Social Justice/Global Options

Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime
Author(s): Rosa del Olmo

Source: Crime and Social Justice, No. 30, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1987), pp. 28-44
Published by: Social Justice/Global Options
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Aerobiology and theWar on Drugs:
A Transnational Crime
Rosa del Olmo
Introduction
There are hardly any inhabitants of the American continent in the

decade of the eighties who have had no contact with theword drug.
Its presence has been felt by the peasant who cultivates drugs when
there is no other means of subsistence, as well as by theMiami banker who in?
creases his capital with them; by the adolescent of our cities who consumes
them in order to imitate his favorite singer, as well as by the child of the barrio
who looks for drugs to kill hunger; by themother who is horrified at the pos?
sible dependency of her child, as well as by thehousewife who asks the doctor
for a drug in order to feel less socially inferior;by theBlack of the ghettowho
shoots up in order to endure discrimination, as well as by the young employee
who inhales in order to bear competition at work; by the policeman who com?
bats drugs as well as by thepolitician who snorts them.Men and women, rich
and poor, old and young, Blacks, Indians, and whites, all know the word.
Some cultivate drugs, others process them, others deal in them, others work
for themwithout knowing it,others consume them, others condemn them, and
the rest fear them. Their presence makes itself felt in one form or another be?
cause drugs are the greatest economic and political business of the 1980s.
In spite of the fact thatdrugs are fundamentally a commodity, regulated by
the laws of supply and demand of theworld market, theymust also be ana?
lyzed as international crimes.
For some politicians of theAmerican continent, the traffic in drugs is a
universal crime. In theDeclaration of Quito, as a result of themeeting of the
various Latin American presidents in Quito, Ecuador, in August 1984, traf?
ficking in drugs was considered a crime against humanity with all of the im?
plicit legal consequences. Others qualify it as a crime of an international
character} in order to distinguish it from international crimes.2More specifi?
cally, the distribution and sale of drugs are viewed as crimes which harm in?
ternational economic and sociocultural development of states and peoples
ROSA DEL OLMO is a professor at theUniversidad Central de Venezuela, Instituto de Ciencias

Penales y Crimin?logicas, Caracas, Venezuela.
28 CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICENo. 30
Aerobiology and theWar on Drugs 29
along with ecocide, contraband, illegal emigration, the counterfeiting of

money, etc.
The theme is imprecise, vague, and general in its definition and location
within international criminal law or criminal international law (assuming the
two are different as is asserted by Luis Jimenez de Az?a [1958]). Thus, the
definition can include any substance considered illegal by health-related crite?
riawhen public health is the concern; however, economic and political criteria
are often not considered in this definition process.
Transnational Criminality and the Reagan

Administration's "War on Drugs"
Since the Latin American continent is a major producer of marijuana and

theonly producer of cocaine ? with the great demand for both substances in
theUnited States constituting the fundamental reason for theirproduction and
commercialization ? we will limit the present study to these two drugs but
especially to the first.However, we will discuss neither theireffects on health,
nor the drug dealers, nor the legislation intended to regulate them,whether of
a judicial-criminal, administrative, ormedical nature.
Drugs are such a multifaceted issue and have such unpredictable conse?
quences that one could approach the topic from an infinityof angles. What
interests us most is a little-known aspect which can be characterized not only
as an international crime, but also as a crime of an international character,
which we prefer to call a transnational crime. It is a crime which in the last
few years has basically arisen in Third World countries, including the Latin
American continent, as a result of the great demand formarijuana and cocaine
thathas developed in theUnited States over the last 15 years, but especially as
a result of theway that theU.S. government has confronted theproblem.
The government of theUnited States has maintained throughout this

century that the solution to the problem of drug abuse is to be found
in the countries which produce themost important illicit drugs. In
1982, theWhite House saw the elimination of illegal drugs in or near
the foreign source as themost efficientway of reducing the domestic
supply of those substances (Reuter, 1958).
In otherwords, we are going to speak of a transnational crime generated by

theReagan administration's current war on drugs. It is a war which, in its
economic dimension, is directed at impeding the arrival of these drugs
(marijuana and cocaine) to theUnited States. That is to say, it seeks to attack
the external supply instead of the internal demand and therefore ignores a
whole set of aspects of the problem such as distribution, consumption, and
domestic commercialization.
30 DEL OLMO
The result is that themain emphasis falls on programs of interdiction and

