Appendix H.

Building Siting Assessments

Abstract
This appendix gives supplemental guidelines for API RP 752 - Management of
Hazards Associated with Process Plant Buildings. It was developed by CRTC’s
Process Risk Team.

Contents Page

H1.0 Building Siting Assessment Overview H-2

H1.1 API RP 752 Methodology
H1.2 Study Team Members
H1.3 Study Timing
H2.0 Stage 1 - Hazard Assessment H-4
H2.1 Building Identification
H2.2 Hazard Screening
H2.3 Occupancy/Function Screening
H2.4 Recommendations
H3.0 Stage 2 - Building Evaluation H-7
H3.1 Toxic Hazards
H3.2 Explosion Hazards
H3.3 Fire Hazard
H4.0 Stage 3 - Risk Assessment H-13
H4.1 Risk Assessment Team
H4.2 Qualitative Evaluation
H5.0 Documentation and Follow-up H-15
H6.0 References H-16

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H1.0 Building Siting Assessment Overview

Building Siting Assessments are performed to provide a better understanding of
potential exposure to incidents by building occupants. Assessments are also
performed to meet the “facility siting” component of the plant Process Hazards Anal-
ysis as required by OSHA 1910.119(e). Following the methodology in API RP 752
“Management of Hazards Associated with the Location of Process Plant Buildings,”
the assessment includes a review of each building at the facility. Each building is
evaluated for hazard, function and occupancy levels, and consequence modeling is
performed for those buildings which exceed the screening criteria. Where necessary,
recommendations are made to reduce the risk to building occupants.

H1.1 API RP 752 Methodology

The study methodology is described in API RP 752 “Management of Hazards Asso-
ciated with the Location of Process Plant Buildings.” API RP 752 outlines a three-
stage analysis process for identifying hazards and managing risk to building occu-
pants from explosions, toxic releases, and fires.
The staged approach systematically identifies and evaluates buildings in which
occupants may be at risk. As the study progresses through each stage, the analysis
becomes more complex. At each stage, buildings are screened out of further study if
it is determined that the risk to occupants is below predetermined screening criteria.

Stage 1
Hazard Identification
Occupancy/Function
Screen

Stage 2
Building Evaluation
Consequence
Modeling

Stage 3
Risk Assessment
Qualitative and/or
Quantitative

Stage 1 - Building and Hazard Identification

During Stage 1, the study team identifies each process plant building, defined as
any building in the facility, temporary or permanent, that may be occupied during a
release from a process area. The team then identifies whether a hazard exists at
each building due to fire, toxic release, or explosion. Hazards are identified by
comparing the hazard screening criteria against the building location and process
conditions. (See Section H2.2, hazard screening criteria). Buildings that meet the

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

hazard criteria are evaluated for occupancy and function. Other buildings are
exempt from further evaluation.
Occupancy data is gathered for each building to determine the peak occupancy load
and the average occupancy level (hrs/wk). Building function is evaluated to deter-
mine if a building must be occupied during an incident for safe shutdown of the
facility or if a building is designated as an emergency response shelter. The occu-
pancy data is then compared against the occupancy/function screening criteria (See
Section H2.3). Buildings that exceed the criteria proceed to Stage 2 - Building Eval-
uation. Buildings that do not meet the criteria are exempt from further evaluation.

Stage 2 - Building Evaluation

During Stage 2, the buildings that met the previous screening criteria are evaluated
with consequence modeling for explosion and toxic release hazards, and/or are eval-
uated against a checklist for fire hazards. The study team reviews P&ID and
process flow data to select representative release scenarios in each process area.
Each release scenario is then modeled. For toxic release hazards the team deter-
mines the maximum potential toxic concentration at each affected building and the
time required to reach the ERPG-2 concentration. For explosion hazards, the poten-
tial blast overpressure at each building is determined. This modeling information is
then used to determine potential personnel exposure and what recommendations, if
any, should be made to reduce the risk. Recommendations may include building
modifications, emergency response changes, changes to the building function and
occupancy, or process plant modifications.
The team may determine that some buildings have a sufficient hazard and occu-
pancy level that a Stage 3 risk assessment is justified. Typically, this is used in
explosion cases only, where it may not be possible to evacuate large occupancy
buildings in a timely manner, and recommendations that could lower the hazard
level involve extremely costly building modifications/relocations.

