G.R. No.

134269 July 7, 2010

THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, Petitioners,

vs.

AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING,
ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 134440

JOSE MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO AND ATTY. MARILYN AQUINO;
LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented by his parents FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO;
CHRISTOPHER E. WALMSLEY, minor and represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA. TERESA WALMSLEY;
JOANNA MARIE S. SISON, minor and represented by her parents BONIFACIO SISON AND JOSEPHINE SISON; and
MATTHEW RAPHAEL C. ARCE, minor and represented by his parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA. ERISSA ARCE,
Petitioners,

vs.

AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING,
ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 144518

AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING,
ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Petitioners,

vs.

MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO,
AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION), Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

At bar are three consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari all concerning the operation of a preparatory and grade
school located in Ayala Alabang Village, more particularly on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 149166. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440 assail the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096, dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, which enjoined said school’s
continued operation on the ground that the same is in violation of the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the title of the
subject property that limits the use of the lot to the establishment thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten)
school. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 challenges the Court of Appeals’ Decision3 dated August 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 54438, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a
zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the
subject property as "institutional" where the operation of a grade school is allowed.

FACTS
The factual and procedural antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:

Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses Jose and Cristina
Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions
was annotated in TCT No. 149166 issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions
indicated that:

2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school
administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.4

ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village, including
the above restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of homeowners therein, the Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA).

In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school
which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was expanded to include a grade school
program, the School of the Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled
advanced.

AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s
violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from
operating the grade school and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms
allowed by the ordinance.5

Injunction Case

On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an action for injunction against TLC
and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions,
the contents of which likewise appear in the Deed of Absolute Sale. It also alleged violation of Metropolitan Manila
Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-01), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region and Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of 1991. MMC No. 81-01 classified Ayala Alabang Village
for zoning purposes as a low-density residential area, or R-1, thereby limiting the use of the subject property to the
establishment or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, which should not exceed two classrooms. The
aforementioned barangay ordinance, on the other hand, prohibited parking on either side of any street measuring eight
meters in width. TLC is adjacent to Balabac and Cordillera Streets, which are both less than eight meters in width. AAVA
prayed that defendants be restrained from continuing the operation of the school. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 92-2950, and was raffled to Branch 65.

On November 24, 1992, owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely the spouses Ernesto and Alma Arzaga,
Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, and LawPhil, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the adjacent
property owners), filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, seeking the same relief as AAVA and prayed for damages.

On July 22, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, defendants are ordered to cease and desist at the end of the schoolyear 1994-95 from operating The
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two (2) classrooms in accordance
with the Deed of Restrictions, and to pay the plaintiff the following:

1) ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees

2) costs of this suit.

The complaint-in-intervention is dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs-in-intervention to show by preponderance of

evidence that they are entitled to the damages prayed for.6

The RTC ruled that the operation of the grade school and the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of two
classrooms was in violation of a contract to which the defendants are bound. The RTC emphasized that the restrictions
were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may validly impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code. The
RTC also agreed with the plaintiffs therein that by allowing parking on either side of the streets adjacent to the school,
the defendants likewise violated Barangay Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1991.

On August 19, 1994, TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. They alleged in
the Motion that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject property as
"institutional," there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses
Alfonso. The adjacent property owners did not move for a reconsideration of, nor appeal from, the said Decision insofar
as it dismissed their Complaint-in-Intervention.

In an Order dated March 1, 1995, the RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its earlier Decision.1avvphi1
The decretal portion of the RTC Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court dated 22 July 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Complaint and
Complaint-in-Intervention filed on 13 October 1992 and 24 November 1992, respectively, are dismissed.7

The RTC ruled that with the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property, the
earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced. Citing Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust
Co.,8 it decreed that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it
has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power by the municipality.

On March 22, 1995, AAVA moved for a reconsideration of the above RTC Order. On July 21, 1995, the RTC denied the said
Motion.

AAVA filed a Notice of Appeal on August 4, 1995. The Appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51096.

On November 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the March 1, 1995 RTC Resolution:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated March 1, 1995 of the lower court in Civil Case No. 92-2950 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The earlier decision of the said court dated July 22, 1994 is Reinstated. Costs against defendants-appellees.9

On December 4, 1997, TLC and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision. On February 5,
1998, petitioners in G.R. No. 134440, namely, Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Velasco, Christopher E. Walmsley,
Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce (Aquino, et al.), alleging that they are minor children who suffer
from various learning disabilities and behavioral disorders benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene and their own Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion to Intervene filed by
Aquino, et al., for being proscribed by Section 2, Rule 1910 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate Petitions for Review with this
Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Petition of TLC and the spouses Alfonso, filed
on July 9, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134269. The Petition of Aquino, et al., filed within the extended period on
August 21, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134440.

Zoning Ordinance Case

In the meantime, on October 3, 1994, while the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso was still
pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel of land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in
Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block
3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." This is the same ordinance which was used as basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 92-
2950, when it reversed its own Decision on Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated March 1, 1995. Lot 25, Block 3,
Phase V is the subject property wherein TLC is located.

On November 29, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the Metropolitan Manila Zoning Administration
Office, informing the latter of the enactment of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179. On December 1, 1994, the
Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for the approval of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed an Opposition.

On June 26, 1995, the HLURB issued its Resolution on the Petition of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, the dispositive part
of which states:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, we defer action to the Muntinlupa SB Resolution No. 94-179 and remand the
same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public hearings as mandated by Resolution
No. 12, Series of 1991, of the Metro Manila Council entitled "Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the Metro Manila
Area."11

According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual
rezoning of the property into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of
Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public hearings. The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses
Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President.

On July 27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is
a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical error in Ordinance No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its
validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of
1991,12 of the Metropolitan Manila Council:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, dated
June 26, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Resolution No. 94-179 of the Sanguniang Bayan (now Sangguniang
Panglungsod) of Muntinlupa is declared valid.13

In said Decision, the Office of the President likewise turned down the alternative prayer of oppositors AAVA and the
adjacent property owners that the Office of the President should recognize the Deed of Restrictions on the subject
property and restrict the use thereof in accordance therewith. The Office of the President ruled on this matter that:

Turning to the alternative relief being sought by the oppositor [that the Office of the President should recognize the
Deed of Restrictions], the same cannot be granted. The reason is simple. No less than Ayala Corporation – in consenting
to the transfer from the Yusons to the Alfonsos of the subject property – agreed that the "lot (shall) be used for school
and related activities", thereby effectively freeing the appellants from the deed restriction that the "Lots (shall) be used
exclusively for residential purposes." This is not all. Prior to its sale, the property in question was already used for school
purposes.

Further the aforementioned Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance itself classifies the area occupied by the appellants’ school as
an "institutional zone" and not a residential area. And the fact that TLC is not the only school operating within the AAV –
De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School, Woodrose School, to name a few, conduct classes within the plush village –
renders unpersuasive appellees’ line that "x x x Through the illegal operation of their school, the parties-in-interest
appellants spouses Alfonso have effectively violated the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of the residents
of the Village x x x."14 (Boldfacing supplied; underscoring and italization are present in the original.)

AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The Petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 54438.

On August 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision slightly modifying the Decision of the Office of the
President:

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
ruling therein passing upon the effect of Ordinance No. 91-39 on the Deed of Restrictions imposed on the subject
property is hereby VACATED.15

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President that being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning
enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing.16 However, the Court of Appeals found the Office of the President to have exceeded its authority when it
ruled17 that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Office of the President effectively overruled said appellate court’s Decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51096 wherein it ruled that the reclassification under Ordinance No. 91-39 does not have the effect of
nullifying the Deed of Restrictions at the back of the title of the subject property, inasmuch as there is no conflict
between the Ordinance and the Deed of Restrictions.18

On October 3, 2000, AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed the third consolidated Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court assailing the above Court of Appeals Decision. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 144518.

ISSUES

Though later in time, we shall first determine the issue in G.R. No. 144518, as the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No.
94-179 impinges on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school in the subject property, which is the main issue
in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440. We shall then resolve the issue in G.R. No. 134440 on whether Aquino, et al., should be
allowed to intervene in the injunction case against TLC. Thereafter, we shall rule on the merits of G.R. Nos. 134269 and
134440 by deciding once and for all whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the
operation of a grade school in the subject property.

The main issues to be decided by this Court, culled from the consolidated Petitions, are therefore the following:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in denying Aquino, et al.’s Motion to Intervene; and

3. Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the operation of a grade school in
the subject property.

