The Role of Perception in Language Comprehension
Nora Chen
University of California Merced
nchen39@ucmerced.edu
Abstract—In their paper ”Language Comprehenders Mentally
Represent the Shapes of Objects Represent the Shapes of Ob-
jects,” Rolf A. Zwaan and colleagues hypothesized that perceptual
symbols are frequently engaged in the process of understanding
language. In the field of cognitive science, a number of studies
have been conducted in order to address the phenomenon
associated with language comprehension, and new ideas have
been put forth, including one proposing that lexical decisions
are formed based on simulation of perceptual experience. A new
phenomenon known as the action-sentence compatibility effect
(ACE) was also discovered by Glenberg and Kaschak in their
paper ”Grounding language in action”. The researchers found
that language understanding is grounded in bodily action, further
illustrating the idea that at least some language comprehension is
similar to this since language was probably developed to facilitate
the coordination of actions. While there has been some discussion
of a perceptual approach to language understanding in the past,
it has not addressed the theoretical and empirical implications of
such a perspective, nor has it addressed the concept of embodied
language processing. An important contribution of this literature
review is that it provides an updated version of previous work in
cognitive science, shedding more light on the role attributed to
perception in language comprehension, as well as on the empirical
and theoretical implications of the role attributed to perception.
This literature study, in addition to being of use to researchers
and academics, may prove to be of practical benefit to anyone
seeking knowledge regarding the function that the motor system
plays in language understanding.
Keywords: perception, embodied cognition, motor resonance,
cognitive linguistics.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Do perceptual representations constitute the building blocks
of cognition or are they amodal propositions? Psychologists
like Barsalou argue that knowledge theories are fundamentally
perceptual and that a perceptual symbol system can compute
the differences by simulating the perception of objects (Barsa-
lou, 1999). However, according to the arguments of researchers
such as Guy Dove, evidence in favor of perceptual symbols is
essentially constrained and persuasive when applied to tangible
or highly imageable notions but has limited applicability when
applied to abstract concepts (Dove, 2007).
Perceptual symbols are analogous to the things they rep-
resent, unlike amodal propositions, as he showed in his pa-
per ”Perceptual symbol systems”. As Barsalou hypothesized,
people use perceptual symbols in their cognitive systems
to simulate their perception. Perceptual simulations occur
when you simulate the perceptual experience of seeing or
touching or tasting or smelling or hearing or moving under
specific conditions. For example, you might simulate the
experience of seeing the surface of the moon. You can do
this just by imagining what it looks like, but you can also
simulate the experience of seeing the surface of the moon
by imagining what it looks like while you are looking at
the actual moon. The paper “Perceptual symbol systems” by
Lawrence W. Barsalou, states that “a perceptual simulation
represents a gist that can be paraphrased in multiple ways”.
Listeners may create a mental picture of a balloon floating
over a cloud by repeating the statement ”The balloon is
above the cloud” (the upper region of above). A simulation
may arise in which the listener loses track of where his or
her attention was concentrated while trying to recollect the
speech. Consequently, it is hard to determine whether the
previous phrase said ”The balloon is above the cloud” or ”The
cloud is below the balloon.” As information is lost from a
simulation’s memory, the likelihood of the information being
paraphrased increases as the simulation continues. Additional
paraphrases become conceivable as a result of the fact that
distinct simulators may often be mapped onto the remaining
information. Thus, the perceptual symbol system is capable
of implementing the fundamental properties of propositions
discussed previously for amodal symbol systems, as well as
producing alternative construals based on different options for
simulated elements of the scene or by simulating the same
elements in ways that differ from the original. To further
support this view, there have been several empirical studies
comparing the two predictions (Perceptual symbol theories and
the amodal propositional representation).
II. S UPPORT OF BARSALOU ’ S VIEW
One interesting article that offers empirical support for
this idea in the domain of language comprehension and that
those perceptual representations are central to some cog-
nitive tasks is “The Effect of Implied Orientation Derived
from Verbal Context on Picture Recognition” by Robert A.
