Old Business, New Tactics: Populism in Vučić’s Serbia and the War in

Ukraine

Abstract: In this article we examine the Serbian government in the first year of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine by communicating with Mudde’s theoretical framework of populism, applying
the demand-media (as mediator)-supply (to citizens) methodological framework. We provide our
take on five different aspects of Serbian populism, additionally exploring how the government has
(ab)used the media to produce anti-EU, anti-Western, and pro-Russian narratives that are
disseminated to the public. These narratives find their starting point in official government
statements, influencing public opinion in a desired manner and providing political leaders with
an excuse not to change the foreign policy towards Russia and impose sanctions on Moscow.

Keywords: Serbia, populism, authoritarianism, Aleksandar Vučić, Western Balkans

Introduction and Methodological Deliberations

Arguably, one of the most bizarre headlines published in Serbian media was the one on
February 20, 2022, just four days before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when the
Serbian tabloid newspaper Informer, known for its sensationalist approach to news and bias
(Burazer, Hills, and Lelonek 2022), published an article with a headline “Ukraine attacks Russia”
(Informer 2022). Since then, the Serbian media space has witnessed a plethora of news dedicated
to the Ukrainian crisis by media platforms that are, apart from a few independent media ones,
heavily prejudiced and reporting on the invasion by taking pro-Russian positions (Vuksanović,
Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 6). Several analyses of Serbian journalism have indicated that the media
are biased in Russian favour, very sensationalist in terms of how most of them report (not only)
on the Ukraine issue, remain predominantly tabloid and pro-government, leaving but a few
platforms genuinely independent (Cuckić, Burazer, and Todorović Štiplija 2020; also, Burazer,
Hills, and Lelonek 2022). The independent ones, such as N1, Danas, BIRN, Nedeljnik (N1
Belgrade 2021), among others, approach the crisis in more balanced manner, expressing opinions
that are critical of the Serbian government led by the Progressives (Srpska napredna stranka,

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SNS), manoeuvring in a confined space significantly influenced by the government (Burazer,
Hills, and Lelonek 2022).

We do not claim that the media has experienced anything new with the surge of the pro-
Russian narratives in the first year of the invasion, as these have been present in Serbia for quite
some time now (Brey 2022), but rather that the government has supported pro-Russian narratives
disseminated to the Serbian public. These narratives find their starting point in official government
statements and public appearances, influencing public opinion and giving the elite an excuse not
to impose sanctions on Moscow. We approach the populist nature of the SNS, and especially
Aleksandar Vučić, by addressing the populism in the region, providing five implications of the
government’s populist nature. We find it populist as it undermines democratic institutions, calling
for the change of representative democracy to the direct one, working to achieve and maintain high
levels of polarization in public space, and disseminating its narratives based on identity politics.
We complement this discussion by deliberating on the leader’s supposedly authentic relationship
with the ‘truth,’ further substantiating our claim that the government, or, if nothing else, its top
leadership, is populist. We provide the given insights within the ‘state-sponsored populism’
paradigm (Džankić and Keil 2017) that addresses the specificities of populism in the post-
Yugoslav space, additionally considering the causal link between popular media and public
perceptions.

Vučić’s government has (ab)used the media, controlling it towards producing anti-
Western, anti-EU, and pro-Russian narratives (Vuksanović, Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 2) that are
disseminated to the public on a near-daily basis. The given narratives find their starting point in
government statements, which significantly influences public opinion and equips political actors
with an excuse to resist changing the policy towards Russia, particularly sanctions-wise. This has
allowed the SNS to deepen its cooperative relationship with large parts of the media, ensuring
public support. Acknowledging the existing studies on “preference formation” (Druckman and
Lupia 2000), we approach the current subject by identifying “alternative conceptualizations of an
issue or event” (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013, 3). The political elites frame (present
and advocate) their attitudes in populist manner, approaching the public by controlling the media
to disseminate anti-EU, anti-Western, and pro-Russian narratives in a desired way (Druckman and
Nelson 2003).

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 We focus on the first year of the war in Ukraine, analysing the Serbian government’s
statements and public appearances alongside selected media content. These are the pro-
government outlets owning national frequencies (Mirilović 2022): they are tabloid and employ the
infotainment approach to news, which opts for the reporting of news in an entertaining and eye-
catching manner over formal and professional journalism (Paul and Matthews 2016), with primary
television channels being TV Pink, TV Happy, the now-heavily-reorganized B92, and Prva TV.
Since the Serbian media are closely associated with the political elites, “the reality is that the media
are afraid to function as a watchdog monitoring those in power; they are constantly under political
and economic pressure, so the accountability of politicians becomes obsolete” (Stojarová 2020,
176). This validates our discussion on the government’s populist nature in setting a particular
course for the country, justifying its policies, and maintaining somewhat constant popular support.
Most of the Serbian population gets its information from television, though internet portals have
recently become more influential: public opinion is characterized by the pro-government media
platforms as the most trusted ones (CRTA 2022, 2-5), such as RTS and TV Pink, by those who
oppose entry into NATO and EU, with Kosovo remaining of crucial importance to both supporters
and opponents of the government (Vuksanović, Sterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 2-9). We see a causal link
between the capture of media by the elites and the dissemination of illiberal narratives impacting
public opinion and used to garner popular support for the government. The following sections
present scholarship informing our research, considerations on populism in Serbia, and the
discussion on the demand-media (as mediator)-supply (to citizens) chain, followed by a
conclusion.

