Modeling The Risk of Ship Grounding - A Literature Review From A Risk Management Perspective

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Modeling the risk of ship grounding - A

literature review from a risk management
perspective
Article in WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs · December 2013

DOI: 10.1007/s13437-013-0056-3
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WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, December 2013, DOI 10.1007/s13437-013-0056-3
Modeling the risk of ship grounding – a literature review from a risk

management perspective
Arsham Mazaheri, Jakub Montewka, Pentti Kujala

Aalto University, Department of Applied Mechanics, Marine Technology, Espoo, Finland
Abstract: Ship grounding accidents, being one of the major types of maritime accidents, are significant
failures putting in danger maritime transportation systems. Moreover, the risks associated with those failures
can be catastrophic for the system, society and the environment. This highlights the importance of
appropriate methodology for assessing and managing the associated risk. Many scholars have introduced a
wide range of methods for modeling the risk, utilizing the concept of the probability and the consequence of
an accident; however those models very often employ critical assumptions on the behavior of maritime
transportation systems, which may seem not to be supported by evidences. This in turn limits models’ ability
to mitigate the risks, as those simply remain unknown.
Therefore this article has three aims. First it proposes a methodological framework suitable for knowledge-
based risk modeling, fulfilling the recommendations given by the Formal Safety Assessment issued by the
IMO. Secondly, it thoroughly reviews and discusses all the existing risk models available in the literature
developed for ship grounding risk analysis in light of the proposed risk perspective. Third, the models that
are more appropriate for risk management and decision making are highlighted and the recommendations are
given to future model developments.
Keywords: Ship Grounding, Accident Probability, Risk Modeling, Risk Management, Decision Making
The final publication is available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13437-013-0056-3#page-1
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Ship grounding accident is a type of marine accident that involves the impact of a ship on seabed or
waterway side. It may result in the damage of the submerged part of the ship’s hull and in particularly the
bottom structure; potentially leading to water ingress, which may at the end compromise the ship's structural
integrity, stability, and finally safety. Severe grounding applies extreme loads onto ship structures. In less
grave accidents, it might result in merely some damages to the hull; however in most serious accidents it
might lead to hull breach, cargo spills, total loss of the vessel, and in the worst case, human casualties. In
global perspective grounding accounts for about one-third of commercial ship accidents all over the world
(Kite-Powell et al. 1999; Jebsen and Papakonstantinou 1997) and it has the second rank in frequency, after
ship-ship collision (Samuelides et al. 2009).
Many scholars, e.g. (Fujii et al. 1974; Macduff 1974; Pedersen 1995; Simonsen 1997; Fowler and Sørgård
2000; Amrozowicz 1996b; Amrozowicz et al. 1997), have tried to model this type of ship accident in order
to predict the likelihood of the accident given certain criteria, which then allows risk estimation as specified
in the IMO guideline (IMO 2002). One of the matters one should consider when modeling a complex
phenomenon, like ship grounding, is the tradeoff between the details and the accuracy of the model, and the
cost of the model in terms of the required time and data; therefore “elegant simplicity instead of unnecessary
complexity” (Amrozowicz et al. 1997) is highly appreciated. Moreover, since the ultimate goal of risk
modeling and risk assessment is to provide information required for decision making to mitigate the risk
(IMO 2002), merely being aware of the accident risk, as a single number, is not crucial. Thus, a suitable
model for risk management purposes should firstly reflect the knowledge on the analyzed system with
satisfying accuracy (Aven 2013), secondly be able to suggest the feasible and meaningful measures for
lessening the involved risk, and thirdly make a comparison among the measures based on predefined
objectives and constraints that leads to selecting the optimal solutions at the end.
The existing reviews on the risk models of grounding accidents do not deeply discuss the weakness and
strength of the models and the applied methods within a risk management framework; see for example (Li et
al. 2012; Przywarty 2008; Nyman 2009; Mazaheri 2009; Pedersen 2010). Therefore, the aim of this paper is
to provide a comprehensive and critical review of the available literature related to modeling the risk in
maritime transportation systems (MTS) with the focus on ship grounding, within a framework of risk
management for MTS.
For this purpose, Chapter 2 proposes a methodological framework suitable for knowledge-based risk
modeling, fulfilling the recommendations issued by the IMO in the guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment.
Chapter 3 thoroughly reviews and discusses all existing risk models available in the literature developed for
ship grounding risk analysis. Chapter 4 highlights the existing models that are more appropriate for risk
management and decision-making and provides the recommendations to future model developments. The
paper is summarized in Chapter 5.
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In the context of risk analysis, presented in Chapter 6 of the FSA guidelines (IMO 2012), risk is defined as a
product of the probability (P) and the consequences (C) of a given action:
𝑅 = 𝑃×𝐶 (2.1)
Whereas, in the context of Chapter 7 (ibid), called “Risk control options” - aiming to determine the areas
needing control, the risk is decomposed and the uncertainty aspect of two risk components is added as an
important element of the decision process. Moreover, for the identification of risk control measures, Chapter
7.2.2 (ibid) suggests developing the causal chains of events leading to an accident, which means that the
definition of risk includes an insight in certain scenarios leading to the undesired situations. Finally, in the
context of the recommendations, called “Presentation of FSA results”, discussion about the assumptions,
limitations and uncertainties of the risk model is recommended (ibid).
To make sure that all these recommendations can be addressed at the last stage of the analysis, the initial
definition of risk must allow for the knowledge-based scenario building, uncertainty analysis, and model
validation; see (Rosqvist and Tuominen 2004; Rosqvist 2010; Aven and Heide 2009). The most common
definition of risk as the product of the probability of an accident and its consequences (Eq. 2.1) may thus
lead to confusion, especially when comparing the risks associated with the following two situations: A)
frequent events resulting in low consequences with B) rare events of high consequence. Even though the
3
products of P and C in both cases can be the same, these two situations differ substantially. The background
knowledge on A is most probably better than in the case of B, as A occurs frequent and B occurs rare. This
knowledge affects the amount of uncertainty associated with the descriptions of A and B. Moreover, the
measures to mitigate the risks are completely different.
Therefore, describing risk as the above combination, expressed as a single number, leads to the situation
where much of the relevant information needed for knowledge-based decision making is not properly
reflected. Thereby, the wider concept of risk should be applied, allowing systematic reasoning.
2.1 Definition
Considering maritime traffic as a system, a well-founded approach to risk can be followed (Haimes 2009;
Aven 2011b), where the risk existing within the system can be defined as a complete set of triplets (Kaplan
and Garrick 1981):
(2.2)
𝑅 = 𝑆, 𝐿, 𝐶 !
Where, this triplet attempts to answer the following questions: what can go wrong in the system (Scenario -
S), how likely is it that it goes wrong (Likelihood - L), and what are the consequences if the assumed
scenario happens (Consequence - C)? However, describing the risk as a complete set of triplets is
unattainable, simply because our knowledge on the system is never complete, thereby the system cannot be
characterized exactly (Aven and Zio 2011). Therefore, what we actually attempt to describe is an incomplete
set of triplets, called “a set of answers” (Kaplan 1997), which reflects the defined risk for the given system
according to our best knowledge and anticipation. This incompleteness, which may result from lack of
background knowledge on the given system, should be recognized. To define a set of outcomes, knowledge
and proper understanding of the system or phenomena being analyzed is a prerequisite; this is referred to as
background knowledge (BK) in this paper. Therefore, risk perspective should account for the amount of
available BK. Thus the description of risk perspective for the given system can yield as follows:
(2.3)
R~{S, L, C|BK}
where S stands for a set of explanatory variables for a given scenario, where the variables and their relations
can take different values due to the stochastic nature of the phenomena being analyzed or by applying
different assumptions, which depends on our background knowledge (BK) of the process being analyzed; L
is a set of likelihoods corresponding to the set of consequences C, for a given scenario and the given
combination of assumptions governing the input variables.
If the results of the risk analysis are utilized for the risk management, the measures to control or mitigate the
risk (RCO – Risk Control Options) are determined and their effects on the risk are studied. The risk control
options can address the likelihood or the consequence part of the risk, but they should be demonstrated in the
context of the analyzed scenario, adopted assumptions, and the available BK. Thus, an answer to the fourth
question is sought: what can be done to efficiently mitigate the risk, meaning preventing the accident from
happening (proactive approach) or reducing the consequences given the accident happens (reactive
approach), and which option is the most effective and economically justified?
Therefore, from the risk management perspective, it is important that the formal definition of risk, which is
adopted, enables the reliability check of the model together with the model validation (Aven and Heide
2009).
2.2 Background Knowledge
A clear representation of BK that is available about the given system is relevant for any model, which is
intended for practical use; see (Aven 2013). Since the lack of knowledge about the underlying phenomena
governing the behavior of the analyzed system leads to uncertainty in the model parameters and on the
