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HOTHYyOGIA
The Illustrated History of
the Russo-Japanese War
John Westwood
he Russo-Japanese war was the
first great war of the twentieth
century. At the time it aroused
enormous interest. Not only was
it a dramatic David and Goliath
confrontation, ‘the Russian colossus’ ver-
sus ‘Jap the Giant Killer’, it was also a
conflict on a huge scale, fought over
extensive areas of land and sea, by large
modern armies and navies. It anticipated
in many ways the shape of things to
come: trench warfare, massive armies
inflicting and incurring huge casualties,
and the effectiveness of the machine
gun. Its most decisive battle, Tsushima
called at the time the ‘Trafalgar of the
East’ was, with the exception of Jutland,
the biggest battleship confrontation of
the century. The name Port Arthur
became world famous, first because of
the Japanese surprise attack at the war’s
outset which anticipated Pearl Harbor
and secondly because of its gallant
defence by the Russians.

The book is lavishly illustrated with

remarkable contemporary photo-
graphs, providing both the atmosphere
and reality of this conflict. The book also
includes two long extracts from eye-
witness accounts by both a Russian
soldier and a sailor, translated by the
author.

There are over 100 illustrations

952.051
Wes

Westwood, John N.

LLLUSTRATED HISTORY OF RUSSO _ JAPANESE

R

a —

| ';
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/illustratedhistoO000unse_hOnO
 The Illustrated History of the
RUSSO-
JAPANESE WAR
J.N. Westwood

Left: A foretaste of World

War I: the new weapons of

Saas
mass destruction used in the
Russo-Japanese War demanded
colossal sacrifices of life. Here
two Russian infantrymen guard
the bodies of their comrades,
killed in one of the battles at
Port Arthur

Overleaf: A Japanese 11-inch

howitzer battery in action HENRY REGNERY COMPANY >
against the Port Arthur defences Chicago
 Contents
REHEARSAL FOR PEARL HARBOR?
THE CAUSES
THE ADVERSARIES
THE FIRST BLOWS
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
THE WAR AT SEA
THE RUSSIANS HIT BACK
THE GREAT SIEGE
EYEWITNESS: IN THE TRENCHES (0) iO):
ARTHUR
THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN
TSUSHIMA: TRAFALGAR OF THE EAST
CP
DHNAS
HOIANHRwW
&y).
= EYEWITNESS: TSUSHIMA
+ 2? THE END

SBN: 0-8092-1150-6
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-15042
Printed in Great Britain
(OeyongglesotaOMe (oly Monies (e(-ays(el ae-teve| Jackson
All rights reserved.
Published 1974 by Henry Regnery Company,
bh AYLx OUb
boo)(opm ©)obCor-t
Lore UNEboo) imofolopCo)
Be

stains
REHEARSAL

Px
FOR PEARL
‘At about midnight everybody was surprised by the squadron Previous pages: The hole below
the waterline of the cruiser
opening fire. It appeared that this was night target practice, Pallada, made by a Japanese
and it soon ceased. But after half an hour the firing was torpedo in the night attack at
resumed and this time it was irregular and ragged. But all Port Arthur
the same we thought that it was the target practice still con-
tinuing. Soon afterwards all the troops were summoned by the
alarm signal to the line of fortifications... .’
It was not until some hours later that this diarist in the
Russian naval base at Port Arthur discovered that what he
and his friends had believed to be target practice was in fact a
surprise attack by the Japanese navy against the Russian
Far East Squadron. Not far from Port Arthur on 8 February
1904 five flotillas of destroyers had been detached from the Below: An impression of the
surprise attack on Port Arthur,
Japanese fleet. Their task, at best, was to win the still-un- painted by a Japanese armchair
declared war against Russia at one stroke; at worst, to so war artist
Above: The three-funnelled
Retvizan was repaired after the
surprise attack. But in
December 1904, with her
Liao
consorts, she was sent to the Vladivostok
shallow bottom of Port Arthur
harbour by Japanese shellfire

Mukden

Liaoyang
Yinkou Tashihchiao av

Telissue
v
AeDalny
~Port Arthur

KOREA e
Kiauchau

es JAI

oN s Ptsushing Ar
SEA <F ; S

Lp, Saseb
Right: The theatre of war
ye
 damage the Russian squadron that it would be in no condition
to risk an engagement with the Japanese battle fleet.
The Russian squadron was at anchor outside its base at
Port Arthur. Its gunners were sleeping by their guns, and two
destroyers patrolled the approaches, aided by searchlights
from the cruisers. But no other precautions had been taken;
despite tension with Japan, Russia was still at peace. In fact
the admiral’s wife was holding a ball that evening. Earlier in
the evening the approaching Japanese flotillas had divided,
two flotillas being sent to the nearby Russian commercial port
of Dalny to attack Russian ships there (in fact, Dalny was
empty). The other three flotillas continued towards Port
Arthur. At about 22.30 they sighted the lights of the patrolling
Russian destroyers, which they succeeded in evading, but
during this manoeuvre two of the Japanese destroyers collided
and the flotillas lost contact with each other. The first flotilla
continued on its course and soon sighted the flashes of a
lighthouse, by which it was able to fix its position. Then,
having seen the Russian searchlights sweeping the water, the
flotilla reduced speed and approached quietly. It was then
about twenty minutes after midnight; the moon had not yet
risen and the sea reflected only the rays of the searchlights.
Still unobserved, the Japanese sailors could make out in this
obscurity the indistinct forms of several large ships. It was at
this point that the commander of the first flotilla gave the order
to attack; his first destroyer moved in close and at 00.28
launched a torpedo against a three-funnelled Russian ship and
then another against a two-funnelled vessel. As it retired at full
speed the crew heard the sound of explosions. The second
destroyer, following in the wake of the first, fired a torpedo at
the Retvizan and then made off rapidly. At this point, according
to the Japanese report,

the enemy seemed to take notice of our attack. Suddenly

Left: Port Arthur at the
beginning of the war. In the
background, overlooking the
sea, is Golden Hill with its fort
and shore batteries
there was an uproar on all his ships, guns began to thunder,
and a large number of shells began to fall in the vicinity
of our destroyers. No. 3, Kasumi, was illuminated by
the enemy searchlights, but as it was not damaged by the
firing it took the opportunity of attacking a ship with two
masts and three funnels, Pallada class. It saw a column of
water and smoke rise up from the side of this ship. Amid
shells, it retired at high speed towards the south. Its com-
panion at the rear, the Akatsuki, after having several times
been caught by searchlights, approached from the port side.
At 00.23 it went west and attacked the Retvizan and then,
continuing in the same direction, launched a second torpedo
at a ship with two masts and three funnels; it saw the
explosion of its torpedo and under a hail of projectiles made
off at full speed towards the south. ...

13
 Left: The forward gun turret
and bridge of the armoured
cruiser Asama, which took part
in the action off Port Arthur
on 9 February 1904

Right: The Tsesarevich

torpedoed at Port Arthur. In
reality, the Japanese torpedo
boats did not approach as
close as the artist depicted

The two other Japanese flotillas, several of whose ships

had lost contact with each other after the collision between two
of them, were less successful. They arrived too late to benefit
from the surprise factor, and made their attacks individually
rather than by flotillas. Comparing the Japanese reports with
the damage actually inflicted on the Russian ships, it would
seem that it was the first flotilla, in the first five minutes of the
attack, which caused all the damage. When the second and third
flotillas made their attack the Russians were wide awake, and
their searchlights and gunfire made close range and accurate
torpedo firing impossible. The last attack was made by the
Oboro towards 02.00. This ship had been damaged in the colli-
sion and reached the scene an hour after her consorts, when the
firing had long ceased. However, the Oboro was soon spotted
and her attack produced no results.
Right: The damaged
Thus as things turned out, despite the cover of night, Tsesarevich is brought into
despite a target clearly visible, unsuspecting, and at anchor, harbour after the attack

14
 “ily,
ca
LG
to”
Previous pages: In material
terms, the surprise attack on
Port Arthur produced meagre
results. But of the ships which
escaped that night only a
handful of destroyers survived
the war. Indeed most of the
survivors were later sunk in
Port Arthur harbour. This
picture shows the cruiser
Pallada and a battleship sunk
by artillery fire in December
1904
Left: The battleship Peresviet
was untouched in the surprise
attack on Port Arthur, but
finally came to grief in
December 1904. This photo-
graph shows her foredeck as it
was in January 1905, wrecked
by Japanese shells
in short, despite ideal conditions for a torpedo attack, the
results were relatively meagre. Evidently the torpedo was not
quite the devastating weapon which had been anticipated. Of
the sixteen torpedoes fired that night, all but three either
missed or failed to explode. But luck was against the Russians
in so far as two of those three torpedoes hit the newest battle-
ships. These (Retvizan and Tsesarevich) were put out of action
for weeks, as was the cruiser Pallada. The Russian diarist
continued:
Tsesarevich was damaged amidships and took a list, but
she floated at high water and could be taken in to the
western basin. It is sad to see this beauty, the pride of our
fleet, standing helpless and heeling. Retvizan is damaged at
the stern and stands at the exit of the basin with her stern
under water. There is less damage on Pallada but neverthe-
less apparently the torpedo explosion here hurt more people.
In the morning after the attack four unexploded torpedoes
were fished out of the water. It is terribly painful how easily
the Japanese have succeeded in significantly weakening our
fleet. Although it is said that the Japanese lost three out of
their four torpedo boats, our sailors themselves are more
inclined to think that they all escaped unpunished. This
misfortune has happened mainly thanks to our habit of
concealing facts from each other. The recall of the Japanese
ambassador was known at Port Arthur yesterday morning,
but nobody had been told. Nobody believed in the possibility
of a Japanese attack....
The result of this attack was that Russian battleship
superiority in the Far East was, temporarily at least, eliminated.
Nevertheless, when next morning the Japanese admiral, Togo,
learned the results of the attack, he must have been a dis-
appointed man. Instead of inflicting a disaster on the Russians,
he had merely, it seemed, inflicted a reverse. But in retrospect
it would seem that this surprise attack really did win the
war for the Japanese. The Russians for a few precious months,
having lost their battleship superiority, did not dare risk an
encounter with the Japanese battle fleet. Thus Admiral ‘Togo
had won the initiative; his ships stayed at sea, gaining confi-
dence and war experience, while inside Port Arthur the Russian
squadron, inactive and demoralized, visibly deteriorated.
Meanwhile Japan was free to send troops and supplies to
Korea and Manchuria, building up the strength to win the
crucial first battles against the out-numbered Russian land
forces. The ultimate effect of this surprise attack before the
declaration of war was well-appreciated by subsequent genera-
tions of Japanese staff officers. In this sense Port Arthur can be
regarded as a dress rehearsal for Pearl Harbour.
19
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which began with the
Japanese naval attack, had its origin in the simultaneous
determination of both Russia and Japan to develop ‘spheres
of influence’ (that is, markets and political leverage) in the
Far East, mainly at the expense of China. Japan fought a very.
successful war against the moribund Chinese Empire in
1894-5, and imposed a hard treaty ; modelling her negotiations
(like her army) on the Prussia which had defeated France in
1871, Japan demanded from China a heavy war indemnity,
Formosa, and Port Arthur with its hinterland. Other great
powers, while having no objection to the indemnity, did feel
that Japan should not gain Port Arthur, for they had their own
ambitions in that part of the world. Russia persuaded France Above: The Emperor (Mikado)
and Germany to join her in applying diplomatic pressure on of Japan
Tokyo, with the result that Japan was obliged to relinquish
Port Arthur. Two years later Moscow bullied Peking into Previous pages: Russian
leasing Port Arthur to Russia, together with the peninsula on infantrymen on the march in
Manchuria in their summer
which it stood. For Russia, this meant the acquisition of an uniform. In the Russian
ice-free naval base in the Far East to supplement Vladivostok. tradition, bayonets are fixed
For Japan, it was a case of insult added to injury. even though there is no enemy
in the vicinity
The Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900 caused the European
powers and Japan to send troops to China to suppress the
rebels. When the fight was over, Russian troops were occupying
Manchuria. Russia promised to withdraw these forces by
1903, but failed to do so, wishing to hold Manchuria as a
springboard for further expansion of her sphere of influence.
Meanwhile, Japan was engaged in all kinds of murderous
intrigues in Korea, successfully increasing her influence in
that country. But Russia also had an interest in Korea, and
although at first Russians and Japanese managed to coexist
peacefully, it was not long before suspicion on both sides
(quite justified) led to tension. Negotiations began in 1901 but
made little headway. Japan then strengthened her position
with an alliance with Britain. This alliance meant that if Japan
was at war in the Far East, and a third power entered the fight
against Japan, then Britain would make a fourth player, on
Japan’s side. Below: Tsar Nicholas II
During her prevarications in the negotiations with Japan,
Russia did not expect the Japanese to go to war. After all,
Japan was a newly emergent country; her naval officers might
have been trained in Britain and her army officers in Germany,
but several of those officers had begun their military careers
wearing armour and carrying a battleaxe. The Russian army
was the world’s most powerful, or at least that is what the
world believed. The Japanese had other ideas. They knew that
they could not beat Russia in a long war, but they could in
a short war localized in the Far East. The Russian supply
line was the single-track Trans Siberian Railway, and Russia
did not have large land forces already stationed in the Far East.
22
 Below: The Minneapolis Fournal
captioned this cartoon simply:
‘Japan’s reply: “War!” ’

Above: How the Chicago

Tribune’s cartoonist saw the
Russo-Japanese dispute. His
Caption was:
_ Japan to the Great Bear:
“Tumble, tumble, little star!
How I wonder what you are
up to!’
 =f
fe
=
fem LJ <=

Pb
=
K 2s
= |
 Previous pages: Russian troops i
Although Japan was developing fast, she did not seem to be
off duty in the Far East
in the big power league. In population (46 million in 1903) she
was about one third the size of Russia (140 million). In terms
of economic strength, Japan’s national revenue was calculated
at £25 million, as against Russia’s £208 million. Russia’s vast Right: Part of the crew of the
Japanese battleship Mikasa, in
economic assets meant that she would be better able than British waters after delivery by
Japan, other things being equal, to borrow money abroad for its builders
the war.
In terms of numbers of men available for service, the
disparity was less. Russia’s conscription system allowed many
exemptions, so that her enormous manpower was not fully
utilized. If all her reserves were mobilized, Russia could muster
about 4,500,000 men. However, such a complete mobilization
was not attempted during the war; despite defeats, Russia was
never in mortal danger during the war against Japan. Japan
disposed of about 850,000 trained men, and in addition could
draw on over 4 million untrained men in emergency. These
figures by themselves were misleading, for what counted was
the number of troops which could be deployed in the battle-
fields of the Far East, and in this respect Russia was inferior to
Japan. At the outbreak of the war Russian strength in the Far
East was less than 150,000 and reinforcement could only be a
slow process; even after the reservists were assembled, they
had to be transported thousands of miles over the single-track
and incomplete Trans Siberian Railway. Japan, on the other
hand, provided she had control of the sea, could easily ship her
forces to Korea and Manchuria.
The Japanese fleet possessed six modern battleships,
together with six armoured cruisers which could be regarded as
scaled-down battleships; all the big ships were built in Britain,
as were the majority of the smaller vessels. Two additional
armoured cruisers, originally ordered by Chile from Italian
yards, were on their way to Japan, having been purchased by Below: All-Japanese boy:
a reservist before embarkation
the Japanese government. The Russian navy was considerably
larger than the Japanese, but was divided between the Baltic,
Black Sea, and Far Eastern squadrons. The latter was being
strengthened; when war broke out a battleship was on its way
east, but turned back since it could no longer reach Port
Arthur without great risk. The Russians also had at advanced
stages of construction in the Baltic a class of five new powerful
battleships, and these were due to go east on completion. Thus
the opening of the war was well-timed by the Japanese; if they
had waited a year longer the Russians might have had twelve
or more battleships based on Port Arthur. As things turned
out, the war started when the Russians had only seven battle-
ships in the east. In addition, they had three armoured cruisers
at Vladivostok. In cruisers and torpedo craft, however, the
Russians were less than half as strong in the east. Neither side
had submarines, but each suspected that the other had them.

26
 Left: Western correspondents
described the Japanese soldier
as ‘cleanly’: one of the
Emperor’s warriors takes a
bath somewhere in Manchuria

The Russian soldier was reputed to be of fine physique and

great endurance, but lacking in intelligence and education;
initiative was missing. It was said that the officers, too, were
brave and enduring, but their promotion was very much a
matter of favouritism, with the result that lazy and incompe-
tent officers flourished. Infantry training concentrated on shock Below: Admiral Togo in his
tactics in close order, and was based on the assumption that full-dress uniform on a state
the main purpose of the rifle was to serve as a handle for the occasion

bayonet. Supply transport consisted of regimental carts; there

was no transport service as such. During the war transport
difficulties did result in the formation of an independent
transport service, but this was slow to develop. The best
feature of the Russian supply system was the two-wheeled
field kitchen. The military medical corps had no reserve, and
would have been overwhelmed by the casualties of the war if it
had not been supplemented by the Red Cross.
The Russian land forces at the beginning of the war were
put under the command of the then Minister of War, General
Kuropatkin. Kuropatkin was more of a bureaucrat than a
general. He had been an admirable staff officer in the Russo-
Turkish War, and was well fitted to draw up memoranda and
to supply data on which others might base decisions; but he
was not himself a man of decision. He had experience in
fighting tribes in the outlying areas of the Russian Empire,
and had also taken part in a French military expedition in
North Africa. But he was quite unsuited for command of large
armies in wartime. He was further handicapped by the Tsar’s
appointment of an admiral, Alexeev, as ‘Viceroy of the Far
East’. Alexeev was no friend of Kuropatkin in any case, and
his position as Kuropatkin’s superior gave him opportunities to
interfere in the conduct of the land war, opportunities which
he did not hesitate to take. Towards the end of the war, both
28
 Right: Japanese infantry
preparing to move into the
firing line

Below: A Japanese guards

division about to leave for
Korea
Above: The Japanese battleships
were built in Britain. The
newly launched Hatsuse is eased
down the Tyne at Newcastle,
her topmasts dismantled to
clear the bridges

Left: General Kuropatkin,

photographed in his favourite
surroundings

Right: The veteran general

Marquis Oyama, the grand
co-ordinator of the Japanese
armies in Manchuria
 Alexeev and Kuropatkin lost their commands, Kuropatkin
being relegated to command of an army under the new C-in-C,
Linievich. Linievich, however, had no chance of showing how
good a general he was for the war soon ended (as Kuropatkin
later complained, it ended just when the Russian army was
about to win great victories).
The Japanese soldier was very much an unknown quantity
when the war started. True, he had given a good account of
himself in the war against China, but the Chinese army and
navy had been hopeless anyway. As the war progressed he was
discovered to be strong and enduring and, according to war
correspondents, ‘cleanly’. What western observers found most
attractive was his spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice, which
made dying for the Emperor and the Emperor’s ancestors a
great honour. Later generations would perhaps regard the
Japanese warrior as brainwashed from the day he was born, but
in 1904—5 the martial spirit of the Japanese population seemed
enviable. The Japanese supply system was better organized
than the Russian. Each division had its supply train, and this
could be rapidly expanded by calling up reservists specializing
in this service. In addition, the armies were accompanied by
pack animals, and a standard piece of equipment was a two-
wheeled light cart pushed by soldiers. In Korea and Man-
churia the Japanese armies pressed thousands of local coolies
into service.
Field Marshal Kuropatkin’s opposite number on the
Japanese side was Oyama, whose earliest war experience was
among samurai in the sixties, during civil war. By 1870
Oyama was military attache with the Prussian army, which he
observed in its victorious campaign against the French. He was
evidently much impressed by the surrounding of the French
a
army at Sedan, which ended the Franco-Prussian War. In the
Russo-Japanese War he repeatedly tried to win his own
Sedan, but never quite succeeded, partly due to his reluctance
to take risks, partly due to the changes which had taken place
in warfare since 1870. Most of the Japanese staff officers had
spent time in Germany, or had been trained by Germans, and
like Oyama their approach to warfare was that of the Prussians
three decades earlier. This had both advantages and dis-
advantages; perhaps the most important of the former was that
Japanese infantry training was based on the assumption that
firepower was the most important factor in warfare. The
Japanese admirals, of whom Togo won the most fame, followed
British practice. Most of them, like Togo, had spent some time
in Britain, either attending British naval colleges or supervising
the construction of warships in British yards. Unlike the
Japanese generals, who discovered that German methods were
not always the best, the admirals had little need to change their
methods during the war.

