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    StatCon Gen Principle

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    PSYCHE SHYNE OSTIQUE

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    Chapter | GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1, WHAT IS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION? CASE: Caltex (Philippines), Inc. ys. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 (citing the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary) [iconsrtic i the art of process of discovering and ex- pourlding the meaning and the intention of the duthoFs of the law ‘with respect to its application fo a given case, where that inten. tion is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reas fe fact hat the given case igingt explicitly provided for in the law.” ee 2. WHYISIT IMPORTANT TO STUDY STATUTORY CON- STRUCTION? = FOR THE LAW STUDENT. 4 Statutory Construction is'hest taken in the first year, pref. erably in the first semester. It'helps\prepare the law freshman for the task of studying, titerpreting’and constructing laws in the various ‘law’subjects. Statutory Construction cases traverse the various fields of law. These cases give the freshman anearly appreciation of thé complexity and variety of law study. . ~{-AIL theigules of Statutory Construction are based on bom- .mon senge. There is thus a logical basis for all of these rules and the Taw student is given an early grasp of law and Jogic. FOR THE LAW PRACTITIONER. Easy recall of the rules of Statutory Construction learned during law school enables the practitioner to ably prepare his Scanned with CamScanner STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FOR THE COURT CLERK OR RESEARCHER. .e power to interpret and construe laws is cessentiall; irae se aubjectineures i ener” nd reports that can stand up Peiet any appellate seating. FOR THE LAWMAKER AND HIS STAFF. can be MGholee of words and careful study of statutes that are in lawmaker (or staffer), versed in the Rules of Statu- fees en tiesto make sure that there will eno or very ‘peed in the future for the application of the rules of statu- “construction in the laws that he is drafting. ‘WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE IN THE CON- “aaa OF STATUTES? Bridges (1847), 1 LLC. 1,4). | OBSRAL PRINCIPLES: 4. DOES STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INVOLVE QUES. TIONS OF FACT OR OF LAW? - Vphe expreasion ‘eonstruction’ 2b applied to a docu ment, at all events as used by English lawyers in Clues two thing first, the meaning ofthe words? waa ‘or the effect which is to be Brecon a 3 p. 85 per 5, WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RULES OF STATU- TORY CONSTRUCTION? CASE: P.C.FI. vs. N-T.C., 131 SCRA 200 (Discussed in detail under the Chapter on Words and Phrases, ‘MAY’ and ‘SHALL’) “Any lawyer of ode entiation boema ith aor of Statutory Construction march in pairs of (dissent of ‘Justice Abad Santos), ei 6. HOW DO YOU DISTINGUISH CONSTRUCTION FROM INTERPRETATION? “Sires speaking, construction ond Saat tion are nof.the same, although the two terms are often Scanned with CamScanner STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION \ Zevingic id) in order ew i Sen ih sin the a ‘tte ces oad se ET ote ased in any ease will depend upon The ature ofthe problem presented, Aad axis apparent, natuteSresses may be used in seeking the legislative bok Pina given statute. Ifthe legislative ten? isnot intent her the completion of interpretation then the clear aii] proceed to subject the statute to construc- i Craken from Statutory Construction, Interpreta- ‘ion of Laws, Crawford, pp. 240-241). 7. WHEN DOES STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION COME. See CASE: NF-L. vs. EISMA, 127 SCRA 419 Facts: ‘The employer filed a suit for damages) for obstruction of private property against the labor uniow before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City. The court denied the union's Motion to Dismiss. The union filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: : ‘Does the/RTC have jurisdiction over the case? Hel ‘The original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiter with jurisdiction. So it we lied by this Court in Garcia vs. Martinez (84 SCRA 577) and in Bengzon us ane Us 380 248). On May 1, 1978, he sidential Decree No, N wwas issued, amending aid and provided “that the Re- indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not seiner curs war than rvied with juridstion to avard a tual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of em- ployees. That isnot, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the ee story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. aay was issued, further amending Article 217, returningthe original Jurisdietion to the labor arbitels, thus enabling them to decide ‘that: “8: All money claims of workers, including those based on | GENERAL PRINcrPLEs nonpayment or underpayment of agea/bvertime setae arn geting mpi, agreement excep® claims for employees’ compensation vecat security, medicare and-materaty benefit (and) ) Al oto claims arising from employer-employe relations unless express excluded-by this;Code)” An equally conclusive manifestation the lack of jurisdiction of a Court, of First Instance then: o Regional Trial Court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amend. ing Article 217 of the Labor Code, It tok effect on August 21 41961. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: “(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.” This is to be compared with the former phraseology:“(2) unresolved issue in collective bargain- ingincluding those that inolve wages, hours of work, and otber ferms and conditions of employment." It isto be tote that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made novhange with respect to the original nd exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money _elaims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer. employee relations.” ames Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious characte of this petition. Certiorari and prohibition lie, respond- ent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the mat ticle 217hs to be applied the way itis. worded. The exclu- sivd original jurisdiction of tabor arbiters i therein provided for explicitly. Ie means, and it can only mean, that a Court of First Tastance judge then, a Regional Trial Court judge now, certainly Cisbeyond tho scope ofthe authority conferred to him bylaw When he entertained the aujt for damages, Arising from picketing {Hiab accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms ofthe lav. Any deviation cannot, therefore, be tolerated xxithas been the constant fuling of this Court even prior toLizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tics, 4 1913 decision. The ringing ‘words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland stil call for obedience, ental ity courts, in.our judgment, come only) On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect Scanned with CamScanner ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION detity to the plain command of the law; it is labor our, that possess original and exclusive jurisdic. for damages arising from picketing or agtrike. ‘the utmost fi "Note:‘The uncertainty here is merely on what isthe state of save at ths particular point in time, This was easly resolved by imply looking at the history and chronology ofall the pertinent ules. There is, a8 of yet, no statutory ambiguity that warrants ication of statutory construction,“ CASE: Past vs. C.A, 77 SCAD 726, 266 SORA 1 Jan. 10, 1997 | in Chapter VID *9 CASE: Leveriza vs. LA.C., 157 SCRA 262 (discussed in detail under SPECIAL OVER GEN- ERAL) CASE: Daoang vs. Mun. Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos d Norte, 159 SCRA 369 (1988) ‘The Agonoy spouses filed a petition forcadoptinm of two ‘before the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. grandchildren of the Agono} s (children of their de- daughter) ‘the adoption arguing that ae et ‘were disgUafified from adopting under Art. 335 of the Code, whigh provides: “Art. 935. The following cannot adopt: (a) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural Pein, mi children, or natural children by GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7 ‘The judge overruled the opposition. The erandchil ‘the matter to the Supreme Court maaan Held: ‘The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 395 of the Civil Code in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear amd tihambiguous.’The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in laW, and, as pointed out by the respondent fdge, do not include grandchildren. Sv ‘DISCUSSION POINT: What is the tatjonale-be- hind this Artiele? Doyou tionaleis achieved with this ruling? 8. READ THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE (CONTEXT). Teis a gardinal rip statutory construction that in nt preting the'meaning_and.scope of a_ term used in the avy involved, as well_as theintendme fact, legislative intent Paras vs. COMELEC, 76 SCAD 46, 264 SCRA 49, Nov. 4, 1994 Facts: ‘Acting on a petition for recall by the voters against Paras, jbanatuan City, the ctign for Jan. 13, the incumbent barangay chairman of Pul: ‘COMELEC ordered the holding of a re 3, Paras filed a petition Tor ith the Supreme Court, arguing that under Sec. 74 (b) of the Local eset: Code (RA 7160), “no recall shall take place within opi(1) year date eh 'sassiumption to office or one (1) year ‘immedi- Scanned with CamScanner . ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ately preceding @ regular election.” Since another Republic Act pee) Ef the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections on the first Monday of May 1996, and the Supreme Court in an earlier case fuled that a SK election is a regular election, the 2) fall ‘lection can be held, The Supreme Court issued ¢ TR Held: ‘The entire Section 74 of the Local Government Code reads: ‘Sec. T4. Limitations on Recall. — (a), Any elective official may be the subject of a resall-election only_once during his term of office for “Toss of confidence (ey No Fecall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or ne) year immediately preceding a regular local elec” tion.” principles dis- The evident (tent of Sect ive local official to,recall Plection once during his term