hypotheses supporting the model structure (Aven and Zio 2011), it is desirable for a risk framework to
communicate the BK level and the involved uncertainties (IMO 2002; Aven 2010; Rosqvist and Tuominen
2004), in order to determine whether the risk results are informative and can be used for decision-making, or
should be used with great caution. The latter may be the case if the uncertainties are greater than the margin
between the estimated risk and the risk limit.
2.3 Scenario
5
A fundamental and most probably the most important stage of any risk analysis, which in turn affects all the
steps following the analysis, is scenario identification; meaning the proper description of the knowledge on a
system and its behavior. Intuitively, the importance of this step seems obvious, while it does not always
receive due credits; see (Apostolakis 1990; Rae et al. 2012). A scenario can be defined as a realization of a
chain of events triggered by an initiating event (IE). The IE may cause the system to move from its
predefined safe and efficient trajectory (S0) towards the set of trajectories (Si), which are not as safe and
effective as S0, but it does not mean they are all unsafe. The system being on its trajectory Si travels through
various mid states (MS) at which transitions take place, redirecting the system towards the end states (ES).
The latter can be either an undesired event, like an accident, or safe operation of MTS, which means that the
system may return at some point to S0; for a thorough discussion on this, a reader is referred to the original
work of Kaplan (1997).
Different trajectories of the system, each deviated from the predefined safe trajectory with an IE, may share
some MSs and end up in a common ES; see Figure 1. Therefore, a scenario over the space state of the system
can be formulated as:
𝑠 = 𝐼𝐸! , 𝑀𝑆! , 𝐸𝑆! (2.4)
!!!
Taking MTS and ships operating there as an example, the S0 means the safe and efficient transitions of the
system within predefined space state, as depicted in Figure 1. Any event requiring an action of the system
agents, like ship heading shallow water, can be considered as an IEi. Depending on the action taken (e.g.
grounding evasive maneuver) referred to as MSj, the system can continue along S0 towards ES0 (safe
operation) or goes through Si, heading to ESk meaning accident or other failure in system operation. From the
ship perspective, where the risk analysis is performed in the time domain, the S0 can be tantamount to safe
and undisturbed arrival to harbor, whereas all other scenarios leading to non-safe arrivals or non-arrivals
would belong to Si. When describing risk in a MTS, the main focus should be on understanding these
scenarios that ultimately lead to undesired events, as those govern the remaining elements of the risk
equation (Eq. 2.3). Scenario identification can be tantamount with discovering causality, which seems to be
the natural way of understanding, analyzing and finally mitigating the hazardous situations which produce
risks; see (Roelen 2008; Ale et al. 2009; Roelen et al. 2011). In the maritime transportation, this approach is
not commonly adopted; however in the recent years some researchers made attempts to follow this way of
describing and analyzing maritime accidents, e.g. (Mullai and Paulsson 2011; Kristiansen 2010).
When it comes to risk management, the accident scenario can be divided into two phases: pre-accident and
post-accident (Figure 1). Therefore, two different approaches of mitigating the risk can be studied, namely:
proactive and reactive. The former can focus on actions to reduce the likelihood of an accident, whereas the
latter focuses on lessening the consequences of an accident. Such a division is easy to understand and clear to
perform if the formal definition of risk is adopted, as given in Eq. 2.3. Both phases (pre- and post-accident)
require the same steps to be taken (S,L,C|BK), in order to evaluate and mitigate the risk.
Figure 1: The trajectory of a “success” or safe scenario in the state space of a system is called S0. Deviation of the system’s
trajectory from S0 by an Initiating Event (IE) goes through some Mid States (MS) and ends to an End State (ES). Deviated
trajectories from S0 may share MSs and ESs. Risk Control Option (RCO) diverts the trajectory of the system from some
undesired MSs and ESs by breaking the chain of hazardous events. An ES of the pre-accident stage can act as an IE for the
post-accident stage.
2.4 Likelihood
To quantify the second component of risk, namely the likelihood of an accident, a well-founded
mathematical concept of probability can be adopted. However, this requires an answer to a question on the
meaning of the probability, which in turn depends on an interpretation of the probability adopted; for
discussion about this topic see (Aven and Reniers 2013; Apostolakis 1990, 1988; Kaplan 1997). In the
engineered systems, the following three interpretations are often in use:
1. The relative-frequency interpretation of probability defines the probability of an event in terms
of the proportion of times the event occurs in a long series of identical trials (Winkler 1996).
7
2. The subjective interpretation of probability views the probability as a degree of belief, and this
notion can be defined operationally by having an individual make certain comparisons among
lotteries. This implies, of course, that different people can have different probabilities for the same
event; see (Winkler 1996).
3. The probability of frequency applies when there is a repetitive situation or can imagine one as a
thought experiment. However, since the experiment has not been conducted we are uncertain about
the frequency. Therefore our knowledge about the frequency is expressed with the probability curve
(Kaplan 1997). However this kind of interpretation can be seen as subjective.
All those interpretations are rooted in the concepts of probability, which are based on solid mathematical
foundations; however the proper implementation and interpretation are challenging. The probabilities, as the
mathematical concepts, follow certain axioms that in some real life cases may not hold the true.
2.5 Consequence
The consequences are considered as the negative outcomes of a scenario; therefore their interpretation may
depend on the adopted approach of risk management (proactive or reactive). In the case where the proactive
measures are sought, since the aim of risk management is to actively influence the way the ships are
navigated to minimize the chances of accidents, the ultimate consequences can be understood as the negative
outcome of ship navigation, meaning the accident itself. However, if the reactive measures are involved, then
the consequences can be seen as the negative outcome of an accident, meaning the environmental pollution
resulting from an oil spill in case of accidents where tankers are involved, or human loss in case of ships
carrying passengers.
The existing models for ship consequences analysis are capable of evaluating the damages to a ship given an
accidental scenario, in a very detailed and accurate way; e.g. (Ehlers and Tabri 2012; Hogström and
Ringsberg 2012). However, in order to obtain these estimates, the detailed input data on the scenario path
leading to an accident with all relevant IEs and MSs are the prerequisite (e.g.: masses of ships and their
speed, loading conditions, etc). The major problem that most of the models simulating maritime traffic and
the resulting accidents are facing is lack of supporting evidences for the assumed relations between IE, MS,
and ES; meaning that there are gaps in the scenarios. Moreover, the gaps exist in very sensitive part of the
scenarios (Goerlandt et al. 2012), meaning that there is a need for a proper, reliable and evidence-based
definition of the parameters involved in the accident. This shows and proves that if the accidental scenario
cannot be determined in a sound and reliable fashion, then the consequences cannot be expected to be
evaluated reliably (Goerlandt et al. 2012), since a combination of uncertain factors can only increase the
associated uncertainties (Rae et al. 2012).
2.6 Risk Control Option
Referring to the way that a scenario is defined in Eq. 2.4, a Risk Control Option (RCO) prevents the
transition of the system from an IE to specific MS or ES, or from a MS to a specific MS or ES. Therefore, a
RCO can mitigate the risk by breaking or redirecting the chains of the hazardous events and therefore
protects the system from transition to an undesired state (Figure 1). Kaplan and Garrick (1981) have
hypothetically stated that to eliminate risk one needs to eliminate hazards. However, in reality we are not
able to eliminate risk but to choose between them. This creates the question of the best decision options for
the given situation. These options cannot be efficiently selected without proper understanding of a system, its
behavior, relationships among its elements, and mutual interactions. This means that the RCO cannot be
effective nor be properly implemented if the uncertainties associated with their type, location in the state
space (see Figure 1) and their impacts on the system are not identified and, preferably, quantified if possible.
Otherwise the choice of RCOs may be just selection between the sets of options suitable for a model, which
does not reflect the reality and explains nothing but itself.
3. REVIEW OF THE EXISTING MODELS
3.1. Scope of the Review
As mentioned, the fundamental phase of a risk modeling, having in mind the risk management perspective, is
a process of scenario identification along with evaluation of background knowledge about the analyzed
system, in order to determine the appropriate risk control options. In the context of this paper, the maritime
transportation is defined as a system, and the scenarios of the reviewed models are assessed as they all share
the same ES referred as ship grounding accident. The approaches that each model follows for building the
scenarios, meaning whether the scenarios are knowledge-based or imaginary, are reviewed and discussed.
9
Moreover, the ways that BK is incorporated in the models are discussed. The ultimate aim of this analysis is
to highlight those models, which allow for risk perspective as given by Equation 2.3, which reflects the best
the IMO recommendation given in FSA and meet the formal definition of risk, as per Stirling and Gee
(2002).
The models in the literature have also been reviewed to detect whether the models are capable of detecting
the plausible RCOs as an important stage of a risk management process. Currently, the risk is mostly
mitigated by applying RCOs which are suggested by the domain experts; see (Amrozowicz 1996b; Briggs et
al. 2003; DNV 2003), which mainly relate to their knowledge on the way that the system works; meaning
that the effective RCOs cannot be defined based on the model. Therefore, in order to assess the practicality
of the existing grounding models for risk management, the ability of the models for showing and testing the
