SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, HYDERABAD

SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, PUNE

10 CASE ANALYSIS ON CONTEMPT OF COURT

Submitted by-
ALPESH UPADHYAY
16010324209
DIV- C
IN

April 2021

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF:

Prof. Ganesh Kumar

SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, HYDERABAD

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 CERTIFICATE

The Project entitled is a final report on “10 Case Analysis on Contempt of

Court” submitted to the Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad as part of internal
assessment is based on my original work carried out under the guidance of Mr.
Ganesh Kumar. The research work has not been submitted elsewhere for
award of any degree. The material borrowed from other sources and
incorporated in the thesis has been duly acknowledged. We understand that we
could be held responsible and accountable for plagiarism, if any, detected later
on.

Signature:

ALPESH UPADHYAY

16010324209

Div- C

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible
without the kind support and help of our institution. We would like to extend
our sincere thanks to all of them. We are highly honor-bound to Mr. Ganesh
Kumar guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing necessary
information regarding the project and also for his support in completing the
project.

We would like to express our gratitude towards our parents and members of
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad for their kind co-operation and
encouragement which helped me in completion of this project.

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 CIVIL CONTEMPT CASE ANALYSIS

CASE I

PALLAV SETH v. CUSTODIAN & ORS. (2001) 7 SCC 549

FACTS OF THE CASE

M/s Fair growth Financial Services Limited was notified on 2nd July, 1992 under the
provisions of the Special Court Act. These appeals by special leave are against the judgment
of the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to
Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Special Court Act')
whereby the Appellant has been held to have committed civil contempt as defined under
Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of one month and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.

On 11th November, 1997 the Income Tax Department conducted raids on Pallav Seth. The
newspaper reports indicated detection of assets belonging to Pallav Seth by the Income Tax
Department whereupon the Special Court directed the Custodian to ascertain from the Income
Tax Department complete details of all the assets of Pallav Seth. In response to a letter
written by the Custodian, the Commissioner of Income Tax vide its letter of 5th May, 1998
informed that during the search operations, the Income Tax Department detected that Pallav
Sheth was the de facto owner of five companies, namely, Anzug Plastics (P) Ltd., Magan
Hotels (P) Limited, Klar Chemicals (P) Limited, Malika Foods (P) Limited and Jainam
Securities (P) Limited. Pallav Seth is further reported to have admitted in the statement
before the Income Tax Department by him and his wife that several cash deposits amounting
to Rs. 2.81 crores made in the bank accounts of the aforesaid five companies were his
undisclosed income. According to the Commissioner of Income Tax, the assets of these five
companies belong to Pallav Seth and these companies were to receive substantial amounts
from other companies/individuals.

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The Custodian then on 18th June, 1998 filed Misc. Application No. 276 of 1998 before the
Special Court with a prayer that Pallav Sheth should be punished for committing contempt of
the Special Court's order dated 24th August, 1994 as despite the said order he had set up
benami companies and had transferred and/or alienated his property including cash inter alia
with a view to defeat the decree passed against him. Though Pallav Seth in his reply denied
that the said five companies were his benami companies the Special Court directed issuance
of the show case notice to punish Pallav Seth for contempt. It appears that Pallav Seth filed
an affidavit on 23rd July, 1999 to the effect that various statements made by him before the
Income Tax Authorities were made without his understanding the full implications since he
had been under the influence of strong medication. Affidavits were also filed by the aforesaid
five companies in support of the stand of Pallav Seth. It may be noticed that by an order dated
29th October, 1999 the Special Court allowed amendment of the Miscellaneous Application
No. 276 of 1998 permitting substitution of reference to the order dated 24 th August, 1994 with
order dated 3rd August, 1994. Ultimately by an order dated 31 st January, 2001 the Special
Court passed an order holding Pallav Seth to be guilty of Contempt of Court and sentenced
him to one-month simple imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. By a separate
order dated 7th February, 2001, the special Court dealt with the contention that its action was
not barred by limitation as contemplated by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act on the
ground that this was a case of continuing wrong.

ISSUES INVOLVED

1) Whether order passed by the Special Court amounted to initiation of proceedings for
contempt?
2) Whether the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable on the cases of civil
contempt?