As regards the third and decisive issue, the parties further exchanged their views on the following two sub-issues:

a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected by Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-
179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions on the subject property; and
b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.

RULINGS

Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179

AAVA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, and therefore did not have to
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing which are required for zoning ordinances. Notice and hearing are
required under the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in Resolution No.
12, series of 1991, of the then Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).

In asserting that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA faults the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals in allegedly accepting hook, line and sinker the assertion of the ENCRFO Regional
Officer and the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was passed merely to
correct a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39.19 AAVA adopts the HLURB finding that it was
allegedly:

[H]ard to believe that the denomination in the text of Block 1 and instead of Block 3 as an institutional zone was an
accident of (sic) mere oversight, the numbers 1 & 3 are not adjoining each other, but are separated by the number 2.
TLC’s position would have been worth considering had the erroneous phrase typed been Block 2 for then it is more
plausible and probable for the typist to have mistyped a "2" instead of a "3." Besides, Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near
each other on the map. Finally, if it were an error, it is surprising that no one noticed it until after a court had ruled
against a party, who now seeks to use said correcting ordinance in its defense.20

We are not persuaded.

The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses:

SAPAGKAT, ang Sanguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ay pinagtibay ang Kautusang Bayan Bilang 91-39 na nagsasaad ng
bagong pagreresona ng Bayan ng Muntinlupa;

SAPAGKAT, sa pagrerepaso sa nabanggit na kautusang bayan ay napag-alamang nagkaroon ng isang "typographical error
sa Appendix B" nito;

SAPAGKAT, sa halip na Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, ang nailagay o nai-type sa hindi sinasadyang dahilan ay Lot
25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang;

SAPAGKAT, ang pagtatamang ito sa teksto ng Appendix B na nakapaloob sa institutional zone ay hindi makakaapekto sa
ibang bahagi o kabuuang nilalaman at itinatakda sa kautusang bayan bilang 91-39.21

Even more telling that there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39 is the fact that both
the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject property, described as
"Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" is classified as "institutional." On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning
Map of Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village classify "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" as
institutional. The official zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without which said
ordinance would be considered void.22 Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39 expressly provides that the Official
Zoning Map of Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of said ordinance. Both the MMC and the HLURB Board of
Commissioners approved the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the very reason for the enactment of
Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is the need to accomplish an updated zoning map, as shown by the following
clause in MMC’s Resolution No. 2, series of 1992:
WHEREAS, the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, approved on 10 December 1991 Municipal Ordinance
No. 91-39 rezoning the entire municipality (as shown in the accompanying zoning map and described in the attached
Appendix "B") as a response to the need to have an updated zoning map. x x x.23 (Emphases supplied.)

It is furthermore noted that TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s claim that Lot 25, Block 1, Phase 5 of Ayala Alabang has been
and remains to be a residential lot24 has never been rebutted by AAVA. As regards the comment that Blocks 1 and 3 are
not even near the map, we agree with TLC and the spouses Alfonso that this bolsters their position even more, as the
distance would make it difficult to commit an error on the map. It is much more plausible to mistype a single digit than to
mistake an area for another that is far away from it.

It is therefore crystal clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39. AAVA,
however, furthermore claims that even assuming arguendo that there was a typographical error in the said zoning
ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new zoning ordinance, following all the formalities therefor, citing the
leading case of Resins, Incorporated v. Auditor General.25

Again, we disagree.

Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not interfere with the workings of
the executive and legislative branches of government:

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system – the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.26

In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in the printing of the statute, unlike in the case at bar
where it is the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which seeks to correct its own error in the printing of the
ordinance. While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with the
wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by
the same entity which committed the error. In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in favor of the enrolled bill,
which the courts should not speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 which is
entitled to a presumption of regularity.

Finally, AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the HLURB under
Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648.27 AAVA reminds us that the decisions of administrative agencies on
matters pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by the courts.28

We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at bar, affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside the HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is certainly
subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore,
while it is true that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies,29 it should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the
Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and
the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this approval should
be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform
Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance
alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.

In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the lack of notice and
hearing as AAVA contends.
Motion to Intervene of Aquino, et al.

It is recalled that the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Aquino, et al., was filed on February 5, 1998, which was three
months after the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals had already rendered its Decision dated November 11,
1997 setting aside the RTC Resolution which had been in favor of TLC and the spouses Alfonso.

Aquino, et al., premised their intervention on their being grade school students in the School of the Holy Cross, wherein
they allegedly benefit from the full-inclusion program of said school. Under said full-inclusion program, Aquino, et al.,
who claim to suffer from various learning disabilities and behavioral disorders, are enrolled full-time in educational
settings enjoyed by regular, typically developing children. Aquino, et al., alleges that TLC is the only educational
institution in the Philippines that offers a full-inclusion program, adding that other schools offer only partial integration
programs wherein children with special needs join their typically developing classmates only in certain classes.

Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that Aquino, et al., would not
still be in grade school at this time, thus rendering their alleged interest in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al.,
claim to represent other special children since the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Motion for Leave to
Intervene bore no indication that it was intended as a class action; they merely sought to represent themselves. Since
the interest of Aquino, et al., in the instant case is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm the denial of their
Motion for Leave to Intervene before the trial court.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.’s, interest in the injunction suit had not yet been
mooted, we nevertheless find no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., was denied in the same Resolution wherein the Court of Appeals denied
the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso. The ground for the denial of Aquino, et al.’s, Petition is
Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)

This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed
"before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word
"trial," with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision,30 while
another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment.31 This ambiguity was
eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of
the judgment by the trial court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended
provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as
in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.

Aquino, et al., claim that they could not have intervened in the case earlier, as the full-inclusion program was allegedly
commenced by defendants TLC and the spouses Alfonso only in 1997. However, said defendants cannot be benefited by
their allegedly recent introduction of a full-inclusion program. While we sympathize with the plight of the minor
intervenors, we cannot allow that a program commenced by the defendants way beyond the institution of the case in
1992 could be considered as a valid defense. To do so would put into the hands of the defendant in a case the power to
introduce new issues to a litigation on appeal with the assistance of intervenors.

Injunction against the operation of the School of the Holy Cross

Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the Deed of Restrictions
In reversing itself on Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC cited the Ortigas32 case and held that the earlier residential
classification can no longer be enforced due to the reclassification by Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 of the
subject property.

In Ortigas, the restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes was contained in the Deeds of Sale of the subject
properties at the insistence of developer Ortigas & Co. and was annotated in the corresponding titles thereof. Therein
defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co. eventually acquired the subject properties from the successor-in-interest of the
original buyers; the deeds of sale and the TCTs issued likewise reflected the same restriction. However, the then
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal passed a Resolution declaring the area to which the subject property is situated
as an industrial and commercial zone. Ortigas & Co. later on sued Feati Bank, seeking an injunction to restrain the latter
from completing a commercial bank building on the premises. This Court held that the Mandaluyong Resolution was
passed in the exercise of police power.33 Since the motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution is
reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality’s exercise of police power.34

As previously stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original RTC Decision enjoining
TLC and the spouses Alfonso from the operation of the school beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum
of two classrooms. The Court of Appeals held that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited
the use of the property for the establishment of a preparatory school, and the provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning
Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified the subject property as "institutional." The Court of Appeals continued that
there are valid grounds for it not to apply the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding that while the subject
property in said case was found in an area classified as industrial and commercial, "a study of the location of defendants’
school would clearly reveal that the same is situated within a residential area – the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village."35

TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist on the applicability of Ortigas in the case at bar, and likewise cited Presley v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc.36 in order to drive home its point that reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of the
state’s police power, with which contractual obligations should be reconciled.

AAVA counters that even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to automatically negate
all other legal relationships in existence since the better policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights and to preserve both
instead of nullifying one against the other, citing the case of Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court.37 AAVA thus adopt the
finding of the Court of Appeals that even assuming that the subject property has been validly reclassified as an
institutional zone, there is no real conflict between the Deed of Restrictions and said reclassification.

A careful study of the pertinent documents yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way to harmonize the seemingly
opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed zoning ordinance.

To recall, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property provides:

PE-222/T-134042 – RESTRICTIONS – The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty (50) years from the date of
sale. The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery
and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and
garage for school vehicles. x x x.38 (Emphasis ours.)