Stanfield, Rolf A. Zwaan. In their experiments, they came
up with 129 sentences to go along with the images: 81
filler sentences, 24 statements positioned vertically, and 24
sentences oriented horizontally. Participants were presented a
sentence after seeing a left-justified, vertically center fixation
point for 250 milliseconds on the left side of the screen.
After thoroughly understanding the text, the participants hit
the space bar and a second fixation point appeared in the
middle of the screen for 250 ms1. A picture appeared on their
screens then. To identify whether the illustrated object was
referenced in the preceding phrase, participants pressed either
the period (”.”) key or the ”x” key on their keyboards. Results
indicated that the way in which a phrase described an item
had an impact on whether or not the participant recognized the
item. One of the arguments highlighted in the article was in
regards to the result that “recognition latencies were shorter for
pictures of objects whose orientation matched the orientation
suggested by the prior text than for pictures of objects whose
orientation did not match the one suggested by the prior text.”
However, Zwann further demonstrates that this is arguably
false with several compelling reasons. The study highlighted
the fact that only 25 percent of the participants used active
generation mechanisms when compared to the findings of
a similar study conducted (Stanfield, 2000) using the same
materials and procedures. Thus, the data does not support the
assumption that participants consciously adopted, strategized,
and developed an image to be contrasted with the picture, and
that their outcomes are solely a product of this approach.
A.
Zwann and colleagues hypothesized that ”if language com-
prehenders represent the implied orientation of objects, they
should also represent the implied shape of objects” in their
second study, which served as an extension of their first study
and helped to provide additional empirical support for the
notion of perpetual symbol theories. Among other scenarios,
Zwann and colleagues anticipated the mismatch effect when
they compared images of the ranger seeing an eagle in the sky
to an image of a bird with folded wings, and the ranger seeing
an egg in the pan to an image of an egg in a carton.
The findings of the research (experiment one) revealed that
reactions to the image were slower when the picture did not
match the inferred form than when the picture did match
the implied shape, providing more support for the perceptual
symbol theory. Thus, when the suggested orientation of the
item in the phrase matched the object’s indicated orientation
in the image, reactions were quicker than when there was a
discrepancy between the assumed and depicted orientations.
Instead of having separate pictures and a comparison, in
their second experiment, people named the image based on
what they read. Recruiting fifty-seven undergraduate students,
participants read sentences that did not imply anything about
the shape of the object like David likes to play with his toy
rabbit. According to the findings of this research, the mean
naming time during the neutral condition was between the
naming times for the match and mismatch situations (which is
in agreement with the perceptual symbol theory). Taking both
tests into account, this study demonstrates that comprehenders
consistently activate perceptual symbols that integrate the form
of objects, even when the shape of the item is neither inferred
nor articulated in the linguistic input. Furthermore, this work
shows that “the sentential context has a strong and rather
immediate impact on the nature of the mental representation.”
B.
In the paper Effects of global and local context on lexical
processing during language comprehension by Blank Foss and
colleagues, one of the major findings was “naming latencies
were only facilitated when the target was related to the
ongoing discourse representation.” When words have features
in common, the amount of time it takes for them to move
between them in the lexical space is reduced. When a term
shares micro-features with a comparable contextual condition,
it is recognized more rapidly than when the phrase does not
share micro-features with the context (e.g., the lexical system
will settle on that word on the basis of its goodness-of-fit
constraint satisfaction procedures). Because of this, lexical
processing is impacted by the context of the whole discourse
environment. Because this is relevant to the research that
Zwann and colleagues are doing, it helps to corroborate
the fact that both the globally related circumstances were
substantially quicker than the global-unrelated-locally related
conditions: the relationship between the global and the local
against the relationship between the global and the local (e.g.
the ranger saw the eagle in its nest followed by a picture
of an eagle with outstretched wings). Thus, these findings
support the hypothesis that meaning representation from lin-
guistic information is a dynamic process involving changes
in perceptions rather than a mechanical coupling of discrete
components of meaning as previously proposed (Langacker,
1987). This means, simulating perceptual experience is an
important part of the lexical decision-making process when
it comes to sentences. Furthermore, “perceptual symbols are
perceptual representations that take on the form or shape
of ’things’, for example, and are thought to be leftovers of
perceptual experiences that are ”stored as patterns of activity
in the brain” (Zwaan et al., 2002, p. 168, Schilhab 2015).