RULES

Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: “civil contempt” means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or
wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Limitation for actions for contempt—No
court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after

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 the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have
been committed.

Section 23 in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Power of Supreme Court and High
Courts to make rules. —The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court, may
make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, providing for any matter
relating to its procedure.

Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Effect of fraud or mistake- Where, in the case of
any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the
knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the
fraud of any such person as aforesaid.

STARE DECISIS

Is the court silent on any issues?

The court was not silent on any of the above-mentioned issues.

What amounts to contempt of court?

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 was the first piece of legislation which was enacted with a
view to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing for Contempt. This Act
was enacted with a view to remove doubts about the powers of the High Court to punish for
contempt and the doubts whether the High Court cold punish for Contempt of Court
subordinate to it were removed by Section 2 of the said Act.

Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the
Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in
each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the
Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a
party filing an application. Therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must
be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing
notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged
to have been committed.

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Principle laid by the court

The Rules so framed by all the Courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated inter
alia with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. If, however, proceedings are
not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed then the Court shall not have jurisdiction to
punish for contempt. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of
an application, in the case of civil contempt like the present before the Court within the
period of limitation then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the Court
exercising its jurisdiction.

Obiter dicta

One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and
not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on
Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the
party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of
the Court a contemner cannot be made to suffer.

Ratio decidendi

The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The
fraud perpetuated by the Appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving
information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5th May, 1998. On
becoming aware of the fraud application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on
18th June, 1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this
application that the Special Court by its order of 9th April, 1999 directed the application to be
treated as a show cause notice to the Appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the
above stated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act it follows that the action taken by the Special Court
to punish the Appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being
unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the
circumstances to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or
contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was nor barred by Section 20.

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Is the decision per incuriam?

No, the decision is not per incuriam. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered all the
issues and elaborated on the all the arguments put forth to them. Through various judgments
and precedents, the court has made the observations on the interpretation of S. 20
applicability of the civil contempt and the limitation act.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The applicability of the Limitation Act to Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 came up for
consideration in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kartick Chandra Das and Others 1. In
that case against a notice of contempt which had been issued by the Single Judge a Letters
Patent Appeal were filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act which was
dismissed on the ground that the delay was not condonable as Section 5 of the Limitation Act
did not apply.

Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the case of any suit or
application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the
right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the
defendant or his agent (Section 17(1)(b)) or where any document necessary to establish the
right of the Plaintiff or Applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him (Section 17(1)
(d)), the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the Plaintiff or Applicant has
discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or
in the case of a concealed document, until the Plaintiff or the Applicant first had the means of
producing the concealed document or compelling its production. These provisions embody
fundamental principles of justice and equity, viz, that a party should not be penalised for
failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so have
been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should not
gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud.

The record discloses that the Custodian received information of the Appellant having
committed contempt by taking over benami concerns transferring funds to these concerns and
operating their accounts clandestinely only from a letter dated 5th May,1998 from the Income
Tax Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18th June, 1998 a petition was filed for

1
AIR 1978 SC 1587

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indicating action in contempt and notice of issue by Special Court on 9th April, 1999. Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides where any special or local law prescribes for any
suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed
by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for
any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law. This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra
Das and Others2 has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation
Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
stand attracted. Therefore, the provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in
the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the Appellant was unearthed only on the
Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5th
May, 1998. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the
sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances to examine the finding of
the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for
contempt was nor barred by Section 20.

For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals were dismissed and the impugned judgment of the
Special Court was affirmed.

CASE II- HUKUM CHAND DESWAL V. SATISH RAJ DESWAL

CIVIL PETITION NO. 591/2019

In Special Leave Petition No. 5350/2019

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner had filed the suit for permanent injunction, possession and for recovery of rent
and damages/mesne profits till the recovery of possession in respect of the property against
the respondent.

2
Ibid.

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The suit was also filed by the respondent in the High Court against the petitioners seeking
permanent injunction restraining them from infringing the trademark acquired by the
respondent.