It is noted that the above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery and kindergarten)
school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The two-classroom limit is actually imposed, not by the Deed of
Restrictions, but by MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region, which classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low density residential area or an "R-1 zone." The
principal permitted uses of a "low-density residential area" or "R-1 zone," the classification of the subject property if not
for the correction under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, is listed in Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No.
81-01 as follows:

In R-1 districts, no building, structure or land used, and no building or structure shall be erected or altered in whole or in
part except for one or more of the following:
Principal Uses

1. One-family dwellings;

2. Duplex type buildings;

3. Churches or similar places of worship and dwelling for the religious and seminaries;

4. Nursery and kindergarten schools, provided that they do not exceed two (2) classrooms;

5. Clubhouses, lodges and other social centers;

6. Parks, playgrounds, pocket parks, parkways, promenades and playlots;

7. Recreational uses such as golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, swimming pools and similar uses operated by
the government or private individuals as membership organizations for the benefit of their members, families or guests
not primarily for gain;

8. Townhouses.39 (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, the following are the principal uses of an institutional site, the classification of the subject property
by virtue of Ordinance No. 91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179:

Institutional

Principal Uses

1. Barangay health centers;

2. Day-care centers;

3. Puericulture centers;

4. Clinics, family planning clinics and children’s clinics;

5. Nursery and kindergarten schools;

6. Elementary schools;

7. Elementary and high school;

8. Local civic centers, local auditoriums, halls and exhibition centers;

9. Churches, temples and mosques;

10. Chapels;

11. Barangay centers;

12. Maternity hospitals;

13. National executive, judicial, legislative and related facilities and activities;

14. Government buildings;

15. Tertiary and provincial hospitals and medical center;

16. National museums and galleries;

17. Art galleries;

18. Planetarium;

19. Colleges or universities;

20. Vocational and technical schools, special training;

21. Convents and seminaries;

22. Welfare and charitable institutions;

23. Municipal buildings;

24. Fire and police station buildings;

25. Local museum and libraries;

26. University complexes; and

27. Penal institutions.40 (Emphasis supplied.)

The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We find that a clarification of the
doctrines laid down in the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas, and Presley is in order.
In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, this Court, in upholding
the exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification of the subject property therein over the Deed of
Restrictions over the same property, took into consideration the prevailing conditions in the area:

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area,
especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial
complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted
the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.41
(Emphasis supplied.)

Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court added:

Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to
the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants-appellees should be
permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian, et al., it was held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are
binding on all subsequent purchasers x x x." However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained a
proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements,
covenants or other agreement between parties." In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the subject property, though declared as an institutional lot,
nevertheless lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots. Verily, the area surrounding TLC
did not undergo a radical change similar to that in Ortigas but rather remained purely residential to this day. Significantly,
the lot occupied by TLC is located along one of the smaller roads (less than eight meters in width) within the subdivision.
It is understandable why ALI, as the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school that will
generate less traffic than bigger schools. With its operation of both a preparatory and grade school, TLC’s student
population had already swelled to around 350 students at the time of the filing of this case. Foreseeably, the greater
traffic generated by TLC’s expanded operations will affect the adjacent property owners enjoyment and use of their own
properties. AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or (2) the obtainment of the
approval of the affected residents for any modification of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand, the
then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any special justification for declaring the subject lot as an
institutional property. On the contrary, Engr. Hector S. Baltazar, the Municipal Planning and Development Officer of
Muntilupa, testified that in declaring the subject property as institutional the municipality simply adopted the
classification used in a zoning map purportedly submitted by ALI itself. In other words, the municipality was not asserting
any interest or zoning purpose contrary to that of the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as
institutional.

It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently conflicting rights of the parties herein pursuant to the aforementioned
Co case. In Co, agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition order, filed a complaint for maintenance of possession
with the Court of Agrarian Relations of Quezon City. The landowner challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing that
the classification of the subject property therein from agricultural to a light industrial zone. This Court denied the
applicability of the reclassification, and clarified Ortigas:

This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is settled that it can legally do
so, being an exercise of the police power. As such, it is superior to the impairment clause. In the case of Ortigas & Co. v.
Feati Bank, for example, we held that a municipal ordinance establishing a commercial zone could validly revoke an
earlier stipulation in a contract of sale of land located in the area that it could be used for residential purposes only. In
the case at bar, fortunately for the private respondent, no similar intention is clearly manifested. Accordingly, we affirm
the view that the zoning ordinance in question, while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights
protected by the impairment clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve both instead of
nullifying one against the other. x x x.42 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision likewise restricted its use for a residential purpose. However,
the area (Jupiter Street) where the lot was located was later reclassified into a high density commercial (C-3) zone. Bel-
Air Village Association (BAVA) sought to enjoin petitioner therein from operating its Hot Pan de Sal Store, citing the Deed
of Restrictions. We allowed the operation of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not without
examining the surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas:

Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The records indicate that
commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no reason
why the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal store. Thus, in accordance
with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's decision has to be reversed.43

Furthermore, we should also take note that in the case of Presley, there can be no reconciliation between the restriction
to use of the property as a residential area and its reclassification as a high density commercial (C-3) zone wherein the
use of the property for residential purposes is not one of the allowable uses.

Alleged estoppel on the part of AAVA from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions

TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on their property is
the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate
acts allegedly constituting a setting aside of said restrictions:

1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had previously approved the proposed
construction of a school building with 24 classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on
the Site Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.44

2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its president Jesus M. Tañedo,
authorized through a letter the construction of a new "school building extension."45

3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly proven by the testimony of
then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar, who said:

Engineer Baltazar:

There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in fact, was the one who submitted this
map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village whom we know
"na maayos naman ang kanilang zoning," we just adopted what they submitted to us. Whereas, the other areas are
"talagang pinag-aralan pa namin."46

TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional in the Official Zoning Map,
thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent to have the subject property reclassified as
institutional.

4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its letter dated July 24, 1991,
wherein it stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales concerning the proposed expansion of the school
curriculum to grade school of the Learning Child Pre-school owned by Mrs. Mary Anne Alfonso.

Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is a worthy
undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such proposal as long as the
conditions mentioned below are met.47

We are not convinced.

Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or
title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it."48 We have previously
cautioned against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel:

Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel becomes a most
effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man’s mouth from speaking the truth and debars the
truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly
proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. x x x.49

TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts so as to bar the
latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.

In numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous approvals by AAVA of the construction of
additional classrooms allegedly constitute a revocation of the Deed of Restrictions. However, as we have previously
discussed, the two-classroom restriction is not imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-
01. The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions
of the Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject property "exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an
office for school administration, playground and garage school vehicles."

The circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no intention on the part of AAVA to
abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to have said restrictions enforced. Frank Roa’s signature in the
Site Development Plan came with the note: "APPROVED SUBJECT TO STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY NOTICES
APPEARING ON THE PLAN AND TO RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND OCCUPANCY
OF THE SAME."50 The Site Development Plan itself was captioned "The LEARNING CHILD PRE-SCHOOL,"51 showing that
the approval was for the construction of a pre-school, not a grade school. AAVA’s letter dated March 20, 1996 contained
an even more clear cut qualification; it expressly stated that the approval is "subject to the conditions stipulated in the
Deed of Restrictions covering your above-mentioned property, which states, among others, that the property shall be
used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a PREPARATORY (NURSERY AND KINDERGARTEN)
SCHOOL."

We furthermore accept AAVA’s explanation as regards the March 20, 1996 letter that at it had to allow the construction
of the new school building extension in light of the trial court’s Orders dated March 9, 1995 and August 3, 1995. It should
be noted here that AAVA was the party appealing to the Court of Appeals as the trial court decision favorable to them
had been reversed by the same court on Motion for Reconsideration.

Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered in the case at
bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
embodies said rule:

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The general Ayala Alabang
Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly
state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or
enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors
and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association."52 As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is
jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the
following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:

Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.53 (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the alleged assent
of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to
a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. As regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALI’s July 24, 1991 letter that
it believes the expansion of TLC is a "worthy undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALI’s purported assent came
with conditions:

Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is a worthy
undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such proposal as long as the
conditions mentioned below are met.

It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) Board does not have the authority on its own to alter the
Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the approval of Ayala is an indispensable condition precedent to any
change in the restrictions. However, we feel that any change in the restrictions for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to
by the AAVA Board on the premise that any change in the restrictions affects the general welfare of the community
which is the primary concern of the AAVA Board. On this same premise, we have imposed as an additional condition to
our approval of the change in restrictions, that such change should be approved by the residents of the Village or by the
residents of the particular district where the school is situated, at the option of the Board. We feel that the concurrence
of not only the AAVA Board but also of the residents of the Village or of the affected district (as the case may be) is fair
and reasonable under the circumstances. 54 (Emphases supplied.)