RCOs on the current associated risk as well as the future scenarios before the implementations of the RCOs
(Haimes 2009) should be investigated. It is believed by the authors that setting the ES of a system at a
desired state in a risk model and then reverse analyzing the scenarios to the possible IEs through different
MSs, will reveal the feasible RCOs for mitigating the risk of the modeled system and achieving the desired
ES. Hence, the reviewed models and their key elements have been also analyzed from this perspective.
Moreover, the key elements of each model that are playing the role of the inputs for the model are reviewed
and presented; and the ways each model quantifies its key elements are discussed.
To extract the existing models, more than 90 relevant articles, reports, and dissertations all written in English
have been reviewed. However, not all of the reviewed literatures were presenting a genuine model for
grounding accident risk analysis; some of them have studied the different causality of grounding accidents in
qualitative and quantitative manners; e.g. (Jebsen and Papakonstantinou 1997; Lin et al. 1998; Martins and
Maturana 2010; Samuelides et al. 2009; Quy et al. 2006; Briggs et al. 2003; Lax and Kujala 2001;
Amrozowicz 1996a; Brown and Haugene 1998; Kite-Powell et al. 1999), and some have implemented the
models of the others; e.g. (Friis-Hansen and Simonsen 2002; Gucma 2002; Chen and Zhang 2002).
In order to have a more organized discussion, the reviewed models are categorized into two groups based on
the kernel of the implemented method, as 1- analytical models, where the scenarios of ship grounding are
obtained based on a geometrical description of the event; and 2- probabilistic models, where techniques such
as Fault Tree and Bayesian Network are used for modeling.
3.2. Analytical Models
3.2.1 Macduff (1974) and Fujii et al. (1974)
The idea of analyzing the ship accidents by the way of modeling was traced back to Macduff (1974) and
Fujii (Fujii et al. 1974; Fujii and Shiobara 1971), when they expressed the idea of causation probability.
Macduff mentioned that the probability of a grounding accident should be estimated as a combination of two
probabilities, so-called geometrical (PG) and causation (PC). Geometrical probability of grounding gives the
likelihood or the number of the ships that are grounding candidates, assuming the blind-navigation, which is
defined as no grounding evasive maneuvers are performed. Causation probability expresses the likelihood
that the ship heading a ground will not evade it due to variety of reasons.
Figure 2: Macduff (1974) implemented Buffon’s Needle problem to estimate the geometrical probability of grounding [Ref:
Adapted from Macduff (1974)]
11
Fujii expresses the expected number of groundings (NG) (Eq. 3.2.1) as a function of the ship’s speed (V), the
traffic density (𝜌), and the width of the shoal (D) in addition to the causation probability (PC); while Macduff
implemented Buffon’s Needle problem (Figure 2) to estimate the geometrical probability of grounding (PG)
(Eq. 3.2.2), meaning a ship hits the wall of a waterway, as a function of two parameters, namely the width of
the waterway (C) and the stopping distance (T). The latter is defined as a function of the ship’s length and the
speed.
(3.2.1)
𝑁! = 𝑃! 𝐷𝜌𝑉
4𝑇 (3.2.2)
𝑃! =
𝜋𝐶
From among the key elements of Macduff and Fujii’s models, one may be able to alter the associated risk
only by affecting the ship particulars, since the rest of the involved elements are location-related and are
practically unchangeable. Thus, owing to the fact that the factors affecting the causation probabilities
implemented in the models are unknown, the models cannot recommend any feasible RCOs. The models
assume ship navigation as a random process, which cannot find support in the practice. Moreover, since the
models are not scenario oriented, they do not provide any knowledge regarding the possible triggering causes
of the accident. The ships are assumed to be in a grounding course without providing any prior knowledge of
the rationale. Thus, IEs and possible MSs for a grounding accident cannot be identified, which makes the
followed approach improper from a risk management perspective. Besides, the models present the number of
the grounding candidates as a single number, which is then calibrated with the causation probability that
comes from the accident history in the location. The method of calibration by merely using historical
accident data introduces uncertainty to the modeling, which is irreducible as it is related to the unknown
causes in the past state of the system (Rowe 1994). Additionally, using traffic density, especially when the
traffic is assumed as uniformly distributed, is another source of uncertainty. However, this can be resolved to
some extent by replacing the traffic density with the actual pattern of the traffic in the area (Mazaheri and
Ylitalo 2010). Therefore, from a risk management perspective, the models cannot be validated as they are not
presenting the measures for controlling the risk. Besides, the models cannot be verified as the causation
probability, which acts as a black box, keeps most of the affecting parameters hidden. Moreover, the models
do not cover the consequence of a grounding accident, nor provide any knowledge that can be used for
consequence analysis. Although, this is not an issue as such, it makes the validation of the model hard when
it comes to a post-accident risk analysis.
Despite the above argument, the method has been widely accepted by other scholars for modeling the ship
grounding accident; e.g. (Pedersen 1995; Simonsen 1997; COWI 2008; Rambøll 2006). The general idea of
the method was to use the trajectory of the vessel’s current heading to find if it will have any intersection
with nearby shoals or grounds given certain sets of conditions, e.g. meteorological conditions. The
differences between various models are on utilizing the available knowledge to model the factors that can
affect on the prediction of the ship’s heading, which in Macduff and Fujii’s models are only the function of
the width of the waterway and speed and length of the ship. Thus, the other possible contributing factors like
human elements, ship’s maneuverability, and the environmental aspects were all neglected by the way that
they defined the causation probability.
3.2.2 Pedersen (1995) and Simonsen (1997)
In spite of its limitations, the methodology presented in Section 3.2.1, has been adopted by Pedersen (1995)
and later on Simonsen (1997) to develop their models (Eq. 3.2.3). This helped the widespread use of the
method; see for example (IWRAP 2009; Kristiansen 2005; Otto et al. 2002; Rambøll 2006; Fowler and
Sørgård 2000; Karlsson et al. 1998). They estimated the expected annual number of groundings (NG) as:
! !"#$$
!!"#
!! !!
𝑁! = 𝑃!,! 𝑄! 𝑒 𝑓! (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 (3.2.3)
!!!" !"#$$ ! !!"#
13
Figure 3: General scenarios for grounding defined by Pedersen (1995) [Ref: Pedersen (1995)]
Similar to Fujii’s, the models of Pedersen and Simonsen estimate the potential number of groundings (NG),
where PC represents the causation probability. However, the key elements of the models were extended to the
ship type and the deadweight tonnage (ship class, i), the annual number of transshipment (Q), the average
time interval between the position checks by the navigator (a), and the width of the waterway (d).
Additionally, instead of traffic density, the actual traffic distribution of ships (f) through the transverse
coordinates of the obstacle (z) is used (see Figure 3). Nowadays, one can use AIS-data to accurately extract
the real traffic properties like distribution of the ships in a certain path; see (IWRAP 2009; Goerlandt and
Kujala 2011; Montewka et al. 2011; Montewka et al. 2010a; Talavera et al. 2013). Nevertheless, using only
the traffic distribution of ships means that the event is being investigated in deductive manner, which means
neglecting the role of the individual ship’s maneuverability for avoiding the accident. This has been pointed
out by Kaneko (2010), in where he used an inductive approach to address the problem. Nonetheless, for
more accurately modeling the ship grounding accident, both approaches should be used and the event should
be modeled by simultaneously taking the role of the whole traffic, if there is any, and the individual ships
into account.
Pedersen and Simonsen’s models also present the grounding candidates as a single number; however, their
models additionally provide the information that is helpful for consequence analysis, like the type and size of
the ship that is involved in the accident. Pedersen and Simonsen’s models are scenario-based models, where
four predefined general scenarios are 1- when the ships are following the ordinary and direct route at normal
speed, and accidents happen mainly due to human error, or unexpected problems with the
propulsion/steering system which occur in the vicinity of a shoal; 2- the ships which fail to change the course
at a given turning point near the obstacle; 3- the ships which take evasive action in the vicinity of an obstacle
and as a result ground on a shoal; and 4- the ships are off-course or drifting ships. Thus, the models introduce
four quite general IEs that scenario analysis process can be start from. Although the presented scenarios are
quite useful for risk assessment, the question about being useful for decision making process and thus for
risk management is still open.
For estimating the causation probability (PC), Pedersen and Simonsen have used Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
in where the required data has been extracted from either historical accident databases or through expert
opinions. Nevertheless, their models are still quite sensitive to the value of causation probability (Mazaheri
and Ylitalo 2010), as it is assumed that the ships are being navigated blindly in the waterway and
consequently some important factors like the maneuverability of the ship and the human role to navigate the
ship have still been neglected. Implementing FTA to estimate the causation probability, where the utilized
knowledge can be closely assessed by looking at the contributing elements, is more logical than restoring
historical accident data to calibrate the causation probability. This procedure can reduce the involved
uncertainties and has actually been recommended for risk assessment for practical decision making (Aven
and Zio 2011). However, some elements of knowledge that is implemented into the model by Pedersen and
Simonsen, like the effect of traffic (Q) and ship class (i) on a grounding accident, are not evidence-based and
comes from some general assumption (Mazaheri et al. 2013a).
3.2.3 Fowler and Sørgård (2000)
Fowler and Sørgård (2000) have also used the same methodology as Pedersen to estimate the frequency of
powered (fpg) (Eq. 3.2.4) and drift (fdg) (Eq. 3.2.5) groundings as:
15
𝑓!" = 𝑛!" 𝑃! 𝑝!",! + 𝑃! 𝑝!",! (3.2.4)
𝑓!" = 𝑓!,! 𝑝! 𝑝! 1 − 𝑝!",! 1 − 𝑝!,! 1 − 𝑝!,! (3.2.5)