The suit between the parties were disposed of on the basis of the settlement arrived between
the parties. The respondent had agreed to vacate the suit property on or before the expiry of
term of two years and handover peaceful and vacant possession to the petitioner. Though the
respondent was permitted to take away civil structures and movable fixtures installed by it in
the suit property. Furthermore, the parties also agreed for revised monthly rent and the
respondent to pay the outstanding dues in terms of the said agreement. Moreover, the
agreement also prohibited the petitioners from using the trademark in any manner. The
agreement had also allowed the parties to take legal recourse before the competent
Court/authority for legal remedy in case of breach of this agreement.

Before the expiration of the term to vacate the suit premises, respondent filed a contempt case
against the petitioner, alleging wilful violation and disobedience of the settlement terms by
illegally using the trademarked word “SPLASH” and continued infringement of the
trademark of the respondent. The petition was disposed of and liberty was given to the
respondent to take recourse to execution proceedings.

The respondent then filed an application stating that the settlement agreement has been
frustrated by the petitioner by continued use of the trademark of the respondent. The parties
arrived at a second agreement whereunder the petitioner herein undertook to abstain from
using the word “SPLASH” or any deceptively similar word, either as a part of the trademark,
trade name/corporate name or with a prefix or suffix in any manner whatsoever and the use of
the word “SPLASH” by the petitioner would be completely stopped. The respondent also
agreed that it would handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property and shall
not cause any damage to the constructed area while vacating the property.

The respondent then filed another application before the High Court seeking intervention of
the Court in implementing the Settlement Agreement in an equitable manner, as the
respondent was suffering losses because of the wilful disobedience and violation of the
Settlement Agreement by the petitioner herein, by continuing to use the trademark
“SPLASH” and also because the respondent was required to pay enhanced monthly rent as
per the revised agreement. The respondent, therefore, prayed for an extension in the time
given to it to vacate the suit premises. The application was rejected on the ground that no

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ground was made out for extending time to handover possession as prayed for. Therefore, an
appeal was filed before the High Court. In the appeal, it was expressly stated that the
respondent was suffering losses not only because of the continued violation of the
conditions/terms specified in the Settlement Agreement in the form of infringement of the
trademark of the respondent, but also because the respondent is required to pay enhanced rent
to the petitioner as per the agreement/settlement. The appeal was rejected on the ground that
Suits were disposed of in terms of the settlement entered between the parties. If there is a
violation of the settlement/decree, it is for the appellant to seek execution of the decree or any
other relief as permissible in law rather than seeking a benefit of further time on the premise
that the respondent has violated the terms of agreement.

Aggrieved respondent then filed a Special Leave Petition wherein request made by the
petitioner to grant four weeks’ time to vacate the suit premises was allowed subject to the
condition that the respondent shall pay all the outstanding dues/arrears and shall file an
undertaking before the hon’ble Supreme Court within two weeks.

This contempt petition filed by the petitioner is a threefold:

 the respondent failed to file undertaking despite direction to do so within two weeks.
 the respondent failed to pay the outstanding dues to the petitioner
 while vacating the suit premises, the respondent caused damage to the suit property.

The petitioner also contends that these acts of commission and omission of the respondent
was intentional and in wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court resulting in the
contempt of court.

ISSUES RAISED:

1. Whether the petitioner is liable to pay any amount to the respondent for the continued
infringement of the trademark “SPLASH”?
2. Whether the respondent has wilfully and intentionally caused the disobedience of the
order resulting in the contempt?

IS THE COURT SILENT ON ANY ISSUE?

No, the court is not silent on any issue.

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE LAID BY THE COURT?

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The principle laid by the court was that: The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and
therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt.

IS THERE ANY OBITER DICTA?

The court opined that: “Wilful” means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and
deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual,
accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts do not encompass
involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a “bad purpose or without
justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely”. Wilful act is to be distinguished
from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include
any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he
knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated
action with evil motive on his part.

WHAT IS THE RATIO DECIDENDI IN THE CASE?

The major reason behind the decision of the hon’ble court is that the present contempt
petition is based on the decision rendered in the Special Leave Petition and therefore, the
court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not
been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the
applicant. Therefore, the court decided to not analyse the question of payment of dues or the
question of payment to be made by the petitioner to the respondent.

