The 1935-1941 Italo-Ethiopian war

Introduction
My paper focuses on the 1935-1941 Italo-Ethiopian war. Some people call it the ‘seven-month
war’ because Mussolini proclaimed the conquest of the A.O.I. Empire (Africa Orientale Italiana)
on 9th May 1936, that is seven months after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. In fact, the struggle
between Italians and Ethiopians never ended till the final defeat of Italy in 1941.
I tried to understand this historical event above all from the point of view of the African
protagonists, which is not so easy because there are many books and documents written by
Western historians and few by African writers, and some of the African scholars who wrote about
this, interpreted the war from the point of view of the ideologies which developed in Ethiopia
and Africa after the war.

Italians know or remember many aspects of WWI and WWII, but they know very little about the
1935-1936 Italo-Ethiopian war which was, however, the third mass conflict in the Italian history.
It was also one of the few moments in the Italian history when an Italian event was discussed,
criticised or supported all over the world1.
Ethiopia, an ancient state located in east Africa, had almost survived the European ‘Scramble for
Africa’2. The country, by the early XX century, was the only indigenous independent state on the
African continent3. It was an ancient empire which the sovereign Ras Tafari Haile Selassie tried to
modernize. Ethiopia was four times as large as Italy, a weak, mainly agricultural nation which
aimed at playing a role in the international market economy. Roads were few and the only
relevant railway line was the French one between Addis Ababa and Djibouti.
The dynasty of the Emperor Haile Selassie went back to the Axum reign founded in the I century
CE. Two centuries later, Ethiopia converted to Christianity and remained for centuries a Christian
island surrounded by Muslim and animistic populations. When Ras Tafari was crowned Negus,
king, in 1928, and Negus Negesti, king of the kings, that is emperor, in 1930, his willingness to
modernize his country was evident. He signed a constitution and founded a parliamentary system
which could represent the multi-ethnic population with its three main groups, Oromo, Amhara
and Tigrayan4.
Tafari named himself Haile Selassie, which means Power of the Trinity. He believed the sovereign
embodied tradition and attributed his success to destiny and the will of God. He aimed at building
a centralized government, a modern professional army, a national system of

1
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 7.
2
Andrew Hilton, The Ethiopian Patriots. Forgotten Voices of the Italo-Abyssinian War 1935-41 (Introduction byRichard
Pankhurst), Spellmount, Stroud U.K., 2007, p. 33.
3
Federico Rampini, L’oceano di mezzo. Un viaggio lungo 24.539 miglia, Laterza, Bari, 2019, p. 193.
4
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 68.
communications, and prominent public works in Addis Ababa. Though the emperor centralized in
his hands the political power, he also believed in progress and modernity. He undertook an
ambitious road-building program to link the capital to every economically important province and
to tie commercial centres into a national grid. He built several new schools in Addis Ababa and
proclaimed his faith in Ethiopian’s youth. In his rush to reform, the emperor hired foreign advisers:
he put an Englishman in the Ministry of Interior to supervise the antislavery campaign. A
Frenchman went to the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones. By 1930, Ethiopia employed
French, British, American, German, Greek and Swiss advisers5.
The emperor’s coronation in November 1930 was designed to advertise the regime’s modernity.
On those days the capital transformed itself, the police and the Imperial Bodyguard appeared in
smart, new khaki uniforms. Triumphant arches were built in several parts of the town, there were
electric lines and telephones, streets were paved at night for the coronation ceremonies.
The Addis Ababa regime became credible to the Europeans; the world seemed to recognize the
nation’s sovereignty and independence. Ethiopia would become a member of the League of
Nations in 1923 but the more complex foreign relations required that the issue of slavery be
resolved. The emperor appointed his nephew to deal with the question. One of the excuses Italy
used to invade Ethiopia was its ‘white man’s burden’, its duty to civilize the African country and
abolish slavery. In fact, in the second half of the XIX century, the Ethiopian Emperor Tewodros II
wanted to modernize the country and declared slavery illegal, but it continued tobe practiced,
so from 1923 Haile Selassie took strict measures to impose its abolition6. In 1931 the monarch
promulgated a Japanese-style constitution with fifty-five articles which acknowledged the
ultimate emperor’s power to delegate authority to other institutions such as a two-house
parliament. Despite all its limits and assertions of imperial supremacy, the constitution was a
relevant step towards a progressive and modern government7. Ethiopia was opening to the world
economy. The regime replaced the Maria Theresa dollar with paper currency and coins issued by
the Bank of Ethiopia. The fiscal reforms helped the government to finance its military
modernization8.
Italy was distressed by this development and tried to weaken the African nation’s autonomy.
After the Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896, Italy renounced its policy of expansion so energetically
pursued by Francesco Crispi. In one of the most surprising twists in Ethiopian diplomatic history,
Italy was fully rehabilitated just a year after Adwa, being the first country to be diplomatically
represented at the court of Menilek II. This was also the result of the love-hate relationship that
Menilek had with the Italians, a pattern that has been the distinctive mark of Ethiopian-Italian

5
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, pp.
130-131.
6
Mario Bolognari (a cura di), Lo scrigno africano. La memoria fotografica della guerra d’Etiopia custodita dalle
famiglie italiane, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2012, p. 21.
7
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, pp.
132-134.
8
Ibidem, pp. 135-137.
relations throughout history. Italy’s interest for Ethiopia never vanished. After Adwa’s defeat,
Italy started planning colonial actions with the two other neighbouring imperial powers, Britain
and France. What followed, the Tripartite Agreement of 1906, sanctioned the primacy of Italian
interests in Ethiopia, in the sense that France and Britain left this area available for the Italian
colonial interests9. The advent of the Fascists to power in 1922 reinforced Italy’s colonial
aspirations. Italian politics proved ambiguous: the idea of reconquering Ethiopia had never
vanished in Italy, but when Ras Tafari Makonnen had his European tour in 1924, he was
enthusiastically welcomed in Italy with “Viva Etiopia! Viva Tafari!”, and a policy of rapprochement
between the two countries was ratified by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed on 2nd
August 1928. On the other hand, in 1925, Britain recognized Ethiopia as an exclusive zone of
Italian economic influence, while Italy supported Britain in its effort to build a dam on Lake Tana,
in Northern Ethiopia. This agreement, signed over a country that had joined the League of Nations
only two years before, made a mockery of the declared equal status of League members. It also
hinted to what was soon to come, the League’s impotence to stop the Italian invasion of
Ethiopia10. In 1932 the Duce declared his intention to avenge Adwa and to win for Italy a ‘Place
in the [African] sun’11.
The failure of Fascism on the domestic front led Mussolini to embark on colonial adventure as a
diversionary tactic. War became imperative not only as a boost to the economy but also as a
medium of psychotherapy. What was necessary was a casus belli. The Wal Wal frontier incident,
on 5th December 1934, played that role. The Italians profited from the ill-demarcated borders
between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland and took hold of the place which was valued for its wells.
Ethiopia reasserted its rights on the area. In no way could Wal Wal be considered Italian territory.
The clash was inevitable. Ethiopia took the matter to the League. A period of futile discussions
followed while it became increasingly clear that, in an effort to woo Mussolini away from Hitler,
Britain and France were ready to sacrifice Ethiopia. On 3rd October 1935 Mussolini launched the
invasion, without any declaration of war, ordering General Emilio De Bono to cross the Marab
river12. Haile Selassie looked to the League of Nations, complaining that Italian forces had no right
being within Ethiopia’s frontiers and that Italy was using a small incident as a pretext for war.
To say that the League was working against Ethiopia’s interests would be generous. The council’s
major powers tried to force humiliating concessions on Ethiopia so that an appeased Italy might
serve the needs of continental policy. The hypocrisy of the League of Nations became clear
during a conference in Stresa in April 1935. The Italian representatives asked twice if the
statement about collective security and the inviolability of treaties applied solely to Europe. The
silence signalled that Italy could go to war with its European rear covered13.

