lions In the ar11a. HowavPr, 1,000 Mat1nas marched In a 1969 Oceanside, Calllomla rally.

Because of the serious penalties for overt organizing, many dissidents chose
to publish and distribute newspapers. GIpapers couldbefound 11varywhare, with such mastheads as Fallgue
Pr&ss, Altllude Check, All Hands Abandon Ship, Left Face, and Siar Spangled Bummer.
The papers printed everything from local gripeslo antlt.rass, antiwar , and antlraclsl news and views. Although
Illegal, the papers found their way Into barracks, bathrooms and lounge areas. 011a Marina organizer
commented , "Guys aSk H the paperIs 'underground'. I we reply 'yes,' they take n. Guys ldanmy with a rebell on
IInot with the revolution."
Reflecting the growing opposition to the warIn the U.S.. rebellions within ha military Increased rapidly from 1968 to
1970. In 1968, there were 68Incidents of combat refusalIn Vietnam ;In 1969, entire units refused orders;and In
1970, tllare ware 35 separa1o combat refusalsIn the Air Cavalry Division alone.
Stalaslda desertion and AWOL rose steadily throughout the war. In 1966,lhe desertion rate was 14.7 par
thousand;In 1968, It was 26.2 par thousand;and by 1970,52.3 per thousand.Al ha height of the war, one GI want
AWOL every three minutes. From January 1967 o January 1972,354,112 Glsleft lhalr posts without permission. Al
ha signing of the 1973 peaca accords,98,324 ware still missing.
The most publicized damonslratlons of GI opposition took place In the 1971 Winier Soldier lnvasllgatlon, when
GI:.gave testimony about war atrocities, and the 1971 Moratorium,whenGls threw away their medalsIn a drarnatlc
gesture of protest against the •
Out of lhesa actions there emerged Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). a nation-wide organization thal
provided the structure neededlo give dissident Gls a volcaIn he national debale. Ma11y who helped launch VVAW
later helped organize Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA). There are scattered chapten: of VVAW still operating
today . VVA has grown lnlo a notional orgariza­ tlon, headquartered In Washington, wllh aln:;>st 30,000 members In
altlllatad chaplars all over the country. In 1987, VVA received recognlllon by ha federal govammant as an olllclal
national vet.:orans organization, alongside ha American Logionand Veterans of Foreign Wars. The Founders of
VVA later organized the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). In 1990, VVAF assumed operation of
the Indochina Profect to conduct relief programsIn Vle nom and to promote reconciliation between the U.S.andls
former enemy .

201
 Death March

Not the numbers but the sound-

murmu1·s In the single-Ille crowds
flickering windy candles,
not the placebut the names marked on placards hung
from living necks-
to be tolled to the cameras for a visual kaddish,
not the hourbut the clear darkness through which mournerslike monks
in 14th-century habitspassed the shrine- the great doomed Capitol
Taj Mahnl
sepulchre of the dead Prince: Justice.

Each of us one of the silent dead returned to march through the white city
past white TV lamps holding white candles past the White House in our white bones, a parade of resurrected sold
bearers of ghost guns and phantom armor decked with blood medals and chevrons of flesh garlanded with the blac
of our enemies-
camouf laged as war protesters bearing our constitutional wounds.

-Charles Fishman

202
()

F!\,I
C
Chapter 8 Howard Elterman and Jerold M. Starr

HOW THE WAR WAS REPORTED

Walter Cronkite, popular

anchor man for CBS
News, on tour
In Vietnam.

Introduction

Have you ever thought nbout how the stories In your morning paper come to be the news? There are
countless numbers of bappenlnas, both planned and unexpected, In llin world eveiy day. Yet only a few of
them become published or brondcast unews events. What detemllnes those outcomes?
Fln; In order to become a news event, a happenlna must be recorded. Then it must be promoted to the
media
u"newsworthy." Finally, It must be chosen and usembled by reporters and editors for public distribution.
In every newsroom there Is someone, often the Manaainl Fdltor, who decides which of the many stories
that arrive on his desk each da,y will be SO!en by the public. On the larger city dalllt11, the "gatekeeper" ml\)'
set ten tlmos more words and seven times more stori•sthan the reader sees.
The evaluation anJ selection of what's news involves several criteria. The rnain fo11tures looked for in any
item, especiall,y for television news, are timeliness, brevity, nearness, size, unusualness, diarna, visual
attractiveness, and Importance.
Obviously, gntekeepcrs ignore any old or long term, distant, smnll,dull, and visually boring events,
esp<'.Cially those involving unimportant people. This •till leaves many choices because most events fall
somewhere in between. Moreover, there Is one other criterion that sh ould be considered because of the
c'1'11cial role plll)led by the news mcdin intl1e U.S. political process:citizen education.

203
2 i. (I
 In the U.S. todl\y citizens depend on the news public ownership of corpora tions and
media to inform them about their govenunent's two of three favored relaxing
policies. In tum, citizens are expected to advise govemme.nt regulation of business.
their political representatives. To perform that
vltlll function, the press, In the words of Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart, must provide
"organized expert scrutiny of govemment [and]
publish what it knows and..seek to learn what it
can." lltroughout the Vietnam War, however,
many contended that the pressdid not always seek to
learn as much as it could, nor publish all that it
knew.

The Living Room

War: Fact or
Fiction?

1bose who supported the war, called "hawks,"