IS IT A DECISION PER INCURIAM?

No, this is not a decision per incuriam as the Hon’ble court has very well relied upon the
judgements of the previous case and has upheld the same. On the basis of the case of
Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., the court had decided that
while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the court is not entitled to enter into questions which
have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged
by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and
not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained.
Therefore, while deciding the question of non-payment of dues, the court had asked the
parties to file an application before the executing court explaining this court’s lack of
jurisdiction to decide this question in a contempt proceeding.

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 DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The hon’ble court transferred the monetary issue of the respondent to the executing court to
pass appropriate orders after considering the claims of the parties. The court also arrived at an
arrangement by permitting the respondent to withdraw the excess amount upon filing an
undertaking to meet the interests of both the parties. Further, for the violation of the order
leading to the contempt proceedings, the hon’ble has decided the issue in the threefold:

 Not filing undertaking within two weeks: the court observed that the undertaking was
required to be filed “if” the respondent wanted to avail of the time granted by this
Court. The respondent vacated the suit property before the time specified in the order
of which contempt has been alleged. Hence, non-filing of undertaking does not take
the matter any further.
 Non-payment of outstanding dues: relying upon the judgment given in the case of
Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., this hon’ble court left
this open to the parties to pursue their claim(s) in execution proceedings or any other
proceedings, as may be permissible in law in respect of the issue(s) under
consideration.
 damage caused to the suit property by the respondent: the court held that it can be
safely assumed that no damage was caused by the respondent to the structure in
question. Minor repairs required to be carried out by the petitioner for making the
water park functional cannot be painted as intentional disobedience of the order of
this Court.

CASE III- RAM KISHAN VS TARUN BAJAJ & ORS

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 336 of 2013

Hon’ble Bench: B.S. Chauhan, J. Chelameswar

BACKGROUND
This Contempt Petition has been filed by the applicant that the respondents, who are alleged
contemnors herein, have wilfully violated the judgment and order dated 5.7.2012 passed by
this Court in C.A. No. 4985 of 2012 as the respondents failed to pay all consequential
benefits of service as directed and thus, the respondents should be dealt with under the

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provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) and further,
to direct the contemnors to implement the order in its true spirit and fix his pension according
to the post of Joint Secretary (Legal) and provide all its retirement benefits.

FACTS
1. Applicant while working as an Under Secretary (Legal), Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran
Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as `Nigam’) was compulsorily retired vide an
order dated 19.11.2003.
2. Aggrieved, he challenged the said order by filing Writ Petition No. 3954 of 2004 and
during its pendency, he reached the age of superannuation on 28.2.2006.
3. The said writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and
order dated 10.2.2009 quashing the impugned order dated 19.11.2003 but did not
award the back wages to the applicant for the period he was out of job.
4. The Nigam filed LPA No. 646 of 2009 challenging the order of the learned Single
Judge. The applicant also filed LPA No. 542 of 2009 for claiming the arrears of pay.
The LPA of Nigam was dismissed affirming the judgment and order of the Single
Judge vide judgment and order dated 24.7.2009 and has attained finality.
5. The appeal filed by the applicant was also dismissed vide judgment and order dated
10.8.2009.
6. Aggrieved, the applicant challenged the judgment and order dated 10.8.2009 of the
Division Bench by filing the Special Leave Petition which was entertained as C.A.
No. 4985 of 2012, which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated
5.7.2012 directing that the applicant shall be entitled to the back wages for the period
during which he was out of job along with reinstatement.
7. The applicant has not been given the benefit of re-designated pay/post and the pay-
scale of a higher post wherein after the compulsory retirement of the applicant, one
Smt. Pooman Bhasin had been appointed w.e.f. 16.3.2005 and has been extended the
benefit which has been allegedly denied to the applicant. Hence, this Contempt
Petition.

ISSUE
The only issue that has been brought forward by the Court is whether Contempt of
Proceedings can be initiated against the Respondents?

