Respondent Side Memorial

Team Code-
CHHATRAPATI SHRI SHIVAJI MAHARAJ FIFTH STATE LEVEL MOOT

COURT COMPETITION - 2024
Before
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiyana
WRIT JURISDICTION
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
INDRAYANI N.G.O. PETITIONERS

Versus
STATE OF GUJRANA RESPONDENTS
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL)) NO. / 2024
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIYANA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

CHHATRAPATI SHRI SHIVAJI MAHARAJ FIFTH STATE LEVEL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
Table of Contents
Sr. LIST OF CONTENT Page no.

No.
1. LIST OF ABBREVATIONS 02
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 03
3. STATEMENT OF 05
JURISDICTION
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 06
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 08
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 09
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 11
8. PRAYER 25
1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
& And
SC Supreme court
HC High Court
Govt Government
Ors. Others
Hon’ble Honourable
Art Article
SCC Supreme Court Case
No. Number
UOI Union Of India
v. Versus
2
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
1. STATUTES
i. The Constitution Of India
ii. Criminal Procedure Code
iii. Indian Penal Code
2. CASES
i. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. M.V. DABHOLKAR,

(1975) 2 SCC 702
ii. JASBHAI MOTIBHAI DESAI VS. ROSHAN KUMAR, HAJI

BASHIR AHMED, (1976) 1 SCC 671
iii. THAMMANNA VS. K. VEERA REDDY, (1980) 4 SCC 62
iv. JANATA DAL VS. H.S. CHOWDHARY, (1992) 4 SCC 305
v. SIMRANJIT SINGH AND IN SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY VS.

RAJU, (2013) 10 SCC 465
vi. TEHSEEN POONAWALLA VS. UNION OF INDIA, (2018) 6

SCC 72
vii. JAGDISH AND V. SRIHARAN
viii. RADHESHYAM BHAGWANDAS SHAH, LALA VAKIL V.

3

STATE OF GUJARAT
ix. MAHENDER SINGH V STATE OF HARYANA
x. KEHAR SINGH V UNION OF INDIA
3. DICTIONARIES
1. Black’s Law Dictionary
4. WEBSITES
1. www.scconline.com
2. www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in
3. www.manupatrafast.in
4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant submits this to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indriyani under
Art. 32 of the Constitution of India.
Art. 32 in Constitution of India:
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 )
and ( 2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the
local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme
Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution
5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
● In 2002, violent riots broke out in Gujrana following the burning of the
Sabarmati Express Train, resulting in the reported deaths of over 1000

individuals.
● Sharifa Bano, along with her family, including her three-year-old daughter
Saniya, fled their village of Dharampur to escape the violence spreading in

Gaya.
● On March 3, 2002, while fleeing, Sharifa Bano's family was attacked by a
group of 20-30 individuals armed with weapons such as stickles, swords,

and sticks in Rampur village near Adilabad.
● During the attack, Sharifa Bano, who was 21 years old and five months
pregnant at the time, was among three women brutally gang-raped by the
assailants. Additionally, her three-year-old daughter, Saniya, was killed as
her head was smashed.
● Seven members of Sharifa Bano's family were found dead, while six were
reported missing. Only Sharifa Bano and a two-year-old child survived the
vicious assault.
● Sharifa Bano, nearly naked, managed to reach the local Police Station in
Limbgaon to register the case. However, the FIR failed to mention her rape,
and despite her identification of 12 assailants, they were not named in the
report.
● Due to death threats against Sharifa Bano, the trial was relocated from
6

Gujrana to Mahadesham. The charge sheet was filed against 20 individuals,
including six police officers and two government doctors.
● The trial lasted six years in the Special Court of CBI Mumbra, culminating
in the conviction of 11 accused individuals, including a Head Constable, for

gang rape and murder. The court also found six individuals not guilty due to
lack of evidence, while charges against two accused were abated due to their
deaths.
● The convictions were upheld by both the High Court and the Supreme Court
of Indiyana. Consequently, all convicted individuals are serving life

imprisonment in Rajkot Jail, Gujrana.
● Subsequently, Mahesh Vora and others sought remission of the sentences
from the Gujrana Government, which was granted according to legal

provisions.
● Indrayani N.G.O. challenged this decision by filing a Writ Petition in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiyana
7
ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IS THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIYANA ?
2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE GUJRANA GOVERNMENT IS

