Disquiet on the western front

In the absence of firm ground rules, and given the disagreements

between India and Pakistan over the International Border and
the Line of Control, border management is driven by ad hocism
August 18, 2016 01:32 am | Updated December 04, 2021 11:00 pm IST

In April this year, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs constituted a Committee to Strengthen Border
Protection (CSBP) with a mandate “to study all types of gaps in fencing and all other vulnerabilities
on >Indo-Pakistan Border and to suggest comprehensive approach to fix these gaps in fencing and
other vulnerabilities on interim and permanent basis”. The committee, which has since made a
number of field trips to various parts of India’s border with Pakistan (from Jammu and Kashmir to
Gujarat), is expected to give its recommendations to the government anytime soon.

The Home Ministry’s decision is timely and laudable. >Recurrent ceasefire violations , increasing
infiltration attempts by Pakistan-based terror groups, and daring attacks by such intruders thereafter
necessitate a close look at the way our western border is manned and managed. The mandate of this
committee, however, falls severely short of addressing key legal, physical, and personnel challenges
that our forces face in guarding these difficult borders.

The India-Pakistan border is a non-uniform one in terms of terrain, threat perception, potential for
terrorist infiltration, illegal activities such as smuggling, humanitarian issues, legal basis of border
management, and the forces that manage the border. From Kashmir to Sir Creek, each segment of the
border has a diverse set of challenges to confront. Given the backdrop of such a panoply of
challenges, the very composition of the CSBP is less than satisfactory: it has no representation from
the two forces that manage India’s border with Pakistan — primarily the Border Security Force
(BSF), and the Indian Army to a lesser extent.

Lacking bilateral legal basis

Since the mandate of the CSBP and the expertise of its members are both severely limited, it is likely
to come up with another set of >‘ad hoc’ solutionsto serious challenges in managing our western
border, unless it is willing to address and appreciate some of the recurrent and long-standing issues.

It is surprising that there is hardly any bilateral treaty/legal basis to guide the management of the
border between India and Pakistan. The India Pakistan Border Ground Rules, 1960-61, which is
‘supposed’ to form the basis of the management of the International Border (IB) between the two
sides, has not been signed by the two governments. More so, India does not officially recognise the
ground rules. The two sides last met in 2005 to frame new rules, but there has been no movement
thereafter. Senior BSF officials in New Delhi say that they have been reminding the Home Ministry
to finalise the same. More curiously, even though the two sides have not yet signed the ground rules,
they have to abide by it in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat since there is practically nothing else to go
by. That, strictly speaking, is an ad hoc arrangement to manage a border that runs into thousands of
kilometres.

There is also confusion when it comes to the IB in the Jammu sector. It is not even considered as a
settled IB (unlike in Punjab, Rajasthan, etc.) by Pakistan. And yet, the two sides do adhere to the
ground rules there even though India maintains their observance is an ad hoc arrangement and
Pakistan claims the border itself is ad hoc. BSF officials in Jammu confirmed to this author during a
recent field trip along India’s Pakistan border that they follow the 1960-61 ground rules. So do
Pakistan Rangers, as an ad hoc arrangement, of course. Officials in Pakistan and India say that they
will continue to follow the 1960-61 rules till new rules are finalised by both sides.
While the border in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat has not had any significant issues due to the non-
finalisation of the 1960-61 ground rules, this poses a serious problem in the Jammu sector, especially
given Pakistan’s non-recognition of the finality of this border and the recurrent ceasefire violations
that happen in the region, like the one a few days ago. Unlike what is generally understood, for
instance, ceasefire violations are often a result of local-level factors, many of which can be avoided if
the two sides have a mutually agreed set of rules to go by.

From the archieve:>India, Pak. agree on truce in harvest season

Karachi v. Shimla Agreements The other major treaty-related confusion is regarding the basis of
border management on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. India has generally argued that
the >Shimla Agreement of 1972(which brought the current LoC into existence) made the Karachi
Agreement of 1949 (which refers to the Ceasefire Line) irrelevant, something Pakistan disagrees
with.