9
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 150-151.
10
Ibidem, p. 152.
11
Andrew Hilton, The Ethiopian Patriots. Forgotten Voices of the Italo-Abyssinian War 1935-41 (Introduction byRichard
Pankhurst), Spellmount, Stroud U.K., 2007, p. 34.
12
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, p. 153.
13
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, p. 141.
Appeasement was the order of the day in Europe, where most statesmen avoided alienating Italy
out of fear of its alliance with Nazi Germany. The League of Nations came out withsolutions
tending to favour the Italians14. On 7th October 1935, the council of the League of Nations
formally found Italy an aggressor, thereby raising the issue of sanctions. On 18th November 1935,
Geneva imposed relatively benign import and export sanctions on Italy, which Mussolini used to
urge his people to war. The closing of the Suez Canal and restrictions on oil sales might have had
relevant effects on the Italian economy, but these proposals were not accepted15.
On 9th May 1936, Mussolini declared the Italian victory: in few months an ancient, glorious African
empire was destroyed. This was the only victory of fascist Italy and it did not last long. Officially
Italy would lose its empire in 1941 but there was never peace and a stabilized power in the
colony. The Fascists had to fight hard against the Ethiopian resistance during all the years 1935-
194116. This is the reason why Nicola Labanca states that the Italo-Ethiopian war lasted 5 years,
from 1935 to 1941, not just seven months, from 1935 to 1936, although Mussolini proclaims the
birth of A.O.I., Africa Orientale Italiana, on 9th May 193617.
Haile Selassie resisted the Italian attack till April 1936. When it was clear that Ethiopia was
being defeated, a crown council decided that the Emperor and his family should go abroad to
symbolize Ethiopia’s refusal to accept defeat. Its logic was that, as long as the sovereign was free
and unbowed, Italian rule in Ethiopia could have no legitimacy. If the monarch remained in the
country, he would risk being humiliated, captured or killed or, even worse, submitted to the
conqueror. On 4th May the emperor, his family and his ranking officials boarded a British war ship
for five years of exile in England, in the town of Bath18.
The major weakness of the Ethiopian army was lack of coordination. The veterans of Adwa saw
a replay of what had happened forty years earlier, a force which occupied a stronghold and lost
the battle. Only, this time, it was the Ethiopians who were on the losing side19. In the first battles
the memory of Adwa pervaded the war. Italians tried to erase the record of humiliation, while
many Ethiopians fought in the confidence of another victory. Yet the Battle of Adwa could not be
repeated. Many factors contributed to this. The most obvious was the monumental imbalance of
armaments. At Adwa, the gap between the two sides, in both quantity and quality, was
considerable. In 1935, the Italians could benefit from modern military technology. The disparity
in machine-guns and artillery was huge, but the fatal advantage was in the air, where the Italian
superiority was out of question, especially if we consider the use of the prohibited mustard-gas.
The disparity was above all numerical: at Adwa, in 1896, about five

14
Ibidem, p. 142.
15
Ibidem, p. 143.
16
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 8.
17
Ibidem, p. 9.
18
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, pp.
145-146.
19
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, p. 154.
Ethiopians had fought against one Italian. In 1935-1936, on the contrary, the Italians enjoyed
numerical superiority in most of the conflicts, which also depended on the mobilization of their
askaris20. The askaris were colonial soldiers from Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. They were
cheap personnel, in the sense that the colonial rulers did not pay much for their services but
allowed them to rob their enemies and steal whatever they could find during the battles. They
were not very obedient and reliable, and many of them abandoned the Italian army to fight with
the Africans, but they were available for the worst work and the most violent actions.In fact, it
would be unjust to say that they were the cruellest soldiers, as they obeyed the orders of the
white authorities21.
According to Bahru Zewde, Professor of Ethiopian History at Addis Ababa University, the reason
of the Ethiopian defeat lay in Ethiopian society itself. It was often said that Ethiopia wasdefeated
because it was feudal. This does not seem to be convincing. Ethiopia was more feudal in 1896
than in 1936. Paradoxically, it lost because it was less feudal. Ethiopia was in a phase of transition
from mediaeval to modern methods, in the military field as well as in politics. Menilek’s reign
was characterized by feudal harmony. Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia was in a period of modern
absolutism. The former was a more united country than the latter. The relative peace of the
post-Adwa period had also contributed to the decline of the martial spirit. The Ethiopian
commanders at Adwa were men born, grown up and dying in war. Forty years later, they were
replaced by men who had worked as civil servants or businessmen rather than warriors. The
emperor assumed military duties uneasily and he trusted collective security, which is why he
appealed to the League of Nations before and after the war22.
For three days between the flight of the Emperor and the arrival of the Italian army, Addis Ababa
was caught in the grip of mass violence. There was a total breakdown of law and order. Burning,
looting and random shooting became the norm. In such a state of anarchy and blind violence, the
arrival of Badoglio’s troops, on 5th May 1936, might have been even welcomed with a sense of
relief. On 9th May Mussolini proclaimed the birth of the Italian Empire of EasternAfrica, which did
not include only Ethiopia but also the other colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The empire
was divided into six regions without respecting the ethnic composition of the population, nor the
administrative subdivision of the territory. This would increase the political division and conflict
in Ethiopia after the retreat of the Italians.
The chief representatives of Fascist power were the viceroys, that is Marshal Badoglio till May
1936, Rodolfo Graziani, till the attempt on his life in February 1937, and Amedeo Umberto
d’Aosta, the Duke of Aosta, who adopted a relatively more pacific style of administration taking
as a model the British colonial system23. The Duke of Aosta was appointed viceroy in November
1937 after Mussolini had decided to replace the brutal Graziani. By 1937, it became clear that
the policies of terrorism and repression adopted by Graziani had succeeded only in strengthening
Ethiopian hostility, delaying development and settlement projects, and raising

20
Ibidem, p. 159.
21
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 231.
22
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 159-160.
23
Ibidem, pp. 160-162.
security costs. The new viceroy continued attacking the insurgents in the north, while offering
them parole with honour and material benefits24.
Italian administration was characterized by heavy bureaucracy and corruption. There was a
mania for creating committees and commissions. A vast number of colonial officials were
distinguished for their ineptitude, narrow-mindedness and corruption. The Duke of Aosta defined
50% of his officials as inept, and 25% as thieves. The colonial experience was seen as an
opportunity to get rich as quickly as possible25.
Because of the Resistance Movement, Italian rule was largely confined to the towns and it was
mainly in the urban areas that the impact of the Occupation was felt. The Italians left a lasting
imprint on the architectural landscape of the main towns, like Gondar, Jimma, Harar and Addis
Ababa, not to speak of Asmara and Mogadishu. For the capital of A.O.I., Addis Ababa, a master-
plan was drafted, but abandoned when Mussolini lost the Empire, in 1941. Yet legacies of the
plan remained: the Markato, the open market in the western part of the city; the Kazanchis (in
Italian Case INCIS, Istituto Nazionale per le Case degli Impiegati dello Stato) in the east, and the
Kaza Popolare (houses for the working classes) in the south. Addis Ababa also received the first
supply of electric energy run by the parastatal CONIEL (Compagnia Nazionale Imprese Elettriche)
and water in the north-west of the city. Several factories were also set up, like textile mills and
cement factories, and oil mills, flour mills and sawmills all over the country. This is what Bahru
Zewde writes about some aspects of the coexistence of Italians and Ethiopians: “In social life,
despite the Fascist policy of racial segregation, there was a great deal of interaction between
Ethiopians and most of the moderate Italians. The ban on marriage with Ethiopian women
(nicknamed madamismo) remained a legal fiction. Given the enormous numerical imbalance
between Italian males and females, this was inevitable; further there was the fact that the
Italians, with their open-minded Latin temperament, were largely impervious to the racist policy.
The sizeable mixed population bequeathed to Ethiopia was a result of these marriages. On an
informal plane, initially sponsored by the officials through the importation of European
practitioners of the trade, prostitution assumed a widespread character. It has often been cited
as one of the legacies of Italian rule in Ethiopia. On a slightly more positive line, the acquisition
by town-dwellers of European habits and manners, already begun before the war, now became
even more pronounced. These ranged from dress styles to food habits (including the eating of
pasta). The cash economy, which had made a faltering start before 1935, was significantly
reinforced during the Italian period”26.
Italians have often been famous for road engineering and this is what they produced in Ethiopia,
too, though this was a bit overemphasized, according to Bahru Zewde. Italian road construction
was more extensive and impressive in the north; this is not surprising as it was used more for the
conquest of the country than for its development. The Italian network provided a skeleton for
future expansion and betterment and gave an impetus to the development of motor transport.
The Italians left in the territory cars, trucks and skilled