31
iP
As tension rose in late 1903 both sides began to take precau- Previous pages: Japanese
sappers assembling in Tokyo,
tionary measures. Alexeev asked permission to mobilize his before embarking for the front
troops, but the Tsar allowed him to put only Port Arthur and
Vladivostok on a war footing, although preparations for Right: A dramatized impression
of the scuttling of the Koreets
mobilization were permitted. In Japan, the collection of at Chemulpo, painted by a
reservists and the concentration of a fleet of transports at western artist
Sasebo commenced in mid-January 1904. At the end of that
month the Russians learned that sixty transports had been
assembled at Sasebo, and Alexeev again asked permission to
mobilize. The Tsar replied that in any conflict it was desirable
that the Japanese should fire the first shot. Any Japanese
activity on the east coast of Korea, or on the west side below
the 38th Parallel should be unmolested, but Japanese forces
acting above the 38th Parallel should be attacked. On 1
February the Port Arthur squadron left for four days of
exercises. This was regarded as a threat by the Japanese
command, and the decision was made to begin war against
Russia in accordance with plans already made. The Japanese
fleet weighed anchor; its strongest part sailed towards Port
Arthur with the aim of destroying the Russian squadron, as
already described. Meanwhile, a cruiser squadron proceeded
towards Chemulpo (Inchon), the port for the Korean capital
of Seoul. Its purpose was to escort troop-carrying transports
and to destroy the Russian naval detachment at Chemulpo.
Tension between Koreans and Japanese in southern Korea
had recently developed into civil disturbance, and a number
of powers had sent warships to Chemulpo to protect their
nationals. On 7 February, as the Japanese Admiral Uryu Below: A painting of the
approached with his cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats, Varyag and Koreets passing
neutral warships as they move
there were already in the harbour British, American and French out of Chemulpo to fight the
warships, the Russian cruiser Varyag and gunboat Koreets, and Japanese squadron
FOR’ FREEDOM
Above: The war aroused great
interest abroad. A number of
Sadak wets stared
serialize the events of the
conflict. This is one of them.
Like almost all the press in
Britain and the U.S.A.,
favoured the Japanese—as its
title indicates
36
the Japanese cruiser Chiyoda. During the night of 7-8 Febru-
ary, the Chiyoda slipped out of the harbour unseen, meeting
Uryu and appraising him of the situation in the harbour. The
Japanese forces already knew of the rupture in diplomatic
relations between Russia and Japan, but because the Japanese
controlled the Chemulpo telegraph agency the commanders of
the Russian ships were not fully aware of the situation.
Uryu decided to enter the port immediately, but during the
approach the Koreets was seen leaving. The Japanese ships
closed in on her from both sides, and the torpedo boats
manoeuvred as though they were about to make a torpedo
attack. During this manoeuvre one of them ran aground, but
the Koreets was sufficiently unnerved to fire a warning shot.
Thus the first shot of the Russo-Japanese War was fired by a
Russian gunboat (but the first act of war had already occurred
off Japan, when a Russian cargo ship was captured by Japanese
hi aS The Kaseers the zo a foll Ws ie:
ships). The Koreets then returned to port, followed soon after
by the Japanese squadron, which began to land troops.
The Russian commanders were still unaware of the state of
inhighs betweendther c send Tan b Hiei
it relations etw een their country anc Japan, ut t 1S ignorance
was short-lived. Uryu, through the medium of the Japanese
and Russian consuls, sent an open letter to the commander of
the Russian detachment, inviting him to take his ships out
of the harbour, where the Japanese would fight him. If he failed
to do so, then the Japanese would regretfully be obliged to
fight him inside the harbour. At about midday the two Russian
ships left harbour to fight the six Japanese. Gunnery on both
Below: Japanese troops, well
provided with patriotic emblems,
leave a Japanese city for their
port of embarkation
sides was poor, but soon the Varyag was set on fire and most
of her guns put out of action. She returned to harbour and
later, together with the Koreets, was scuttled. After which
the Japanese inhabitants of Chemulpo, who had cheered on
their side from the shore, returned to their homes to celebrate.
None of the Japanese ships, nor the Koreets, had been damaged
in the gun battle. The crews of the Russian ships were later
sent back to Russia on board foreign vessels, on the under-
standing that they would take no further part in the war.
On 10 February, two days after the attacks at Chemulpo
and Port Arthur, Japan declared war on Russia. The latter,
on 9 February, had already proclaimed her own declaration
of war. Last to be informed (according to the Japanese official
history of the war) were the Mikado’s ancestors and the
Japanese gods, who were not brought up to date with events
until 11 February. The war brought outbursts of patriotism in
both countries. In Japan the Empress donated artificial eyes
and limbs to the wounded and helped to roll bandages, while
at the other end of the social scale a condemned murderer
gave his savings to the war effort. In Russia, those members
of the government who had hankered after a minor war in
order to rally a disaffected population around the Tsar seemed
to have been right, for there were patriotic demonstrations
in most Russian cities. Meanwhile, the Tsarina and the grand
duchesses organized hospital trains or enrolled as nurses,
while schoolchildren learned rhymes about what was going to
happen to the little yellow monkeys who had dared to attack
the Russian bear. The press in both countries proved more
patriotic and warlike than the governments, both reflecting and
leading public opinion.
The morning after the surprise torpedo attack at Port
Arthur, Togo brought up his main forces, hoping to finish off
the Russians, or at least inspect the damage. He found most of
the Russian ships still outside Port Arthur, at anchor. There
began an artillery duel between Togo’s ships and the guns of
the Russian ships and the shore batteries. Hits were scored
by both sides, but the Russians had the best of this encounter,
the Japanese retiring when things became a little too hot for
them. It seemed that the Russian squadron was still a force
to be reckoned with and Togo could never relax so long as it
might leave its safe harbour, break out, and prey on the
transports taking the Japanese army to fight in Korea. So
during the next few weeks there were many attacks on Port
Arthur. These took the form of bombardments, of destroyer
attacks, and three night attempts to sink blockships in the
harbour entrance in order to bottle up the Russian ships. These
blocking attempts were carefully planned and courageously
executed, but it was found impossible to position the block-
ships accurately under fire at night.

37
». CHALLENGE
RESPONSE
 Previous pages: Russian troops
advance towards the Yalu
RUSSIAN through the hills of Manchuria
ENTRENCHMENTS

RUSSIAN
RESERVE
12.8.8. : irst Japanese Crossing
kkk
to

Left: Map of Yalu theatre

Le

Below: Japanese troops
disembark at Chinampo. At this
stage of the war they were still
wearing their dark blue
uniforms. Khaki was introduced
soon afterwards
The first Japanese troops to land in Korea were those escorted
by Admiral Uryu to Chemulpo, as already described. Most of
them went on to Seoul by train, and later spread northwards.
Further troops landed at Chinampo after the ice melted in
March; these and the previously landed troops made up
the First Army, which for the duration of the war was com-
manded by General Kuroki. The Russian forces were too small
and ill-prepared to oppose the Japanese at this stage. Not until
the Japanese reached the Yalu, the frontier between Korea
and Manchuria, would there be stiff opposition. In the mean-
time the Russians contented themselves with Cossack raids
against the advanced Japanese detachments. At the beginning
of April the Japanese reached Wiju, on the southern bank of
the Yalu. This set the stage for the Battle of the Yalu, for
on the northern shore was a small Russian force, growing daily
as reinforcements reached it from the main Russian concentra-
tion at Liaoyang. The Japanese objective was to cross the river
and then advance into Manchuria, co-operating with the
Japanese Second Army. The latter was scheduled to disembark
in southern Manchuria from the beginning of May, the
disembarkation being expected to last six weeks.
The Russian defensive position (see map opposite on page
40) was about twenty miles long, and its strength lay in its
command of the river valley and the river islands. Along the
western bank of the Ai Ho, at the foot of the mountain spurs,
the Russians had dug a line of entrenchments, because that
river, although about ninety yards wide, was fordable. The
commander of the Russian armies in Manchuria, Kuropatkin,
did not take personal part in the battle; the immediate com-
mander was General Zasulich, who was in constant touch with
Kuropatkin’s headquarters. Kuropatkin ordered him to meet
the Japanese with ‘firmness and prudence’ and said that his role
was not to try and fight a decisive action, given the Japanese
numerical superiority. Contempt for the Japanese army was
widespread among Russian officers. The second in command
of the Yalu force declared that he would kill them all, taking
no prisoners; ‘our troops carry swords, not ropes’. For Kuroki,
the main problem was getting his troops across the river, and
to do this it was essential to avoid taking any action which
would cause the Russians to contract their extended front.
In other words, no indication of the direction of the Japanese
attack should be allowed to reach the Russians until it was too
late for them to concentrate their troops in anticipation.
After making surveys of the river valley, Kuroki captured
the midstream islands. He had help from small Japanese war-
ships and these islands were not strongly defended by the
Russians. He then built trestle and pontoon bridges to these
islands, and installed guns in carefully camouflaged emplace-
ments. He then issued his battle orders. He would cross the
AI
river six miles upstream, where Russian defences were thin. Above: On the eve of the Battle
of the Yalu: Japanese pontoon
One of his three divisions would cross on 29 April, supported sappers begin to bridge the
by heavy artillery fire, and the next day would move south- river
westwards along the northern shore. In so doing it would
capture valuable high ground and also establish a beachhead
where the other two divisions could land during the night of
30 April-1 May. Thus on the morning of 1 May, all three
divisions would be ready for battle along the eastern shore
of the Ai Ho, facing the Russian position on the western bank.
In the meantime naval activity towards the mouth of the Yalu
would persuade the Russians that the main landing would take
place there, rather than upstream.
The plan worked perfectly. Upstream, Japanese scouts
swam across the river at dawn to reconnoitre, and were
followed by parts of the Twelfth Division in boats. The weak
Russian pickets were driven back and by early afternoon
bridge-building had begun, using timber which had been cut
earlier. By evening, despite a river current which was stronger
than expected, the bridge was complete. Twenty thousand
men with about fifty guns began to cross at dusk, and by day-
break were settled in the hills three miles away. Their presence
did not seem to disturb Zasulich who, unaware of their num-
bers, regarded them simply as a diversion. It was not until the
fog lifted on the morning of 1 May that Zasulich realized his
mistake; three Japanese divisions were in position along the
Ai Ho, facing at 2,000 yards distance just seven Russian
battalions stretched along six miles of the river. These seven
battalions had already suffered some losses from artillery fire
the previous day.

42

Below: Kuroki’s plan for
crossing the Yalu required strict
secrecy of movement. In this
artist’s impression Japanese
infantry move towards the
concentration point, camouflaged
by brushwood screens
The battle began about 06.00, but really the Japanese had
already won. A preliminary artillery duel soon silenced the
ill-concealed Russian artillery and Kuroki ordered all three of
his divisions to advance against the Russian entrenchments.
The Japanese infantry, in close order as specified by the
German training manuals they used, suffered many casualties
at this stage. Fording the breast-high river under rifle fire,
many of the wounded were swept away and drowned. But on
emerging from the river the disorganized but not disheartened
Japanese began to return the fire. Backed by strong artillery fire
eoA Sam sh
Ce
directing shrapnel shells against the Russian trenches, the
Japanese infantry eventually pushed the Russians back. For
the Russians this was the beginning of the end. Henceforth
their main task was to extricate themselves. The main Russian
forces, which had taken no part in the battle, withdrew north-.
wards without trouble, but the rearguard was cut off, and was
eventually compelled to surrender, losing all eight of the
Russian machine guns and eleven field guns. It was at this
stage that the Russians suffered most of their casualties
(Russian casualties in the battle were about 3,000, and Japanese
about 1,000). For the Japanese, the most costly part of the
battle was the crossing of the Ai Ho. The Japanese medical
staff proved itself in this battle. The Daily Mail correspondent
wrote:
Field hospitals were run up; the German-trained medical
men, alert and cool, opened their cases of instruments and
the quick work began. No time for delay or finicking
hesitation here . . . a Cossack in grey shirt lay still beside
his erstwhile adversary in blue coat. The Japanese was
carried along on the stretcher close to the Siberian infantry-
man, the one shot through the leg, the other in the side...
Here was a Russian officer, his silver-laced coat ripped off
and thrown by the doctors lightly over him, his face graved Above: A wounded Japanese
with pain, every half-conscious thought merged in the one soldier is removed from the
determination not to show signs of his agony before his battlefield by sling-stretcher

nation’s foes...

After the war Kuropatkin blamed Zasulich for the Yalu

defeat, alleging that he had tried to inflict a serious defeat on
the enemy instead of retiring in the face of superior numbers
as he had been ordered. But Kuropatkin failed to mention that
he had also ordered Zasulich to be firm, and it was precisely
when the Russians were firm, resisting the Japanese advance
across the Ai Ho, that they became entangled in a situation
from which they could escape only with serious loss. In the
world at large the result of this first major land encounter
caused a sensation, for it was the first time Orientals had fought
Europeans on equal terms, using European techniques; and
they had won.
The victorious Kuroki pushed on from the Yalu to occupy
Fenghuangcheng, a road junction thirty miles northwest of
Wiju. Meanwhile the Second Army was landed about fifty
miles north of Port Arthur, on the Liao tung Peninsula.
Landing so close to the Russians, an operation which took
several weeks, indicated considerable self-confidence, and a
belief (justified) that the Russian navy would be unable to
interfere; Togo’s blockade of Port Arthur was saving the
Japanese army a good deal of trouble. Later, further armies

44

Below: The Chinese and
Koreans, neutrals on whose
territory the war was fought,
were treated contemptuously
by both sides. Here, with
Japanese formality, a Korean is
being beaten
began to arrive from Japan; the Fourth Army under Kawamura
landed near Takushan, about thirty-five miles west of the Yalu,
and the Third Army, destined under General Nogi to besiege
Port Arthur, landed at Yentai Bay. Thus the land war would
proceed on two fronts: three Japanese armies would move
northwards against the main Russian forces which, supplied
by the Trans Siberian Railway, were concentrating around
Liaoyang, while one army would attempt to capture the key
naval base of Port Arthur.
The Japanese landing in the Liao tung Peninsula threatened
Port Arthur’s rail link with the north. The viceroy, Alexeev,
who had recently arrived in Port Arthur to supervise defence
preparations, left hurriedly by special train, taking with him a
poor impression of the town’s siege-worthiness.
Half-way between the Japanese Second Army’s landing
place and Port Arthur, the Liao tung Peninsula tapers to its
narrowest point at Nan Shan. Here, at high tide, the distance
from shore to shore was only about three or four miles.
Obviously this was the most favourable place to oppose the
advancing Japanese, and indeed the Russians did entrench
themselves across this strip of land. As at Port Arthur, their
defence works were not as strong as they might have been,
but as it turned out they were more than strong enough, if
effectively utilized. The Russians had about 18,000 men
assembled near this line, and General Oku’s attacking Second
Army was barely more than double this. At dawn on 25 May
the Japanese artillery began to bombard the Russian positions,
assisted by ships’ guns from a flotilla sent to the westward
side of the peninsula. During the morning and afternoon
there took place scenes which had never before been witnessed
in land warfare, as the Japanese despatched wave after wave
of attacking infantrymen against entrenched positions disposing
of all the enormous firepower provided by modern weapons.
The Japanese attacked in close order, leaving heaps of dead and
dying in front of the Russian positions. In retrospect, it seems
possible that the Russians, given good generalship, could have
held these positions for weeks, inflicting heavy losses on the
attackers. But good generalship was lacking. General Stoessel,
commanding at Port Arthur, could send instructions to his
subordinates at Nan Shan, but could not guarantee that his
orders would be carried out. He found that the defending
commanders, instead of obeying instructions, sent him
lengthy memoranda explaining why they had done precisely
the opposite of what had been intended. So bad was the
command that in the day’s battle less than 4,000 of the available
18,000 Russian soldiers actually participated in the fighting.
In the late afternoon one Japanese division, wading breast-high
through the sea, enveloped the Russian left flank. There was an
almost immediate panic as the Russian line was drawn back
45
hastily. One Russian colonel later said, ‘The noise and chaos
were terrible, shots and salvos could be heard from the
bivouacs in the rear. Together with other officers nearby I
rushed back to the rear . . . to restore order . . . I ordered also
our band to strike up a march and, thank God, its martial
sounds restored confidence . . .? Of the Russians actually
engaged in the fighting, about forty per cent (1,400) were killed
or wounded, largely in the artillery preparation and in the final
desperate minutes. The Japanese lost nearly 5,000, but had
opened the way to Port Arthur. On their way south they
captured Dalny, where the Russians had expended great efforts
to create a commercial port. Most of the harbour installations
were intact and after a few weeks, during which Russian mines
were swept from the seabed, Dalny became a very useful base
and port for supplying the army besieging Port Arthur. After
the capture of Dalny, Port Arthur was cut off both by sea and
by land, its only contact with the outside world being an
occasional small blockade-running boat. The close siege of the
port was entrusted to the new Japanese Third Army under
General Nogi, who had helped to capture the same objective
from the Chinese in 1894.
Meanwhile the other Japanese armies were slowly moving
northwards. The Russians evidently feared that after the
Battle of the Yalu the Japanese might march directly on
Mukden (Shenyang). To find out what was happening a strong
detachment of Cossacks under Rennenkampf was despatched
from the main Russian concentration. Ceaselessly skirmishing
with the Japanese, Rennenkampf discovered, as other Cossack
commanders would discover, that the reconnaissance tactics
he had learned were useless against this enemy. Japanese
infantry seemed to occupy all the passes and neither small
parties of Cossacks on foot, nor larger parties mounted, could
penetrate this screen. Rennenkampf was obliged to fight his
way through with a large force whenever he wanted informa-
tion, and this was a slow and costly process. If he had left
detachments at villages likely to be approached by the advanc-
ing enemy he might have secured more information about the
Japanese progress, but he failed to do this; indeed, such a tactic
was not thought of by the Russians at this stage of the war.
The main Russian forces were fortifying key locations on
the roads leading from the south to Liaoyang and Mukden.
Liaoyang itself was being transformed into a strong fortress.
Russian troops were extended south of Liaoyang in a defensive
line about fifty-five miles long, covering all the main roads.
From time to time Cossack detachments were sent along the
roads to reconnoitre, but they experienced the same diffi-
culties as Rennenkampf. On 1 June a reconnaissance in force
was sent out on foot along a primitive track, but after a twenty- Right: Japanese survivors of
seven-mile march in the rain it was recalled; as one general the Battle of Nan Shan

