Zulueta v Pan-Am Airways 49 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Sps. Rafael (plaintiff) and Telly Zulueta, as well as their daughter, Carolinda
were passengers aboard a PANAM plane from Honolulu to Manila, and the first leg
was Wake Island. On said Island, the passengers were advised of a stopover of
about 30 min. Before reaching that place, the flight according to the plaintiffs was
very rough." The purser of PANAM, testified to the contrary; but her notes state that
there was "unusually small amount of roughness," which the Trial Judge considered
properly as "an admission and only the degree thereof is in dispute." Plaintiff testified
that, to relieve himself, he went to the men’s comfort room, but found it full of
soldiers, in view of which he walked down the beach some 100 yards away.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and as passengers had boarded the plane,
the plaintiff's absence was noticed. The take-off was delayed and a search was
conducted. Minutes later, the plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach heading
towards the ramp of the plane, where he remarked, "You people almost made me
miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged." The
airport customer service supervisor was about to reply when the captain motioned to
join him. Plaintiffs were asked to turn over their baggage claim checks. However,
only 3 out of the 4 bags were located and once identified, the airport manager
demanded that the bags be inspected (closed, but not locked). Plaintiff refused,
hence, the defendant’s manager told him he would not be allowed to proceed to
Manila and handed him a letter for the same and the charge. The flight was delayed
for 2 hours and upon plaintiff’s request, his wife and daughter were allowed to
continue with the flight (required to leave the 3 bags behind). Nevertheless, the plane
flew with the 4th bag (it was found with other passengers’ luggage). Defendant
refused the reroute request so Mrs. Zulueta was forced to pay for plaintiff’s ticket and
the he arrived after spending 2 nights at Wake, then from Honolulu to Tokyo to
Manila. Plaintiff demanded that he be reimbursed P1,505,502.85 for damages, but
was denied, hence this action. Xxx
On April 22, 1971, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for more
than 2 years, been actually living separately from her husband (herein plaintiff), and
that she had decided to settle separately with PANAM and had reached a full
settlement of all her differences with said defendant for the case to be dismissed
insofar as she is concerned. PANAM expressed no objection thereto. Plaintiff prayed
that the motion be denied, upon the ground that the case at bar is one for damages
for breach of a contract of carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff, the husband
and administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the PANAM
had been paid under said contract; that the action was filed by the plaintiffs as a
family and the lower court had awarded damages to them as such family; that,
although PANAM had questioned the award of damages, it had not raised the
question whether the lower court should have specified what portion of the award
should go to each plaintiff; that although spouses had been living separately, this has
been without judicial approval; so Mrs. Zulueta may not bind the conjugal partnership
or settle this case separately; and that the sum given by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta is
believed to be P50K, which is< 3-1/2% of the award appealed from, thereby
indicating the advisability of denying her motion to dismiss, for her own protection.
ISSUE:
W/N the Compromise Agreement without the husband’s consent is ineffective
because the award of damages for breach of contract of carriage forms part of the
conjugal partnership pursuant to Art. 153 of the Civil Code (old, now 117) - YES
RULING:
The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, but what
is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is
concerned. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s
consent, except in cases provided by law," and it has not been shown that this is one
of the cases so provided. Art. 113 of our CC, pursuant to which "the husband must
be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: . . . (2) If they have in fact been
separated for at least 1 year . . ." — relied upon by PANAM — does not warrant the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the latter. Obviously the suit contemplated in
subdivision (2) of said Art. 113 is one in which the wife is the real party — either
plaintiff/defendant — in interest, and, in which, without being so, the husband must
be joined as a party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her. Said provision
cannot possibly apply to the one at bar, in which the husband is the main party in
interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the
conjugal partnership. Moreover, he having acted in this capacity in entering into the
contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the
contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership, the damages recoverable for breach
of such contract belongs to said partnership. It is true that the law favors and
encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the
contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of the
spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the
defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of
the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" — which the law seeks
to protect — by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had
arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a
reconciliation between them.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a
breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid
their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, the Court
holds that said damages fall under par. 1 of said Art. 153, the right thereto having
been "acquired by onerous title during the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered
up by Article 148 of our Civil Code: “The following shall be the exclusive property of
each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2) That
which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title; (3) That which is
acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only
one of the spouses; (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband.” In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly
entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during
marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting
from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was
coupled with a quasi-delict constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not
possibly have the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
 While it is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., the "patrimonial and moral
damages" awarded to a young/beautiful woman by reason of a scar are her
paraphernal property, the opinion is indecisive because the cited passage from Colin
y Capitant are comments on the French Civil Code referring to indemnities in
consequence of accident resulting in physical injuries sustained by one of the
spouses (which Mrs. Zulueta has not suffered); and that said commentators admit
that the question whether or not said damages are paraphernal property or belong to
the conjugal partnership is not settled under the Spanish law.