As previously stated, a majority of AAVA’s members, on April 5, 1992, voted to ratify the Board of Governors’ resolutions
that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore, the conditions for ALI’s approval of the alteration of the
Deed of Restrictions, namely the concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the
village, were clearly not met.

Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case furthermore shows that AAVA consistently insisted upon
compliance with the Deed of Restrictions:

1. Petitioner Mary Anne Alfonso, as directress of TLC, wrote AAVA on May 20, 1991 requesting "reconsideration and
approval to modify the restrictions at our property at 111 Cordillera to include the establishment and maintenance of a
grade school" and avowed to make a similar representation to ALI.55 AAVA replied on June 26, 1991 with a letter stating
that the matter of interpretation or relaxation of the Deed of Restrictions is not within its power, but of ALI, and thus
referred the request to the latter.56 ALI wrote AAVA on July 24, 1991 stating that while it interposes no objection to the
modification of the restrictions on the subject property, any change on such restrictions should be concurred in by
AAVA’s Board of Governors and approved by the residents of the village, particularly the residents of the district where
the school is situated.57 AAVA’s Board of Governors, during its regular meeting on August 27, 1991, voted unanimously
to retain the restrictions and recommended said retention to ALI.58

2. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on October 25, 1991 requesting a reconsideration of the decision of AAVA’s Board of
Governors.59 On October 31, 1991, AAVA wrote ALI to inquire about the reasons for the restrictions.60 ALI replied that
the restrictions were imposed because the school sites located along small roads had to be limited to small nursery
schools since the latter generate less traffic than bigger schools. ALI reiterated that the residents should be consulted
prior to any change in the restrictions.61 In the meantime, TLC proceeded to operate a grade school on the subject
property. On February 27, 1992, AAVA’s former counsel wrote TLC a letter demanding that they suspend the enrollment
of students other than for pre-school.62

3. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on March 11, 1992, reiterating their request to operate a grade school in the subject
property. 63 On March 24, 1992, the Board of Governors of AAVA affirmed its earlier decision to retain the restrictions.
On March 27, 1992, AAVA replied to the spouses Alfonso’s letter informing them of the denial.64

4. On April 5, 1992, during AAVA’s annual membership meeting, the spouses Alfonso appealed directly to the members
of AAVA. Majority of AAVA’s members voted to ratify the Board of Governor’s Resolutions,65

5. On April 24, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA another letter requesting that it be allowed to continue holding
classes for Grades I to III at their premises for at least the coming school year, since they needed time to relocate the
same outside the village.66 AAVA replied on April 30, 1992, explaining that the Board of Governors has to follow the
April 5, 1992 decision of the members and demanded that the TLC close its grade school in the coming school year.67

6. On June 4, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote to AAVA again, appealing to be allowed to continue in their premises for
three more months, June to August, after which they solemnly promised to move the grade school out of the village,
possibly in TLC’s former school site in B.F. Homes Parañaque.68 AAVA replied on June 16, 1992 denying their request,
and demanded that TLC cease its operation of a grade school on the subject property.69

7. In view of the continued operation of the grade school, AAVA sent letters to TLC on August 17 1992 and September 4,
1992 demanding that the latter immediately cease and desist from continuing and maintaining a grade school in the
subject property.70

From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither could it be deemed
estopped from seeking the enforcement of said restrictions.

DISPOSITION

This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51096 insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to
cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to
Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete
the two-classroom restriction from said Decision.

This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current students of the
School of the Holy Cross, who are innocent spectators to the litigation in the case at bar. We therefore resolve that the
current students of the School of the Holy Cross be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their
graduation in their Grade 7. The school, however, shall no longer be permitted to accept new students to the grade
school.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:

1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC
Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child
School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy
Cross, the Learning Child School’s grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school
up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V.
Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby
AFFIRMED.

3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August
15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a
zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

A homeowners' association may regulate passage into a subdivision for the safety and security of its residents, even if its
roads have already been donated to the local government. It has the right to set goals for the promotion of safety and
security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of its residents.1

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assailing the Court of Appeals' July 5, 2013 Decision3 and
February 12, 2014 Resolution4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115198. The Court of Appeals set aside the Office of the President's
March 24, 2010 Decision5 and found the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy valid and issued within the authority of the
homeowners' association.

Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision in Balibago, Angeles City, Pampanga with several commercial
establishments operating within it. These establishments include beer houses, karaoke bars, night clubs, and other
drinking joints.6

Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision. Such
unrestricted access to the subdivision, however, also exposed its residents to incidents of robbery, akyat-bahay,
prostitution, rape, loud music, and noise that would last until the wee hours of the morning.7

Diamond Homeowners & Resident Association (Diamond Homeowners), the legitimate homeowners' association of
Diamond Subdivision, sought to address the residents' peace and security issues by raising their concerns to the City
Council of Angeles City (Angeles City Council).8

On February 24, 2003, the Angeles City Council issued Ordinance No. 132,9 series of 2003, reclassifying Diamond
Subdivision as exclusively residential and prohibited the further establishment and operation of any business except for
those already existing.10 The Ordinance states:

Whereas, legitimate homeowners of the Diamond Subdivision have presented to the City Council their serious concern
on what is presently occurring in their subdivision;

Whereas, with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision constant problems of peace and order have confronted
the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property and security;

Whereas, the introduction of business establishments in an uncontrolled manner have likewise proliferated due to the
current classification of the subdivision;

Whereas, due to the R-2 classification of Diamond Subdivision the value of property have not increase[d], despite its
strategic location;
Whereas, there is an urgent need to address all the concern[s] of the homeowners and residents of Diamond
Subdivision;

Whereas, the appropriate and immediate solution to the present concerns is the reclassification of Diamond Subdivision
from Residential 2 to Residential 1 Classification.

Now therefore foregoing considered, the City Council of Angeles City in session assembled hereby resolved to ordain:

Section 1. An Ordinance reclassifying Diamond Subdivision located in Balibago, Angeles City from Residential 2 to
Residential 1 Classification status, be as it is hereby, approved.

Section 2. Arayat and S.L. Orosa Streets and the service road of Diamond Subdivision are exempted from this new
classification.

Section 3. That existing and legitimate business establishments operating within the territorial boundaries of the said
Diamond Subdivision as of approval of the ordinance shall remain and continue to operate and no commercial
establishment of any kind shall be allowed thereafter.

Section 4. Unless by hereditary succession no business establishment rights shall be transferred to any individual or
entity after approval of this ordinance.

Section 5. This Ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.11

However, this Ordinance was not complied with as more beer gardens and nightclubs were still put up.1âшphi1 The
peace, order, and security situation in the subdivision did not improve.12

Among those affected was William G. Kwong (Kwong). A resident of Diamond Subdivision for more than 38 years, he runs
three (3) motels13 in the subdivision under his company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc.14

Seeking to address his security concerns, Kwong proposed to his neighbors that guard posts with telephone lines be set
up at the entry and exit points on the street where he resides to screen all incoming and outgoing visitors.15 In an
August 3, 2006 Letter, Kwong wrote:

TO THE RESIDENTS OF EMMANUEL STREET

Diamond Subdivision, Balibago

Angeles City

Dear MR/MS _______,

In direct response to a sharp increase in criminal activities in our subdivision, a number of which have remained
unreported, I would like to ask your approval and cooperation on a number of proposals, which I outlined below, for our
own protection and safety:

1. To put up security gates on both entry/exit points of Emmanuel Street.

2. To permanently seal off the proposed gate at Emmanuel Street corner V.Y. Orosa Street.

3. To engage the services of two security guards to man the gate 24 hours a day at Emmanuel Street comer Marlim
Avenue.

4. To install a telephone line at the guard's booth to screen all incoming and outgoing visitors and outsiders. The guard
will have to call the residents for approval before he lets anyone in.

With regard to the costs of this project, I am willing to shoulder the cost of the two security gates and one-half (1/2) of
the monthly security and telephone fees, which amounts to approximately Nine Thousand Pesos (PhP9,000.00). In
support of this project, I would like to request the residents to shoulder the remaining one-half (1/2) of the monthly
costs of security and telephone fees, which also amounts to approximately Nine Thousand Pesos (PhP9,000.0[0]) for 15
household or Six Hundred Pesos (PhP600.00) a month per household.