Research on Populism (not only) in the Western Balkans

Recent discussions on populism in the region address several perspectives. Mikucka-

Wójtowicz (2019) discusses the chameleonic nature of the parties she understands as populist in
Croatia and Serbia, additionally showing how populism has historically been a powerful force in
these countries. Hale and Peshkopia (2021) examine the international perspective of populism,
taking the case of the support for Trump’s policies and the appeal he has enjoyed with the people
of Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia, highlighting ethnic divisions between Serbs and Albanians in
Kosovo. Vladisavljević and Krstić (2022) explore populism and authoritarianism in Serbia by

3
treating political cartoons in the Vučić era, considering unfair competition in domestic politics and
limited media freedoms. This study establishes a link to the already extensive scholarship on the
failing democratization of the region, with post-conflict transformation going rogue (Ottaway
2003; Pavlović 2020; Bieber 2020; Radeljić and Đorđević 2020).

In addition, Orenstein and Bugarič (2022) speak of the change in and the growth of the
populist agenda in Serbia, Hungary, and Poland, showing how this agenda has gravitated towards
conservative statism and nationalism in economic terms. Džankić and Keil (2017) define state-
sponsored populism in Montenegro, tackling the dominance of the Democratic Party of Socialists.
Bergmann (2020) opens a link to media studies, deliberating on the profound change of the populist
agenda with the emergence of mass online media, allowing populists to (ab)use (mis)information
and limit the influence and trust in mainstream media outlets. This study is complemented by
Stojarová (2020), who analyses the Serbian media space by treating its conditions, major
characteristics, and functioning. The study by Vladisavljević (2020) complements these
discussions, linking the quality of democracy and the change in the media discourse by revealing
the democratic decline in the second decade after Milošević’s fall.

As hinted, so much has been written on populism that one would think there is consensus
among scholars on its definition. Even more so, the study of populism has developed into an
independent discipline, reflected by the growing body of literature, and, unfortunately, followed
by lingering debates on the definition and meaning of the term. Some scholars have tried to define
this multi-meaning concept by linking it to other concepts in ideology research, such as
nationalism, radicalism, secessionism, authoritarianism, and left-wing/right-wing political
positions. Populism may be understood as a conflictual ideological relationship between the ‘pure
people’ and the ‘corrupted elite,’ seen differently with left-wing and right-wing ideological poles
(Judis 2016, 13-15). On the other hand, it may be read as a rhetorical style, with populists being
anti-elitist and anti-pluralist in their public appearance (Müller 2016) or assumed to be a radical
emancipatory project for the return of democracy to the marginalized and neglected (Laclau 2007).
Moreover, it may be perceived as an implicit claim to the legitimacy of the people (and not of the
elites) since the people possess the legitimacy to rule and fulfil their interests (Norris and Ingelhart
2019). Lastly, populism may be read as a political strategy based on direct communication

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involving the leader’s public appearance and stance towards the ones he/she governs (Weyland
2001).

Our article draws on Mudde’s definition of populism as a “thin-centered ideology,” seeing

society divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” vs. “the corrupted
elite”, with politics as “an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde
and Kaltwasser 2017, 6). In Mudde’s view (2004), defining populism as an ideology is
characterized by the following elements. The elites and the people are separate homogeneous
groups. There is a conflicting relationship between these antagonistic groups. The people are seen
as the moral sovereign, with politics fulfilling people’s interests. Finally, it is the people, being the
moral sovereign, whose power has been stolen by the corrupted and self-seeing elites, pushing the
populist leaders to establish a monopoly on legitimate representation as being ‘the only’ and ‘the
authentic’ voice of the people (Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000; Canovan 1999; Stanley 2008).
Defining populism as a “thin-centered ideology” enables us to distinguish between it and other
political positions: any entity that opposes pure, authentic people against a corrupt, inauthentic,
and self-interested elite is populist, while any group that fails to meet this requirement is not
(Canovan 2002; Mudde 2002; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Mikucka-Wojtowitz 2019).

Populism the Serbian Way

European politics has dramatically shifted over the last two decades, with several populist-
oriented parties emerging and becoming electorally large enough to form governments in EU
countries and the Western Balkans. Serbia is an excellent example of this in four aspects. The first
relates to a new type of political representation, where traditional and mainstream parties have lost
popularity while the populist ones have become more prominent. The second is that political
platforms supporting direct democracy using referendums, petitions, people’s movements, and
online voting have increased in popularity.1 The third is in political style, where polarization, rather
than consensus, has become the main pattern of behaviour. Finally, the fourth is the prevalence of

1
Pokret slobodnih građana [Movement of free citizens] (https://pokretslobodnih.rs/), Moramo [We have to]
(https://www.moramo.rs/), 99% (http://www.99posto.org/srpski), and, most recently, Narodni pokret za državu [The
people’s movement for the state] https://n1info.rs/vesti/novi-dan-cemu-sluzi-narodni-pokret-za-drzavu/).

5
political narratives based on identity politics, generating popular support for agendas often
preferred by the leader (Judis 2016).