of Paragraph (b), construed together with paragraph (a), ly designates the period when such elective local official tay be the subject ofa recall fection, What year of his term of office. Thus, ‘subscribing to petitioner's inter- pretation of the phrase regular local electic election will Government é "femoval of public officers i of the peopl ‘the end of hig térmy And if the fore : ion which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three 'yeard from May(1996 ithin the purview of Dre sisted by petitioner, the no)recall i {inutile the recall provision ofthe Local Government Gode. ~~ 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES i 2 } * i us, the int ment i ode, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in confit 1 with the constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the f Constitution t t { t i on intention but in the spirit Note: The issue became moot. The scheduled barangay election was only 7 months away:) a Scanned with CamScanner Chapter Il STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? 1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: WHOSE JOBS 17? ‘o declare what the lawishall’bé (eps) poder bat to declare what the Taw is-or has been, is OVERLAP OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; HOW a yes THIS AFFECT THE TASK OF STATUTORY CON- STRUCTION? 1987 Constitution, we have returned to the Presi- Under toe eernment earicr provided for under thé 1935 Toosely characterized by a “sepa- ‘areas the same is understood under the American ple, the three branches of government, namely, the tive ranch, the Legislative branch and the Judicial branch, al branches of government with separate and distinct "In reality, however, these functions do not fit into separate ‘compartments, but often overlap. “The American government is commonly spoken of as one with ‘separation of powers’, a designation. later referred to a3 Separated and coordinated powers! the belief of the dominant posit ‘presidential’ government or ‘Presidentialism’. As has been pointed 10 I STATUTORY coNsTRUCTION ‘OR JUDICIAL LeaishamioN® " cut previously, the tern( power! Ggurative rather. structural, shouldbe raped by Tuners seen different areas of state activity, f ‘The early concept of a strit and rigid separation cfaca usd Pad he aie raneous French constitutional theory and practice, ap- pears an artifical product, period-and-environment con- ditioned by the speculative rationalism of the enlight- enment. It was nurtured by ti tic premises into the socio-political realm and inspired by the belief that the equilibrium established between ‘he several power holders will result in the permanent harmony of the state society. The assumption that the power holders in equipose would voluntarily dedicate themselves tocoperation for the common welfare was, psychologically unsound, It neglected to itg peril, the Gemonism of the power dynamism. The co-existence of several power‘holders in rigid isolation was an un- workable illusion, as clearly demonstrated by the French Constitution of 1791, which attempted to apply Montesquieu's separation of functions to a practical test.” (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, pp. 65-66) ‘The great ordinanced of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white, Even the mote specific of them are found to terminate in a pe- riumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. (Justice Holmes; Springer us. Government, 217 Us 188, 210-212, 72 Led. 845, 853; cited in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141, 169). ‘There are, thus, invreality, overlaps in the functions of government, Instead of a clear-cut airtight delineation Scanned with CamScanner 2 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘We have spheres that overlap: Diagram 1 Legislative It thus appears from Gur diagram above, ‘that there are three ateas of overlap, Areas 1, 2 and 3. soe Area 1is the overlap between the executive and the legisla- 7 Area fur has been referred to as to the rue: ive functions, Tho executive, Ths allowable overap some times exceeded: Diagram 2 Legislative jive branch (usually through one of its agen- aber bos ‘allowable overlap of Area 1, i¢., delegated ‘rule-making power, and extends to the shaded area, the exercise ‘is rule-making power exceeds the legislative grant and will be ‘out by the judiciary a8 ultra vires. Cases on this overlap are discussed in succeeding chapters. a fi ee ‘The next area of overlap in diagram one is Area 2, which i “the overlap between the executive andthe judicial branch. This area of overlap can in turn be segregated into 2 different types ‘overlap: _, * to perform quasi Juda Tunctions Some of These age 4 StaTUTORY coxsTRUcTioN ORJUDICIAL LEGisLaTioN? Diagram 3 = N Judicial ‘Area 2-A is the power granted to an administrati the Securit “Exchange Commi Public Service Commission, the Land Transportation Commission, etc. These quasijudictal functions are expressly provided for by the Legis lature and when the agenty exceeds the jurisdiction granted by law, it may be set aside by the judicial branch. (B.P. Blg. 128 provides for appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the decisions of these agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions.) ‘The second sub-area of overlap is Area 2-B) In certain in- stances, the judiciary allows the executive branch to interpret acts of the legislative branch. This is referred to as the exeentives. interpretation of statutes. In most cases, this exeeutive interp tation, although not conclusive upon the courts, is given substan- tial weight. Of course, there are instances when this executive interpretation strays beyond the tolerable ogerlap. Executive construction is treated as a separate chapter and cases are dis cussed where executive construction was allowed or discarded ~The third area of overlap, which is of primary concern in our study of Statutory Construction, is the pverlap between the judi- ial and the legislative branches /‘This is treated separately in the next chapter. It may strike the reader as rather od@ that the executive branch encroachesion the functions of both the judicial and leis lative branch, there | rsitobenoencroachment on a eS, » Under Section 5 (6), Article XIII of the 1987 ae the Supreme Court has the power to “appoint. all officials an employees of the judiciary in sccrdana With the Civil Service Law.* Again under Section 6 e article, “the Supreme KE AOA! Scanned with CamScanner ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Stcael thereat” vrrewee, Section 16 (8) of Article VI ofthe 1987 Constt son net “ench House may determine the rules of ts ion ngs. The administrative supervision of its own depart = n necessary requisite for judicial and legislative inde- ment pendenet While the power to.declare what the law is or has been concededly judicial, that function sometimes treads dangerously int Tepislative domain, We have seen in diagram 1 that one of tthe areas of functional overlap is that between the legislative and the judicial branches. That portion of diagram 1 is repro- here in detail: eta net Tua Homes next page) was do so only interstitially, -* Tkis also in this area what Article 9 of the Civil Code article provides that eo judge or court, to render judgment by reason of the silence, dbscu- iency of law.” - erties 5 or the shaded area on Diagram 4 above, is t me c to as the area bf judicial legislation or some- r more harshly referred to edjusisal yrenayy exactly’ where that boundary line between tion and judicial legislation lies, is not clear. ary isealled upon to regulate its actions and in a Sstablish its own boundaries, the interpretation of where ‘Poundary lies varies widely depending on time, policies, H. STATUTORY coNsTRUCTIO: ‘OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? types of laws involved, and even the idiosyncrasies of different judges-and justices. To determine where we are now or where we ‘were at any particular point in time in this judicial-legislative “border war” would require a separate treatise. The reader is, however, given a few representative cases to get a glimpse of this on-going debate, “It does fot teem to need argument to show that. however we may distinguish it by veiling words we do fot andcannot tarry put the distinction between legis- Tative gnd executive/action with mathematical preci- Sionand divide the branches into watertight compart- tents, Were itVen'bo desirable to do so, which I am (Aaprom believing that itis, or that the Constitution so Fequires (Justice Holmes; Springer vs. Government, 277US, 188, 210-212, 72 Led. 845, 853 cited in Floresca vs. Philee Mining Corporation, 136 SCR.A 141, 169), 8. WHEN IS IT CONSTRUCTION AND WHEN Is IT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? CASE: Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp. 186 SCRA 142 Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philo ‘Mining Corporation's mine sites. The heirs of the miners s.r able to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act (WC. Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety pro- ‘The heirs decided to file i é or is desided to lea complaint for damages before the + Philex filed i round that acfion>was based. 0 te ae under,the WCA.and, 1 the case, Ph es = epee) ‘under Soatoas 8 and 46 of the WGA, which provides:. Scanned with CamScanner STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Section 5. Excl fright to compensation. — ‘the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an emplayee by reason of a personal injury entitling him fo eompensation shall exclude all other rights and rem- ediseaccruing to the employee, his personal repre- Sentatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because oF said injury xx x,” *Section 46. durisdiction. ~The Workmen's Com- pensation Comnitssioner shall have exclusive jurisdic- tion to hear and decide elaims for compensation under ‘the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to ‘the Supreme Court, xxx.” further contends that the WoA covers work-con- even if the employer was negligent as the WCA in itional compensation in the Jhowever, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction as t ig not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code on damages arising out of negligence. dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. jority Opinion; Makasiar, J. ‘opinions