It is with the sense of cooperation and solidarity that I ask you to consider this project for the security and safety of our
family.

Thank you for most (sic) kind attention and understanding.16

However, the other residents of Diamond Subdivision also wanted their security concerns addressed. Thus, to safeguard
the whole subdivision, Diamond Homeowners proposed the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy (the Policy).17

Under the Policy, visitors on vehicles who sought to enter the premises must leave with the subdivision guards their
identification cards, which they may reclaim upon leaving the subdivision. Visitors on foot were not required to
surrender theirs. Meanwhile, residents with vehicles may obtain stickers to identify themselves so that they did not need
to surrender any identification card.18

After consultations and meetings, the Policy was approved in December 2006. Diamond Homeowners later issued a
Memorandum to inform residents that the Policy would be implemented by March 15, 2007.19

Kwong, however, contested the Policy.

When Diamond Homeowners did not heed his objection, Kwong filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Regional Office a Complaint for the issuance of a cease and desist order with application for a temporary restraining
order. He argued that the Policy was invalid because the subdivision roads have been donated to the City of Angeles in
1974 and were, thus, public roads that must be open for public use. Likewise, he contended that the screening of visitors
would be cumbersome for his customers, affecting his businesses.20

Ruling in Kwong's favor, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office issued a Cease and Desist Order and
a Temporary Restraining Order. The records were later forwarded to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter
for final disposition.21

In his August 10, 2007 Decision,22 the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter lifted the Cease and Desist Order
and dismissed Kwong's Complaint. He ruled that the Policy's alleged damage to Kwong's business was "imaginary,
unsubstantiated[,] and hypothetical[.]"23

The Arbiter further held that the protection and security of Diamond Subdivision's residents were the primary and
utmost concern, and must be prioritized over the convenience of motel patrons.24 He ruled that the Policy's objective to
protect the community at large was far greater than Kwong's business concerns.25
Upholding the Policy's validity, the Arbiter found that it neither prohibited nor impaired the use of the roads. Neither did
it change the classification of the roads nor usurp the government's authority. Moreover, the roads were still for public
use, and the public was still allowed to pass as long as they presented identification cards. The Arbiter noted that there
was no evidence showing that persons were being refused access or asked to pay for its use.26

On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Arbiter's ruling was
reversed. In its September 12, 2008 Decision,27 the Board of Commissioners found merit in Kwong's appeal and declared
the Policy void for being "unjustifiable and without legal basis."28

In subjecting the subdivision roads to the Policy, the Board of Commissioners found that they were turned into private
roads-inaccessible, not open to the public, and under the control of Diamond Homeowners. It also ruled that Kwong and
William G. Kwong Management, Inc. have already acquired a vested right to unrestricted passage through the
subdivision roads since 1974 because they owned the subdivision lots and because the public use of the roads is
guaranteed by law. It found that to limit or impose pecuniary conditions for their enjoyment over the roads violates the
roads' public character.29

The Board of Commissioners also ruled that the Policy must be justified by an issue so serious and overwhelming that it
is prioritized over the lot owners' rights. Diamond Homeowners, it fmmd, failed to present evidence of peace and
security issues within the subdivision.30

The Office of the President, in its March 24, 2010 Decision,31 affirmed the Board of Commissioners' Decision in toto. It
noted that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, as the administrative agency with the
technical expertise on the matter, were entitled to great respect.32

Hence, Diamond Homeowners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review.33

In its July 5, 2013 Decision,34 the Court of Appeals granted Diamond Homeowners' Petition and set aside the Office of
the President's Decision.35 It found that Diamond Homeowners was authorized in enacting the Policy.36

The Court of Appeals ruled that while the local government acquires ownership rights, these rights should be
harmonized with the interests of homeowners who invested life savings in exchange for special amenities, comfort, and
tighter security, which non-subdivisions did not offer.37

The Court of Appeals found that the State recognized this interest in Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1216, and recently in Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations.38

The Court of Appeals noted that Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, required the
donation of subdivision roads to the local government. While the issuance was silent on regulating access to subdivision
roads, it found that the requirement was imposed to benefit homeowners, amid subdivision developers who tended to
fail in maintaining the upkeep of subdivision roads, alleys, and sidewalks.39 It cited Albon. v. Fernando,40 which
explained that subdivision owners or developers were relieved of maintaining roads and open spaces once they have
been donated to the local government.41

Likewise, the Court of Appeals noted the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, under which
homeowners were given the: right to organize to protect and promote their mutual benefits and the power to create
rules necessary to regulate and operate the subdivision facilities.42 Section 10(d) provided homeowners' associations
the right to regulate access to and passage through the subdivision roads to preserve privacy, tranquility, internal
security, safety, and traffic order.43
The Court of Appeals further noted that the law did not distinguish between roads donated to the local government and
those retained by the subdivision owners or developers. This showed that while the local government had ownership of
subdivision roads, homeowners' associations maintained their enjoyment, possession, and management.44

Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the Policy was reasonably exercised.45 It ruled that Ordinance No. 132 was
sufficient to show that Diamond Subdivision was encountering peace, order, and security problems, as it explicitly stated
that the subdivision was confronted with such issues affecting the residents and homeowners. As a public document, it is
prima facie evidence of facts stated in it.46 The Court of Appeals further found that the City of Angeles would not have
approved Ordinance No. 132 had it not been substantiated by these facts.47

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held the Policy reasonable because its purpose was to secure and ensure the peace,
safety, and security of homeowners and residents. It found that not only was the Policy supported by 314 Diamond
Homeowners members, but that only Kwong opposed it, and he himself recognized the security concerns when he had
proposed to set up gates at the entry and exit points on the street where he resides.48

The Court of Appeals further found that even if Kwong's proprietary rights may be affected, it is still his duty as a
Diamond Homeowners member to support and participate in the association's projects. Likewise, it held that his
personal interests may be limited for the promotion of the association's goals for the community at large.49

The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Office of the President dated
March 24, 2010 and its Order dated June 10, 2010 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for the issuance of a
cease and desist order plus damages with application for temporary restraining order filed before the House (sic) and
Land Use Regulatory Board Region III is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.50 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals denied Kwong's Motion for Reconsideration in its February 12, 2014 Resolution.51

Hence, Kwong and William G. Kwong Management, Inc. filed this Petition.52

Diamond Homeowners filed a Comment53 and, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply.54

The parties later submitted their respective Memoranda.55

Petitioners insist that the Policy is invalid.

They assert that the subdivision roads are public roads for public use, and outside the commerce of man, having been
donated to the Angeles City government since 1974.56 They maintain that access to and use of Diamond Subdivision
roads should be open to the general public, not limited to privileged individuals.57 They point out that these roads
cannot be alienated, leased, be the subject of contracts, be acquired by prescription, be subjected to attachment and
execution, be burdened by any voluntary easement, or be under the control of private persons or entities, including
homeowners' associations.58

Petitioners further argue that the Policy is an unauthorized restriction on the use of public roads as it unduly converts
them to private roads, hinders their accessibility from the public, and subjects them under the exclusive control of
Diamond Homeowners.59
Petitioners insist that it is the City of Angeles that has the power to control and regulate the use of roads.60 As such, they
argue that Diamond Homeowners should have had the city government address its concerns.61

Petitioners contend that the Local Government Code has conferred local government units with the authority to regulate
the use of public roads and ensure protection and promotion of public welfare,62 well before the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations was enacted.63

Petitioners claim that the local governments' power to regulate roads cannot be exercised by a private entity. To do so
would be a usurpation of the local government's authority, and an illegal abdication of power on the part of the latter.
Thus, they posit that, to their and the public's prejudice, the Policy disregards the primary right, power, and authority of
the City of Angeles to regulate the use of the public roads.64

Petitioners further insist that nothing in Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 or in Albon, which the Court of Appeals
relied on, gives homeowners' associations the authority to regulate the use of subdivision roads that have already been
donated to the local government.65

Petitioners also contend that since the Policy was issued before the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners'
Associations, it should not apply retroactively.66 In any case, they assert that the law did not give homeowners'
associations absolute and unbridled power to regulate the use of subdivision roads. They cite Section 10(d), which lists
the requisites that limit a homeowners' association's rights and powers,67 showing that its power is merely delegated
and conditional. A homeowners' association cannot arrogate unto itself the power to issue the Policy or limit or prevent
the free use of public roads without complying with the law's requisites, as it would be ultra vires.68