Stage 3 - Risk Assessment

During Stage 3, a team is convened at the facility to analyze the potential scenarios
in a semi-quantitative manner. Using the scenarios developed in Stage 2, the team
reviews the predicted consequences. The team develops possible causes for each
scenario as well as the applicable safeguards. The team also reviews previous inci-
dent history within the Company and industry to estimate the frequency of the
scenario. Using a risk ranking matrix, the team then determines whether risk reduc-
tion is required for the scenario. Mitigation and/or prevention options are proposed
to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or severity of the consequences for each
scenario. This is the final evaluation step in the API RP 752 Building Siting Assess-
ment methodology.

H1.2 Study Team Members

The building assessment study should be done by a team with the following
training and experience. One team member can perform more than one of these
functions:

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• Facility representative with knowledge in the plant process and operations.

• A member with training in the application of API RP 752. (Both API and
CRTC offer one day training courses. Contact the CRTC Process Risk Team.)
• Dispersion modeling should be done by CRTC or an approved outside
consultant.

H1.3 Study Timing

It is more efficient to perform one building siting assessment for the entire facility,
since most of the modeling done in Stage 2 will affect multiple buildings.
Completing the study one process unit at a time, or one building at a time, is
possible but may involve extensive duplication of effort.
One use of Building Siting Assessments is to meet the “facility siting” requirement
of Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) in OSHA’s PSM rule. These Building Siting
Assessments should be completed within the timeframe allowed for completing the
facility PHA’s. There are three exceptions:
1. Some facilities have already identified a significant risk to a building through
an initial plant PHA. These facilities should proceed with a building siting
assessment as soon as practical.
2. Where a new building is being constructed or a major modification is planned
to a building or process, a siting assessment should be completed during the
feasibility phase, prior to detailed design.
3. Where a facility can document that a building assessment was already
completed during the plant PHA, or during design/construction, a new assess-
ment is not required. The original assessment must have included toxic and
explosion modeling. During PHA revalidation, the original assessment should
be reviewed and upgraded as necessary to meet the specific requirements in
these guidelines.
The building siting assessment may produce recommendations that are time
consuming to implement. (e.g. moving occupants, or construction of a new
building). As with any other PHA or risk management decision, all recommenda-
tions should be addressed in a timely manner, with responsibility assigned for each
recommendation and the actions tracked to completion.

H2.0 Stage 1 - Hazard Assessment

In Stage 1 of the building assessment the facility identifies whether hazards exist at
each building due to fire, toxic release, or explosion (Refer to Figure H-1). Hazards
are identified by comparing the hazard screening criteria against the building loca-
tion and process conditions. Occupancy data is gathered for each building to deter-
mine the peak occupancy load and the average occupancy level (hrs/wk). Building
function during an incident is also evaluated. The study team then compares the

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Fig. H-1 Stage 1 - Hazard/Occupancy Screening Flowchart

Is
building
routinely No
occupied?
See Section H2.1

Yes

Is
there a toxic, No further
fire, or explosion No
evaluation
hazard?
See Section H2.2

Yes

Is occupancy
Yes
> 400 hrs/wk?
See Section H2.3

No

Is peak
Yes occupancy
> 40/one hr?
See Section H2.3

No

Must the
building be
Yes
occupied during
an incident?
See Section H2.3

No

Verify building has

Stage 2 emergency response plan
Building Evaluation for identified hazards that
required includes sufficient warning
and appropriate evacuation

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occupancy data against the occupancy/function screening criteria. Comparison with

the screening criteria determines the need for Stage 2 consequence modeling.

