacity that did exist was

able compartmentalization, which left the local army a
Hawaii without critical information, even though such i
to policymakers in Washington, D.C. (Clausen & Lee,
processing motivation issue may be traced to the man
partmentalization, Chief of the War Plans Division in th
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. Some experts regard
important persons responsible if not the man mainly re
(Prange, 1991, p. 295). It is instructive, from the lay-ep
Turner was described by one colleague as a "man of inf
man who wanted it all simplified... [who] wanted al
black and white and no difficult mental process to go
thinking, just machine-gun answers--bang, bang, bang
described him as "rigid, narrow, intolerant" (Prange, 19
istics prototypical of an individual with a high need for
Harbor attack can be attributed to the combination of a
telling the "signal" from the considerable "noise"),
capacity for the transmittal and sharing of informati
have had a high need for cognitive closure. Such circum
deadly mixture of psychological ingredients that collecti
ability to avert a sneak attack.
Coda
The comprehensive judgmental analysis offered by the lay-epistemic m

suggests new ways of looking at decision-making processes underlying cruc
political events. Furthermore, a lay-epistemic reconstruction of real-world
of political decision-making may furnish a fertile testing ground for the l
epistemic theory as such and contribute to its future development and refinem
The present attempt to understand the Yom Kippur intelligence failure in
epistemic terms represents a step in this direction.
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS
Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Uri B

Division of International Relations, Department of Political Scienc
of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel (E-mail: barjo@pol
Arie Kruglanski, Department of Psychology, University of Mary
Park, MD 20742 (E-mail: arie@psyc.umd.edu).
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Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur

Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure:

0162-895X ? 2003 International Society of Political Psychology

ferent causes. Much of the puzzl

In so doing, our major assumption is that an und

needs to maintain their own em

How Judgments Are Formed: A Theory of Lay Epistemics

or "parameters," represented at some of their va

processes by bringing the info

Antecedents of the Nee

According to the theory of la

aversiveness of information processing-for exa

Consequences of the Need for Closure

When the need for closure is aroused (or is gener

Need for Closure and AMAN's Processes of Ju

As already noted, our analysis assigns a major

have had a particularly high deg

Zeira and Bandman's Personalities

held in high esteem the professional skills of the other

Zeira and Bandman tended to view the complex Arab-Israeli environment in

initiate a war (Bar-Joseph, 200

Managerial and Organi

Individuals with a high need f

Beliefs About Professio

Common wisdom has it that th

The chief of staff has to make decisions and his dec

Bandman viewed his duties in very similar terms.

Although the mere emergency deployment at th

In reference to this particular statement, Bandman e

I wrote the first version of this document with

The emphasis on clarity and coherence in Zeira's an

I saw no reason to alert the chief of staff at 11:00

chief of staff knew that the w

When making this decision, Zeir

overriding emphasis on "clarity"), and dogmati

Denial of Preconception-Inconsistent Inf

In an attempt to preserve their preconceptions,

The Egyptians continue to fear an Israeli i

Here, at least, Bandman did not have to contend w

cannot help but wonder whe

ception about the low likelihood of an Egyptian

The Motivational Context of Intelligence Assessments

According to the lay-epistemic theory, no judgment or decision occurs in

In classic decision theory, the c

Because the costs of a successful surprise attack may seem

Note that the "need for nonspecific closure" as s

Avoiding Premature Closure

The lay-epistemic analysis suggests several avenu

in judgment formation, and the

Concluding Remarks: Lay E

This paper used newly availab

attitudes and opinions vis-a-vis the unfolding events

Lay Epistemics and Political Decision-Ma

It is of interest, in the present context, to ponder

specific contexts. The flexible

As a general theory of judgm

short supply. The cognitive capacity that did exist was

The comprehensive judgmental analysis offered by the lay-epistemic m

Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Uri B

Agranat (investigation committee, Yom Kippur war) (1974). An additional partia

Agranat (investigation committee, Yom

Handel, M. I. (1987). Technological surprise in war. Intelligence and National Security,

Handel, M. I. (1989). War, strategy and intelligence: An overvie