LEGAL AND CORRECT IN VIEW OF LAW ?
3. WHETHER THE DECISION GIVEN BY GUJRANA GOVERNMENT

VIOLATES THE SPIRIT AND CONTEXT OF THE PROVISION OF SEC 432
OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 ?
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue 1 - 1. The respondent argues that the writ petition filed by the NGO is not maintainable as
they are considered strangers to the case of remission and lack the necessary connection or
aggrieved status. Citing legal precedents such as State of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar, it's
emphasized that a "person aggrieved" must demonstrate a material adverse effect or denial of a
legal right, which the petitioner fails to establish.
2. Referring to Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, it's asserted that the petitioner lacks
locus standi as they haven't been denied or deprived of a legal right, suffered no legal grievance,
and have no legal basis for their claim against the impugned order of remission.
3. The respondent argues that the grant of remission is solely within the jurisdiction of the state, and
third-party interference, as represented by the petitioner NGO, is unwarranted. They stress that the
petitioners are unrelated third parties to the case and have no legitimate grounds for intervention.
4. Drawing from legal precedents like Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, it's argued that
allowing third-party petitions would disrupt settled legal principles and open floodgates for
frivolous litigation. Moreover, the petitioner fails to demonstrate a violation of fundamental rights
or a direct aggrievement.
5. The respondent contends that filing the petition as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is an abuse of
PIL jurisdiction driven by political motives, as demonstrated in Tehseen Poonawalla vs. Union of
India. Additionally, it's suggested that an alternative and wider remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution is available, making the petition under Article 32 unnecessary and should be
dismissed.
Issue 2 -
1. The respondent argues that the State of Gujrana, where the offense occurred, is the appropriate
authority to consider remission applications, as per Section 432 of the CrPC, regardless of where
the trial took place. Legal precedents, including Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Gujarat,
9

support this interpretation, reinforcing the state's jurisdiction over remission decisions.
2. Remission of sentence, according to the respondent, does not equate to acquittal but rather affects
the execution of the sentence. Citing Sarat Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, it's emphasized
that remission alters the enforcement of the sentence without interfering with the court's order of
conviction and sentence.
3. The respondent underscores the progressive and humane approach of Gujrana's remission
policies, which prioritize prevention, reformation, and compassion in the criminal justice system.
By recognizing the rights of both victims and offenders, Gujrana's policies aim to strike a delicate
balance between accountability and rehabilitation, setting a positive example for other jurisdictions.
Issue 3 -
1. The respondent argues that the decision of the Gujrana government to grant remission aligns with
Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which vests the power to suspend or remit
sentences with the appropriate government. Citing legal precedents like Kehar Singh v Union of
India, it's emphasized that every prisoner has the right to be considered for remission, providing
hope for life convicts.
2. It's contended that since the crime was committed in the State of Gujrana, it remains the
appropriate government competent to examine remission applications, despite the trial being
transferred to another state. Legal principles and previous judgments support this interpretation,
ensuring consistency with the provisions of Section 432(7) of the CrPC.
3. The petitioner's reliance on the case law of Manu Ram v Union of India is highlighted to
emphasize that the executive power under Section 432 of the CrPC is unfettered, allowing for
judicious exercise of discretion by the appropriate government in considering remission
applications.
4. The respondent asserts that the grant of remission by the Gujrana government was not arbitrary
but well within the rights of the convict to apply and seek remission. The decision aligns with legal
10