24
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, p. 150.
25
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 162-163.
26
Ibidem, p. 164.
personnel, which were of value to the post-liberation enterprises. The trentaquattro, an Italian
truck model which became the generic name for all lorries, and the awtanti (from aiutante, that
is driver assistant) were two Italian concepts which became features of good transport in the
1940s and 1950s. Italian has remained the language of mechanics in Ethiopia.
In the economic sphere Italian government was corporatist. It adopted a policy of acquiring or
weakening non-Italian firms. One of the victims of this policy was the House of Mohammedally,
a leading import-export firm before 1935, and the French firm A. Besse. The latter, however,
came back after the Liberation and dominated again import-export trade. The Italians set up
parastatal organizations in industry, commerce and agriculture aiming at realizing the
fundamental program of settlement of Italian farmers in selected fertile areas. This was
considered essential not only to ease Italy’s demographic pressure, but also to make the colony
self-sufficient, in line with the Fascist principle of autarky. The Fascists also hoped that the colony
would later develop in such a way as to be able to support the metropolis. However, the return
was very disappointing: the colony could not even support itself. Neither could the otherItalian
colonies. Ferdinando Martini, the governor of Eritrea till 1907, tried to attract investments to the
colonies but he was not successful. For thirty years the Italian presence in Africa did not
contribute to the economic development of the African continent and the decisions taken by the
Italians regarding borders and geographical divisions are still the cause of wars and conflicts
nowadays27. Nor did the colonial enterprise contribute to the economy of the Peninsula.
Mussolini’s decisions damaged public finances seriously. The heavy militaryexpenses in Ethiopia
made Italy unable to start WWII with sufficient means. Besides, Italians are still paying nowadays
for the Ethiopian invasion. Every time someone buys one litre of fuel, they still pay a small
percentage for the expenses of that remote war, more precisely 1.90 Italian Lira each litre,
corresponding to € 0.00098128.
The main problem for the farmers was insecurity: they lived under the constant threat of attack
by the patriots’ guerrilla bands. Never in their quinquennium of rule did the fascists and the
Italian civilians feel secure in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian resistance never ceased to attack 29.
Settlers who had come with the money anticipated by the government, wrote back to their
relatives not to fall into the same trap. By the end of the colonial period, only 10% of the
agricultural plans had been implemented, while in the fields of commerce and industry, the
activities reached much higher levels because in the urban areas they were less subject to the
pressures of the Resistance30.
The Italians had at first planned to rule the country through the submitted hereditary nobility,
the masafent. Later, this was found unacceptable due to the Italian sense of superiority and the
Fascist praxis of total power. The local nobility was left with their titles and economical support,
but after the attempt on Graziani’s life, some became victims of the reprisals and many of them

27
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 7.
28
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 94.
29
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, p. 148.
30
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 164-165.
were deported to Italy. They were rehabilitated under the liberal and anglophile Duke of Aosta
who made some of them advisers and judges on their return to Ethiopia in 193931.
The resistance remained a constant problem for the invaders. Since their arrival, they were
confronted with a nation-wide war of resistance which embraced all religious and ethnic groups
The Resistance may be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted seven months, from the
opening of hostilities, early in October 1935, to the Italian occupation of Addis Ababa on 5th
May 1936. It was mainly conceived and organized by the Emperor. The second phase covers the
four-year period from the fall of Addis Ababa to 10th June 1940, when the Duce entered WWII by
declaring war on Britain and France. In this period the Ethiopian patriots fought alone without
external help. Though poorly armed, they fought courageously. They increased greatly in number
after the attempt on Graziani’s life on 19th February 1937. The third phase ofresistance ran from
Mussolini’s entry into WWII, through the Allied capture of Addis Ababa on 6th April 1941 and the
Emperor’s return to the capital on 5th May, to the final Italian surrenderin November 1941. This
phase was characterized by the British, and to a lesser extent other allies, involvement in the
struggle. The Ethiopians could now rely on allies and military support32.
On 19th February 1937, Italian Fascism showed its darkest face. Following the unsuccessful
attempt on Graziani’s life by two young Ethiopians, Abraha Daboch and Mogas Asgadom, a period
of terror started in Addis Ababa and all over Ethiopia. General Rodolfo Graziani was well-known
for his brutality and cruelty. Before arriving in Ethiopia, he had ruled in Eritrea, from 1908 to
1912, and in Libya, from 1914. He was called the “killer of Arabs”33 and was reputed to have
vowed to deliver Ethiopia to Mussolini “with the Ethiopians or without them, just as he
pleases”34. He set up concentration camps in Cyrenaica where he imprisoned almost half of the
local nomadic population. Shortly after the attempt on Graziani’s life, the Italian command
ordered all shops closed and shuttered, directed people to return home, and suspended postal
and telegraphic communications. Within an hour the capital was isolatedfrom the world, and
its streets were empty. During the afternoon, Addis Ababa’s Fascist party voted a pogrom against
the city’s black population. The slaughter began that night and continued into the next day.
Blackshirts and civilians went around the city chopping off heads, burning down houses with their
inhabitants, disembowelling pregnant women and committing all sorts of atrocities. Ethiopians
were killed indiscriminately, burnt alive in their huts, or shot as they tried to escape. Italian
truckers chased people down and then ran them over, or tied their feet to tailgates and dragged
them to death. People were beaten and stoned until dead. Women were scourged, men
emasculated, and children crushed underfoot; throats were cut,

31
Ibidem, pp. 166-167.
32
Andrew Hilton, The Ethiopian Patriots. Forgotten Voices of the Italo-Abyssinian War 1935-41 (Introduction byRichard
Pankhurst), Spellmount, Stroud U.K., 2007, pp. 35-36.
33
Moustapha Akkad (film director), Il leone del deserto, 1981: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITJ9-tGNB_U .

Moustapha Akkad (film director), Lion of the Desert, in Wikipedia.en:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_of_the_Desert
34
Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, p. 113.
people were disembowelled and left to die, or hung, or stabbed to death. The educated
Ethiopians, especially the Amhara ethnic group, were particularly targeted, including the
members of the Black Lion organization. This elimination of the intelligentsia created “the missing
generation” in Ethiopia’s history, between the pre-war and the post-war generations. Since
reprisals were not limited to Addis Ababa, the bloodletting became a national calamity.
Altogether as many as ten thousand people died, not a large figure by World War II standards,
but enough to reveal the Italians as murderous racists35.
Antonio Dordoni was in Addis Ababa in those days. He reports: “Nel tardo pomeriggio [del 19
febbraio 1937], dopo aver ricevuto disposizioni alla Casa del fascio, alcune centinaia di squadre
composte di camicie nere, autisti, ascari libici, si riversarono nei quartieri indigeni e diedero inizio
alla più forsennata ‘caccia al moro’ che si fosse mai vista. In genere davano fuoco ai tucul con la
benzina e finivano a colpi di bombe a mano quelli che tentavano di fuggire ai roghi. Intesi uno
vantarsi di “essersi fatto dieci tucul” con un solo fiasco di benzina. Un altro si lamentava di avere
il braccio destro stanco per il numero di granate che aveva lanciato. Molti di questi forsennati li
conoscevo personalmente. Erano commercianti, autisti, funzionari, gente che ritenevo del tutto
serena e del tutto rispettabile. Gente che non aveva mai sparato un colpo durante tutta la guerra
e che ora rivelava rancori e una carica di violenza insospettati. Il fatto è che l’impunità era
assoluta. Il solo rischio che si correva era quello di guadagnarsi una medaglia. Che io sappia, i
carabinieri intervennero una sola volta, per impedire che si bruciassero imagazzini dell’indiano
Mohamedally”36.“Per ogni abissino in vista non ci fu scampo in quei terribili tre giorni in Addis
Abeba, città di africani dove per un pezzo non si vide più un africano”37.
We do not know exactly how many Africans were killed on 19th, 20th and 21st February 1937,
between 1,400 and 30,000, according to the different historical sources. The thousands of Italian
civilians who took part in the slaughter were never punished. A ‘Nuremberg Trial’ for the Italian
war criminals never took place38. Three photos of the massacre exist, taken by the youngAlberto
Imperiali39 who was a supporter of the Ethiopian Resistance, together with his father 40.They show
piles of corpses of Ethiopians lying on the ground.