46
commented, its only result was the ruin of 8,000 pairs of boots.
Although Kuropatkin still favoured a policy of gradual
withdrawal until his forces had been brought up to a strength
superior to the Japanese, others did not share this idea. In St
Petersburg there was pressure for quick results, or at least for
good news. In late May Alexeev appears to have told Kuro-
patkin to do something positive. Accordingly, General Stakel-
berg was ordered to advance south with his Siberian Corps
towards Telissu in the Liao tung Peninsula. On 30 May,
Cossack cavalry reconnoitring towards Telissu in preparation
for this move encountered Japanese cavalry, whom they drove
back with a charge. This was the only occasion in the war when
a classic cavalry charge took place, the most practised
manoeuvre of the Cossacks. Stakelberg sent his troops by rail
and road to Telissu, and dug himself into a position south of
that town. His orders from Kuropatkin were ambiguous:
‘... However, a battle is not to be offered against superior
strength ... Your final aim will be . . . the relief of Port
Arthur’. How Stakelberg could relieve Port Arthur without
encountering the enemy in superior strength defies the imagi-
nation, but he was probably expected to read between the lines
in the Russian bureaucratic tradition. Doubtless the aim of
relieving Port Arthur was inserted to satisfy Alexeev; Kuro-
patkin’s main concern was that Stakelberg should not be
defeated. In fact, Stakelberg was defeated, though not disas-
trously. After he had established himself south of Telissu he
was attacked by Japanese troops sent from the south. The
latter, in what would become the standard Japanese procedure,
attacked from the front all along the line, while enveloping one
flank. Stakelberg was unaware of the presence of a Japanese
division near his right flank, and it was this failure of recon-
naissance which caused his defeat. The retreat, however, was
in good order. Russian casualties for the battle were about
3,500 and Japanese 1,200. Above: Japanese cavalry.
The Battle of Telissu witnessed a notable use of rail transport Western correspondents
described the Japanese horses
in war. During the struggle Russian reinforcements arrived on as ‘small’, while Kuropatkin
the battlefield by train, and were deployed to delay the Japanese described his own cavalry as
advarice. But rising mist allowed the Japanese to advance ‘old men on little horses’
unseen almost to Telissu station. This compelled the Russians
to withdraw, which they did by boarding their two trains and
steaming away under fire. But some.missed the train and were
taken prisoner. For the commander of the 4th East Siberia
Rifles, Telissu meant a humiliating end to his war career. His
regiment was severely mauled and he himself, an old and rather
fat man, had his horse pulled from under him by a Japanese
soldier, who took him prisoner. Breathless and thirsty, without
his upper clothing, he asked the first Japanese officer whom he Previous pages: Russian infantry
occupy a defensive position in
met for a bottle of soda water, only to be told that the Japanese Manchuria as the Japanese
army did not take soda water into battle. approach

50
 In the ensuing weeks the Japanese armies, apart from the
Third, which was besieging Port Arthur, moved steadily
towards Liaoyang along the roads leading from their supply
bases. In July, Marshal Oyama, a celebrated veteran, arrived
from Japan to take overall command of the armies; by this
time, with four armies operating separately, some coordination
was needed. Oyama’s chief of staff, General Kodama, was
ideally suited for a coordinating role, being an experienced
administrator (he had been governor of Formosa). By the end
of July most of the important passes leading to the Plain
of Liaoyang were in Japanese hands, sometimes after very
hard-fought engagements against Russian outposts. One key
pass, that of Motien Ling, was the object of a Russian counter-
attack. For some reason the Russian commander chose to
make a frontal attack, keeping a strong reserve. Russian
techniques here were still antiquated; officers bravely but
unhelpfully took pride in exposing themselves to fire, rifle fire
took the form of volleys by sections, and men were placed at
close intervals irrespective of the availability of cover. Despite
these self-imposed handicaps the battle, which took place in
and around Chinese temples, was only just won by the
Japanese.
At the end of July the Japanese attacked the railway junction
of Tashichiao, where the Russians put up a stubborn defence.
In particular, Stakelberg’s artillery distinguished itself. Stakel-
berg was one of the few Russian generals who was willing to
learn from the Japanese. Having been discomfited by the
Japanese guns at Telissu, he copied the Japanese technique of
concealment, placing his batteries under cover. The Japanese
had more guns than the Russians at Tashichiao, but the
Russian weapons had a longer range. Thus the Japanese guns
had to be brought up as their infantry advanced, revealing their
positions to the hidden Russian guns. The Japanese artillery
in this way was largely silenced, and the almost unscathed
Russian guns could turn their attention to the Japanese
infantry. After fifteen hours of fighting, the Russians were still
holding their ground, and inflicting heavy losses. At this point
the Russian commander, Zarubaev, gave the order to retire,
fearing that his ammunition would be exhausted. Thus at a
point when not all the Russian reserves had been utilized,
where the Japanese were in a weakened and demoralized
situation and the Russians felt triumphant, a possible victory
was converted to a defeat. Not only was this defeat bad for
morale, but it gave the Japanese yet another strategic advantage.
Hitherto their advantage had been slowed by the need to
bring up supplies along mountainous roads. ‘Tashichiao was
the junction for the railway branch line to the port of Yinkou,
and Yinkou would henceforth be an advanced Japanese supply
base, in easy touch with Japan.
aS.
VIDOR HIGH SCHOOL LIBRAnt ou
VINOR TEXAS 7766?
After the first attack on Port Arthur, the Russian admiral had Previous pages: Survivors of a
Japanese blockship, accompanied
been relieved of his command and replaced by Admiral by two coffined and two
Makarov, reputed to be Russia’s most intelligent and energetic cremated comrades
admiral. Under him the Russian morale, which had sunk low,
began to improve. Anxious to give his crews proper training, Above: Japanese blockships
sunk outside Port Arthur
he took the battleships to sea, exchanging shots with the
Japanese but not yet risking a full-scale encounter with Togo’s
battlefleet. At dawn on 13 April a Russian destroyer, creeping
back to Port Arthur after an operation, was cut off by Japanese
cruisers outside the port. Makarov immediately sent a cruiser
to help, but the latter only succeeded in picking up five
survivors of the destroyer before approaching Japanese cruisers
obliged it to retire. Meanwhile Makarov, in vengeful mood,
emerged from Port Arthur with two battleships and three
cruisers. Not wasting time over sweeping the harbour
Below: Admiral Makarov, the
approaches for any mines the Japanese might have laid, Russians’ best admiral
Makarov’s ships chased after the Japanese cruisers for about
ten miles. Then, seeing the smoke of Togo’s battlefleet on the
horizon, Makarov turned about and retired under the protec-
tion of his shore batteries. Cruising along the coast, his flagship
Petropavlovsk struck a mine. There was a thunderous explosion
which shook the town of Port Arthur, followed by one or more
other explosions. According to an eyewitness, the explosion
raised the battleship several feet and then she lowered herself
with a list. The mine explosion had detonated a torpedo store
which in turn set off a magazine and caused some of the boilers

54

Above: Admiral Witgeft, who
succeeded but could not replace
Makarov
to burst. The battleship was broken in two and sank in a couple
of minutes. Makarov took off his greatcoat, went down on
his knees for a final prayer, and disappeared with the ship. Over
600 men died with him, among them the artist Vereshchagin,
who had come to Port Arthur to paint the war. Thus in a few
minutes Russia had lost her most celebrated admiral and her
most celebrated artist. However, another celebrity on board,
the Grand Duke Cyril, lived to fight another day and to become,
two decades later in Paris, the self-styled Tsar Cyril I. A few
minutes after the Petropavlovsk went down another battleship
which had just left Port Arthur struck a mine. At this the
entire force went berserk, firing its guns at the water under the
impression that a submarine attack was in progress. After this
cannonade ceased the damaged battleship was safely towed
back to harbour. News of Makarov’s death had a depressing
effect not only on the officers and sailors, but on the garrison.
Port Arthur, after all, was being defended for the benefit
of the fleet, and now it seemed less likely than ever that the fleet
would ever fulfil its function of mastering the sea. Up to this
stage the Russian ships had not shown that they were inferior
to the Japanese, but henceforth, under more timid com-
manders, the bigger ships had few opportunities of action, so
necessary for gaining confidence and experience. Makarov’s
successor, Skrydlov, never reached Port Arthur because by
this time the town was cut off on the landward side. Skrydlov
had to be content with taking the train to Vladivostok, from
55
 OPN
Catan

(hillbi
Ch
N\

Hi,

WH).

Left: Artist’s impression of the
bridge of the Tsesarevich at
the time of Witgeft’s death.
Inset: Photo of the Tsesarevich.
The cross marks the hole made
by the shell which killed
Admiral Witgeft
where he exercised command as best he could. Effectively, the
Port Arthur squadron came under the command of Admiral
Witgeft, an officer who was neither good nor bad. Unfor-
tunately, Makarov’s staff, chosen for their intelligence and
energy, had also gone down with the Petropavlosk, so Witgeft’s
ae were unlikely to be compensated by a first-rate
staff.
But Togo, too, had a black day. On 15 May he lost one
cruiser by collision and two battleships from mines. The first
loss occurred in thick fog, when the recently acquired armoured
cruiser Kasuga rammed the Yoshino. The battleship loss was
due to Russian action. Russian ships the previous day, taking
advantage of poor visibility, had laid mines outside Port
Arthur along the route frequently taken by patrolling Japanese
warships. The next morning a Japanese detachment of three
battleships under Rear Admiral Nashiba, flying his flag in the
Hatsuse, appeared off Port Arthur. Under the expectant gaze
of many officers of the garrison the Hatsuse duly struck a mine.
Admiral Nashiba ordered his squadron to turn back, but was
too late to prevent the battleship Yashima striking another
mine and then, a few minutes later, a second. Attempts to get
the two stricken battleships under tow were hampered by
attacks of Russian destroyers. The Yashima was pulled free
but the Hatsuse, too, struck another mine; there was a great
explosion and a column of yellowish water was thrown into
the air. The mainmast was broken, the funnels blown down,
and in twelve minutes the battleship sank, taking more than 450
men with her. The Yashima was towed from the scene of
action but sank later; her loss was concealed from the Russians
until the war ended. Although Togo had in one day lost
one-third of his battleship strength the Russian victory was
not as complete as it might have been. If the Russian battle-
ships had come out to finish off the Japanese detachment the
whole course of the war might have been changed; Japanese
command of the sea would have been at great risk if on this
day Togo had lost not a third, but a half, of his battleships.
But the Russian ships stayed safely in harbour. It is true that
they could not leave at low tide, but even with a few hours
delay they could still have caught up with the Japanese, who
were slowed down by the Yashima. This was not quite the end
of Admiral Nashiba’s bad day. Having had his flagship blown
up in the morning, he transferred to the despatch vessel
Tatsuta, which in the evening ran aground in fog.
Japanese naval supremacy was also being challenged by the
activities of Russian cruisers stationed at Vladivostok. The
Russian armoured cruiser squadron, consisting of three ships
(Gromobot, Rossiya, and Rurik) made several raids on Japanese
shipping. Although the press of Japan, Britain and the U.S.A.
made much of the unheroic nature of attacks on unarmed
ey
commercial vessels, this could hardly hide the fact that these
three vessels were a menace to the Japanese war plans. The
cruises of these ships usually lasted about a week and they
seemed to have no difficulty passing through the Tsugaru
Straits. One of their victims was a heavily loaded Japanese
troopship, whose military cargo refused to surrender and was
sent to the bottom. British hackles were raised when a British
steamer carrying coal to Japan was captured. In July the squad- ee”
ee
ron wreaked havoc on shipping near Yokohama and for a time
sailings from Japanese ports had to be suspended. Rear
Admiral Kamimura, commanding the Japanese armoured
Bie aA
w
cruiser squadron, had been charged with intercepting the he

intruders, but they continually evaded him. The Japanese 6

public, egged on by its press, was by this time in bloodthirsty

mood and vented its spleen on Kamimura, his house being
attacked and damaged by a mob. However, in August Kami-
mura did catch the Russian squadron and, in greatly superior
force, managed to sink the oldest ship (Rurik) and damage the
others. Henceforth the Vladivostok ships were less venture-
some.
Both navies continued to aid their land forces in the siege
of Port Arthur. In general, Togo detached his oldest ships
to form an inshore bombarding squadron; from time to time
these ships suffered loss by mines, and Togo was not willing
to risk his newer ships, which in any case were probably little
more effective for this kind of work. The Russians, despite the
Japanese blockade, were able to make use of fog and darkness
to send gunboats and destroyers to bombard shore targets.
The bigger ships did make one sortie, but their main contribu-
tion was guns and men for the landward defence. As the
Japanese got closer, however, the battleships were occasionally
used as artillery platforms in harbour, bombarding Japanese
positions from their anchorage. Towards the end of June the
Tsesarevich finished its repairs, this being the last of the ships
torpedoed in the surprise attack in February to be returned to
service. Witgeft thereupon informed his captains that the time
had come to quit Port Arthur and to defeat the enemy at sea.
On 23 June the Russian squadron emerged. First came the
light cruiser Novik and the destroyers, together with mine-
sweepers to clear the harbour approaches. Then came the main
force of four cruisers and six battleships, the last leaving about
midday. Discovering an unswept mine, Witgeft ordered sweep-
ing to continue and the big ships to drop anchor. About a
dozen mines were exploded and after this two-hour intermis- Above: Japanese cartoon
sion the squadron got under way once more. Its aim was to showing a Russian admiral
presenting the Tsar with the
make a reconnaissance and, should it meet the enemy, to give remnants of his fleet
battle. After it had progressed eight miles and exchanged fire
with shadowing Japanese destroyers, Togo’s main force was
sighted. In view of the superior Japanese numbers, Witgeft

58
 decided to return. Close to Port Arthur, in the darkness,
y¥
Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats attacked his ships,
but caused little damage, although the battleship Sevastopol was
slightly damaged by a mine. The squadron dropped anchor
outside the port and at dawn began to pass safely into the inner
I |Sess
Ry
pe
Dim
harbour.
ws
The Battle of the Yellow Sea took place on 10 August.
Witgeft, in view of the advance of the Japanese army nearer to
e
TARR
oa Port Arthur, had been instructed to break out and make for
Vladivostok. On 9 August all preparations were made and on
ey
ESN
Bs
okt
Shas
OY the next day, cheered by the local population, the squadron
left. It had been agreed that whatever happened the objective
which all ships should pursue was the transfer of naval strength
to Vladivostok. The Russian force consisted of six battleships,
with Witgeft flying his flag in the Tsesarevich (number one in
the line) and the second-in-command, Ukhtomski, in the
Peresviet (number four). There was a cruiser squadron of
three ships, eight destroyers led by the light cruiser Novik and,
following at a suitable distance, a hospital ship. By 10.00 the
harbour approaches had been cleared of mines and the mine-
sweepers returned to port as the main force got under way. As
it advanced into the open sea at thirteen knots, it was not long
before various Japanese squadrons could be seen approaching
from three directions. Among them was Togo’s battle fleet,
consisting of the four surviving battleships together with the
armoured cruisers Nisshin and Kasuga. This force manoeuvred
so as to cut off the Russians, and the latter responded by
altering course. For a time the two battle fleets lay on parallel
courses and exchanged fire, both sides suffering some damage.
However, this exchange soon ceased and Witgeft ordered all
his ships to serve lunch.
Later in the afternoon Togo managed again to get into a
position where the Russians would be forced to give battle.
Firing commenced at 8,000 yards and gradually the two forces
drew closer. At first both sides seemed equally matched, each
inflicting as much damage as it received. On the Japanese
flagship Mikasa there were several hits, one of which almost
killed Togo. The Japanese ships also suffered from premature
explosion of their own shells while still in the barrel. Towards
18.30 the Japanese battleships concentrated their fire on the
Tsesarevich, which received fifteen twelve-inch shells, not to
speak of smaller calibres. At 18.40 a shell hit this battleship
close to the conning tower, killing Witgeft and most of his
staff and the helmsman. The steering jammed, and the
Tsesarevich began to turn in circles. This threw the Russian
column into confusion, with some ships turning towards the
enemy, and others away. The Japanese took advantage of this
confusion to approach closer and direct a withering fire at the
huddle of Russian battleships. When Ukhtomski finally

39
realized that he had become commander he discovered that the
signal halliards of his ship had been shot away. He eventually
managed to hoist a signal; this said ‘follow me’ and he made
full speed back towards Port Arthur. The rest of the battle-
ships followed him as best they could, with the exception of
the still circling Tsesarevich and three cruisers. The latter,
led by the Askold, broke through the line of encircling Japanese
ships and made for Vladivostok, successfully beating off
torpedo attacks. Some of the Russian destroyers also made off.
Meanwhile, until nightfall, Togo pursued the Russian battle-
ships. Then he withdrew, leaving the field clear for his torpedo
boats and destroyers. During the night the unhappy Russian
squadron endured successive torpedo attacks, but the Japanese
caused more damage to themselves than to the Russians. At
least two Japanese torpedo craft were damaged by collision,
and another was torpedoed by its own side. No torpedoes
struck the Russian ships; it would have been hard to find a
better demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the torpedo,
hitherto so feared as a new, unbeatable, and destructive
weapon. The next morning the battleships re-entered Port
Arthur, but not to the accompaniment of bands and cheering
crowds. Of all the mistaken decisions committed by Russian
commanders in the war, Ukhtomski’s decision was probably
the most damaging. If only half his ships had managed to
reach Vladivostok the strategic picture would have been
greatly changed to Togo’s disadvantage. Togo was already
concerned about reports of strong Russian reinforcements
arriving from the Baltic, and he was counting on eliminating
the existing Russian Far Eastern Squadron well before the
arrival of new Russian ships. His own ships needed repair
and their gun barrels were already worn. If Ukhtomski’s
battleships had reached Vladivostok, Togo might have been
caught between two fires when the Russian Baltic Squadron
arrived.
As for the ships which did break through towards Vladi-
vostok, none arrived. The Novik got as far as Sakhalin, where
she ran aground, was discovered by Japanese cruisers, and
destroyed. The Askold, having two damaged funnels, lacked
sufficient coal to reach Vladivostok and needed repairs to her
hull, so she went to Shanghai, where she was interned for the
duration of the war. Similarly the Diana went to Saigon, where
she was disarmed and interned by the French. As for the
Tsesarevich, this ship was also attacked by torpedo boats
during the night following the battle, but she too escaped with
no damage. However, she had been severely mauled by the Right: The damaged Rossiya
gunfire of the previous day; with her funnels badly damaged after her return to Vladivostock.
her coal consumption was so high that it was out of the question Funnel damage reduced the
draught for the fires and thus
to go to Vladivostok. So she went to the German port of Kiao the speed. It was the equivalent
chau, where she was interned. of dismasting in the days of sail

60
RUSSIANS
By mid-August the Russian forces concentrated around
Liaoyang outnumbered the Japanese troops advancing north-
wards against them. In addition, reinforcements were arriving
daily over the hard-pressed Trans Siberian Railway. Kuro-
patkin divided his troops into three forces, the Eastern and
Southern groups, and a Reserve. In preparation for the immi-
nent battle, much fortification had been undertaken in and
around Liaoyang. In the town itself was developed and fortified
a ‘main position’, while six miles south was the ‘advanced
position’, consisting basically of a semicircular line of entrench-
ments covering both the roads from the south. The terrain
was mountainous towards the east but on the west of the main
road from the south there was a fertile plain covered with
fields of tall-growing millet. The main river of the locality
was the Taitzu, which flowed westwards towards the town
then turned north and then again westward. The Japanese
were advancing along the two roads from the south and the
south-east. Along the former moved the Second and Fourth
armies, based on Dalny, and along the latter marched Kuroki’s
First Army, still based on the Yalu. Since the two Japanese
lines of advance were separated by mountains, their best
strategy was to avoid battle, or at least the main battle, until Previous pages: Russian infantry
in a prepared position await
the two lines met; that is, the Japanese advantage of two a Japanese attack. As usual the
converging forces could only be exploited where the two roads line is densely packed.
met, at Liaoyang itself. Conversely, it was to the Russian Inset: Japanese infantry in
action. They have hastily
advantage to fight as far south of the road junction as possible. scooped a shallow trench
Accordingly, Kuropatkin decided that his Southern and
Eastern troops should make their first serious resistance to the
Japanese some miles south of the ‘advanced position’, gradually
falling back to the latter and holding up the enemy until
Kuropatkin was ready to launch a counter-attack with his
Reserve. Serious fighting began on 26 August. In many
localities the Russian guns silenced the Japanese batteries,
although when they turned their attention to the Japanese
infantry they were not as damaging as they might have been,
possibly because by this time the Japanese had learned to
avoid crowding their troops together. However, after the
Japanese in a night attack had unexpectedly captured a key
pass, and after a storm had so raised the level of a river that it
threatened to cut off the Russian forces, Kuropatkin ordered
his forces to fall back on the ‘advanced position’. Hitherto the
Japanese frontal attacks on the two Russian groups had been
expensive failures, and the withdrawal order somewhat dis-
heartened the Russian soldiers, who were confident that they
could easily hold the enemy. Nevertheless, the withdrawal
operation was successfully carried out at night. It was only in
the morning, when the Japanese launched another attack on
hitherto impregnable entrenchments, that their infantry
discovered that they were attacking a deserted objective.