! !
They have also utilized FTA to estimate the causation probability of grounding in good (Pc) and bad (Pf)
visibilities. However, they have defined the grounding candidates differently. Instead of integrating the
probability density function of the ship traffic over the transverse coordinates of an obstacle, they have
defined two critical situations, in where the grounding candidates in powered and drift groundings can be
recognized. In order to define the critical situations, they have consulted experts. For powered grounding, the
critical situation (npg) is defined as when the vessel is in a grounding course within 20 minutes of a depth
contour less than the vessel’s draft. For drift grounding, the critical situation is defined as the product of the
number of ship-hours that are spent within 50 nautical miles of a shoreline and the probability that the vessel
is drifted toward the shore (pd) within different wind speed categories (pw). The probability and the location
of drifting are defined by combining the frequency and location of breakdown situations (fp) with three ways
of regaining the control of a drifting ship as emergency anchoring (pa), self-repair (ps), and tug assistance
(pt). The data that is used for the frequency analysis of different elements of the model are based on some
assumptions and simplifications that are not explicitly mentioned. This introduces unknown levels of
uncertainties to the model, which is thus irreducible. However, the authors have tried to address the
uncertainty matters in the discussion part, where they have discussed about the accuracy of the used
databases. Nevertheless, since one of the matters that make a model useful for decision makers is the
clarification of all the assumptions behind the actual model and its elements, the verification of the model
cannot be done flawlessly when it comes to the involved uncertainty. Moreover, the model estimates the
grounding frequency associated to an area, without assessing the possible consequences or having the
potential to deliver the knowledge required for a post-accident consequence assessment.
3.2.4 Eide et al.(2007)
Eide et al. (2007) have used the same procedure as Fowler and Sørgård (2000) for modeling the drift
grounding, though omitting the emergency anchoring from the possible control regaining options, which is
acceptable as the model is aimed for the deep coastal waters of the Norwegian Sea. However, this needs to
be reconsidered if the model is used in more shallow water areas with possibility of emergency anchoring.
The advantage of the model over the model of Fowler and Sørgård (2000) is the utilization of the dynamic
meteorological data as wind, current, and wave and the acknowledgment of the dynamic nature of ship
related conditions as position and speed, which are affecting both the frequency (F) and consequence (C) of
drift grounding (Eq. 3.2.6 and Eq. 3.2.7).
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡 = 𝐹 (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)×𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡) (3.2.6)
𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡 = 𝐹!"#$% ×𝑃!"#$%&'%!|!"#$% (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡) (3.2.7)
The frequency of drifting is estimated based on the available statistics on the failure rates of steering and
propulsion for different ship types as well as some modification from experts’ judgment. The probability of a
grounding accident given a drifted vessel is estimated given the control regaining options as self-repair and
tug-assistance as well as the dynamical surrounding conditions. The required probability density functions
are based on statistics and are modified from the previous studies.
Eide et al. have modeled the consequence of the tankers drift groundings in two parts as size of oil spill,
which depends on the ship size, loading condition, and the hull structure as double or single hull; and as the
impact of one tone of spilled oil on the environment, which depends on the sensitivity of the location of the
spill and on the type of the spilled oil. Therefore, their model is basically capable of providing the required
knowledge for post-accident consequence analysis, which makes it more suitable for risk management than
what is previously presented for the purpose of risk analysis. However, the oil outflow model used by Eide et
al. is rather a simple model that is based on the statistics of the previous tanker accidents. In this regard and
in order to be more comply with the dynamic nature of the presented risk model and decrease the level of the
involved uncertainties, dynamical oil outflow models (e.g. Sergejeva et al. 2013; Tavakoli et al. 2010;
Tavakoli et al. 2011) that more accurately estimate the oil outflow as a result of a grounding accident should
be used instead. Additionally, the consequence analysis of their model can be greatly enhanced if a more
detailed model (e.g. Lecklin et al. 2011) is used for impact analysis of the spilled oil on the environment.
Nevertheless, the presented approach encompasses uncertainty description. The discussion is quite detailed
and outstanding, and the uncertainty analysis has been performed qualitatively. This allows the comparison
17
between the risk levels of different tanker accidents. Therefore, from a risk management perspective, this
approach may seem to be useful.
3.2.5 COWI (2008)
COWI (2008) has performed FSA by implementing Pedersen’s approach, as presented in Section 3.2.2.
Therefore, COWI’s model is another revision of Pedersen’s model while using the distribution of the course
over ground (COG) of the ships in the vicinity of shoals (Figure 4). In addition to Pedersen’s expression of
probability of grounding, COWI expresses the probability of grounding (PG) as:
𝑃! = 𝐹 𝛼! − 𝐹 𝛼! (3.2.8)
where F is the Gaussian distribution of the ship’s COG in the vicinity of the shoals that its parameters are
extracted from the AIS data; α1 and α2 are the COG angles that the trajectory of the ship has intersection with
the nearby shoal (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Ship maneuverability based on the course over grounds of the ships [Ref: COWI (2008)]
Perhaps implementing the distribution of COG in the vicinity of shoals can be seen as taking the ship’s
maneuverability into account since quite the same approach was followed by Kaneko (2010), who believed
that Pedersen neglected the role of the individual ship’s maneuverability in accident avoidance. Nonetheless,
the question is whether the distribution of the COGs of the ships from the historical data (here AIS or radar)
can necessarily reveal the individual ship’s maneuverability. Excluding the COG distribution of the ship, the
COWI’s analytical model is the same as Pedersen’s model, which identifies the scenarios from the four
general IEs, as described in Section 3.2.2. Nevertheless, instead of applying FTA, COWI has borrowed and
calibrated the causation probability from Fujii’s model. This keeps the concerns explained above for both
Fujii and Pedersen’s models still valid for COWI’s model.
3.2.6 Montewka et al. (2011)
Montewka et al. (2011) have also considered the maneuverability of an individual ship in their model, where
the interaction between the ship and the shoal is evaluated in different locations. For this purpose, a utility
function is defined, which encompasses a set of variables as the characteristics of the vessel together with the
spatial properties of the waterway and the traffic. The characteristics of the vessel are modeled by the
maximum draught, the turning circle, and two coefficients that one describes the distance at which a hazard
to the vessel can be detected and one represents the technical equipment possessed by the ship. The spatial
properties of the waterway are modeled taking into account the depth of the channel by coefficients that
represent the sounding accuracy of the depth and the seabed composition. In contrary to COWI (2008) and
Kaneko (2010), Montewka et al. (2011) have taken into account the maneuverability of individual ships
based on indices like the maximum draft of the ship and the resulting radius of the turning circle; and have
estimated the consequence of the accident expressed in the amount of oil spilled using the generic
methodology proposed by IMO. However, the concern about the disability of providing the RCOs for risk
managers by reverse analysis of the scenarios is valid for this model. Montewka et al. have utilized the
physical description of the event (grounding accident) that made them able to validate the model within its
defined aim, which is determining the most navigable, i.e. safest route, for a single vessel. Nevertheless,
since the physics of the event is considered the only cause of the accident, the model lacks an evidence-based
approach, which makes it hard to validate the model in the framework of knowledge-based risk management.
3.3. Probabilistic Models
Probabilistic models can be seen as a tier above the analytical models. As complementary to analytical
models, probabilistic models analyze the grounding accident from a more holistic and systematic view,
19