The process of associating meaning with language in order to
interpret and judge the degree of congruence between objects
shown in photographs and objects depicted in sentences is
hence the excitation of the perceptual symbols involved. In
a study done by Friedemann Pulvermüller, his paper Brain
mechanisms linking language and action further supports this
notion in that it found “an action-related word meaning is not
only reflected in the cortical activity pattern, but stimulation
of the motor system also produces differential effects on the
recognition of action words of the different semantic type”
(Pulvermuller, 2005). The strengthening of linkages between
inferior frontal motor circuits and superior temporal speech
perception processes, which create scattered cell assemblies,
is essential for both speaking and comprehending speech,
according to a neurobiological explanation (Kiefer, 2001). As
a result of the empirical studies that have been presented and
the neurobiological evidence to further support the hypothesis
that perceptual symbols are frequently engaged in the process
of understanding language and people activate perceptual
symbols during language comprehension, there are several.
grounds support the claim that language probably arose to
facilitate coordination of action (see Barsalou, 1999; Zwann
et. al. 2002; Pulvermuller, 2005).
C. Conclusion
A short introduction to perceptual symbol theories, as well
as publications in support of Barsalou’s claim that percep-
tual representations are the fundamental building blocks of
cognition, has been provided and reviewed in this portion
of the work. In this section, he asserts that conceptions of
knowledge were essentially perceptual and that a perceptual
symbol system can calculate these distinctions via the use
of perceptual simulation (or perception). Through empirical
studies done by scholars including Zwann, Glenberg, and Pul-
vermuller, this section helps contribute to the growing evidence
in that perceptual representations constitute the building blocks
of cognition and overall adds empirical support from both
an experimental and neurobiological account to the role of
perception in language comprehension. To further add to the
analysis of the perception’s role in language comprehension,
the next section will introduce and highlight the counter-
arguments from Guy Dove and Kosslyn including potential
flaws underlying perceptual symbols with abstract concepts
and how amodal representations may be the building blocks
of cognition rather than perceptual symbols.
III. A MODAL P ROPOSITIONAL R EPRESENTATION
While it has been discussed and argued in the literature
that perceptual representations are the fundamental building
blocks to cognition in accordance with Barsalou, there has
been arguments that suggest otherwise in that amodal propo-
sitional representation the object’s orientation would not be
represented (in accordance to Zwann et. al.’s experiment).
In Zwann’s experiment, reactions were quicker when the
inferred orientation of the item in the phrase matched the
orientation of the object in the image, as opposed to when
there was a mismatch between the implied and depicted
orientations. While amodal symbol theories predict that the
match-mismatch adjustment will have no effect on reaction
latencies to the image. An amodal sign is a symbol that has
meaning in all modalities at the same time. The number three
is an example of an amodal sign, as may be seen below.
The number three is relevant across all modalities because
it may be represented in a variety of ways, such as three
dots, three lines, or in words, among other things (three).
Amodal perception is the perception of things as a whole,
as opposed to perception via a single sense, which is referred
to as amodal perception. In addition to touch, sight, hearing,
smell, and taste are used to express this impression. The
thing is regarded as a whole, rather than as a collection
of individual components. This is in contrast to multimodal
perception, which is the perception of things via the use of
many senses at the same time. One of the senses is responsible
for perceiving multisensory perception. When you hear a
person’s voice but don’t see them, you have a full perception
of the person since you have heard their voice in its totality.
In essence, you do not experience a person via one of their
senses, such as sight, hearing, or smell, but rather through
the whole person. Focusing on Barsalou’s arguments against
amodalism, one of six central problems exists in which the first
two will be discussed here. In the paper Grounded Cognition,
he found that “from the perspective of grounded cognition,
it is unlikely that the brain contains amodal symbols; if it
does, they work together with modal representations to create
cognition” (Barsalou, 2008). As a result, there is no evidence
to support the existence of amodal symbols, according to this
remark. However, in the paper Amodal or perceptual symbol
systems: A false dichotomy? Davies argues against this first
argument by stating that “even some of the strongest evidence
for perceptual imagery suggest only principled support for the
existence of imagery, not direct evidence.” He also states that
“equally, while it can also be fairly said that amodal symbols
do not handle many aspects of cognition, so it is also true
that perceptual symbols cannot handle other aspects, or do
so with great difficulty.” To put it simply, a symbol may be
”perceptual” in the sense that it is, for example, a picture of
an object that is intended to represent an object in the world,
but simply because it is a picture of an object that is intended
to represent an object in the world does not entail that it has
a perceptual aspect to it. It is ”perceptive” in the sense that it
is perceptual of something else, rather than in the sense that
it is a non-perceptual, ”modal” sign in and of itself.