64

Above: A Russian
reconnaissance detachment,
leading its horses over a difficult
mountain track
Below: With drums beating,
Russian infantry march through
Liaoyang
Moreover, lack of efficiency on some officer’s part resulted in
the Japanese headquarters learning of the Russian withdrawal
only in the afternoon, about fifteen hours after it had started.
It was on 30 August that the main battle began. As usual
the Japanese intended to pin down the main Russian forces
by a succession of frontal attacks, while devoting part of their
strength to an outflanking movement. As usual, too, the frontal
attacks were not merely diversions but serious attempts to
capture the Russian positions. Six divisions attacked the
‘advanced position’ of the Russians, while Kuroki took his
Twelfth Division through the fordable Taitzu river about
fifteen miles east of Liaoyang. The main Japanese attacks
were unsuccessful, the Japanese command not yet having
mastered the technique of controlling such large numbers of
men in battle. Units frequently failed to support each other
and guns were placed too far in the rear; this made them less
vulnerable to Russian gunfire but hampered their support of
the infantry. In front of their positions the Russians had cut
down the millet up to a distance of about 1,000 yards. This
meant that for the last part of an assault the Japanese infantry
were without cover, and in fact, despite many attacks, few
Japanese reached the Russian entrenchments; those that did
were soon despatched with bayonets. Many of the Russian
defenders felt admiration for the endless succession of Japanese
assaults, which were made with such contempt of death.
Reuter’s correspondent with the Russian army wrote of a
Cossack who told him that the sight was ‘terrible beyond
words’, with line after line of smiling Japanese coming up
to the trenches, to be mown down with bullets until the
trenches were full of bodies, and then more coming on over the
bodies of the dead; ‘an officer went mad from the sheer horror
of the thing’.
But Kuroki’s move across the Taitzu threatened Kuropat-
kin’s eastern flank, and this advantage was all the greater
because Kuropatkin believed that an entire army, not a mere
division, was with Kuroki. So once more he ordered his main
forces, successfully defending their positions, to fall back. This
time the withdrawal was to the ‘main position’, and was
successfully carried out during the evening of 31 August.
This time the Japanese discovered the withdrawal more
quickly, for at 01.00 they launched a desperate night attack
against the Russian entrenchments, only to discover that once
again they were attacking empty trenches. Although this
discovery raised their morale, they were too exhausted to
pursue their enemy and it was not until the next afternoon that
heavy guns were brought up by rail to bombard the fortifica-
tions of the Russian ‘main position’. An intense artillery barrage
was then laid down, with 250 guns concentrated on the
western end of the defences. The Times reported:
65
 The civilized world had never seen anything to compare Right: The Russians recapture
their guns; an artist’s
with the final preparations for the advance of the Japanese impression of an incident in
infantry. The massed and scattered batteries took the line of the Battle of Liaoyang
Russian resistance in sections. The 250 guns opened first
on the Russian settlement. Great columns of dust and smoke
rose up from amidst the grey stone buildings. Then suddenly
out of this whirlwind of bursting shell shot up great tongues
of lurid flame . . . The Japanese gunners redoubled the
service of their pieces. The very rocks of Shushan quivered
with the blasts of ever-recurrent discharges. The air shrieked
with the rush of high velocity projectiles.

Meanwhile, because the ‘main position’ was shorter than

the ‘advanced position’, Kuropatkin was able to withdraw
troops from the line to send against Kuroki. The latter’s men,
however, had captured Manjuyama Hill, which commanded
the plain to the east of Liaoyang, and this loss spoiled Kuro-
patkin’s plan of defeating Kuroki and then launching a
counter-attack. Despite pounding by Russian artillery and
successive costly attacks by infantry, Manjuyama Hill remained
in the hands of the Japanese. During the night of 2-3 Septem-
ber, Kuropatkin received in succession news that the last
effort to take the hill had failed, a report from the general
commanding the ‘advanced position’ that he was running out of
reserves of men and ammunition, and a message from Stakel-
berg saying that his trusty Siberian Corps had been forced to
fall back, thus endangering the flank of the forces which
Below: Russian artillery in
Kuropatkin was poising for his counter-attack. At this, action at the Sha Ho
Kuropatkin gave up, ordering a general retreat towards Muk-
den. It was not until about midday on 4 September that the
Japanese realized that the Russians were making another of
their brilliantly conducted retreats, so the pursuit was half-
hearted. Nevertheless, although Japanese casualties were
greater than Russian, it was undeniably a Japanese victory,
for their numerically inferior forces had driven the Russians
from a battlefield of the Russians’ own choice. This victory did
something to compensate for the effect on public opinion of the
recent failure to capture Port Arthur by general assault.
In European Russia, the news of the Battle of Liaoyang
increased popular dissatisfaction with the government, with
the war, and with the way the war was being fought. Pressure
was put on Kuropatkin to act more offensively, and in late
September he did decide to take the offensive. He now had
about 210,000 men and calculated that the Japanese had only
about 150,000. However, as previously, he had little concrete
information about the Japanese dispositions and strength. He
did realize that he had to strike soon, because the fall of
Port Arthur seemed imminent, and that event would release the
besieging army to reinforce the troops facing him. The Russian

66
plan of attack, drawn up by the higher officers collectively
rather than composed by Kuropatkin himself, was issued on 28
September and envisaged an attack beginning on 5 October.
The result was the battle of the Sha Ho, which lasted fourteen
days and extended over thirty-seven miles of front. This battle
took place on a wide front because Oyama feared an outflanking
movement, while Kuropatkin was wary of a Japanese attempt
to slip past his main forces and take Mukden.
It would seem that Oyama had fairly early knowledge of a
proposed Russian offensive. If careless talk in Mukden was not
overheard by spies, the St Petersburg newspapers would
doubtless have alerted the Japanese. A succession of church
services in Mukden, with prayers offered for military success,
was another indicator. Nevertheless, and despite the slowness
of the Russian deployments, the Russian attack disturbed
Oyama’s plans and he was forced to take prompt emergency
action to avoid a crushing defeat. In the end, both sides lost
heavily in this prolonged battle and the Russians retired from
the field of battle. In strategic terms it was a draw, but since
Kuropatkin and his officers had previously spoken of a great

67
impending victory the retirement was yet another blow to the
morale of the Russian soldiers and their officers. The battle
degenerated into a succession of frontal attacks and counter-
attacks. Sometimes the two forces advanced at the same time
and met head-on, a situation for which the Russian officers
were quite untrained (their manuals dealt only with defensive
tactics and offensive tactics, not with both at the same time).
Because of the superiority of the Russian artillery, the Japanese
often resorted to night attacks, when artillery fire was less
effective. The Russians, too, began to experiment with night
attacks, but were less successful for the same reason: they lost
the benefit of superior artillery. Kuropatkin did venture a
flanking attack, massing large reserves on his wing and then
sending some (but not all) into the attack. But he only let them
advance for about two miles before halting them. All this
positional warfare, when a more dynamic manoeuvring could
have been undertaken by either side if only a few risks had been
taken, foreshadowed the techniques of the First World War.
Russian attacking troops were formed up in columns by
companies in accordance with the century-old doctrine of
‘momentum’ in attack and the supremacy of the bayonet.
With such formations only a proportion of the attackers could
use their rifles, and they presented a very vulnerable target to
machine guns. The British military attaché, who was an eye-
witness, wrote that in this open locality great masses of Russians
could be seen in formations which he had never previously
encountered except on parade.
Also foreshadowing the First World War was the aftermath
of the Sha Ho; both sides because of the cold and the danger of
artillery fire took to covered trenches and heated dug-outs
for the winter. Kuropatkin, however, was anxious to undertake
some operation during the winter which would raise morale and
restore his reputation. He decided on a raid on the Japanese
supply base at Yinkou; this would not only serve as a demon-
stration but would delay the arrival of Nogi’s Third Army
from Port Arthur by interfering with its supply route. Although
the plan for this operation was worked out in November, it
did not begin until January, which gave plenty of time for
advance news of it to reach the Japanese via the St Petersburg
newspapers. However, perhaps because they were tired of
waiting, the Japanese seem to have been unprepared when the
attack eventually came. Horsemen, 7,500 of them, with their
light artillery, took part in the Russian enterprise, which was
intended to make a wide detour around the Japanese western
flank and then ravage the rear supply lines, damage the railway, Above: Kuropatkin inspects
the battlefield of the Sha Ho:
and culminate in the destruction of supply dumps at Yinkou. an artist’s impression
Because the terrain traversed offered little in the way of
fodder, the Russian expedition, commanded by the Cossack
General Mishchenko, was accompanied by 1,500 pack animals.

68
This meant that it was not going to be a fast dashing action
in the alleged Cossack tradition, but an operation which would
be carried on at walking pace. Further delay was caused by
skirmishes with Japanese rear detachments. En route a number
of Japanese supply vehicles were destroyed and a detachment
wrecked the railway line. This wrecking, however, showed a
lack of technical competence; both the railway and its accom-
panying telegraph line were restored by Japanese engineers in
six hours. Evidently Kuropatkin and his subordinates believed
that the railway could be put out of action for days merely by
knocking out a length of track.
Arrived at Yinkou, Mishchenko rested for the night and
launched an attack the next morning. He used less than a
quarter of his men for this, the remainder being employed on
diversionary activities. One detachment was sent to cut the
Tashichiao—Yinkou branch railway, so as to prevent Japanese
troops being sent to reinforce the small force defending the
town. However, the detachment dallied, and cut the line only
after a train of Japanese reinforcements had already passed. In
consequence, Russian cavalry advancing to attack Yinkou
station found itself overtaken by a trainload of interested
Japanese infantry, who got there first. With this reinforcement,
facing an attack by troops who had not thoroughly recon-
noitred the ground and had only light artillery, the Japanese
held off the attackers until Mishchenko gave the order to retire.
Some Japanese supply dumps had been set on fire, either by
Russian guns or by the Japanese in anticipation of their
capture by the Russians, but this was a small success to set
against Mishchenko’s 400-odd casualties. Later in January
Kuropatkin undertook another offensive, on a rather larger
scale. His plan was again drawn up to incorporate the observa-
tions of officers and as a result had all the appearance of an
attack planned by a committee. No risks were to be taken.
Only one of the three armies would participate, the others
would come in only after success had been achieved. And
Grippenberg, the commander of that army, so arranged his
attack that it too would start with only part of his forces
engaged. All this was a recipe for failure, because the advantage
of the initiative was lost; the masses of the Russian forces
would be absent from the first crucial engagements. Moreover,
as previously, the Russian commanders were under strict
supervision (by letter) by Kuropatkin and could hardly act
independently. At one stage of this unsuccessful battle of
Sandepu, Stakelberg against instructions attacked and cap-
tured a key objective; for this he was later relieved of his
position as corps commander. The result of this battle was a
little ground gained by the Russians at a cost of 12,000 casual-
ties, against a Japanese loss of 9,000. Many of the wounded died
from cold while awaiting pick-up by Red Cross detachments.

69
Pe
When the war started, the fortification of Port Arthur was far
from complete. Most of the guns planned for the seaward
defence were already emplaced, but few of those designed for
landward defence were ready. The population of Port Arthur
was about 30,000, plus the garrison and the naval establish-~
ment. Since its acquisition by the Russians it had grown and
had been extended into the so-called New Town. After 9
February the programme for landworks was feverishly pressed
ahead, many of the old and ineffective Chinese fortifications
being replaced. By the time the Japanese had succeeded in
laying the town under siege, some of the positions were
complete, although more could have been done if there had
been more time and more material; barbed wire, among other
things, was in desperately short supply. Fortification work was
conducted especially well after the arrival of General Kondra-
tenko, a sapper officer of great competence who subsequently
became the life and soul of the defence. The landward approach
to Port Arthur, from any direction, was dominated by hills, and
the most vital of these were fortified. In their earlier tactics,
the Japanese commanders behaved as though they believed
that Russian Port Arthur would be just as easy a nut to crack
as it had been in 1894 when they captured it from the Chinese Previous pages: View from a
captured Russian strongpoint
with the loss of only eighteen men; but the Russian defences near Port Arthur. In the shelter
were quite different from the Chinese. of the hill the Japanese have
Port Arthur, isolated apart from the occasional blockade established a camp

runner entering its harbour, was defended by about 42,000 Above: Japanese howitzers,
men and 500 guns, plus the crews and lighter guns of the well concealed, bombard
203 Metre Hill at a range of
warships so long as the squadron was unable to leave. The about three miles
Japanese had about 90,000 men and about 500 guns which,
however, were supplemented during the siege. While the Below: General Stoessel in
Japanese were plentifully supplied with ammunition and food one of his heroic poses
via Dalny, the Russians had to rely almost entirely on stocks.
When the siege began they had enough flour for six months,
but meat for only three weeks. The defence of the town rested
on three lines: there was a great entrenchment, virtually a last
ditch, encircling the landward side of the old town; then, at a
radius of about 4,000 yards from the centre, was the Chinese
Wall, which enclosed both the old and new towns and which
had been refortified with concrete forts and new entrenchments;
beyond this were the fortified hills, mostly to the north-west
of the town but with two important positions to the north-east.
These last two hills were the first to be attacked by the
besiegers, and were captured after two days of intense bom-
bardment and costly infantry assaults. It was the loss of these
two hills which prompted the Tsar to order the ships to sail
to Vladivostok. Their return after their defeat on 10 August
at the Battle of the Yellow Sea, caused a temporary loss of
spirit among the garrison, but their guns and men later fought
effectively on land.

72

Above: The besieger of Port
Arthur. General Nogi sits for
the photographer
Perhaps because of memories of his exploits in the war
against China, perhaps because he was not aware of the differ-
ence which the quick firing gun, the magazine rifle, and the
machine gun had made to warfare, Nogi decided to capture
Port Arthur by a frontal assault. After sending Port Arthur
the traditional summons to surrender, which met with the
traditional ‘we shall fight to the last man’ type response, Nogi
launched on 19 August the first of a series of unsuccessful
assaults which would continue until the 24th. Most of the
attack was directed against the Chinese Wall, although the
outermost of the fortified hills (174 Metre Hill) was also in-
cluded. Most of the fighting took place at night, for it was soon
realized that the new quick firing weapons made day attacks too
costly. But even with night assaults the entrenched Russians,
picking out the attackers with naval searchlights, inflicted
thousands of casualties. After five days the Japanese suffered
over 15,000 casualties and had captured only 174 Metre Hill
and two Russian positions in front of the Chinese Wall. At this
rate Port Arthur would not be captured before the last Japanese
infantryman had been put out of action. Nogi therefore aban-
doned the general assault on 24 August. The next day, farther
north, General Oyama launched his attack against Kuropatkin
at Liaoyang, realizing it was pointless to wait any longer for
Nogi’s Third Army to join his forces. Meanwhile, Nogi sent
for heavy guns and ordered his sappers to go ahead with siege
works ; he now realized that the capture of Port Arthur would
be a long and expensive process.
Siege works at this stage usually meant the digging of
approach trenches. close to the enemy positions. When the
trench was sufficiently near, a trench parallel to the objective
would then be joined to it. In this, infantry could be assembled
under cover and, after artillery bombardment of the enemy
position, go into the assault. In mid-September one fortified
position was captured by repetition of this laborious process,
but another, 203 Metre Hill, defied capture. These attacks,
still made by densely packed lines of infantry, were not good
for morale. They rarely succeeded, and when they did casualties
were demoralizingly high. However, by the end of September
heavy guns began to arrive from Japan via Dalny. These
included eighteen eleven-inch howitzers, with a range of
10,000 yards, and 550 Ib. shells which the Russians called
‘train shells’ because of the noise they made in approach.
During the remainder of the siege no fewer than 36,000 of these
terrifying projectiles were fired into the defences, not to speak
of nearly one and a half million smaller shells. Apart from the
gradual crumbling of fortifications under shellfire, the Japanese
began to make successful mining assaults. These took the form
of underground passages dug up to the Russian positions, which
were then blown up by charges or mines. In October, by means
73

Left: Japanese infantry
advancing towards the firing
line
of mining followed by immediate infantry attacks exploiting
the gap made by the explosions, a number of strongpoints were
taken, but not 203 Metre Hill. At the end of October there was
a second general assault on the defences following the success-
ful mining of a Russian key position. But this, too, was repulsed.
News that the Russian Baltic Squadron was on its way to the
Far East gave new urgency to the Japanese attacks. If this
fleet could join the ships trapped at Port Arthur Japan would
be in danger of losing command of the sea, and hence losing
the war. 203 Metre Hill commanded a fine view of Port Arthur’s
harbour; if it was captured, long range guns would be able to
shell the Russian squadron at leisure. Sapping and mining were
already in progress around this hill, as elsewhere. To defend it
and its smaller adjacent neighbours the Russians had a force
of about 2,000 men. For two days it was bombarded by
Japanese artillery and then, in the evening of 27 November, the
first assault was launched. This captured the barbed wire
entanglements which, very slowly, were cut under fire. The
bombardment was resumed and the following day another
infantry assault was made, which was thrown back by a
desperate Russian counter-attack. Murderous fighting, attacks,
counter-attacks, bombardments, minings, sapping, bayonet-
ting, continued for six more days. Finally, on 5 December
a Japanese company managed to enter the redoubt, to find only
a handful of wounded Russians left there, surrounded by piles
of corpses. About 400 Russians had been killed, whereas total
Japanese casualties, including those dead through disease,
in the fight for this hill exceeded 10,000. One eyewitness wrote
that never since the Battle of Borodino in 1812 had so many
dead been crowded’ into so small a space; the sight was es-
pecially horrible because the Japanese turned green when dead.
But at least the hill had been captured. Almost immediately
observers were brought up who could direct fire on the Russian
ships. The latter were put out of action within a few days.
The shelling of the Russian ships meant that, strategically
speaking, the Japanese no longer had any need to proceed with
the capture of Port Arthur. But the whole affair was now
largely one of prestige. The siege had attracted great public
attention all over the world, and the Japanese had done little
worthy of applause apart from showing suicidal courage. It
was the Russians who were gaining the respect of the world.
Prints of a painting of the unprepossessing General Stoessel,
standing like an over-fattened bull on the bastions of Port Arthur,
sold in thousands of copies, and not only in Russia. If there was
a hero in popular imagination, it was he. The real hero, General
Kondratenko, was killed on 15 December by an 11-inch shell
which entered a fort he was supervising. After his death the
garrison seemed to lose some of its spirit. Apart from occasional
horsemeat, and dog disguised as lamb sold by Chinese mer-
79