were especially critical of television coveraae of the
war. They accused the networks of shocking the
public and
undermlnlng support for the war by showing too
much violence by U.S. and South Vietnamese
troops. Also, Vice President Spiro Agnew
frequently attacked net work news programs for
their alleged bias against Nixon admlnlstratlon
policies. Million.a of Americans echoed agreement
with these charges. What Is the truth? Were the
media controlled by liberal critics of the Whlte
House and the war?
During the Vietnam War, Case Western Reserve
University conducted a survey of local news
anchormen in the top 140television nwkets serving
9S percent of American TV households. Over half
described their political orientation as "neutral."
There were almost as many "strict
conservatives"(21%) a,, there were "liber al!'"
(27%). Regardless of tltelr personal views, more
than 70 percent said they could not insert their
personal opinions into the news;that the station
manaaement had authority over the views exl)ftssed
in all broadcasts.
There Is no evidence that establishment critics
are in executive positions in the media either. A
1986 survey of l04 television executives, producers
and writers by the conservative American Enterprise
Institute found them to be 99 percent white, 98
percent male, and 63 percent eam.IJig more than
$200,000 a year. Some four of five were opposed to
 Such flndings should not be surprising. Television, after all, is
bla business.The networks make their proflt by selli1t1 time to
sponsors to promote their products. Set.king to reach audiences
of up to 100 mllllon con sumers, the nallon's 100 largest
corporate advertisers account for over 80 percent of the $10
billion In revenue collected by the major networks each year. rn
1970, a bad year for the economy generally, the television
Industry made a net profit of $424 million.
Since the bottom line is audience size, stations gen erally avoid
programs that tend to divide the audience. During the Vietnam War
a congressional subcommittee report on the Fairness Doctrine foWld
that more than a fourth of the 3,000 stations surveyed said they
never broadcast any programs C1n important controversial
subjects and almost all the rest said they dld so only "sometimes."
In the U.S., commercial television is primarily an
entertainment medium. Despite Federal Communica· tlon
Commission requirements for Informational broadcasting, the
network gives news only S percent of Its prime-time schedule;
the average station features news for barely 10 percent of its 18-
hour prog1amlng day.
A typical half -hour network news broadcas1 features
22 minutes of news. lbe time devoted to each story Is
7 • 90 seconds. These constminta moved e-.-en Walter Cronkite,
20
0 4 21 1
f l\
LC
perhaps the most popular television news caster
ever, to protest, "It has become impossible to cover
the news with the half-hour show. We have a
rsponslbllity that we simply cannot discharge." Ed
ward Fouhy, fonner CBS bureau manager in Salgon
and senior producer of the CBS Evening News
during the Vietnam War, states, "Television news
is a medium capable of transmitting small slices of
truth. It is not capable, even If the people running it
had the will, of changi"I the course of history."
lndustey Insiders candidly admit they provide
essentially a "headline service."
Well, what about those "small slices" and "head
Hnes?" Were they biased against administration
policy and the war? Not according to Mkhael Arlen,
contrib· uting television editor to the New Yorker. Aa
he recalls:
Television very rarely showed us anything of a
horrific or bloody...nature on the nightly news.
In fact, television dutifully passed on the
body counts-a distant, alienating kind of
announce·
 rnent-but almost never showed us dealh, influence. After all,
which might have been more meanln&ful .
Fouhy concurs. According to him, of the 4,000
filmed reports on the network news prograim during
the war, only about 10 percent were "ban& bang"
stories,
that is, stories that featw'ed imaaes of combat.
As for political bias, a study by &Sward Epstein
found that, "up until 1968, television coveraae was
conlrolled to a large extent by the American
Military, and It generally reflected a controlled
ArnericM initia tive that seemed to be winning the
countryside and dec:imalin& the Vietcong." One
reason for this is that the media division of the
Pentqon produced several bun· dred news features
promoting the war effort that were shown by
stations all over the country. Arlen recalls, that "for
most of this undeclared war, almost nothing
resembling a flunking grade was &lven to our
military by television news." Two systematic
studies of televi sion war cover.age concluded that
It was politically balanced or, if nnythlng, slightly
In favor of President Nixon. In perhaps the most
comprehensive analysis of
this issue, Daniel Hallin concludes that television,
"nel· ther showed the 'literal horror of war' nor did
It play a leading role In UM collapse of support. It
presented a highly idealized picture of the conflict in
the early years, and shifted toward 11 more critical view
only after public w1happiness and lite divisions over
the war were well advanced ."
Whether or not there was any blllS In content ,
tl1cre Is
Hlrong evidence thnt the actUPI Influence of television
news has been very over tated. Studies by the U.S.
Sw1oon General 's Conunittee in 1969 Md 1974
eXMl· incd the vlewina habits of national samples
of 6,000 adults. Both st.udles found that, over a two
week sample period, more than half of the adults did
not watch L\ single evening network news progr81'1.
Only about one of fifty watclled TV news every
night. In contrast, 90 percent said they had read
yesterday's newspaper.
Moreover , many of those who reported
watching television news were not paying close
attention at the time. In both the 1969 and l 974
st11dles, videotapes of asubsample of 1Vviewers in
their oMt honws reve.'.lled thal almost tl1roe of five
were Involved inother activities and did not give
their full attention to a single network news
program. Only about one of seven gave their full
llltention to more than four news programs.
Perhaps the television indusby is partly
responsible for the inflated lmoge of its public
that isthe basis for charging such high feesfor commer cial time.
Perhaps many of those involved in polities have had such a low
reprd for common sense that they could believe that millions could be
easily manipulated by 75 to 90 second news "headli nes" on
something so monumental as the ri&htness of their govemment's
policy on war and peace. However, John Mueller, Professor of
Political Science al Rochester University, bas found that simply not
credible:
Whatever Impact television had, it was not enough to reduce
support for the war Wltil casu alty levels had swpassed those
of the earlier wnr [Korea)...the assumption that people will
know how they feel about [war) only If they see it regularly
pictured on their television screens is essentially naive and
patroniz ing.
In the 1940s and 1950s, people listened to radio broadcasts, read
newspapers and watched the movie ne•vsrcels to learn about
developments in World War D and the Korean Wor. Despite Its visual
Impact and popular access, television isjust another communico
tions medium. Its power to mold public opinion ho,, been vutly
overrated . Newspapers R?malned the prl· mary source of
information for most Americans throughout the Vietnam War. Of
course, newspaper s also were crit icized severely.
The Controversy
Over Press Coverage
Howles charged the press with giving the
Impression the U .S. WllS losing a war that, in their
view, it wos winning. Moreover, they clo.lmed, the
press made too much of U.S. troop atrocit ies and
South Vietnamese government corruption and too
little of Vietcong atrocitlei; and North Vietnamese
government totalitari· anism. Such alleged
distortions often were blamed on inexperienced,
lazy, but ambitious reporters cager to pleuse editors
with a libero.I bilLS.
Some conservative critics have gone so far as to
blame the press for subverting public support and caus
ing the U.S. defeat lnVietnam. Maxwell Taylor, fonner
Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S
Ambas· sador to South Vietnam, has
charged:"InVietnam there was the feeling on the part
of some of the pt that tl1eir task was to destroy the
American conu'!Wld and to work
212 205
against what was beln& done.• Keyes S-h, started when correspondents hegan to ('fiticize the
Pulitzer Prlze-wiMin& Far F.ast conespondent for way inwhich the war wu belna fou&ht lrlCI the
the Ollcago Daily Ntws, ll&l'ft' with Taylor: •...the corruption of the Diem government . Diem reacted
media helped lose the war...because of the way with cenaorshlp and intirnidllion. Associated Press
the war wu re· ported...." (AP) writers MaJ. colm Browne and Peter Arnett
In contrut, those who opposed the war, called were beaten and falsely
"dovet," criticlzed press coverage for repellin& the charged with attackina the Saison secret police.
administration's version of the war, while nealectlna Aller luge aeale U$.intervention in th war, the
or bwyina Inthe back pqes fllCISand opinions thll U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam
contra· dieted this version. Dovet charged further (MACY) beaan dally press briefinaa. In time the
lhll when they organized demonstrations to publicize "rnisinfonnollon and lack or verificllion" of the brief·
these facts and opinions, they either were ianored ings became so notorious Iha! they were dubbed the
o·.,..ere pic:tw«I as criminals and traitors, "flv• o'clock failles" by the newsmen. According to
dlsruptln& order and povok· David Halberstam. Pulitzer Prlze-wlnnilll reporter for
lng orresu. The news pbotoa,.phers' alleged prefer· 111t Ntw York Times in Vietnam 1962-63:
ence for the most blwn and militant elements inany
demonst111tlon especially frustrtted the many These reports from Vietnamese offlr.ers, never
serious, middle class critics of tho war seeklna to substantilled or witnessed by American officers,
recNit allies for their movement. We will e<>R•lder would be passed on, and would thereupon
media coverage of the peace movement inthe come
conclusion to this Qiap. ter. out u 'American sources said'. Each dsy, then,
there would be a positive story comln& out of
Defenders of the press have conceded tlw its
the brlef1111...rieaaUng or effectively neutrallzlng
per· formance wu aometlnies flawed, but have the
blamed this on the complexltla of cover•:11a war story that Peter Arnett or Horst Faas would
on the other side of the &Jobe, frequent lies by U.S. be doing that day.
and South Vietnam· ese govemment and milita')' Mo:ley Safer, who opened the Saiaon Bweau for
officials, and censorship of field reporters by CBS News in 196S, concurs with Halberstam: "the
con1<rvative edltors and publish· ers. Saigon version of events wu almost always at
variance with what actually happened inthe
field,witnessed by a cortt1pondent or described by
an officer or civilian
Accordlng to Phillip 'Knightlcy, writer for the Sun· reprcsen!allve who gave you unflltered informllion ."
day Timts of London. inthe early days of the w.ir, Safer comments on one aspect of coverage: "Prior to
"none of (the! comspondcnts...were qainst the commitment of new American unlts, enemy
American in· volvement in Vietnam and they troop strength would rise; when lt wu nece1sory to
wanted the United Stales to win." Inhis view, the so- demon strate success in Washington, enemy troop
called "press mess• strength would dramatically fall."
Reporters who rumed to U.S.milibry llOW'COI for
Phillip KnlghUoy, English journalist the truth were similarly led astray. Mike McCusker,
com bat comspondent with the First Marine
Division in South Vietnam, admits:
My job essendally wu to cover things up from
tlie press, to be the PR [public relations) man and
come off with the Mllrine Corps looking like a
shining knight on a white horse. If anything WBS
coming up thll would embarrass the Marine
Corps, we were to take reporters someplace else
and make 11.re they didn't know about it
Neverth•less , critical stories did man88< to get
out. When they did, Saigon and Washington would
conspire to counter them with more favorable r<parts.
Accord· ir.J to Knighdey, pressw• on U.S. publishers
and edi· tors by Washington resulted in "• stream
of famous

