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Andrei N. Petrov
Entered Flight Research Institute named after M. Gromov (Russian abbreviation – M. Gromov
LII) in 1980 upon graduation from the Moscow Aviation Institute (Technical University) with a
MS degree in Aircraft Mechanical Engineering and is working at LII to present time on engi-
neering and managing positions. Since 1993 as a Chief of the Safety, Reliability, Mainte-
nance Research and Test Division of the Institute. He was closely involved in development,
testing and certification of a number of both civil and military aircraft (major projects are Il-96-
300, Il-114, Su-27, Yak-42, Tu-204, An-74, An-124, Ka-126, Ka-32, Mi?28, Mi-34, Mi-17) with
main activity in maintenance program and maintainability optimization and certification. Be-
sides the research and certification activity, he participates in development of many technical
and regulatory documents (specifications, standards, etc.) in aircraft safety, reliability, and
maintainability. Mr. Petrov received his Dr. Sc. degree in Aircraft/Systems Testing, Evaluation,
and Operation from the M. Gromov Flight Research Institute in 1989. He is an Expert-Auditor
of the CIS Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) for continuing airworthiness of the aeronauti-
cal products. Started in 1994, he closely involved in ICAO Continuing Airworthiness Panel
activities, and since 1998 he is a nominated Panel Member from the Russian Federation
(since year 2000 ICAO Airworthiness Panel – AIRP). Mr. Petrov is an author of about 70
publications (book, standards, handbooks, and printed papers). He also teaching methods of
maintenance program development, certification, continuing airworthiness, and quality con-
trol for students and specialists of aviation industry. The degree of the Senior Scientific Fellow
was awarded to Mr. Petrov in 1996. He is a Member of the Society of Flight Test Engineers
(SFTE) and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE – Aerospace).
А.Н. Петров
Начал работать в ЛИИ им. М.М. Громова в 1980 г. по окончании МАИ с дипломом
инженера-механика по самолетостроению и продолжает работать в ЛИИ по настоя-
щее время на инженерных и руководящих должностях. С 1993 г. он начальник научно-
исследовательского отделения надежности, безопасности полетов и проблем эксп-
луатации авиатехники. Он принимал активное участие в разработке, испытаниях и
сертификации как гражданских, так и военных ВС (основные проекты Ил-96-300, Ил-
114, Су-27, Як-42, Ту-204, Ан-74, Ан-124, Ка-126, Ka-32, Ми?28, Ми-34, Ми-17) в основ-
ном в части оптимизации и сертификации программ ТОиР и эксплуатационной тех-
нологичности. Кроме исследовательских и сертификационных работ он участвовал в
создании многих технических и нормативных документов (технических требований,
положений, стандартов и др.) по вопросам безопасности, надежности и других эксп-
луатационных характеристик ВС. В 1989 г. А.Н. Петрову в ЛИИ им. М.М. Громова была
присвоена ученая степень кандидата технических наук в областях контроля, испыта-
ний и эксплуатации летательных аппаратов и их систем. Он является экспертом-ауди-
тором МАК СНГ по вопросам поддержания летной годности авиатехники. С начала
1994 г. он активно участвует в работах Группы экспертов ИКАО по сохранению летной
годности, а с 1998 г. он в качестве уполномоченного эксперта представляет в этой
Группе Российскую Федерацию (с 2000 г. Группа имеет новые полномочия и пере-
именована в Группу экспертов ИКАО по летной годности – ICAO Airworthiness Panel –
AIRP). А.Н. Петров автор около 70 публикаций (книг, стандартов, руководств и статей).
Он преподает методы разработки программ ТОиР, сертификации, поддержания лет-
ной годности и управления качеством студентам и специалистам авиационной от-
расли. Звание старшего научного сотрудника было присвоено А.Н. Петрову в 1996 г.
Он член международного Общества инженеров по летным испытания (Society of Flight
Test Engineers -SFTE) и Общества инженеров транспорта (Society of Automotive
Engineers, SAE – Aerospace).
In general terms an aircraft has a number of on- Unfortunately, it seems lack of good (simple but
board systems and each system may be regarded accurate) math model leads to very low MSG-3 for-
as consisting of a number of elements (components) malization level. In fact it is not an engineering tech-
with each element having limited number of par- nique – it looks like kind of "holy bible" for an "expert
ticular failures. Basic reliability assumptions for the elite". Would be very useful to bring the document
aviation systems are as follows: closer to that kind of handbooks most aircraft and
• Element failure rates are constant. maintenance engineers use to use everyday.