provisions and principles, ensuring fairness and adherence to due process in the criminal justice
system.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1 - WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIYANA ?
1.1 It is most respectfully submitted that the writ petition filed by the Indrayani N.G.O.
are not maintainable as the petitioner are stranger to the impugned order of remission
and they are in no way connected with the matter. There can be no third party
interference in the criminal matter in the grab of filing of the public interest
litigation. It was also contended that the petitioner who have filed the writ petition
are interlopers and busybodies and are not aggrieved persons and ambit of the
expression “person aggrieved” reliance has been placed on State of Maharashtra
vs. M.V. Dabholkar1 ; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar2,; and
Thammanna vs. K. Veera Reddy3
1.2 The ratio laid down in State of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar 4 whereby the
definition of “person aggrieved” is explained –
a. The words `person aggrieved" are found in several
statutes. The meaning of the words "person aggrieved"
will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose
and the provisions of the statute. Some times, it is said
that the words "person aggrieved" correspond to the
1 , (1975) 2 SCC 702

2 1976 AIR 578
3 (1980) 4 SCC 62
4 supra
11

requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to
judicial remedies.
b. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an
administrative or judicial decision is created by statute,
the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or
a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the
words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the
con text of the statute. One of the meanings is that a
person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that
decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is
required to establish that one has been 'denied or
deprieved of something to which one is legally entitled in
order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person
is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The
meaning of the words a "person aggrieved" is sometimes
given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which
provide remedies for the protection of private legal
rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or
deprivation of legal rights.
The Respondent relies upon the ration laid down in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs.
Roshan Kumar5 disputes the locus of the petitioner i.e the NGO in the present case
–
2. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that

the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right.
He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In
fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against
him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something.
He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no
5 1976 AIR 578
12

legal grievance. He 'has no legal peg for' a justiciable claim to
hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no
locus standi to challenge……….
1.3 It is submitted that the grant of remission is in the exclusive domain of the State and
although no convict can seek remission as a matter of fundamental right has
nevertheless the right to be considered for remission. That remission is a matter
between the convict and the State and, therefore, there can be no third party inference
in such a matter. The locus of the petitioners in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.319 of 2022
and connected writ petitions and contended that the petitioners therein are not related
to the said case and are third-party/strangers to the case.
1.4 If petitions filed by third- party strangers are entertained by this Court, then it would
unsettle the settled position of law and would open floodgates for litigation. In
Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary6which was reiterated and followed in Simranjit
Singh and in Subramanian Swamy vs. Raju7 where it has consistently been held
that a third party, who is a total stranger to the prosecution has no 'locus standi' in
criminal matters and has no right whatsoever to file a petition under Article 32.
1.5 It is submitted that in Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India 8, this Court was
faced with the situation where a conviction of some of the accused persons by this
Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, (TADA Act)
was sought to be challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution by the President of
the Akali Dal (M), namely, Simranjit Singh Mann which was dismissed. In
paragraph 5 of the judgment in Simranjit Singh, this Court categorically dealt with
the said issue and held that the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was not
maintainable for the simple reason that the petitioner therein did not seek to enforce
any of his fundamental rights nor did he complain that any of his fundamental rights
were being violated. This Court was of the view that a total stranger in a criminal
case cannot be permitted to question the correctness of a decision and also the
petitioners have not pleaded as to how their fundamental rights have been abridged
6 (1992) 4 SCC 305 (“Janata Dal”)