eradication. Under the first,drugs are confiscated before arriving at the bor?
ders of theUnited States; under the second, the goal is towipe out production
in the place of origin? meaning theLatin American countries, in the case of
marijuana and cocaine.
This article is about the latterprograms. This is not only because they are
the principal expression of the current war, but also because (as we will
demonstrate) one can include among "the crimes which harm the economic
and sociocultural development of states and peoples" programs which have the
characteristics of crimes against the environment. Such is the case even when
those programs may be directed, in principle, at combatting another crime of
an international character: traffickingin drugs.
In other words, the issue is a typeof crime committed on thepretext ofpre?
venting another crime, although in practice ithas not succeeded in doing so, as
has been demonstrated. It is a crime which has the characteristics of ecocide
by virtue of making war with certain methods, systems, or prohibited
weapons. Vietnam was a good example, with napalm and agent orange. To?
day, the new war is on drugs and itsweapons are toxic chemicals, especially
herbicides prohibited in their place of origin for causing poisoning, contami?
nation of food, and serious environmental problems, like paraquat, gliphos
phate, and agent orange.
International agreements do exist, such as a 1977 United Nations conven?
tion on environmental protection, which prohibits the use of agents thatmod?
ify the environment for military purposes or other hostile objectives. In
essence, these are agreements against ecocide, against the destruction of the
environment, and more concretely, biocide,3 ifwe bear in mind the future.
Criminality against the environment,Manuel Lopez Rey (1983) calls it,when
he points out the necessity of creating the phrase "criminal protection of the
natural world" in relation to the quality of life and the importance that it is
gaining in international study.
In Reagan's war against drugs, these agreements and international studies
are not recognized.
Deadly Toxins and Double Standards
The governments of Latin America, overwhelmed by an external debt that

becomes more and more unpayable, and plagued by growing social problems
which often result from the demand for drugs itself, are becoming victims of
this transnational crime. They are also threatenedwith being denied foreign
aid if theydo not comply with theprograms of crop eradication, in accordance
with theForeign Aid Authorization Act. The suspension of aid and the sending
ofU.S. troops to "assist" anti-narcotic forces in Bolivia in July 1986 is a clear
example of the situation. But sometimes these same governments are con
verted into accomplices in another major crime, genocide, which is also rec?
ognized by international agreements going back to theNuremberg Tribunal,
because the crop eradication programs employ weapons with serious effects
on the "quality of life,"when life indeed remains. These programs have his?
torically served only to expand the drug industry into new regions, ultimately
increasing the sources of supply, and in the concrete case of marijuana, it has
served to increase domestic production within theUnited States.4
We are thus faced with a transnational crime of broad scope which we can
call eco-bio-genocide. It goes beyond the war against drugs because it in?
volves the utilization of a whole complex of toxic chemicals, called pesticides,
herbicides, or plaguicides, which are prohibited and/or restricted in the devel?
oped countries but have an unlimited market in Third World countries despite
thewell-known legal consequences. The situation is facilitated by the fact that
themajority of theThird World countries have neither environmental laws nor
laws which control the use of toxic chemicals.
With the knowledge of theireffects censored, such chemicals are utilized
widely in programs of drug eradication because the sole preoccupation is to
destroy themarijuana and cocaine crops before they arrive in theUnited States
in order to protect North American youth, regardless of the consequences for
ThirdWorld youth.
International pressure against the use of these toxins is therefore ignored.
The fact is ignored, for example, that in 1982, a whole series of organizations
in 20 countries created a network known as the Pesticide Action Network
? World Environment
(PAN) International. On June 5, 1985 Day, according
to theUnited Nations ? that network launched a world-wide campaign in 25
countries against the so-called Dirty Dozen, the "12 dirty pesticides" also
known as "the Twelve Killers" (los doce del patibulo), which include the her?
bicide paraquat used against marijuana in Latin American. These are pesti?
cides which cause serious environmental problems, food contamination, and
unnecessary poisoning of Third World people, who are themain victims of
those pesticides for lack of adequate medical care, chronic malnutrition, and
other health problems (IFDA Dossier 50,1985).
One must also note thepressure from theproducing companies not to reg?
ulate the use of these chemicals in the same way as in theUnited States, so as
to avoid "effects that are bad for business" and to reduce the fear thatThird
World countries will learn the dangers of the pesticides. In this spirit,Dr. Jack
Early, president of theNational Agricultural Chemical Association, remarked
with great cynicism: "It is not the affair of theUnited States to draw up the
laws of theworld. We do not have to impose on those countries the standard
which we have imposed on ourselves" (Newsweek, August 17, 1984: 46-48).
32 DEL OLMO
The famous "double standard" or "double morality" observable here also

reflects the particular way of confronting the drug problem in the United
States and inLatin America.
All of this is rooted, we repeat, in thewar on drugs of theReagan admin?
istration,whose basic strategy is the elimination of plants utilized in the pro?
duction of drugs in theirplace of origin, as Carlton Turne, White House advi?
sor on the struggle against drug trafficking,has clearly indicated (El Univer?
sal, September 24, 1985). This justifies utilizing as weapons, outside of the
United States, some of those toxic chemicals which have been denounced and
which are disseminated with the air as a vehicle. They form part of
aerobiology, a new type of war which leads to the alteration of plant
metabolism. The agent utilized:
...destroys the vegetation, calcines the soil and alters the vital cycles
of different animal species accustomed to determined ecological con?
ditions, thus causing epidemics and epizootics.... At the same time, it
produces an increase in thenumber of cases of fetalmalformation, as
has been confirmed by, among others,Matthew Meselson, Professor
ofMolecular Biology at Harvard University, in his studies of preg?
nant women and babies recently born in the victimized areas (Torres,
1986).
In 1981, only two countries were eradicating the illegal cultivation of

drugs. Today 14 countries do it. Information on the toxic chemicals used in
thiswar is restricted and contradictory because it is considered a matter of na?
tional security. The subject requires major investigation, but for themoment
we will try to present some facts in order to demonstrate its character as a
transnational crime.
Aerobiology and theParaquat Panic
On the American continent the first attempts at aerofumigation of drug