35
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, pp.
148-149.
36
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 178.
37
Dante Galeazzi, Il violino di Addis Abeba. Uomo sulla soglia, Gastaldi, Milano, 1959, p. 105.
38
Nicola Labanca, Una guerra per l’Impero. Memorie della campagna d’Etiopia 1935-36, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005,
p. 406.

Fascist Legacy, BBC, History Channel, 1989: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2IlB7IP4hys .

Fascist Legacy, in Wikipedia.en : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fascist_Legacy .

39
Alberto Imperiali in Wikipedia.it: https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Imperiali
40
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 220.
The massacre following the attempt on Graziani’s life is just one of the many violent episodes
showing the extreme cruelty of the Italian colonialists. Another one is the most tragic massacre
of Christians which has ever taken place in Africa, that is the murder of around 2,000 Coptic
priests, monks, nuns and believers in the sacred monastery of Debre Libanos 41, founded in the
XII century by the Tigrinya Saint Tecle Haymanot. This happened three months after the attempt
on Graziani, the Christians being accused of having supported the crime in Addis Ababa. After
the 19th September 1937, the Italians exterminated hundreds of harmless, innocent sorcerers,
fortune-tellers and story-tellers, accused of foretelling the end of the fascist empire42. Many
members of the Ethiopian intelligentsia were deported to the concentration camps in Nocra,
Eritrea, and Danane, in Italian Somaliland, where almost half of them died of diseases and poor
food. According to Azolino Hazon, only the Italian carabinieri killed 2,509 innocent Ethiopians
between February and May 193743.
In the summer 1937, a large revolt took place in the area of Goggiam. The Italians were forced to
leave their places and they could retake control of the territory only after several months. The
Italian reprisals were extremely violent and lasted till the summer 1938. The authorities feared
the spread of news about their brutality, so they forbid all journalists to speak about the events44.
The control of the information was total and no one in Italy learnt anything about these
massacres which can be compared to what the Nazis did in Italy during the 1943-1945 German
occupation45.
The Fascist terror marked a change in the resistance war, from conventional hostilities to guerrilla
warfare. There were full-time combatants and peasants who contributed food production for
them. The fighters became known simply as Arbegnochs or ‘Patriots’. Andrew Hilton collected
the stories of some of them who were still alive in Ethiopia at the beginning of the XXI century46.
Fourteen veterans were interviewed, the youngest being seventy-seven and the oldest ninety-
one years old. Many were only in their mid-teens when they joined the resistance47. The story of
the Ethiopian Patriots, who fought almost alone against the Fascist occupation, has never been
adequately told and is today largely forgotten. However, the struggle of the Patriots represents
a glorious chapter in the history of Ethiopia. The Patriots, moreover, were of great importance in
the history of WWII because their existence enabled the Allies to rapidly defeat the common
enemy in east Africa. Allied troops achieved in Ethiopia their first victory of the war against
Fascists and Nazis48. Most Ethiopians proved fearless of
41
TV2000 Debre Libanos: https://www.tv2000.it/tg2000/video/tg2000-speciale-debre-libanos/
42
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, pp. 157-158.
43
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 224.
44
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, pp. 192-193.
45
Ibidem, p. 196.
46
Andrew Hilton, The Ethiopian Patriots. Forgotten Voices of the Italo-Abyssinian War 1935-41 (Introduction byRichard
Pankhurst), Spellmount, Stroud U.K., 2007.
47
Ibidem, p. 18.
48
Ibidem, p. 33.
death and ready to die for liberty and independence. Although the Patriots won few major
battles, the Resistance had a corrosive influence on the colonialists, both physically and
psychologically.
The Resistance showed several weak points too, which influenced the political events after the
Liberation. Although it was nation-wide, it was not comprehensive. If many Ethiopians worked
for the resistance, many others became collaborators. Self-interest or self-preservation led many
to work for the Italian authorities. The Italians called them banda, and far from being punished
or disgraced, they came to occupy key positions in the post-Liberation Ethiopia. Another
weakness of the Resistance was its lack of unity. Parochialism and jealousy marked the relations
between guerrilla bands. Some groups spent more time fighting one another than attacking the
enemy. There was no uniting personality, nor a common ideology or political organization. Haile
Selassie’s flight created a serious gap in this respect49. Two movements involved in the Resistance
had two clear political directions: the Black Lion organization and the republican resistance
movement in exile in Sudan. Both had a marginal impact on the Resistance: the former
disappeared one year after the beginning of the Italian Occupation; the latter was of only
academic significance. The Black Lion organization had a ten-point constitution, the most
interesting aspect of which was its assertion of the superiority of the political over the military
command. It was also against harassing the peasantry and mishandling war prisoners. It forbade
its members to seek exile and urged them to prefer death to capture by the enemy. It was a
conservative movement, expressing its loyalty to Haile Selassie and his family.
The origins of the republican movement went back to the time before the Italo-Ethiopian war.
In exile, the republicans issued a program of action which aimed at the unity of all patriots. They
insisted that Ethiopians should liberate themselves by their own efforts rather than by inviting
foreign powers. It also called for a popularly elected government after liberation, ratherthan the
restoration of the monarchy. Finally, it advocated a federalist approach to accommodate the
diversity of Ethiopia’s constituent regions. Returning from the exile, the republicans found
themselves in trouble as their republicanism and French orientation made them enemies of Haile
Selassie and his British supporters, so they were persecuted till the extinction of their movement.
WWII marked the fall of the Fascist empire. When Italy declared war on the Allies on 10th June
1940, the possibility of liberating Ethiopia became believable. Haile Selassie’s pleas for assistance
were finally answered by a suddenly solicitous British government that saw the liberation of
Ethiopia as a way of securing the Suez Canal’s Red Sea flank from the Axis. On 12 th July 1940,
London recognized the emperor as a full ally50. In 1941 the British launched their attack to the
Italian colonialists from Sudan and Kenya. The Italians made some valid attempts to save the
situation but, worn out by five years of guerrilla warfare and facing a vastly superior force, they
were condemned to inexorable defeat. On 6th April 1941 Addis Ababa was liberated.

49
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 170-174.
50
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994, p. 151.
On 5th May, precisely five years from the Italian entry, Emperor Haile Selassie re-entered his
capital, regaining the throne he was to occupy for thirty-three more years51.
The Italian colonial experience presents some unique and distinct characteristics compared to
the far more established liberal empires of Britain and France which were based on a stronger
and older sense of national unity. Italy founded its first colony, Eritrea, in 1890, barely 30 years
after unification in 1861. The colony of Somalia soon followed, and then Libya was invaded in
1911, forming the “fourth shore” of Italy’s national territory. The fascist regime’s illegal invasion
of Ethiopia occurred in 1935, when anti-imperialist movements and alliances were flourishing
across the globe, and Western public opinion was beginning to seriously question the values
underpinning the imperial project. Empire, in other words, was in crisis. Italy’s actions in Ethiopia
received widespread international condemnation and therefore provided a golden opportunity
for anti-colonial activists, especially Pan-Africanists, to highlight the cruelty and barbarism of
imperialism52.
Mussolini’s decision to attack Ethiopia was based on his will to pursue a policy which could raise
the ‘Italietta’ to the same level as the other prestigious European colonial powers. It was also a
matter of revenge: the defeat at Adwa in 1896 was never forgotten. The 1929 financial crisis
encouraged Italy to find new economic opportunities with the expansion of the empire. All these
reasons urged Mussolini to start an enterprise which proved totally anachronistic. Colonies and
empires still existed in 1935 but the phase of imperial expansion was over,followed by a time of
increasing local autonomy and spreading of anti-colonial movements. The atmosphere was very
different from that of the imperialist era (1870-1914). All colonial and imperialist powers were
now obliged to recognize certain administrative and also political rights. Founding or expanding
an empire now was totally anachronistic53.
Italian imperialism was unique for another reason, too. Italy was not a rich colonial power aiming
at expanding its territory and wealth but a poor State needing land and resources to feed and
employ its population. The word colonia had two meanings in this early period: it meant both
Italian emigrant communities abroad, for example, in North and South America,and Italian
colonial territories in East Africa. It made economic and political sense, for Italy, to pursue a policy
that promoted emigration and the conquest of overseas territories at the same time, because,
unlike France and Britain, Italy lacked capital to invest in establishing colonies abroad. Such an
approach to colonialism shakes up conventional understandings of hegemonic versus subaltern
relationships in postcolonial studies, as it does not distinguish neatly between colonization and
diaspora. By contrast, for Britain and France, it was thorough territorial conquest that the
colonizer’s cultural and political hegemony could be established over colonized populations. At
the same time, emigration was symptomatic of Italy’s “internal colonialism”, the systematic
exploitation of the Italian working classes on the part of the elites,