H2.1 Building Identification

As the first step, the list of buildings should be developed. A building can be
defined as having a roof and 75% of the perimeter enclosed. (Some enclosed
smoking posts are buildings.) Every building in the facility that could be occupied
during a release should be listed. One rule of thumb - if there is a chair in the
building it should be listed. For example, if a substation receives periodic mainte-
nance only, then it does not need to be listed. If, however, it contains a desk and
chair, then personnel probably spend some additional time in the building and it
should be included in the list. Low occupancy buildings will be quickly screened
out of the study, so if there is any question about a building, include it in the initial
list. Both temporary and permanent buildings should be included in the building list.

H2.2 Hazard Screening

Once the building list is developed, the next step is to identify the hazards associ-
ated with each building. API RP 752 addresses three types of hazards: explosions,
toxic releases and fires.
• Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) - A building has a potential VCE hazard if
process streams in the facility contain C2’s, C3’s, or C4’s. A VCE hazard
should also be identified if heavier hydrocarbons are processed at temperatures
higher than their flash point.
• Physical Explosion - A building has a potential physical explosion hazard if the
process contains exothermic chemical reactions that could runaway, with a
corresponding vessel rupture. BLEVE’s are not addressed because these are
typically secondary events that occur after a vessel is exposed to fire for a
significant period of time.
• Fire - A building has a potential fire hazard if the building is located less than
50 feet from process areas containing flammable liquids or gases, (or combus-
tible liquids at temperatures greater than their flash point).
• Toxic Release - A building has a toxic hazard if the facility stores or uses
highly hazardous chemicals as defined by OSHA PSM rule 29CFR 1910.119
or EPA RMP rule. (e.g. H2S, Ammonia, Chlorine) A complete chemical list is
available from the Process Risk team. If the state or local community has iden-
tified other highly hazardous chemicals, these should also be included as toxic
hazards.
Note Exception - if a process stream contains less than the ERPG-2 level for a
chemical. ERPG levels are described in Section H3.1.2.

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H2.3 Occupancy/Function Screening

Each building is now compared against the occupancy screening criteria. The
following screening criteria were developed based on the industry screening levels
described in API RP 752.
• Occupied >400 hours per week, or
• Occupied by >40 people for one hour, or
• Required occupancy during an incident for safe shutdown of the facility, or
• Designated as emergency response shelter
Examples of buildings that meet the above criteria are:
1. A maintenance shop that has 10 full time employees. (10x40 =400 hrs/wk
occupancy)
2. A control room that is occupied round the clock by 3 people.
(3x24x7=504 hrs/wk)
3. A cafeteria that is used for safety meetings attended by 50 people each month
4. A control room that must be occupied during emergency shutdown of the
process area
5. A safety building designated as the incident command center

H2.4 Recommendations
Buildings that meet the hazard and occupancy/function criteria proceed to Stage 2
to be evaluated with consequence modeling (for explosion & toxic hazards) or eval-
uated against a checklist of Company design standards (for fire hazards).
Buildings that do not meet the criteria are exempt from further evaluation in the
study. These buildings should be reviewed to ensure that the emergency response
plan addresses the identified hazard, including appropriate notification and evacua-
tion. For example, if a chlorine hazard is identified for a small maintenance
building with one occupant, there is an identified hazard, but low occupancy. This
building would not be subject to Stage 2 consequence modeling, but there should
be an emergency response plan that details how the building occupant would be
alerted in the event of a chlorine leak and the appropriate response. Typical docu-
mentation of Stage 1 findings are shown in Figure H-2.

H3.0 Stage 2 - Building Evaluation

During Stage 2 of the assessment, buildings are evaluated that exceeded the
previous Stage 1 screening criteria. Consequence modeling is performed for the
identified hazards which could impact these buildings. P&ID’s and process flow
data are reviewed to select representative release scenarios in each process area.
Each release scenario is then modeled. For selected toxic release scenarios, the
maximum potential toxic concentration is determined for each affected building.
For explosion hazards, the potential blast overpressure level and duration at each

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building is calculated. For fire hazards, the building is evaluated using a checklist of
Company design standards.