? that is to say, an application of aerobiology ? were car?
producing plants
ried out inMexico in the 1970s.
From January 1971 toMay 1972, 936 poppy fields [the source of
?
opium and heroin production eds.] were razed to the ground and
4,500 marijuana plantations were destroyed.... A contingent of police
officials from the United States with an arsenal of electronic and
aerial observation equipment as well as chemical products moved
into thatcountry (Neuman, 1984).
In 1975, the herbicide paraquat was utilized massively as part of an opera?

tion financed by theUnited States in order to eradicate the cultivation of mar
ijuana, especially in the Sierra Madre, which at the timewas the principal ex?
porter of thatdrug to theUnited States. From 1975 to 1978, theUnited States
contributed approximately $30 million per year for thatprogram as well as for
a program of poppy eradication using 2-4 dichlorophenoxyacetate (2-4-D),
another dangerous toxic chemical which causes birth defects (Landrigan et al.,
1983).
As a result of this program, a "paraquat panic" was created in theUnited
States in those years, and an international debate on this herbicide was un?
leashed, which led Congress tomake it illegal for theUnited States to support
fumigation programs in other countries. Thus, Section 481 of theForeign Aid
Bill was amended by a proposal from Senator Charles Percy; thismeasure
came to be known as thePercy Amendment.
The central preoccupation of health authorities at that timewas thatmari?
juana sprayed with paraquat continued to arrive in theUnited States and could
damage the health of U.S. smokers.What happened to the peasants and the
ecological system ofMexico mattered little.A national investigation ordered
by theDepartment of Health, Education, andWelfare was conducted to deter?
mine if the residue of paraquat inmarijuana represented a danger to the health
of its consumers. At the same time, the Center forDisease Control (CDC) and
theNational Institute for Environmental Health Sciences made an evaluation
as to the epidemiological risk of paraquat and marijuana.5 Itwas pointed out in
this report thatparaquat is very toxic for the human being, with the lungs be?
ing the principal organ affected, since it causes pulmonary fibrosis as well as
irritativedermatitis, damage to the nails, optical injury, and severe epistaxis
(Ibid.:lU).
On April 2, 1979, the Secretary of theDepartment of Health, Education,
andWelfare concluded: "The fumigation ofmarijuana with paraquat can cause
serious damage to the health of persons who consume thatmarijuana" (Ibid.:
787). That decision was submitted to theDepartment of State and U.S. support
for theMexican program was suspended.
That same year, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of
theU.S. House of Representatives (1979: 10) presented its report on a study
mission toColombia and Puerto Rico which pointed out:
The most effectivemethod to control theproduction ofmarijuana and

cocaine is through eradication and not prohibition, but by some as
yet undetermined acceptable method. The Colombians resist partici?
pating in eradication with herbicides due to unresolved environmental
and policy questions (emphasis added).
At the same time, a report called "Is Marijuana Sprayed with Paraquat
Harmful or Not?" was prepared. In 1980, another study entitled "The Use of
Paraquat to Eradicate Illicit Marijuana Crops" appeared. On December 15,
34 DEL OLMO
1981, the U.S. Congress annulled the Percy Amendment and appropriated
$37.7 million for the fiscal year 1982-1983 in order to reinstate the utilization
of herbicides in the international drug control program. The funds would be
utilized in various countries and not limited toMexico.
The spraying of marijuana with paraquat had a double effect: it killed the
plants and reduced theMexican market through fear of the possible conse?
quences for theU.S. smoker's health. But it did notwipe out theproduction of
marijuana; the industryrelocated toColombia, Jamaica, and theUnited States,
as did theproblem of paraquat.
Despite the revocation of thePercy Amendment, the governments of Latin
America resisted the introduction of U.S. eradication programs in their re?
spective countries. Many foreign officials maintained that the U.S. govern?
ment followed a double standard since itwas not sprayingmarijuana fields in
California and Hawaii. It was public information in 1982 thatNorth Ameri?
cans were cultivating billions of dollars worth of marijuana ? the famous
seedless type, of much better quality? and production was confirmed in 11
states. Itwas considered the thirdmost profitable crop at that time.6
Legal Protections in theUnited States
The intransigence of the Latin American governments and the growing

problem within theUnited States motivated theDEA (Drug Enforcement Ad?
ministration) to begin spraying in theU.S. Thus, on August 12, 1983, paraquat
was sprayed in theChattahoochee National Park in the state of Georgia. Nev?
ertheless, this operation was not successful because itwas subjected to legal
investigation by organizations like theNational Organization for the Reform
ofMarijuana Laws (NORML) and the Sierra Club (an environmental protec?
tionorganization) which charged that the spraying violated theNational Envi?
ronmental Protection Act (NEPA). On November 8, 1983, Judge L. Green of
theDistrict of Columbia prohibited theDEA from continuing with the opera?
tion on federal lands unless an Environmental Impact Statement justified such
action, as stipulated by NEPA legislation and the regulations of theCouncil on
Environmental Policy.
In 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of the
House of Representatives prepared a detailed report on the "Cultivation and
Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marijuana," which pressed to attain its interna?
tional objectives. The report stressed that:
We urge theDEA, however, to insure that all statutoryrequirements