RULES

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 1. Contempt of Court Act, 1971

STARE DECISIS
a. The Court is not silent on any issue because there is only one issue in this case, that is
whether the Respondents can be held for contempt of Court?
b. The Principle laid down by the Court is as follows - Contempt jurisdiction conferred
onto the law courts power to punish an offender for his wilful
disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the
reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest
guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire
democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is
undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the
hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless,
thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither fair nor reasonable
for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act.
c. The obiter dicta in this case is as follows - In order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is ‘wilful’. The word ‘wilful’ introduces a
mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of person/contemnor by
gauging his actions, which is an indication of one’s state of mind. The Court states
that the intention has to be established and it is very important to establish that the
intention was wilfully malafide in nature. This can be stated as the obiter dicta.
d. The Ratio Decidendi means the reasoning given by the Court for arriving at a
particular decision. In this case, Ratio decidendi is that there has to exist a calculated
action with evil motive on the part of the alleged contemnor. Mere disobedience
cannot be stated to be contempt. Sometimes, disobedience can also be caused by
compelling circumstances.
In this case, it was highlighted that It is well settled principle of law that if two
interpretations are possible, and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt
proceeding would not be maintainable.

DECISION OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT AND ANALYSIS

In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated that the Respondents cannot be held for
contempt of Court. It is well settled principle of law that if two interpretations are possible,
and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be maintainable. The

15
effect and purport of the order is to be taken into consideration and the same must be read in
its entirety. Therefore, the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring
home the charge within the meaning of the Act.

ANALYSIS
For an alleged contemnor to be held liable of the Contempt of Court it is important to
establish that there was wilful act. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done
negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he
is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil
motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the
result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor
to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished.

The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within
the meaning of the Act.

In this case, the learned counsel for the applicant could not point out the service rules
applicable to the applicant to assess his eligibility. And therefore, the Supreme Court rightly
dismissed this petition, however no costs were imposed on the Petitioner.

It is therefore, important to understand that in case of Contempt of Court, wilfulness has to be

established and the mere act or omission cannot suggest contempt of Court and the Court is
required to examine the situations.

CASE IV- DINESH KUMAR GUPTA VS UNITED INDIA INSURANCE

CO. LTD.

Civil Appeal No: 8839 of 2010

Bench: J.M. Panchal, Gyan Sudha Misra

Before: Supreme Court of India

a. Brief Facts:

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1. This appeal by special leave has been filed against an interim order dated 08.12.2006
passed by the Jaipur Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 1072 of 2001 whereby the learned single Judge initiated suo moto contempt
proceeding against the appellant and directed issuance of notice to him after which a
separate Contempt Petition was ordered to be registered against him. This initiation
apparently was based on the assumption and impression gathered by the learned
single Judge to the effect that the appellant had obstructed the course of
administration of justice by ensuring that the interim order of stay dated 22.03.2001
passed by the learned single Judge against implementation of the award of
compensation as also direction to the Registrar General (Vigilance) to initiate inquiry
against the then Judge of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur, be not
implemented. The learned Judge further inferred that this was an attempt on the part
of the appellant herein to shield the Judge of the MACT from facing the vigilance
inquiry and hence contempt proceeding has been initiated against the appellant.
2. As the appellant was not a party in the writ petition in the High Court in which
contempt proceeding has been initiated, he sought leave of this Court to file Special
Leave Petition which was granted and an order of stay against initiation of contempt
proceeding was also passed by this Court on 19.01.2007.
3. The matter thereafter was heard finally at the admission stage itself with consent of
the counsel for the parties. At the outset, the appellant assailed the impugned order on
the plea that he had joined as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in the Jaipur Bench of the
High Court of Rajasthan only on 05.01.2005 and the order which is alleged to have
been not implemented at the instance of the appellant, is dated 22.03.2001 from which
it is clearly established that the initiation of contempt proceeding alleging non-
implementation of the order dated 22.03.2001 on the face of it, was not justified at all
since the communication by him to the Registrar (Vigilance) for ascertaining the
number of the case as also the date of the order sheet - a copy of which was to be sent
to the Registrar (Vigilance), was the normal requirement without which the order
sheet could not have been sent and hence the same would not amount to contempt of
Court.
4. In response to the aforesaid letter dated 09.05.2005, the appellant traced out the
number of the concerned writ petition and informed the Registrar General
(Vigilance) vide his response letter dated 18.05.2005 that the matter was pending