7 (2013) 10 SCC 465
8 AIR1993SC280
13

or how they are aggrieved by the action of the State Government.
1.6 Therefore, filing of the writ petition as Public Interest Litigation (in short, ‘PIL’) is
an abuse of PIL jurisdiction and is motivated by political intrigues and machinations.
In this regard, reliance has been placed on Tehseen Poonawalla vs. Union of India9,
(“Tehseen”); and Ashok Kumar. Therefore dismissal of the petition at the
threshold is sought.
1.7 It is submitted in Jagdish and V. Sriharan 10to contend that if a policy which is
beneficial to the convict exists at the time of consideration of the application of
premature release then the convict cannot be deprived of such beneficial policy and
that judicial review of the order of remission is not permissible in law. The Petitioner
seeks reliance upon Mohammed Ishaq vs. S. Kazam Pasha[1] .It is submitted that a similar
issue of maintainability arose in Mohammed Ishaq, wherein this Court observed that the
mere existence of an alternative remedy in the form of Article 226 does not preclude an
aggrieved person from approaching this Court directly under Article 32. The rule requiring
the exhaustion of alternative remedies was described as being one of “convenience and
discretion” as opposed to being absolute or inflexible in nature
[1] (2009) 12 SCC 748 (“Mohammed Ishaq”).
1.8 Then it is submitted that by straightaway filing a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution a right of approaching this Court by way of an appeal by an aggrieved
party has been lost. It is submitted that if victims file petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution before this Court challenging orders of remission, floodgates would be
opened and persons such as the petitioner would straightaway file writ petitions
before this Court. That when an alternative remedy of filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution is available which is also a wider remedy than Article
32 of the Constitution and therefore, must be dismissed reserving liberty to her to
approach the High Court, if so advised .
9 (2018) 6 SCC 72
10 AIRONLINE 2019 SC 96
14
1.9 Hence in conclusion, the Respondent states that the petition is filled without a valid
locus standi. Moreover, the Petitioner has an alternative efficious remedy available
under Article 226 to approach the respective High Court.
15
ISSUE 2- WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE GUJRANA GOVERNMENT IS

LEGAL AND CORRECT IN VIEW OF LAW ?
2.1 It is hereby submitted that the “appropriate Government” for considering the
remission application is the State in which the offence was committed and not the
State in which the trial was conducted and therefore, directed the State of Gujrana to
consider the application of the Mahesh vora and ors. Accordingly, the State of
Gujrana considered the application of the prisoners as per Section 432 read with
Section 435 of the CrPC along with the Premature Release of Convicts Policy of
1992. That, the State Government vide its Circular dated 09.07.1992 had issued a
policy for early release of prisoners who have completed fourteen years of
imprisonment and who were imposed punishment of life imprisonment.
2.2 It is submitted that the State of Gujrana therein that since the trial had been
concluded in the State of Mahadesham, the 'appropriate Government' as referred to
under Section 433 of the CrPC would be the State of Mahadesham, was rejected by
this Court holding that the crime in the instant case was admittedly committed in the
State of Gujrana and ordinarily, the trial would have been concluded in the same
State and in terms of Section 432(7) of the CrPC, the appropriate Government in the
ordinary course would have been the State of Gujrana but in the instant case, the case
was transferred under exceptional circumstances by this Court for the limited
purpose of trial and disposal to the State of Mahadesham. In the landmark case of
Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Gujarat11(a convict in Bilkis bano
case, the apex court observed the crime was commited in Gujarat & the case was
transferred to Bombay under special circumstances, just for disposal of the case &
Hence the appropriate government under Sec 432 Crpc shall be the Gujarat
government). However, after the conclusion of trial and on conviction, the case stood
transferred to the State where the crime was committed and the State of Gujrana
remains the appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) of the CrPC.
11 (2022) 8 SCC 552