are met before a plan of action is decided upon. Our efforts to con?
vince other nations to utilize paraquat in mass eradication of mari?
juana may be irreparably damaged if our nation becomes embroiled
in an unnecessary controversy over the use of paraquat formarijuana

eradication purposes (p. 19).
The DEA spent $1.5 million on two Environmental Impact Statements and
other documents in its attempt to legalize the utilization of herbicides within
theUnited States. Nonetheless, paraquat remains prohibited so long as the
Environmental Protection Agency's order ("Environmental Protection Agency
Approved Paraquat Label") is not changed.
In order to attain its objective of eradication, theDEA opted for utilizing,
besides paraquat, another toxic chemical: gliphosphate, known in theUnited
States as Roundup, a new herbicide produced by theMonsanto Company of
St. Louis, Missouri, about which very little is known, even though itwas im?
plicated in a famous scandal in theUnited States. Because of this,Monsanto
has been denounced7 for having concealed information from the public on the
pretext that itwas a factory secret. The chemist, JamesWoodford of Georgia,
has noted thatwhen gliphosphate burns, itcreates a gas similar to cyanide gas,
which can be lethal.
Acceleration of US. Anti-Drug Aid toColombia
Meanwhile, despite all the controversies, theU.S. government has contin?

ued to insist through all available channels that the government of Colombia
? which became the new ?
producer spray itsmarijuana with paraquat. In a
meeting of Colombia's Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes (National Nar?
cotics Council) held on February 17, 1982, the thenMinister of Justice, Felio
Andrade Manrique, presented to the head of theHealth Division of theMin?
istryof Health a scientific report on the herbicide gramaxone (paraquat). In
documents 10093 ofMarch 26, 1982, and 00730 of January 7, 1983, theMin?
istry specialists presented their reports advising against utilization of the
herbicide.
Two days before the presentation of the last report, i.e., on January 5,
1983, theU.S. government announced that itwould aid Colombia in the de?
struction of itsmarijuana with paraquat, and the thenAssistant Secretary of
State, Don Thomas, would give "high priority" to the program (see Santos
Calder?n, 1983; 1985). Colombia's Jorge Garcia, thenMinister of Health,
prohibited its use and rejected theU.S. assistance. The following week, U.S.
Ambassador Thomas Boyay minimized the risks involved in using paraquat.
Meanwhile, the debate continued as did the attempts to use paraquat in the
United States, although only symbolically, as inRed Bay, Florida, at the be?
ginning of 1983. Much stresswas placed on minimizing paraquat as a health
risk; fortunately, a series of publications, which emphasized its harmful ef?
fects, refuted thisview.
36 DEL OLMO
Nevertheless, a group of U.S. Congressmen visited Colombia on a study

mission inAugust 1983, with the goal of persuading President Betancur to or?
der plants sprayed with the aforementioned toxic chemicals. Itwas alleged that
"cutting the plants out by hand was equivalent to trying to clean theUnited
States Capitol with a toothbrush" (El Universal, October 1, 1984). President
Betancur rejected the request of the Congressmen. But when theMinister of
Justice,Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, was assassinated on April 30, 1984, the situa?
tion changed radically. The Colombian government, realizing that the drug
problem was no longer exclusively thatof theUnited States, agreed to put the
eradication programs into effect under certain conditions. Along with other
measures, theNational Council of Narcotics approved aerial spraying, but not
with paraquat; rather,gliphosphate was tobe used on an experimental basis, in
order to determine possible consequences. The National Instituteof Health did
not recommend its aerial use at that time. In any case, theVice Minister of
Health indicated that therewould be a permanent monitoring.
At least 60,000 hectares of marijuana and some 30,000 of coca (the plant
fromwhich cocaine is extracted) were sprayed in the Sierra Nevada of Santa
Marta, forwhich theU.S. government provided helicopters. In spite of peasant
protests, itwas said that gliphosphate was harmless. Nevertheless, itwas sub?
sequently noticed that the gliphosphate "had affected wheat crops, domestic
animals, and human health in the Sierra de Nevada" (Santos Calder?n, 1985).
On the other hand, the spraying of the coca bushes achieved nothing; no herbi?
cide has been found which succeeds in exterminating coca (although by
November 1985 a product called garlon was being experimented with in the
United States). In order to fight against coca, "dealers are arrested, imports of
ether and acetone are controlled, airports are searched, or laboratories are de?
stroyed" (New York Times, September 9, 1984) as was seen in Bolivia with
"Operation Blast Furnace" at the end of July 1986. Moreover, in San Jose del
Guaviara on the Colombian plains, coca bushes were sprayed with several
mixtures of herbicides at the end of November 1984 and in January 1985, and
theonly thing thathappened was that thebushes grew stronger (US. News and
World Report, March 25, 1985).
The War Broadens Despite Mounting Scientific Evidence Against Herbicides
In 1985, U.S. efforts to implement eradication programs in thewar against

