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The transition from a multi-domestic to globally integrated multinational

enterprise - In an industry where local taste matters

Article in European Journal of International Management · March 2012

DOI: 10.1504/EJIM.2012.045796

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The Transition from a Multi-domestic to Globally Integrated Multinational
Enterprise – In an Industry Where Local Taste Matters.

Paul Gooderham

NHH - The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration

5045 Bergen, Norway

Phone: +47 55 95 96 96

Mobile: +47 90934942

E-mail: paul.gooderham@nhh.no

1
The Transition from a Multi-domestic to Globally Integrated Multinational
Enterprise – In an Industry Where Local Taste Matters.

Abstract

Existing theory suggests that multi-domestic MNEs attempting to make the transition from

the multi-domestic to the global state are confronted by two fundamental challenges, a

political and a social network challenge. What is lacking is a process theory of how MNEs

overcome these challenges. Adopting a theory-building approach the purpose of this paper is

to address this gap. Our setting is a Scandinavian multi-domestic MNE, SCF, which has been

engaged in the transition to a distinctly more global state for nearly a decade. More

specifically we focus on the attempts by the corporate centre to integrate the purchasing

activities of its group of subsidiaries. We compare its early, and largely unsuccessful,

initiative to achieve purchasing integration with its more recent, largely successful, initiative.

In so doing we develop a set of propositions that provide a framework for shaping and

guiding the deliberate actions of managers for the creation of a favorable context for transition

2
Introduction

Multi-domestic MNEs with structures that resemble federative rather than unitary

organizations have been common particularly among European MNEs (Gooderham and

Nordhaug, 2003) and particularly in industries such as foodstuffs, where local taste matters

(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Characteristic features of such MNEs are that their subsidiaries

have a national focus and substantial latitude to forge locally oriented strategies (Birkinshaw

and Hood, 2000). Porter (1986) and Prahalad and Doz (1987) refer to this particular generic

MNE strategy as the multi-domestic strategy and contrast it with a second generic strategy,

the global strategy. Harzing (2000) found clear empirical support for this distinction. The

essence of the multi-domestic strategy is its emphasis on the need to be responsive to each

local environment in order to achieve local competitive advantage (Yip, 1989). In contrast, a

global strategy views competitive advantage as being based on capturing global scale or scope

economies through the integration of the activities of the business and focusing on customer

demands that are standardized across markets (Roth, 1992). Thus in terms of the degree of

integration of activities across locations, whereas MNEs pursuing a global strategy seek to

exploit cross-national sources of advantage through a high level of intra-firm integration of

resources, those pursuing a multi-domestic strategy allow subsidiaries to be largely

autonomous and to depend more on locally-sourced resources as opposed to centralized Pro-

Cures (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Thus not only is there local production, but also local

purchasing responsibility.

Among others, Yamin and Sinkovics (2007), have argued that globalization and

environmental drivers, including increasing market liberalization and advances in information

and communication technologies are causing multi-domestic or federative MNEs to seek

3
global integration of operational and functional activities (see also: Buckley and Ghauri,

2004). Indeed Birkinshaw (2001: 281) has claimed that:

“Most MNEs have now moved towards some variant of the global subsidiary structure

in their international operations and a corresponding dilution in the power and

responsibilities of the country manager.”

The notion that emerges is one of two very different MNE states. The multi-domestic

state is characterized by a low degree of integration of operations combined with

decentralized decision-making and managers with a local view of their role. By contrast the

global state is characterized by substantial integration of operations underpinned by global

decision-making and managers with a geocentric view of their role. Given these fundamental

differences, it is remarkable that there is a dearth of in-depth studies of the transition process

that commences when an MNE resolves to move from the multi-domestic to the global state.

Present theory suggests that when MNEs engage in this transition they will confront two

distinct challenges, a political and a social network challenge. However, what is lacking is a

process theory of how MNEs overcome these challenges. The purpose of this paper is to

address this research gap. Given that existing theorization is limited to delineating the barriers

to transition, we adopt a theory-building approach (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Our setting is a

Scandinavian multi-domestic MNE, SCF, which has been engaged in the transition to a

distinctly more global state for nearly a decade. More specifically we focus the attempts by

the corporate centre to integrate the purchasing activities of its group of subsidiaries. We

compare its early, and largely unsuccessful, initiative to achieve purchasing integration with

its more recent, largely successful, initiative.

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 Our paper is structured as follows. First, we give an overview of the considerable

operational differences between the multi-domestic and the global MNE. Thereafter we draw

on extant theory that identifies two significant barriers to moving from the multi-domestic to

the global state. The first of these is political and the second concerns the lack of social

networks across subsidiaries and the concomitant difficulty of facilitating knowledge transfer.

We then present the case of the SCF and its main subsidiaries, Voso (Norway), Pelecta

(Czech Republic) and Pitana (Poland) (all names anonymized at the request of the company).

We compare SCF‟s two contrasting efforts at integrating the purchasing activities of its

subsidiaries. This polar sample, an unsuccessful and a successful effort, makes it possible to

observe emergent constructs and theoretical relationships (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). In so

doing we develop two sets of propositions.

The Multi-domestic and the Global MNE: Operational Differences

Harzing (2000) empirically verifies three different generic types of multinational

enterprises (MNEs), the transnational, the global and the multi-domestic. In that the

“transnational company combines characteristics of both global and multi-domestic

companies” (Harzing, 2000:115), it is the latter two that are particularly identifiable. Leong

and Tang (1989) also had difficulties in clearly distinguishing the transnational type and noted

that to the extent they could, the transnational was somewhat a rarity. Thus not only are multi-

domestic and global MNEs the most prevalent forms of MNE, they are also unambiguously

distinct forms with Harzing‟s (2000:115) findings indicating that they are effectively the

“reverse of one another”.

Whereas a multi-domestic approach typically entails the presence of geographic

divisions and/or a portfolio of relatively independent national units (Verbeke and Kenworthy,

5
2008) a global MNE approach typically revolves around product divisions. These two

approaches result in three key operational differences. The first is in the overall degree of

product standardization: MNEs pursuing a global strategy focus on the efficient production of

a narrow range of products, whereas MNEs pursuing a multi-domestic strategy view product

diversity as necessary to support a locally-based competitive advantage (Yip, 1989).