‘Democratic backsliding’ linked with rising authoritarianism has been central to the
Serbian political system over the last decade (Vladisavljević and Krstić 2022, 2). From 2012, when
Vučić and his party came to power, Serbia has spent a decade acquiring all the characteristics of a
defective democracy (Bieber 2020). Democratic backsliding can best be described “as movement
of the regime with democratic features away from democracy towards greater authoritarianism”
(Bieber 2020, 3). This kind of democratic decline has been witnessed in much of the post-Yugoslav
space, facilitating the birth of hybrid regimes that are between the states with consolidated
democracy and those with fully authoritarian regimes. Serbian politics is characterized by the
formal existence of democratic institutions and the organization of elections in seemingly
democratically acceptable electoral conditions that undermine the independent functioning of
democratic institutions by keeping them under autocratic control (Dolonec 2013; Kmezić 2020;
Bieber 2020; EWB 2023). As a hybrid regime with a developed authoritarian mechanism, the
Serbian government formally operates within democratic boundaries and supposedly according to
democratic principles while misusing its prerogatives, undermining independent democratic
institutions and being declaratively committed to the EU accession process (Ottaway 2003;
Levisky and Way 2010; Dolonec 2013; Lavrič and Bieber 2020). This authoritarian rule is
manifested in state capture by the SNS, weak democratic institutions, the politicization of the
judiciary, corruption, clientelism, and patronage networks that are almost exclusively informal
(Radeljić and Đorđević 2020; Transparency Serbia 2021). Vučić has shown the ability to modify
Serbian foreign policy, changing its ideological positions when needed, as seen in his contradicting
approach to the EU. Apart from other things, the Serbian people’s approval of such a system can
be attributed to failing democratization, whereby the elites have traditionally kept the state under
their control.

This type of autocratic rule has also been reflected in what is known as ‘state-sponsored
populism’ (Džankić and Keil 2017), where Vučić has used various populist tools to consolidate
his power and strengthen the dominant position of his party. This is manifested in creating
conditions enabling political elites to interfere in the functioning of the judiciary, weakening
democratic institutions to the point of fragile dependency (Lavrič and Bieber 2020; Kmezić 2020).

6
More than that, his elite has managed to marginalize and undermine his opponents, which has led
to a sharp polarization between the governing elites and the opposition. Hence, populists such as
Vučić rely on mechanisms spreading fear and creating artificial political crises to influence internal
political processes and assume control over societal changes (Keil 2018; Lavrič and Bieber 2020;
Kmezić 2020). Under Vučić’s developed political instincts, the SNS has built a near-hegemonic
political apparatus, smoothly adapting to the new political environment while maintaining the
profile of a pragmatic reformist whose involvement is needed to achieve needed reforms. The EU’s
perceived tolerance of ‘stabilitocrats’ has facilitated Vučić’s approach to governing Serbia: by
combining populist mechanisms of rule with a declarative commitment to joining the EU, the
leader has legitimized democratic backsliding and erosion of democratic safeguards in Serbia,
presenting them as necessary means of transforming his country and becoming an EU member
(Bieber 2020; Keil 2018; Elbasani 2013).

There are five implications of the rise of populism in Serbia. The first is reflected in
democratic institutions being undermined and changed in an authoritarian manner. The shift to a
more authoritarian rule may be read by applying Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology
that considers society to be divided into two separate groups, the (pure) people and the (corrupted)
elite (2004). By seizing power in Serbia, Vučić has tried to build an image of himself as the only
legitimate representative and the only authentic voice of the people, thus giving normative priority
to the notion of the popular will based on popular sovereignty. After taking power, Vučić has
sought to remove his political opponents, creating conditions that would make their return to power
less likely. To do so, he has aimed to make the internal political processes meaningless while
homogenizing all political institutions within the SNS. Such a populist appeal legitimizes political
actions, asserting the mandate the leader has supposedly received from ‘the pure people’ that the
leader claims to represent (Pappas 2014; Havlik 2019).

Additionally, Vučić has for quite some time now sought to make a turn from representative
to (a more) direct democracy by organizing referendums, petitions, public hearings, forums, and
public gatherings to see and hear ‘what the people want.’ The last in a series of announcements for
Vučić is the organization of the “National Movement for the State,” a supra-party organization
that would include all political entities in defense of Serbia’s national interests (BBC 2023). Even
more so, Vučić’s elite has engaged in changing the institutional and constitutional setup of the

7
country through direct political interference in the functioning of the judiciary and institutionally
entrenched corruption intending to upset the separation of powers, checks, and balances, as well
as other constitutional limits (Mikucka-Wojtowitz 2019; Vučković and Đorđević 2019; Lutovac
2020). This is furthered through the replacement of meritocracy with clientelism and informal
patronage networks, particularly within the judicial sectors. While this raises the likelihood of
public institutions being staffed with incompetent and inexperienced cronies, this gives Vučić the
internal bureaucratic support he needs to amend the current constitutional order, which in turn
gives ruling elites the ability to enact broader legislative changes (Stanley and Cześnik 2019).