16
2.3 It is submitted that the orders granting remission to respondent is not illegal. This is
based on a previous judgment by the Court in Writ Petition No. 135 of 2022, where it
was stated that the policy applicable for deciding remission applications should be
the one in place at the time of conviction, which was the premature release policy of
1992. Additionally, it was clarified that for the purposes of Section 432 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), the authority to consider remission applications
lies with the state where the offense was committed, not where the trial took place.
Therefore, the State of Gujrana, where the offense occurred, considered the
application of Mahesh vora and others , in accordance with the procedures outlined
in Section 432 and Section 435 of the CrPC, along with the Premature Release of
Convicts Policy of 1992.
2.4 It is most humbly submitted that a remission of sentence does not mean acquittal
and an aggrieved party has every right to vindicate himself or herself. In this context,
reliance was placed on Sarat Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, 12wherein a
Constitution Bench of this Court while distinguishing between a pardon and a
remission observed that an order of remission does not wipe out the offence; it also
does not wipe out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on the execution
of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person would have to serve out the full
sentence imposed by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the
sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An order of remission thus, does not
in any way interfere with the order of the court; it affects only the execution of the
sentence passed by the court and frees the convicted person from his liability to
undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the court even though the order of
conviction and sentence passed by the court still stands as it is.
2.5 The power to grant remission is an executive power and cannot have the effect which
the order of an appellate or revisional court would have of reducing the sentence
passed by the trial court and substituting in its place the reduced sentence adjudged
by the appellate or revisional court. According to Weater's Constitutional Law, to cut
12 AIR 1961 SC 334 (“Sarat Chandra Rabha”),

17
short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive power which

abridges the enforcement of the judgment but does not alter it qua the judgment.
2.6 It is submitted that “The Laws, underscores that punishment is to be inflicted, not
for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of
prevention and reformation”.
2.7 In light of the philosophical and legal principles discussed, it becomes evident that
the decision of the State of Gujrana to implement remission policies is commendable.
By embracing the ideals of prevention, reformation, and compassion, Gujrana's
government demonstrates a commitment to fostering a more humane and effective
approach to criminal justice.
2.8 Through the policy of remission, Gujrana acknowledges the potential for
individuals to reform and contribute positively to society after serving their
sentences. This approach not only aligns with the progressive values of modern
jurisprudence but also reflects a deep understanding of the complexities involved in
addressing crime and its underlying causes.
2.9 Furthermore, by recognizing the rights of both victims and offenders, Gujrana’s
remission policies strive to strike a delicate balance between accountability and
rehabilitation. This balanced approach ensures that justice is served while also
offering offenders the opportunity for redemption and a second chance.
2.10 The argument relies on the case Mahender Singh v state of Haryana 13to
assert that convicts have a legal right to be considered for early release from prison,
known as remission. This right is based on constitutional protections for convicts
under Articles 20 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Even though there's no specific
constitutional guarantee for obtaining remission, the argument holds that policy
decisions effectively grant convicts the right to be considered for it. This right stems
not only from laws like the Prisons Act but also from the rules formulated under it.
2.11 Regarding the Mahender Singh case itself, it dealt with a situation where the
Punjab and Haryana High Court had declared a circular from the State of Haryana,
13 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2005
18
outlining criteria for releasing prisoners early, as unconstitutional. The focus of the
Mahender Singh case was on affirming the right of convicts to be considered for
remission, rather than determining the specific criteria for granting it.
2.12 In conclusion, the judgment of the State of Gujrana to implement remission

policies embodies a forward-thinking and compassionate approach to criminal
justice. By prioritizing the principles of prevention, reformation, and compassion,
Gujrana sets a positive example for other jurisdictions to follow in their pursuit of a
more just and equitable society.
19
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE DECISION GIVEN BY GUJRANA GOVERNMENT