famicus curiae] were advanced as to the ifthe remedies provided for under the WCA, namely: CUMULATIVE — Justice Lazaro is of the opinion s fnay file a complaint for damages (which is differ- sation under the WCA) with the regular courts fof the negligence of an employer pursuant to the provisions, 1, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 2 B IVE — Atty. (now Senator) Angara believes that recovery under the WCA is exclusive and therefore pre cludes an action vf damages under the Civil Code, 3) SELECTIVE — Atty. Bacungan believes that the rem edies areGelective,’ie., the heirs had the option of choosing between availing of the compensation under the WCA or filing an Action for damages arising out of negligence under the provisions ‘of the Givil Code. If the heirs had chosen one remedy and have collected under that remedy, they can no longer avail of the other remedy. ‘The allegations of the complaint indicate that there was a breach of contract which may justify an award for damages “inde? the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The question ow is whether or not the action for damages will prosper, not- ‘withstanding the fact that the heirs have already received com- pensation under the WCA, ‘The Court agreed with the position o€ Atty. Bacungaithat the tho remedies are selective/The WCA is based on a theory of pensation distinet frow existing theories on damazes. Recov ery under the WCA is not based on any theory on the part of the employer. ao the.two remedies are Ss = bss ave the ce fifo. are the heirs now ie eae ‘remedy under the Civil Code, con- siderin h dy availed of (and received compen sation) under the WCA? © Theheirs have ‘simultaneously, i A choice but they.eannot pursue both civics ______The Court, however, noted that the ligence>report after the ed ‘Stare eit oc naka ex intelligent and formed choice at the time they opted for the WCA remedy. ' ‘The heirs were thts poral tops ols edy but they are not entitled to! ‘both, i Payment they received under the WCA shall be eer the court's award of damages, ifany. Per trras Scanned with CamScanner a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (On the Issue of Judicial Legislation: ‘The Minority contends that the Court is guilty of Judicial Legislation The Majority replied that it was merely giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice and the protec- tion of labor-\Article 173 of the Labor Code and Article 1702 of the Civil Cade both mandate that pny doubt in the construction tf Tabor laws should be construed in favor of labor} Its curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts gannot legislate. That myth has been exploded by dle f the CV Code which provides hat \ “No judge or court shall decline to render judg- ment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insuffi- ciency of the laws,” Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the [sivit Cove, sizes that in certain instances, the Court, in the | Tustice Holmes, ‘do and:must legislate’ to fill in the ‘the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all | Stiuman beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all-poss- bile cases to which the law may apply: Nor has the human mind tthe infinite capacity to anticipate all situations/ 5 ia ee * Dissenting Opinion; Melencio-Herrera, J.: 1. Compensation and damages aire synonym 2. The WCA remedy is exclusive. 3. The WCA proceedings are a finished transaction. 4 Even assuming that the remedies are selective, the hpeirs have already made their choice and have accepted the Benefits thereof, At the very least, if they want to make a second lection on the argument that the first one was a misinformed ichoice, they should return the amounts they received from the Wea. 7 5. When the court gives effect to a statute not in accord: lance with the intent of the lawmaker, the court is unjustifiably legislating. I staruToRY constuction 8 ‘OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION Dissenting opinion; Gutierrez, J. 1. It should be the legislature, not the court, whiel h should remove the exclusionary provision of the WCA. 2. The WCA is a compromise. In return for the near cer- tainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by the law, the injured ‘worker gives up the right to subject the employer to tort suit for shuge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault butit is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and, in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in acivil suit, The employer is required to act swiftly on the compensation claims, An administrative agency supervises the rogram. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers ‘who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of the entire working class, 3. The schedule of compensation, the rates of payment, the compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by ‘employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the ‘rust fund and many other interrelated parts have all bev care fully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted into law Ifthe court disregards this totality of the scheme in a

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