Another implication of the rise of populist appeal in Serbia is manifested in the imposition
of a high level of political polarization between the government and the opposition. The SNS
denies any forms of cooperation with the opposition parties. This us/them polarization has not
decreased even after the SNS achieved a near-monopoly of all spheres of social life, from
participating in reality shows to meddling in the editorial policy of the media (EWB 2023) to
appointing children theatres’ managers to demonstrating to doctors how respirators work during
the COVID-19 pandemic (Lutovac 2020). Polarization has been and will likely remain Vučić’s
main lever of power in strengthening his and his party’s dominant position by employing the
continuous populist narratives on ruthless antagonism between those tagged as “the former
corrupted” elites and “the new people’s government”; “the defeated thieves” and “the pure
patriots”; “the former traitors” and “the current protectors of the national interest” (Spasojević
2021, 125-140). The imposed polarization is beneficial to the elites: not only that it has
substantially helped centralize political power in the hands of the populist leader, but it has also
allowed his party to have a dominant position in the country. More than that, it has also been elite
interests-wise a much cheaper and electorally more rewarding strategy than implementing painful
and often uncertain political and economic reforms (Pappas 2014; Lutovac and Marković 2017).

The third implication is based on the SNS’s encouragement of high levels of tension and
conflict against its political opponents. Strong intolerance towards different attitudes, which often
leads to physical violence, is mainly directed against the so-called ‘opponents of the people’s will’
(the opposition parties), NGOs, and CSOs, some of which have been very vocal in their opposition
to the government in recent years (Pavlović 2020). Anyone who opposes the SNS’s political
agenda risks being characterized as ‘the state enemy.’ Populist behaviour opposes political and

8
legal rules or norms that reinforce consensus instead of polarization. By weakening these rules and
norms, Vučić has aimed to upset the constitutional equilibrium, devastating the separation of
powers alongside undermining checks and balances. As a result, by deepening political tensions
and conflicts combined with constitutional ineffectiveness, Vučić and his government have sought
to undermine public confidence in the quality and functionality of independent democratic
institutions (Meny and Surel 2002; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012).

The fourth implication is the strengthening of narratives based on identity politics. The
success of the SNS is achieved through articulating illiberal rhetoric. Populists’ reliance on identity
politics can be highly problematic, leading to political conflict with dissenters, who risk isolation,
acrimony, and even threats to their safety. On the other hand, populists almost exclusively present
themselves as victims of both internal and external conspiracies. For instance, both SNS
representatives and their allies in the media have often made deeply troubling and factually
incorrect claims, and it does not go unnoticed that there is a pronounced media inequality and
erasure of boundaries between the state and the ruling party (EWB 2023). One of the most
infamous ones is the supposed account of the planned assassination of Vučić and his children,
having been/being prepared by the supposed enemies of the state that are, according to media
reports, many (Al Jazeera Balkans 2022; TV Pink 2022; Nova S 2022; RTV 2022).2 This and other
factually incorrect narratives that are little more than rumors seem to be “aimed at the
personalization of the state” (Milivojević 2022), instilling fear in the Serbian populace that
strengthens the leader’s dominant position (Mikucka-Wojtowitz 2019; Stojiljković and Spasojević
2018, 104-128; Teodosijević and Pavlović 2017; EWB 2023).3

The fifth and final implication is Vučić’s ‘authentic’ relationship with the ‘truth.’ However,
this truth is often what the government says and what compliant media publish at face value
without fact-checking, simply because the government either does not or would not lie. The
opponents of his government are publicly labelled as opponents of the state. At the same time, the
leader effectively puts a sign of equality between himself, his party, and the Serbian state. In short,
if the SNS represents the people, and the people are the authentic voice of the state, then the SNS

2
On the media accounts discussing this issue see, among others, Milivojević (2022). Vučić sees enemies not only
among his political opponents, claiming he would be hanged in/by Brussels if he, as Croatia did, paid Chinese workers
with EU funds (Mayr 2019).
3
Vučić’s claims of a coup d’état date back to 2012 (B92 2012).

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is the authentic voice of the people. Neither the populist leader nor his regime are subject to being
held accountable over the statements made that range from inaccurate to outright falsehoods. To
make things worse, the leader and his party likewise do their best to make other forms of public
deliberations. Academic dialogue and even parliamentary debates are often meaningless, as fierce
insults and intolerant rhetoric in belittling their political rivals are used by the SNS. As paradoxical
as that may sound, this has brought additional credibility to the regime and its leader: the public
does not have to believe everything the populists say, only that the populists as the representatives
of the people will remain true to themselves (Jones 2019; Vučković and Đorđević 2019;
Stojiljković and Spasojević 2018; Teodosijević and Pavlović 2017).

Old Narratives, New Challenges

As noted, the studies of the relationship between populism and Serbian politics have long
contributed to our understanding of the persistent patterns in illiberal democratic policy in the post-
Milošević era. While “state-sponsored populism” has taken on various socio-political forms in
Poland (Kotwas and Kubik 2019), Slovakia (Cohen 1999), Hungary (Krekó and Enyedi 2018),
Italy (Alekseenkova 2022), and Greece (Pappas 2020), patterns in Serbia draw heavily from pre-
existing narratives of national collective identity that have long enjoyed, and in many cases been
strengthened by, institutional support from the state since the 1990s (Thomas 1999; Listhaug et al.
2011). Some studies regard this as little more than legacies of ethnonationalism and xenophobia
that have neither been addressed nor atoned for since the dissolution of Yugoslavia; however, more
nuanced research has noted how certain narratives of collective identity have taken on new
meaning and understanding with changing economic, political, and diplomatic circumstances
(Gagnon 2004). If populism is understood as an ‘Us/Them’ dichotomy between the “pure” and the
“corrupted,” the core cultural narrative remains unchanged even if the symbols change. Thus, to
understand the institutional practice of, and public attraction to, populism, one must acknowledge
the importance of narrative and symbol.