51
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, pp. 174-176.
52
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018,
pp. 1-2.
53
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 35.
and of the wealthy North extracting maximum economic advantage out of the impoverished
South54.
Antonio Gramsci’s radical critique of colonialism responded directly to Mussolini’s brand of social
imperialism that was presented to Italians as their right to a “place in the sun”. But colonialism,
according to Gramsci, simply cannot be justified by the need of Lebensraum; it instead stems
from internal hegemonies, which subject subaltern classes within the nation to economic and
political exploitation. Francesco Crispi, a liberal Prime Minister who strongly supported Italian
colonial expansion in the Horn of Africa, presented the “mirage” of African colonies to the
Southern Italian peasant as a diversionary tactic to avoid affecting a more equitable redistribution
of land itself, and to consolidate the hegemony of the political ruling class over the rural masses
of the South. In response to Mussolini’s imperialism, in the 1930s the Italian Communist Party
promoted a radical anti-colonial campaign against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, also hoping
that this costly war would prove so unpopular with the working classes that it could serve as a
form of leverage to topple down the fascist regime55.
Neelam Srivastava’s examination of the PCI records, the Pan-Africanists’ writings and the print
activism of Sylvia Pankhurst56, who was one of the founders of the British Communist Party but
who later concentrated her energies on supporting Ethiopia against the fascist invaders, all this
demonstrates that socialism and communism as revolutionary and anti-fascist movements, are
strictly connected to anti-colonial politics57.
Britain and France have always presented themselves as ‘civilizing’ countries able to ‘teach’ and
promote modernity in their colonies. Fascist Italy boasted of being a civilizing nation, too. In fact,
critics of colonialism from right and left argued that Italy was in dire need of a “civilizing mission”
itself: with 60% illiteracy, a widespread lack of hygiene and a corrupt political class, the nation
was hardly in a position to act as a guiding light for colonized subjects58.
Fascist imperialism, especially in Ethiopia, was supported by the Italian masses, though Labanca
points out that the consensus lasted less than the actual empire, which is another distinguishing
factor from French and British colonialism, where consensus was much more entrenched among
the population. But the consensus was also sustained by a massive use of propaganda by the
regime, which infiltrated nearly every major newspaper, periodical, magazine and children’s
publication in Italy. The Ministry of Press and Propaganda was consolidated in the year of the
invasion of Ethiopia59.

54
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018,
p. 2.
55
Ibidem, 2018, p. 3.
56
Sylvia Pankhurst, in Wikipedia.en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvia_Pankhurst
57
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018,
p. 7.
58
Ibidem, p. 22.
59
Ibidem, p. 23.
Mussolini always intervened directly in all the decisions concerning the empire. To obtain the
support of the Italian and foreign public opinion he obliged all means of communication to
observe certain precise rules when dealing with topics concerning the empire. He wanted the
colonial experience to be described according to the tradition of war myths and heroes, of Roman
emperors and symbols. The press had to publish only images that proved the ‘rights’ of the
Italians to fight against a barbaric slaver empire. The films of the Istituto Luce played an important
role as supporters of the fascist propaganda. Theatres produced plays for the purpose. Musicians
composed songs like Faccetta nera. Teachers obliged students to write compositions praising
Mussolini’s conquest of the empire. Corriere della Sera published articles where the war reality
was transformed into an epic adventure where fascists were good heroes risking their lives for
the Italian people while the Ethiopians were painted as sub-human beings60. All this efficient
propaganda produced what some historians called a ‘consensus masterpiece’61. Corriere della
Sera proved not only Eurocentric but overtly racist and a supporter of the personality cult of
Mussolini, the fascist authorities and the Catholic Church which blessed the atrocities of the war.
Only the stereotyped images of a wild, dark, mysterious Africa versus the white, superior
civilization of the Italians were allowed in the means of communication, while it was strictly
forbidden to show the tragic images of the violence and crimes committed by Italian soldiers and
civilians62.
The regime imposed precise ‘veline’ and ‘ordini alla stampa’ to jornalists and press directors:
“mettere in rilievo il carattere popolaresco dell’intervento, cioè guerra voluta dal popolo”,
“riprodurre il duce soltanto insieme a grandi masse e mai da solo”. Pictures must show that
“l’Abissinia è un Paese arretrato, è un Paese di straccioni e di banditi; mai andava esaltato”.
Another ‘velina’ states that “il ministro Ciano […] ha detto di smettere con le sdolcinature che
appaiono in alcuni giornali nei confronti degli abissini e di rammentare che questi sono nostri
sudditi e che è necessaria una netta separazione tra razza dominante e razza dominata. La razza
italiana non deve subire ravvicinamenti di sorta con la razza negra e deve mantenere intatta la
sua forte purezza”. Journalists could not “parlare […] di lanciafiamme, in genere, né di quei reparti
che usano armi speciali”, “non pubblicare fotografie con reticolati italiani in A.O.I.”, “le
corrispondenze sul bombardamento di Dessiè vanno ridotte di volume stando bene attenti a non
dare risalto agli effetti distruttivi della nostra aviazione”63.
According to Angelo Del Boca, the manipulation of information sustained the consensus to the
regime and a certain “esaltazione collettiva, questo lungo distacco dalla realtà, questo
sconfinamento di un intero popolo in una dimensione onirica”64; “per quasi due anni, dalla
primavera del 1935 all’autunno del 1936, gli italiani dimenticano di vivere in uno stato di polizia,
di essere irregimentati a forza nelle varie organizzazioni del PNF. Dimenticano le

60
Mario Bolognari (a cura di), Lo scrigno africano. La memoria fotografica della guerra d’Etiopia custodita dalle
famiglie italiane, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2012, p. 12.
61
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 55.
62
Ibidem, pp. 58-60.
63
Ibidem, pp. 107-108.
64
Ibidem, p. 122.
incursioni delle squadracce fasciste, la marcia su Roma, l’assassinio di Matteotti. Dimenticano
tutto pur di non rompere l’incantesimo creato dalla promessa del duce che anche l’Italia avrà il
suo impero, il suo ‘posto al sole’”65.
The division of labour in many British colonies followed the racial divide; it was injurious to white
prestige if whites were to be seen as part of the working classes in the colony. This was very
different in the case of Italian colonies; Italians came over as labourers, drivers, farmers,
mechanics and so on. Italian colonies were really “colonie di popolamento”, settlement colonies,
not exploitation colonies. The strict reinforcement of racial segregation in Italian East Africa,
enacted under Mussolini, may have been due to this need to increase white prestige in a situation
where whites were performing “humble” jobs, like road-building or farming. Nicola Labanca
notes that 50% of Italians living in the colonies were manual workers. East Africa was the ideal
destination for all those poor Italians who had been prevented from emigrating to America due
to Mussolini’s campaign against emigration from 1926 onwards66.
The fascist authorities in Ethiopia proved racist since the beginning. They did not wait for the
publication of Provvedimenti per la difesa della razza italiana, signed in Italy on 17th November
1938 and abrogated only in 1947. A fundamental part of the legislation dealt with Sanzioni per i
rapporti d’indole coniugale tra cittadini e sudditi where the regime prohibited interracial
relationships between Italians and Africans, especially marriage relationships 67. The authorities
wanted to prevent the birth of ‘mezzosangue’ condemning interracial relationships to one to five
years in prison. After 1940, Italian parents were not allowed to recognize their half-breed children
and give them their surnames. The children could only be supported and educated by their native
parents; they could not attend Italian schools; they could not be adopted68. The racist laws
concerned any form of relationship between white and black people: whites cannot attend public
places reserved for natives; they cannot be employed by natives and make manual jobs for
them69; “nell’A.O.I. i bianchi devono condurre vita nettamente distinta da quella degli indigeni.
Cotesto governo disporrà pertanto: a) che […] [siano tenute] separate le abitazioni dei nazionali
da quelle degli indigeni; b) che sia evitata ogni familiarità fra le due razze; c) che i pubblici ritrovi
frequentati dai bianchi non siano frequentati dagli indigeni; d) che sia affrontata con estremo
rigore […] la questione del “madamismo” [concubinaggio] e dello sciamuttismo
[prostituzione]”70.