• Element failures are detected in flight and on Since the end of 70th Russian aircraft engineers
the ground and are corrected during mainte- have gained a lot of experience in the area of main-
nance; system failures are detected in flight only tenance planning using the RCM principles [4]. A
and corrected before the next flight. number of issues within MSG?3 methodology were
• Corrective maintenance (repair) after the failure found both by Western [5] and Russian specialists.
assures system restoration in a specified time. This collected experience allowed to propose origi-
• For highly reliable aerospace systems failure nal methodical approach based on RCM and MSG-
repair time could be considered negligible with 3 principles, which was published as special manual
respect to the mean time between failures. on maintenance program development [6].
• The inspections are perfect (essentially hundred At the same time this new approach to be visi-
percent of the failures are detected and fixed, ble to Western civil aviation community would be
and no new failures are introduced as a result adopted as part of known MSG-3 document in a
of the maintenance). framework of its regular amendments. There are
On the basis of these assumptions the Markov also the method military application issues could
homogeneous process may be used as a math be considered.
model for the aircraft system safety/reliability as-
2. Methodology
sessment and maintenance planning [3].
2.1. Approach and Initial Data
1. General
The idea of methodology in general would be
The goal of maintenance program development
the logical extent of the failure mode and effect anal-
is to reduce the aircraft operating cost, maintain-
ysis (FMEA) data to the maintenance planning ac-
ing at the same time its airworthiness and market
tivity since early stage of an aircraft design and test-
competitiveness. The experience of the aircraft
ing. Airworthiness principles are quiet easy (Fig. 1).
operations shows that maintenance costs can be
In most cases equipment failures are inevitable.
reduced through wide implementation of the so-
All anticipated aircraft failure can be divided in two
called on?condition maintenance without unnec-
groups: (1) evident to the flight crew during perfor-
essary maintenance tasks and scheduled compo-
nents replacements. It is clear that generally, with mance of normal duties and (2) hidden means non-
all the necessary initial information available, the evident to the crew. Hidden failures are subject for
quantitative substantiation of an effective mainte- scheduled maintenance checks and timely restora-
nance schedule means ensuring the required safe- tion tasks to keep the aircraft airworthiness. Mainte-
ty and effectiveness of aircraft operations while min- nance checks intervals should be optimized to
imizing the maintenance specific cost (say in $ per achieve low maintenance cost while maintaining
1 flight hour). Main difficulty here is a quantitative required failure probabilities.
validation of meeting the aircraft design require- Within evident group any single hazardous failure
ments, which requires an adequate analytical model principally shall be eliminated or – with limited design
of maintenance influence on the safety and effec- capabilities – the probability of such a failure shall be
tiveness criteria. limited in accordance with the airworthiness require-
Real alternative for the accurate quantitative ments. Evident failures of redundant elements gen-
approach is the rational combination of the qualita- erally have no safety effect and could be treated the
tive engineering analysis, to select the PMPs and same way as hidden failures – restoration tasks should
maintenance tasks, and the quantitative optimiza- be established and their intervals should be optimized.
tion of the maintenance intervals using the math These tasks have the same physical nature as main-
model of scheduled maintenance influence on air- tenance tasks listed in the maintenance program but
craft system reliability and safety. This allows formal they forms separate document – MMEL to be ap-
analyzing of the influence of possible systems' and proved by the airworthiness authority as part of the
components' failure modes on aircraft safety, dis- aircraft flight manual. Later it is implemented by an
patch reliability, and economics. Such rational ap- operator in his operations manual.
proach was proposed in 70th by United Airlines [2] Reason for the same nature of hidden and evi-
and later became well-known ATA MSG-3 method- dent failures in the fault tolerant systems is their
ical document for scheduled maintenance program similar restoration policy. For a hidden failure res-
development [1]. This document is recognized by toration interval will be the interval of scheduled
USA FAA, European Union JAA, and widely used maintenance check with subsequent item repair.
by aircraft manufacturers and airlines. And for an evident (MMEL) failure this interval will
be the allowed time for the item to be unservice- modes, failures' average probabilities and effects
able (supposed an item failure to become evident on aircraft operation.
during a flight). 2.2. Scheduled Maintenance Tasks
Aircraft designer always have a choice when Selection
considers redundant elements' failures. Sometimes The aircraft scheduled maintenance analysis
it is more effective to keep them hidden (not dis- has two major parts:
turbing the crew and not spending on failure warning 1. PMPs and maintenance tasks selection for each
systems) with the scheduled maintenance tasks de- possible aircraft failure mode.
velopment. In other cases on-board failure monitor- 2. Maintenance interval optimization for the formed
ing is preferable – then redundant elements' failures maintenance tasks schedule.
have to be covered by the MMEL procedures. There is also third part of redundant component
The initial data for the maintenance planning analysis – the MMEL development as a compliment
analysis, besides general technical data on the air- to the scheduled maintenance program – but this
craft systems design and operation would be the methodology is not an objective of presented paper.
