NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION &FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:

1. The Establishment Clause

2. The Free Exercise Clause (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

Concept and basis

1. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can it
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another, neither can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa (Everson v. Board of Education, 30 US 1).

2. It is rooted in the separation of Church and State (Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C; Sec.
5(2), Sec. 29(2) Art. VI).

3. The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws
and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against
immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs.
When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular.
Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose. In the same way,
this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain
neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When
laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to
overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its
part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights. There is the danger of
"compelled religion" and, therefore, of negating the very idea of freedom of belief
and non- establishment of religion when religious morality is incorporated in
government regulations and policies. (Perfecto vs. Esidera, A.M. NO. RTJ-15-
2417, July 22, 2015)

4. Accorded Preferred Status

Freedom of religion is accorded preferred status by the framers of our

fundamental law. And the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good. (Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-
4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and

liberty and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights,
therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only
to the smallest extent necessary. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. NO. P-02-1651, June
22, 2006)
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Concept

The establishment clause principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups.

Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014)

Basis

In Philippine jurisdiction, there is substantial agreement on the values sought to

be protected by the Establishment Clause, namely, voluntarism and insulation of
the political process from interfaith dissension:

1. Voluntarism
Voluntarism, has both a personal and a social dimension. As a personal value, it
refers to the inviolability of the human conscience which is also protected by the
free exercise clause. From the religious perspective, religion requires voluntarism
because compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled religion is a
contradiction in terms.

As a social value, it means that the growth of a religious sect as a social force
must come from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that
both spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete
on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage.

2. Insulation of the Political Process From Interfaith Dissension

Such voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from
religion and unless religion is insulated from politics. Non- establishment thus
calls for government neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and
avoid breeding interfaith dissension. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. NO. P-02-1651,
June 22, 2006)

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Concept

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (Re:
Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Freedom to believe

Absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter.
He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his
inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what
they cannot prove." Everyone has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to
account because he cannot prove what he believes. (Re: Letter of Tony
Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
 Freedom to act on one's beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect
the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As
great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in
the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.
It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police
power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. (Re:
Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Purpose

The Free Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual religious

convictions and beliefs and proscribes government from questioning a person's
beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities based solely on those beliefs. The
Clause extends protection to both beliefs and unbelief. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M.
NO. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)

However, a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily

invalid as one interfering with the free exercise of religion merely because it also
has an incidental and detrimental effect on the same. (Centeno v. Villalon-
Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, Sept. 1, 1994)

Distinction between the clauses (School District v. Schempp, 374 US 203)

The non-establishment clause does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion. It is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing
individuals or not. The test of compliance with the non-establishment clause can
be stated as follows: What are the purposes and primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, the law violates the non-
establishment clause. Thus, in order for a law to comply with the non-
establishment clause, two requisites must be met. First, it has a secular
legislative purpose. Second, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits
religion.

The free exercise of religion clause withdraws from legislative power the
exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. In order to show a
violation of this clause, the person affected must show the coercive effect of the
legislation as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. While the
freedom to believe (non-establishment) is absolute, the moment such belief flows
over into action, it becomes subject to government regulation.

Requisites for government aid to be allowable:

1) It must have a secular legislative purpose;

2) It must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;
3) It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient
institutions.

Tilton vs. Richardson & Lemon vs. Kurtzman

Non establishment of religion and Free Exercise of Religion Clause

 Permitting federal aid for construction of secular buildings at church-sponsored
colleges and universities, finding that the Act did not violate the religious
clauses.

Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause

Benevolent neutrality doctrine

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into
account…to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-
02-1651, June 22, 2006)."

NOTE: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in

the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government
practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions. Among
these are the inscription of "In God We Trust" on American currency; the
recognition of America as "one nation under God" in the official pledge of
allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral
argument with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court"; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a
chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives
in prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological
viewpoint—the existence of and potential for intervention by a god—over the
contrary theological viewpoint of atheism (Ibid)

Acts permitted

1. Tax exemption on property actually, directly and exclusively used for religious
purposes (Art. VI, Sec. 28 [3]);

2. Religious instruction in public schools (Art. XIV, Sec. 4[2]):

Requisites:

a. At the option of parents/guardians expressed in

writing;

b. Within the regular class hours by instructors

designated or approved by religious authorities of
the religion to which the children belong;
c. Without additional costs to the government;

3. Financial support for priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary assigned to the armed
forces, penal institution or government orphanage or leprosarium (Art. VI, Sec. 29
[2]);

4. Government sponsorship of town fiestas, some purely religious traditions have

now been considered as having acquired secular character (Garces vs. Estenzo,
104 SCRA 510); and
 5. Postage stamps depicting Philippines as the venue of a significant religious event–
benefit to the religious sect involved was merely incidental (Agliay v. Ruiz, 64
Phil. 201).