A.
Further adding onto the implications of this argument, in
the paper Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery
Debate Stephen Kosslyn says how a compelling explanation
that imagery is reliant on depictive representations will be
required, but it will also be necessary to demonstrate how such
representations are formed and deployed within the context of
the processing system as a whole in order to resolve the imag-
ing challenges. Specifically, Zenon Pylyshyn’s critique in his
paper What the Mind’s Eye Told the Mind’s Brain: A Critique
of Mental Imagery, which presents a critique of contemporary
research that uses the notion of a mental image as a theoretical
construct to describe one type of memory representation, was
the main point brought up during the discussion. Pylyshyn
says how depictive images can only represent information if
the appropriate kind of processes are available, which he felt
was implausible. In a bid to counter this concern, Kosslyn and
Shwartz created computer simulation models; if computers
were capable of using depictive representations, there could
not have been a reason why such endless regresses could
not, in theory, arise. However, the architecture of its paradigm
relied mostly on empirical evidence and logical analysis which
shows even while a computer may be taught to use depictive
representations, this does not imply that such a capability
exists inside the realm of the human mind. The absence of
the mental machinery necessary to make and use depictive
mental images means that epiphenomenal mental images are,
by definition, non-existent. Therefore, an amodal sign is a
symbol that has meaning in all modalities at the same time.
Amodal perception is the perception of things as a whole,
as opposed to perception via a single sense. One of the
senses responsible for perceiving multisensory perception is
touch. When you hear someone’s voice but don’t see them,
you have a full perception of the person since you have
heard their voice in its totality. In the paper Image and
Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate Stephen Kosslyn
says how a compelling explanation that imagery is reliant
on depictive representations will be required. It will also be
necessary to demonstrate how such representations are formed
and deployed within the context of the processing system as
a whole in order to resolve the imaging challenges. Zenon
Pylyshyn’s critique of contemporary research uses the notion
of a mental image as a theoretical construct to describe one
type of memory representation. The absence of the mental
machinery necessary to make and use depictive mental images
means that epiphenomenal mental images are, by definition,
non-existent. Kosslyn and Shwartz argued that if computers
were capable of using depictive representations, there could
not have been a reason why such endless regresses could not,
in theory, arise in the human mind.
B. Transduction and Symbol Grounding Problem:
Furthermore, Barsalou cites another major issue, “they are
amodal because their internal structures bear no correspon-
dence to the perceptual states that produced them.” (Barsalou,
1999). However, Davies counters this issue as though being
of valid concern, he calls this the – “transduction and the
symbol grounding problems” (Davies, 2002). In this section,
he argues that his reasoning supports something considerably
more sophisticated and richer than the perceptual systems
approach that he advocates for. Take, for example, the chair
example from Barsalou’s paper Perceptual Symbol Systems,
in which [Figure 1] reveals how sensory-motor system states
can be extracted and stored in long-term memory to perform
symbolic functions. This results in a modal internal structure
for these symbols, and they are analogous to the perceptual
experiences that created them in terms of their internal struc-
ture. Therefore, the internal structure of perceptual symbols is
a specific subset of amalgamation of the sensory-motor states
that gave birth to them in the first place. In this way, the inter-
nal structure of perceptual symbols differs from the internal
structure of sensory-motor states in terms of their structure.
Hence, Davies raises two questions: “1) How is the arbitrary
symbol represented grounded in the transduced sensory states?