drugs increased. A new study mission of Congressmen visited Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Their report gives a
detailed account of those programs, especially that of Colombia, which had
been operating for almost a year.
Also in 1985, the DEA tried to resume its program of plant eradication
within theUnited States with a mixture of herbicides: paraquat, gliphosphate,
and 2-4-D, which, as will be remembered, is related to the famous agent or
ange denounced inVietnam. The DEA had continued with its program known
as CAMP (Campaign Against Marijuana Planting) since 1982. It carried out
the first spraying on September 6, 1985, in theMark Twain National Forest in
Missouri, and the second on October 6, 1985, on government land inCarlsbad,
New Mexico.
Nevertheless, theDEA encountered legal problems in theUnited States. In
1984, for example, District JudgeRobert Aguilar thought that the CAMP pro?
gram violated theFourth Amendment of theConstitution and on this ground
he issued a ruling restricting it. The following year, he reviewed 70 sworn
statements about efforts to violate his decision. In August 1985, two citizens
of Tidewater, Oregon, introduced a petition against the local, state, and federal
officials of the eradication program, towhich were attached 118 depositions
fromVirginia, West Virginia, and California alleging abuses by DEA officials
and accusing them of violating constitutional, civil, and environmental laws,
for example, violation of private property (NORML, 1985: 6). In addition,
many authorities such as theAttorney Generals of California and Oregon, the
State Department of Agriculture ofWashington, and theDepartment of Health
and Rehabilitation of Florida opposed the use of herbicides for environmental
reasons.
Also in 1985, theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that

gliphosphate was a short-termcarcinogen (though theEPA had not yet com?
pleted its studies in detecting the chemical's genetic consequences). It noted
that even if gliphosphate does not directly attack the lungs, like paraquat, it
does damage the liver. Recently, at the request of theDEA, an Environmental
Impact Statement was prepared to justify resumption of themarijuana eradi?
cation programs within theUnited States. This study admitted thathuman be?
ings could contract cancer from the herbicides, although only a small percent?
age. It pointed out thatunder certain circumstances it could be toxic or fatal to
fauna and to sea life. "If animals come in contact with the spraying of either of
the three herbicides ? paraquat, gliphosphate, or 2-4-D
? or if they eat
contaminated vegetation, it could be fatal" (Washington Post, January 17,
1986).
It is evident that precautions against these dangers are not taken in the
countries of theThird World. This is certainly the case when illegal crops are
involved,8 and especially so under conditions of war, as now exist with the
eradication of illegal drugs. Meanwhile the programs not only continue but
have also been extended inLatin America. In the first sixmonths of 1985, for
example, 896 hectares of marijuana and 4,544 of poppies were sprayed in a
joint program of theU.S. and Mexican governments with 70 aircraft donated
and serviced by theU.S. (Toronto Globe, January 23, 1986).
In 1986, when this article was written, "Operation Pacific 7" was con?
cluding in theMexican states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua. It
38 DEL OLMO
was one of themost intensemarijuana and poppy eradication campaigns ever

staged, in which six spraying planes of the high-speed type, supplied by the
U.S., joined three helicopters owned by theOffice of theAttorney General of
Mexico, as part of an "attack force" in thewar on drugs (El Impulso, August 5,
1986).
At the same time in Colombia, the eradication programs initiated in 1984
in collaboration with theDEA continue. By 1986, however, a heated debate
about increasing them developed. Thus, in themonth of June, 50,000 hectares
ofmarijuana were sprayed in theTaurona National Park in the Sierra Nevada
of Santa Marta in northernColombia, with helicopters financed by theDEA.
Reportedly, gliphosphate was used but the press also spoke of paraquat. How?
ever, either of the two, as we have seen, can have fatal effects on the environ?
ment. The Institute of Health sent a document to the judicial authorities ad?
vising against the spraying. The Instituteof Natural and Renewable Resources
(INDEREMA) was also opposed, pointing out that "the war is against nar?
cotics and not against nature" (El Colombiano, July 18, 1986). A well-known
Colombian journalist, German Castro Caicedo, completed a detailed study on
theway in which these programs are being carried out. "According to evi?
dence gathered from growers in the region, the spraying is being done indis?
criminately, not only against marijuana, but also against every type of food
crop of thepeasants, and their farms are being destroyed by the helicopters"
(ElMundo, July 23, 1986: 1-A). Since the beginning of 1986, numerous farm?
ers of Meta and Guaviare have protested because the aerial sprayings were
razing to the ground thousands of hectares of food crops and threatening an
economic collapse in these regions (El Tiempo, July 13,1986: 4-A).
An Indian leader of the Arhuaco tribe of the Sabana Culebra region of
Santa Marta has denounced these actions and commented:
My brothers are dying there and what the doctors are doing, the
medicines they leave, is not sufficientbecause this is an unknown and
deadly epidemic. We believe that it is a poisoning produced by
spraying with gliphosphate because the symptoms are vomiting of
blood, intense headaches, and shivering all over the body until death
(El Tiempo, June 29, 1986).
The monitoring called for by the National Institute of Health, and an?
nounced by theVice Minister of Health in 1984, was to include a study of the
respiratory, endocrine and metabolism systems, and hereditary characteristics
of the inhabitants of the Sierra Nevada. It was never completed. Thus, Dr.
Jesus Idrobo, the prominent president of the Colombian Society of Ecology
and a national policy adviser for the gliphosphate spraying program, said:
I remember very well thatwhen the program was going to begin, the
National Institute of Health designed a monitoring effortwhich con?
sisted of taking specimens ofwater, botanical life, soil,milk, animals,
human milk, blood, urine, etc., in order to see if the presence of
gliphosphate in human beings, plants, and animals was detected. As
far as I know, this extremely good program was not carried out. Con?
fident that themonitoring was going to be carried out, we recom?
mended gliphosphate, considering it the least dangerous of all the
pesticides we studied (ElMundo, July 24, 1986).
It is interesting to note here that theColombian government's Order 704 of