6. Book lending program for students in parochial schools because of the benefit to
parents and students (Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236).

7. Display of crèche in a secular setting which depicts the origin of the holiday
(Lynch v Donely, 465 U.S. 668).

8. Financial support for secular academic facilities (i.e. library and science center) in
parochial schools – has secular use (Tilton vs. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672).

9. Exemption from zoning requirements to accommodate unique architectural

features of religious buildings i.e. Mormon’s tall pointed steeple (Martin vs.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 434 Mass. 141).

10. Ecclesiastical Affair. It is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of
the church, or the adoption and enforcement within religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such association those deemed not worthy of
membership (Austria v. NLRC and Central Philippine Union of Seventh Day
Adventist, GR 124382). It involves the relationship between the church and its
members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation to which the state cannot meddle.

Where civil rights depend upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs,
the civil tribunal tries the civil rights and nothing more (Gonzales v. Archbishop,
51 Phil. 420; Fonacier v. Court Appeals, 96 Phil. 417).

Acts not permitted

1. Religious instruction in public schools (Art. XIV, Sec. 4[2]):

2. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools (Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421;
Abington School District v. Schema 374
3. U.S. 203)

4. Financial subsidy for parochial schools

5. (Lemon vs. Kurtzman,403 U.S. 602)

6. Religious displays in public spaces: Display of granite monument of 10

commandments in front of a courthouse is unconstitutional for being
unmistakably non-secular (Glass Roth vs. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11thCir. 2003).

7. Mandatory religious subjects or prohibition of secular subjects (evolution) in

schools (Epperson vs. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97).

8. Word “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance: religious vs. atheist students (Endow vs.
US, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).

9. Governmental reliance on religious justification and using the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad which advances the right of the
LGBT is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality and grave violation of the non-
establishment clause (Ang Ladled LGBT party v. COMELEC, GR 190582,
10. and April 8, 2010).
 NOTE: How does one tell whether a case is a free exercise case or a non-
establishment case? One simple guide: every violation of the free exercise clause
involves compulsion whereas a violation of the non-establishment clause need not
involve compulsion (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer).

Free exercise clause

Dual Aspect of Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship:

1. Freedom to Believe – absolute as long as the belief is confined within the

realm of thought (see Nuchara, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 Ed.,
p. 162; Bernas The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer); and

2. Freedom to Act on One’s Belief – subject to regulation where the belief is

translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (Ibid).
Non-Establishment
LEMON TEST
Is a test to determine
whether an act of the
government violates the
non-establishment clause.
1. Have a secular
purpose;
2. Not promote or
favor any set of
religious beliefs or
religion
generally; and
3. Not get the
government too closely
involved (“entangled”)
with religion.
Free – Exercise Clause
COMPELLING STATE CLEAR AND PRESENT
INTEREST TEST DANGER TEST
is the test used to determine if circumstance and of such nature
the interests of the State are as to create a clear and present
compelling enough to justify danger that will bring about
infringement of religious substantive evil that state has
freedom. right to prevent.
REQUISITES
1. Has the statute or 1. Whether the words are used
government action created a in such circumstances and
burden on the free exercise are of such a nature as to
of religion? create a clear and present
danger that they will bring
2. Is there a sufficiently about the
compelling state interestto substantive evils that Congress
justify this infringement of has a right to prevent. It is a
religious liberty? question of proximity and
degree
3. Has the State in achieving its
legitimate purposes used the 2. The danger created must not
least intrusive means possible so only be clear and present but
that the free exercise is not also traceable to the ideas
infringed any more expressed.
than necessary to
achieve the
legitimate goal of the State?

TESTS USED IN ASCERTAINING THE LIMITS OF THE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM
 1. Clear and Present Danger Test
Appropriate for religious speech cases. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. NO. P-02-1651,
June 22, 2006)

The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints
of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957)

2. Benevolent Neutrality - Compelling State Interest Test

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching.