206
names-Joseph Alsop, Mftl'llierite Higains, Kenneth
Oawford-lwbo) went to Vietnam and duly decided
that the wu was aoin& well and that Diem was
democncy's white hope." Halbentam also witnessed
this llllllipuladon of press coverage. He recalls,"the
Department or Defense ,.,..constantly flying in report
ers from hometown papen because they more
malleable than the resident comspondents....•
Throughout the wu, the White House laboM to
control press coverage. In 1967, a report by the Fm
dom of Wormalion Committee of the American Soci
ety of Newspaper Editon charged that President John
son "tended to manage the news to suit bis
ownpurposes rather than to inform the public."
During a 1976 national 1ymposium, pres• secretariu
from three ad ministrations admitted they had been
guilty of lying to White House reponen because they
themselves had been given false informalion by
White House staff.
Sometimes the veil of secrecy was pulled so tiaht
that not even the militaty itself knew the 11Uth of
(lelt-r1ght) David Halberstam of The New
whal was happening. General Doualas KiMlfd,who
Yorlc Times, Malcolm Browne of AP and Nell
planned the logistics fo: the Anierican-on:hestrated
Sheehan of UPIIn Vietnam, November 1963
drive into Cam bodla, stales thal he had difficulty
gettiq aerial phc.to pllpbs ol the border region.
When the photos did arrive, he learned that the land
was pock-marked with B-S2 craters from secret raids
thal had been going on for two years. Kinnard says,
"We weren't aware of it officially and, indeed, I wasn't
aware of it at all."
Well, there you have it How is one to son out the
truth from all these charges and counter-charges?
One excellmt way would be to conduct a systematic
exami nalion of whal the White House said about its
policies in Vietnam and whal tlie press reported. Was
the White House presentation accurate? Was it
reponed accu rately by the press or was it distoned?
If the White Hc., se presentation was not accurate,
did the press correct for this and give the public a
fuller and more truthful view of what was going on
in Vietnam?
To investigale this qUH!ion we will look at national
press coverage of eight major issues or events in Viet
nam, from U.S. policy before the Geneva Agmn>ent
of 19S4 to the fall of Saigon i1t 197. examples of the
Joseph Alsop receives a briefing from two high
national press we will use the nation's leading mass
ranking Manne off cers. He and other lnfluenUal
circulation news publications-The New York 71lnu,
journalists who supported U.S.policy "' Vietnam
U.S.News and World Rtpor/, Timt.and Newswetk. racelved VIP treatment dur1ng visits there.
a control for ..tiether the failings o( national
press coverage of the war were due solely to the
obstacles
;n>•.nted by Washington and Saigon or,perhaps, also