March 3, 1986, prohibited the use on national territoryof plaguicides interna?
tionally labeled as the "Dirty Dozen" (to which we referred at the beginning
of this article). Remember also thatone of them is paraquat. Also, according to
reports originating in theUnited States, a compound of the threeherbicides al?
? ?
ready mentioned paraquat, gliphosphate, and 2-4-D is being used in
Colombia today in thedrug eradication programs.
Domestic U.S. Herbicidal Practices
During a visit toColombia, when confronted by the debate unleashed there

and with accusations about the non-use of the herbicides in theUnited States,
theU.S. Director of Customs, William von Raab, denied that toxic chemicals
and specifically gliphosphate were not being used in theUnited States. He
nonetheless pointed out that aerial sprayingwith gliphosphate, as practiced in
Colombia, is not profitable in theUnited States because of the small size of
themarijuana fields there (Ellmpulso, August 5,1986).
If it is true that one of the peculiarities of marijuana cultivation in the
United States is the utilization of small plots and winter pastures, Mr. von
Raab has forgotten, among other things, the large-scale cultivation in the
Hawaiian Islands where an underground economy of $700 million surpasses
legal agriculture,which is estimated at a total of $650 million.9 He also did not
explain the reasons for the unquestionable increase in the production of mari?
juana in the continental territoryof theUnited States, which no one can deny.
According to the Annual Report on theDomestic Marijuana Crop of 1985
publishedbyNORML,
for the first time in the history of theUnited States an illicit crop is
themost profitable crop of this country. In 1985 themarijuana crop
produced earnings of $18.6 million, placing itself above corn...and
rising in relation to 1984 when themarijuana crop reached $16.6
million (NORML, 1985: 1).
40 DEL OLMO
Neither did von Raab point out that efforts to establish eradication pro?
grams in theUnited States are of a symbolic character, geared toward pres?
suring other countries into carrying them out. Remember, for example, that
marijuana consumption has been practically decriminalized in 11 states and its
retail sale is ignored by the authorities. Actually, since U.S. quality and tech?
nology are superior,U.S. marijuana is beginning to be widely exported. Mar?
ijuana is going to Canada and the technology toHolland, and, to a largemea?
sure, toMexico and Central America. The marijuana from theUnited States is
of better quality, grows more rapidly, and, since its cultivation is carried out
on small plots of land, ismore difficult to detect (Ibid.: 2).
Mr. von Raab rejected the positions of a group of state government repre?
sentatives who are openly opposed to the DEA's domestic eradication pro?
grams. Among those repudiated were the Department of Agriculture of
Washington and theDepartment of Health and Rehabilitation of Florida, men?
tioned earlier.
Mr. von Raab's position should not seem odd because it is consistent with
thepolicy, i.e., thewar on drugs of theReagan administration. However, it is
inconsistentwith official documents giving priority to the drug cocaine as an
object of concern. Further, thepriority given to cocaine was demonstrated, for
example, at the Specialized Inter-American Conference on Narcotic Traffic
organized by theOrganization of American States and held inRio de Janeiro,
Brazil, inApril 1986, where the drugmarijuana was not discussed at all.
Conclusion
However, when it comes to putting eradication programs into practice,

marijuana does become important as long as we are talking about Latin
America, as this article has shown. The underlying reasons why suchmeasures
are not practiced in theUnited States would require furtheranalysis. Mean?
while, we have tried to demonstrate how theirpractice constitutes a form of
transnational crime. It is a crime by virtue of joining together the characteris?
tics of what we have termed eco-bio-genocide, and transnational because
within the limits permitted by the respective governments, these programs
seem to constitute a single program. Their planning is usually centralized, in
this case in theUnited States, even when they are executed in two or more
countries and those responsible for theprogram are of differentnationalities.10
On the other hand, the insistence on "stopping the drugs at the source," so
often repeated by theReagan administration and expressed concretely in the
eradication programs, today exemplifies in themost obvious way the double
standards mentioned at the beginning of this article. In the case of marijuana,
towhich aerobiology can be openly applied because the necessary weapons
exist, a number of concerns can be raised which should at least be mentioned
before concluding. To what extent can this aggressive campaign taking place
in the countries of Latin America, in contrast to theU.S., be explained in fun?