FMEA results: systems' and components' failure
Questions:
1. Is the occurrence of a system failure mode evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2. What is the most serious failure effect caused by the system failure mode?
3. Does the system failure mode lead to an aborted take-off or to a diversion when occur during a flight?
4. Is there FDR/CMC flight data are recording that allows finding out the system failure mode during maintenance?
5. Is an operational check to verify operation for the system failure mode applicable & effective?
First part process includes three levels of logic option if the component design and/or installation
analysis. Level 1 logic analysis scheme (Fig. 2) is are not appropriate for accomplishment of neces-
aided to categorize all possible failure modes for sary maintenance tasks.
particular aircraft system into four effect catego- 2.3. Maintenance Intervals Optimization
ries (FEC) depending on severity of the failure in-
Second part of the maintenance program de-
flight consequences and to evaluate the necessity
of the system scheduled operational checks. velopment process could be generally divided in
Level 2 and 3 of the decision logic analysis are three main stages.
deal with aircraft components' failures. Level 2 logic 1. Determination of the so-called unreliability
analysis scheme (Fig. 3) allows to categorize each functions for each system failure mode and main-
component failure significance (SC) in accordance tenance specific cost function for the system.
with the failure effect on system and aircraft oper- These functions are defined in terms of: the sys-
ation (FEC), its redundancy level (FP), anticipated tem failure physical nature with associated safe-
probability and the physical nature of the failure ty and mission completion effect, the required
mode. At Level 2 there also has to be selected (normative) failure probabilities, and the mainte-
component PMP (hard time, on-condition or failure nance tasks under consideration. The following
monitoring). data (parameters) are used: component failure
Possible re-design measures would be proposed modes and their probabilities; typical flight and
at Levels 1 and 2 if the system or component design its phases duration; unknown maintenance task
and/or installation are not meeting the appropriate intervals to be optimized; scheduled and un-
airworthiness or operation requirements. scheduled maintenance tasks cost (man-hours
Level 3 of logic analysis (Fig. 4) is intended for or money values).
component design evaluation to select necessary 2. Optimization of the individual maintenance
scheduled maintenance tasks that can prevent fail- task intervals using LaGrange's method for convex
ures, or timely find failures out, and timely restore functions case. Math model available [3].
the airworthy state of the component. Re-design 3. Final step is estimation of rational mainte-
measures at this level of analysis are also possible nance intervals. This requires a rational integra-
Questions:
1. What is the failure mode functionality parameter?
2. Is failure mode an item mechanical damage / jam?
3. Does failure mode effect dispatch reliability?
4. Is there sufficient relationship between the failure rate and item life?
5. Is a combination of failures not more frequent then extremely improbable (average probability per 1 FH is not
more then 10–9)?
6. Is this failure mode not more frequent then extremely remote (average probability per 1 FH is 10–9–10–7)?
7. Is this failure mode not more frequent then remote (average probability per 1 FH is 10–7–10–5)?
8. Is this failure mode not more frequent then probable (average probability per 1 FH is 10–4–10–2)?
9. Is it possible to monitor condition of the item to find out potential failure (early signs of this failure mode causes)?
Fig. 2. Level 2 Logic Diagram for Item Failure Modes – Determine Primary Maintenance Process (PMP) and
Significance Category (SC) for Each Item
Questions:
1. Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
2. Is an item design and/or available support equipment allows effective accomplishment of the assigned task(s)?
3. Is an in-flight monitoring allows effective finding of potential failure (early signs of the failure mode causes)?
4. Is an in-flight monitoring allows effective finding of the failure mode?
5. Is an in-flight restoration of the item failure mode applicable and effective?
6. Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
7. Can item be effectively restored after reaching the assigned airworthiness limit (finding particular item failure
mode, its predetermined condition of potential failure, or exceeding item life limit)?
Fig. 4. Level 3 Logic Diagram for Item Failure Modes – Determine Scheduled Maintenance Tasks for Each Item
tion of the individual tasks with optimum values The results permitted to reduce the IL-96-300
into appropriate scheduled maintenance checks maintenance by 30% compared to that of the IL-86
with known base intervals. to comply with the world level of characteristics.