207

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208 2 1.1·
to Its own failings end bl..ses, we will compaR its
coverqe to three examples or the alternative (to the
malnstrum) press-Tiie Ntw RepMblic, the
Guardian, and a Bridsb wtekly c:a1l«I the Ntw
Staitsman.
Throupout Ibis a.pier wt will be guldtd tially
by the questions-did these publicallons eccu·
rattly repon the White House version of events In
Vietnam and did they inform the public about
findings that contndicted the White House version?
I. et us begin Inthe spring of 1954. Imagine
that on
a sunny April momi111 you hlppeMd to &lance al
your newspaper while ealing breakfast. Soe below
whal you would have read.
U.S. Policy Before
1954 Geneva Accords
Dulles leR the impression that the United
SL1tes militmy intervention in Indochina wu
neither imminent nor under active considtrallon
at Ptt•· ent.
Tht Ntw Y1Jrt Tins. April 21, 1954
United States leaders are said to be beginnlna to
f.ice up lO the need for lllllSSiVe and efrectlve
United States rnililllt)' intervention to save In·
dochina and the whole or IOUlh Asia from com
munist domination.
'111e Ntw York Times. April 23, 1954.
As these quotes rr.,m Ntw York Times
illustra1e, a readtt of the national prcu in tlie sprina
or 1954would have been confused about the
prospects for U.S. mili tary Intervention In
lndochi. lly 1954, the United Stotts WU paying
for alniosl 80 ptrttnl of the cost of France's war
aplnst the Vietminh. Despite this aid, French
forces faced dtfeai at the battle of Dienbienphu. The
French people, Iona wtary of the war, began 10
clunor ror a settleontnl. The govemontnl consented to
includin& such dilcussions In the aaenda or the fonh·
comh11lntematlonal conference al GeneVL The
Eisen hower admlnistratlon held an eontrgcncy
meeting to consider U.S. Intervention in the
conOict Air stril<ts, around lroopl, and even the
use or teclical nuclear we11pons all were
considered and finally rejected be cause orobjections
by Democratic Party leaders and the United
Kingdom.
lbt Eisenhower odministration viewed any settle·
mtnt that conceded communist control 1wer any
pan of Indochina u a "disaster.• It urged the French
riot to "sell out• westem interests at Geneva. It
usened that mllilllt)' vktory was the only guarantee
of diplomMic success and usured France or
continued rnllitary aid.
Mer the battle of Dienbienphu ended with a Vitt·
minh victory, the U.S. reviewed its stand on military
intervention. El$111hower decided not to participate In
oor sian the Geneva agreemtnt and beaan 10 mobilize
U.S.and allied forces In Southeast Asia.
What did the nlllional press report about this
policy? In the five weeks before the Geneva
Conference, Th< New York Ti111t1 published twelve
SIOries on paae one thAt did, lnde«d, auuest lh>t war
seemed ilnmlncnt . Iladlines like these annow1ced
such repor1s:
GROWING CONCERN OVER POSSIDLE U.S.
INVOLVEMENT
WIDER CONFLICT STUDIED: CHANCE OF
DIRECT INTERVENTION DISCUSSED
U.S. WEIGHS FIGHT IN INDO-CHINA, I F
NECESSARY . HIGH AID!? SAYS TROOPS MAY
Bl? SENT IF FRENOi WlllIDRAW
Ouri111 the same period , on the other hand, eighl
wtlclcs on page one or 711t' Ntw York 17tnts
presented an entirely different view or possible
U.S.intervention .
As °""headline put it, "DULLES SAVS U.S. IS
UNLIKELY TO PUT MEN IN INDOCHJNA." 1'his
story reponed tl1at Defense Stcretary Charles Wilson
und Secretmy or State John Foster Dulles hod lcR the
distinct Impression lhat no lnlervtntion by the Unll<d
StAtes •was In si&ht"or even "under active consldtra·
tion at present.•
If news COVl!l':lge or Woshinaton's plons for Inter·
vention WIS confusing, rtpo11ina or the Amerlcar )Oli·
lion at the Geneva puce talks WIS deceptive. Although
the United Sta1ts had rejected all efforts .: negotiating
• settlemtnl of tl1e war, readers or the n•tlonal
press were told just the opposite. Eleven fron• P'l&e
stori..In the Timts and odditional anicles In rim.
Newswut, and U.S.Ntws and World Rtport ttpof"
U WIS die communists wlio refused to
•1llllll
compr.m1se. As Secretary or Stale Dulles repeatedly
said, peace prospocts would improve if the
communists were less •aaaresslve in
2 u; 2011
 French soldiers at
Olanblenphu run tor cover as communist artillery pounds their positi

Apr11 HI,1954.
U.S.personnel,still
operating In a
support capacity In
Vietnam, observe
developments and
await further
orders.

210
2 !'/
spirit.• Vice Pre-ldent Nixon -quoted 111&ying th>
U.S.only cletired on "bonoroble S--·"
Incontrut, dwin& the aame Ow-week period, the
altemsllve pess reported 11..ithe United Stares bad
no Intention of neaotiatlna an end to the Wit at
GtnevL The New Statesman observed thll the
United Statts viewed a Geneva conference "with
oomethlnaI•dian relish," and hoped It would fall.
Tiit New Rtp11blic obM"'ed thal to Dulles and the
Join: Clllt(s of StalT,"a negodaled peace In
Indochina would be quite simpl,y a conununlst
vic:ol)I," and the Guardian reporled thal the
U.S. feared neaotia11oM and Intended to torpedo
the coruCl1'nce .
Inconchalon,during the nve-ks IClding up to the
Geneva Coruerence , the nllional pms did not present
a consistently ICCUnlte :inalysis of administration
Senator Richard Russell wamed the
pol· icy. On several occuioru they simpl,y Elsenl10war administration that sanding
reported the ltalements of U.S. leaders Iha! they did U.S.troops to help the FrenchInIndochina
not intend to send troops, without mentlonin& other would be "the greatest ml..taka this country
Indications thal eovemment officials really were has aver made."
conaiderina military intel'ltntion at the time. The
national press also falsely stated that, unlike the
communists, the United Stales sought a negotiated
stltlement at Geneva In contnst, the alternative press Dlscuaalon Questions
coruistently reported that Wash
ington bad 6trious resel'lalions about a nt&otiated I. What was U.S.policy inIndochina inthe five W«>ki
.a. before the Geneva Conference?
tlement at Geneva. 2. How did government leaders present this oolicy to
This was a significant period In U.S.Vietnam the pms?
policy. As the French neaotiated their witl1drawal 3. How did the national press report U.S.policy during
from the region, the United Slllttl could have followed his period?
suit, Of it could have deepened it.: involvement. It 4. How did the alternative press repon U.S. policy
chose the laner course. The consequence was twenty durina this aame period?
mOft years of war. Would the American people have
supported such a policy If they bad been fully
lnfOfmtd?

1954 The Joint Chiefs that decide against lntervenUon In Vietnam.

(from Ian) General Nathan Twining, Admiral Arthur Radford, Generals Matthew Ridgway, Lemuel Shephard, and Admiral Robert Camey.