17
 consideration and as and when it is disposed of, the copy of the judgment would
be sent. Six months thereafter, the Registrar General (Vigilance) again wrote a
letter on 13.12.2005 that the desired judgment be sent positively within 20 days of
the receipt of the letter but he again failed to indicate the number of the case in
which the judgment was required by him. However, the appellant this time
responded to the same by writing to the Registrar (Vigilance) vide letter dated
22.12.2005, that the writ petition entitled United India Insurance Company Ltd.
Vs. MACT, Jaipur City, Jaipur and Ors. had been admitted in which notice had
been issued and recovery of the amount passed by the Award of the MACT had
been stayed by the High Court vide order dated 22.03.2001 but the case was still
pending in the category of incomplete service matters because the notice upon the
respondent Nos. 2 to 8 was not served and the next date fixed by the Hon'ble Court
was 20.02.2006.
5. In the meantime, the claimant Smt. Kaushalya Devi had also filed an application
for vacating the order of stay passed by the High Court in the concerned writ
petition i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2001 which came up for hearing
before the learned single Judge on 16.10.2006. The learned single Judge on this
date ordered that as the Presiding Officer Shri S.K. Bansal had retired and was no
more in service, the order of the Court dated 22.03.2001 directing to conduct the
enquiry by the Registrar General (Vigilance) against the then Judge of the MACT,
Jaipur be treated as closed and no further action need be taken. It was also ordered
that this be brought to the notice of the Deputy Registrar (Judicial).
6. The above matter went to SC for appeal
b. Issues:

1. Whether the learned single Judge of the High Court was justified in initiating suo
moto contempt proceeding against the appellant judicial officer in absence of even
prima facie material to the effect that there was at all a case of disobedience to the
order of the High Court - much less wilful disobedience.
2. Whether issuance of notice to initiate contempt proceeding would be justified merely
on assumption, speculation and inference drawn from facts without existence of a
clear case of wilful disobedience to the order of the High Court so as to treat it as a
case of contempt of Court of civil nature.

18
c. Rules:

Section 2(b) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - “civil contempt” means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or
wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

d. Stare Decisis:

i. Is the court silent on any issue?

No, the court wasn’t silent on any issue.

ii. What is the principle laid by the court?

The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that to satisfy the test that it is a wilful
disobedience to the order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a
proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged to have been disobeyed itself
provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order or circumstance which is
the factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party
although acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith without
any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so
as to give rise to a contempt proceeding.

iii. Are there any Obiter dicta?

No, there is no Obiter dicta.

iv. What is the ratio decidendi in the case?

The ratio behind the judgement is that mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold
anyone guilty of contempt and although, disobedience might have been established, absence
of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the
contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional
disobedience is not sufficient to justify one for holding guilty of contempt. It is further
relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of contempt that casual or accidental or
unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestion of
contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the contemnor
liable to punishment.

19
 v. Is it a decision per incuriam?

No, it is not a decision per incuriam.

vi. Decision of the Supreme Court:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while disposing the case of the view that the learned single
Judge inferred and assumed erroneously that the appellant had the intention to obstruct the
administration of justice by being instrumental in ensuring that the interim order passed in
2001 may not be implemented oblivious of the fact that the appellant was posted in the
registry of the High Court only four years later in 2005 and hence non-implementation of the
interim order of stay cannot be attributed to the appellant to shield the Judge of the MACT,
Jaipur who had retired way back in the year 2003 against whom the enquiry was ordered to
be closed by the learned Single Judge himself. Thus, initiation of the contempt proceeding
against the petitioner by the learned single Judge is based on a wholly wrong premise based
on unsustainable and unfounded facts which cannot be treated sufficient material so as to
initiate contempt proceeding in spite of absence of any degree of fault or misconduct or even
unintentional disobedience to the order for the reasons assigned hereinbefore. Hence, SC set
aside the impugned order dated 08.12.2006 passed by the learned single Judge by which the
proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated by registering a regular contempt
proceeding against the appellant and the same shall be treated as dropped. Consequently, the
appeal is allowed directing the parties to bear their cost.

