Abbysinia Crisis

The Abyssinian crisis was a diplomatic crisis that took place between 1934 and 1937 over
Italy's policy of aggression against Ethiopia. It had the direct effect of undermining the
credibility of the League of Nations and encouraging fascist Italy to ally itself with Nazi
Germany. In December 1934, Mussolini accused the Abyssinians of aggression at an oasis
called Wal Wal. He ordered Italian troops stationed in Somaliland and Eritrea to attack
Abyssinia. Large quantities of ammunition and supplies had been stockpiled there. In October
1935, the Italian army invaded Abyssinia. Some historians believe that the Abyssinian crisis
destroyed the credibility of the League of Nations. This war suggested that the ideals of peace
and collective security, upon which the League had been founded, were now abandoned. In
the end, approximately 107 Ethiopians and 50 Italians and Somalis were killed. Neither side
did anything to avoid confrontation; the Ethiopians repeatedly menaced the Italian garrison
with the threat of an armed attack, and the Italians sent two planes over the Ethiopian camp.

The impact of Anglo-French response to the Abbysinia crisis

Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 prompted a major European crisis. This article
applies the main theories of foreign policy analysis to the British Government's handling of
this crisis. It argues that bureaucratic politics existed, but had little impact on outcomes.
Domestic politics had more influence, but did not provide detailed instructions on how to act.
The perceptions of key actors, informed by reasoned judgement, determined this. Fears of the
threat posed by rival states coalesced with concerns about Britain's own military weakness,
leading decision-makes to emphasise the need to act in tandem with France. British policy
was therefore motivated by the tension between the public's desire to see action against Italy
and the Government's wish to minimise any breach with her allies. These findings highlight
the weaknesses of the bureaucratic politics model and show how domestic politics can affect
foreign policy outcomes. They also demonstrate the interaction between rational analysis
defined in terms of reasoned judgement, and actors' perceptions. It is thus argued that benefits
are to be gleaned from combining these theories.

Haore-Laval Pact
The Hoare–Laval Pact was an initially secret December 1935 proposal by British Foreign
Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval for ending the Second
Italo-Ethiopian War. Italy had wanted to seize the independent nation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia)
as part of its Italian Empire and also avenge the 1896 Battle of Adwa, a humiliating defeat.
The Pact offered to partition Abyssinia and thus partially achieve Italian dictator Benito
Mussolini's goal of making the independent nation of Abyssinia into an Italian colony.The
proposal ignited a firestorm of hostile reaction in Britain and France and never went into
effect. Hoare and Laval were both sacked.
Stresa Front

The Stresa Front was an agreement made in Stresa, a town on the banks of Lake Maggiore
in Italy, between French Prime Minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin (with Pierre Laval), British
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini on 14 April
1935. Formally called the Final Declaration of the Stresa Conference, its aim was to reaffirm
the Locarno Treaties and to declare that the independence of Austria "would continue to
inspire their common policy". The signatories also agreed to resist any future attempt by
Germany to change the Treaty of Versailles.Patrick Buchanan's Churchill, Hitler and the
Unnecessary War considered the Stresa Front the last chance to stop Hitler before the
Second World War. The Stresa Front began to collapse after the United Kingdom signed the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935 in which Germany was given permission to
increase the size of its navy. It broke down completely within two to three months of the
initial agreement, just after the Italian invasion