211
Secretary ol State ')utles (right) ahown here with French ambassadorlo the U.S.. Henri Bonne
,and former President Antoine Plnuy.
U.S. Policy Toward
1956 Vietnam Elections
In the case of nations now divided against their
will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity
through free elections, superviS«I by the
United Nations to ensure that they are
conducted fairly.
Statement read by U.S.repre..,ntatlve at the
signing of the Geneva A&reement, July 21,
l9S4
I would favor genuinely free elections under
con ditions where there would be an
opponunity for the electorate to be adequately
informed as to what the issues are. At the
present time in a countJy whicb is politically
immature...we would doubt whether ...the result
...would really reOect the will of the
people....Tite United States should not stand
passively by and see the extension of
communism by any means into Southeast Asia.
Secrewy of Stale John Dulles,Press Qinfer
ence, April 11, 1954
212
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
The Geneva Accords establishe two temporary
zones in Vietnam . They were separaeed al the 17th
parallel by ademilitarized zone. The two zones were
to be reunited under one government to be elected by
all
the people by secret ballot in July 1956. Consultation
between representatives of the two zones was to be&ln
c year earlier, July 1955.
Inthejudgement of U .S.official., "the Accords were
a disaster" and actions would have to be taken for
preventing communist expansion in Vietnam. As early
as Marth 1954, American ofncials feared that free
elections would result In a communist victory at the
polls. On July 7, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles told
his Under Secretary, Bedell Smith, that elecllons in
Viet· """'would mean unificatlon under Ho Oii Minh.
After the Geneva Conference, American intelllgence
repons concluded that South Vietnan1 would be
unlikely to defeat the communists in a counll)'-wide
election. On August 20, 1954, lhl' National Security
O>uncil in Washington defined the major objectives
in Indochina as maintaining "a friendly non..:ommunill
South Viet nam• and preventing •a communist victory
through all Vietnam elections."
2 J !I
 From 1954 through 1956, the U.S. provided
more tlwt one-half billion dollan to establish South
Vietnam as 111 Independent, llQl\-COmmunlll stale.
South Viet· namese Pmnler, Nao Dinh Diem.
refused to consult with the Nor1h In July 1955; nor
would he pennlt Mlion wide elections In July 1956.
The Eisenhower odmlnJ. strlllon Rlpported these
decl1lon1. Since the U.S. llld
South Vietnam had refused to lian the Geneva
Accon!s,
they or&ued that they weno not leplly committed to
carrylna them out. Others dluaroed, pointlna out
thll
the U.S.bad formally pledaed not to disturb
implemen Wion of the agreement. In111y event, the
rejection of elections clearly meant Iha!
"reunificlllon could be achieved In the foreseeable
future only by resort to force." In 1957, the
International Control Commission concluded that
both North Vietnam and South Vietnam bad viollled
the Geneva Accords.
Tho U.S.decision to back Diem's rejection of cite·
liMs soon led to the renewal of annecl conflict In
the ountry. NeverthelHs, this critical dtci,lon wu
almost
ignored by the nallonal press. For example, we sur·
veyed papers from May IS to Auauat IS, In both
1955
llld 1956and fowid that 171e New Yori< Times
published on ii.frontpage only one article thll
pointed out that the United Stales was tryln& "to
evade and sabotage the
elections." And durln& th- same six months over
two years, the 'fimts, Newswuk, and U.S. News
and World Report publlshed a total of only 13
articles reporting American opposition to elections In
Vietnam. Most of these stories were very short and
almost all featured Washington's justificllion for its
policy; elections could not be held until the Nonh
stopped Intimidating a.nd coercing itJ citizens.
Roaden of the altemative P'<'f• were given even
less coveraae of the U.S. decisior.·not to permit all
Vlcbiam· ese elections. During the same six-month
(llTiod in
1955-56, there were only tlu..e stories about this policy
In thesejournals, all of which pointed out that the
United States wu strongly opposed to holdina
elections in Vietnam.
In tiie sumuien of 1955 111d 1956, the aovcmmerl
was not talkina very much about its opposition to the
scheduled 1956 election In Vietnam. And the press
did little lo brina this to public attention. Indtfense
of the
press,there was little to recommend this protrected
non· happening in a small, distant country as a
news event. Moreover, Vietnam did not appear lo be a
foreign policy crisis confrontinc the U.S. al the
time. Thus, less
coverage was &Ivon to Vietnam tlwlto other areas
Md l1111t1. Inretrospect, perhaps none were as
li...,ortant as whal was happenlna and nut happenlna
In Vietnam. 71it Ptnragon l'un report thal U.S.
policy pla,yed •a direct role In the breakdown of
[the) Geneva settle ment," and that "'9akdown led to
the second Indochina war.
llCUHlon QuHtlon•
I. . What was U.S.policy towatd the holding of
unifica. lion elections in Vietnam?
2 Whal did Washinaton -.yabout ii.policy regard
elections?
3. How did the national press ond the oltemllive prea
report on American policy toward elections in Viti·
nam?
4. Why was coverage so slight?
5. Do you think there are current American foreign
policies not covered very well by the national press?
Whal might some of these be llld why might they not
n\11ce the news? How can concerned clUzens find out
about them?
U.S. Involvement
in the Overthrow of
Ngo Dinh Diem
We are launched on a course from which there
Is no respectable tumlna back; the overthrow of
tire
Diem govemment. There Is no tumin& back
in part because U.S. prestige Is already
publicly committed to this end In large
me.uure llld will become niore so as facts leak
out.
Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambusador to
South Vietnam In a classified r.ic1141e to
Wash· lnaton, August 20, 1963
Now the overthrow...of the Diem regime was
a purely Vietnamese affair. We never gave
any advice. We had nothing whatever to do
with It.
Henry Cabot Loda•. June JO, 1964
213
 PrealMl>t Diem wu overthro..,. on November point for the Unit.tel Stales inVietnam. Convinced
the cnn.. oftho
I, 1961,with Diem would suffer
andcompllclcy
direct Wubin&ton .inthe
of &rievouslY thal ample, Timt,Vietnam
South In ill November
must8 i5Sue,
remain quoted Swe
anti-
"The nine-yew
tragedy soon lo drama
unfold.ofAccotdlna
the Diemloera
ThewuPentagon communist,
over andDtpert the United
r. Press Officer Rkbard Slalel •1canligniflcant
"auumecl"
Pbllllpo, cale­Pope,.., President Kmnedy knew ...iopproved of plans aoricall
a new drama bid begun inSouth Vietnlm." So W101e respon.siblllty for the new regime, beiahtenlng "our
71leNew York
overthrow Diemrepor1er,
1'inu!s
of the Malcolm
aovenunent wu aBrowne, on commitment"
major tumin& Mdmore
mlllwycoup than "our
deepening inYOlvernent
It cared .• New York
to ldrnit. TIU!
November 6, 1963. Inearly November 1963, the Kennedy administra
The Unit<d Sta!U badplll)'ed a najor role tion denied complicity in Diem's overthrow. For
Inendin& ex

Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Coneln (rear), a CIA agent who served as a HaJson with the generals who
conspired to overthrow Diem. With him are (from lelt) <>-rals Le Van Kim,Ton That Dinh,Tran Van Don,Nguyen Van Vy, and Mal Huu Xuan.