Fig. H-2 Preliminary Hazard Screening

Building Hazard Occupancy Recommendation
Administration VCE, Toxic (H2S) >400 hrs/wk Further evaluation with consequence
>40 people in one hr modeling
Control House/Lab VCE, Toxic (H2S) >400 hrs/wk Further evaluation with consequence
Occupied during modeling
plant shutdown
Maintenance Shop VCE, Toxic (H2S & Does not meet No further evaluation in this study
Ammonia) criteria Verify building has emergency response
plan for release incidents that includes suffi-
cient warning and appropriate evacuation
procedures

H3.1 Toxic Hazards

Dispersion modeling should be performed using an approved computer model. At
this time, only the QuestFocus Consequence Modeling Package is recommended.
(licensed by Quest Consultants Inc. of Norman, OK) This comprehensive software
package is a collection of thermodynamic, fluid flow, atmospheric dispersion and
other algorithms. These sub-models are systematically coupled together and, as a
software package, can predict the consequences of various hazardous release
scenarios. For example, a jet dispersion model may be used to account for the
turbulence and mixing during the initial stage of the release. Once the jet
momentum dissipates and the released material plume is moving downwind at the
same speed as the wind, the model transitions to a dense gas model. Dense gas
models are applicable to releases with little or no momentum and involve plumes
which are heavier than air. These releases tend to drop or slump toward the ground
and spread out as they collapse. Refer to Section 1200 of the Fire Protection
Manual for additional information on dispersion modeling.

Release Scenarios
The release scenarios to be modeled should include a 2 inch hole in any piping
system or equipment identified as having a toxic hazard potential.
Note Exception: the maximum piping size should be used if it is less than 2 inch
Although small flange and seal leaks and small piping breaks (<3/4 inch) are more
likely scenarios, 2 inch releases have occurred within the Company on a yearly
basis. Larger releases from line breaks are extremely rare events and as such, are
not credible scenarios for building design. Potential leak sources should include
underground piping. Atmospheric vents and atmospheric relief valve discharges
should be modeled as well. A range of weather stability and wind speeds should be
modeled for each release point. Often, the most severe scenario involves “F” atmo-
spheric stability and 5 mph winds, conditions that might be found during a calm,
cool night or early morning. Inputs to the dispersion modeling program include:

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

• Analysis of process stream showing individual components

• Normal operating pressure, temperature and flow rate
• Line size, vessel size, PSV size
• Description of surrounding terrain and containment

Recommendations
Results of the dispersion modeling are used to determine the potential maximum
concentration at the buildings studied and the time to reach this concentration,
assuming that the cloud is blowing toward the building. Concentrations are
predicted as 60 minute average values at the building location. If the concentration
is less than the ERPG-1 level, then no mitigation is required. This is the level at
which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr
without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a
clearly defined objectionable odor. Also included is the time to reach the ERPG-2
level. This is the level at which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1
hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or
symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. If a building
evacuation will take longer than the time to reach ERPG-2 then, personal protective
equipment will be necessary in order to safely evacuate, or if it will be necessary to
shelter in place. A list of some ERPG levels is included in Figure H-3. A complete
list is available from the American Industrial Hygiene Association. (See Refer-
ences, Section H6.0.)

Fig. H-3 ERPG Levels

Material ERPG -1 ERPG -2
Ammonia 25 ppm 200 ppm
Chlorine 1 ppm 3 ppm
Hydrogen Sulfide .1 ppm 30 ppm
Vinyl Acetate 5 ppm 75 ppm
Source American Industrial Hygiene Association, “Emergency Response Planning Guidelines,” 1995

Potential mitigation measures to consider include:

• Ventilation system controls with appropriate detection, and fail safe control
measures, which stop the flow of a contaminated air supply to the building.
• Use of elevated intake stack for potential releases of heavier-than-air materials
• Emergency response plan, with scheduled drills, which may include safe shel-
ters in the building and/or clearly identified evacuation routes.
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) for building occupants
• Review of locations of potential gas infiltration into the building for sealing
Typical documentation of Stage 2 - Toxic Evaluation findings are shown in
Figure H-4.