65
Angelo del Boca, Prefazione, a Patrizia Caccia e Mirella MIngardo (a cura di), Ti saluto e vado in Abissinia.
Propaganda, consenso, vita quotidiana, attraverso la stampa periodica, le pubblicazioni e i documenti della
Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Milano, Viennepierre, 1998, p. 10.
66
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London,26018,
pp. 28-29
67
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, pp. 162-163.
68
Ibidem, pp. 164-165.
69
Ibidem, p. 166.
70
Ibidem, p. 171.
Work conditions differed according to the race and Italians were paid more than natives. White
employers could not employ natives for more than 30%. There were jobs for whites and jobs
for blacks. “Per i cittadini italiani e stranieri equiparati sono vietati i seguenti mestieri girovaghi:
cenciaiolo, saltimbanco, cantante, suonatore, ciarlatano, servitore di piazza, facchino, cocchiere,
lustrascarpe e ogni altro mestiere lesivo del prestigio di razza”71. White and black people had to
live and eat in separated places72. Bread for whites was different from bread for blacks: “il pane
per la popolazione civile di razza bianca deve essere confezionato con farina di grano,
abburrattata all’80 per cento, miscelata fino al 20 per cento di farine cereali locali” 73. Blacks and
whites could not share the same cinemas and some films could be prohibited to blacks. In A.O.I.
there were precise laws and rules for whites but “Per i sudditi e assimilati, i Governatori, a loro
insindacabile giudizio, possono prescindere dalle norme”74.
In 1939, a theorist of racism made a list of races: “a) cittadino italiano di razza ariana, che è
cittadino optimo jure; b) cittadino italiano musulmano, limitatamente alle province libiche; c)
cittadino italiano di razza ebraica, che a sua volta si può distinguere nel cosiddetto discriminato
e nel cosiddetto non discriminato; d) cittadino italiano delle isole italiane dell’Egeo; e) cittadino
italiano libico, compreso l’ebreo libico; f) suddito dell’Africa orientale italiana”75.
According to an article published in the PCI newspaper L’Unità in 1970, when Heile Selassie was
in exile in Bath, he apparently nominated Ilio Barontini Vice-Emperor of Ethiopia. Barontini was
the emissary of the PCI who helped organize Ethiopian resistance against the Italian colonial
army. He had previously fought in Spain with the Republicans and subsequently became a
partigiano in the Italian Resistance. At the end of the war, General Alexander, the commander of
the allied troops in Italy, decorated him for his merits in combating Nazi-fascism76. His work
contributed to unify Ethiopian resistance forces and to help them change their combat tactics.
So far, the Ethiopians had been prevalently fighting in large bands of 1000/2000 men, which were
easily targeted by the Italian army. Barontini and his mates Rolla and Ukmar urged the Ethiopians
to fight in smaller units, like guerrilla groups. They also told them to stop killing their prisoners,
but rather disarm them and let them go free77.
Ethiopia represented a ‘critical event’ for the development of anti-fascism. The first major anti-
fascist campaign took place in Ethiopia, not in Italy. The PCI members who actively took part in
the anti-war campaign were all working from outside Italy because fascist censorship prohibited
open demonstrations against its colonial enterprise. Gramsci was a keen observer but he was in
prison during the Ethiopian war and died in 1937, while the PCI was in exile in

71
Ibidem, p. 170.
72
Ibidem, p. 168.
73
Ibidem, p. 169.
74
Ibidem, p. 169.
75
Ibidem, p. 172.
76
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018,
pp. 44-46.
77
Ibidem, p. 47.
France. The PCI’s organization of the Barontini mission in Ethiopia, as well as their accurate
analysis of Italian imperialism are fundamental aspects of the way anti-fascist and anti-colonial
discourse developed. This connection took place precisely because the PCI was in exile and was
thus in a different situation from that of other European communist parties; it likely facilitated
the development of internationalist sympathies for colonized peoples. The term ‘subaltern’ was
elaborated precisely in those years by the imprisoned Gramsci78.
The Ethiopian war was not only a major event of Italian history and Italian colonialism. It was also
a fundamental event in the history of Pan-Africanism, probably the single most important event
in black internationalism79. Despite its being considered a short and insignificant empire, the
extremely high number of its African victims, around 400,000, together with its ferocious
methods used to exterminate them, including massive use of poison gas against civilian
populations, makes Italy one of the most bloody and brutal among the imperial powers 80. The
Ethiopian war was a critical event linking transnational, anti-colonial and anti-fascist sentiments.
The advent of fascist colonialism in the late era of imperialism contributed to a profound change
in the conception of “European civilization” which went together with the destruction of
certainties in World War II. Italy, and the Western “civilizing” imperial powers it represented, was
the debated question81.
If the League of Nations and the European powers did not do much against the fascist invasion,
common people protested against fascist Italy all over the world showing their solidarity with
Ethiopia. The reaction to the Italian invasion was a global phenomenon, which can be compared
to the global movements protesting against the invasion of Vietnam. There were manifestations
in Paris, London, Stockholm, Beirut, Damascus, Il Cairo, Nairobi, Lagos, Accra, Cape Town, Mexico
City, India, Iran, in Jamaica and the Caribbean, in China and Japan. For a certain time, Italy became
the main subject in newspapers and debates. This was the only choice by the fascist regime which
aroused such a global interest and such widespread criticism. In New York black people refused
to buy products in Italian shops; in Jamaica and the Caribbean the antifascist protest became one
with the defence of black people’s rights. In particular, the Rastafarian movement, which believed
in the divinity of Ras Tafari Haile Selassie, intensified its political struggle82. However, although
there were so many movements and protests, few people came to Ethiopia to fight with the
natives, if compared to the many volunteers who reached Spain to fight against the dictator
Francisco Franco. In 1935, only around 200 people from Greece, the Soviet Union, Belgium,
Switzerland, Cuba, the USA, Turkey, France, Britain moved to Addis Ababa to help the
Ethiopians83.