Left: This artist’s impression
of the fighting for 203 Metre
Hill is in accord with the
descriptions of participants.
Certainly fighting here was
quite as intense as the picture
suggests
chants, the soldiers had eaten no meat for weeks. More serious,
they had no vegetables either. Scurvy was taking a toll just as
heavy as that exacted by the Japanese attacks. Sapping and
mining continued, more Russian strongpoints being taken by
these means. The garrison of one fort was completely wiped
out when their grenade magazine was mined. But despite their
other preoccupations the Russians continued to fight as
desperately as before. On 1 January 1905 one of the forts of the
Chinese Wall was captured, and soon after a strongpoint
between the Chinese Wall and the last ditch defence was taken.
But Stoessel had already offered to negotiate a surrender. On
2 January, conversing in English, representatives of the two
sides agreed on surrender terms. When this was known many
Russian soldiers abandoned their arms and began to loot the
town. On 4 January the fortifications were formally handed over
to the Japanese, and the garrison marched out as prisoners of
war. This fate was, however, not shared by Stoessel. He had
shown his gentlemanly qualities by offering a white horse to his
‘opponent General Nogi. He had sat down for a group photo-
graph of the higher Russian and Japanese officers. He had,
like Nogi, just been awarded an Iron Cross by the Kaiser, for
whom the Russo-Japanese War was a great excitement. And
now he returned to Russia, having given his parole to the
Japanese.
Gradually rumours leaked out to the outside world that the
Russian commanders; far from being a band of brothers, had
been a bunch of intriguing and quarrelsome individuals with
little military talent. Only the late Kondratenko was acknow-
ledged to have been a real hero. As for Stoessel, he was
allegedly the worst of all. After the war, partly but not entirely
aS a scapegoat, Stoessel was court-martialled. Among the
charges was that being the commander of the military region
and the most senior in rank, he had interfered with the duties
of the Commandant of Port Arthur, General Smirnov, who
was entrusted with the conduct of the defence. Stoessel had
publicly overridden Smirnov’s orders, usually to bad effect, and
Smirnov had appealed to Kuropatkin. Kuropatkin had tele-
graphed Stoessel to hand over his duties and leave Port Arthur
in a blockade-runner. At the same time Kuropatkin wired
Smirnov to tell him about this decision to get rid of Stoessel.
Stoessel, however, ignored the first telegram and intercepted
Smirnov’s before it reached the latter, and continued to play
his old overbearing role. Meanwhile his subordinate and friend
General Fock wrote ‘observations’ about the conduct of the
siege, in which several commanders were ridiculed, accused of
cowardice and ignorance. Stoessel, it was alleged, allowed
Fock to circulate these observations, thus damaging morale.
Among other accusations was the allegation, which seems to be
true, that after the Battle of Nan Shan Stoessel reported to
79
Kuropatkin that no ammunition had been left behind in the
retreat (untrue) and that the retreat had been orderly whereas
in fact it had been so panic-stricken that the men burst through
their own barbed wire entanglements. Moreover, in this report
Stoessel gave the impression that he had been active on the
field of battle, whereas he had been in Port Arthur the whole
time. He had weakened the defence of the town by dismissing
the head of the fire brigade and permitting, before the attackers
closed in, the export from Port Arthur of tinned food. As if all
this were not enough, ‘He knowingly and deceitfully and
wrongly presented Lieutenant General Fock for the Order of
St George, 3rd class, on the occasion of the battle lost by him’
at Nan Shan, ‘. . . in which this general had shown his complete
incapacity ;Major-General Nadien for the Order of St George,
3rd class, for the same battle, in which he had done nothing in
particular; and Major-General Reiss for the Order of St
George, 4th class, whereas this general himself admitted that he
had carried out no exploit worthy of such recognition .. .’
However, the most serious charge related to the surrender;
Stoessel had called a council of war, in which a majority of
officers had been opposed to a surrender, but following which
Stoessel and Fock nevertheless sent an offer to the Japanese.
Such a step, without convening a second council of war to
approve it, was plainly against regulations. Moreover, before
an agreement was actually signed with the Japanese Stoessel
had ordered the evacuation of certain key strongpoints. He had
also telegraphed the Tsar saying that food and munition stocks
were exhausted when in fact there were supplies for several
more weeks.
The court-martial decided that on all except one count the
charges were either unproven, or if true were of no legal force,
and that Stoessel was justified in some of his criticized actions.
However, his over-hasty and unjustified surrender was proven.
For this he was sentenced to death by firing squad. However,
this was commuted to life imprisonment and in the end
Stoessel spent only a few months in gaol. This was probably
rough justice, because although Stoessel had behaved stupidly
and overbearingly, his conduct was probably no worse than
many who gave evidence against him. A situation where a
commander entrusted with a particular task is burdened with
the ‘assistance’ of a higher-ranking officer is always liable to
Right: Disposal of the dead
cause discord. In several months of siege, with many high
was often a problem during
officers being of doubtful character, it was hardly surprising the defence of Port Arthur.
that intrigue and hatred should develop. This unpleasant Here, dead Japanese infantry
have been piled in a trench
aftermath tended to obscure the fact that, in spite of or because
actually inside the Russian
of Stoessel, the defence had been conducted gallantly and for position which they had
the most part wisely. Japanese casualties amounted to about unsuccessfully stormed. Mean-
while, the defenders take a
60,000, almost a complete army. The Russian casualties were
break, waiting for the next
a little more than 30,000. assault

78
 9. EYEWITNESS:
IN THE TRENCHES
OF PORT ARTHUR
From the Diary of a Sapper Officer
7 October
During the day Battery A was bombarded by 11-inch shells.
One of the casemate traverses was destroyed. A concrete
arch was broken through and the explosion of a shell killed one
of the soldiers there and wounded several others.
Some changes were noted in the little-by-little attack of the
Japanese, mainly against Kuropatkin Lunette and Fortification
2, in front of which have appeared new approach trenches and
new parallel trenches. The Japanese are working with amazing
persistance, in their characteristically slow but systematic way.
They carry out this kind of attack superbly, and we are power-
less to seriously hinder their slow approach towards us.
At 3 a.m. there was a sortie from Fort 2, which I mentioned
yesterday. The organisation of this sortie was entrusted to me,
because its main aim was reconnaissance of the enemy’s works
close to the fort. 40 infantrymen and 5 sappers took part.
Because of the failure of the two preceding sorties the objectives
of this one were narrowed down as much as possible. The men
were ordered to go round the foot of the glacis and its slopes
and to direct their attention to the heads of the enemy’s three
approach trenches. If possible, the works were to be wrecked
and then, without getting involved in pursuit or in occupying
the enemy trenches, they were to return immediately. 25
infantrymen and 3 sappers under the command of Ensign
Marchenko were to go around the fort from the left and lie
hidden on the glacis. Ensign Marchenko is a volunteer and a
veteran of the 1877-78 campaign, and has already received all
four grades of the St George Cross. He went with the firm
intention to achieve the aim which had been set, whose
seriousness he fully understood. The other part, 15 men under
the command of under-officer Berezovsky, was to go through
the barbed wire of the glacis on the right face of the fort, and
similarly lie quietly until the general signal was given for
both parties to attack. This signal would be given by search-
lights trained on the summit of nearby Dagushan. Initially the
searchlight would be trained at 2.45 as a signal to get ready
and then, exactly at 3, would come the signal for the general
attack, at which both sections would simultaneously rush down
the glacis to the objectives. In this movement we counted on not
immediately encountering machine gun fire... Above: For several months the
town of Port Arthur was under
Until the moment of our discovery by the Japanese there was
sporadic bombardment. Here,
not to be a single shot, apart from the routine firing at the in an artist’s depiction, a
approaches and posts. But as soon as the Japanese opened fire restaurant is hit
on the sortie, the guns and rifles of our neighbouring fortifica-
tions were to immediately bombard the Japanese trenches... to
attract their fire. At the same time, from the covered path of Previous pages: With two
the salient corner there was to be a demonstration, in which lookouts keeping watch for
Japanese attacks, the defenders
dummies would be raised up and stones, tied with string, of a Port Arthur strongpoint
thrown into the barbed wire, so as to create the impression take time off for lunch

82
that we were advancing from the centre, and not from the
sides. As all the participants of the sortie had been acquainted
with the locality and knew the aim of the sortie, everything
went off well, just as was planned. The sortie was quite
unexpected by the Japanese, and when our men leaped into
the heads of the approach trenches, the Japanese panicked
completely. From the glacis I clearly heard their cries, ex-
pressing the greatest fright. They only put up a ragged rifle
fire and their machine guns were at first quite silent. After the
cries of the Japanese we heard brief ‘hurrahs’ and after 5 or 10
minutes our men appeared at the caponier, where they had
rushed for fear that the Japanese would recover and begin to
operate their machine guns. Our men, however, soon got
themselves in hand and unhurriedly and successfully went
round the caponier and lowered themselves down steps into
the ditch.
Questioning the participants led to the conclusion that the
Japanese are building galleries to undermine the caponier of
Fort 2. One under the axis of the caponier and another to the
left towards the left salient corner. On the right no mining work
was discovered. The entries to the galleries are concealed in
dugouts, in one of which one of our sappers managed to throw
a 6-pound charge. In the left dugout a faint light reflection
was seen, as though something was shining in the distance.
We had three killed and seven wounded; among the latter,
causing general grief, was Ensign Marchenko, badly wounded.
In terms of results our sortie was very successful; our counter-
mining would no longer need to be carried on blindly groping
as previously.
Incidentally, at 2 a.m., i.e. before the sortie, at the head of
our own left gallery . . . could be heard the sound of picks and
shovels. The work in the gallery had to be stopped, and the men
withdrawn, because there was a danger that the Japanese would
place a charge from above and destroy the head of our
gallery .. . In view of this I ordered the work to be stopped
until we received the results of our sortie...
8 October
Japanese entrenchments are appearing everywhere, from
where they can bombard any little path or corner of our posi-
tion. Between Fort 2, Fortification 3, and the railway there is
literally nowhere where one can show oneself without risking
being shot. Our counter-trenches move forward impossibly
slowly. With the Japanese, trenches sprout in one night, like
mushrooms.
The hero of yesterday’s sortie, Ensign Marchenko, is dead.
Everyone is terribly sorry for him. It is a great loss for us.
Today it is the turn of the Cemetery Redoubt. The Japanese
have become so spendthrift that they are shooting 11-inch shells
at this, a temporary redoubt with timber covering.

83
 Right: Some of the 11-inch
9 October howitzers which were brought *
These last days the Japanese approaches to Kuropatkin to help in the siege of Port Arthur.
Lunette have been developing noticably. At Fort 2 almost Having won command of
nothing new, but the infantrymen from the caponier have seen the sea, the Japanese felt able
to transfer heavy coast-defence
rocks being carried out from under the glacis, obviously from guns hitherto defending
mining galleries. In our counter mines today for the first time their home ports
was heard a suspicious sound. However I listened for a long
time in both galleries and heard nothing. I think this is simply
a mistake caused by an involuntary movement by someone
in the caponier. All the same I ordered the miners to listen as
carefully and as often as possible.
On the positions it has been relatively quiet, except that
towards evening the Japanese opened a quite rapid fire on the
locality where our staff is situated and on the right, along the
road to the town. 11-inch shells today landed in the port,
between Battery 20 and the Central Wall, and one shell hit
Fortification 3. This time little damage was done. At Battery A
one gun was burst by its own charge.
10 October Below: The Japanese 11-inch
Our own and the Japanese trenches are now so close that howitzers, which played so
frequent and continuous rifle fire is inevitable, in which each crucial a role in the attack on
Port Arthur, were well concealed
side tries to spot the enemy and put a bullet into him. Our and well protected. Only a
soldiers resort to the following method: one man fixes to his cloud of smoke (concealed from
back a stick with a fur cap on the end and a greatcoat thrown the Russians by the intervening
hill) indicates their position
over it and then crawls along the trench; the Japanese immedi- in this photograph
ately open fire on the moving target, thus revealing themselves
and making it possible to shoot one or other of their riflemen.
. . . Meanwhile every day the burden of the siege becomes
ever more noticeable. The cold is coming and at nights in the
trenches it is almost freezing. In the light dugouts it is
becoming uncomfortable, and in the trenches quite impossible.
The danger from enemy shells and bullets grows all the time.
Food is getting scarcer; for a long time there has been no meat,
and tinned food is very short and we are treated to it rarely.
Horsemeat is issued but cannot be increased because the horses
are very necessary for transporting materials, shells, and food
to the positions. But our soldiers don’t seem to notice all this
and seem to be becoming ever more cheerful and lively.
In town it is daily becoming more difficult to buy anything.
Meat costs 1:50 roubles per pound and one needs luck to get it;
it is available only if someone takes it into his head to sell a
cow, and there are very few cows left now. A chicken costs 12
roubles, a goose up to 20. Eggs are one rouble each. Onions
1 rouble per pound. A pound of horsemeat half a rouble.
We have enough tinned food left for 11 days, and flour. for
87 days. There are still a few biscuits, but butter has dis-
appeared. There is one good thing; the time left for us to en-
dure this siege must be less than the time we have already gone
through.

84
13 October
At about 4 p.m. the enemy intensified his fire on the entrench-
ments in front of Fort 3 and also on the part of the open
caponier 3° occupied by us. For a whole hour this hellish
fire continued on the trenches, and at the same time all fortified
points and batteries from Fort 5 to Battery A were bombarded.
At about 5 p.m. we began to clear out of the caponier and
trenches, and the Japanese succeeded in occupying the right
half of the trenches in front of Fort 3, and the retrenchment
and the rear part of caponier 3. There was a moment when the
trench in front of Fort 3 was entirely occupied by the Japanese,
but we then detonated the 9 charges we had previously laid
there. Eyewitnesses say that there was a terrific explosion.
The Japanese rushed out of the trench, but our men did not
take advantage of the situation, occupying only the left half
of the trench, together with its just-built tributary. Thus
again an abnormal and strange division has happened. At
about 11 p.m. we tried to seize from two directions the trench
in front of Fortification 3 but it seems that this did not succeed;
our counter-attack was too indecisive and the once triumphant
Russian ‘hurrahs’ lacked confidence. Our soldiers’ nerves have
been weakened; we have let them get used to all kinds of
protective cover.

85
 At 4 a.m. in the left gallery in front of Fort 2 the work of
the Japanese quite unexpectedly became audible; the thud of
their tools became ever closer and distinct. When, at about 9
a.m. I listened to them, it seemed that the enemy was digging a
few feet away to the left and somewhat above. Calculations
showed that for an explosion which would not break the surface
of the ground about 8 pounds of powder would be required. I
immediately gave the order to prepare a chamber for the charge,
and the necessary materials to block up the chamber. After
listening extremely carefully we came to the conclusion that the
enemy was moving downwards in a narrow shaft from the
surface of the glacis, and intended to destroy our left gallery.
Speed was essential now, so as not to let slip the chance to
chase the enemy away; his task, evidently, was to paralyse our
countermining so as to enable him to approach by his own
galleries and then with a boosted charge to destroy the caponier.
We are convinced of this by the sound of distant work in front
of the centre of the caponier—probably this is what we heard
the other day.

ov ga
14 October
There was feverish activity all night at Fort 2, as the charge
was placed in the chamber and then blocked up. The work
of the Japanese gradually sounded more and more distinct, at
first on the left and somewhat in front, and then behind; i.e.
they passed by at a very close distance, we could hear them
coughing and talking. As we hastily arranged the chamber, and Above: Simplified diagram
later blocked it up, we continually made a noise with a pick, and showing the principle of
approach by zigzag and
later a hammer, against the wall separating the gallery from parallel trenches
the neighbouring shaft, in order to deceive the enemy’s
vigilance. The enemy was ceaselessly listening to our work;
when we stopped knocking he immediately himself became
silent. We feared above all that he would realize the purpose
of our work and then quickly sink a charged shaft from his
upper gallery by means of which, it seemed to us, he could
with a double charge destroy our gallery and all our hopes of
success. But, luckily, the noise and the work in the enemy’s
gallery continued unchanged. We finished blocking up only
Right: Despite the obvious
at 11 a.m. We took the precaution of fixing three detonators, transformation of war into a
and provided two electric plungers. At midday the garrison mechanical process, western
commander arrived, and as he definitely wanted to see the correspondents and their
readers were reluctant to
effect of the explosion we quickly ran wires and a battery to concede that all the alleged
the front wall. At 12.30 the commandant personally exploded romance had gone out of it.
the charge. Above the position of the enemy shaft arose a great Hence the glamourization of
real or imagined acts of chivalry.
column of smoke, only slightly tinted with earthdust. Rocks Here an artist depicts a
and boards flew up. Our own gallery and chamber were not Russian soldier carrying a
boarded, so it was clear that it was the boards of the enemy wounded Japanese officer back
to the Japanese trenches, after
shaft which were flying in the air. According to observers in an unsuccessful assault on one
caponier 2 and in the Kuropatkin Lunette, smoke also appeared of the Port Arthur positions

86
from the lowest exit of the gallery. The ground was not broken ;
the charge had succeeded perfectly...
At about 11 p.m. an enemy 11-inch shell struck the arch of
the rear gallery of the left salient corner of Fort 2 and pene-
trated it, making a gap just above the entrance to our left
countermining gallery. The hole was quickly blocked by
sandbags and pieces of concrete in an endeavour to hide it from
outside view. But the Japanese noticed it and approached
stealthily along a hollow on top of the glacis to the caponier,
being able to do this quite unseen. They inserted in the edges
of the hole and in the blocking materials explosive, charges
which widened the aperture. Several brave ones jumped into
the furthest casemate of the caponier, followed by about 20
others, armed with grenades and explosive charges. A battle
began inside the caponier itself. When I, having heard about
this, ran to the caponier, I saw the following sight: inside the
caponier there was almost total obscurity, making it difficult
for the Japanese to shoot us. All around were the bitter
suffocating fumes from the detonation of explosive charges,
whose fiery glow every instant illuminated this obscurity.
The fort commander and almost all the officers had been re- Above: The Russo-Chinese
Bank was one of the main
moved half-dead, having lost consciousness from suffocation. instruments of Russian expansion
The garrison in a panic was rushing about the narrow case- in the east. One of the first
mates and the corridors of the caponier and the escarpment Japanese shells to land in Port
Arthur struck its local branch
gallery. At first it was impossible to decide what to do. Then,
having encountered sapper lieutenant Levberg, who had been
able to keep his presence of mind in this hell, I requested him
to organize a logical defence of the caponier, blocking the
corridors with sandbags. I called by telephone Lieutenant
Deboriya-Mokrievich, requesting him to come immediately
with explosive charge, hand grenades (which he himself was
charged with making) and electricians. With the charges I
envisaged blowing up, from the covered ditch, the embrasure
in the casemate occupied by the Japanese and then to throw
inside a big charge in order to completely clean out the
Japanese. However, this was not necessary; after half an hour
the Japanese could not stand the suffocating atmosphere of the
caponier, or they ran out of hand grenades, and they left the
casemate of their own volition, carrying with them through the
gap in the wall all their dead and wounded . .