utilizing different methods like FTA or Bayesian approach. By a FTA, the grounding accident as the top
event is broken down into its initiating factors; and by the Bayesian approach, the key factors that contribute
to the accident are recognized together with the degree of belief associated with the states of each factor, and
they are taken into account as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). BBN has been suggested as a suitable tool
for analyzing the complex phenomena under uncertainty with deterministic and stochastic data allowing the
causality discovery (Kristiansen 2010; Kaplan 1997). Moreover, the Bayesian probability theory has been
specifically mentioned as a suitable method to handle the uncertainty as it allows the measurement and
combination of different types of uncertainty (Paté-Cornell 1996).
There are some issues that makes using BBN more suitable than FTA for risk analysis purposes in
probabilistic models (Kristiansen 2010). From among them, two issues can be highlighted; in FTA the events
can have only two states (binary events); otherwise, since the failures in FTA need to always be sequentially
dependent, the process would become complicated for multistate events, as the size of the tree grows
exponentially by the number of the involved parameters. The other issue is that in FTA the events need to be
statistically independent (Bobbio et al. 1999) and it is computationally difficult to use common mode failures
in FTA (Kristiansen 2010). However, in BBN, for the nodes (failure elements) that the parents are uncertain
or unknown, the incomplete Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) can be neglected by implementing so-
called noisy-or model (Bobbio et al. 1999). Additionally, from risk management perspective, a unique
inherent ability of a BBN is the possibility to perform backwards reasoning on the model to find the most
probable causes of the system failure, which is essential for determining RCOs (Bobbio et al. 1999). BBNs
are capable of handling multi-states scenarios burden with uncertainty and lacking knowledge. Finally, such
models allow introducing decision and utility nodes, which makes them suitable for fast decision-making
processes.
3.3.1 Amrozowicz (1996)
With this being said, Amrozowicz performed a FTA on tankers grounding. He analyzed the scenarios by
defining two ESs as powered and drift groundings, knowing the fact that they are mutually exclusive events
(Eq. 3.3.1); see (Amrozowicz et al. 1997; Amrozowicz 1996b, a). Each type of grounding has been put in a
FT as the top event and has been broken down to its basic events. By taking a system analysis approach,
Amrozowicz (1996a) has used expert knowledge to develop the FTs. To estimate the probabilities, historical
data was used in addition to expert judgment. For analyzing the human errors and estimating their
probabilities, he applied THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) method, which is
recommended by IMO (2002) for human element analysis in FSA, while consulting the Handbook of Human
Reliability that is written mainly for nuclear industry. For drift grounding, Amrozowicz (1996a) considered
two rescue options as the tug assistance and the emergency anchoring; yet neglected the chance of the self-
repair for avoiding the drift grounding.
𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑃 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑃 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (3.3.1)
In order to tackle the uncertainty due to using expert opinion, Chen and Zhang (2002) added Fuzzy concept
to Amrozowicz et al. (1997) FTA for powered grounding by applying the theory of Fuzzy Fault Tree (Singer
1990). Therefore, the final results will contain the uncertainty associated with the accident probability
estimation which will be also present while making decisions based on the model outcomes.
3.3.2 Rambøll (2006)
Rambøll (2006) incorporates the analytical model of Pedersen as part of its probabilistic model (Figure 5).
Similar to COWI (2008), Rambøll has applied a scenario-based approach following the framework of FSA in
the modeling process. The causation probability has been defined using BBN, while the geometrical
probability of a ship being a grounding candidate is added to the network by nodes expressing the elements
of Pedersen’s analytical model. Thus, Rambøll has replaced the FTA in Pedersen model by a BBN keeping
the same elements; thereby from the conceptual point of view the two models do not differ much. Similar to
Pedersen, Rambøll has tried to bring the environmental condition into account by merely adding the node
“visibility”. Moreover, the technical failure only includes failure from radar and not steering or propulsion;
thus it limits some plausible IEs for a grounding scenario. Also a BBN has been utilized to model the post-
accident consequence, which is fed by the outputs from the frequency network, such as the ship type, ship
size, and the speed that all are actually the outputs from Pedersen’s analytical model. The consequence
model then combines these outputs with the other nodes that give the amount of cargo and bunker oils and
the number of passengers onboard. It then gives the amount of oil spill or human casualties as the result of
the grounding accident. Nevertheless, all the assumptions behind the BBN model by Rambøll, which some
21
come from Pedersen’s model and some from experts’ opinions, make the model a non evidence-based model
that does not fit to knowledge-based risk management.
Figure 5: The geometrical model to estimate the grounding candidate on a route with a bend [Ref: Rambøll (2006)]
3.3.3 DNV (2003)
Another BBN model for collision and grounding accident analysis has been proposed by DNV (2003). The
main network has two sub-networks on operator’s behavior and the situation of the vessel (see Figure 6).
The study is made in FSA framework and by having cruise vessels in mind. The structure of the model has
been defined by a group of experts, and statistical data have later been used to calibrate the model. The CPTs
of the nodes were also estimated using expert judgment and historical accident data. The uncertainties
associated on the system behavior are also discussed; though how the uncertainties affect the output of the
model is not addressed.
Figure 6: Overview of the Bayesian grounding model for passenger ships [Ref: DNV (2003)]
23
The geometrical part of the model has five IEs, which creates five different scenarios for a ship to be a
grounding candidate. They are defined as when the ship is: 1- in a course towards a shoal, supposed to
change the course, does not; 2- in a course along the shore, not supposed to change the course, turns towards
the shore; 3- in a course along the shore, she drifts-off the course, should correct the course, does not; 4- in a
wrong position towards an obstacle, should steer away, does not; 5- in meeting/crossing traffic, gives way,
steer towards a shoal (see Figure 7). Thereby, the scenarios are mainly defined based on the experts’
knowledge about the system.
In addition to the human and the environmental factors, the model contains the causality from the technical,
organizational, and managerial factors. Notwithstanding the model’s ability for backwards reasoning, the
RCOs have not been determined as the direct outcome of the model and they have been suggested by domain
experts while they have focused on reducing the frequency of grounding accidents.
Figure 7: Five grounding scenarios defined by [Ref: DNV (2003)]
3.3.4 Kristiansen (2010)
The only model that determines the causality in the system behavior having in mind the ship grounding
accident as an ES has been developed recently by Kristiansen (2010), who has analyzed the powered
grounding accident utilizing accident reports and structured the obtained knowledge into a BBN. Kristiansen
was inspired by an approach taken in the aviation industry (Luxhøj and Coit 2006) together with the
frustration from the lack of supporting empirical data on the maritime accident modeling. The way that
Kristiansen coded the data ends to have three major causes for a powered grounding accident as human
factors, unsafe acts, and external factors (see Figure 8). The study shows that the coding procedure of the
data has influence on the final structure of the model by delivering the different relative frequencies for the
casual factors. Additionally, the Greedy Thick Thinning algorithm as a Bayesian search learning algorithm
(Dash and Druzdzel 2003) that was used for structuring the BBN allowed the inputs from human experts as
well as from the accident data (Mazaheri et al. 2013b). Therefore, one may question the level of experts’
knowledge contribution to the learning process in order not to expose the contribution of the empirical data
as an evidence-based approach.
Although the model is still in the initial stages and is not ready to be used for risk analysis objectives, and the
learning data on grounding accidents used for constructing the model is limited to the Norwegian waters, it is
an important step forward in the field of risk analysis and management of MTS. The model that is