Because as we know, in the process of being transduced
from perceptual states, amodal symbols are assimilated into
larger representational structures such as feature lists, frame
representations, schemata, semantic networks, and production
systems. All higher cognitive activities, including memory,
knowledge, language, and reasoning, are supported by a fully
functional symbolic system made of these components and
with combinatorial syntax and semantics. (Barsalou, 1999).
As a result, Barsalou feels that it is critical to recognize that
the symbols in these systems are amodal and arbitrary in
their construction (The fact that they are amodal indicates that
their internal structures have no connection to the perceptual
experiences that produce them). Assuming, however, that the
arbitrary symbols which perform this function are structured
symbolic expressions, it is difficult to see how they can meet
these requirements without involving perceptual representa-
tion. “Our linguistic capacities are the primary examples here,
but many of the other skills we have – logical reasoning,
mathematics, chess-playing, perhaps even our higher-level
perceptual and motor skills – also seem to be symbolic.”
(Harnad 1990); and even if they do, Barsalou’s point is that
perceptual symbols are all that is required (Harnad 1990,
Davies 2002). Furthermore, Davies contends that if it is found
that an alternative account of symbols can be supported, it may
be able to overcome the transduction and symbol grounding
challenges, as well as the other objections presented by struc-
tured symbols such as propositions. Therefore, the internal
structure of perceptual symbols is a subset of amalgamation
of the sensory-motor states that gave birth to them in the
first place. They are amodal because their internal structures
bear no correspondence to the perceptual states that produced
them. Davies raises two questions: 1) How is the arbitrary
symbol represented grounded in the transduced sensory states?
A properly functional symbolic system underpins all higher
cognitive activities such as memory, knowledge, language, and
reasoning. Barsalou feels that it is critical to recognize that the
symbols in these systems are amodal and arbitrary in their
construction. Davies contends that if it is revealed that an
alternative explanation of symbols can be supported, it may be
feasible to overcome the transduction and symbol grounding
challenges.
C.
In Guy Dove’s paper Beyond perceptual symbols: A call
for representational pluralism, Dove argues against previous
research results that some cognitive processes utilize percep-
tual representations, as well as the proposal that cognition is
intrinsically perceptual. It is important to note that although
Barsalou (1999) asserts that cognition is ”inherently percep-
tual,” he also accepts the potential that certain conceptual
representations may be amodal in some cases (Barsalou,
Simmons, Barbey, Wilson, 2003; Goldstone Barsalou, 1998).
In a personal conversation on the matter, Barsalou claims
that his concept of perceptual symbol systems is incompatible
with the universality thesis since it lays a strong focus on
introspection, which he claims is not a perceptual symbol
system (Dove, 2003). The author of Cognitive psychology
and its implications, John Anderson, conducted a study that
found that what distinguishes a person from someone else who
forges their signature is not their actions but their intentions
at the time as well as the relationship between the intentions
and unseen social contracts. Using Barsalou’s method from a
third-person viewpoint, this is an example of an introspective
event and how it plays a crucial part in helping to differentiate
between ideas that do not seem to be perceptually distinct at
first glance. “The first-person experience of these two events,
though, is presumably different. A perceptual simulation that
involves introspective events would thus be able, at least in
principle, to disambiguate these concepts. Introspective events
could also play a similar role in distinguishing freely chosen
votes from coerced ones” (Dove, 2003). A further argument in
Dove’s paper is that introspection does not provide convincing
evidence that perceptual symbols exist, and that Barsalou
disputes the claim that introspection is perceptual, concluding
that some forms of conceptual representation do not possess
perceptual properties. Because of this, his solution to the issue
of abstract conceptions is dependent on amodal symbols to
some extent at least in part. Hence, according to Barsalou,
amodal symbols are representations that are not bound to a
particular sensory modality, such as vision or hearing. They
are available for conceptual processing. However, this does
not mean that they are irrelevant to processing conceptual
information in the modality in which they are encoded. In
fact, the information stored in an amodal symbol is stored
in many modalities, including imagery, auditory, and tactile.
Thus, Barsalou argues that amodal symbols are the “core
representations” of mental concepts. In this section of the argu-
ment, Guy Dove argues against previous research results that
some cognitive processes utilize perceptual representations, as
well as the proposal that cognition is intrinsically perceptual.
He also argues that introspection does not give persuasive
evidence for the presence of perceptual symbols. Barsalou
argues in a personal discussion that his notion of perceptual
symbol systems is incompatible with the universality thesis
since it emphasizes introspection in a prominent manner.
D.
The empirical evidence in support of Barsalou’s stance
that people activate perceptual symbols of referents during
language comprehension, as well as the fact that theories of
knowledge were inherently perceptual, and that a perception
symbol system can compute these differences using perceptual
simulation, have been the focus of my argument thus far.
The major strengths of this argument are predicated on the
empirical research that has been conducted. One study was
in the paper Grounding language in action (Kaschak Glen-
berg, 2000). A novel phenomenon connected with language
understanding also known as the action–sentence compatibility
effect, was discovered in this research by the authors. 44
native English-speaking participants from the University of
Wisconsin, Madison’s right hands were asked to determine
if words were logical by performing a response that required
them to move toward or away from their bodies. A directional
sentence is a statement that conveys activity in just one
direction (for example, ”Close the drawer” implies action away
from the body) and is used to indicate activity in only one di-
rection. According to the data, there is a statistically significant
interaction between response direction and suggested phrase
direction, which is referred to as the ACE [F(1,34) 5 7.75, MSe
5 47,013, F(1,34) 5 7.75, MSe 5 47,013]. [F(2,68) 5 72.41,
MSe 5 111,207] revealed a statistically significant main impact
of sentence type [F(2,68) 5 72.41, MSe 5 111,207], which
represented the fact that the shorter imperative phrases were
read considerably faster than the lengthy transfer sentences.
This resulted in difficulties in making a sensitivity judgment
demanding an opposing reaction, which lends credence to an
embodied theory of meaning, which links the meaning of
words to the actions of people in their daily lives. While in
the paper Language Comprehenders Mentally Represent the
Shapes of Objects (Rolf A. Zwaan et. al. 2002), they had
participants read out sentences like, “the ranger saw the eagle
in the sky followed by a picture of an eagle with folded wings
and “the ranger saw the eagle in its nest followed by a picture
of an eagle with outstretched wings.” They anticipated that
if language comprehenders represent an object’s suggested
orientation, they should also represent its implied form, re-
sulting in a mismatch effect. The influence of mismatch on
reaction latency was statistically significant: answers were
faster when the sentence and picture matched than when they
were mismatched (F1(1, 38) 13.14, p.0001; F2(1, 44) 14.54,
p.0001). Thus, the authors of the paper, then concluded that the
comprehenders of the language representation of the pictures
represented the implied orientation of the objects and their
implied shape, as per their hypotheses. This work is one
of the many that shows that people can activate their own
knowledge of the world when they read the language — that
is, their representations of objects and their properties are
activated. Issues in which Barsalou has acknowledged in that
he found that “from the perspective of grounded cognition,
it is unlikely that the brain contains amodal symbols; if it
does, they work together with modal representations to create
cognition” (Barsalou, 2008). As a result, there is no evidence
to support the existence of amodal symbols, according to this
remark.
IV. E MBODIED L ANGUAGE P ROCESSING
Perception is the process of creating an internal model of the
external world through the senses and then manipulating that
internal model (Carbon, 2014). Embodied language processing
is a branch of cognitive science that studies how the brain maps
language onto action, creating a link between perception and
language. In this context, perception is a form of perception-
action coupling; perception does not simply reflect what is
going on in the external world but is also actively involved
in creating the internal model of the external world. This is
in contrast to the traditional view of perception, which sees
perception as the passive extraction of information from the
external world. In this traditional view, perception is separate
from language and is not strongly coupled to it (Kellman,
Garrigan, 2014). In the paper Embodied language: A review
of the role of the motor system in language comprehension by
M. H. Fischer and Rolf A. Zwaan, they discuss various studies
in regards to the role of motor resonance during language
comprehension from an action simulation perspective. They
discovered that there is a motor resonance associated with
the acts done by the speaker, known as communicative motor
resonance, as well as a motor resonance associated with the
events narrated by the speaker, known as referential resonance.