78
Ibidem, pp. 48-49.
79
Ibidem, p. 66.
80
Ibidem, p. 72.
81
Ibidem, p. 183.
82
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, pp. 10-11.
83
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 14.
In the US, the journalist George S. Schuyler, among many African American intellectuals, noticed
the analogies between the oppression faced in his community and the fascist dictatorship. For
African Americans, fascism was not a novelty, as they experienced it every day:“The simple truth
of this matter is that we already have fascism over here and have had it for some time, if by
fascism one means dictatorial rule in the interest of a privileged class, regimentation, persecution
of racial minorities and radicals, etc.”84.
Some black activists wanted a free Ethiopia which was seen as a homeland for all black people
around the world85. The seeds for this anti-colonial position was sown, in the Caribbean, by the
spread of the Rastafarianism, a religion that sprang up in Jamaica with the coronation of the
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. Ethiopianism and Ethiopian Baptist Churches were at the
centre of a race consciousness movement among former slaves in North America and in the
Caribbean. When Marcus Garvey summoned the first convention of the Universal Negro
Improvement Association (UNIA) in New York in 1920, the name Ethiopia was adopted as the
focal point of identity for blacks all over the world86. The defeat of Italy by Ethiopians at Adwa
in 1896 reinforced the idea that Ethiopia was the ideal homeland for all blacks, especially those
who had been enslaved and deported to America from Africa. The fact that Ethiopia was the only
free African country before the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1941, contributed to make it the
perfect symbol of the blacks’ undefeatable struggle for liberty.
Anti-fascism, anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism had some points in common. Pan-African ideas
and activities centred around a small group of West Indian and African intellectuals and agitators
in Britain. They protested against fascism and colonialism, and in 1936 they began to formulate
a new ideology of colonial liberation which threatened both capitalism and communism. The
European left was shaped by Pan-Africanism, and this is particularly evident in regard to the
political activism of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia87.
Sylvia Pankhurst was a British anti-fascist, anti-imperial, anti-racist, communist and feminist
intellectual who spent more than thirty years of her life devoting herself to the Ethiopian cause
and died in Ethiopia where she received a state funeral. She was very close to the Ethiopian
Emperor and the imperial family. She aimed at keeping Britain informed of the atrocities
committed by the Italians. Sylvia was the daughter of Emmeline Pankhurst and the sister of
Christabel Pankhurst, both founders of the Suffragette movement. She moved from feminism
to communism, to anti-fascism and anti-colonialism, which is not something disconnected or
impulsive, rather a form of struggle for emancipation and for gender, class and racial equality 88.
In her imagination the subaltern had the plural dimensions that it also took in Gramsci’s thought:
oppression came from class, gender and race. For Pankhurst anti-fascism and anti-colonialism
were strongly connected. She was an editor and, in her writing, she wanted to

84
Neelam Srivastava, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018,
pp. 73-74.
85
Ibidem, p. 74.
86
Ibidem, pp. 76-77.
87
Ibidem, p. 86.
88
Ibidem, pp. 165-166.
give voice to the subaltern, to those people whose rights she tried to defend: women, workers,
black people89. She was the only regular foreign correspondent for Gramsci’s publication Ordine
Nuovo for which she wrote eight articles in 1919 and 1920. Her partner was the Italian anarchist
Silvio Corio who helped her find the funds to finance New Times and Ethiopian News. They never
married and their son, Richard, took his mother’s surname, Pankhurst. He was a historian of
Ethiopia and taught for many years at Addis Ababa University90. One of the main contributors of
the NTEN was the prominent black journalist and historian J. A. Rogers, who wrote in a front-
page article published on 5th August 1936, that he refused the idea that Ethiopia would benefit
from Italian colonization because any improvement in the Italian colonies had been made for the
sole benefit of its white colonizers: “The Italians, so far, have been the worst, the most cruel, the
most barbarous of all the colonial exploiters. This is not because they are inherently different
from the English, the French, the Belgians and the others, but because they are the poorest”91.
The Italian colonialists never tried to understand the natives, their culture and habits, which
proved disastrous for their military authority. They did not have good information in several
contexts. They never had good, up-to-date maps and this also happened during the occupation
of the other Italian colonies. In 1896, in Adwa, there were many mistakes in the distances and
geographical names of the Italian maps and this was one of the reasons for their defeat.
Something similar happened in Tripoli in 1911. The Italian army set along the Ethiopian coast was
efficient and well equipped, but the soldiers could not move easily in the internal territory
because of their poor maps92.
High-rank officials and soldiers did not know the Ethiopian languages. Some could speak Arabic
but very few could understand Oromo, Amhar or Tigrayin. In the summer 1935 the Ministry of
War could not employ Italian interpreters and translators of the Ethiopian languages for the
military division ‘Sila’ and ‘Gran Sasso’ because there were none. This was a big problem for the
army93. The army was often obliged to employ Ethiopian or Eritrean translators. They were
usually askaris who had previously fought with the Italian troops. Though their knowledge of the
Italian language was not very good, they were employed in trials and they often made bad
mistakes which caused conflicts between Italians and natives. If the defendant was a native, the
Italian judges did not care much about the correct comprehension of the language as their
decisions were always very arbitrary94.

89
Ibidem, p. 166.
90
Ibidem, pp. 165-169.
91
Joel Augustus Rogers, “Italian ‘Civilization’ Will Desolate Ethiopia: Oppressor Will Take All, Leave Natives
Nothing”, New Times and Ethiopian News, August 15, 1936, 1.
92
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 42.
93
Ibidem, p. 43.
94
Ibidem, p. 44.
The protagonist of the novel Tempo di uccidere by Ennio Flaiano95 has sexual intercourse with an
Ethiopian girl who first refuses but then accepts him96. If the Italian soldier had known something
about local culture, he would have not had the intercourse with the girl because she was wearing
a white turban around her head and this happened when a woman suffered from leprosy. Italian
soldiers knew little about local culture and did not respect it97. Many Ethiopian churches were
surrounded by plants which were considered sacred. Italian soldiers often cut and used wood
and leaves to make fire, as it happened in Endamariam Church in January 193698. Ethiopian
Christians banned killing and eating certain animals, according to their interpretation of the Old
Testament. Many Italians ignored or did not respect these rules, so they were seen as kind of
cannibals. This incomprehension increased conflicts between blacks and whites99.
The literary production on the war in Ethiopia shows some common characteristics which the
authors derived from the worst fascist teaching. Alessandro Pavolini’s writing, Vittorio
Mussolini’s Voli sulle ambe, Quaderno Affricano by Giuseppe Bottai, XX Battaglione eritreo by
Indro Montanelli, all these works express the writers’ despise of their enemies, the inability to
understand human suffering, the fascination for the opportunity of exterminate people, the
idealization of a glorious death. One of Alessandro Pavolini’s favourite themes, almost his
obsession, is hunting Abyssinians, seen not as human beings but rather as animal preys with no
dignity100. In his novel Voli sulle ambe, Vittorio Mussolini writes that he enjoyed setting villages
on fire: “Era un lavoro divertentissimo di un effetto tragico ma bello […] Bisognava centrare bene
il tetto di paglia […] Quei disgraziati che stavano dentro e si vedevano bruciare il tetto saltavano
fuori come indemoniati”101. Vittorio Mussolini recognized he had “acquistato sulle Ambe la laurea
per essere uomini. La guerra certo educa e tempra e io la consiglio a tutti, ancheperché credo sia
proprio dovere di uomo farne almeno una.”102 Indro Montanelli admitted he had gone to Africa
“a cercarvi una coscienza di uomo”103 which he thought he had found leading a band of Eritrean
askaris to the North Front. He describes the devastation of an Ethiopian village in these words:
“La spedizione era stata buona: sessantasette accertati. Gli ascari si sparpagliavano pei tukul a
razziare e, all’occorrenza, fornire i sacramenti definitivi a

95
Giuliano Montaldo (film director), Tempo di Uccidere, 1989, from the novel Tempo di uccidere by Ennio Flaiano,
1947: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_LnWYuALog
96
Nicola Labanca, Una guerra per l’Impero. Memorie della campagna d’Etiopia 1935-36, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005,
p. 408.
97
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 46.
98
Ibidem, p. 47.
99
Ibidem, p. 48.
100
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 197.
101
Vittorio Mussolini, Voli sulle ambe, Sansoni, Firenze, 1937, p. 78.
102
Ibidem, p. 150.
103
Indro Montanelli, XX Battaglione eritreo, Panorama, Milano, 1936, p. 9.
qualcuno che poteva essersi rintanato in qualche nascondiglio a esalarvi l’ultimo rantolo”104.
Thus, sixty-seven Ethiopians were murdered and askaris were authorized to plunder and kill.
According to Indro Montanelli, such an extreme violence could contribute to educate a citizen105.
He was grateful to Mussolini for such an opportunity: “Questa guerra è per noi come una bella
lunga vacanza dataci dal Gran Babbo in premio di tredici anni di scuola. E, detto tra noi, era
ora”106. For over fifty years, Montanelli was the most authoritative Italian opinion maker107.
However, he was the most convinced denier of the employment of gas by the fascists in Ethiopia:
“Lui, in Etiopia, c’era stato. Non parlava per sentito dire. La sua era la testimonianza di un
combattente, sempre in prima linea con le avanguardie. E giurava di non aver mai visto un
abissino ucciso dai gas. Giurava di non aver mai sentito il caratteristico odore di mostarda
dell’iprite. Chi sosteneva il contrario era semplicemente un mentitore”108. He was wrong. Not
only did Mussolini use mustard gas, he also wanted to start a biological war, but General Badoglio
persuaded him to drop the plan109. On 7th February 1996, the Ministry of Defense Domenico
Corcione, admitted for the first time that “nella guerra italo-etiopica furono impiegate bombe
d’aereo e proiettili d’artiglieria caricati ad iprite ed arsine, e che l’impiego di tali gas era noto al
Maresciallo Badoglio, che firmò di proprio pugno alcune relazioni e comunicazioni in merito”110.
Few days after, in Corriere della Sera, Indro Montanelli recognized that historical documents
proved he had been wrong and he publicly apologized111.
On the other hand, the only book circulating in Italy and in the Italian universities till the 1960s
about the Italian colonies in Africa, was Raffaele Ciasca’s Storia coloniale dell’Italia
contemporanea. Da Assab all’Impero, published by Hoepli in 1938, showing an idealized picture
of the regime. Ciasca was a Senator and scholar, and he spread his book in many universities.
Ciasca’s book and the 50-volume L’Italia in Africa, provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
obscured and deformed many events of the Italo-Ethiopian war112. Only in the 1970s, it became
easier to consult the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a fundamental source for any
research about Italian colonialism113.