The second involves the degree of integration of activities across locations: whereas

MNEs pursuing a global strategy are seeking to exploit cross-national sources of advantage

through a high level of intra-firm resources, those pursuing a multi-domestic strategy allow

subsidiaries to be largely autonomous and to depend more on locally-sourced resources as

opposed to input from affiliated subsidiaries (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Indeed the

component subsidiaries of a multi-domestic MNE may primarily operate on the basis of local

products and local brands. Thus whereas the global strategy necessitates close inter-unit

communication this is markedly less necessary for MNEs pursuing a multi-domestic strategy

(Roth, 1992).

The third key difference is in the degree of localization-centralization of the value-

adding process (R&D, manufacturing, and distribution/marketing): while the global strategy

is based on achieving the centralization of the value-adding process, the multi-domestic

strategy necessitates that it is local in order to ensure responsiveness to purely local tastes

(Roth, 1992).

For multi-domestic MNEs, particularly those operating in industries where local

adaptation continues to matter, product standardization is clearly problematic. Thus for

example MNEs located within the food industry, where meeting local taste sensibilities is of

critical importance, cannot disregard the issue of local responsiveness in regard to their end

products. To a significant extent they must retain their ability to be experienced by local

6
consumers as, to employ SCF‟s concept, “local-taste champions”. However, the integration

and centralization of underlying activities such as purchasing and production is in principle

viable. In practice though, the integration of such activities by multi-domestic MNEs will

involve having to confront two particular barriers that to a significant extent are products of

their multi-domestic heritage. The first derives from the polity of multi-domestic MNEs and

the second from the lack of social networks between subsidiaries. Either of these has the

potential to block the transition from the multi-domestic to the global state.

The Political Challenge

It has been argued that MNEs may be conceived of as “resembling highly political arenas in

which power games continuously take place” (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008: 492). As such

“micro-politics and conflicts (are) an unavoidable social reality and a natural mechanism of

social interactions in MNCs” (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006: 261). In other words actors

within MNEs are intentionally and strategically attempting to advance their own interests,

strengthen their influence and avoid conceding previous mandates. Mudambi and Pedersen

(2007) distinguish two political theory pillars upon which to understand decision-making by

managers in MNC subsidiaries: agency theory and resource dependency theory. Both agency

theory and resource dependency theory suggest that the political character of the MNE will be

particularly discernible when corporate headquarters seeks to move the MNE from a multi-

domestic to a global stance.

Agency theory assumes that the headquarters-subsidiary relationship in MNEs is

founded on self-interest and opportunism so that “the local interests of the subsidiaries may

not always be aligned with those of the headquarters or the MNC as a whole” (Nohria and

Ghoshal, 1994, 492). According to O‟Donnell (2000) in order to counter this agency problem

the corporate centre has two generic alternatives at its disposal. The first of these is that of

7
bureaucratic monitoring mechanisms in the form of centrally determined rules, programs or

procedures in order to obtain information about the behaviors and decisions of subsidiary

management. However, in the case of subsidiaries of multi-domestic MNEs, because they are

perceived as being in a better position than headquarters to evaluate the needs and demands of

the particular markets they serve they have substantial strategic autonomy. Additionally,

because they are also considered to be in a better position to identify the particular physical,

technological, knowledge, financial and human resources that are needed to serve their

particular markets, they also have operational decision-making autonomy. As such subsidiary

management has considerable discretion in dealing with the demands of the local market and

task environment. Thus as O‟Donnell (2000) argues, and finds empirical support for, this

degree of discretion reduces the feasibility of applying bureaucratic monitoring mechanisms

to subsidiaries of multi-domestic MNEs.

The second generic device for countering the agency problem is the use of financial

incentives that align subsidiary management goals with those of corporate headquarters.

Given that outcome measurability is unproblematic, and as monitoring devices are unviable,

financial incentives that reflect subsidiary performance are the chosen governance device in

the case of multi-domestic MNEs (O‟Donnell, 2000).

Thus MNEs that have pursued a multi-domestic strategy corporate headquarters over

time have institutionalized a semi-autonomous mode of governance characterized by

substantial local strategic and operational discretion at the subsidiary level (Roth and Ricks,

1994). Furthermore, it has established incentives that reward local subsidiary managements

on the basis of their own outputs. In other words the multi-domestic MNE customarily

comprises “fiefdoms” whose managers have developed a local view of their roles (Bartlett

and Ghoshal, 1989). A transition from the multi-domestic to the global state constitutes a

8
profound challenge to this local view and it will be resisted if subsidiary managers are

unconvinced that it will confer benefits.

Resource dependency theory posits that power is based on the control of resources that

are considered strategic within the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981)

suggests another source of political strain in any move from the multi-domestic state. Because

the various national subsidiaries units of a multi-domestic MNE are confronted by different

local markets, some of which will be larger and more munificent than others, over time

subsidiaries will vary considerably in terms of their resource ownership and control. In other

words some subsidiaries will be relatively resource-strong while others will be relatively

resource-weak. From a resource dependency perspective when a multi-domestic MNE

attempts to move to a global, integrated state its various subsidiaries will attempt to acquire

control over those resources that minimize their dependence on other subsidiaries while

maximizing the dependence of other subsidiaries on themselves. In practice this will mean

that the most resource-powerful subsidiaries will seek to achieve the dominant role in the

integrated MNE, while the weaker subsidiaries will resist possibly through alliance-seeking

with other similar subsidiaries.

The Social Network Challenge

Social networks can be broadly defined as a web of personal ties and connections that

enable individuals to secure favors such as access to novel information (Granovetter, 1985;

Burt, 1992). In organizational settings such as MNEs social network theory emphasizes how

social relationships among subsidiaries and their managers within MNEs are necessary

conditions for effective cross-subsidiary collaborations (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010).

Social capital theory (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000) extends social

networks theory by arguing that it is not ties as such that enables collaboration but ties

9
characterized by common vision, common language, identification and mutual trust. It is

these features that give rise to exchange not only of basic information but also to the exchange

and combination of locally embedded tacit knowledge.

Dimaggio and Powell (1983), Lave and Wenger (1991) and Vygotsky (1986)

emphasize the socially embedded nature of knowledge. Knowing is a social act, the tools we

use for thinking and acting, the categories available to us to through which we know are the

products of social action and negotiation. Thus the social institutions in which we partake

frame the ways we know. In this view, expertise is a property of social groups (e.g.

Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, and Lehtinen, 2004). In his knowledge-based theory of the

firm Spender (1996) proposed that in addition to distinguishing explicit and tacit knowledge

one should distinguish individual from social knowledge. Spender refers to knowledge that is

both tacit and social as “collective” knowledge. Spender (1996:52) argues that in terms of

organizational advantage “it is collective knowledge (that) is the most secure and strategically

significant kind of organizational knowledge.”

Collective knowledge is such that individuals can only be proficient once they are

“socialized” into the organization and “have acquired much of the collective knowledge that

underpins „the way things are done around here‟” (Spender, 1996:54). In other words

knowledge acquisition and its transfer within an organization are dependent on sustained

exposure to that organization‟s collective knowledge.

Because multi-domestic MNEs comprise units that are locally responsive a

considerable proportion of knowledge development takes place locally. To the degree this

knowledge is “collective” it is not readily transferable across the MNE. In the case of a multi-

domestic MNE that is for example seeking to integrate its devolved, local approach to

purchasing, it needs to facilitate the exchange and combination of subsidiary-based collective

10
knowledge in order to develop a purchasing approach that is relevant and viable across

subsidiaries.

Social capital theorists (e.g. Burt, 1992; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Edelman, Bresnen,

Newell, Scarbrough, and Swan, 2004) have emphasized the distinction between the bonding

and bridging aspects of social capital. Bonding social capital concerns the internal ties within

a group which gives that group cohesiveness and facilitates the development of collective

knowledge. In network terms, bonding social capital will be a feature of “closed” networks

such as the subsidiaries of multi-domestic MNEs. Bridging social capital refers to the

“external”, between-group, social ties of focal actors which bridge social networks. Because

of the semi-autonomous status of subsidiaries in multi-domestic MNEs, bridging social

capital will be largely absent in such MNEs.

Thus in the context of multi-domestic MNEs one should expect to find bonding social

capital within the geographically bounded subsidiaries but little bridging social capital

between such locations. Indeed subsidiaries are more likely to be connected to their external

within-country social networks than to other units within the MNE (Forsgren, Holm, and

Johanson, 2005). A transition from the multi-domestic to the global state will have to address

the lack of inter-subsidiary social networks if knowledge exchange is to occur.

To summarize, extant theory posits significant barriers to multi-domestic MNEs

seeking to make the transition to the global state. On the one hand there is a political barrier

that stems from the self interest subsidiaries have been rewarded for pursuing. On the other

hand there is a lack of social networks and bridging social capital that undermines collective

knowledge exchange between subsidiaries. As we will argue these were clearly factors in the

initial unsuccessful attempt SCF made to integrate its purchasing operations. However, they

do not provide any substantial insight into the success of SCF second and successful attempt

at purchasing integration.

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Methodology

In that theory concerning the transition from the multi-domestic to the global state is

limited to specifying barriers we engaged in inductive theory building in order to develop

propositions regarding successful transition (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Martin and Eisenhardt,

2010). The setting is a Norwegian headquartered multi-domestic MNE, SCF located in the

dry foods industry. In other words it is an industry where responding to local taste preferences

is often critical. We analyze two temporally distinct attempts by SCF to integrate the direct

purchasing of its main subsidiaries, one that resulted in little change and one that resulted in

significant integration. These two contrasting attempts constitute two polar cases within one

and the same setting which lends itself to observing emergent constructs and theoretical

relationships (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). Sampling within firms is also advantageous

because it controls firm-level factors such as firm size, industry, product-range and type and

production technology.

Data

SCF‟s roots go back some 150 years. For most of the previous century and through

until 2000 it was the corporate centre of a conglomerate spanning a number of unrelated

industries including asphalt production and dry foods. At that point it divested itself of all of

its businesses apart from those in the dry foods industry. In addition to its Norwegian

subsidiary, Voso, this left SCF with a number of fully-owned foreign-based subsidiaries that

it had acquired during the 1990s. The most important of these were Pelecta (Poland) and

Pitana (Czech Republic). In addition it had smaller operations in five other European

countries and sales and market offices in a further six countries. In 2007 SCF owned 28

12
brands in 12 countries. Its workforce comprised nearly 4,000 employees of whom 1,000 were

located in Norway. Of its subsidiaries, while Voso (Norway) has for many years been highly

profitable, its non-Scandinavian subsidiaries units are markedly less profitable. In other

words like a significant proportion of other MNEs, SCF is for the most part achieving lower

profitability from its operations abroad than from those in its home country (Gooderham and

Nordhaug, 2003).

In 2007 it would be reasonable to categorize SCF as the corporate centre of a multi-

domestic MNE. Its approach to product development across its markets was summarized as

that of being “a local taste champion”. Despite the potential savings that could be realized by

concentrating production to their low cost sites in the Czech Republic and Poland only seven

and four per cent of Pitana‟s and Pelecta‟s production volume respectively was for inter-

subsidiary customers. Purchasing, the focus of this paper, was also largely uncoordinated not

only between the subsidiaries but also within them. Just for Voso raw materials were supplied

by 268 different suppliers, 39 of which accounted for 70 per cent of raw materials by value.

For packaging for Voso the figures were 132 suppliers of which 28 covered 95 percent of

packaging needs. The situation was repeated across Pelecta and Pitana with virtually no co-

ordination of purchasing between any of the subsidiaries.

SCF has made two attempts to integrate its purchasing. The first, the Unification

Project, spanned 2004-2007, and is acknowledged by corporate and subsidiary managers and

board members as having been largely unsuccessful. The second, the significantly more

successful Program Amalgamation, commenced September 2008 and was in the main

completed by March 2010.

Our primary source of data on the Unification Project was a series of interviews with

managers at SCF and the main subsidiaries, Voso, Pelecta and Pitana who had been closely

13
involved in the project as the project. These took place as the project was drawing to a close

and in its immediate aftermath (October 2007-February 2008). In regard to Program

Amalgamation we conducted interviews at three stages: prior to the actual start of Program

Amalgamation in September 2008, during its early stage (September 2008-mid-March 2009)

and its final phase (March 2010). In addition to managers from SCF, and the four main

subsidiaries we also interviewed the chair of the board of directors in April 2008. Some key

managers were interviewed at more than one point in time. In particular, at each stage, we

interviewed at the individual who during the Unification project became the Group

Purchasing Director and who during Program Amalgamation was the Project Director. Table

1 provides an overview of our informants.