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Fig. H-4 Toxic Evaluation Findings

Release Time to Max
Building Scenario Weather ERPG-2 concentration Recommendations
Control House C-1000 Btms F & 5mph <5 sec 1400 ppm H2S Stress importance of existing auto-
(<5 sec) matic ventilation controls and verify
that the system is tested on a
regular basis
Administration V-2000 Ovhd F & 5mph 140 sec 900ppm H2S 1. Automate the existing ventila-
(180 sec) tion to close upon detection of
H2S.
2. Verify that the emergency
response plan covers adequate
response to toxic hazards and
that the plan is practiced on a
regular basis
3. Seal any exterior wall locations
where gas infiltration is possible.

H3.2 Explosion Hazards

Vapor Cloud Explosion Modeling
The Baker-Strehlow method is the current state-of-the-art methodology used to esti-
mate the potential overpressure at each building due to a vapor cloud explosion.
This method incorporates the concepts of the Multi-Energy method, using the Stre-
hlow curves for determination of explosion energy. It accounts for the effects of
confinement and congestion on the explosion overpressure. Using the Multi-Energy
concept, only the volume of a flammable vapor cloud within a partially confined
and/or obstructed environment will contribute to an explosion. The remaining
portions of a cloud will burn more slowly without contributing significantly to
blast. Other methodologies (e.g. TNT) are often inaccurate due to conservative
assumptions and the differences between high explosive blast characteristics and
vapor cloud explosion characteristics.
The study uses the results of the FOCUS vapor cloud dispersion modeling to obtain
the potential size of the vapor-air cloud, within the flammable limits, for each
release scenario. (See Section H3.1.) The flammable clouds are then superimposed
on the facility plot plan to determine the volume within areas of partial confine-
ment/congestion due to process equipment, piping and plant structures. The volume
of equipment or piping is then deducted to obtain the blast source volume.
A graphical solution using the Strehlow curves is then applied to determine the
predicted overpressure (Ps) at the building in question and the predicted impulse
(is). Choice of the curve is dependent on the level of plant congestion within the
cloud, the degree of cloud confinement and the fuel reactivity. The Baker-Strehlow
method is described in detail, with an example, in Section 1200 of the Fire Protec-
tion Manual.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

Physical Explosion
In processes that have the potential for a “runaway reaction,” a vessel rupture
scenario should be modeled to determine potential blast overpressures at affected
buildings. This overpressure due to a vessel rupture (physical explosion) should be
estimated using the calculations described in Section 1200 of the Fire Protection
Manual. The method is very similar to that described above for vapor cloud explo-
sions, except that the energy term is calculated differently.

Recommendations
The response of the affected buildings to an explosion is dependent upon both the
overpressure and the duration of the blast. These values should be compared with
the data from the 1995 WBE Industry Tech Coop reports to determine the predicted
building response. (Software is available from the Process Risk team). Damage
levels are described in Figure H-5 and Figure H-6. Where building damage is
predicted above the 2B level, mitigation measures should be taken to reduce the
risk to occupants. Mitigation measures may also be appropriate for buildings within
the vapor cloud itself (within 100% LFL). Potential mitigation includes:
• Change of function (e.g. designating a different building as the emergency
response center)
• Prevent scenario (e.g. remove walls that produce confinement in the process
areas)
• Upgrade building (e.g. reinforce roof-to-wall connections, strengthen walls -
Contact the Process Risk team for information on cost effective building
upgrade options)
• Relocate the building
• Change the process to eliminate/reduce the risk. (e.g., shutdown the process)

Fig. H-5 Building Damage Levels

Damage Level Building Consequence
1 Onset of visible damage. Repairs are only needed for cosmetic reasons. Building is reusable
following an explosion. Very little risk to occupants because of building damage.
2A Localized building damage. Building performs function and can be used; however, major repairs
are required to restore integrity of structure envelope. Total cost of repairs is moderate. Risk of
injury is moderate.
2B Widespread building damage. Building cannot be used until major repairs are completed. Total
cost of repairs is significant, approaching replacement cost of building. Significant risk of injury.
3 Building has lost structural integrity and may collapse due to environmental conditions, (i.e.,
wind, snow, rain). Building blast protection is impaired. Total cost of repairs exceeds replace-
ment cost of building. High risk of severe injury to occupants caused by building damage.
4 Building fails completely. Repair is not feasible. High risk of fatality.