Compelling State Interest Test From a Benevolent Neutrality Stance

A three-step process is followed in weighing the state's interest and religious

freedom when these collide: (BSCL)

1) Has the statute or government action created a Burden on the

free exercise of religion? The courts often look into the
Sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the
truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
inquiring about its truth.

2) Is there a sufficiently Compelling state interest to justify this

infringement of religious liberty?

3) Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the Least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state?

In the above circumstances, the State undertakes the burden of presenting

evidence of its compelling interest to override respondent's religious belief.
Further, the State has to show that the means it has adopted in pursuing the said
interest is the least restrictive to means to a person's exercise of religious freedom.
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. NO. P- 02-1651, June 22, 2006)

3. Conscientious Objector Test

A person who for moral or religious reasons is opposed to participating in any
war, and who may be excused from military conscription but remains subject to
service in civil work for the nation's health, safety or interest. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 9th ed.)

RELATED CASES:

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals- Under the non-establishment clause of

freedom of religion, when it comes to religious differences, the State enjoys no
banquet of options – neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. It is not
its task to defend one religion against an attack by another religion. After all, the
remedy against bad theology is better theology. Let them duel in the market place
of ideas. The marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more
speech, for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can
fan the embers of truth.

Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, 618

SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo) The decision of the COMELEC
not to allow the Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party to participate in party-list elections
because its members are “immoral,” citing verses from the Bible and the Koran,
was ruled by the SC to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion and, therefore,
nullified, as it violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion. In
effect, the COMELEC used religious standard in its decision by using verses from
the Bible and the Koran. The COMELEC, as a government agency, is not
supposed to be guided by religious standards in its decisions and actions.

Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-165, August 4, 2003- The State could not
penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest
in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based
on her right to freedom of religion.

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS

RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 313.- To disallow the holding
of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and
commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a
courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of
Muslims from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all
be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The exception of members of
Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor
of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the
flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we insist on strict
separation.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend
non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates
an unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess
their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is emphatic in saying that
"the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be
 without discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance
would just be mere lip service.

RENATO V. PERALTA vs. PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION

(PHILPOST), G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018-Benevolent neutrality
recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence
of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must
pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might
adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious
exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the
wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral
purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of
accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability
that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent

neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean
that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious
beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can
within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply
dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question
offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by
the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation
granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an
exception when the religion clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a
doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in
determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state
interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest,
the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause
jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its
merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional
history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the
launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause
cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of
religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small-not only for a majority,
however large-but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. xxx

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not
inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious
character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a
religious procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that
a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political
assemblage.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TEST

1. A conscientious objector (CO) is an "individual who has claimed the right to

refuse to perform military service” on the grounds of freedom of thought,
conscience, and/or religion ("International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
See Article 18". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights. Retrieved April 1, 2014).
2. The United State Supreme Court held that the test of religious belief within the
meaning of the exemption in the Universal Military Training and Service Act –
Section 6(j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of their "religious
training and belief," i.e., belief in an individual's relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties beyond a human relationship but not essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code – is whether
it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption.

a. The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal
moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially
political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief.
There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not
deal with that question. This test accords with long established legislative policy
of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is based on
religious beliefs [United States v.Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)].

James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819,
April 8, 2014, En Banc (Mendoza) Sections 7, 23 and 24 commonly mandate
that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking
health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant
an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment
of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious
objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his
will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of

individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the
birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.

Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with

the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 -

members of Jehovah’s witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag
ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of
their religious beliefs.

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 – Freedom of religion does not
prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost
of registration.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405
SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because
the standards are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office
of the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O.
No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced
Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that “[n]o law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad.
The Court held that moral disapproval “is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party list system.”
Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the
political process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. As such,
laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they
deserve to participate in the party list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a
transgression of Ang Ladlad’s fundamental right of freedom of expression since,
by reason of the COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot meddle

following the Separation of Church and State Doctrine?

An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship

of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such associations those deemed not worthy of
membership.” Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete,
examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle
are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance. (Pastor Dionisio V. Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16,
1999, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is
a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.