CASE V. MOHD. ASLAM OBHURE v. UNION OF INDIA & STATE OF

UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
Citation: AIR 1995 SC 548
Decided On: October 24, 1994
Bench: M.N Venkatachaliah, CJ, G.N. Ray
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

a) The contempt petition was filed against the then chief minister of Shri Kalyan Singh
for acting against the orders of the court. The proceeding against disobedience to
judicial pronouncement led to huge destruction as many people lost their lives and the
property was also damaged.

20
 b) The contempt proceeding was in regard to the construction which took place in the
month of July 1992 in relation to an extent of 2.77 acres of land in Ayodhya which
was acquired by the State Government pursuant to a notification dated 7- 10-1991,
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land was acquired for the
purpose of developing it as an amenity for pilgrims at Ayodhya. The land acquisition
challenged both before the High Court and Supreme Court. In those proceedings,
three interlocutory orders came to be made – two by the High Court and one by the
Supreme Court. Following which the CM passed certain statements on whose basis
the resolution of National Integration Council was passed which states:
“All efforts will be made to find an amicable resolution of the issue;
 Pending a final solution, the Government of Uttar Pradesh will hold itself fully
responsible for the protection of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid
structures;
 Orders of the Court in regard to the land acquisition proceedings will be fully
implemented; and
 The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the cases pending before it will
not be violated.”
c) Despite all this, petitions filed alleging demolitions of certain structures in violation of
the interdiction contained in the order of the Court. Further, certain affidavits filed
pointing out that large-scale construction of work of a permanent nature was carried
out on the land in utter disregard of the orders of this Court.

ISSUES RAISED:

1. Whether the undertaking is given by the Chief Minister before the National
Integration Council which was in terms recapitulated and incorporated in the order
dated 15-11-1991 of this Court could be said to be an undertaking given by the Chief
Minister personally or was merely an undertaking on behalf of the U.P. Government?
2. Whether there was any construction of a permanent nature carried on the land in
willful disobedience of the orders of the Court?
3. Whether these constructional activities were carried on by or at the instance of the
State Government or its authorities or were done in connivance with and assistance
and encouragement of the State Government; or where they carried out in spite of all
reasonable steps taken in that regard by the State Government and the Chief Minister
to prevent the same? and

21
 4. Whether the State Government and the Chief Minister were not liable for contempt
for any alleged willful disobedience of the orders of this Court?

RULES APPLICABLE

 Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950- Remedies for enforcement of rights

conferred by this Part.
 Section 4, Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Publication of preliminary notification and
powers of officers thereupon.

CONTEMPT OF COURT IN THIS CASE

The essence of the case revolves around willful disobedience of order of Court in the Babri
Masjid Case, wherein an undertaking was given by the Chief Minister of the State, both in his
personal capacity and on behalf of his government. The Court observed a flagrant breach of
the undertaking, wherein personal element depicted the act of disobedience of order of
Courts, whereby the Chief Minister of the State was convicted of contempt of courts.

ANALYSIS:

STATE DECISIS:

a. The Apex Court relied on Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock v.
John Aaron3, where the US Supreme Court held that the use of force to further
obedience to law is in any event a last resort and one not congenial to the spirit of our
Nation. ... Violent resistance to law cannot be made a legal reason for its suspension
without loosening the fabric of our society. What could this mean but to acknowledge
that disorder under the aegis of a State has moral superiority over the law of the
Constitution? The historic phrase 'a Government of laws and not of men' epitomizes
the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase
into the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical
flourish. He was expressing the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration
of Independence and founded the Republic.

3
Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock v. John Aaron, 358 US 1 (3 L.Ed.2d 19).