A narrative is defined as a “conscious connection of previously unstructured and possibly

even unrelated events, figures, and ideas in a seemingly emplotted framework of logic and
reference” (Rossi 2012, 873). In this understanding, narratives are a way to convey a message,
teach a lesson, or tell a story. The “story” may be historically factual, but it is an interpretive history

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meant to impart emotional qualities ascribed to people, places, things, and ideas to evoke a
particular way of identity and remembering (Zerubavel 2003). Narratives exist in every country
and form a core psychological foundation in how national histories, traditions, beliefs, and values
are crafted (Kubik 1994; Zerubavel 1995; Tanner 1997; Čolović 1997). With this understanding,
there is nothing inherently unique or particular about populism except in the types of narratives
appropriated. The use of symbols is crucial herein, for they function as the “tool of narrative” that
provides both the physical manifestations of a narrative in the form of people and places as well
as referring to the intangible, such as feelings of patriotism, belonging to a group, and traditional
ways of living (Rossi 2012, 873). Again, the use of narrative and symbols is crucial to the success
of any political culture, democratic or otherwise, and populist movements have been noted to take
these instruments of culture far more seriously than their liberal counterparts. This explains, in no
small measure, the success of Vučić and the SNS in shaping and directing Serbian political culture
that already possessed a substantial cultural legacy of victimhood and injustice. This is important
to note because the SNS is probably not the first political party in Serbia to utilize populism, but
it has been the most successful in harnessing long-felt collective sentiments among the population
for political gain (Stojiljković and Spasojević 2018, 115f.). Whether or not Vučić and other SNS
party leaders believe in them is irrelevant, and what matters is that the use and abuse of certain
cultural sentiments has contributed significantly to the party’s entrenchment to that of a political
monopoly.

Chief among these legacies is the collection of narratives that frame identity politics within
acute degrees of socio-political polarization. Of most significant importance is the ‘Us/Them’
dichotomy, forming a core foundation of populist philosophy, regardless of political ideology or
orientation. Within this framework, the “Us” is the Serbian people, or, more specifically,
“ordinary” Serbian people, struggling for decades against a myriad of enemies and obstacles, both
external and internal, in their pursuit of justice. The “Them” are regional rivals such as Albanians,
Croats, or Bosniaks; international enemies, most often collectively grouped as the “West,” or even
internal enemies perceived to be little more than fifth-column elements loyal to their own interests
or the interests of their external partners.

The symbols which these narratives are broadly connected with include territory. For over
a century-and-a-half, the primary territorial symbol of the nation and state has been Kosovo, a

11
disputed territory since ethnic Albanian majority unilaterally declared independence in 2008. A
more recent territorial symbol includes the Bosnian Serb Republic, or Republika Srpska, which is
frequently used in Serbian media to highlight the perceived double standards of the international
community in supporting territorial fragmentation of Serbia and self-determination of Albanians,
while insisting on the unity of Bosnia and denying similar rights to Bosnian Serbs (see Živković
2011; Russell-Omaljev 2016). The populist rhetoric in mainstream media accentuates the Us/Them
paradigm through narratives of Western-backed policies that deny Serbs the same things openly
afforded and justified to others. This aids in maintaining public scepticism of the West and the
European Union, structuring the public discourse where any political actors advocating for coming
to terms with the reality of Kosovo’s loss are disloyal to the Serbian state.

The SNS is the inheritor of four critical narratives that tug at the emotional heartstrings of
a society scarred by war and isolation coupled with twenty years of perceived international stigma.
The first narrative that the SNS plays on is that Serbs have no control over their destinies, including
their state’s territorial integrity, which remains heavily tied to the frozen conflict around Kosovo’s
disputed status. Second, while the SNS does not openly state this, it turns both a blind eye and a
deaf ear to sensationalist media, especially tabloids, which openly depicts the Western world as
hypocritically lending sympathy to the plight of everyone else in the Balkans but the Serbs, who
continue to face institutional discrimination, particularly in Croatia and Kosovo. Third, the
perceived indifference to Serbian injustices feeds into the long-standing belief that the West is
Serbophobic. Whether these are residual prejudices of the 1990s or the products of specific foreign
policy agendas meant to weaken Serbia at the cost of others, they deepen the ‘Us/Them’ divide,
adding elements of conspiracy theories that can neither be proven nor refuted that media formulate
into hyperbolic and sensationalist headlines. The fourth narrative is that Serbia has been beset by
internally subversive political, social, and cultural elements that lack honour and loyalty to the
state (Medija Centar Beograd 2023; EWB 2023). While never explicitly identified and changing
over time, these fifth-column elements comprise a veritable mishmash of groups, including pro-
Western political parties and NGOs, feminist movements, the LGBTQ community, various
journalists, academics, and political opposition leaders. Though they vary in range on interests and
objectives, lack any significant political organization or leadership, and share little more than
collective grievance against the government, the pro-state media frequently lump them all together
as disloyal opportunists who would sell their country out in exchange for EU membership.