VIOLATES THE SPIRIT AND CONTEXT OF THE PROVISION OF SECT.432
OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973?
Power to suspend or remit sentences.—
(1) It is submitted that under Section 432 of CrPC “When any person has been sentenced to
punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without
conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the
execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has
been sentenced”.
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or
remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of
the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to
whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such
opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the
record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.
(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion
of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the
suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been
suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant
and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.
(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be
one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or
one independent of his will.
(5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as
to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented
and dealt with:
Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male
person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any
other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and—
20
(a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the
officer in charge of the jail; or
(b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that
the person sentenced is in jail.
(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also
apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any
other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his
property.
(7) In this section and in Section 433, the expression “appropriate Government” means,—
(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in
sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive
power of the Union extends, the Central Government;
(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is
sentenced or the said order is passed
3.1 It is submitted that, the power to grant remission is vested with the state government
under Section 432 of the criminal code of procedure and the Supereme court of India
in the landmark case of Kehar Singh v Union of India14 held that every prisoner
cannot be denied the opportunity to be considered for remission as this provides a ray
of hope even to the life convicts that may see the light of day.
3.2 It is submitted that, the reason that the crime in the instant case was admittedly
committed in the State of Gujrana and ordinarily, the trial was to be concluded in the
same State and in terms of Section 432(7) CrPC, the appropriate Govt in the ordinary
course would be the State of Gujrana but the instant case was transferred in
exceptional circumstances by this Court for limited purpose for trial and disposal to
the state of Mahadesham but after the conclusion of trial and the prisoner being
convicted, stood transferred to the State where the crime was committed remain the
appropriate Government for the purpose of Section 432(7) CrPC.
3.3 Indisputedly, in the instant case, the crime was committed in the State of Gujrana
which is the appropriate Government competent to examine the application filed for
pre-mature release and in the case of Bilkis bano (the High Court of Bombay in
14 1989 AIR 653
21

Criminal Writ Petition No.305 of 2013 filed at the instance of co-accused Ramesh
Rupabhai under its Order dated 5th August, 2013 declined his request to consider the
application for pre-mature release and left the application to be examined according
to the policy applicable in the State of Gujarat by the concerned authorities).
3.4 Here it is submitted that the hon’ble court must examine the application submitted by
Mahesh vora and ors. as per the policy applicable in the state of Gujrana and the
policy hereby states, Sec.432(A) has come into implementation with effect from
18/12/1978, according to its provisions punishment upto 14 years, taking that
provision into consideration, the authority that the State Government has got under
the provisions of Sec.432 of the Cr.P.C. gets controlled to that extent. Hence, for
those prisoners who have been imposed with the life
3.5 imprisonment on or after 18/12/1978 after their completion of 14 years of
imprisonment only the State Government can give them early release from the jail.
Under the powers and authorities vested to the State Government, with regard to the
early release of such convict prisoners.
3.6 In the instant case, once the crime was committed in the State of Gujrana, after the
trial been concluded and judgment of conviction came to be passed, all further
proceedings have to be considered including remission or pre-mature release, as the
case may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State of Gujrana where
the crime was committed and not the State where the trial stands transferred and
concluded for exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court.
3.7 A very important principle of legal jurisprudence is that the judgement delivered by
the court cannot be overturned by the executive. Although, the executive i.e the state
govt can grant remission to convict under section 432 of the CrPC. Such a provision
is permitted in law because remission of a convict only seeks to change the execution
of the sentence granted by the court. It does not overturn the court’s decision of
conviction per se.
3.8 Sub-section (1) of Section 432 is an enabling provision which states that when any
person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government
may, at any time, without conditions or upon any condition which the person
22

sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any
part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. The pertinent provision
involved in this case is sub-section (2) which deals with an application made to the
appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence and the
appropriate Government may require the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by
which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to, whether, the
application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion
and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record
of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.
3.9 The petitioner relies on the ration laid down in Manu Ram Vs Union of India 15 for
buttressing the claim that the executive power under Section 432 of the CrPC is
unfettered, the ration reads as –
Sentencing is a judicial function but the execution of the sentence,
after the courts pronouncement, is ordinarily a matter for the
Executive under the Procedure Code, going by Entry 2 in List III of the
Seventh Schedule. Keeping aside the constitutional powers under Arts.
72 and 161 which are 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable' for any
legislature, let us examine the law of sentencing, remission and
release. Once a sentence has been imposed, the only way to terminate
it before the stipulated term is by action under ss. 432/433 or Arts.
72/161. And if the latter power under the Constitution is not invoked,
the only source of salvation is the play of power under ss. 432 and
433(a) so far as a 'lifer' is concerned. No release by reduction
or remission of sentence is possible under the corpus juris as it stands,
in any other way. The legislative power of the State under Entry 4 of
List II, even if it be stretched to snapping point, can deal only with
Prisons and Prisoners, never with truncation of judicial
sentences. Remissions by way of reward or otherwise cannot cut down
the sentence as such and cannot, let it be unmistakably under-stood,
15 1980 AIR 2147
23