214
2.? l
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
 7'imes ttported that Wuhinaton's cutback In aid
am opn hostility to Diem _,.. slpds to the
opposition tbat It "M>uld tolerate 111 overthrow. The
1'imes allo ttported that reliable s.Jaunsowces
believed 001111 of tbe plottlna genmls privale!y
The Gulf of
sawoome key AmericM officials before tbe coup. Tonkin lncident-
Ntwrwuk oboerved Iha! Wumn,ton wu vulner
able to criticism tbat it bad eitbtt supported or al 1964
least condoned "a mllilaly revolt -aainlt 111
established gov ernment in Southeast Asia." U.S.
Ntws and World Rtporl wrote that "many officials
in Saigon feel the
United Stales invited llTllY intervention aaainst lbls new act of eagression aimed direcdy al our
Diem own forces, aaain brinp home to all of us in
when it..aboolved the milillly forces of any the United Stales the importance of the stN1&l•
complicity Inthe raids by [Diem's) special forces for peace and security In Southeast Asi11.
on Buddhist temples.• And In the "°'els of Timt, Pmldent l,yndon Johnson
"there could be no question that the United A11&ust 4, 1964
States, in policies and...presswes It brouaht ID bear
had effectively en couraged the overthrow of the Having the Maddox and the Joy there,in
view of what the South Vietnamese boats
Diem regime.•
were up to, constituted Illact of collective
The alternative press also challen&•d the
aaaression on our part.
government'sdenial of involvement in tbe coupqainst
Diem. The Ntw Rtpubllc reported that the "military Senator Wayne Mon1e, Oregon
push" in South Vietnam bad received Pres 1.dential Au&ust 2, 1964
en
It all started in a charged atmospliere of melodnun.•.
cour11ement lbe Ntw S1art11nan wrote thal "Am•ri· Suddenly, on the evening of A111ust 4, 1964, al 11:36
cnu assistance wu obvious enough to undr.:i:>e in thal event, ..tiom would you believe?
[Red
Otlna's) propaganda altliek thal this was an -' ".:Can
inspired coup." lbe Guardian 'M'Ote thatthe coup
came as no surprise to Washin&ton- In Its view,
American Ambassador to Scuth Victnun, Henry
Cabot Lodge, had plotted the coup over several
months, Including culling ofT aid for the South
Vietna111ese government's special security forces.

Dlscuaalon Questions

I. Did press accounts of the overthrow of South

Vietnamese President Diem differ from those of the
government? How?
2. Why didn't the KtMedy administrallon publicly
admit its complicity Inthe overthrow of Diem?
3. In 1963, ""ich version of Diem's overthrow
doyou
think the American people believed :the venion told
by our gove1nment or the venion reported in the
prHS?
4. Ifthe government denied complicity
inoverthrowing a foreign government tOO.y and the
press reported that the United States wu involved
p.m.,the Pmidtnt appeared on television. Ht told the
nalion thal,for the fint time since the Korean Wez, the
United States would launch a military offensive on
communist soil. At that very moment, American planes
were about to bomb gunboat bases in North Vietnam.
These ralds, the President said, were in reprisal for
torpedo-boat a:tacks &ainst Anierlcan destroyers twelve
hours earlier In the Gulf of Tonkin ofT the coast of North
Vlttlwn.
Three days later, on August 7, 1964, the Johnson
administration received a sweeping resolution from
Congress which authorized it "lo repel any 11T11ed attack
qalnst the foras of the Uni1ed States and to prevent
further aacression.•
Whal President Johll!On failed to tell the American
people on that A111ust night was that the Tonkin Gulf
incident followed slx months of clandestine military
attacks by U.S.-sponsored forces in South Vietnam
111ainst North Vietnam. Onthe night before the alleged
attack on the Maddox, Sou.Ii Vietnamese pott"I forcos
had launched a midnight rdtack,including an amphibl·
ous commando raid, on Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands off
thecosst of North Vietnam. At the time,the Maddox wss
operaling within the 12 milt territorial limit clahned by
North Vietnam and recognized by the

21!'i
United Stales. The Maddox fired fml and suslained no dech:.nuion of war. ThUJ, !he evidence seems
strong damage. Iha! lhc finl anack was provoked by the U .S. and
the
The second reported altack on the Maddox and the alleged eecond atllek never took place.
Turner Joy almost certainly never took pl1ee. Appar- The Tonkin Gulf Incident wu a 1111,jor turnina point
ently, an Inexperienced sonarman, alarmed by the flnt for American involvement In Vietnam. Tht
Pentagon en&113tmtnt, interpreted bis own ship'ssounds as those J>aptrs concludes: "After Tonkin Gulf
the policy obJec· of hostile torpedoes. Captain John Herrick, Com- I live of gradual disengagement
from Vietnam was no
mandtr of the Tonkin Gulf patrol, had signaled the longer relevant....The iuue for the futtn would no
Pentagon that there were "no ICtUal sightings by Mad· longer be withdrawals, but what additional United
dox•..• James Stockdale, a Navy carrier pilot circling Stales forces would be required to stem the tide
above, said Iha!, because it was so dark below, he had how fast they would have to be thrown inlo the
brelCh." very good vision. Stockdale says, "!he wake [of an How did the national press repon this aitical
event? attacking boat) would have been luminous. The rico- UnfortwWely, it gave extensive coV«qe to the
lnlCcu
cbet would have been sparklin1,the IW!fi.re would have raJe version of events promoted by the aovernment.
been red and briabt• Stockdale searched in vain for any Repeatedly in 1964readers of 11it New York rimes
and signs of North Vietnamese attack bolls. When hf helll'd the three leading news wetkllts read of two
"unpro
lhe next day Iha! retallaJlon hadbeen ordered, Stockdale voked attacks" by !he communists on American
de reflccted: stroyers lawfully petrolllna in international waters.
For
Well, I sat there on the edge of the bed reallzing example, in the week following the first Tonkin Gui!
that I was one of the few people Inthe world encounter, the Times published fifteen stories on Its
who were aoin& to launch a war under false front page alone, all presentlng the admlnlstratlon's
pretenses. account of ..tlll happened.nie headline on August 3
And so sureenouah the next day we did. I led told of the initial communist attack: RED PT
this BOATS FIRE AT US DESTROYERS ON
bia horde of airphnes over there and we blew tl1• VIETNAM DUTY.
oil tanks clear off the map.
The story that followed was based on informal:' •n
Commentin1on the Incident some months loter, provided by military ooun:es. Two dl\ys later, a
Pre1ident Johnson remarked with a grin, "For all I Timt.f headline told of the second altack: US
know, our Navy wu shooting at whalts out there." It Pl.ANES AT TACK NORTH VIETNAM BASES;
was, however, just the kind of incldenl that Johnson PRESIDENT ORDERS LIMITED RETALIATION
r..:eded 'o rally congressional support for a AfTER COM MUNIST PT BOATS RENl .W
resolution his staff and he octually hod prepared RAIDS. Once again,
many months before, a resolution they considered the Defense Department provided lhe delails for the
tht equivalent of a