Now comes the twist. When it comes to the management of the LoC, both the Indian and Pakistani
armies do swear by the strictures of the Karachi Agreement. For instance, the Karachi Agreement
stipulates that there should be no new defence construction, such as bunkers, within 500 yards of the
LoC, which is adhered to by both sides — at least theoretically (both sides engage in defence
construction in defiance of this rule, even while paying lipservice to it). When pointed out that the
500-yard stipulation has no validity under the Shimla Agreement, a senior Indian Army officer in
Kashmir responded that they have always followed the stipulations of the Karachi Agreement. This
was confirmed by every officer I met in Kashmir during my recent field trip. Clearly, this then means
that we are going by ad hoc arrangements when it comes to managing the LoC, a line that is rife with
multiple challenges.

The 2003 ceasefire agreement The so-called 2003 Ceasefire Agreement is yet another example of
bilateral ad hocism. India and Pakistan have so far taken no serious steps to formalise the 13-year-old
agreement, the result of a telephone conversation between the two Directors General of Military
Operations in November 2003. Scores of soldiers and civilians have been killed by ceasefire
violations, but that hasn’t forced the two sides to formalise the agreement.

The ceasefire agreement, as it stands today, is not a written document with properly laid-down rules,
norms or principles which would have enabled the two sides to better manage the border and reduce
violence and casualties. Indeed, both serving and retired officers, on both sides, support this. A
senior serving Army officer in the Valley says that the “2003 ceasefire should be formalised and
regularised. It is important to have a written ceasefire agreement for better managing the border with
Pakistan”. Pakistani officials also agree on it; indeed, Islamabad has called upon India more than
once to formalise the 2003 agreement. In October last year, Pakistan’s High Commissioner in India
once again asked New Delhi “to formalise the 2003 (ceasefire) agreement”. New Delhi is yet to
respond to it.

Physical and personnel challenges There are a number of physical challenges to securing the
border, especially the maintenance of the fence which has successfully reduced infiltration and cross-
border crime. The fence has a number of gaps across the States it runs through. While in Kashmir
snowfall plays havoc with it, in Jammu and Punjab torrential rains and overflowing rivers create gaps
in the fence. The fence in Rajasthan’s Thar desert gets seriously impacted by the shifting sand dunes.
Infiltrations take place through these gaps in J&K, and sometimes in Punjab. Then there are the
India-Pakistan smuggling rackets: the fence is hardly an obstacle for them, nor is the presence of the
BSF along the fence. This task clearly reflected in the mandate of the CSBP.

Inadequate personnel and the consequent hardship faced by troops on the ground are the other major
challenge facing the management of India’s western border. During my visit to a BSF post in the
Thar desert on a June afternoon this year, I met a young BSF jawan guarding a post, in 55°C,
watching the Indian fence almost completely covered by shifting sand dunes. “You guys do a great
job. How many hours do you have to be on guard duty every day in this heat?” I asked. “Around 16
hours. But we can’t survive with goodwill alone, sir.”
This despondent response from a BSF jawan in the Thar desert is symbolic of the deep-seated anger
and the sense of anguish that persists among all ranks of the force about the stepmotherly treatment
meted out to them. While the BSF guards most of the Indian border with Pakistan, including taking
bullets in times of ceasefire violations in J&K, they are neither treated on a par with the Army when
it comes to pay and facilities — though as per rules they are supposed to fight alongside the Army
should a war break out — nor are they considered equal to civilian organisations when it comes to
the question of promotions. The sheer lack of boots on the ground, which results in 16-18 hour duty
for the soldiers in such prohibitive conditions, needs to be addressed, as well as the issue of
stagnation within the ranks of the force.

The Home Ministry’s high-level committee should therefore look beyond its narrowly defined
mandate and suggest ways to rectify the ad hoc manner in which we guard our western border. To
believe that “gaps in the fence” is the only challenge there is in managing the borders with Pakistan
is delusional.

Happymon Jacob is an Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament Studies at the

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.