2.4. One Example of the Method Practical This has been achieved not only by the mainte-
Implementation nance program optimization, but also due to the
earlier rectification and elimination of maintainabil-
The S. Ilyushin Company experience shows a ity deficiencies. The most airplane components
good example of practical implementation of the (about 100% of types and nearly 90% of the total
proposed math model and associated techniques. number of the components) can be on?condition
The first experience was acquired during IL-86 air- maintained and are successfully operated now with-
plane development, which was thoroughly analyzed out life time limitations.
by "IL" reliability engineers together with M. Gro-
mov LII specialists to assess systems reliability and 3. Potential Outlook
safety. Also there was an attempt to realize older The future activities of methodology improve-
ATA MSG-2 document logic analysis for IL-86 main- ment are focused on implementation of the digital
tenance program development but without a close system reliability assumptions and the development
relation to the results of FMEA. of MMEL optimization technique. There is also a
Failure mode and effect analysis, system safe- technological issue of method automation realiz-
ty assessment, and development of a maintenance ing a systematic approach to safety, reliability, and
program for the next generation IL-96-300 airplane maintainability ensuring and evaluation in a frame-
were carried out completely based on the above- work of modern Continuos Acquisition and Life-
mentioned methodology from the early stages of cycle Support (CALS) technologies. Widely used
the airplane design [4]. All the system components CALS and e-business environments have a real
without division into "significant" and "non-signifi- need in integrated object-oriented applications for
cant" as it is prescribed by the ATA MSG-3 were particular technical disciplines. Aircraft safety, reli-
analyzed in accordance with the special Manual ability, and maintenance software applications still
[6]. About 800 types of maintenance objects (parts have a lot to be improved.
and components) were considered and the total Last years we faced visible movement towards
workload was about 30000 man-hours. next century of dynamic flight. Airbus's giant A380
Перечень вопросов
1. Можно ли отнести отказ в момент его возникновения к числу явных для летного экипажа при выполне-
нии служебных обязанностей?
2. Какова наибольшая возможная степень опасности особой ситуации при данном отказе ФС?
3. Приводит ли данный отказ к вынужденной посадке или прерванному взлету ВС?
4. Обеспечена ли регистрация БСК информации, позволяющей выявить данный отказ при ТО?
5. Обеспечено ли выявление данного отказа при ТО?
Перечень вопросов
1. Можно ли отнести отказ в момент его возникновения к числу явных для летного экипажа при выполне-
нии служебных обязанностей?
2. Какова наибольшая возможная степень опасности особой ситуации при данном отказе ФС?
3. Приводит ли данный отказ к вынужденной посадке или прерванному взлету ВС?
4. Обеспечена ли регистрация БСК информации, позволяющей выявить данный отказ при ТО?
5. Обеспечено ли выявление данного отказа при ТО?
Перечень вопросов
1. Приемлемы ли профилактические работы по поддержанию режимов функционирования элемента?
2. Приспособлены ли конструкция и средства ТОиР к выполнению выбранных работ?
3. Является ли контроль экипажа и/или FDR/CMC эффективным для выявления в полете предотказного
состояния элемента?
4. Является ли контроль экипажа и/или FDR/CMC эффективным для выявления в полете данного вида
отказа элемента?
5. Существует ли возможность и целесообразность устранения в полете данного вида отказа элемента?
6. Целесообразен ли контроль технического состояния элемента при ТОиР?
7. Обеспечено ли восстановление элемента при ТОиР при достижении предельного состояния?
Благодарности Литература
Считаю своим долгом выразить глубокую 1. Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance
признательность всем специалистам отделе- Development. ATA MSG-3. Revision 2001.1, 2001.
ния 4 ЛИИ им. М.М. Громова и лично к.т.н. 2. F. S. Nowlan, H.F. Heap. Reliability-Centered Main-
О.Я. Деркачу и к.т.н. Ю.А. Ялозе, чья помощь tenance, 1978.
3. G. M. Susova, A. N. Petrov. Markov Model-Based
была особенно полезна при подготовке это-
Reliability and Safety Evaluation for Aircraft Main-
го доклада. Автор благодарен также специа- tenance-System Optimization. IEEE Proceedings
листам ОКБ им. С.В. Ильюшина за их под- of the Annual Reliability & Maintainability Sympo-
держку в отработке и практическом внедре- sium, 1997, p.p.29?36.
нии предлагаемой методологии в инженерную 4. A. N. Petrov, V. A. Karpenko. Experience of Develop-
практику. ment and Certification of the IL?96-300 Maintenance
Особая признательность Американской ас- Program. Proceedings of the Aircraft Flight Safety
социации воздушного транспорта (Air Transport International Conference, 1993, p.p. 676-681.
Association – ATA) и лично директору по про- 5. S.J. Bradbury. MSG-3 as Viewed by the Manufac-
turer (Was it Effective?). – SAE Technical Paper
блемам ТОиР господину Рику Андерсону (Mr. Ric
Series # 841482, 1984.
Anderson, ATA Maintenance and Material Director) 6. Руководство для конструкторов и эксплуатантов
за его эффективное взаимодействие и предос- по разработке и сертификации программ
тавленный доступ на сайт ATA. Его поддержку в технического обслуживания и ремонта
совместных усилиях по развитию документа ATA воздушных судов гражданской авиации
MSG-3 трудно переоценить. (РДК-Э). ЛИИ им. М.М. Громова, ГосНИИ ГА, 1993.