constructed evidence-based and based on the real scenarios -as opposed to imaginary- reflects the reality.
This gives the opportunity to learn from the real data, thus shows the areas to be improved in order to reduce
the number of accidents.
Figure 8: Powered grounding risk model by Kristiansen (2010) [Ref: Adapted from Kristiansen (2010)]
3.3.5 Uluscu et al. (2009) and von Dorp and Merrick (2009)
All of the reviewed models till now, except Eide et al. (2007), are stochastic but static models that are not
considering the time issue into account. Nowadays, the widespread use of computers makes easier to address
the time dependent factors by modeling the stochastic scenarios based on the historical data of time
25
dependent elements to estimate the frequency of an accident (van Dorp and Merrick 2009; Gucma 2006;
Uluscu et al. 2009; Goerlandt and Kujala 2011). For this purpose either PC-based models or full-mission
bridge simulators are utilized (Briggs et al. 2003; Gucma 2002).
The power of PC-based simulation models is in the number of scenarios they can generate and analyze in a
reasonable time. In this regard, using methods like Monte Carlo (MC), the models generate variety of IEs
and MSs of traffic scenarios based on the distribution of the input elements. Thereafter, by implementing
different algorithms, the models analyze the likelihood of the various ESs of each scenario. Thus, the models
estimate the frequency of the ESs that are grounding accidents, and output them together with the knowledge
about the traffic scenario that can be fed to the consequence models for post-accident analysis. Besides, by
utilizing techniques like MC, PC-based simulation models have the ability to propagate the uncertainty of the
input variables into the outputs for further consideration of the decision makers, which is accepted as a way
to handle the uncertainty issues (Pedronia et al. 2012; Merrick and van Dorp 2006).
Using computer simulation, Uluscu et al. (2009) have randomly generated accident scenarios. They
estimated the frequency of powered grounding accidents in the Strait of Istanbul using the proportional
hazards model proposed by Cox (1972), which is made on the assumption that the accident probability
behaves exponentially with changes in the related covariate values. This is the same method that has been
used by van Dorp and Merrick (2009); see also (Merrick et al. 2005a); for simulating powered and drift
groundings in Puget Sound and surrounding waters. van Dorp and Merrick (2009) have used computer
simulation to predict the ship’s position, course and speed in a limited time frame, given certain conditions as
covariate values; like meteorological conditions as wind, current, and visibility. The ship and the route
related information for generating the scenarios were extracted from the AIS data. The simulation for drift
grounding scenarios runs till the drifting path of the vessel, which is predicted in a five-hours timeframe
considering the effect of future wind speed and current, has its first intersection with a depth contour
shallower than the draft of the vessel; however, no barrier options like tug assistance or emergency anchoring
has been considered. The powered grounding locations are defined as the most frequent depth contours that
ships’ trajectories intersect with within five hours timeframe, conditioned to the constant speed of the vessel.
The likelihood of the scenarios in both types of grounding was calibrated based on the expert opinions. At
the end, the model is able to produce a risk map based on the frequency of the occurred grounding in the
simulation timeframe. The same holds true for the model by Uluscu et al. (2009) too. The strength of the
simulation models following the methodology presented in the literature (Goerlandt and Kujala 2011; Uluscu
et al. 2009; van Dorp and Merrick 2009) lies on their abilities to feed the consequence models with detailed
and location dependent outputs. Simple consequence models for tanker grounding will use the particulars of
the ships (e.g. dimension and mass) that are involved in the accidents, to predict the size of the hole in a
breached tank and then oil outflow after a tanker grounding accident (van de Wiel and van Dorp 2009;
Tavakoli et al. 2010; Montewka et al. 2010b). This approach has been implemented by van Dorp and
Merrick using the consequence model of van de Wiel and van Dorp (2009). von Dorp and Merrick (2009),
however, have relied on expert opinions for estimating the consequence of the accidents, using
questionnaires. Nonetheless, none of the simulation based models presented here have the ability of reverse
analysis, in which the ES of a scenario is set at a desired condition and the possible option to reach the ES is
obtained by a reverse scenario analysis. This can be generalized as the weak point of the simulation models
that do not have a BBN kernel. Therefore, the RCOs in the simulation models as such are not the outcome of
the modeling process, rather they are generally recommended by the experts.
4. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The above review of the available models for risk analysis of ship grounding shows that there is no
systematic and holistic method that can satisfy all the existing concerns about the modeling process; such as
the ability to provide and evaluate feasible RCOs, inherent uncertainty of the data and the outcomes,
possibility to easily update the model when new information is acquired, possibility to generalize the model
over other locations and vessel types, the clarity of the affecting factors, and the ability to handle dynamic
variables.
Decision making is one of the critical parts of a risk management process. For decision making, three items
are indispensable: 1) a set of the available options, 2) a set of the evaluated outcomes of each option, and 3)
the value judgment on each outcome (Kaplan 1997). The value judgment should only be done by the
decision makers provided with the set of the options. The RCOs in the reviewed papers have all been
recommended by domain experts and not as the direct result of the modeling (see Table I). However, for a
systematic and reliable decision making, the RCOs should be the direct result of the knowledge-based
27
modeling process, and the expert opinion should be supplementary to the model’s output. As if otherwise,
the outcomes of the RCOs cannot be evaluated with the utilized risk model, and the final state of the system
after the implementation of the control options will remain unpredictable. Besides, relying on only expert
opinion for all three essential parts of decision making will push subjectivity into the risk management
process. With that being said, neither of the possible outcomes of the RCOs recommended for controlling the
risk was actually evaluated in the reviewed papers. There are two major features that elevate a model from
the level of risk analysis to the level of risk management: 1) the reverse analysis of the scenarios that enables
the model to identify the RCOs; and 2) the ability of the model to handle the decision nodes that can measure
the effect of various RCOs and determine the optimal solution for an analyzed scenario (Hänninen et al.
2012; Helle et al. 2011; Lecklin et al. 2011; Hänninen et al. 2013). From among the reviewed models, only
the models of DNV, Rambøll, and Kristiansen that are BBN-based models and have the ability of the reverse
analyzing of the scenarios may have the above two features, and thus have the better potential to be used for
risk management and decision making purposes (see Table I).
Another key issue is how a model addresses the involved uncertainty. Due to the limited available
background knowledge on the modeled system, always some level of uncertainty is involved in the models
used for risk assessment (Amrozowicz et al. 1997); either in the way that the models are structured, or in the
way that the likelihood of each element is quantified. In all the reviewed models, the historical data have
been used for quantifying the likelihood of the IEs and the MSs in the analyzed scenarios; which was
unavoidable as the only way to understand a phenomenon is to look at what happened in the past. However,
since there are doubts on the ability of the historical data to predict the future state of a system (Paté-Cornell
2007), using the data from the past state of a system will introduce (aleatory) uncertainty into the modeling
(Rowe 1994). Therefore, all the reviewed models have used at least one other source of data as analytical
model or expert opinion. When it comes to the use of analytical models, the question is how accurately the
models are mimicking the reality. Thus, depending on the knowledge that is utilized into the model, some
level of (epistemic) uncertainty is involved. From among the ones that have used such method, only Rambøll
(2006) has discussed the involved uncertainty; which then increases its potential to be used for decision
making purposes (see Table I). When the expert opinion is used either for model construction or for
likelihood quantification, the involved uncertainty becomes even more highlighted. Typically, the largest