In general interviews lasted about one hour and although they revolved around the

issue of purchasing integration, the interview guides allowed for a semi- structured approach.

Interviews with Norwegian personnel were conducted in Norwegian and all other interviews

in English, the official company language. With the exception of one interview all of the

interviews were conducted by two researchers. In addition to detailed note taking, nearly all

of the interviews were tape-recorded. A second important source of data was documentation

relating to the Unification project and Program Amalgamation supplied by SCF. Finally, one

of the researchers was provided with the opportunity to attend a Program Amalgamation

“launch” seminar aimed at Voso managers in September 2008 and a meeting of the General

Management Team (GMT) in March 2009.

Data Analysis

The case study method that we have used is well suited to the exploration of complex

ongoing processes with uncertain outcomes, that is processes that therefore do not lend

14
themselves to being studied using more theoretically pre-structured approaches (Yin, 1994).

Additionally we viewed the case study approach to be well suited to an exploration of the

micro-processes involved over time in purchasing integration. The method also allows the use

of multiple research methods and the use of different sources of information placed at the

researchers' disposal by the organization (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Following Eisenhardt (1989a) we used cross-case analysis with no a priori hypotheses.

Immediately after interviews the one of the two researchers wrote them up. The second

researcher also studied the data and then read the initial write-ups and his views were then

synthesized with the initial write-ups. Like Martin and Eisenhardt (2010: 270) “Once our

cross-analysis was underway, we cycled among the emergent theory, case data, and literature

to refine further the emerging construct definitions, abstraction levels, construct measures,

and theoretical relationships.” In our study we have attempted to isolate those features that

were present in the successful case of Program Amalgamation, but not present in the

unsuccessful Unification project. These features embody an emergent theory from which

propositions are derived.

The Unification Project (2004-2007)

In addition to their own brands, and their own product development and marketing

specialists, in 2004 Voso, Pitana and Pelecta all had their own purchasing specialists. Given

strong price growth in agricultural commodities world-wide SCF decided that the lack of

inter-subsidiary synergies was an issue, particularly in regard to purchasing, that could no

longer be ignored. Under the so-called “Unification Project”, during 2004-2007, a number of

activities were implemented in order to take out purchasing synergies across subsidiaries. The

approach was to harmonize raw material specification across subsidiaries and then allocate for

each category a central lead-buyer with responsibility for sourcing across subsidiaries. For the

15
most part these individuals were Norwegians located at Voso. In addition the position of

Group Purchasing Director was established whose task was to coordinate between the

purchasing departments in the respective subsidiaries. This position was allocated to a senior

Pitana manager. To support these initiatives a number of supporting measures were

undertaken: SAP was introduced; inter-subsidiary networks for marketing and sales managers

were formed; a common set of performance appraisal principles were introduced; annual two

day strategy meetings for subsidiary heads were organized.

A feature of the Unification project was that no subsidiary was to be obliged to go

against its business judgment and use the central lead-buyers. In other words each subsidiary

had the latitude to decide the degree to which it was in their interest to employ the services of

the central lead-buyers. On the whole they chose not to do so. As a manager with product

development engineering responsibilities at Pitana observed, because product development

continued to be done locally, it was generally the case that she and others at Pitana would

consider it more efficient to use the local buyer rather than the central lead buyer. Not only

were the communication opportunities significantly greater but mutual understanding was

already established. According to another manager at Pitana with purchasing responsibilities

part of this understanding was that local purchasers were significantly more cost conscious

than purchasers based at Voso in affluent Norway.

This lack of confidence or trust on the part of Pitana managers in the central lead-

buyers based at Voso was experienced in reverse by one of the few central lead-buyers

located outside of Voso. Based at Pitana, his perception was that the view of managers at

Voso was that “anything that originated from the Czech Republic was by definition sub-

standard”. As the Unification project concluded his experience was that rather than consulting

with him Voso managers would simply buy what they wanted behind his back. However, as

he himself recognized this deficiency in trust was not just a matter of chauvinism. He pointed

16
that one one of the difficulties central lead-buyers experienced was their lack of deep

understanding of the end products of the other subsidiaries. He recalled that in regard to one

relatively large order for an ingredient he had placed on behalf of a number of the subsidiaries

Voso had rejected it for what he came to accept were substantially objective reasons. The

particular ingredient would have resulted in a taste that Norwegian consumers would have

rejected. As a senior manager at SCF with long-term experience of purchasing for Voso

emphasized, “the challenge for a purchaser is to get the precise quality needs of the subsidiary

right. Otherwise the brand suffers.” Furthermore, getting the quality right depends not only on

understanding the needs of the subsidiary but also on communicating these to suppliers. His

experience was that getting the supplier relationship to work could take as much as two years

of steady interaction.

The deficiency in trust across the group in the central lead-buyers evolved into

skepticism of the Unification project. By the end of the project this was understood not least

by the Group Purchasing Director. A Czech national and based at Pitana, he felt that the

general attitude at Voso was that his position would eventually “evaporate”. When it became

clear that the position was actually going to be permanent his Norwegian colleagues simply

“pretended” to cooperate. It was significantly easier for him to gain respect and a measure of

cooperation outside of Voso and particularly in the Czech and Polish operations.

As the Unification project came to an end the view of managers at SCF was that the

managing directors (MDs) of the various subsidiaries had failed to identify with its potential.

One senior SCF manager stated that in the early phase of the project she and colleagues had

calculated that savings from an integrated, group-wide approach to purchasing could have

been in the order of NOK 280 million. However, in her view the subsidiary MDs failed to

accord this group-level analysis any serious attention. She ascribed this in part to their lack of

integration in the Unification project and in part to their remuneration being exclusively

17
calculated on the basis of their local performance rather than on the basis of group-level

performance. Like others she acknowledged that by the end of the project the old local

purchasing mentality had reasserted itself and that the Unification project had achieved

relatively little.

The view from the subsidiaries was similar. The Pitana based Group Purchasing

Director viewed the Unification Project as having been a “great idea” but “old habits had

quickly largely reasserted themselves.” Likewise the MD of Pelecta concluded that a unified

group mentality across SCF remained underdeveloped and that the process of integration had

barely begun. In his view one significant barrier had been the lack of willingness on the part

of Voso to concede any purchasing responsibilities to the non-Norwegian operations.