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Moreover, they experience threats or harassment (CoE 2023; OSCE 2023; Nesić 2022; Amnesty
International 2019).

State-friendly media often depicts these disparate groups in Serbia as allies with external
enemies, with the more sensationalist tabloids accusing them of internal contagion that, if unable
to seize control of the state, is bent on undermining Serbia’s cultural, historical, and moral
foundations. This is juxtaposed, however, with ordinary people protesting, which without
organized leadership, remain collectively aggrieved but politically innocuous. Public protests like
“Serbia Against Violence” (Srbija protiv naslija), a response to two recent school shootings by
students, can be portrayed in state-friendly media as a natural reaction to tragic events that the SNS
can address and rectify.4 The addition, however, of political opposition leaders in the marches
alters the narrative to show how the opposition, frequently referred to as “hooligans,” “hyenas,”
and “vultures,” is using a tragic moment for political opportunism (Nova S 2023; N1 2023;
Informer 2023, Al Jazeera 2023; Savić 2023). In his response to the first protest, Vučić claimed
that there will be no Maidan in Serbia, alluding to the events in Ukraine in 2014. Almost two weeks
later, a Kosovan politician takes up the protests, also referring to Ukraine, which the State
Secretary in the Défense Ministry, Nemanja Starović, comments to the effect that in Serbia there
has never been or will be a Maidan (Starović 2023). All of this affirms the core populist principle
of dichotomizing the pure “Us” from the immoral “Them,” but this is also connected to the way
the media shapes Serbia’s place in the international community as being caught between the West
(particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany), which is seemingly
determined to turn Serbia into a supplicant, and the non-West as an alternative which, according
to the narrative, offers Serbia far more sovereign agency. Russia, enjoying near-unconditional
praise and gratitude among Serbia’s conservative elements for being its biggest, staunchest, and
most powerful ally, friend, and defender in the world, is leading this non-Western countries’ camp
(Vuksanović, Šterić and Bjeloš 2022, 3f).

4
The first happened at a grammar school “Vladislav Ribnikar” in Belgrade on May 3, 2023, when a 13-year-old boy
killed eight schoolmates and a security guard, injuring 6 other students and a teacher. The second took place in
Mladenovac a day after, when a 21-year-old shot 8 people and seriously injured 14 others. The gun violence protests
started soon after, attended by 20000 to 50000 people on a regular basis, and heavily criticized by both SNS politicians
and pro-governmental media. See: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-against-violence-protests-
expand-into-15-cities/

13
 Within this understanding of the narrative, Russia is depicted as the symbolic antithesis of
the West, and it is a part of the “Us” group: religiously Orthodox, socially conservative, and
politically anti-NATO. The symbolism of Russia is in helping defend Serbia and its people against
the “Them”: secular progressives, socially liberal, and politically pro-Western. This last
characteristic also includes neighbourhood rivals in the Balkans, chiefly the “pro-German” Croats
and the staunchly “pro-American” Kosovo Albanians, both of whom, according to the narrative,
have used the support of these larger countries to strengthen their position against the Serbs.
Multiple symbols contribute to these Us/Them narratives through multi-layered political, cultural,
diplomatic, and geostrategic narratives.

By affirming Russia, and, more specifically, the leadership and persona of Vladimir Putin,
as part of “Us,” Serbian media navigates through a series of narratives that appear both conflictual
and contradictory. Russia is Serbia’s staunch defender of sovereignty and territorial integrity
regarding Kosovo, even though the same media allows credence to Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian
territory, first in Crimea and more recently in the Donbas region. Prior to Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, which was met with a palpable degree of Schadenfreude in Serbia due to the staunch
opposition from the very powers that advocate for Kosovo’s statehood, similar sentiments could
be found in Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Though Serbia
officially supports the territorial integrity of all UN-recognized borders, and there are no main
political parties that advocate secessionism in Bosnia, Ukraine, Georgia, or any other country with a
separatist movement. It is this premise that adds to the understanding of double standards from the
international community that equally supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia, Georgia, and
Ukraine, while trying to argue that Kosovo’s independence is a fait accompli and a “special case.”
Serbian media have remained one of the most pro-Russian in Europe despite the contradictory
positions (Samorukov 2019).

Glowing accounts of Russia are especially afforded to its president, Vladimir Putin, who
is often regarded as a political, ideological, cultural, military, and moral counterbalance to all
things Western. After the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine in 2014, Putin publicly suggested that
Russia’s military intervention, first in Crimea and then in the Donbas, was an attempt to forestall
a Yugoslavia scenario from unravelling on Russia’s borders. Putin’s frequent mentioning of
Yugoslav dissolution via narratives of Western collusion with non-Serb nationalist forces is widely

14
shared in Serbian media. “Look at what they did with Yugoslavia: They cut it into small pieces
and are now manipulating everything that can be manipulated. […] Apparently, someone would
like to do the same with us” (Putin, 2014). The annexation of Crimea, the proclamation of the
Donbas people’s republics, cooperation with Transnistria in Moldova, and the recognition of
Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have all been explained through
the “Kosovo precedent” to justify the respective Russian position (Anđeljović 2022; McGlynn
2022; Samorukov 2019).