source of uncertainty is human elements in the forms of expert judgment and human failures quantification
(Amrozowicz 1996b). Although, there are some methods that can somehow decrease the effects of human
elements uncertainty (Pyy 2000; Rosqvist 2003), they are very often not utilized and the uncertainty of this
type is not addressed nor discussed in the reviewed papers. Although involved uncertainty in the model
construction may be eased using the method adopted by Kristiansen (2010) (i.e. knowledge-based model
construction), from a risk management point of view, the remaining uncertainty should be somehow exposed
to the decision makers for further precautions. The possible ways to visualize the involved uncertainties,
when quantifying the key elements of the risk models, are: the probability of frequencies, risk curves, the
imprecise probability, fuzzy logic, and the theories of possibility and evidence; see (Aven and Zio 2011;
Aven 2011a; Kaplan 1997). The visualization of the uncertainties has only been addressed in few of the
reviewed papers (Merrick and van Dorp 2006; Merrick et al. 2005b; Chen and Zhang 2002); while the rest
were either silent or have merely presented a general discussion on the topic.
The other concern about a risk model is how the model reflects the current reality of the phenomena that the
model is being used for. Idealistically, a model only represents the phenomenon that is designed for, and
merely based on the available knowledge of the time that is developed. With the fast forwarding
advancement in the human understanding about the physical phenomena, the possibility that a model
becomes obsolete in a short time is high. Thus, the possibility to easily update the model when new
knowledge is acquired seems important. To do so, the affecting factors of the model should be clear in order
to make the developers able to understand the way and the situation that the model works, and possibly alter
the elements according to the new state of the knowledge. From among the reviewed models, those that are
only based on predefined scenarios (i.e. Fujii’s, Macduff’s, Pedersen’s, and COWI) do not have this ability
(see Table I). They only represent the scenarios that they are designed for, and the validity of the model is
questionable if the scenarios are changed. Besides, the models that have implemented causation probability
(i.e. Fujii et al., Macduff, Pedersen, Fowler et al., and COWI) have also made some of their affecting factors
unknown and unclear to the user; which then makes the model hard to be updated and thus less reliable to
use in a different situation. On the contrary, the tree-based and BBN models do not have such flaw. Since
they clearly exposed their elements to the user, the models can be updated, and they do not need a total
restructure when new knowledge is acquired. However, since BBN models do not have the hierarchical
29
structure of the tree-based models, and the elements do not need to be sequentially dependent (Bobbio et al.
1999), they can be updated more easily when new knowledge is acquired or when the situation is changed.
Moreover, the grounding accident is a dynamic-by-nature phenomenon as it has time-dependent affecting
factors. Thus, ability to handle dynamic variables will certainly increase the reliability of a model that is
designed for assessing the risk of grounding accidents. From among the reviewed models, models of Eide et
al., Uluscu et al., and van Dorp and Merrick have considered the dynamic nature of the phenomenon.
Thus far and based on the reviewed models and from the risk management perspective, it can be argued that
a BBN model that has decision and utility nodes and is erected on the real data of grounding incidents
/accidents (i.e. evidence-based) with modification from the knowledge of the domain experts can satisfy the
requirements of the knowledge-based decision making process. Although a BBN core can address the
involved uncertainties (Merrick and van Dorp 2006; Paté-Cornell 1996), the remaining uncertainty of the
modeling process should be clearly presented and visualized in the final results, in order to make the
different decision makers able to optimally choose the best possible RCOs for decreasing the risk, and at the
same time maximize the utility value of each stakeholder (Grabowski et al. 2000; Merrick and van Dorp
2006). Undoubtedly, not all of the decision makers have the same priorities, and not even have the same
degree of feeling about the risk. Therefore, the risk and the RCOs should be estimated under the doctrine
of utilitarianism (Kaplan 1997), in order to maximize the utility of the stakeholders that the risk is defined
for. Besides, integrating such BBN model with PC-simulation techniques gives the model the ability to easily
handle the dynamic elements of the model, and thus make the output of the model more reliable.
5. CONCLUSION
The aims of this paper were: first, to propose a methodological framework suitable for knowledge-based risk
modeling, fulfilling the recommendations given by the Formal Safety Assessment issued by the IMO;
second, thoroughly review and discuss all the existing risk models available in the literature developed for
ship grounding risk analysis in light of the risk perspective provided; and third, to highlight the models that
are more appropriate for risk management and decision-making and to provide the recommendations to
future model developments.
As the result of the reviewing process and the comparisons between the reviewed models, we have found
some of the models to be more proper for decision making purposes in compare with the others (see Table
I). What we have also found, which can be considered as a recommendation for risk management process, is
to use a model that allows the discovering causal relations existing in the modeled system. This can be done
by mixing various methodologies, for instance a simulation-based model with a BBN core which has the
ability to address the dynamic nature of the event; and moreover such a model has the ability of reverse
analysis of scenarios that is indispensable for the RCOs recognition by the model itself. Besides, using
analytical models to identify the possible scenarios in the specific situations is recommended. The
conditional probability of the different nodes and their states in the BBN could be addressed using different
statistical and time-series models. Additionally, the involved uncertainty in all sources of data should be
clearly visualized and presented in the final results, in order to make the different decision makers able to
optimally choose the best possible RCOs that maximize the utility function of the stakeholders that the risk is
defined for.
In this paper more than 90 articles, reports, and dissertations all written in English have been reviewed. From
among the reviewed literature, 13 genuine models that made contribution to the risk modeling, focusing on
the ship grounding accident, have been closely assessed from a risk management perspective. Thus, the
scope of the review was limited only to those models that have been published in English and for ship
grounding risk assessment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
31
This study was conducted as a part of “Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport by holistic safety
strategies” (MIMIC) project. The MIMIC project is funded by the European Union and the financing comes
from the European Regional Development Fund, The Central Baltic INTERREG IV A Programme 2007-
2013; the City of Kotka; Kotka-Hamina Regional Development Company (Cursor Oy); Centre for Economic
Development, and Transport and the Environment of Southwest Finland (VARELY).
Our colleagues, Floris Goerlandt, Kaarle Ståhlberg, and Otto Sormunen are greatly appreciated for the
inspiring conversations and their comments on the manuscript. The authors are also grateful towards the two
anonymous reviewers that their useful comments and suggestions help us to improve the first version of the
manuscript.
Table I: Comparison of the models with noticeable contribution in the risk modeling of the grounding accident
The implemented
Source of the used data
Reverse Analysis
Decision Making
methods
Consequence
Assessment
Uncertainty
Probability
Discussion
Causation
Potential●
Elements
Dynamic
Ability
Geometrical
Year
Analytical
Historical
Inputs† Outputs‡
scenarios
Name RCOs
Evidence-
Simulation
opinion
Expert
model
BBN
FTA
data
based*
Fujji et al. 1974 √ - - - √ - √ - f(C, Z, v) NG 1.55E-04 - - - - - L
Macduff 1974 √ - - - √ - √ - f(L, v, C) PG 3.70E-04 - - - - - L
Pedersen 1995 √ √ - - √ √ √ - f(type, dwt, L,T, C, Z, a) NG, type, dwt, L, T 1.59E-04 - - - - - L
Amrozowicz 1996 - √ - - √ √ - - f(a, F) PG - - - by Experts √ - M
Fowler et al. 2000 √ √ - - √ √ √ - f(C, F, w) PG 3.70E-04 - - - √ - L
DNV 2003 - - √ - √ √ - - f(C, a, F, w) RG - √ - by Experts - √ M/H
RAMBØLL 2006 √ - √ - √ √ √ - f(C, Z, T, F, v, a, w) PG, type, dwt, L, T - √ - by Experts - √ M
Eide et al. 2007 √ √ - - √ √ √ - f(w, t, F) PG - √ √ - √ - M
COWI 2008 √ - - - √ √ √ - f(C, T, Z, a, v) PG, type, dwt, L, T 3.00E-04 - - by Experts - - L
f(a, F, C, w, L, type, age, - M/H