However, as he somewhat light-heartedly remarked, had Pelecta been as profitable as Voso he

“would not have voluntarily sacrificed anything for the greater good of the whole group.”

In short, after a flurry of top-down initiated activities SCF‟s group of subsidiaries still

constituted very much a multi-domestic MNE with not only predominantly locally evolved

products and local production but also mostly local purchasing. The view that the Unification

project had been largely unsuccessful was one that was shared not least by the SCF board. As

a consequence towards the end of 2007 the board instructed SCF‟s CEO to depart the

company.

In terms of the extant theory we have presented the inability of SCF to move its

approach to purchasing from a multi-domestic to a global state was arguably hardly

unexpected. Indeed it would be reasonable to contend that SCF‟s experience with its

Unification project constitutes an almost perfect illustration of the existing theory. In line with

agency theory we observed that the corporate centre, SCF, was confronted by a fiefdom

mentality. Given the critical importance of meeting local taste, SCF‟s approach was to accept

that the subsidiaries should continue to determine which aspects of purchasing could be

18
viably integrated. Likewise it did not attempt to change the locally-focused remuneration

system. In line with resource dependency theory Voso, the most powerful subsidiary,

dominated the central-lead buyer functions and undermined initiatives fronted by non-Voso

employees. To the extent there was inter-subsidiary cooperation this was between the non-

Voso subsidiaries. Finally, in line with social network theory we observed that the lack of

inters-subsidiary social networks. Perceived as being too deeply embedded in their own

respective subsidiaries the central lead-buyers failed to develop the degree of bridging social

capital that would have facilitated critical knowledge exchange.

Post-Unification Project

The SCF board decided to engage in a second and, what it signaled, would be a final attempt

at achieving group-wide purchasing integration. As a first step it initiated a purchasing and

supply management (PSM) analysis conducted by external consultants from McKinsey. The

PSM analysis benchmarked the group‟s overall PSM performance against other companies in

the packaged goods industry. The McKinsey analysis concluded that purchasing represented

an unexploited annual cost reduction potential of NOK 300 million. Two thirds of this derived

from direct purchasing (raw materials and packaging materials) and one third from indirect

purchasing/operating (e.g. travel costs and office cleaning costs). This figure was almost

identical to the calculation by corporate headquarters we referred to above.

On the basis of the McKinsey analysis the board and the interim CEO took the

decision to launch Program Amalgamation starting early September 2008, some two weeks

before the new CEO was due to start. The core aim of Program Amalgamation was to

integrate direct purchasing across the group. This would mean transforming the highly

19
decentralized structure of the group. At the same time, the board reiterated the need for each

subsidiary to be its respective country‟s “local taste champion”.

Whereas the Unification project had been loosely structured the board was determined

that Program Amalgamation should have a clear structure from the outset. A working group

comprising the Group Purchasing Director who moved from Pitana to SCF, a Voso manager

and a SCF corporate manager was formed to prepare the ground for Program Amalgamation.

Building on the work of the Unification project the working group divided purchasing into 50

catgories. It was then determined that the purchasing project should comprise four waves with

each wave accounting for 25 per cent of the total savings and roughly 25 per cent of the

categories. The plan was that the project was to be completed by early 2010. Each purchasing

category was to be assigned a team by the Program Amalgamation project organization which

also had the responsibility for monitoring the progress of the catgeory teams and reporting its

findings to SCF corporate management. Each category team was to comprise about five

catgory experts who would also have access to advice from an external purchasing

consultancy. It was understood that the release of these experts by the subsidiaries would

have to be based on cooperation between the Program Amalgamation project organization and

the subsidiaries. In terms of the category teams, we collected our data within the Flexible

Foils and Traded Goods teams.

The category teams were charged with defining the group-wide needs within each

category and signing new group-wide contracts with new suppliers. Even before Program

Amalgamation commenced the Voso member of the working group was deeply concerned

that the category teams might fail to acquire sufficinet understanding of the products they

would be purchasing for. His particular concern was that the precise quality needs of the Voso

brand might be compromised. As Program Amalgamation got under way in September 2008

20
under the leadership of the Project Director (formerly the Group Purchasing Director) our

research was to indicate that this skepticism was widespread across the group.

Program Amalgamation (2008-2010)

Initial Reactions

One month after the launch of Program Amalgamation the Project Director was

concerned that the MDs of Voso, Pelecta and Pitana viewed Program Amalgamation as a top-

down operation driven by a McKinsey analysis that was insufficiently anchored in the

realities of their businesses. His impression was that “things are moving too fast” for the

subsidiaries and that there was a lack of common vision and trust in the project. He speculated

that this would explain why subsidiary MDs had resisted releasing their most qualified

personnel to serve in the category teams. Instead of being composed of the “best people” for

the job, the Project Director characterized their members as being no more than “somewhat

above average”. He referred to one subsidiary MD as having said that, “my best sales people

should sell” and to another MD who had labeled the travel costs of his single employee thus

far involved in Program Amalgamation as a “punishment”.

The Project Director had also observed that the category team members themselves

had their concerns. He thought that they were anxious that while they were involved in

Program Amalgamation their stand-ins either might harm the day-to-day business or,

alternatively, might replace them on a permanent basis. Finally, he had no illusions about his

own standing remarking that “Some don‟t see me as a sufficiently strong guarantor. If he‟s

fired – well, life goes on.”

21
 At highly profitable Voso the view was that the McKinsey analysis was correct.

However, skepticism was also voiced by its MD who commented that “Our attitude to the

issue of quality is a different to that of Eastern Europe.” He pointed out that nearly 70 percent

of the (Norwegian) customer complaints Voso receives involve products emanating from

Pitana, although Pitana accounts for no more than 10 per cent of the products Voso delivers to

the Norwegian market. Likewise, attempts to get Pelecta to produce cake mixes on behalf of

Voso had always been undermined by quality problems whose causes were impossible to

determine. “Therefore” he commented, “we are skeptical as to „their‟ ability to deliver quality

over time and (given Voso‟s long-term quality criticisms) “„they‟ are browned-off with „us‟.”

At Pelecta the MD recalled that in the course of his six years tenure he had seen a

number of company-wide projects aimed at greater integration. However, he remarked that

“few of these had been successful in the sense that they had delivered lasting, tangible,

results”. They had been characterized by a lack of consistency and continuity. While he

supported greater integration because it could ultimately lead to the greater use of Pelecta‟s

production capacity, his immediate reaction to Program Amalgamation was that it might

prove to be “just another time-consuming project”.