damentally economic terms ifwe continue to look at drugs as commodities?
Remembering the present protectionist policy of the U.S. government,
wouldn't it be better to try tomonopolize the production of marijuana within
theUnited States, bearing inmind its industrial potential? A recent scientific
reportfrom theUniversity of California lists the virtues of this plant as a sec?
ond source of vegetable protein in theworld and points out that"the plant pos?
sesses the following advantages as nourishment: it has more enzymes and
amino acids thanmany foods...and with its seed domestic animals can be
nourished..." (LAU, 1985: 8).
In June 1983, theLos Angeles Times stated:
with the collaboration of governments, the plant, the seed, and the
pulp of marijuana could be used as a means to solve theworld prob?
lems of hunger and misery. However, the programs of military and
foreign aid of theUnited States are dedicated to spraying these plants
with paraquat and gliphosphate. Paraquat is one of themost danger?
ous poisons on theplanet, and used criminally as it is by theDEA, it
is themost detestable crime that a government can commit against
thepeople (cited in Ibid.: 9).
Itwould be adventurist to affirm or deny these propositions without more

investigation, even though the history of marijuana prior to its criminalization
would seem to support them. Similarly, the way in which marijuana as a
problem within theUnited States is tacitly ignored, despite the fact thatvari?
ous official sources agree thatmore than 29 million people in theU.S. con?
sumemarijuana, is cause for reflection.
One cannot conclude this analysis of the double standard without men?
tioning, however briefly, its political dimension. As we have seen, within the
United States citizens can take refuge in the Fourth Amendment of the Con?
stitution in order to get the judicial authorities to rule against eradication pro?
grams based upon their civil rights. In Latin America, a government cannot
suggest a step of this nature,much less a judge or a citizen, unless itwants to
run the risk of being internationally accused of being a narcoterrorist, a ter?
rorizing label in the currentwar. Meanwhile, the eradication programs, with
all of theirunforeseeable consequences, will have to continue.
Returning to the startingpoint of this article, we wish to conclude with the
words of a Spanish journalist:
For a poorly paid policeman and a poor peasant who barely manages
to harvest products for subsistence, there is nothing easier than re?
ceiving the handy money earned through producing and traffickingin
drugs. The bribes of the narcotic traffickersmore than surpass the
42 DEL OLMO
miserable wages of a Mexican policeman. For a poor peasant, the

cultivation of mota (marijuana) and the poppy is more convenient,
several timesmore profitable, and much less complicated than fight?
ing theMexican institutions in charge of agricultural credit together
with the insecurity of the harvest. The drug bosses provide the seed,
and themoney, and pay much more than those who buy corn and
beans (Comas, 1986).
NOTES
1. "Crimes of an international character are criminal acts covered by international conven?

tions, which are not classified as crimes against humanity but which threaten normal relations be?
tween states, and are harmful to international cooperation in diverse areas (economic, sociocul
tural, property, etc.) and also to organizations and citizens. They are punishable according to
norms established and ratified in international conventions. Moreover, they flow from norms of
national legislation in line with these conventions" (Karpets, 1983: 65).
2. "International crime refers to an assault on the basics of existence and evolution of the
peoples" (Ibid.: 39).