Captain John Herrick

Photograph takenlrom the U.S.S Maddox ol a North Vietnamese PT

boat In the Tonkin Gul .

216
•nsulna stoiy. 1be Timts announced lhat North of its repor1ers wrote lhat "the lnciclentt in Vietnam do
Viet· nun PT boats bad made a "doUbtrat• attock"
on two American destroyers palmlllns lntonllllonal
waters In the Tonkin Gulf. 1be attack wu made at
10:30 a.m. Washington time by M"undetermined
oumbtr of North Vietnamese PT boats.•
Timt, In its August 14, 1964 issue, headlined
acrou itsfront cover: TI-IE US STAND IN ASIA.
1beweekly reported tl..i on Auaust 2, the Maddox
was forced to fire her &IW II the comnrunist
attackers '"1o kept closina in unher. lbenon August 4,
7'ime dnunatically described lite second attack, an
event which eye witnesses claimed never occumd:
"The night glowed eerily with Lbe nightmarish
&lare of air-<ltoppod flares and boat ..an:h· lights.
For throe hours the small (bo.lls) auackod in pass
after p:111. Ton (communist) torpedoes sluled throuah
the waters....Gwtli1't and gun smells and shots stung
the uir....• Newsweek und U.S. Ntws and World
Report publiohed similar stories. It was Important
and dramatic news. However, it was not tme.
The altemallve press provided a sharpcontnut to
the govomnient and national press accounts of the
Gulf of Tonkin Incident. In August 1964, both the
Guardian and the New Statesman questioned the
government's version of events. As a result, their
readers learned important information Ignored by the
natio'181 press.
The Guardian published five major a11icles on
this subject. 1beradical weekly wondered If the
August 2 "skirmish" had been provoked bytlte
United States, and if the August 4 incident had
even taken place. It observed that tho first incident
occurred near two North Vietnamese islands that
had been shelled 48 hours earllor. It also noted that
the Maddox had been witl1in the 12-mile terrltorlal
limit claimed by North Viettwn. Perhaps, the
G11ardian proposed, the communists bt· lieved the
U.S. destroyer was coMect..d to the earlier raids
against its territory.
As for the .econdattack, the G11ardian wrote that
this alleged encounter took place in tho middle of a
pitch black, storm)' night and, according to the
Pentagon, at no point did the two United States
destroye"' identify tlte opposing craft. Also, the
Guardian asked, if tht two United Stales destroyers
were under continuous tor· pedo attack for tluw
hours, why were there no CaJual· ties7
The Ntw Sta1<sma11 also challenged the
adrninistration's version of events at Tonkin Gulf.
One
not seem quite a1 1lmple as the Initial headlines lndi·
clled....Tberc is...llttle tl\lst in official accounts about
Vietnam...and a climate of intrlaue...foa• the entire
episode.• Both the New Statesman and especially the
G11ardian gave extensive coveraae to Information pro
vided by Senator Wne Morse, the leading congres·
sional critic of U.S. policy. They also provided !II:·
counts by communist as well a1 non-communist
spokesporsor. ,accounLs which proved to be more acc:u·
rale than that offered by the Johnson administration .
The U.S government's account of events in the
Tonkin Gulf contained "the fatal taint of deception."
The • nal press only reported the White House
versl .. It did not point out inconsi•tenciu in this
account, nor present Oilier perspectives . In contr:ISI,
news covoraae wao much more accurate in the
altema tlve press.
In reliectlng on national press coveraae of this criti
cal Incident, Edwin E. Moise has proposed that it
followed two rules: (I) the press should support our
boys-support and praise the actions of the U.S. Mili
tary; and (2) never accuse any United SLatos Govern·
ment spokesman of making an Incorrect statement,
even If you notice lhat he has done so.
Public opinion polls Laken after the Tonkin Gulf
Incident revt•led widespread support for President
Johnson's handlina of the crisis. Would the public
opinion polls have been different had the aovernmcnt
or the national press told tl>e American people the
com· plete story7
Dl1cu11 on Oueallons
I. What were the clrcumsLances surrounding the al
leged attacks In the Gulf of Tonkin?
2. How did the Johnson administration present the
events?
), Were there differences i11 coverage of the
Tonkin Gulf Incident by the national press and the
alternative press7 What were they7
4. If, in 1964, you had rv.d about the Tonkin Gulf
Incident in Tire Ntw York Times and in the radicol
G11ardian, which version, if any, would you have
be· lieved7 Would you have been confused? If a
majority of Americans had '""d about the Tonkin
Gulf crisis ui the altenralive press, do you think tl1cy
would have supPOrted tlteir aovemment's policy?
2: . 217
 3. SuppolC the public had been lnfonnecl by the media
about the Johnson admlnlstrallon '• reluctance
loneao tlate a peaceful 1Cttlememof the war in 1965-
U.S. Polley 66. Whal do you think mlaht have happened, It
anythins?
Toward 4. Doyou -any simllarilY between press C:OVCf'I&•
Negotiations of this topic and of U.S. suppon for Diem's refusal
to permit the nationwide unification elections In
1956? Explain.