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Fig. H-6 Building Damage Thresholds

Overpressure Impulse
Building Type Damage Level (psig) (psi-msec)
Steel Frame
Metal siding/roof 1 0.5 7
2A 1.3 45
2B 1.5 60
3 2.5 120
Steel Frame
Unreinforced masonry walls 1 0.5 5
2A 1.0 30
2B 2.0 50
3 3.0 120
Trailers 1 0.5 10
2A 1.2 20
2B 1.8 40
3 2.0 50
Load Bearing
Unreinforced masonry walls 1 0.5 5
2A 0.8 25
2B 1.0 35
3 1.5 70
Source WBE Industry Tech Cooperative 1995 Study, "Conventional Building Blast Performance
Capabilities"

Windows can be expected to fail with high fragment velocities between .15 and .6
psig, depending upon the size of the window and the blast duration. Where the
predicted overpressure falls within this range, the SAFEVUE software can be used
to determine if the window will break. (Contact the CRTC Process Risk team for
information on SAFEVUE.) Windows that are expected to break can be removed or
upgraded to meet the predicted overpressure. The Process Risk team can provide
design details on the application of polyethylene film to the window, which
removes the fragment hazard for blast overpressures of up to 5 psig. New buildings
should use laminated glass designed for the predicted overpressures.
Documentation of typical Stage 2 explosion modeling results are shown in
Figure H-7. Where the mitigation measures are impractical or extremely costly, a
risk assessment is recommended to be completed per Section H4.0.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

Fig. H-7 Explosion Modeling Results

Building Scenario Blast Overpressure Recommendations
Maintenance VCE following release 1.4 psig Move the trailer or occu-
Trailer at V-1000. Sufficient to shatter glass and damage pants to a less hazardous
wood panels location.

Admin Building VCE following release .5 psig Review windows using

at V-1000 Sufficient to shatter large panes of Safevue software to deter-
glass, depending on blast impulse mine appropriate level of
mitigation.
Control Building VCE following release 7.5 psig at present Seal the area under the
at C-1000 that accu- .7 psig after Recommendation is North MCC building to
mulates under North complete prevent vapor cloud accu-
MCC prior to ignition. mulation.

H3.3 Fire Hazard

There are two concerns associated with buildings that have an identified fire hazard.
The building itself could be a potential ignition source following a release in the
nearby process area. In addition, a fire in the process area could spread to the
building, increasing the magnitude of loss and plant down time. Process area refers
to hydrocarbon equipment or piping.
All buildings with an identified fire hazard should be compared with the checklist
in Figure H-8. This table is based on the guidelines in the Fire Protection Manual.
If the answer to any question is “No,” it is recommended that the building be
upgraded to meet the requirement. In addition, if a building has an identified fire
hazard, future modifications to the building or process area should not increase the
fire risk. In other words, additions to the plant or building should not further
decrease the separation distance.

H4.0 Stage 3 - Risk Assessment

It is expected that Stage 3 risk assessments will be unlikely. Most building siting
assessments will be complete following Stage 2, when recommendations are made
to address the predicted consequences for each scenario. However, in a few cases,
the mitigation measures for the explosion hazards may be impractical or extremely
costly (e.g. moving a control room). In these cases, a risk assessment may be
performed using Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) methodology. The risk assess-
ment will evaluate the frequency and consequences of scenarios and assign an
overall risk to the building occupants.

H4.1 Risk Assessment Team

A team should be formed to perform the risk assessment that includes, as a
minimum, the following members:
• A person trained in the use of HAZOP technique of process hazard analysis

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Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

Fig. H-8 Building Checklist for Fire Hazards

Question Yes/No
1. If the building is in an electrically classified area, (see API RP 500) is it pressurized per NFPA 496?

2. Is there a hydrocarbon detector in the inlet air duct for the building that alarms at 20% LFL and
shuts down the ventilation system at 60% LFL?
3. Is the air intake for the ventilation system located 30 feet above grade?