Petitioners point out that because respondent failed to comply with the requisites under Section 10(d),69 it violated the
law.70 They claim that the required public consultations must include the general public who use the public road, and
should not be limited to the subdivision residents or the homeowners' association members. They argue that it should
be done the same way public hearings are conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod before the enactment of an
ordinance or resolution.71

Petitioners further allege that no authority from or memorandum of agreement with the City of Angeles was obtained.
They maintain that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be treated as the required memorandum of agreement because it made
no mention of the Policy. They argue that a separate ordinance is necessary to comply with the requirements.72

Petitioners further allege that while Ordinance No. 132 reclassified Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential, it still
expressly exempted Arayat and S.L. Orosa Streets and the service road from the classification. The ordinance, they point
out, also recognized that the existing businesses have acquired a vested right to operate within the subdivision as it
allowed them to continue their operations.73

Petitioners also cite Sections 2 and 18 of the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, which
provide that homeowners' associations are encouraged to actively cooperate with the local government unit to pursue
common goals and provide vital and basic services. They claim that to perform this mandate, the homeowners'
association should not disregard the law that gives them the power to regulate roads.74

Petitioners contend that if the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations were to be harmonized, it is the local government unit that has the primary right and power
to regulate the use of the public roads. Homeowners' associations only have limited, delegated power, which may only
be exercised upon compliance with the conditions in the law.75

Moreover, petitioners deny that there are security concerns within the subdivision. They claim that the Policy was
enacted based on a speculative, conjectural, and negative exaggeration of the actual situation, as there is no single
evidence of an actual crime committed.76 Likewise, they submit that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be considered as
competent evidence of the alleged criminality in the subdivision.77
Finally, petitioners argue that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the technical expertise and special
competence on matters involving the business of developing subdivisions and condominiums. Thus, its factual findings
should be respected.78On the other hand, respondent insists that the Policy is valid.

In its Memorandum, respondent asserts it has the right and authority to issue the Policy under Section 10(d) of the
Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations. It insists that it issued the Policy to preserve "privacy,
tranqui[l]ity, internal security[,] safety[,] and traffic order."79

Respondent further cites Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 957, which mandates subdivision associations to promote
and protect the mutual interests of homeowners, and Section 5 of the Rules on Registration and Supervision of
Homeowners Association, which empowers homeowners' associations to adopt rules and regulations, and to exercise
other powers necessary to govern and operate the association. It argues that this right and authority applies even if the
subdivision roads have been donated to the local government.80

Respondent points out that it issued the Policy to only regulate the use of roads and streets inside Diamond Subdivision.
It neither recategorized them as private property nor exercised acts of private ownership over them. It emphasizes that
the roads are still public roads, open for public use.81

Respondent claims that subdivision owners were required to donate their roads to the local government primarily to
protect and benefit the residents themselves, as some developers would lose interest in maintaining the subdivision's
upkeep.82 They claim that no law puts the exclusive authority to control, dispose, and enjoy the roads to local
government units, to the exclusion of the homeowners, especially since the donation was intended for the latter's
benefit. Moreover, no law denies associations their right to regulate open spaces and roads within their subdivisions.83

Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that while the local government units own the lots, their
enjoyment, possession, and management are retained by the homeowners and their association.84

Respondent further asserts that there was a valid reason for the Policy's adoption.85 It was not a whimsical exercise of
authority to exclude the public from using the roads, but an effort to attain peace and order within the subdivision.86

Respondent emphasizes that the Policy was applied because the public's uncontrolled and unrestricted passage into the
subdivision has made crimes rampant within it. It asserts that the situation has caused its residents fear, discomfort, and
disquiet.87Respondent argues that while the Angeles City Council recognized issues of peace and order in Ordinance No.
132,88 its intervention was not sufficient to abate the recurring crimes.89

Respondent narrates that after the residents of the subdivision clamored for action, it studied and sought advice from
other subdivisions in Angeles City that implemented the same Policy, as they had minimal security problems within their
subdivision. Respondent alleges that when the Policy was approved by 314 legitimate residents90 and implemented, the
crimes decreased as it was able to deter lawless elements.91 Thus, the Policy has improved the peace and order of the
subdivision.92

Respondent points out that only petitioner Kwong questioned the policy, even if he recognized the crime and disorder
issue himself. It points out that prior to the Policy, he was willing to shoulder the cost of putting up security gates on both
the entry and exit points of the street where he resides to prohibit by-passers.93 He even sought to block those who do
not live on his street, whether or not the person was a Diamond Subdivision resident.94 It is, therefore, contradictory for
him to oppose the more reasonable solution of implementing the Policy in the entire subdivision.95

Respondent further argues that under the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, subdivision
residents are duty bound to support and participate in the association's projects and activities, especially if the project is
supported by 314 members, with petitioner Kwong as the only opposition.96
Respondent further maintains that every person's right to life, property, and security is constitutionally protected. The
Policy, thus, is a reasonable means to ensure that these rights are guarded, especially since the local police were unable
to stop the threats to it.97

Respondent further posits that petitioner Kwong's ownership and personal or business interests may be limited for the
interests of the community at large. Such interests cannot defeat the association's right to regulate and administer the
use of the roads inside the subdivision, in accordance with existing laws and regulations, and for the welfare of the
homeowners and residents of Diamond Subdivision.98

Respondent asserts that entry to the subdivision was not confined to privileged individuals, and that it exercised no
discrimination in the Policy's implementation.99 The regulations, it alleges, were not so rigid as to make it difficult for the
riding public to comply with.100 It further points out that the roads within Diamond Subdivision are not the main entry
and exit points to the highway or main roads of Angeles City.101

Respondent, thus, claims that it is actually working hand in hand with the City of Angeles in protecting the lives,
property, and security of its residents from lawless elements.102

Lastly, respondent denies that the Court of Appeals disregarded the special competence of the lower administrative
bodies. It points out that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter even ruled in its favor and found the Policy
to be justified.103

This Court resolves the following issues:

First, whether or not the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board are entitled to respect;

Second, whether or not the security concerns within Diamond Subdivision were established; and

Finally, whether or not respondent Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association was authorized in issuing the "No
Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy despite the roads having been donated to the local government.

This Court denies the Petition.

Petitioners argue that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board should be respected as it is the
agency with the technical know-how on matters involving the development of subdivisions.104 Respondent, however,
denies that the agency's special competence was disregarded, pointing out that even the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office found that the Policy was justified.105

Petitioners are correct that the factual findings of administrative agencies with special competence should be respected
if supported by substantial evidence.106 However, this Court finds that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board's
findings were not disregarded.

To begin with, the proper procedure was followed. The matter was brought before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, which exercised jurisdiction and ruled on the merits of the case. The appellate process then took place from the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter to the Board of Commissioners, to the Office of the President, to the
Court of Appeals, and now, to this Court.
However, because the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal.

On one hand, the Arbiter found that the Policy did not prohibit or impair the use of the roads.107 He noted that there
was no evidence showing that persons were being refused access or asked to pay for its use.108 He also found no
evidence of any damage to petitioners' business. He lent credence to respondent's allegation that there was a need for
the protection and security of its residents, which must be prioritized over the convenience of motel patrons.109 These
findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, the Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President ruled that there was no evidence of
peace and security issues within Diamond Subdivision. It held that subjecting the subdivision roads to the Policy converts
them to private roads, which are inaccessible, not open to the public, and under respondent's control.110

Since the factual findings are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal
and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this Court may determine what is more consistent with the evidence on
record. While only questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions, this rule is not without exceptions. In Spouses
Miano v. Manila Electric Company:111

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule
45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once
again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

....

However, the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists down the
recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee:, (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.

These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this Court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal
cases.112 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Since the findings of the lower tribunals are cont1icting as to whether there were security concerns within Diamond
Subdivision that would warrant the issuance of the Policy, this Court may exercise its discretion to resolve this factual
issue.

II

The case records reveal that Diamond Subdivision was experiencing security concerns.