At Pitana the initial reaction of the MD to Program Amalgamation was even more

skeptical. It was “yet another so-called „improvement‟” and one that could threaten Pitana‟s

limited resources in a period of substantial improvement because of improved cost control

and increased product focus. In short the Pitana MD was concerned that Program

Amalgamation would distract critical personnel from their pressing Pitana responsibilities. He

viewed the hazard posed by the demands inherent in Program Amalgamation as relatively

much greater for Pitana than Voso because the latter had significantly more “slack”. In other

words potential sub-optimality was not evenly distributed across SCF.

22
 At this point in time, in line with overall extant theory, Program Amalgamation

appeared to be another unsuccessful attempt to move from the multi-domestic to the global

stance.

Concluding Reactions

In March 2010 our findings indicated that the initial misgivings to Program

Amalgamation had mostly evaporated. The Project Director viewed Project Future as having

delivered on its targets and as having been perceived as having done so by the subsidiary

MDs. Not only had the category teams worked well together but they had “created a lot of

knowledge”. Furthermore, although Voso employees had constituted the largest contingent of

category team members in his opinion they had not been perceived by the other subsidiaries

as having dominated the work of the category teams. Our other interviews confirmed that the

view of the Project Director was shared by of all of the senior management team at SCF,

including the CEO, and the subsidiary MDs. In the words of a senior manager at SCF this

“good result” had resulted in a “good feeling” around the whole of the company. A measure

of the success of Program Amalgamation was the assertion by another senior manager at SCF

was that purchasing had moved from being a marginal function to “being in the driving seat”.

One senior SCF manager had two caveats to the success of Program Amalgamation.

First, he pointed out that there is a time-lag before one would see all of the tangible P&L

effects. Not only does it take time to get contracts signed, but old stocks have to be disposed

of, inattentive employees continue to order the old materials and suppliers who are being

phased out may renege on current contracts in terms of for example lower quality. Second, he

had registered that SCF‟s competitors had also improved their purchasing strategies.

However, he also observed that Program Amalgamation had been so successful that

23
McKinsey regarded it as an exemplar of “how things should be done.” Indeed during the latter

part of 2010 and early 2011 as the tangible P&L effects were fully realized and communicated

to the markets there was a substantial increase in the value of SCF stock.

The Distinctive Elements of Program Amalgamation

The contrast between the respective outcomes of Program Amalgamation and the

Unification project is considerable. There also is a pronounced contrast between the initial

reactions to Program Amalgamation and the concluding reactions to it. Our research question

is how do managers create the conditions for a successful transition from the multi-domestic

to the global state? By identifying those elements that were introduced to Program

Amalgamation and that were not features of the Unification project we develop an emergent

theoretical framework.

Governance Reconfiguration – The General Management Team

When SCF‟s CEO joined the company in late September 2008 he was acutely

conscious that the implementation of Program Amalgamation was to be his key responsibility.

Reflecting on the significance of Program Amalgamation at the start of his tenure his view

was that it was a highly critical “journey” for SCF‟s long-term success. For him the challenge

was to get managers to develop a “dualistic” view of their roles. On the one hand they were to

have a focus on the needs of their local markets, while on the other hand they were to have an

equally strong commitment to the need for the integration of purchasing.

His first action in this “journey” was during early October 2008 to conduct one-to-one

meetings with each of the MDs of the main subsidiaries. He explicitly requested that they act

24
on behalf of the whole business rather than their own subsidiaries. Late October 2008 he

presented a two-page memo to subsidiary MDs, “From a food conglomerate to an integrated

food company”. This outlined a radical shift in the structure of the company. In it the new

CEO stated that “the history of SCF has been that of a conglomerate in which the

performance of subsidiaries had been discretely measured with cooperation between

subsidiaries …relatively voluntary. In 2009 we must take the step from a food conglomerate

to an integrated food company to improve performance and efficiency.”

However, a much more substantial action by the new CEO was his decision to form an

entirely new GMT which, in addition to himself, the CFO, the head of human resources, the

director of marketing and sales and the new supply chain director included the MDs of the

main subsidiaries. For the first time in the history of SCF subsidiary managers were now

integrated in the corporate centre. From December 2008 the GMT held monthly meetings in

different locations supplemented by telephone conferences half way through each month. At

each and every GMT the Project Director of Program Amalgamation reported on the progress

of the project including any personnel issues that had arisen in the wake of manning the

category teams.

At its outset the new GMT was a brittle entity. One senior manager at SCF recounted

that there was a lack of understanding on how to cooperate in order to function as an effective

top management team. She described the CEO‟s use of a variety of informal methods to

develop the way in which GMT members interacted. The policy of the CEO was that critical

views could be expressed at GMT meetings but once decisions had been taken those decisions

should command collective loyalty. Another senior manager at SCF had a somewhat different

recollection of the initial GMT phase. He recalled “innumerable meetings” with the CEO

“hammering home Program Amalgamation”. Unlike under the Unification project it was now

no longer the case that subsidiaries could use their local needs as “an excuse for inaction”.

25
Such was the pressure from the CEO that those who opposed Program Amalgamation thought

“it wise to keep their skepticism to themselves”. Indeed as our “Early Program Amalgamation

Interviews” indicated that is precisely what the subsidiary MDs did. Nevertheless, according

to this manager, the GMT, even in its initial phase provided a powerful mandate for Program

Amalgamation. He argued “that none of the achievements of Program Amalgamation would

have been possible without this powerful mandate coming not just from the CEO but also

from the collective voice of the GMT”.

Overall what we observe at SCF is governance reconfiguration. The fiefdom mentality

of the subsidiary MDs is not only challenged but the MDs are incorporated in a new group-

wide governance mechanism. GMT meetings are an arena for exchanging views, for

developing a common vision of the group and for reaching common binding decisions. Given

the success of Program Amalgamation this suggests that:

Proposition 1: Incorporating subsidiary MDs in the corporate centre is more likely to lead to a

successful transition from the multi-domestic to the global state than allowing them to remain

semi-autonomous.

Realignment of Rewards

Coupled to the new GMT was a fresh approach to MD compensation. Whereas the

former system had been primarily local in its orientation, rewarding subsidiary MDs on the

basis of their unit‟s performance, the new CEO introduced a new rewards system that to a

significant extent rewarded the subsidiary MDs on the basis of overall group performance.