4. Have windows facing the process area been removed?

5. Is there a personnel egress door located on the opposite side of the building from the process
area?
6. Is there a fire water monitor located within 40 -70 ft from the building that can protect the
building from a fire in the process area.
7. Are the roof and wall(s) facing the process area rated for 2 hour fire?

8. Is the surface drainage sloped away from the building toward the process area?

9. Are the drains within the building sealed to prevent vapors from entering the building from the
underground drainage system?
10. Is there an emergency response plan for building occupants that details their response in the
event of a fire?
11. Are annual hypothetical drills held to practice the emergency response plan?

• A person trained in the application of RP 752 hazard and consequence assess-

ment
• A person experienced in operations and the plant processes at the facility
Additional team members could include ESF&H personnel, operators, mechanics,
inspector and corrosion specialists, equipment specialists, and process engineers.

H4.2 Qualitative Evaluation

The risk assessment team will make a qualitative evaluation of the risk to building
occupants using PHA methodology in the following step by step manner for each
explosion scenario:
1. List the explosion scenario identified during Stage 2 of the building assess-
ment. (e.g. 2-inch hole in the debutanizer overhead piping to the reflux drum)
2. List the potential causes of the scenario. (e.g. corrosion, vibration, mechanical
impact, wrong line cut, etc.)
3. Review the previous incident history at the facility, including other similar
scenarios in other process units at the facility. The team should also review the
history of the specific equipment or piping in question. (e.g. inspection records,
maintenance history)

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

4. Review industry history of incidents in similar systems. (Contact the Fire &
Process Safety Team for information)
5. List the consequences predicted during Stage 2 of the scenario. For damage
level >2B, the consequence is major. For damage level >1, the consequence is
serious.
6. List and critically evaluate the safeguards in place at the facility that could
prevent the scenario from occurring. (e.g. shutdown systems, inspection
programs, safe work practices, control of ignition sources, etc.) Do not list a
program or procedure unless it has been confirmed during the most recent
PSM or Safe Operations audit. Do not list automatic shutdowns unless quar-
terly testing is performed and documented.
7. Use the risk ranking matrix shown in Figure H-9 to assign an overall risk for
the scenario.
8. If the assigned risk is a 1 or 2, then prevention or mitigation is required. If the
assigned risk is a 3, then the team should evaluate whether additional safe-
guards can be added to reduce the risk to a 4 or 5. (e.g. increasing inspection,
improving safe work practices) If the assigned risk is a 4 or 5 then no addi-
tional mitigation is required.

Fig. H-9 Risk Ranking Matrix

Likelihood of Frequent Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Occurrence
With 1 2 3 4
Safeguards
This incident This incident is This incident has Given current
has occurred likely to occur occurred at a practices and
at this facility at this facility similar facility and procedures,
and/or is within the next may reasonably this incident is
Severity of reasonably 15 years. occur at this not likely to
Consequences likely to occur facility within the occur at this
Without Safeguards at any time. next 30 years. facility.
Major 1 1 1 2 4
Safety - Fatality or permanently
disabling injury.
Serious 2 1 2 3 5
Safety - Severe injury.

H5.0 Documentation and Follow-up

The building siting assessment documentation should be added to the facility’s
PHA files. Recommendations, plot plans, process flow drawings, occupancy data,
dispersion modeling and blast calculations should all be kept in the building assess-
ment file. All recommendations should be numbered, with assigned responsibility
and dates for completion. The recommendations should be tracked to completion,

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Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

as with other PHA recommendations. Revalidation is required for the building

siting assessments as well as for other PHA’s.

H6.0 References
American Industrial Hygiene Association Emergency Planning Committee, “Emer-
gency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG),” September 1995.
American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice 752, “Management of
Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings,” 1995.
Wilfred Baker Engineering, Inc., “Upgrade of Windows to Mitigate the Glass Frag-
mentation Hazard from Vapor Cloud Explosions,” prepared for the 1993-1994
Petroleum and Chemical Processing Industry Technology Cooperatives.
Wilfred Baker Engineering, Inc., “Conventional Building Blast Performance Capa-
bility,” prepared for the 1995 Industry Technology Cooperative.

January 1997 H-16 Chevron Corporation