104
Ibidem, p. 196.
105
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 199.
106
Indro Montanelli, XX Battaglione eritreo, Panorama, Milano, 1936, p. 226.

Nicola Labanca, Una guerra per l’Impero. Memorie della campagna d’Etiopia 1935-36, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005,p.
107

404.
108
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 206.
109
Ibidem, p. 205.
110
Angelo Del Boca, I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996, p. 40.
111
Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?, Neri Pozza Editore, Vicenza, 2005, p. 206.
112
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. V.
113
Ibidem, p. VI.
Wars are usually told by the winners. As regards the Italo-Ethiopian war, we know much more
about the ‘white’ point of view. A lot was written about the military, political, cultural aspects of
the war from the point of view of the Italian protagonists and how the Italians in Italy were
involved and supported the war. Not much was written by Ethiopians. There are some
biographies of the Negus and documents about his attempts to persuade the European powers
that Italy was the aggressor and that Ethiopia should be defended. Something is written about
some relevant Ethiopian personalities and leaders, but very little was collected about the
Ethiopians’ opinions, how they lived the war, what they thought about the Occupation, how
faithful they were to the Negus or how they collaborated with the Italians 114. Military histories
are often written by the winners with the purpose to defend their reasons, so they often neglect
what happened in the enemy’s field. The Italo-Ethiopian war was written above all by Italians,
British, French and Americans. Nicola Labanca tried to give voice to several points of view and
balance the Italian documents with those coming from other nations115. Labanca writes that few
African and Africanist historians had sufficient language and cultural competences to write a
history “from an African point of view”. Some of them wrote exceptionally good and interesting
works, but they are not many. Labanca thinks historians could be divided into two groups: those
who are not interested in the African and native point of view, and those who consult different
sources and try to consider different voices. The latter know that their opinion is partial, too, but
they cannot be considered colonial historians like the former116. As regards our war, a lot was
written about the 1935-1936 conflict from the Italian point of view, enough about the 1940-1941
battles from the British more than from the Italian, point of view, not by chance. We do not know
much about the Italian military events in the years 1936-1940 as they were hidden and
transformed by the regime’s propaganda. We know even less about the Ethiopian activities from
1935 to 1941 both because colonial historians were not interested in this point of view, and
because African and Africanist historians could not produce enough materials. Some interesting
reconstructions by African and Africanist historians were strongly influenced by the political
ideologies in their countries. Besides, many Italian Africanists were more interested in the
cultural and philological aspects of the Horn of Africa than in social and political history117.
A complete work about the Ethiopian resistance was never written 118. The Ethiopian resistance
was very important as it represented one of the first anti-colonial battles and it led to the first
Fascist defeat. Nevertheless, it was not given enough importance in the Western world, and it
did not become a symbol of anti-imperial liberation in Africa119. The Ethiopian resistance leaders
were important fighters who enjoyed respect and prestige among the local population

114
Nicola Labanca, La guerra d’Etiopia 1935-1941, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, p. 17.
115
Ibidem, p. 18.
116
Ibidem, p. 19.
117
Ibidem, pp. 20-21.
118
Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941, Laterza, Bari, 2008, p. 261.
119
Ibidem, p. 261.
but were totally isolated. The only support from abroad was the Italian-British-Ethiopian mission
led by Ilio Barontini, which had a high symbolic value but poor military relevance. This changed
completely after Italy declared war on Britain in June 1940: the arbegnochs, thepatriots, started
being supported from abroad. After 1940, the British employed twenty-five to thirty thousand
men against the Italians in the Horn of Africa120.
The Ethiopian liberation war cost an extremely high price. In September 1945, Haile Selassie’s
government reported Ethiopia’s human loss. From May 1936 to May 1941, 75,000 patriots died
in battle, 17,800 children, women and old people were killed by bombs, 30,000 people were
murdered during the 1937 massacre, 24,000 patriots were condemned to death and executed,
35,000 prisoners died in concentration camps, 300,000 died as a consequence of the devastation
of the villages121.
All colonial wars are brutal and do not distinguish between soldiers and civilians. Human rights
are not respected and no institutions guarantee the defence of the civilians. Italian colonialism
was not better and not worse than other Europeans’ colonialism, though it had some specific
features. The natives were totally excluded from public functions and could not share the
administration of the territories. From this point of view, it was different from the British and
French models. The power was totally in the hands of the white colonizers, but not those in the
colonies, rather the rulers in Rome. It was an example of super direct rule. Mussolini had a total
control of the colony. He refused to leave any power to local authorities like the Ras. This
extremely brutal decision shows how the Duce totally ignored the glorious imperial history of
Ethiopia and the role of its nobility and religious authorities. Mussolini despised Africans, he
considered them inferior and subhuman. In this way he created in Ethiopia the most
segregationist regime which became later a model for the apartheid in South Africa122.
Violence and murders were imposed by a class of officials depending on the colonial police.
Soldiers despised the natives, their culture and their traditions, too. After the attempt to
Graziani’s life, in September 1937, officials, soldiers and civilians started the worst massacre of
black people in Africa. Historians often use the term “genocide” to define the military violence
by the European powers in the XIX and XX centuries. Were the Italian crimes in Ethiopia an
example of genocide? After the attempt to his life, Graziani imposed reprisals especially against
people belonging to the Amhara ethic group: the so-called Young Ethiopians, fortune-tellers,
story-tellers. Noblemen and high-rank officials were deported to Italy and low-rank officials to
the concentration camps in Danane, Italian Somaliland. According to Matteo Dominioni, the
definition of genocide is correct if referred to the extermination of the Amharas from March to
May 1937. As regards the other ethnic groups genocide is not the correct word, although violence
and crimes were extremely brutal123.

120
Ibidem, pp. 266-267.
121
Ibidem, p. 271.
122
Ibidem, p. VIII-IX.
123
Ibidem, pp. 297-299.
Conclusion
Italians have forgotten or self-forgiven the events I talked about. Few people in Italy know the
Italo-Ethiopian war, while many remember a lot about WWI or WWII. We still tend to consider
ourselves brava gente, as if the atrocities committed by the Fascist regime were less criminal
than those by other colonial powers. The Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia was to the
Ethiopians as vile and atrocious as the Nazi invasion was to the European nations. The British-
led liberation five years later had the same resonance for them as the D-Day had for us in the
West124. Nazi invasion, D-Day, Liberation are still meaningful words for each of us in Italy.
However, we refuse to remember or we do not know at all that we ourselves played in Africa the
criminal role we condemn in our former enemies in Europe. It is time to remember and to be
aware of our responsibility as a nation. This was the purpose of my paper.

124
Andrew Hilton, The Ethiopian Patriots. Forgotten Voices of the Italo-Abyssinian War 1935-41 (Introduction by
Richard Pankhurst), Spellmount, Stroud U.K., 2007, p. 19.
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