In Ordinance No. 132, the Angeles City Council acknowledged that Diamond Subdivision had been having security
problems that seriously affected the homeowners and residents. The whereas clauses state:
Whereas, legitimate homeowners of the Diamond Subdivision have presented to the City Council their serious concern
on what is presently occurring in their subdivision;

Whereas, with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision constant problems of peace and order have confronted
the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property and security;

Whereas, the introduction of business establishments in an uncontrolled manner have likewise proliferated due to the
current classification of the subdivision;

Whereas, due to the R-2 classification of Diamond Subdivision the value of property have not increase[d], despite its
strategic location;

Whereas, there is an urgent need to address all the concern[s] of the homeowners and residents of Diamond
Subdivision[.]113 (Emphasis supplied)

Ordinance No. 132 explicitly states that "with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision[,] constant problems of
peace and order have confronted the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property[,] and security."114

Ordinance No. 132 is a public document. Under Rule 132, Section 19(a) of the Rules of Court, written official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines are public documents. The
provision states:

SECTION 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated m them.115 Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules of Court
provides:

SECTION 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

Thus, there is prima facie evidence of the security and safety issues within Diamond Subdivision.
Besides, these security concerns were affirmed by petitioner Kwong himself. In his August 3, 2006 Letter, he
acknowledged that there was a "sharp increase in criminal activities" in Diamond Subdivision, "a number of which
remain[ed] unreported."116 He also proposed to shoulder the costs of putting up security gates on both entry and exit
points of the street where he resides, and the hiring of security guards to screen incoming and outgoing visitors.117
These constitute admissions, or declarations "as to a relevant fact that may be given in evidence against him."118

Petitioner Kwong presented no evidence to counter these documents. Thus, this Court affirms that Diamond Subdivision
was experiencing security concerns.

III

Diamond Subdivision was, likewise, authorized m enacting the Policy.

There is no question that the subdivision roads have been donated to the City of Angeles.119 Therefore, they are public
property, for public use.

According to the Deed of Donation,120 the donation was done in compliance with Resolution No. 162, series of 1974, of
the Municipal Board of Angeles City.121

This donation is consistent with Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protection Decree. The provision states:

SECTION 31. Donation of Roads and Open Spaces to Local Government. -The registered owner or developer of the
subdivision or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his option, convey by
way of donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or municipality wherein the project is
located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donated shall
thereafter be converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved by
the Authority.

On October 14, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 957 was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, which made the
donation to the local government unit mandatory:

SECTION 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces. - The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate
roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty
percent (30%) of the gross area for open space. . . .

....

Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by
the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local governments to accept;
provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with
the consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of the parks and playgrounds donated thereafter shall be
converted to any other purpose or purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

The whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No. 1216 explicitly state that roads, alleys, and sidewalks in subdivisions are
for public use, and are beyond the commerce of men:
WHEREAS, there is a compelling need to create and maintain a healthy environment in human settlements by providing
open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks as may be deemed suitable to enhance the quality of life of the residents
therein;

WHEREAS, such open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in residential subdivision are for public use and are, therefore,
beyond the commerce of men[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, both parties admit that the subdivision roads are public. Thus, there is no issue on the roads' ownership: it
belongs to the Angeles City government.

However, both Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 are silent on the right of homeowners' associations to issue
regulations on using the roads to ensure the residents' safety and security.

This silence was addressed in 2010 when Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners'
Associations, was enacted. Section 10(d) states:

SECTION 10. Rights and Powers of the Association. - An association shall have the following rights and shall exercise the
following powers:

....

(d) Regulate access to, or passage through the subdivision/village roads for purposes of preserving privacy, tranquility,
internal security, safety and traffic order: Provided, That: (1) public consultations are held; (2) existing laws and
regulations are met; (3) the authority of the concerned government agencies or units are obtained; and (4) the
appropriate and necessary memoranda of agreement are executed among the concerned parties[.]

Section 10(d) gives homeowners' associations the right to "[r]egulate access to, or passage through the
subdivision/village roads for purposes of preserving privacy, tranquility, internal security, safety[,] and traffic order" as
long as they complied with the requisites. The law does not distinguish whether the roads have been donated to the
local government or not.122

Petitioners argue that the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not apply because it was
not yet in effect when the Policy was issued. Assuming that it applies, they assert that respondent failed to comply with
the stated requisites.123

Petitioners are correct. The Policy was approved in 2006, way before the law was enacted in 2010. Diamond
Homeowners, then, could not have yet complied with the conditions provided. It would, thus, be unjustified if the Policy
were to be invalidated on the ground that these conditions were not followed.

Laws are not retroactive. Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided." Lex prospicit, non respicit; the law looks forward, not backward. This is due to the unconstitutional result of
retroacting a law's application: it divests rights that have already become vested or impairs obligations of contract.124 In
Espiritu v. Cipriano:125

Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is
untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights
and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We
must apply it to the facts as found. . . . The said law did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation.
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" and, therefore, no
reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be
accorded to the same. . . .

....

. . . Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the
obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as
intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or
clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.126 (Citations. omitted)

The Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not state that it has a retroactive effect. Thus, it
cannot be applied to the Policy. This Court must rule on the Policy's validity based on the laws, rules, and court doctrines
in force at the time of its issuance.

Under Section 16 of the Local Government Code, local governments have the power to govern the welfare of those
within its territorial jurisdiction:

SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

This includes the power to close and open roads, whether permanently or temporarily:

SECTION 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. - (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or
temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in
case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance
of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or
conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or
relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways,
telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive
concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be
temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any
local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or
shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce
may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

More relevantly, local governments may also enact ordinances to regulate and control the use of the roads:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:

....

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same[.]

In Albon, this Court upheld the City of Marikina's right to enact an ordinance to widen, clear, and repair the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision that have been donated to it:

Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government
Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of R.A.
7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities
as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed by
their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of
the "whereas clauses" of P.D. 1216 (which amended P.D. 957) declares that open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a
residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, P.D. 957, as
amended by P.D. 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the
use of the general public.

....

Moreover, the implementing rules of P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216, provide that it is the registered owner or
developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and
open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU. The owner or developer shall be deemed
relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a certificate of completion
and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU.127 (Citations omitted)

Nonetheless, homeowners' associations are not entirely powerless in protecting the interests of homeowners and
residents. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 recognizes the need for a homeowners' association to promote and
protect their mutual interest and assist in community development:

SECTION 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. - The owner or developer of a subdivision project or
condominium project shall initiate the organization of a homeowners association among the buyers and residents of the
projects for the purpose of promoting and protecting their mutual interest and assist in their community development.
Moreover, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board issued Resolutions that provided the powers and rights of
homeowners' associations. Its Resolution No. R-771-04, or the Rules on the Registration and Supervision of Homeowners
Associations, states:

SECTION 5. Powers and Attributes of a Homeowners Association. - The powers and attributes of the Homeowners
Association are those stated in its by-laws, which shall include the following:

a. To adopt and amend by-laws, rules and regulations;

b. To adopt an annual program of activities and the corresponding budget therefor, subject to the limitations and
conditions imposed under the by-laws;

c. To impose and collect reasonable fees on members and non-member residents who avail of or benefit from the
facilities and services of the association, to defray necessary operational expenses, subject to the limitations and
conditions imposed under e law, regulations of the Board and the association by-laws;

d. To sue and be sued in its name;

e. To enter into contracts for basic and necessary services for the general welfare of the association and its members;

f. To acquire, hold, encumber and convey in its own name any right, title or interest to any property;

g. To impose reasonable sanctions upon its members for violations and/or non-compliance with the association by laws;
and upon non-member residents by reason of any act and/or omission prejudicial to the interest of the association or its
members; and

h. To exercise other powers necessary for the governance and operation of the association.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 770-04, or the Framework for Governance of Homeowners
Associations, states that associations are expected to promote the security of residents in their living environment:

WHEREAS, there is a need to highlight the basic roles, powers and responsibilities of a homeowners association and its
officers and members under existing laws and regulations;

WHEREAS, there is also a need to promote and operationalize the best practices and norms of good governance in the
management of a homeowners association:

WHEREAS, the active and enlightened management of the affairs of a homeowners association will enhance the delivery
of basic services to and promote the general welfare of its members;

....

SECTION 3. General Principles. - An Association should-

a. endeavor to serve the interest of its members through equity of access in the decision-making process, transparency
and accountability, and the promotion of security in their living environment;

b. establish its vision, define and periodically assess its mission, policies, and objectives and the means to attain the
same; and

c. without abandoning its non-partisan character:

i. actively cooperate with local government units and national government agencies, in furtherance of its common goals
and activities for the benefit of the residents inside and outside of the subdivision; and

ii. complement, support and strengthen local government units and national government agencies in providing vital
services to its members and in helping implement local government policies, programs, ordinances, and rules.