10 November
At about 5 p.m. the Japanese unexpectedly rushed out of the
head of their sap in front of Battery B and threw themselves
into our lower trench. In the trench only the sentries were
prepared and about 15-30 brave Japanese managed to jump
into the trench, finishing off the left side with its 46 riflemen.
Probably the first men were followed by others, and there

88

Below: Service as usual in a
shell-damaged Port Arthur
restaurant
began a lively exchange of fire. Enemy shrapnel and mortar
bombs rained down. The smoke from the firing and the explo-
sions wrapped around the whole area below Battery B so that
it was literally impossible to make out anything. The firing of
the riflemen and artillery was quite disorderly and aimless,
but at the same time extraordinarily intense . .
As always, it was very difficult to drive out the Japanese
from the trenches; this needed almost half an hour and a great
expenditure of grenades. The unsuitable construction of our
trenches was clearly illustrated. They consist of a deep narrow
channel with board firing steps on which the riflemen feel like
chickens on a laying rack. It is impossible to fire well from these
trenches and it is likewise impossible to give any help to a
part where the enemy has broken in: one has to squeeze past
the men already occupying the trench. To carry out the
wounded is torture. It is very difficult for an officer to pass
along to regulate the firing... .
We managed to throw out the Japanese towards 7 p.m. .
11 November
At half an hour past midnight there again began restless rifle
firing at Battery B, which soon turned into intensive firing.
Guns also began to roar. Once again the Japanese rushed from
their two saps towards our lower trench. Two officers and
about ten men jumped into the trench but could not hold on
for very long and most were killed. One of the officers managed
to jump out, but he was nailed by bayonet thrusts in the back.
It is surprising that the Japanese instead of real decisive
assaults should undertake this kind of sortie at a time when the
whole garrison is weak, lacks proper food and ammunition, and
might find one decisive blow too much for it...
29 November
... Lhe Japanese firing has become a little more lively. 11-inch
guns have shelled forts 3 and 2, each of which received about
50 shots.
No special damage was caused, but the breastwork has been
damaged in places and at Fort 3 several shells fell into the
forward shelter, cracking the arch of the communication
tunnel. Zaredutny and nearby sections of the wall were shelled.
The town was not neglected; this time the New Town was
shelled, the 9th Hospital almost being set on fire by several
shells. ‘Zvezdochka’ was also hit, as well as Churin’s warehouse
and many...
(The diary ends here, the writer being killed by the same
eleven-inch shell which killed Kondratenko.)
89
10. THE BATTLE
OF MUKDEN
The Battle of Mukden was the final big encounter between
Kuropatkin and the Japanese armies. It lasted two weeks, and
some units on both sides were in action for one week con-
tinuously ; the strain which the new prolonged type of battle put
on both men and their commanders was thus once more
underlined. By this time the Russians were in superior num-
bers, especially in artillery. They had a total of about 380,000
men available, as compared to the Japanese 320,000. The
Japanese armies had been swelled by the addition of General
Nogi’s troops fresh from the capture of Port Arthur, and by
the Fifth Army, recently landed from Japan, which was march-
ing from the south-east through the mountains towards
Mukden.
The Russian position south of Mukden was about forty-
seven miles long from east to west. The outer line of defence
was partly two, partly three, lines strengthened with fortified
villages and redoubts, all surrounded by barbed wire, man-traps
and abattis. All the entrenchments were connected by tele-
phone to each other and to headquarters. Half the troops
stayed in the positions under cover, while the other half rested Previous pages: Japanese infantry
take a rest in a well-trenched
in the rear. Nearer Mukden, just south of the Hun Ho,
area behind the front line. By
there was another line of entrenchments, while on the other this time khaki uniforms had
side of the river there were more entrenchments to the east been issued, matching almost
of Mukden. The western approach to the town was covered by exactly the hue of the dry
Manchurian hillsides
a series of redoubts and fortified villages. The Japanese
defensive line was about forty miles long with well-protected
flanks. Fortification was strong, though not everywhere as
highly developed as the Russian defences. In the Japanese
line, from west to east facing northwards, stood the Second
Army of General Oku, the Fourth Army of General Nodzu, Below: The Russians dig in
and the First Army of General Kuroki. Behind General Oku’s outside Mukden
men was stationed the newly arrived Third Army of General
Nogi. Meanwhile the Fifth Army under General Kawamura
was making its laborious way over snowclad mountain tracks
towards Mukden from the south-east.
As at Liaoyang, the country to the west of the main north—
south road was flat and cultivated. This land was not easily
crossed by men or horses, because the deep furrows were
frozen hard. In general, temperatures of two degrees above
freezing were experienced during the day, but at night there
were twenty or more degrees of frost. East of the road the
terrain became hilly, then mountainous. Apart from the river
valleys and the tracks which followed them, this land could be
regarded as impassable for most infantry and for artillery.
On 19 February a Russian council of war decided to take
the offensive on 25 February, rolling back the Japanese
westernmost positions. Appropriate orders were given, but
these were later cancelled. According to some accounts, this
change of plan was caused by the discovery that a Japanese
92

Above: In the Manchurian
winter: temperatures were
extremely low, although there
was little snow. As shown here,
the Japanese, like the Russians,
built substantial dugouts
spy ring in Mukden knew all about it. More likely, however,
is that Kuropatkin realized that things were happening on the
Japanese side which anticipated his plans. In fact, as it turned
out, the Japanese had themselves decided to take the offensive
at this same time. Kawamura’s Fifth Army in the south-east
had driven back some Russian outposts on the approaches to
Mukden, while Kuropatkin also received a report (false) that
Japanese reserves were moving towards the east. Kuropatkin
revoked his attack orders on 24 February, and dispatched the
reserves of his western wing towards the eastern wing, where
he expected the Japanese to attack.
The Japanese plan was to make frontal attacks on the
Russian positions by the Second, Fourth, and First armies and
at the same time to threaten the Russian eastern flank and line
of retreat by Kawamura’s Fifth Army. The latter would draw
away the Russian reserves to the east, enabling Nogi’s Third
Army, hitherto inactive and hidden behind the Second Army,
to appear suddenly on the western flank and by a rapid advance
outflank the Russians and cut the escape route from Mukden
northwards. The destruction of the demoralized Russians
would follow almost as a matter of course. This plan succeeded
almost in every detail, except that the Russians, as usual, fought
a stubborn rearguard action which enabled most of their forces
to escape the trap.
At many points in the battle the Russians could have changed
the outcome by a bold move, for the Japanese generalship was
not faultless and left itself open to disastrous counter-attack
at least twice. In particular, General Nogi’s Third Army, when
it emerged and streamed northwards in an extended column,
was wide open to a Russian counter-attack ;but at this point the
local Russian commanders were more interested in adopting a
defensive posture. The only Russian forces which did attack
were two divisions which in fact should have stayed where they
were. These two divisions confronted the advance of the Third
Army, secure in their entrenched positions. But, perhaps as
a result of the Russian army doctrine about the effectiveness
of the mass bayonet charge, they emerged from their trenches
and attacked the Japanese in the open. Whereas if they had
waited in their positions for the Japanese to attack they would
have inflicted heavy casualties, with this manouevre they them-
selves were exposed to gunfire and suffered a bloody defeat.
Thus the situation in the first days of March was that the
Russian lines had well withstood the Japanese frontal attacks;
here and there the three attacking Japanese armies had gained
ground despite Russian counter-attacks, but the ground gained
was small in proportion to the losses sustained. In the east,
Kawamura’s Fifth Army, advancing in two columns along
parallel river beds, was being held by the Russian forces.
Kuropatkin, having already dispatched reserves from the
93
western sector of the line, was still anticipating that the decisive
struggle would be in the east. In the west, General Nogi had
emerged and was advancing and outflanking the Russians, but
Kuropatkin still regarded this as a diversion. By 4 March,
however, the Russians on the west were clearly outflanked and
were forced to fall back; the fighting front took the form of two
sides of a square. By this time Kuropatkin apparently realized
that the Japanese attack in the west was something more than a
mere diversion. By 8 March a general retreat was inevitable if
encirclement was to be avoided. The retreat went well until
10 March, when Japanese cavalry with their own artillery
pushed into a gap which had formed between two Russian
armies. From this position they were able to disorganize the
retreat of the last Russian units with sallies and artillery fire.
As a result, most of the heavy Russian casualties of the Battle
of Mukden occurred at this stage; hitherto the Japanese had
lost more than the Russians. The total casualties of the battle
were Russians 156,000 (26,000 killed, 90,000 wounded, 40,000
taken prisoner) and Japanese 47,000. The Russian defeat was
therefore a complete defeat. The Japanese had not succeeded
in destroying the Russians, but they had captured Mukden and
inflicted almost fifty per cent casualties on the opposing army.
Kuropatkin’s crucial mistake was the dispatch of the
reserve, standing behind the western sector of his front,
towards the east to counter the anticipated Japanese attack
in that quarter. This reserve was on the move from 24 Feb-
ruary; en route it was recalled to Mukden and not until 6
March, quite tired from its prolonged marching, did it come
into action. And by then it was too late. This Russian mistake
was twofold: the reserve went in the wrong direction, and the
wrong reserve was sent. As the course of the battle showed, the
Russians were more or less secure in their prepared positions ;
only if the Japanese were prepared to accept grievous casualties
could they hope to dislodge their enemy from his trenches and
fortifications. In their main defences the Russians concentrated
more men than were needed; machine guns and magazine
rifles meant that fewer men could defend a line of trenches.
Thus Kuropatkin, when he decided to strengthen his eastern
sector, might well have gathered men from the centre rather
than dispatch his western reserve. As has been shown, the
absence of a reserve in the west enabled the outflanking
Japanese Third Army to move quickly into a dominating
position on the battlefield.
But the whole key to the battle was Kuropatkin’s conviction
that the main Japanese thrust would be on his eastern flank.
Only when it was too late did he realize that the main Japanese
attack would come in the west. This conviction had its sources
both in Japanese deception of Russian intelligence, and in Right: In a Japanese shell-
Russian self-deception. The latter was a consequence of earlier filling tent in Manchuria

94
 LEK

RE
~~.

QE
Russian propaganda. In the land battles preceding Liaoyang
the Russians had been beaten in mountainous territory, and
consequently evolved the convenient explanation that the
Japanese were trained to fight mountain wars whereas most
Russian training was carried out on the plains. As soon as the
Japanese came out on to the plains, said Russian spokesmen,
they would be defeated. Even Liaoyang, fought both on low-
lands and highlands, did not disprove this, for the crucial
outflanking movement was made by the Japanese in the east,
among the mountains. Thus the Russians convinced themselves
that the Japanese preferred to fight on the high ground. In the
weeks preceding Mukden the world’s press forecast that when
the Japanese attack came it would come in the west, on the
plains, because only here could large bodies of troops and their
supplies be manoeuvred in comfort. The Russian staff never-
theless stuck to their belief that the attack, if there was an
attack, would come in the mountainous east. The Japanese
were not slow to supply misinformation which would confirm
this belief. The name of Kawamura’s force, the Fifth Army,
was itself deceptive, because the forces it comprised were con- Above: A Russian 6-inch
siderably less than an army; this meant that Kuropatkin howitzer in Manchuria
already overestimated the strength of the enemy threatening
his eastern flank. Then, one division of General Nogi’s Third
Army was sent to join Kawamura and in due course Kuropatkin
heard that units of the enemy Third Army had been en-
countered in the south-east with Kawamura; Kuropatkin
thus was led to believe that two armies, the Fifth and the Third,
were advancing in that quarter whereas in fact the strength
facing him there was less than one army. As for the bulk of the
Third Army, this stood behind the Second Army on the
Japanese westward sector. Putting one army directly behind
another like this was directly contrary to the recommendations
of the German training manuals, but by this time the Japanese
had sufficient confidence to modify the German doctrines on
which they had once so heavily relied. It was true that placing
one army behind the other meant that the rearward army had to
make a time-consuming detour in order to get into action, but
it had the advantage of concealment. It was essential for the
Japanese plan that the Russians should believe that the Third
Army was in the east, not quietly waiting in the west. Russian
cavalry could not penetrate the Japanese Second Army to
discover the position of the Third; Kuropatkin was completely
deceived, and in the early stages of the battle shifted the centre
of gravity of his forces towards the east, a move which proved
fatal.
The Russo-Japanese War has been described as the first of
the modern wars, and Mukden and Liaoyang as the first of the
modern battles. Probably rightly, for never before had such
great masses of troops been brought into the field of battle,

96

Below: Japanese field guns in
the millet fields of Manchuria.
At this season the millet had
not grown to its 12-foot height.
It was therefore not yet
suitable as cover
and never before had the new weapons of mass destruction
been used in full-scale war. Commentators wrote that these
lessons would be taken to heart, that armies would no longer
be exposed on the battlefield with old-fashioned tactics and
weapons. In fact though, as time passed it seemed that different
soldiers drew different lessons from the war; intelligent ob-
servers used the same facts to draw different conclusions and
the next great war, the Great War, did witness the exposure of
soldiers on the battlefield with outdated tactics if not out-
dated weapons. Nowhere was this divergence of opinion more
significant than in the matter of the impregnable front, for the
frontal attack on fortified lines was one of the bloodiest
features of that later war. Soon after the Russo-Japanese War a
former Inspector-General of the French Army wrote that
the war had shown that it ‘*. . . is almost impossible for a
front protected by really powerful weapons and field defences
to be broken through even by troops of undaunted courage
willing to sacrifice any number of lives. The effectiveness
of enveloping movements has been continually confirmed
wherever it has been possible to hold the enemy fixed in his
positions by vigorous attacks persistently repeated.’ Yet the
younger generation of officers did not accept this. A British
artillery captain who wrote a series of commentaries on the
war had this to say in summing up: ‘It may, however, be
repeated that the offensive, even in frontal attacks on prepared
positions, was constantly finally successful, and that approaches
to these positions were constantly, and attacks on them
occasionally, made at night. The enfilade fire of a few guns
or rifles succeeded in making a whole position untenable.’
Probably both these authors would have agreed that a fortified
line taken in the flank was vulnerable; this weakness of the
line gave rise to fronts of tens of miles in length in 1904—5,
and in the First World War would spawn fronts of hundreds of
miles.
Many believed, with some justification, that any apparent
lessons of the war were devoid of any relevance because the
Russians were so badly led and trained. In other words, that
if another power’s army had been fighting the Japanese the
whole course of the campaign would have been different. The
Russians were indeed outclassed, except in engineering and
artillery, and they were slow to change their methods. Whereas
the Japanese after a few months of war were modifying the
tactics laid down in the German army manuals which they had
hitherto followed, the Russians, right up to the end of the war,
were still using tactics dating from Napoleonic times. A
Russian report described with some amazement how the
Japanese utilized every inch of possible cover in their advances,
‘,, . they become part and parcel of the earth itself, and cases
are on record in which whole regiments have crawled over the
97
ground for hundreds of yards simply so as not to betray their
presence...” Such crawls would not amaze the modern soldier,
but to the Russians they were a great novelty. The Japanese
also made use of night attacks, in which the Russian soldiers
had little training, and they were avid diggers-in. After an
advance, typically at night, the Japanese would dig themselves
in before dawn, ready to make another advance the following
night. This was a far cry from the mass assaults delivered
by both sides in the early battles, and by the Russians through-
out the war.
On several occasions Russian soldiers were ordered to
leave their trenches to make a bayonet attack on their enemy,
and usually as soon as they left their cover they were flattened
by artillery shrapnel fire. The reliance on the bayonet had
its origins in the words of the eighteenth-century Russian
general, Suvorov, whose victorious career inspired succeeding
generations of Russian officers. Suvorov had said that the
bullet is a fool, whereas the bayonet knows what it is doing,
and his words were learned by heart by Russian soldiers.
The bayonet became a symbol; it was always attached to the
rifle, in action and out of action. By 1905 the bullet may still
have been a fool, but this was compensated by the magazine
rifle and by the machine gun, which could fire hundreds of
fools per minute.
Love of fixed positions did mean that the Russians were
highly skilled in fortification. As the Japanese discovered, the
capture of Russian Port Arthur was not like the capture of
Chinese Port Arthur. The Russian engineering corps had
always been highly respected in the west; Russian manuals on
fortification and siegework had been translated for use by
foreign armies. Despite the haste with which they were built,
the Port Arthur defences lasted a long time, even when eleven-
inch shells were unexpectedly brought against them. The other
field in which Russia had superiority was artillery. It is true
that many guns were lost, but this was usually because the
artillery horses were killed. The Russian guns included many
quick-firers (the Japanese quick-firer was no such thing,
having to be laid on the target again after each shot). But
because of the drain on shell supplies, quick-firers rarely fired
quickly. It was quite common for batteries in action to cease
fire for long periods in order to conserve ammunition. Most
Russian artillery officers soon learned the importance of
concealing their guns and that it was risky to move their guns
during an action. The Japanese, whose guns were of shorter
range, often tried to bring up their guns as their infantry ad-
vanced, but soon discovered that this exposed them to Russian
counter-fire. In general, in the latter stages of the war the
Right: A dramatized depiction
Japanese hesitated to advance their guns. As one correspondent of Russian cavalry covering the
remarked, the Japanese wrapped their guns in cotton wool and retreat from Mukden

98
 ~~\
La
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SS SS
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valued them more than their soldiers’ lives. Russian guns fired
shrapnel and high explosive. It was the former which
dominated the battle. Japanese infantry when attacking, even
after it adopted a more open formation, suffered badly from
Russian shrapnel shells, timed to explode over its heads. The
Russians suffered likewise when they attempted mass bayonet
attacks across terrain covered by Japanese batteries.
The importance of the machine gun was plainly underlined
by this war; the swollen casualty lists were evidence of this.
At first these weapons were treated as artillery rather than as
infantry weapons, but it was clear to all armies that future wars
would be fought with machine guns as infantry company
weapons. Together with the magazine rifle, the machine gun
enabled lines of trenches to be defended with many fewer men.
The Russian commanders were slow to realize this, and per-
sisted in cramming their men into the trenches, often two deep.
This made their infantry vulnerable to shrapnel shells, and
prevented them amassing sufficient reserves. It also meant that
usually in the Russian positions there was too much strength
in the centre and not enough reserve on the flanks.
For the Russians, the big disappointment was the cavalry.
Much had been expected from the Cossacks, but neither in
reconnaissance nor in cutting the enemy’s supply lines did the
Russian cavalry gain great success. In protecting the flanks
and in rearguard actions, however, they did useful work.
After the battle of Telissu, for example, Samsonov’s Cossacks
brilliantly screened the Russian rearguard, often spending Above: General Nogi awaits
the arrival of western newspaper
three unbroken days in the saddle. The failure in reconnais- correspondents for lunch
sance was the most serious; time and time again, in the small
battles as well as the big, Kuropatkin simply did not know
what the enemy was doing and in consequence was surprised
by outflanking movements. Cavalry was unable to penetrate the
screens which the Japanese arranged around their main bodies.
These screens consisted of small detachments of cavalry and
infantry which would occupy villages and passes. Such detach-
ments ensured that if the Russian cavalry wanted information,
they would have to fight hard for it and might find their way
blocked on their return journey. It is true that Japanese
reconnaissance was similarly hampered by Russian cavalry
screens, but the Japanese had other ways of gaining informa-
tion. They could read St Petersburg newspapers to find the
details of units opposing them and to discover long-term
intentions. More immediately, they made use of Chinese spies
to find out what was going on behind the Russian lines.
Japanese cavalry was provided with horses inferior to those of
the Russians; although horses were soon ordered from
Australia these did not arrive in time to be effective. Yet the
Japanese cavalry had more success than did the Russians. The
Russian cavalry raid against the Japanese supply line at Yinkou

I0O

Below: A Russian Orthodox
priest conducts a burial service
for the Russian dead
was mainly unsuccessful, whereas the most spectacular exploit
of the Japanese cavalry, its rush into a gap between two Russian
armies retreating from Mukden which converted the Russian
retreat into a costly disaster, was an undoubted success.
Cavalry no longer employed the charge, but usually fought on
foot with rifles, and the Cossacks were trained in horsemanship
rather than marksmanship. The artillery which Cossack squad-
rons took with them was too light for most purposes; it failed
to reduce the mud huts and railway station at Yinkou and was
of little use against infantry. The Japanese practice of combin-
ing their horsemen with infantrymen jogging along behind
proved very effective.
With battles being fought over wide fronts, for days and even
weeks on end, questions of command organization arose
which neither the Russians nor the Japanese quite solved. The
Japanese tendency was to give subordinate commanders a
general picture of the plan, and to allow them to act according
to circumstance. This preserved the value of individual
initiative, but it did result in some Japanese units doing nothing
at times when their contribution might have been crucial.
The Russian command system was more _ bureaucratic.
Kuropatkin evolved a system whereby the field commanders
would assist his staff in the formulation of plans. Proposals
would be circulated as memoranda and the officers invited to
make comments. This does not seem to have improved the
plans but it probably gave the officers a sense of participation.
During battles, Kuropatkin closely controlled all his subordi-
nates through written correspondence. His instructions were
often long; they had the advantage of covering all possibilities
but often did not make clear what he really wanted. In a sense
this meant that the subordinates could act as they thought fit,
but they were not usually suited to exploit this privilege. Like
their commander, like the ministry of war, like the regime,
their outlook was essentially bureaucratic. Their main care
was to avoid getting into a situation where they might be subject
to blame. Like Kuropatkin, they were unfitted to make the
bold stroke which brings victory, but they were superb at the
rearguard actions which avert disaster.
As for the ordinary infantrymen, the men who suffered most
of the casualties, both sides were said to be amazingly
courageous, though they were not always quite as unfailingly
courageous as the war correspondents reported. Japanese
infantrymen did sometimes run away or refuse to advance
against withering fire, and so did the Russian. But the almost
fanatical will to victory of the ordinary Japanese soldier and his
willingness to die for the Emperor was a fact, however
exaggerated by the reporters. The Russian soldier was less
willing to die for the Tsar than his officers claimed, but he
showed a great stolidity in defence.
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When the war started, there were five new Russian battleships
nearing completion in Baltic shipyards, while the Baltic
Squadron had a few oider battleships, together with cruisers
and destroyers. Even before it had become clear that British
diplomacy would prevent Russian warships from the Black Sea
proceeding down the Straits en route to the Far East, thoughts
had: turned towards the idea of sending ships of the Baltic
Squadron, if possible including the new battleships. Construc-
tion of the latter was accelerated; the fifth ship of the class was
deliberately held up so that men and materials could be con-
centrated on the four most advanced units. After the death of
Makarov and the loss of the Petropavlovsk, work on preparing
what would be known as the Second Pacific Squadron went
ahead hurriedly so that by August 1904 all the ships were
ready, with the exception of the battleship Orel and two
cruisers. The two latter were in fact left behind when the
Second Squadron sailed, catching up later. The press,
especially the right-wing St Petersburg newspapers, was
vociferously demanding the immediate dispatch of this
Squadron, despite the strategic and logistic problems which it
faced.
The main problem was supply. Russia had no naval bases
between the Baltic and Port Arthur and the laws of neutrality
limited the hospitality of foreign ports. Since Britain owned
so many of the ports along the route the options open to the
Russian admiral were even more limited. Putting in at British
ports would have been unthinkable even if the British would
have accepted the Russian ships; so great was British hostility
that a surprise attack on the Russian vessels could not be
regarded as impossible. Fortunately, Russia’s friend France
had a number of colonial anchorages in Africa and the Far
East and it was proposed that the Russian ships would use these
isolated bays for coaling and maintenance. Since even at
economical speeds the ships needed to take coal about once a
week a whole series of anchorages was needed, while between
Madagascar and Indo-China coaling would need to be done at
sea. Russia did not possess enough commercial vessels, so
foreign ships were chartered for supplying the squadron. Previous pages: Painting showing
men of the Baltic Squadron
The German Hamburg-Amerika Line proved very co- going aboard their ships before
operative, partly because the Kaiser wished to make a new and departure for the Far East
advantageous trade treaty with Russia and was seeking means Top: The Alexander III, one of
of putting pressure on his cousin’s government in St Peters- the four new battleships
burg. It was the Hamburg-Amerika Line which agreed to completed in 1904 and sent to
the Far East under Admiral
arrange a series of rendezvous between the Second Squadron Rozhestvensky
and the Line’s fleet of colliers.
Another problem facing the Second Squadron was the Above: Admiral Rozhestvensky,
shortage of men. Russia’s best sailors had been with the Port who agreed to take the Baltic
Squadron to the Far East, after
Arthur squadron. To supply the Second Squadron, with its other admirals had refused
new battleships and cruisers, was not easy. Some officers and