Uluscu et al. 2009 √ - - √ √ √ - - RG - √ √ by Experts -
flag, t)
van Dorp et √ M/H
2009 √ - - √ √ √ - - f(a, F, C, w, L, type, t) RG - √ √ - -
al.
dictated by the real - M/H
Kristiansen 2010 - - √ - √ √ - √ PG - - - - √
accident cases
Montewka - L
2011 √ - - - √ - √ - f(T, a, C, F, L, v) PG - √ - - -
et al.
*
Based on the real accident and incident cases w = meteorological conditions
†
a = human or/and organizational factors Z = traffic density or distribution
C = width/geometry of the waterway
F = technical reliability
‡
L = ship’s length dwt = dead weight tonnage
T = ship’s draft NG = annual number of grounding
t = time PG = probability/frequency of grounding
v = ship’s speed RG = risk of grounding
33
●
H = High
M = Medium
L = Low
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Modeling the risk of ship grounding - A

Article in WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs · December 2013

Arsham Mazaheri Jakub Montewka

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Modeling the risk of ship grounding – a literature review from a risk

Arsham Mazaheri, Jakub Montewka, Pentti Kujala

to mitigate the risks, as those simply remain unknown.

given to future model developments.

The final publication is available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13437-013-0056-3#page-1

ship-ship collision (Samuelides et al. 2009).

management for MTS.

paper is summarized in Chapter 5.

limitations and uncertainties of the risk model is recommended (ibid).

measures to mitigate the risks are completely different.

and Garrick 1981):

combination of assumptions governing the input variables.

2.2 Background Knowledge

between the estimated risk and the risk limit.

work of Kaplan (1997).

can be formulated as:

𝑠 = 𝐼𝐸! , 𝑀𝑆! , 𝐸𝑆! (2.4)

engineered systems, the following three interpretations are often in use:

1. The relative-frequency interpretation of probability defines the probability of an event in terms

event; see (Winkler 1996).

(Kaplan 1997). However this kind of interpretation can be seen as subjective.

associated uncertainties (Rae et al. 2012).

2.6 Risk Control Option

3. REVIEW OF THE EXISTING MODELS

3.1. Scope of the Review

as Fault Tree and Bayesian Network are used for modeling.

3.2. Analytical Models

3.2.1 Macduff (1974) and Fujii et al. (1974)

it comes to a post-accident risk analysis.

they defined the causation probability.

3.2.2 Pedersen (1995) and Simonsen (1997)

risk management is still open.

comes from some general assumption (Mazaheri et al. 2013a).

3.2.3 Fowler and Sørgård (2000)

𝑓!" = 𝑓!,! 𝑝! 𝑝! 1 − 𝑝!",! 1 − 𝑝!,! 1 − 𝑝!,! (3.2.5)

potential to deliver the knowledge required for a post-accident consequence assessment.

3.2.4 Eide et al.(2007)

drift grounding (Eq. 3.2.6 and Eq. 3.2.7).

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡 = 𝐹 (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)×𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡) (3.2.6)

𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡 = 𝐹!"#$% ×𝑃!"#$%&'%!|!"#$% (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡) (3.2.7)

approach may seem to be useful.

3.2.5 COWI (2008)

probability of grounding, COWI expresses the probability of grounding (PG) as:

the nearby shoal (see Figure 4).

Fujii and Pedersen’s models still valid for COWI’s model.

3.2.6 Montewka et al. (2011)

3.3. Probabilistic Models

combination of different types of uncertainty (Paté-Cornell 1996).

3.3.1 Amrozowicz (1996)

repair for avoiding the drift grounding.

𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑃 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑃 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (3.3.1)

3.3.2 Rambøll (2006)

that does not fit to knowledge-based risk management.

3.3.3 DNV (2003)

model is not addressed.

knowledge about the system.