This Court has also acknowledged the right of homeowners' associations to set goals for the promotion of safety and
security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of their residents.128 In Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio:129

The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive
and confiscatory. According to him the assessment is oppressive because the amount assessed is not based on benefits
but on the size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and unreasonable because only the owners of the lots are required
to pay the questioned assessment and not the residents who are only renting inside the village; and confiscatory because
under the by--laws of the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the property assessed if the amount is not
paid.

We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:

....

The second question has reference to the reasonableness of the resolution assessing the monthly dues in question upon
the defendant. The exhibits annexed to the stipulation of facts describe the purpose or goals for which these monthly
dues assessed upon the members of the plaintiff including the defendant are to be disbursed. They are intended for
garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets, establishment of parks, etc. Living in
this modern, complex society has raised complex problems of security, sanitation, communitarian comfort and
convenience and it is now a recognized necessity that members of the community must organize themselves for the
successful solution of these problems. Goals intended for the promotion of their safety and security, peace, comfort, and
general welfare cannot be categorized as unreasonable. Indeed, the essence of community life is association and
cooperation for without these such broader welfare goals cannot be attained. It is for these reasons that modern
subdivisions are imposing encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot buyers a limitation upon ownership of the said
buyers that they automatically become members of homeowners' association living within the community of the
subdivision.130 (Emphasis supplied)

In Spouses Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals,131 this Court, quoting the Court of Appeals Decision, affirmed that ownership
of public spaces is with the local government, while enjoyment, possession, and control are with the residents and
homeowners:

It appears that reliance was placed by the lower court upon the fact that TCT No. 37527 covering Lot II, Block 6 did not
contain an annotation as to the open space character of said piece of land. But the argument does not find justification
with applicable jurisprudence. When the lot in question had been allotted as an open space by Carmel Corporation, it
had become the property of the Quezon City government and/or the Republic of the Philippines held under the
management, control and enjoyment of the residents and homeowners of Carmel II-A Subdivision. . . .
....

Therefore, with the approval of the subdivision plan of Carmel II- A followed with it the exclusion of the land from the
commerce of man. It would not be too presumptuous to conclude that the sale by Carmel Corporation which resulted in
the subsequent private dealings involving this public property is void ab initio. And the mere fact that Carmel
Corporation did not consider Lot II, Block 6 as the designated open space would not give it licentious freedom to sell
such public property "under the nose"! so to speak, of the Quezon City government, the Republic of the Philippines, and
the homeowners who are the direct beneficiaries thereof. While the afore-enumerated entities do not hold the owners'
duplicate title over the open space, hence, could not properly forewarned of any prejudicial act of conveyance or
encumbrance perpetrated by the subdivision owner/developer, they should not be faulted for taking a belated attempt
to question these conveyances affecting the open space which are made manifest only during the actual disruptions
accompanying the exercise of ownership and possession by the ultimate vendee.132 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)

From all these, we hold that the Policy is valid. In De Guzman v. Commission on Audit:133

It is a basic principle in statutory construction that when faced with apparently irreconcilable inconsistencies between
two laws, the first step is to attempt to harmonize the seemingly inconsistent laws. In other words, courts must first
exhaust all efforts to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws and only resort to choosing which law to apply when
harmonization is impossible.134 (Citations omitted)

The Policy maintains the public nature of the subdivision roads. It neither prohibits nor impairs the use of the roads. It
does not prevent the public from using the roads, as all are entitled to enter, exit, and pass through them. One must only
surrender an identification card to ensure the security of the residents. As stated, the residents and homeowners,
including petitioner Kwong, have valid security concerns amid a sharp increase in criminal activities within the
subdivision.

The Policy, likewise, neither denies nor impairs any of the local government's rights of ownership. Respondent does not
assert that it owns the subdivision roads or claims any private right over them. Even with the Policy, the State still has the
jus possidendi (right to possess), jus utendi (right to use), just fruendi (right to its fruits), jus abutendi (right to consume),
and jus disponendi (right to dispose) of the subdivision roads. It still has the power to temporarily close, permanently
open, or generally regulate the subdivision roads.

It must be pointed out that this case is not even between a homeowners' association and the local government, but a
homeowners' association and a resident who disagrees with the Policy. Respondent, therefore, is not asserting any right
against any local government act on the subdivision roads. Neither is the local government claiming that its right to
regulate the roads is being impinged upon.

Furthermore, Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended, on the donation of subdivision roads to the local
government, "was [enacted] to remedy the situation prevalent at that time where owners/developers fail to keep up
with their obligation of providing and maintaining the subdivision roads, alleys[,] and sidewalks."135 The whereas
clauses of Presidential Decree No. 957 reveal the legislative intent:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to
provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety
of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to
different innocent purchasers for value;

WHEREAS, these acts not only undermine the land and housing program of the government but also defeat the
objectives of the New Society, particularly the promotion of peace and order and the enhancement of the economic,
social and moral condition of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses
be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and manipulations
committed in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, here, the donation was for the benefit of the subdivision's homeowners, lot buyers, and residents. This must
be taken into consideration in interpreting the provision for the donation:

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases - the primary rule is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of
this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.136
(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

In Spouses Belo v. Philippine National Bank:137

It is well settled that courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdities. If the words of a statute
are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against
its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation. We test a law by its result. A law should not be interpreted so
as not to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them in slavish obedience to their language.138
(Citations omitted)

Thus, the donation of the roads to the local government should not be interpreted in a way contrary to the legislative
intent of benefiting the residents. Conversely, residents should not be disempowered from taking measures for the
proper maintenance of their residential area. Under Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 957, they may protect their
mutual interests. Here, the Policy was not inconsistent with this purpose. To rule against it would be contrary to the
intention of the law to protect their rights.

This Court further notes that the Deed of Donation recognizes the Diamond Subdivision's power to monitor the security
within the subdivision. The Deed of Donation between the developer of Diamond Subdivision and the City of Angeles
states:

That it is a condition of this donation, that the Severina Realty Corporation will have the exclusive right to appoint and to
enter into a contract with any duly licensed security guard agency for the security guard services of the Diamond
Subdivision, Angeles City.139

Thus, the subdivision is still empowered to determine how best to maintain the security and safety within the
subdivision.

Moreover, it is common knowledge that when homeowners purchase their properties from subdivisions, they pay a
more valuable consideration in exchange for better facilities, safer security, and a higher degree of peace, order, and
privacy. Some may also have purchased their properties in contemplation of their right to organize and to take measures
to protect these interests. It would be an injustice if these were not taken into consideration in determining the validity
of the Policy.
Here, the Policy was enacted to ensure the safety and security of Diamond Subdivision residents who have found
themselves exposed to heightened crimes and lawlessness. The Policy was approved by 314 members of the
homeowners' association, with only petitioner Kwong protesting the solution. His protest is ultimately rooted in the
damage that the Policy has allegedly caused to his businesses. However, he failed to present any evidence of this
damage.

It is established that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi:140

It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence
required by law. In civil cases such as this one, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party. It is therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, the
defendant must likewise prove its own allegations to buttress its claim that it is not liable.

The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the defendant. It
is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's
cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense - i.e., an "avoidance" of the claim.141 (Citations
omitted)

Since petitioner Kwong presented no evidence of the damage caused to him, this Court cannot rule in his favor.

In any case, the community's welfare should prevail over the convenience of subdivision visitors who seek to patronize
petitioners' businesses. Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that the use of property bears a social function,
and economic enterprises of persons are still subject to the promotion of distributive justice and state intervention for
the common good:

SECTION 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the
right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so demands.

Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution states that the State may regulate the use of property and its increments for the
common good:

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.

These provisions reveal that the property ownership and the rights that come with it are not without restrictions, but
rather come with the consideration and mindfulness for the welfare of others in society. The Constitution still
emphasizes and prioritizes the people's needs as a whole. Such is the case here: even if petitioner Kwong's rights are
subordinated to the rights of the many, the Policy improves his own wellbeing and quality of life. In Bel Air Village
Association, Inc.:

Even assuming that defendant's ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered by TCT No. 81136 is limited because of the
burden of being a member of plaintiff association the goals and objectives of the association are far greater because they
apply to and affect the community at large. It can be justified on legal grounds that a person's enjoyment of ownership
may be restricted and limited if to do so the welfare of the community of which he is a member is promoted and
attained. These benefits in which the defendant participates more than offset the burden and inconvenience that he may
suffer.142 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals' July 5, 2013 Decision and February 12, 2014 Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 115198. This Court finds that Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association's "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry"
Policy is valid and consistent with law and jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.