In terms of behavior, Pickering and Garrod (2007) describe
how these types of resonance manifest themselves in an
increased ability to predict the appearance of upcoming words
at the linguistic level and the appearance of upcoming events
at the referential level, and how this increases the fluency of
information processing (Pickering Garrod, 2007).
V. R EPLICATION
To further extend the study on the idea that people activate
perceptual symbols of referents during language comprehen-
sion, we can replicate the study done by Kaschak Glenberg,
2000. In this replication study, participants determined whether
phrases were reasonable by moving their bodies up or down
(as opposed to moving toward or away from their bodies).
When a statement indicated activity in one direction (e.g.,
”Open the top shelf”), the participants had trouble generating
a sensitivity assessment demanding a reaction in the opposite
direction [down]. The ACE was shown for three types of
statements: imperative phrases, sentences indicating the trans-
fer of actual objects, and sentences expressing the transfer of
abstract entities, such as ”Bob informed you of the news,”
among other examples. According to these results, models of
language comprehension in which meaning is represented as
a sequence of interactions between nodes are flawed. While
this idea is supported by the data, it is not the only one. The
hypothesis based on Kashak and Glenberg’s study is since
affordances mesh under the supervision of syntactic constructs,
the utterance is comprehended if the matrix of affordances
corresponds to a possible action. While there is common
ground between the words and syntactic connections in a
phrase, comprehension may be partial, or the sentence may be
judged illogical, even if it lacks affordances that lead to action.
As a result, comprehending an upward statement should keep
one from making a downward motion. A movement upward
of the body to indicate yes (yes-is-up) should conflict with a
movement away from the body to indicate yes (yes-is-far). In
this methodology, for the reasonable sentences, the indepen-
dent variable [up/down] was modified. As a result, ”up” words
like ”open the top shelf” and ”touch the ceiling” signified the
movement of the body. Downward phrases, such as ”open the
bottom shelf” and ”touch the floor,” conveyed motion from the
body downwards. The meaningless statements, such as ”freeze
the air,” seemed to have no meaning.
VI. C ONCLUSION
Rolf A. Zwaan and colleagues postulated in their study
”Language Comprehenders Mentally Represent the Shapes
of Objects” that perceptual symbols are regularly involved
in the process of comprehending language. In the field of
cognitive science, a number of studies have been conducted
in order to address the phenomenon associated with language
comprehension, and new ideas have been proposed, such as the
hypothesis that the simulation of perceptual experience is in
charge of making lexical decisions. in the context of sentences.
Further substantiating the idea that the origins of language lie
in the facilitation of coordinated action, researchers Glenberg
and Kaschak discovered the ”action-sentence compatibility
effect” (ACE) when they published their paper ”Grounding
language in action” in which they showed how language
understanding is rooted in bodily action. While there has
been some discussion of a perceptual approach to language
understanding in the past, it has not addressed the theoret-
ical and empirical implications of such a perspective, nor
has it further extended the concept of embodied language
processing. An important contribution of this literature review
is that it provides an updated version of previous work in
cognitive science, shedding more light on the role attributed
to perception in language comprehension through a meta-
analysis of several studies done within the field, inclusive of
the empirical and theoretical implications of the role attributed
to perception. Additionally, this paper presents a more fine-
grained analysis of the findings of previous research, which
is particularly important for a better understanding of the role
attributed to perception in language comprehension. Drawing
upon both sides of the arguments in regards to the fundamental
building blocks of cognition, Section 2 (Perceptual Symbol
Systems) presents empirical evidence in support of perceptual
representations and how linguistic information is a dynamic
process that involves changeable perceptual representations
rather than a mechanical coupling of discrete components of
meaning, as previously proposed (Langacker, 1987). While
Section 3 (Amodal Propositional Representation) contests the
central problems that Barsalou had proposed in regards to
amodalism. However, the current state of research is still far
from being conclusive, as the meta-analysis of the present
study also shows. In this regard, the meta-analysis of the
present study is particularly important because (1) it shows that
the results obtained by researchers in language comprehension
are very consistent; (2) it provides a more complete picture of
the role attributed to perception in language comprehension;
(3) it allows the reader to understand the relationships among
the various aspects investigated in the present study as well as
their respective contributions to language comprehension.
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