AJ revealed in The Pe111ago11 Papers and In the

wrilina1 of Important diplomata, foreign leaders, and
reponers, the only sotUement of the war the United
States wu willin1 to accept for years required the Television Coverage
withdrawal of North Vietnameoe troopo from the South
llldthe end of what it called Nonh Vietname1e of the Tet Offensive
aasre•·
sion. Given that concession,the U.S. said it would
halt its bombing llldbegin to discuss conununlst
A major htmlng point Inthe Vieblam War took
participa tion in the government of Soulh Vietnam.
From the point of view of tho communl1t1, place in late January llldearly February 1968. At that
time, Hanoi sent 84,000 ttoops into Saigon, Hue,Md
however, this 1Unounted to surrender.
Durina this period Washington was unwilllng to
a dozen other cities In the south. A I9 man team of
communist auerrlllu penetrated the U.S. Embusy
even discuss the future political composiUon of the
compound In Saison. However, North Vietnam did
aovemment of SelBOn because It saw the leaders of
not achieve Its
South Vietnam u too weak politically to compete
mlllwy objectives Inthe Tet offensive. Local citizens
with the conununllts for popular suppon. Throuahout
1964-
67, decision makers In Wuhlnaton preferTed to con·
In the liOuth did notjoin Inan uprilina aaainst the
Sataon tinue military presaure on Nonh Vleblarn rather than
open peaceful ne1otia1ion1. For example, In!ale nego tiations during U1is period? Do you agree
1964 1111d early 1965,Washington rejected effons by U witl1 this po$ltlon? Explain.
Thant, S<'Cretary General of the UN, to Initiate 2. How was this topic covered In the national
peace talk¥ between the United State• and Nor1h
Vietnam. press? 2111
In December 1966, effons by Polish officials lo
encouraae talks between tbe two sides collapsed when
the U.S. initiated bombln& of Vietnam. There is
some question M to wheU1tr Hanoi would have been
willlna lo cornprornlse Ineither of these proposed
neaotiRllons. What Is clear, however, is that It was
action• by the Johnson administration lhllt scuttled
the peace effons. Never1heless, during this period,
the Johnson admini
stration publicly presented a position of compromise,
claiming that it was only the communists who refused
to ne901i11e. While the communists cenainly had
demands of their own, it also Is quite clear that the
Johnson administration hnd not given up on its dttam
of ntllitary victory and was not ready to sit down at
the lwgalnlng table. This story, however, was not
fearured in Ute nntlonal press.

Dl1cu11lon Question•
I. Why was the United States opposed to peace
During Te ,the Great Seal of the United
Stales was blasted ott the wall of the U.S.
Embassy.

.,,..
I J
2

government. Observers agree that the Vietcona suf
fered devRStatin& losses in the stnJ&Ble. U.S.
troops cleared out Hue within three w...ks and, by
the follow ina w...k, the pttssure eased on Khe Salm.
At the same time, the Tet offensiw has been seen
by many o*rvers as "a smashing psycholoaical
victory for the enell1)'•...• and "a brilliant political
victory for them here in the United Swes.• ln the
words of Secrewy of Swe Rusk, "it became very
clear efter the l'et offensive that many people at the
arassroot.s...finally came to the conclusion that if we
could not tell them when tllis ""'was going to
end..•thal we miaht as well chuck it.•
Widely respected CBS anchonnan, Walter Cronkite,
told his viewers, "It seems now more certain than ever
that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a
slalenlalc." The only rational w:iy out, he sugested, is
to negotiate, not as victors but as honorable men
who
did the best they could. Within ,_ks of Tet,
President
Johnson rejected General WeSlmoreland's request for
206,000 additional troops and replaced Westmoreland
as U.S.Commander in Vietnam with General
O.ighton Abrams. Eugene McCarthy and Robert
Kennedy en·
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
Gene•al Nguye-.1
Ngoc Loan executes
·:;p 11 VC suspect durtng
the Teloffensive .
· ·The photo by
AP
photl)grapher Eddie
IAdams shocked the
,wortd and eamed a
Pulitzer Prize In
111611.
tered the Democratic presidential race as peace candi
dates, and Jotin.on announced he would not run for
re election.
Many hawksblamed the prtSS for misrepresenting a
grea1 American victory asadefear. The news modi• was
a. cused of engaging In disaster-type reporting by em·
phasizing the boldness of the enemy's swprise attack
while ignoring its military defeat. Hawks also cont·
plained about the images of violence, like the famous
photo of .uuanary execution of a V.C. susp>CI by the
Saigon Chief of Police.
Certainly coverage ofTet was different. Because the
offensive was unexpected and took place in Saigon
where reporters and camera crews were stationed, the
American ntllitary was unable to control pttss move
ments. Correspondenls rushed Wtedited phC't !
rl4!! back to the U.S. and "network producers in
control rooms in New York hadneither the time nor the
oppor tunity to shield American viewers from the grisly
close ups of wounded Americans, body bags, a;td
death."
Peter Braestrup concludes: "Tet's peculiar circum
stances-surprise, melodrama unprecedented in the
war, White House ambiguity -impacted to a rare
de-
2;:ti
219
gree on the peculiar habits, susceptibilities, t'IMpoW<1 especially shocking lo the American people. limitations, and technological conslrlints of newspa·Acco
Some doves sugaesttd that the Tet offen•ive Wiii' u •vln<ling clown. Vietnamizalion wu said lo be a
chanaed public opinion so clrwnatically, not beause of mWt1r:1•ucceu. American troops wel'f' said to be
biased press c:oveniae, but Ironically, btcause it contra· withdraw'.ng while the govetnme.11was neaotialing a

dlcted the l1'W'IY years of uncritical preu 1eports of setllermnt. Yet the war would continue for four more
ove- ly optlmhtlc predlctions by U.S. le.den. In the months years, more
leadingthan 20,000
up to American
Tet, the Johnsonsoldiers would dle,
..Sministrllion repuledly uswed the peop!e that we were nurina a
vidory in the war, that there•r...-: ;:i.t al the end of the and the airInwar
tunnel." over ,..ns
December of Indochina
196i. acrually would
General Westmoreland scunclcd this theme in a wel -1111blic:ized addRss.
Accordina lo Noam Otornslcy, news coverage was escalate.
biased, but in favor of the Johnson adminlstnlion; It "accept[ed) uncritically the framework of government propaaanda" ralher than risk appearing lo undmnlne
Dlacuulon QuHtlon1
I. Why was news covera&e of the Tet offensive so controversial ?
2. Whal did hawks say about news coveroge and the
public impact of the Tet ofTonslve? Whal dld doves say?
3. Whal imp9ct, if any, doyou thlnlt television coverace of the Tet offensive war mlabt have b..s on pub

Durtng Te , the worst lghUng was concentrated In the Cholon dl trict on the edge o1Saigon. This
aerialphoto shows the devastoUon.

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