Thus as the new GMT set to work on making Program Amalgamation operational the

26
subsidiary MDs this coincided with the introduction of a rewards package whose primary

element reflected overall group performance. There would still be an element that reflected

subsidiary performance, but group performance as a metric was for the first time in SCF‟s

history not just a metric, but the most significant metric. Given the success of Program

Amalgamation this would suggest that:

Proposition 2: Rewarding subsidiary MDs on a mainly group-wide basis is more likely to lead

to a successful transition from the multi-domestic to the global state than rewarding them on a

local performance basis.

Rolling Measures of Outcomes

A transition to a new centralized and integrated purchasing process challenges the

local view of subsidiary MDs. As the “Early Program Amalgamation Interviews” indicated

the adoption of an integrated approach to purchasing was initially viewed by MDs with some

doubt. Part of the design of Program Amalgamation comprised the regular monitoring by a

controller of each category team in order to objectively identify tangible savings. Thereafter

these unambiguous outcomes were immediately communicated to the GMT by the Project

Director.

The communication of „early wins‟ (i.e. substantial savings) to the GMT not only

persuaded subsidiary MDs that Program Amalgamation was working but it even generated a

conviction that further integration was both possible and desirable. Thus by the end of

Program Amalgamation with profitability improving for the group as well as the subsidiaries

as a consequence of the realized savings, the GMT had embarked on a discussion on how to

develop “common platforms” for products that could span several countries. The initial

skepticism to Program Amalgamation was converted into a belief in it and a greater

27
commitment to making it work. The issue of which nationality dominated the category teams

was transformed into a discussion of which individuals were most competent to lead and

serve in them.

Of course one may ask what the outcome would have been if tangible savings had not

been achieved. However, that does not invalidate the importance of directly and almost

instantly communicating tangible results to the GMT and not least to its subsidiary MD

members. Nor does it invalidate the significance of Program Amalgamation focusing on those

aspects of purchasing integration that were readily measurable. In other words measurability

precedes actual measuring. The contrast with the outcome of the Unification project which

had no mechanisms for producing rolling measures of savings suggests that:

Proposition 3: Unambiguous rolling measures of outcomes from integration projects are more

likely to lead to a successful transition from the multi-domestic to the global state than when

they are not used.

Mandated Category Teams

In our analysis of those elements that were features of the successful Program

Amalgamation, and not a feature of the unsuccessful Unification project, we have thus far

focused on elements that directly impacted on the subsidiary MDs. We now turn to the core

operational element of Program Amalgamation, the category teams.

In terms of the overall task of the category teams, this was very similar to the task

assigned to the central lead-buyers of the Unification project. It was to define the group-wide

needs within each purchasing category and then to sign new contracts with suppliers on behalf

of the group. However, in operational terms there were profound differences. The SCF

28
approach to the operational integration of purchasing in the Unification Project was to appoint

central lead-buyers for the various purchasing categories and to provide them with

authorization to invite cooperation from the purchasing managers based in the various

subsidiaries. The approach of Program Amalgamation to developing category teams was not

to devolve the responsibility for forming them but to centralize it. Category teams were

formed at the outset of each phase of Program Amalgamation with designated team members

covering a variety of relevant competencies including production, product development,

logistics and marketing. Furthermore, unlike the Unification project where central lead-buyers

remained in their regular purchasing roles, category team leaders were designated on a full-

time basis while the team members were to spend an average of 60 percent of their working

week on category team-related activities.

Initially both category team leaders and their members were appointed by the Project

Director on the basis of nominations from the subsidiaries. The Project Director was not

pleased with the outcome of this approach. As we have noted above, in his view cost-

conscious subsidiary MDs were not only trying to limit the number of nominees they

forwarded, but more significantly they were resisting nominating their most qualified

personnel for category team service. However, after the formation of the new GMT which

included subsidiary MDs, both the nomination process and the category team appointments

became subject to GMT scrutiny and monitoring. This scrutiny and monitoring effectively

constituted a mandating and therefore legitimatization of the category teams by the GMT.

Furthermore, the scrutiny and monitoring was also immediately applied to the category teams

that had been formed shortly prior to the formation of the new GMT. As Program

Amalgamation concluded the view of the Project Director was that the members of the

category teams had been more than sufficiently qualified for their tasks. This was a view that

29
was endorsed by a Pelecta manager who had herself participated in a category team. Finally,

as the Voso MD pointed out, the boundaries of the category teams had in effect been buffered

by the GMT against disruptive, competing tasks thereby “enabling its members to work

outside of their normal functions and to work across both functions and geographies.”

Effectively the subsidiary MDs of the GMT had acted as “sentries and guards” (Yan and

Louis, 1999:31). The overall suggestion from this is:

Proposition 4: Category teams that are formed and consistently mandated by a corporate

centre that includes subsidiary MDs are more likely to lead to a successful transition from the

multi-domestic to the global state than category teams formed on the basis of devolved

authority.

Multi-subsidiary Category Teams

We have indicated that social network theory points to two salient features of multi-

domestic MNEs. First, because they comprise business units that have to be responsive to

local taste, product, and therefore purchasing, knowledge is both geographically distributed

and locally embedded. Particularly that proportion of knowledge that is „collective‟ – that is

knowledge that is both tacit and held by groups rather than individuals - is problematic to

transfer across the MNE. Second, because of the lack of bridging ties there is little in the way

of social capital between subsidiaries.

In terms of the first of these features, as we have observed, the Unification project was

spearheaded by central lead-buyers who for the most part were Norwegians located at Voso.

The view of non-Voso colleagues was that they failed to understand their idiosyncratic local

needs. Equally in relation to colleagues at Voso the central lead-buyer located at Pitana fared

30
no better. The approach to Program Amalgamation was very different to that of the

Unification project in that it aimed to form multi-subsidiary category teams. In so doing

Program Amalgamation created arenas for the exchange and sharing of locally embedded

knowledge. On the whole, according to the Project Director, these arenas worked well and

resulted in “a lot of knowledge” being created. A Pelecta manager referred to the category

team she had belonged as having consisted of “a great mix of people”. The Voso MD also

commented on the multi-subsidiary character of the category teams observing that “the

Norwegians (at Voso) had their fixation with quality questioned by the Czechs (at Pitana) and

the Czechs (at Pitana) their focus on costs.” He further remarked that this had led “to a much

greater understanding of one another‟s thinking”. This suggests that:

Proposition 5: Category teams with multi-subsidiary membership are more likely to lead to a

successful transition from the multi-domestic to the global state than category managers

embedded in single subsidiaries.