3. Biocide is understood as "the illegal, irreversible destruction of the environment, which
implies the alteration of international security and affects thewell-being and the health of not only
the present generation of human beings but also future generations" (Karpets, 1983: 44).
4. See also the interesting discussion byMary K. Perkins and Herbert R. Gilbert (1986).
5. See the discussion inLandrigan et al. (1983).
of this evaluation
6. See also the detailed
report, "Guns, Grass and Money: America's Billion Dollar Mari?
juana Crop" (Newsweek, October 25,1982).
7. It is interesting to note thatMonsanto was sued along with other companies by Vietnam
veterans in a famous case in which 20,000 veterans were identified as having been affected by the
herbicide agent orange manufactured by those companies. After negotiations, the companies had
to pay indemnities of $180 million (Newsweek, "A Fast Deal on Agent Orange," May 21, 1984:
43).
8. According to theWorld Health Organization, one person is poisoned every minute in the
Third World because of plaguicides. This totals 500 million people poisoned yearly.
9. See the report by the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of theHouse of
Representatives, "Cultivation and Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marijuana" (1984), on the situa?
tion inHawaii.
10. It is in this sense mat we intentionally use the term transnational in contrast to the terms
multinational and international, even though in practice there can exist combinations of the three,
following the clear differentiation of Samuel P. Huntington (1973: 333-368).
REFERENCES
Comas, Jose*
1986 "Cruzada de Reagan Contra el Narcotr?fico." El Pafs (Madrid, August 24): 8.
El Colombiano
1986 "La DEA Fumiga con un Qmmico Prohibido en los Estados Unidos** (July
18): 2-A.
El Impulso
1986a "La Producci?n de Drogas Genera Consumo'* (Barquisimeto, August 5).
1986b "El Gobierno de Mexico Ataca por el Aire" (Barquisimeto, August 5).
El Mundo
1986a "Glifosfato Masivo y laDoble Moral de los Estados Unidos" (Medellm, July
24).
1986b "Glifosfato Masivo y el Gobierno con la Vista Gorda** (Medellm, July 23):
1-A.
El Tiempo
1986 "Indigenas Insisten que ei Glifosfato Ha Causado Varias Muertes" (June 29).
El Universal
1984 "El Gobierno Colombiano Rociar?" Herbicidas en las Plantaciones de Mari?
juana y Cocama" (Caracas, October 1).
Huntington, Samuel P.
1973 "Transnational Organizations inWorld Politics." World Politics 25,3
(Princeton).
International Foundation forDevelopment Alternatives
1985 "The Dirty Dozen: Global Campaign Launched Against Hazardous Pesti?
cides." IFDA Dossier 50 (November-December): 79.
Jimenez de Az?a, Luis
1958 Tratado de Derecho Penal. Volume II. Buenos Aires: Losada Publishers S.A.:
727.
Karpets, Igor
1983 Delitos de Car?cter Intemacional. Moscow: Editorial Progreso.
Landrigan, Philip J.,M.D., Kenneth E. Powell, M.D., et al.
1983 "Paraquat and Marijuana: Epidemiological Risk Assessment.*' American Jour?
nal of Public Health 73,7 (July): 784.
LAU
1985 "La Marijuana M?s All? del Bien y del Mal.** No. 1 (Medellm): 8.
Ley, Hans Joachim
1982 Introducci?n al Derecho Intemacional Penal. Caracas: Ministry of Foreign
Relations: 29.
Lopez Rey, Manuel
1983 International Criminology. Madrid: Institute of Criminology, Universidad
Complutense de Madrid: 152.
Neuman, Elias
1984 Droga y Criminologi'a. Mexico: Siglo XXI: 129.
New York Times
1984 "Shaken Colombia Acts at Last on Drugs" (September 9).
Newsweek
1984 "A Fast Deal on Agent Orange" (May 21).
1982 "Guns, Grass and Money: America's Billion Dollar Marijuana Crop" (October
25).
1981 "The Pesticide Peril" (August 17): 46-48.
NORML
1985 "Annual Domestic Marijuana Crop Report, 1985.**Washington, D.C.: 1.
1985 The Leaflet 14 (December 4): 6.
Perkins, Mary K. and Herbert R. Gilbert
1986 "The Economic Impact of theDrug Trade and U.S. Interdiction and Eradica?
tion Policy in the Caribbean.*' Caribbean Studies Association Conference,
Caracas (May).
44 DEL OLMO
Reuter, Peter
1958 "Eternal Hope. America's Quest forNarcotics Control." The Public Interest:
79.
Sant?s Calderon, Enrique
1986 "Drogas: La Oferta y laDemanda." El Tiempo (Bogota, July 13): 4-A.
1985 "Drogas y Triunfo Moral." El Tiempo (Bogota).
1983 "Paraquat, Remedios Que Matan." El Tiempo (Bogota, August 11).
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of theHouse of Representatives
1984 "Cultivation and Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marijuana." Washington,
D.C.: USGPO: 19.
1979 "A Report on the Fact Finding Commission to Colombia and Puerto Rico."
Washington, D.C.: USGPO: 10.
Toronto Globe
1986 "New Ways Planned to Stem Drug Traffic" (January 23).
Torres, Hildemaro
1986 "Aerobiologia." Communication of August 8.
Washington Post
1986 "DEA Seeks to Expand Herbicide Use" (January 17).

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Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime

Author(s): Rosa del Olmo

Rosa del Olmo

There are hardly any inhabitants of the American continent in the

ROSA DEL OLMO is a professor at theUniversidad Central de Venezuela, Instituto de Ciencias

28 CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICENo. 30

along with ecocide, contraband, illegal emigration, the counterfeiting of

Transnational Criminality and the Reagan

Since the Latin American continent is a major producer of marijuana and

The government of theUnited States has maintained throughout this

In otherwords, we are going to speak of a transnational crime generated by

The result is that themain emphasis falls on programs of interdiction and

Deadly Toxins and Double Standards

The governments of Latin America, overwhelmed by an external debt that

The famous "double standard" or "double morality" observable here also

In 1981, only two countries were eradicating the illegal cultivation of

Aerobiology and theParaquat Panic

On the American continent the first attempts at aerofumigation of drug

In 1975, the herbicide paraquat was utilized massively as part of an opera?

The most effectivemethod to control theproduction ofmarijuana and

Legal Protections in theUnited States

The intransigence of the Latin American governments and the growing

We urge theDEA, however, to insure that all statutoryrequirements

in an unnecessary controversy over the use of paraquat formarijuana

Acceleration of US. Anti-Drug Aid toColombia

Meanwhile, despite all the controversies, theU.S. government has contin?

Nevertheless, a group of U.S. Congressmen visited Colombia on a study

The War Broadens Despite Mounting Scientific Evidence Against Herbicides

In 1985, U.S. efforts to implement eradication programs in thewar against

Also in 1985, theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that

was one of themost intensemarijuana and poppy eradication campaigns ever

It is interesting to note here that theColombian government's Order 704 of

Domestic U.S. Herbicidal Practices

During a visit toColombia, when confronted by the debate unleashed there

However, when it comes to putting eradication programs into practice,

in the countries of Latin America, in contrast to theU.S., be explained in fun?

Itwould be adventurist to affirm or deny these propositions without more

miserable wages of a Mexican policeman. For a poor peasant, the

1. "Crimes of an international character are criminal acts covered by international conven?

peoples" (Ibid.: 39).

following the clear differentiation of Samuel P. Huntington (1973: 333-368).

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