grant final exit passport for the prisoner except by Government action
under s. 432(1). The topic of Prisons and Prisoners does not cover
release by way of reduction of the sentence itself. That belongs to
Criminal Procedure in Entry 2 of List III although when the sentence is
for a fixed term and remission plus the period undergone equal that
term the prisoner may win his freedom. Any amount of remission to
result in manumission requires action under s. 432(1), read with
the Remission Rules.
a. Sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC deals with a power vested with the
appropriate Government which is an enabling power. The discretion vested
with the appropriate Government has to be exercised judiciously in an
appropriate case and not to abuse the same. However, when an application is
made to the appropriate. Government for the suspension or remission of a
sentence such as in the instant case by a convict, the appropriate Government
may seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which
the conviction was had or confirmed and on considering the reasons for such
opinion, may consider the application for remission vide sub-section (2) of
Section 432 of the CrPC
3.10 Hence the State has committed no arbitrariness in granting the remission to
the convict, whereas the question of a particular time span to be served of the
sentence, the accused has already served and the remission was well within
the rights of the convict to apply and seek remission.
24

PRAYER
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Respondent humbly submit that the Supreme Court be pleased to adjudge and declare that
1.The Writ Petition filed under Article 32 ought to be non- maintainable.
2. The Petitioners lack the sufficient locus standi ;
3.In view of the above, dismiss the present Writ Petition.
4. Any other relief deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of justice.
For the act of kindness ,the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
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CHHATRAPATI SHRI SHIVAJI MAHARAJ FIFTH STATE LEVEL MOOT

INDRAYANI N.G.O. PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Sr. LIST OF CONTENT Page no.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

SCC Supreme Court Case

UOI Union Of India

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

i. The Constitution Of India

ii. Criminal Procedure Code

iii. Indian Penal Code

i. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. M.V. DABHOLKAR,

ii. JASBHAI MOTIBHAI DESAI VS. ROSHAN KUMAR, HAJI

iii. THAMMANNA VS. K. VEERA REDDY, (1980) 4 SCC 62

iv. JANATA DAL VS. H.S. CHOWDHARY, (1992) 4 SCC 305

v. SIMRANJIT SINGH AND IN SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY VS.

vi. TEHSEEN POONAWALLA VS. UNION OF INDIA, (2018) 6

vii. JAGDISH AND V. SRIHARAN

viii. RADHESHYAM BHAGWANDAS SHAH, LALA VAKIL V.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

ix. MAHENDER SINGH V STATE OF HARYANA

x. KEHAR SINGH V UNION OF INDIA

1. Black’s Law Dictionary

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Art. 32 of the Constitution of India.

Art. 32 in Constitution of India:

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Sabarmati Express Train, resulting in the reported deaths of over 1000

Saniya, fled their village of Dharampur to escape the violence spreading in

● On March 3, 2002, while fleeing, Sharifa Bano's family was attacked by a

group of 20-30 individuals armed with weapons such as stickles, swords,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

in the conviction of 11 accused individuals, including a Head Constable, for

of Indiyana. Consequently, all convicted individuals are serving life

● Subsequently, Mahesh Vora and others sought remission of the sentences

from the Gujrana Government, which was granted according to legal

● Indrayani N.G.O. challenged this decision by filing a Writ Petition in the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiyana

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IS THE HON’BLE

2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE GUJRANA GOVERNMENT IS

3. WHETHER THE DECISION GIVEN BY GUJRANA GOVERNMENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

ISSUE 1 - WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN

1 , (1975) 2 SCC 702

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

2. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that

5 1976 AIR 578

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

6 (1992) 4 SCC 305 (“Janata Dal”)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

ISSUE 2- WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE GUJRANA GOVERNMENT IS

11 (2022) 8 SCC 552

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT