ESTOPPEL Adoracion E. Cruz, et al. v. CA and Sps.
Eliseo & Virginia Malolos
 “An important branch of American Law
is estoppel. It is a source of many rules
which work out justice between the
parties, thru the operation of the
principle that an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon.”
ARTICLE 1431
Concept of Estoppel
 “Speaking generally, it may be said that
estoppel is a bar which precluded a
person from denying or asserting
anything contrary to that which has
been, in contemplation of law,
established as the truth either by acts
of judicial or legislative officers, or by
his own deed or representation either
express or implied.”
 NOTE: In Lopez v. Ochoa (L-7955, May
30, 1958), the Supreme Court held that
waiver and estoppel are frequently
used as convertible terms. The doctrine
of waiver belongs to the family of, is of
the nature of, is based on, estoppel.
The essence of waiver is estoppel, and
where there is no estoppel, there is no
waiver. This is especially true where
the waiver relied upon is constructive
or implied from the conduct of a party.
Thus, when it is asserted that a “party
is in estoppel,” this is the same as
saying that said party had made a
waiver.
Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
 If recourse to the barangay courts is
not availed of, the complaint may be
dismissed for lack of a cause of action,
unless the requisite has been waived
by failure to set up a timely objection.
The aggrieved person may be deemed
to be in estoppel.
GR 126713, Jul. 27, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners, in their transactions
with others, have declared that the other
lands covered by the Memorandum of
Agreement are absolutely owned, without
indicating the existence of a co-ownership
over such properties.
Issue: Are petitioners estopped from
claiming otherwise?
HELD: Yes, because the petitioners’ very
own acts and representations, as evidenced
by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, have
denied such co-ownership. Under the
principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred
from claiming co-ownership of the lands in
issue. In estoppel, a person, who by his
deed or conduct has induced another to act
in a particular manner, is barred from
adopting an inconsistent position, attitude
or course of conduct that thereby causes
loss or injury to another. It further bars him
from denying the truth of a fact which has,
in the contemplation of law, become
settled by the acts and proceedings of
judicial or legislative offi cers or by the act
of the party himself, either by conventional
writing or by representations, express or
implied of in pais.
Origin of Estoppel
 The doctrine of estoppel has its origin
in equity, and is based on moral rights
and natural justice.
 Its applicability to any particular case
depends to a very large extent upon
the special circumstances of the case.
Examples of Estoppel
(a) If a husband in a sworn declaration
constituting a family home has stated in
said documents that he was married,
naming his wife, he cannot thereafter be
heard to say that he and the girl are not
married. Therefore, the family home should
be considered as conjugal property.
(b) A holder of a promissory note given
because of gambling who indorses the
same to an innocent holder for value and
who assures said party that the note has no
legal defect, is estopped from asserting that
there had been an illegal consideration for
the note, and so, he has to pay its value.
(c) A person who alleged at one time in
court that he was the owner of a certain
cabaret cannot afterwards deny his
ownership thereof.
(d) A person claiming for his salary was
selling his interest in the stock of a
corporation to said corporation. The
corporation refused to consider the sale
unless the claim for salary was omitted. So,
the seller drew another contract, this time
with no mention of the salary. He cannot
now claim the salary in view of estoppel.
(e) A vendee a retro who at one time
recognized ownership in the subject matter
by the vendor a retro cannot now claim
ownership over the same.
(f) “He who prevents a thing from being
done may not avail himself of the non-
performance which he himself has
occasioned,” for the law says to him in
effect, ‘this is your own act, and therefore
you are not damnifi ed.’ Where, therefore,
a taxpayer repeatedly requested for
reinvestigation of his case and therefore
persuaded the government to postpone
collection of the tax, he cannot set up
prescription of the action.
(g) If the registered owner of a private or
public vehicle sells it to another, but does
not cancel its registration under his name,
he will still be responsible if the buyer
causes damage or injury to another. He will
be estopped from asserting that the
property had already been transferred by
him to another. The Motor Vehicle Law
requires registration so as to identify the
owner in case of an accident or injury on
the highways. Responsibility is thus fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner.
If this were not the rule,
it would be very easy for the registered
owner to escape responsibility by simply
transferring the property to an indefinite
person or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond fi nancially
for the damage or injury done.
However, the registered owner who
has already conveyed or transferred a
vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the
vendee or transferee for the amount that
he may be required to pay as damages to
the person injured by the vehicle.
(h) A government employee who accepts
the benefits accruing from the abolition of
his offi ce is estopped from questioning the
validity of the abolition and is deemed to
have waived the right to contest the same.
Fieldman’s Insurance Co., Inc. v. Mercedes
Vargas Vda. de Songco, et al.
L-24833, Sept. 23, 1968
FACTS: Federico Songco, a man of scant
education being only a first grader, owned a
private jeepney, which was covered by a
common carrier’s liability insurance by the
Fieldman’s Insurance Co. The contract was
procured by the company’s agent, who
induced Federico to have the vehicle
insured, although it was NOT a COMMON
CARRIER, but a private one. In fact the 42-
year-old son of Federico had misgivings, for
the vehicle was merely for private use. The
agent assured Federico, however, that the
contract was valid. Sometime later, the
vehicle was involved in a collision, resulting
in death to Federico and one of his sons,
and physical injuries to two others. When
the surviving widow and other children
sued the Company under the terms of the
contract, the latter alleged that the same
was not valid, for it was not a common
carrier.
Issue: Is the Company liable?
HELD: Yes, the Company is liable on
account of estoppel. Moreover, the
contract of insurance is one of perfect good
faith (uberrima fi des) not for the insured
alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact,
it is more so for the latter, since its
dominant bargaining position carries with it
stricter responsibility.
Manila Electric Co. v. Court of Appeals
L-33794, May 31, 1982
If a party fails to object to the construction
of an electric sub-station within his
property, and only asked for assurance that
the station would not be a nuisance or
dangerous, he can be said to be in
“contractual estoppel.”
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon
Marine Dept. Union, et al.
101 Phil. 257
Estoppel by laches (unreasonable delay
in making a claim in court) does not apply
to employees in claiming overtime pay, for
to allow estoppel in this case would be to
bring about a situation whereby the
employee or laborer, who cannot expressly
renounce the right to extra compensation
under the law, may be compelled to
accomplish the same thing by mere silence
or lapse of time, thereby frustrating by
indirection the purpose of the law.
However, laches may favor the
inference that no such overtime work had
been made; or that, even if it existed, it has
already been duly compensated. No
estoppel can be invoked if the complaining
party has not been misled.
If a public officer makes an erroneous
application and enforcement of the law, he
is not considered in estoppel. However,
other affi rmative acts of officials may raise
estoppel against the government.
NOTE: However, omission or neglect of
governmen officials does not create
estoppel against the government.
 A petitioner cannot be estopped in
questioning the validity of a customer’s
agreement and from denying the
effects of his conduct.
ARTICLE 1432
Suppletory Effect of the General Principles
of Estoppel
The principles of estoppel are only
suppletory.
Pleading of Alleged Estoppel
If facts are alleged as constituting estoppel,
they must be expressly pleaded.
ARTICLE 1433
Kinds of Estoppel
(a) estoppel IN PAIS (equitable estoppel);
this may be estoppel:
1) by conduct or by acceptance of benefi ts,
2) by representation or concealment,
3) by silence,
4) by omission,
5) by laches (unreasonable delay in suing).
(b) estoppel BY DEED (technical estoppel);
this may be:
1) estoppel by deed proper (written
instrument may also be in the form of a
bond or a mortgage).
2) estoppel by judgment as a court record
(this happens when there could have been
RES JUDICATA). (See Rule 131, Sec. 3[3] and
Rule 39, Sec. 47, Revised Rules of Court)
[NOTE: While res judicata makes a
judgment conclusive between the parties as
to things which were directly adjudged,
estoppel by judgment prevents the parties
from raising questions that could have been
put in issue and decided in the previous
case.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v.
Weaver Textile Mills, Inc. & Court of
Appeals
GR 58469, May 16, 1983
A machine movable by nature, which
becomes immobilized by destination or
purpose, may be treated as movable
property. One who agrees to executing a
chattel mortgage is estopped from denying
the chattel mortgage on the ground that
the subject matter is immovable property.
Estoppel IN PAIS (Equitable Estoppel)
(a) Definition: It arises when one, by his
acts, representations or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or thru culpable negligence,
induces another to believe certain facts to
exist, and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts.
Carolina Liquete Ganzon v. CA
GR 136831, Jul. 30, 2002
Estopped in pais, or equitable estoppel arises when
one, by his acts, representations or admissions or by his
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or thru
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. The real offi
ce of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to
supplying deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant
positive law.
In the case at bar, the requisites for the existence of
a tenancy relationship are explicit in the law and these
elements cannot be done away with by conjectures.
[NOTE: It takes place in a situation where because of a
party’s action or omission, he is denied the right to plead
or prove a fact otherwise important.
[NOTE: Its purpose is to serve the objectives of justice. It is
founded on morality and fair dealing.
[NOTE: Estoppel should not be confused with fraud.
Firstly, estoppel exists with or without a contract; fraud
presupposes an attempt to enter into a valid agreement or
contract.
Secondly, while estoppel may be raised as a defense, fraud
may properly be a cause of action, on account of the
vitiated consent that it produces.]
Examples of estoppel in pais:
1) If a vendee a retro agrees to accept a
check in payment of the repurchase price,
he cannot afterwards allege that the check
is not legal tender. He is bound by his own
act.
2) If the real owner of a house pretends to
be merely a broker in the sale thereof, he is
estopped from asserting ownership over
the same.
3) If the NAMARCO has entered into a valid
contract with a certain Federation for the
sale of certain goods imported by the
former, it (NAMARCO) cannot question
the validity of the transaction particularly
after it has received and accepted certain
benefi ts from the Federation as a result of
the contract.
Some Doctrines
1) Conduct because of ignorance or mistake
does not result in estoppel. Indeed if
someone was ignorant of the truth or was
mistaken, he cannot be said to be in
estoppel.
2) Estoppel by laches (unreasonable delay
in bringing a court action, even if the period
of prescription has not yet lapsed) bars an
action to create a vested right (executory
interest) but does not bar an action to
protect a vested right (executed interest).
NOTE: In Liguez v. Lopez, 102 Phil. 577, the
Supreme Court held that the rule of
estoppel by laches cannot apply to prevent
enforcement of the principle that a party to
an illegal contract cannot recover what he
has given pursuant thereto, for the latter is
a rule of superior public policy.
NOTE: In Viloria v. Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, et al., L-11754, April 29,
1960, the Court held that the equitable
defense of LACHES requires four elements:
a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or
of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which the complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a
remedy;
b) delay in asserting the complainant’s
rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant’s
conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part
of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases
his suit;
d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred
 Just because a person is silent does not
necessarily mean that he will be in
estoppel. There should have been a
duty or obligation to speak.
 A mere promise to perform or to omit
at some future time does not
necessarily result in estoppel
(promissory estoppel). For this to exist,
the promise must have been relied
upon, and prejudice would result
unless estoppel is applied.
Estoppel BY DEED
(a) Definition: It is a bar which precludes a
party to a deed and his privies from
asserting as against the other and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the
deed, or from denying the truth of any
material fact asserted in it.
(NOTE: There must be a written
instrument.)
Examples of estoppel by deed:
1) If several persons, each claiming
ownership over certain property deposited
in a warehouse, in a written document
agree it should be sold, said persons cannot
later on modify the terms of the
agreement.
2) If a shipper has his goods valued at only
P200, he cannot later on recover damages
for its value more than what he has
declared in the bill of lading, even if the
value of the goods be worth much more,
for he is in estoppel.
3) Purchase in one’s own name with
another’s money generally gives title to the
purchaser, that is, to him who appears in
the deed to have made the purchase in his
own name.
Some Doctrines
1) If the deed or instrument is null and void
because the contract, let us say, is illegal,
there is NO estoppel.
2) Ordinarily, the person estopped must be
capacitated. But if a minor is clever enough
to deceive others, estoppel may result.
Thus, minors who sell real estate
pretending, by the execution of a public
instrument, to have reached their majority,
cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse
themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or to seek their
annulment. And the circumstance that
after the conveyance, they inform the
vendee of their minority is of no moment,
because their misrepresentation had
already estopped them from disavowing
the contract.
3) If a person notarizes (and is not a party
to) the instrument, he is NOT in estoppel.
ARTICLE 1434
Sale or Alienation by Non-Owner
(a) Example:
Jose sold in his own name Brigitte’s car to
Gina. He also delivered the car to Gina. If
later on Brigitte donates the car to Jose,
ownership over the same passes to Gina,
not by tradition or delivery, but by
operation of law.
(b) In this kind of estoppel, prejudice is not
essential.
(c) Art. 1434 applies to the sale of “after-
acquired property.” This is allowed by the
law on Sales under the Civil Code.
Inquimboy v. Paez Vda. de Cruz
L-13953, Jul. 26, 1960
FACTS: Inquimboy sold a parcel of land to
Albea in 1941, who in turn, without having
fully paid the price, sold the same land to
Cruz in 1943. The land was registered land,
and when Albea sold it to Cruz, the land
was still registered in Inquimboy’s name. It
was only in Feb. 1944 that the sale in favor
of Albe was recorded. In May 1944, Albea’s
title was cancelled and the transfer
certificate of title was issued to Cruz. Did
Cruz really acquire title over the property?
HELD: Yes, because although Albea was not
yet the registered owner at the time he
sold it to Cruz, the fact remains that he
(Albea) subsequently acquired valid title in
his own name. This title was later
transferred to Cruz.
ARTICLE 1435
Sale or Alienation in Representation of
Another
This is estoppel created in a representative
capacity. In this kind of estoppel, prejudice
is also not essential.
Example
Amalia, in representation of Romeo, sells to
Juanito a car. Amalia cannot afterwards
allege that she was really the owner of the
car, and that, therefore, the sale is not
valid.
ARTICLE 1436
Estoppel on the Part of a Lessee or a Bailee
(a) Under the Revised Rules of Court, one of
the instances of conclusive presumptions is
in the case of the tenant, who is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between
them.
(b) Ordinarily, therefore, it is enough for
the landlord to prove the existence of the
lease contract, for the presumption to
apply.
(c) Note that the law refers to a lessee or
bailee (such as a depository).
(d) The presumption has also been applied
to a donee who had accepted the donation
in due form, as well as to a servant or
agent. (Barlin v. Ramirez, et al., 7 Phil. 41).
When Presumption Does Not Apply
If the alleged tenant does not admit
expressly or implicitly the existence of the
lease contract (such as when the landlord
did not attach or plead in his complaint the
contract of lease), the presumption does
not apply.
ARTICLE 1437
Estoppel Concerning Immovable Property
To apply this Article, one should have been
misled, otherwise there is no estoppel.
Knowledge of the true facts by the stranger
prevents deception, so estoppel cannot
apply. On the part of the party who is to be
in estoppel, should have made a fraudulent
representation or wrongful concealment of
facts known to him.
Fabie, et al. v. City of Manila
10 Phil. 64
FACTS: Prior to his application for title,
Fabie made a plan where he mentioned a
certain “estero” as the boundary of his
property, implying that it was not included
in the estate. Later, he submitted a formal
application, this time including the “estero”
inside the estate. It was proved that the
City of Manila, to whom the application was
submitted, never saw the plan hereinabove
referred to.
Issue: Is Fabie in estoppel?
HELD: No, for the City could not have been
misled, since its officials never saw the plan.
Effect of Consent on the Part of the True
Owner
Acquiescence by the true owner estops him
from asserting any right over the property.
Cementina, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
91 Phil. 922
FACTS: Ireneo and Isabel Cervantes owned
conjugal land, which was sold after Isabel’s
death to Pablo Concepcion by Ireneo, with
his children’s consent. Later the children
claimed part of the property stating that
the sale, insofar as it referred to the portion
inherited by them from their mother,
Isabel, should be considered void because
Ireneo could not validly sell the same.
HELD: The children are estopped from
asserting their rights in view of their
acquiescence to the sale.
ARTICLE 1438
Allowing Someone to Assume Apparent
Ownership of Personal Property
This is estoppel that results from
acceptance of benefits (with knowledge of
the true facts).
Example:
A has a diamond ring. He allowed B to
assume apparent ownership over the ring
so that B might sell the same. Instead, B
pledged the ring with C to obtain a loan.
The money lent was later handed over to A.
Later A attacks the validity of the pledge
claiming that under the law, the pledgee
must be the owner thereof, and since B in
this case acted without authority, the
pledge is invalid. Is A allowed to do this?
ANS.: No, A is not allowed to do this. His
receipt of the sum for which the pledge was
made is an implied ratification of the pledge
and A is, therefore, in estoppel.
When Estoppel Applies Even if There Be No
Benefits
Even if there be NO benefits, estoppel
would also apply if the “agent” was given
apparent authority, and the other party
was misled into giving him credit.
ARTICLE 1439
Persons Bound by Estoppel
Both parties are, however, bound (Andres
v. Pimentel, 21 Phil. 431) such as parties to
a sale. (Borlaza v. Borgonio, GR 3433, July
16, 1951). Successors-in-interest (as well as
privies and grantees) are bound. (19 Am.
Jur. 809). But third parties are not.
Estoppel on the Part of a Minor
A minor possessed of discretion and
cleverness may be bound by his own
contract, even if entered into without
parental authority. (Sia Suan v. Alcantara,
47 O.G. 4561).
Is the Government Bound by Estoppel?
Generally, the Government is not bound by
estoppel, particularly so if there has been
an erroneous application and enforcement
of the law.
Examples:
(a) In People v. Go, et al., L-11368-69, Oct.
30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that the
fact that the clerk of the Supreme Court
served notice upon the appellant that its
brief must be printed and filed with the
Court within 45 days from receipt of notice
does not and cannot confer appellate
jurisdiction upon said Court, where the
appeal was taken BEYOND the period
prescribed by the Rules of Court.
(b) Any error made by a tax official in the
assessment or computation of taxes does
NOT have the effect of relieving the
taxpayer from the full amount of liability as
fixed by law. Errors of tax officers do not
bind the government or prejudice its right
to the taxes or dues collectible by it from
the citizen. Estoppel cannot operate
against a court and it can therefore dismiss
a case anytime it discovers it has no
jurisdiction.
[NOTE: In Nilo, et al. v. Romero, L-15195,
Mar. 29, 1961, it was however held that
where the defendant City was wrongly
represented and its city attorney failed to
file a motion to dismiss based on such
ground, estoppel operates against said
defendant City. The erroneous designation
of the representative when the defendant
City itself is named, is NOT sufficient to set
aside the proceeding had in the case.
Antonio Favis, et al. v. Municipality of
 Sabongan
L-26522, Feb. 27, 1969
ISSUE: Does estoppel apply against a
Municipal Corporation?
HELD: No. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
be applied as against a Municipal
Corporation to validate a contract which it
has no authority to make — otherwise, it
would be enabled to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly.
Applicability to Questions of Fact
The rule on estoppel applies only to
questions of fact, not of law, about the
truth of which the other party is ignorant.
Abines v. BPI
482 SCRA 421 (2006)
Note here that the public policy
considerations behind forum shopping are
superior to that of a party‘s claim of
estoppel.
Estoppel by Record
The doctrine of estoppel by record only
applies as between the same parties or
their privies and cannot be used against
strangers. If in two cases the plaintiffs be
different but the defendants are the same,
the new plaintiffs are neither bound by the
first proceedings, nor may they take
advantage of the same.
[NOTE: If party-litigant submit a case for
decision without objection they cannot
claim, for the fi rst time on appeal, that
they were deprived of the opportunity to
submit additional evidence. They are guilty
of estoppel.
Estoppel Cannot Validate a Void Contract
Prudential Bank v. Panis
GR 50008, Aug. 31, 1987
The doctrine of estoppel may not be
invoked to validate a void contract. As
between parties to a contract, validity
cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is
prohibited by law or is against public policy.
No citizen is competent to barter away
what public policy by law seeks to preserve.
Promissory Estoppel
Medoza v. CA
HELD: The RTC’s ruling is based on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel enunciated
in Ramos v. Central Bank (41 SCRA 565).
This doctrine may arise from the making of
a promise, even though without
consideration, if it was intended that the
promise should be relied upon, and if a
refusal to enforce it would be virtually to
sanction the perpetration of fraud or would
result in other injustice. Reliance by
promissee is generally evidenced by action
or forbearance on his part, and the idea has
been expressed that such action or
forbearance would reasonably have been
expected by the promissor.
With the doctrine serving as an
exception to the general rule that a promise
of future conduct does not constitute
estoppel, certain elements, however, have
to be established so as to be entitled to its
benefit:
(a) a promise reasonably expected to
induce action or forbearance;
(b) such promise did, in fact, induce action
or forbearance; and
(c) the party suffered a detriment as a
result. Clearly, then, the doctrine
presupposes the existence of a promise on
the part of one against whom estoppel is
claimed. The promise must be plain and
unambiguous and suffciently specific so
that the judiciary can understand the
obligations assumed and enforce the
promise according to its terms.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed
to prove that the bank had promised to
approve the plan in exchange for the
submission of the proposal. Because no
such promise was proven, the doctrine
does not apply.

Concept of an “Agency by Estoppel”

Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp.
490 SCRA 204 (2006)
For an “agency by estoppel” to exist, the
following must be established:
1. the principal manifested a representation
of the agent’s authority or knowingly
allowed the agent to assume such
authority; or
2. the third person, in good faith, relied
upon such representation; or
3. relying upon said representation, a third
person has changed his position to his
detriment. An agency by estoppel, which is
similar to the “doctrine of apparent
authority,” requires proof of reliance upon
the representations, and that, in turn,
needs proof that the representations
predated the action taken in reliance.