104

Below: Admiral Nebogatov,
who took over command from
Rozhestvensky after the latter
had been wounded
men were taken from the Black Sea Squadron, and many
engineers were drafted from the commercial fleet. The latter
expedient meant that many of the engineers of the Second
Squadron were unfamiliar with the water-tube boilers used on
the newer warships. As for the ordinary seamen, few of these
were experienced; many were men who had been previously
rejected for war service because they were unintelligent,
revolutionary, or with criminal records. Others were reservists,
disgruntled at having been called up, and unfamiliar with new
types of equipment. When a typhus epidemic spread by
inefficient distillation ravaged one of the new cruisers, the
guards of honour dispatched to assist in the burial of the victims
did not know how to load their rifles for the farewell salute.
Also among the crews were recent graduates who had volun-
teered for wartime service, in this way satisfying both their
patriotic instincts and their conscription liability. It was
probably these who provoked the comment that the Russian
sailors spoke excellent French, but did not know how to tie a
reef knot. Officering the squadron was yet another problem; in
retrospect, it would seem that a high proportion of the ships’
commanders were quite unsuited for their task, being strict
disciplinarians with a distaste, or ignorance, of modern methods
of warfare; men who avoided gunnery practice because it made
the decks dirty. About the commander of the squadron,
Rozhestvensky, opinions differ. He was a violent man, alleged
to be in the habit of throwing his binoculars at the head of
anyone, seaman or officer, who irritated him. He was reputed
to be a gunnery expert and had served with some distinction in
the Russo-Turkish War. He was certainly not fainthearted, and
aman who could instil fear into the hearts of his friends would,
it was hoped, terrify his enemies. But Rozhestvensky, though
he was said to owe his appointment to the favouritism of the
Tsar, was not in fact the first choice. Other admirals, not
wishing to pin their reputation on such a risky enterprise,
had already refused the command. Rozhestvensky himself had
no faith in his mission, believing that the Russian fleet should
have taken the offensive early on and that it was now too
late, with demoralized crews and war-hardened enemies. In
an interview in April 1904 Rozhestvensky had declared, ‘We
are now doing what remains to be done, we are defending the
honour of the flag. It was at a previous stage that another
course ought to have been taken. Attack should have been met
by attack. . . Sacrifice the fleet if need be, but at the same
time deliver a fatal blow to Japanese naval power.’ As things
turned out, Rozhestvensky was a failure in his command of the
Second Squadron, but it seems possible that he would have
been a great success, perhaps changing the course of the war,
if he had been in command of the Port Arthur ships.
At the end of August 1904 a conference of officials, grand
105
dukes, and admirals finally decided that the Second Squadron
should be dispatched even though it seemed likely that Port
Arthur would fall before it could arrive. With Port Arthur and
the Pacific Squadron lost, the original concept of a combination
of the Pacific and Second squadrons assembling at Port Arthur
and defeating Togo’s fleet would lose its force. Moreover,
if Port Arthur fell the Second Squadron would have to steam
through narrow Japanese-controlled waters to the other
Russian base at Vladivostok. Nevertheless, the Second Squad-
ron was ordered to sail; presumably public opinion as expressed
through the newspapers had something to do with this
gambler’s throw. Rozhestvensky is quoted as saying at this
meeting, ‘What can I do? Public opinion has to be satisfied. I
know that. But I also know that we don’t have a chance against
the Japanese.’
The squadron finally put to sea from Libau in October 1904,-
having been delayed by the Orel. This ship, the last of the
battleships to be completed, had been sabotaged by a reservist
unwilling to go on such a perilous voyage to the Far East.
He put metal shavings in the propeller shaft prior to engine
trials. After this was put right the Orel] ran aground, which
delayed matters still further. Finally, after a farewell review
by the Tsar, the squadron left. It consisted of four new
battleships (Suvorov, Borodino, Alexander III, Orel), the
modern battleship Oslyabia, the older battleships Siso1 Veliky
and Navarin, an old armoured cruiser, three modern and two
old cruisers, an armed yacht intended for Admiral Alexeev, and
a flotilla of destroyers. Apart from accompanying supply ships,
there was also a fleet repair ship, for this was a self-contained
force anticipating the Task Force concept which would be
introduced by the U.S.A. four decades later in another war
against Japan. Because trials had been hasty and uncompleted,
the new ships had a number of defects and were therefore each
provided with a naval architect who was expected to put them
right en route.
At this period the torpedo exercised an almost hypnotic
influence over the minds of naval officers the world over.
Virtually untried in warfare before 1904, it seemed to promise
the instant destruction of ships exposed to it. The fear of
a torpedo attack on the Second Squadron while it was still on
its way east was therefore understandable. Also understandable
was the fear that either British torpedo boats, or Japanese
torpedo boats with British connivance, might ambush the
Russian ships in northern waters. To guard against this, an
involved secret intelligence system had been established. Its
Scandinavian operations were under the control of an un-
scrupulous bureaucrat who established himself under a false Right: The Hull trawlers,
damaged by the Russian
name in a hotel at Copenhagen. Having nine boats in his ser- squadron, arrive at their home
vice, and receiving great sums of money from St Petersburg, port

106
 sanwpe

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ASHA CHES WHAW
he did his best to give a good return on the government’s invest-
ment in his services. He sent to the Russian authorities detailed
accounts of the activities of Japanese torpedo boats in the
North Sea. These torpedo boats did not exist, and despite
these warnings there were some Russian officers in the Navy
Ministry who scoffed at the whole idea. Rozhestvensky,
however, took them seriously, as indeed he had to if he was not
to be accused of irresponsibility.
When the squadron crossed the North Sea at night its repair
ship lagged behind by about fifty miles. The captain of this
ship was drunk, and so, probably, were its other officers.
During the night this ship fired 296 shots at various foreign
commercial ships, under the impression that they were enemy
torpedo boats. More important, the ship radioed Rozhestvensky
that Japanese torpedo boats had started to attack. So it was not
surprising that when a few hours later the Russian battleships
unexpectedly sighted a Russian cruiser on the horizon they
mistook it for a hostile torpedo boat. Almost simultaneously
the battleships sighted fishing boats from Hull, fishing the
Dogger Bank and as usual signalling to each other with rockets.
The result of this conjuncture was ten minutes of pande- Above: One of Nebogatov’s
coast defence ships, derisively
monium as the battleships opened fire on the fishing boats known as ‘flatirons’
and on the accompanying cruiser Avrora. A British fishing boat
was sunk and others damaged. Several fishermen, and the
chaplain of the Avrora, were killed. The Russian ships, not
wishing to present static targets for torpedoes, did not stop.
When the surviving Hull trawlers limped home to tell the tale
of this night action, public indignation in Britain seemed likely
to lead to war. The strong Russophobic element of the British
press did its best to stir up public demand for a war against
Russia. ‘The horror of this ignoble exhibition of harebrained
cowardice and brutality has shocked the whole civilized world,’
wrote one newspaper, referring to the Russians as ‘shivering
wretches’ comparable only with ‘the half-breed people of iments
mena
merase

Venezuela and one or two kindred republics in that quarter’.

But despite public pressure, the British government was in no
mood for war, especially as such a war would spoil the growing
entente with France. After a few strongly-worded notes had
been sent to St Petersburg Britain accepted the Russian
government’s apologies and offer to let an international court
aportion the blame and the damages. Rozhestvensky did not
apologise and insisted that the trawlers, willingly or un-
willingly, had been used as cover by two Japanese torpedo
boats.
After calling at Vigo to coal and to land a handful of officers
to take part in the International Inquiry, the Russian ships
proceeded to Tangier, under the watchful eye of a British
cruiser squadron. On leaving, one of the ships pulled up with
her anchor the international cable linking Africa with Europe,

108

Below: Togo’s flagship Mikasa
in dry dock
which she cut to save time; Rozhestvensky was known to be
hypersensitive about delay. The squadron divided for the trip
around Africa. The four new battleships were well in excess
of their designed tonnage and it was thought that they were too
large for the Suez Canal, so part of the squadron proceeded to a
rendezvous off Madagascar via Suez and part via the Cape.
The local:anchorages where the squadron halted for coal and
maintenance varied from the hospitable to the hostile. No
attempt was made to enter British colonial waters. Japan
was already protesting vigorously to France about the latter’s
abuse of the laws of neutrality. Rozhestvensky, who felt that
his ships must always be prepared for a possible battle, could
not let his ships coal only when their bunkers were nearly
empty; they had to have a full supply at all times. This meant
that coaling took place about every five days, the ships loading
to 150 or even 200 per cent of their normal capacity. Coal was
stacked on deck, in the passageways, on the mess decks, and
even in the officers’ galleys. Some captains had doubts about
the stability of their ships with this extra topweight, but they
were more afraid of their admiral than of capsizing. Rozhest-
vensky had other cares, too. As his cipher officer wrote to a
friend, ‘. . . you would have to experience in person the burden
of diplomatic negotiations with the different administrations in
Spain and the African colonies to know what the admiral
suffered. Any Spanish gendarme could wound your pride, any
commander of a decrepit European guard-ship conscious of his
own dignity and righteousness could make you hesitate, not
to speak of the various requests and hints of colonial governors
who gave the impression that any help would be an illegal act
of political charity.’ All in all, the successful rendezvous of the
two parts of the squadron off Madagascar was something of a
triumph of Russian organization and endurance. Such a voyage
in pre-turbine days, without the benefit of British anchorages
en route, with a collection of ships which resembled more a
heterogeneous convoy than a fleet, would not have been lightly
undertaken by any of the world’s navies, and if achieved
without loss or damage would have been regarded as a master-
piece of seafaring.
The squadron stayed two and a half months off Madagascar
while the Russian Navy Ministry decided what to do with it.
It arrived at that French colony just two weeks before Port
Arthur fell. Rozhestvensky apparently believed that it was
useless to carry on; he had little faith in his subordinates and
the squadron alone was not capable of beating ‘Togo and would
probably not even succeed in breaking through to Vladivostok.
However, the Navy Ministry, under the pressure of public
opinion (or rather, newspaper opinion), was already planning
to send a Third Squadron from the Baltic to reinforce Rozhest-
vensky. This Third Squadron, which Rozhestvensky emphati-
109
cally declared he did not want, was scraped together from old
ships and training squadrons, crewed by men whose prison
records, health or age had hitherto kept them from active
service. This ‘collection of flatirons’, under the command of
Admiral Nebogatov, was ordered to catch up and join Rozhest-
vensky’s ships.
During those two and a half months at Madagascar, the
morale of officers and men deteriorated. Even Rozhestvensky
suffered a nervous breakdown. The opportunity to exercise,
and practice the guncrews, was taken, but only with difficulty.
The heat and humidity had a deadening effect on everybody.
The battleships proved unable to manoeuvre successfully
together; the officers were in many cases mediocre, and they
were not yet familiar with the handling qualities of their
ships, while being all too familiar with their Admiral’s violent
reprimands. Two of the new battleships collided gently side
against side in one bungled exercise, while at gunnery practice
few hits were scored but two shells struck the bridge of one of
the cruisers. Further practice was curtailed because practice
shells and half-charges had, by bureaucratic oversight, not been
sent with the squadron but had been dispatched to Vladivostok
by rail. Meanwhile, in these tropical waters the ships’ bottoms
began to sprout all kinds of animal and vegetable growths.
The men, exhausted by coaling, by practices, by hot sleepless
nights, began to lose whatever spirit remained. Rheumatism
and furuncles plagued many, and cockroaches plagued all.
In March the squadron finally left Madagascar, bound for
the Far East. For three weeks it passed out of public view,
but not out of public speculation. Making about five knots,
with destroyers towed by supply ships so as to reduce mechani-
cal wear and tear, the Russian armada crossed the Indian
Ocean. It had no neutral anchorages at which to call, and its
coaling was done on the high seas, no mean feat. Ships’ boats
took the sacks of coal from the colliers, which were then
winched up to the decks, before being emptied down the
bunker chutes or stacked somewhere on deck. Even the Russian
Navy Ministry did not know Rozhestvensky’s choice of route;
in England most press opinion believed that he would circum-
navigate Australia in order to avoid the narrow waters of the
East Indies. So there was a good deal of surprise when the
smoke of the squadron was sighted off Singapore; Rozhestven-
sky, true to character, had scorned the dangers and chosen
the shortest route. Moving four abreast, seven miles out, at
about eight knots, the squadron took one hour to pass. Reuter’s
Right: Coaling aboard the
correspondent went out in a launch and described the ships as Russian ships was at first done
‘magnificent but foul’, with a foot of seaweed along the water- alongside—as in this picture.
line and the decks laden with coal. Soon afterwards the squad- But after a collier had fouled
one battleship’s guns, small
ron arrived in friendly French waters at Camranh Bay, Indo- boats were used between the
China. It was not long before their presence here became colliers and the warships

IIo
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known to Tokyo, which launched a series of indignant notes
at the French government, hinting that Japan might declare
war on France if the latter continued to aid the Russians so
blatantly. So for the next few weeks a French cruiser periodi-
cally requested the Russian ships to leave French waters.
Usually Rozhestvensky obediently took his ships to sea,
returning when the French cruiser had gone.
Three weeks after arriving in Indo-China the squadron was
joined by Nebogatov’s ships; these included five armoured
vessels (an old battleship, three coastal defence ships, and an
old rigged cruiser). One of the coastal defence ships had leaked
badly en route, but had been caulked with cement. The state
of their crews, despite their doubtful origin, was probably
better than those of the original Second Squadron; the voyage
out had been quicker, with no demoralizing stays in tropical
anchorages, and there had been training in evolutions and
gunnery on the way. On 1 May the combined squadron went
to sea for the last time; five days later there was a coaling at sea,
and after five more days another. An officer of one of the light
cruisers wrote in his diary that this was the thirty-second
coaling since leaving the Baltic, and that the ship had consumed
twice its own weight of coal. There was a choice of routes to
Vladivostok, but all passed through narrow Japanese-controlled
waters. The shortest and most direct path was through the
Tsushima Straits (between Korea and Japan) but there were
alternatives: around the east side of Japan and then through
one or other of the straits separating the different islands of
Japan. Rozhestvensky, as Togo anticipated, chose the shortest
route.
A hundred miles south of the Tsushima Straits Togo had
arranged a system of patrols with armed merchant cruisers.
One of these one night spotted the squadron’s hospital ship,
which in accordance with international practice was fully
illuminated, with a red cross painted on her white side. The
Japanese cruiser passed her and, as was expected, soon came
up with the Russian ships, proceeding slowly northwards with
dimmed lights. She radioed ‘Sighted square 203 enemy squad-
ron apparently bearing eastern passage’ and in the Russian
radio cabins this message could be heard transmitted and re-
transmitted further and further to the north. At 05.00 at
Mozampo, Togo’s base in South Korea, the Japanese officers
ordered all hands on deck and clouds of black smoke began to Above: The shattered upper-
float upwards from the ships’ funnels. Meanwhile, a Japanese works of the Russian
cruiser squadron had contacted the Russian ships at dawn and battleship Ore/ after the Battle
of Tsushima bear testimony to
was shadowing it, radioing its deployment and bearing to the effect of high-explosive
Togo’s staff. Relying on this information, Togo decided to shells
attack the head of the Russian column at about 14.00. On the
Russian ships, action stations were sounded at midday, when
the shadowing Japanese cruisers turned as though intending to

II2
 cross the Russian path. Officers on the ships, celebrating the
anniversary of the Tsar’s coronation, had time to drink the
health of the Tsar, the Empress, and Russia before hurrying off
to their posts.
Soon after midday Rozhestvensky redeployed his battle
line. The four battleships leading the column turned to port
and then back to starboard. This was a peculiar manoeuvre,
and it was in any case bungled, at least one of the ships mis-
taking the signals and taking her own course. The end result
was that the battle squadron of twelve armoured ships ad-
vanced towards the approaching enemy in two columns, the
starboard column of new ships being in advance of the port
column. At 13.20 Togo’s battle line was seen approaching; it
too had twelve ships (four battleships and eight armoured
cruisers) and was approaching in line ahead on a SW bearing,
moving across the Russians’ bow (Rozhestvensky was moving
NE, directly towards Vladivostok). By about 13.45 the Japanese
had crossed the course of the Russians and were ahead and to
port of the latter and seemed intent on attacking the older
battleships of the Russian rear. But then Togo made an un-
expected manoeuvre, ordering his ships to turn about ‘in
succession’. On his new course Togo could threaten to move
across the head of the Russian line and be able to fire his
broadsides at the leading Russian ships while only a proportion
of the Russian guns would be able to reply. On the other hand,
the ‘in succession’ turn was itself dangerous because each ship
would turn at the same place and move through fixed points
whose range the Russians would soon discover. However,
Togo’s danger was reduced because at the time when the
- Russians opened fire they were in the throes of yet another
bungled manoeuvre. Rozhestvensky had ordered his four
battleships of the leading starboard column to increase speed
and take their places at the head of the port column, in other
words, to form again a single column which would be easier to
control in battle. Unfortunately the four leading battleships
tried to squeeze into line too early and the other ships had to
slow down or even stop their engines to make room for them.
Even so, the Orel was shut out of the line, her guns masked, for
the first few minutes of the action.
The action commenced at a range of about 7,000 yards. The
Japanese Had the advantage of the windward side, so that their
gunners were less distracted by spray than the Russians.
According to a British naval attache on board the second
Japanese battleship, the Russian gunfire was accurate, but
somehow the near-misses well outnumbered the hits (and
about one-third of the Russian shells failed to explode). The
Japanese gunfire was more destructive. Whereas only the
leading Russian ships were in range, so that the rear ships
could not take part in the gun action until after the crucial
113
first period, all of Togo’s vessels could take part as soon as
they had each made their turn. They concentrated their fire
on the leading Russian vessel, Rozhestvensky’s flagship
Suvorov, and on the smaller Oslyabia. With their shells filled
with the highly destructive explosive Shimose, which apart
from its devastation gave off poisonous gases, the Japanese
gunners wreaked havoc on their opponents, disorganizing their
gun control system, putting some of their guns out of action,
and starting fires. In the first few minutes all the Oslyabia’s
main guns were put out of action. A series of heavy shell hits
on her side armour loosened the plates and they dropped off
into the sea, so that a following shell blew an enormous hole
in her side. She began to capsize and the order was given to
abandon ship. Nobody thought to unlock the doors of the
engine room and stokehold, so hundreds of stokers and artifi-
cers went down with her. It was 14.25 when Oslyabia left the
line, disabled, and 14.50 when she sank. In those twenty-five
minutes the Suvorov continued to suffer. Already the Russian
line had been forced to incline to starboard to prevent Togo
crossing its “I’. Togo similarly inclined to starboard and thus
maintained his position off the port bow of the leading Russian
ship; the slower Russian ships were describing an inner circle, Above: In all probability in no
other war in history has the
while the Japanese, making about fourteen knots, described
public been presented with so
an outer circle, the speed differential keeping the relative much inaccurate information.
positions of the Russians and Japanese ships constant. At This picture, first published in a
serial publication devoted to
about 14.30 shell splinters entered the conning tower of the
the war, shows the battleship
Suvorov, killing or wounding those inside. The helm jammed Borodino at Tsushima. The
so that the battleship turned 180 degrees and passed down the artist apparently believed that
gun barrels had remained
line of her consorts, followed for a time by the Alexander III,
unchanged since Nelson’s time,
which at first thought it was a deliberate change of course. and that battleships had been
From this time neither Rozhestvensky nor the Suvorov took miniaturized
any further effective part in the battle. The Suvorov stayed
afloat for a surprisingly long time, beset by waves of Japanese
torpedo boats. Eventually in the evening, with only one light
gun still functioning, the Suvorov and her crew disappeared.
By that time Rozhestvensky, wounded in several places, and
his staff, had been taken off by a destroyer.
After the Suvorov dropped out of line the Russian column
was led by the Alexander III, on which Japanese gunfire was
then concentrated. She too, fell out of line temporarily, and her
place was taken by the following ship in line, Borodino. At
14.50 the Borodino, unable to stand the enemy gunfire, turned
away towards the north-west. But since the Japanese ships were
faster there could be no escape for the Russians, so long as
visibility lasted. However, the mist thickened into fog and by
15.05 Togo had lost touch with the Russian battleships.
Meanwhile, the Alexander III, once more under control,
rejoined the Russian line. By 16.00 the Japanese had again
located the Russians. Togo pressed the head of the Russian