The media remains strongly biased toward Russia despite Ukraine being a country whose
territorial integrity, like Serbia, has been compromised and which has not recognized Kosovo as
an independent state (RTS 2023). Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine is explained as a
defence of the country against NATO, the actual invaders. The narratives are less concerned with
the invasion of Ukraine than with the larger war between a decadent, expansionist, and immoral
West continuing its policies of aggression and regime change in Ukraine from its actions in the
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Indeed, most Serbs believe responsibility for the war lies either
with NATO (31.6%) or the U.S. (29.2%). Only a minority (11.6%) think Russia is responsible
(Vuksanović, Šterić and Bjeloš 2022, 7). Serbian media portrays Russia’s intervention as both
reactive and defensive, while the Ukraine government of Volodymyr Zelensky is likened to a pro-
Western puppet that will do anything to get into both NATO and the EU. That Ukrainian
governments have since 2014 taken positions adopting domestic laws that stigmatize, marginalize,
and more recently criminalize displays of all things “Russian,” has enabled media outlets to liken
the Zelensky government to Croatia in the 1990s under Franjo Tuđman; both of which had given
hard-line nationalist movements carte blanche to target minority groups. Both governments are
understood to have embraced ethnonationalism that rehabilitates symbols and key figures their
respective Nazi-era collaborationist governments. The fact that some of Ukraine’s hard-line
nationalist parties have long called for doing to Crimea what Croatia did to Krajina in Operation
Storm only helps explain the entrenchment of the Us/Them cultural and ideological divide.
Similarly, both Serbian and Russian media frequently write about how the West ignores some of
the ethnopolitical extremism in Ukraine as they did in Croatia in the 1990s and continue to do so
in Kosovo, which additionally affirms media-crafted narratives of Serbia being persecuted for
taking what it justifies as the moral high ground in siding with Russia.

15
 There is little evidence to suggest Vučić and the SNS personally identify with these
narratives. Yet the relative freedom afforded to media sectors that support their policies suggests
these narratives are used to the government’s benefit. First, this keeps the government, especially
Vučić, in a favourable light with those reading, watching, or listening to these media outlets. For
someone leading a party with no credible rival, Vučić has assumed the persona of a dour,
beleaguered, pragmatic, yet patriotic leader doing the best one can, given the limited
manoeuvrability Serbia finds itself in. This is meant to not only authenticate Vučić’s relationship
with ordinary people but to indirectly cast Serbia’s political opposition as demanding, haughty,
privileged, and altogether out-of-touch with anyone living outside of krug dvojke, a term used to
designate the inner city of Belgrade that is also euphemistically, and derisively, used to describes
someone living well off enough not to share the concerns of ordinary citizens.

Second, using populist narratives in the media to his advantage, Vučić acts as if the only
stateman in Serbia to get through any crisis. Many of his critics have likened this tactic to the
strategies used in the 1990s by Milošević, who also presented himself and his party, the Socialist
Party of Serbia (Socialistička Partija Srbije, SPS), the same party that remains the SNS’ chief
coalition partner, as the voice of stability and certainty. Though he presents himself as the grim
leader tasked with a thankless job that doesn’t receive nearly as much gratitude as it should, Vučić
is keen on showing himself as ready and willing to cooperate with all international powers:
Washington, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Beijing, and Moscow (Dokmanović and Cvetićanin 2023;
Vučković 2023). That he has been credited by Western leaders as a pillar of stability in the region
is used to counter accusations of increased authoritarian measures at home by his political rivals
and critical NGOs.

Third, by framing much of the Russian–Ukrainian war within the Us/Them debate and
moral/immoral polarization, Vučić relies on the media to garner public support for his decision to
refuse, or at the absolute least, delay imposing sanctions on Russia. The sanctions are
overwhelmingly unpopular (Vuksanović, Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 7), and, in providing evidence
of how sanctions hurt the sanctioning country’s economy more than Russia’s, Vučić bypasses
populist sentiment by simply advocating sensible economic policy. His rhetoric is not framed in
bombastic statements but with an air of experience learned from past mistakes and losses. Vučić
argues that most Serbs (42%) are against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but a more significant

16
percentage of citizens are against sanctions (76%). As Serbia’s spokesperson, he explains that by
“having lived with sanctions for decades, […] we know no benefit of that” (NSPM, 2022), a claim
that is also sustained by public opinion survey (Vuksanović, Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 5; NSPM
2022). He also notes that only 35% of Serbs would currently like to join the EU, while 44% remain
against (Bastian and Brüggmann, 2022), as indicated in recent surveys (Vuksanović, Šterić, and
Bjeloš 2022, 9). By citing these figures, Vučić presents himself as a leader reflecting the “people’s
will.” Thus, opinions, especially among Serbian political actors that ignore or oppose majority
sentiment, can be branded in the media as a potential traitor to the Serbian people. Admitting being
dependent on Russian gas, as well as pitting the country’s future on participating in Russia’s Turk
Stream pipeline project, allows him to muzzle political opponents’ critical voices in journalism,
all the while overlooking the fact that Serbia consistently receives more financial aid and
investments from the EU (Europski parlament 2023).