Bridging Category Teams

In relation to the second salient feature of multi-domestic MNEs underscored by social

network theory, the lack of bridging ties, the category teams of Program Amalgamation were

specifically instructed to interact not just with suppliers but with local stake holders across the

group. Furthermore, their success in doing this was monitored by the Project Director and the

GMT. By contrast bridging ties were not an explicit priority of the Unification project.

The Voso senior manager in charge of the Traded Goods category team recounted that

her team had consistently involved local purchasers drawing on their knowledge particularly

in regard to extant suppliers. This shared understanding created a “buy-in” and also a sense of

common achievement when improved contracts with suppliers were achieved. Networks
31
across the subsidiaries were developed that could be drawn on in the future. One of the Pitana

managers that had had extensive dealings with the Traded Goods team concurred with this

analysis. She added that as a result of the interaction both her purchasing competence and her

inter-subsidiary contacts had increased significantly.

The Flexible Foils category team told a similar story. The Voso senior manager who

led this team observed that in developing its new purchasing competencies the team had not

only developed a strong internal network, but also a network across the company. A Pelecta

manager who was member of this team observed that when the team started its work “not

everybody was aware of what was going on and nobody really strongly believed in it”. The

“just-another-project-syndrome” ruled. However, at the conclusion of Program Amalgamation

she now observed a marked change of attitude and “quite a high level of trust” in Program

Amalgamation. She ascribed this change to the extensive use the category team made of

stakeholders and specialists across the company. In all more than 20 people from product

development, marketing, technical support, production and maintenance as well as controllers

had been involved. It was not just a matter of consulting with these individuals but also “lots

of knowledge sharing”. She described the networking undertaken by the team as “priceless”,

and emphasized the value of the interpersonal relations and the shared understanding that had

been developed. She summed up her experience as “If you know people you can fix it” and

referred to several “fantastic experiences where new knowledge and insight had been created

because the right people were in the right place at the right time”.

On the whole her account was validated by a senior manager at SCF who was also a

member of the GMT and therefore had monitored the progress of the Flexible Foils category

team. He remarked that these “success stories” had functioned as “change ambassadors”

across the company. More substantially he argued that by interacting with internal

stakeholders across the subsidiaries new purchasing knowledge was generated that enabled

32
the category teams to favourably re-negotiate with suppliers. Indeed the savings were the

double of the original aim. Likewise, he thought, the Traded Goods category team had also

done “an unbelievably good job”. As such this suggests that:

Proposition 6: Category teams that develop bridging ties between themselves and stake

holders based across the subsidiaries are more likely to lead to a successful transition from the

multi-domestic to the global state than category teams lacking in bridging ties.

Discussion

We have argued that for multi-domestic MNEs attempting to make the transition from

the multi-domestic to the global state extant theories indicate two fundamental challenges, a

political and a social network challenge. So significant are these two challenges that achieving

transition is a case of „easier said than done‟. Indeed the lack of success experienced by SCF

in conjunction with its unsuccessful Unification project provides a potent illustration of the

difficulty in surmounting these challenges. The aim of this paper has been to add to extant

theory by developing a set of propositions that we have derived from observing the design

elements that featured in the contrastingly highly successful case of Program Amalgamation.

Our propositions may be divided into two categories. Propositions 1-3 relate to the

relationship of the subsidiary MDs to the group as a whole. In part they are about addressing

the self-interest of the MDs by realigning their compensation with that of the group as a

whole. However, addressing financial incentives is only one aspect to the case of Program

Amalgamation. Another is the creation of the new GMT which provided SCF executives and

the MDs with an arena for frequent face-to-face interaction. In terms of social network theory

33
the GMT represented an opportunity to create a combination of structural, cognitive and

relational social capital. The provision of rolling measures of outcomes of Program

Amalgamation meant that the GMT had unambiguous hard data as a basis for interaction. It

seems likely that had the data from the early rolling measures been negative the GMT would

have unraveled. Thus at least initially the development of social capital within the GMT was

dependent on the self interest of the MDs being met.

Propositions 4-6 address the operational aspects of Program Amalgamation and in

particular the workings of the category teams. On the one hand we have argued that the multi-

subsidiary membership of them and the bridging ties they forged were critical for the

exchange and creation of new legitimate purchasing knowledge. On the other hand the

category teams would have unraveled quickly had they not been mandated and buffered by

the subsidiary MDs. The pressure that was initially applied by the new CEO on the MDs to

endorse the category teams could not, we suggest, have been maintained for an extended

period. Indeed we may surmise that had the “early wins” not appeared self-interested MDs

would have withdrawn their support for the category teams. However, when the “early wins”

were registered the support provided under pressure for the category teams was transformed

into enthusiasm.

In short our propositions involve necessary rather than sufficient conditions for a

transition from the multi-domestic to the global state. They do not constitute a guarantee of

successful transition. Indeed given particular contingencies failure is entirely possible. These

contingencies may include a lack of critical skills on the part of key managers or unfavorable

market conditions. However, unlike extant theories, which we emphasize we do not reject;

our propositions provide a framework for shaping and guiding the deliberate actions of

managers for the creation of a favorable context for transition.

34
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 Table 1: Overview of informants

SCF Voso Pelecta Pitana

Unification Project Interviews Acting CEO 2-senior managers MD MD
(October 2007- February 2008)
2-senior 2 Senior manager
managers managers
3 managers

Group
Purchasing
Director

Pre-Program Amalgamation Chair of the SCF 2-senior

Interviews (May 2008-August Board managers
2008)
3 senior Group
managers Purchasing
Director

Early Program Amalgamation CEO MD MD MD

Interviews (September 2008- mid-
March 2009) 3-senior Head of Category 2-senior
managers Team for Traded managers
Goods
Project Director Manager
(3 interviews) Head of Category
Team for "Foils"

Concluding Program Amalgamation CEO MD MD MD

Interviews (March 2010)
5-senior Head of Category 2- Senior manager
managers Team for Traded managers
Goods Manager
Project Director
Head of Category
Team for "Foils"

40

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