114

Below: Nebogatov’s flagship,
the elderly battleship Nikolai I
line, firing at a range of only 2,200 yards and forcing it to turn
eastwards and then southwards, but at 16.20 the Russians were
once more saved by the fog.
Meanwhile the opposing cruisers were fighting their own
battle. Although they were outnumbered and hampered by the
need to protect the supply ships, the Russian cruisers more
than held their own in this engagement. At one point the
Russian battleships, trying to evade Togo in the fog, loomed up
and opened fire on the surprised Japanese cruisers. Nebogatov’s
coast defence ships especially distinguished themselves with
some good shooting; several of the Japanese cruisers were put
out of action at this point. Nebogatov was now in command of
the Russian squadron, which at 18.06 once again came under
the fire of Togo’s battleships and armoured cruisers. From then
until nightfall there was a repetition of the previous gun
battles. The Russian ships, on fire and partly disabled, were
pressed at short range by the Japanese, who concentrated their
fire on the leading ships. First the Alexander III was sunk.
She was forced out of line for a third and final time, with her
signaller sending the ‘In Distress’ call. She unexpectedly
capsized and took her entire crew with her as she went down.
Next came the turn of Borodino. Nebogatov later described the
scene. ‘She capsized, presenting to our eyes a terrible and
moving picture. It was as though she had hesitated thought-
fully, then decided to heel over and capsize. At that moment
she resembled the back of some enormous fish and on the
spine of this back stood about eight men with raised arms
shouting something which we could not hear.’
Of the 900-man crew of Borodino, only one survived. After
sunset, Togo removed his heavy ships and left the attack to
his torpedo boats. The latter converged on the hapless Russian
squadron from three directions. By this time Nebogatov’s
flagship Nikolai I was in the lead, and the course for Vladi-
vostok was maintained. In general, what happened during the
night was that some Russian ships got left behind, some sped
from the scene of battle, while the heavier ships followed
Nebogatov and beat off as best they could the successive waves
of torpedo boats. The ships which had come with Nebogatov
from the Baltic had been practised in night navigation, and
refrained from using their searchlights, whereas the ships of
Rozhestvensky’s original squadron swept the seas with their
searchlights, looking for torpedo boats. These searchlights in
fact were an excellent guide to torpedo boats in search of targets
and it was no coincidence that during the night those ships
which used searchlights were torpedoed, whereas those that
did not escaped. Thus during the night the Navarin was tor-
pedoed and capsized, while the Nakhimov and Siso1 Veliky
were damaged and fell out of line, to be sunk the following day.
115
 Meanwhile the Avrora and two other cruisers had fled,
eventually reaching the Philippines, where they were interned
by the Americans for the duration of the war. Thus when dawn
broke the following morning the remnants of the Second
Squadron were scattered and proceeding in various directions.
Three cruisers had fled south. Rozhestvensky and his staff were
on a destroyer which was making its way independently towards
Vladivostok. Two cruisers were limping separately northwards.
The Sisot Veliky, Nakhimov, and a cruiser were seeking a
suitable coast off which they could scuttle themselves. One
coast defence ship was moving independently and about to be
overwhelmed by Japanese cruisers, while Nebogatov was taking
the venerable Nikolai I, the badly damaged Orel, and two
coast defence ships towards Vladivostok. Soon after dawn a
Japanese cruiser sighted Nebogatov’s ships and by 09.00 it
seemed that all of Togo’s heavy ships surrounded the Russian
squadron. Nebogatov said a prayer, to St Nicholas the Miracle-
Worker, but divine rescue in the shape of a convenient fog
tailed to manifest itself. Nebogatov ordered his gunnery officer
to open fire and was told that the old guns of his battleship
were outranged. The only other ship with heavy modern guns
was the Orel, but the Ore/’s turrets were out of action. Neboga-
tov turned to the official Naval Regulations and found Article
354, which stated that a commander could surrender if his ship
was no longer in a fighting condition. He decided to surrender.
The white flag was hoisted, Nebogatov went in a boat to pay a
visit to Togo, and the crews of the Russian ships broke into the
vodka stores and became gloriously drunk.
Meanwhile the destroyer carrying the semi-conscious
Rozhestvensky was being pursued by Japanese destroyers. The
staff officers on board persuaded the captain to surrender;
at the subsequent court-martial they explained that they took
this decision simply to save the life of their beloved admiral.
Thus in total the Japanese captured one destroyer, two coast
defence ships, and the battleships Orel and Nikolai I. All these
eventually joined the Japanese navy. Of the warships in the
Russian Second Squadron all had been sunk with the exception
of the surrendered ships, the three cruisers which went to the
Philippines, and the armed yacht and two destroyers which
crept safely to Vladivostok.
Nebogatov made a splendid scapegoat. After the war he
was court-martialled and sentenced to death, although the
sentence was commuted and he spent only a short time in
prison. Rozhestvensky, ridiculed and attacked in all quarters,
kept his silence. His side of the story was never told. As for
the Japanese, this splendid victory, achieved at the cost of
only a handful of torpedo boats sunk, confirmed them in the
Left: Yokohama celebrates the
belief of their natural maritime genius.
victory at Tsushima

117
2. EYEWITNESS:
SUSHIMA |
survivor's account
It happened like this. After the skirmish with the four enemy
cruisers our whole battle squadron followed in a line astern of
the Suvorov. But just before the battle Rozhestvensky turned
with his lst Division to starboard and then turned again
to form a second line moving parallel to the 2nd and 3rd divi-_
sions. He did not continue long like this; when he saw more
than twenty units of the enemy which were cutting ahead of
him from the port side and rapidly preparing for battle he
turned his four battleships toward the enemy (that is, to port)
and thereby cut in ahead of the remainder of the Squadron led
by the Oslyabya. The latter, so as to avoid colliding with these
four battleships of the lst Division, was forced to stop her
engines. Other ships did likewise. The Squadron became a
mixed-up huddle and a wonderful target for the enemy.
Wishing, no doubt, to show his courage and to frighten the
enemy, our commander on the Suvorov moved off quickly
ahead, thus breaking the most elementary rules of naval tactics.
In the given circumstances he resembled a mad bull bravely
breaking its horns against a brick wall. And the battleship
Oslyabya remained stationary with her port side toward the
enemy. Taking advantage of such a convenient opportunity
to defeat us, the enemy laid on these two flagships a fire so Above: The ill-fated battleship
Oslyabya
deadly as to deal them a fatal blow right at the start. The
Suvorov for some time was out of action and the Oslyabya
perished on the spot. The higher officers of the latter were so
excited that from the conning tower via the speaking tubes the
‘open fire!’ order was given to the engine rooms and ‘full
speed ahead’ was ordered from the guns. At this time also
some other ships were hit, the Sisoz Veliky and Alexander III,
for example, on both of which fires broke out...
At the very start of the battle the Oslyabya received a large-
calibre shell at the waterline near the bow on the port side.
The entire ship shuddered as though a living being, able to feel
pain. The force of the shell was such that the bow of the ship
turned slightly to starboard. On bursting it made such a big
breach that there could be no hope of stopping it with a patch.
The water rushed in, a powerful torrent, flooding the entire
bow compartment. The armoured watertight door was bolted
so as to confine the water to the bow. The ship took a bows-
down attitude but this was corrected to some degree by the
energetic work of the repair party led by Mechanic Uspensky.
The same shell cut the main electric cable and in consequence
the forward 10-inch gun turret could no longer be supplied
with power and had to cease fire after only three shots. Al-
though the electricians soon re-connected the cable the turret
did not fire again because it was hit by two more shells which
jammed it and thus put it out of action, as well as blowing off
Previous page: Togo’s squadron
the port barrel. At the same time the two sailors, who on a few minutes before sighting
the commander’s orders had been deliberately put near the the Russians off Tsushima

I20

Above: The captain of the
Oslyabya, who went down with
his ship
turret to be slaughtered, were blown to pieces. These two
were sailors Korol and Suslenko. Until the battle they had
been in the cells; Korol had been expelled from the Nakhimov
for rioting. Inside the turret one man had his head knocked off
and the others were wounded. There was some groaning and
then Gunner Bobkov was carried out. His foot had been torn
off. As they were carrying him off on a stretcher to the operating
station he was cursing the officers, and shouted furiously.
‘Monsters! Bloodsuckers! You see what you’ve started! May
you be swept off God’s earth!’
Another shell then hit the forward upper bridge, shattering
it. The Barr and Stroud rangefinder was located there, served
by five sailors and Lieutenant Poletsky. They were all blown
on to the upper deck. Apart from the officer, who was lying
with a smashed chest, none of these six dead could be identified
because there only remained of them some shapeless bloody
chunks of flesh.
At the same time another shell exploded near the conning
tower, throwing fragments into the latter which killed Helms-
man-Petty Officer Prokyus and slightly wounded three officers,
Baron Kasinsky, Gorchakov, and Osipov. These three went off
by themselves to the dressing station, and decided not to
return to their post. Near the conning tower a drummer had
his head and feet torn off, leaving a kind of ugly-looking
stump.
All the light guns on the port side were put out of action
in about half an hour. Most of their gunners were also casualties
and the ones who were left, together with Troiller the battery
commander, had nothing more to do and took cover in the
mess deck. The heavier guns did not last much longer either.
The forward casemate on the port side upper deck was struck
on its armour by a shell; the armour slipped down, making
any further shooting impossible. On the same deck, in the
centre port casemate, there was an explosion of an enemy shell
which fell in the trolley bringing up ammunition; all the men
were blown into tiny pieces and the 6-inch gun put out of
action. There remained on this side only three workable 6-inch
guns, one of which was on the upper deck and the other two
on the lower deck. Moreover, the subsequent operation of the
latter was stopped by the heavy list on this side. In general, the
guns had almost no further action: there were very few more
shots and these doubtless fell wide because nobody gave the
range.
Twenty or thirty minutes after the beginning of the battle
the Oslyabya received a second, quite small, hole opposite the
port torpedo tubes above the waterline just at the end of the
armour belt. It was somehow patched with a so-called hawse-
sack. After the first hole the bow compartment watertight doors
I21I
had been bolted, as already mentioned. Water had subsequently
penetrated it, cutting off access to the two bow generators so
that the men had to save themselves by crawling out through
the forward part of the turret. The same water, being an
excellent conductor and linking the main cables with the hull,
was the cause of the burnt-out commutators in the stern
generators. This in turn meant that the turbo-pumps no longer
pumped out the water, and winches for raising the shells no
longer worked and anything else dependent on electric power
came to a stop.
The ship could no longer fight because she had nothing left
to fight with. Heeling to port, she stood with her guns dumb,
helpless like an orphan, waiting for the end.
The end was not long in coming. Soon there was a third
and fatal penetration. Thirty or forty minutes after the battle
began two or three shells struck the side armour between the
port torpedo tubes and the washroom. The impact was power-
ful and probably the armour only just held because it immedi-
ately began to fall away plate by plate like plaster from an old
decrepit building. When this place was quite bare of armour
another shell struck it, making an enormous hole in the side!
No attempt was made to patch it. Water roared noisily into the
inside of the ship, sweeping over the lower deck and falling
into the magazines. Soon the list increased. The ship’s life was
coming to an end—there were only a few minutes left.
By this time gunfire had killed up to 60 men and wounded
about 80. The latter were concentrated in the mess deck, where
there were two operating points: the original one with the
Senior Surgeon, and one in charge of the Junior Surgeon which
had been improvised in the washroom. Both doctors with their
rolled-up sleeves and belted aprons were working at full speed,
but there were so many wounded that many remained without
help. It was a terrible sight; blood everywhere. Beside the
wounded lay amputated pieces of body, as well as those who
were already dead. The doctors fussed about with blood-
reddened knives in their hands. Their aprons were reddened
and becoming deep crimson. All around there were cries and
groans. Some were complaining about the unbearable pain
and asking to be bandaged quickly, while others simply cried,
or groaned bitterly. Especially loud were the shouts of a sailor
lying on the table. He had a gaping wound in one shoulder
in which the doctor was digging around with a long probe and
drawing out fragments. The wounded man screamed, twisted,
and bit his hands; but four strong sailors held him down firmly. Right: The battered side of the
Russian battleship Orel, after
Bobkov was also here. He was not shouting anymore, just Tsushima. Inset: The artist
grinding his teeth malevolently. And then somebody else was Matania, who depicted the
brought in on a stretcher. All the flesh had been torn away sinking of the Borodino (see
page 114) also exercised his
from his side, completely exposing his ribs of which one, talents to show the loss of the
fractured, stuck out to one side like a broken branch of a tree. Suvorov

I22
 Faecal
ANS
 But all this was nothing compared to what happened when
the battleship sank. After the Os/yabya was holed for the third
time and began to heel over with water flooding the mess deck,
pandemonium broke loose. The battleship was heeling at such
an angle that it was evident she would be on her side in a few
seconds; water was streaming in. Not waiting for orders every-
one rushed aloft, shouting frantically. My God, how the
wounded groaned now! The fitter sailors trampled them
underfoot, mercilessly stamping on them as they struggled to
get out. There were so many people crowding the hatches
that they could go neither forward nor back. Many crawled
over other people’s heads.
And how to describe what went on in the stokeholds and
engine-rooms? The hatches of these had been closed for the
battle with armoured covers which could be opened only
from above. The last men to run past these hatches told how
those who were virtually buried alive in these compartments
were hammering on the covers and shouting for people to come
and release them. But who was cool enough for that? Everyone
was too busy saving his own life. So the stokers and mechanics
without exception remained there below: two hundred and
fifty men stayed there, bolted in, in that iron coffin. Anybody
with any imagination can imagine the torture which these men
must have gone through. When the ship turned over with her
keel in the air they would have been flung down head-first and
after them, killing and maiming, would have dropped all those
iron fittings which were not firmly fixed. There would have
been banging, crashing, and roaring. The electric lights would
have failed at once, so it would have been completely dark...
Into these sealed compartments water would have entered only
slowly, so those who had not been killed would have lived for
some time. My God, how they would have suffered! What
devil could have thought up a man-made hell like this?
Meanwhile, outside, those who had had time to run to some
place where they could jump into the water were in such a
hurry that they did not take any life-saving objects with them.
Those who could not swim soon disappeared beneath the
waves. A few brave fellows went to the hammock splinter
screens and began to throw hammocks to those who were
drowning. But this was not of great help, people were drowning
right and left and the air was filled with wild shouts. Things
were made worse by the fact that the enemy had not stopped
firing at the battleship. Shells were still raining down, killing
and maiming those who were struggling in the water.
... The battleship was already lying on her side, but smoke
was still issuing from her funnels and, spreading over the
surface, irritated the eyes of the drowning, poisoning their last Right: The negotiators at
Portsmouth, U.S.A. On the
moments. Then, with her keel high, the Oslyabya went bow- extreme left is Witte and in the
first to the bottom. centre President Roosevelt

124 VIDOR HIGH sopor

LEG
 After Mukden, there had been no more major military opera-
tions, although the Japanese made plans to advance on Harbin
and Vladivostok. Both sides needed peace, but were as yet
unwilling to admit it. Japan was almost at the end of her
resources and was already in heavy debt to foreign financiers.
In Russia the original enthusiasm for the war had long since
evaporated. There were demonstrations against the govern-
ment’s incompetence and against its method of governing.
Reservists resisted call-up, there were strikes, and in January
1905 occurred Bloody Sunday, in which workers on strike who
marched to ask for Nicholas’s intercession were instead shot
down by his troops. Because of the quite justified fear of
rebellion, the best and most reliable troops had to be kept at
home for possible use against the population. Kuropatkin
only got the second best: the old, the raw, and the discontented.
After Tsushima the American President, Theodore Roose-
velt, offered his mediation and both sides sent delegations to
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The chief Russian delegate, the
brilliant bureaucrat Witte, deliberately set out to make a
good public impression, making well-staged appearances,
giving friendly interviews to the press, and allowing himself
to be photographed in all kinds of situations. Thanks to this
contrived but convincing display of an outgoing personality,
American sympathies tended to be transferred from Japan to
Russia, so that when Russian arguments delayed the conclusion
of the talks it was the Japanese who were blamed. In the
end, thanks to Witte’s refusal to acknowledge that Russia was
a beaten belligerent, the terms he obtained were quite mild.
Russia did not pay the indemnity which Japan had demanded.
Nor did Japan gain the island of Sakhalin; she had to be
content with the southern half. However, Port Arthur in-
evitably went to Japan, and Japanese supremacy in Korea was
acknowledged. But Russia still maintained her sphere of in-
fluence in northern Manchuria. Witte went home to a deser-
vedly warm welcome, and the Japanese went home to a very
cold welcome. President Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace
Prize; quite an achievement for the man who, as Navy Secre-
tary, had more or less single-handedly launched the Spanish-
American War a few years previously. But that is another story,
as is Russia’s revenge for the defeats of the Russo-Japanese
War, a revenge which was postponed for exactly four decades.
Top: The chief Japanese
negotiator, Baron Komura, goes
on board the presidential yacht
at Portsmouth

Centre: The two Japanese

negotiators

A- 35 Bottom: Count Witte comes

- ashore
VIDOR HIGH SCHOOL LIBRARY
TEVAC FTRRD
Tsushima quotation is from:
J. N. Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima (Diplomatic
Press 1970) and was first published in a 1907
booklet which was suppressed by the tsarist
government immediately after publication.

Port Arthur quotation is from:

Dnevnik polkovnika S. A. Rashevskogo (The
Diary of Colonel Rashevski), published by the
USSR Academy of Sciences in 1954.
eS,
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ayMi
 Et

tee
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 ohn Westwood is a former naval
correspondent of the ‘Birmingharn
Post’, and has served in the Inteiii-
gence Corps. He has worked for
the U.N. as a translator and is the
author of ‘Witnesses of Tsushima’ and
four other books on Russian history. He
has lectured and taught Russian history
at Florida State and Sydney Universities.

Jacket design by Bob Burroughs

Also available
AGE OF THE AIRSHIP by Edward Horton

HENRY REGNERY COMPANY

Chicago

Printed in Great Britain

i
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