Vučić has openly stated that Serbia’s future is a member of the European Union, and
maintaining good relations with major European powers and, increasingly, the United States is
necessary (Vučić 2020). Yet, in the eyes of Belgrade, sanctions against Russia mean turning your
back on the most important ally (Adria 2022). Western officials have frequently criticized Serbia
for ‘trying to sit on two chairs’ by trying to court Brussels while maintaining close ties with
Moscow. According to this mindset, Serbia has to choose one or the other (Danas 2023). While
this may be official policy from Brussels and Washington, the media in Serbia present this as just
another ultimatum from powers that have spent the last three decades undermining Serbia’s
legitimate interests. Vučić recently admitted that Serbia would have to impose sanctions sooner or
later, but, as this is a question of morale, he would delay it as long as possible (S.D. 2023). Amid
this, Serbian media has long portrayed the EU as a non-democratic bureaucracy more detrimental
than beneficial to Serbia’s sovereignty, reinforcing Vučić’s hand. However, the recent escalation
in tensions in Kosovo between its Serbian community and the hard-line policies of the current
government in Pristina under Albin Kurti and his Self-Determination party has renewed fears in
Belgrade that failure to impose sanctions on Russia may anger the US and the EU, which could
lead to consequences in Kosovo (Danas 2023). Thus, if Vučić authorizes the sanctions, his allies
in the media will portray it as an act of blackmail (Kulačin 2023), one where he was forced to
make an unpopular decision for the sake of security in Kosovo, which the same European powers
see him as a partner for peace.

17
Conclusion

Vučić arguably exhibits leadership patterns more similar to a stabilitocrat than a populist.
But within studies on the former, particularly ways in which political leaders leverage external
support for internal reform, populism can be understood to be the means to justify the ends. Of
course, this implies that Serbia’s democratic institutions have been weakened and opposition
parties have been polarized, while professional journalism has been marginalized to profit-driven
media and infotainment eager to sell sensationalism. Still, this neither thoroughly explains the lack
of any credible democratic opposition party for more than a decade, nor does it diminish the
importance of professional and objective journalism in Serbia.

Before its apparent implosion in 2010, the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, DS)
enjoyed all the political, diplomatic, and media-friendly advantages currently held by the SNS
while in power. But with the meteoric rise of the SNS after it broke away from its parent party, the
far-right Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS), the DS saw its popularity wane
amid public perceptions of corruption and failure to deliver on promises that brought it to power
in 2000. The DS’s loss in political legitimacy was also, in no small measure, due to its apparent
inability to prevent Kosovo from declaring independence in 2008. In all fairness, there was little
the DS could do. But amid public perception of economic and political ineptitude, coupled with
sustained attacks from its political opponents in more populist-oriented media, the DS, or any
closely related party, has been unable to regain any electoral footing or provide any credible
opposition leader since losing power to the SNS in 2012. Studies on populism note that the SNS
allure is also associated with a lack of public confidence in more mainstream parties. In other
words, populism gains votes when conventional parties fail to connect with the electorate, and thus
it is no surprise with the SNS’s near monopolization of power amid the fading credibility of any
of its opponents.

With regards to Russia, Serbian media has long regarded it and its leadership as friendly
towards Belgrade (Vuksanović, Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 8). To be sure, criticism exists among
those who believe the public space has been “colonized” through “the proliferation of books,
magazines, radio and television programs, and online outlets all devoted to promoting (or
“revealing”) Russia’s rather new ties and contributions to the region” (Mujanović 2019, 55).
However, observations like these seem to either assume Serbia has been at the mercy of sustained

18
Russian propaganda for decades, or that Serbia’s political culture has not been shaped in response
to pressures and ultimatums from the West since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Both are wrong or, at
best, detached from historical analysis. Serbia’s populist media is no stranger to sensationalist
headlines and clickbait. But sensationalism is legitimized through consistent patterns of action. A
key component in the Us/Them dichotomy that forms a major foundation of populism is that the
actions of the “Them” are self-writing narratives to identify and condemn. The more it can point
to observable empirical evidence affirming pre-existing suspicions, the more convincing the
narrative becomes.

It is also important to note that the war in Ukraine has changed Serbian demographics
(Andrić 2023). It is estimated that while around 200.000 Russians initially came to Serbia since
the outbreak of the war, approximately 100000 decided to stay permanently, established
businesses, and contribute to Serbia’s public sphere (Euronews Srbija 2023; Sikima 2022). Like
other countries where Russians have moved to, Serbia has become a bridgehead for Russian
companies, universities, and technical and skilled workers (Pancevski 2023). Though this mass
arrival has increased purchasing prices for goods, foods, real estate, and rents, negative comments
on “Russians” are limited in political statements.5 Finally, it should be noted that serious
investigative journalism has existed in Serbia since the collapse of Yugoslavia. As noted above,
independent media not only examine the war in Ukraine more objectively than state-friendly giants
and tabloids, but reader- and viewership remains disproportionately smaller, mainly comprised of
individualized government critics (N1 2021). Segments of the population critical of their
government tend to remain small and stigmatized anywhere. This provides a sense of guarded
optimism that Serbian media remain critical of government policy. Still, with the noted weakness
in alternative political options, the SNS can disregard critical analysis of its leadership in the name
of free speech, knowing that most protesters are weary of politicians. In contrast, its smaller
segments of political supporters remain innocuous as ever.

5
52.2% of the population (would) welcome both Russian and Ukrainian refugees, while 26.1% do not accept either
(Vuksanović, Šterić, and Bjeloš 2022, 8).

19
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