22
 b. The Supreme Court of United States further held that compliance with decisions of
this Court, as the constitutional organ of the supreme law of the land, has often,
throughout our history, depended on active support by State and local authorities. It
presupposes such support. To withhold it, and indeed to use political power to try to
paralyze the supreme law, precludes the maintenance of our federal system as we
have known and cherished it for one hundred and seventy years.
c. Further, reliance was placed on House of Lords in M. v. Home Office4, wherein the
principle that “crown can do no wrong” was reiterated by the Courts, and held that
parliamentary supremacy over the Crown as monarch stems from the fact that the
monarch must accept the advice of a Prime Minister who is supported by a majority
of Parliament. Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown as executive stems from the
fact that Parliament maintains in office the Prime Minister who appoints the ministers
in charge of the executive. Parliamentary supremacy over the judiciary is only
exercisable by statute. The judiciary enforce the law against individuals, against
institutions and against the executive. The judges cannot enforce the law against the
Crown as monarch because the Crown as monarch can do no wrong but judges
enforce the law against the Crown as executive and against the individuals who from
time to time represent the Crown. A litigant complaining of a breach of the law by the
executive can sue the Crown as executive bringing his action against the minister who
is responsible for the department of State involved, in the present case the Secretary
of State for Home Affairs.
d. Lastly, the Court placed reliance on the case of State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati
Kumari5 and Tarafatullah Mandal v. S.N. Maitra6, where it was held that writ for
contempt may not be asked for against a corporation itself, or against a Government.

DECISION OF THE COURT

a. The Court held that the Government failed to take steps to prevent the grossest
violation of the order of this Court and the respondent was held liable in both his
personal capacity and on behalf of his Government for contempt of court. The court
sentenced him for the imprisonment of one day and to pay a fine of Rs 2000.
b. An expert committee was formed to investigate the matter. The Expert Committee
headed by Shri S. Rai, Registrar General, and consisting of members Professor K.K.
4
House of Lords in M. v. Home Office (1992) 3 All ER 97.
5
State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, (1961) AIR 221.
6
Tarafatullah Mandal v. S.N. Maitra, (1952) AIR Cal 919.

23
 Nayar, IIT Delhi, and Professor Arvind Krishan, School of Planning and Architecture,
New Delhi.
c. In the committee report, the nature of construction was determined. The report stated
that the construction work involved tonnes of cement and concrete deployed with the
help of constructional machinery. Also, the photographs produced by the complainant
justified an inference that the large workforce at the site does not consist of mere
Sadhus but the inference that professional workmen had been deployed at the site.
d. The report further included that the government took no reasonable measures to
prevent the inflow of constructional material and not attempted to prevent the work.
The reasonable presumption taken that the Government itself was not too anxious to
prevent construction and not merely positive acts of violation but also the indirect aids
to violation of the orders are equally impermissible. If reasonable steps are not taken
to prevent the violation of the orders of the Court, the Government cannot be heard to
say that violation of the orders was at the instance of others.
e. In order to determine liability by referring the authorities court reached at a point that
A Minister or Officer of Government is also either in his official capacity or if there is
a personal element contributing to contempt, in his personal capacity, liable in
contempt.

CRIMINAL CASES

CASE I- DR. SUBRAMANIUM SWAMY v. ARUN SHORIE

Citation: AIR 2014 SC 1019

Bench: Chief Justice, Anil R. Dave, Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra,
Shiva Kirti Singh JJ

Forum: Supreme Court of India

Brief facts of the case

In the issue of Indian Express of August 13, 1990, an editorial was published bearing the
caption “If shame had survived”. It so happened that Justice Kuldip Singh, the then sitting

24
Judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed as Chairman, Commission of Inquiry under
the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1952 Act’) to probe into
alleged acts of omissions and commissions by Shri Ramakrishna Hegde, the former Chief
Minister of Karnataka. The one-man Commission headed by Justice Kuldip Singh submitted
its report on 22.06.1990.

It is pertinent to notice here that the then Chief Justice of India obtained opinion of the
Attorney General for India in the matter. The then Attorney General Shri Soli Sorabjee in his
opinion dated 27.08.1990 noted that the editorial had, prima facie, overstepped the limits of
permissible criticism and the law of contempt, as was existing in the country, did not provide
for truth as defense and, therefore, he opined that an explanation was called for and a notice
could be issued for that purpose. In his view, the question whether the contempt of a
Commission or Commissioner appointed under the 1952 Act tantamount to contempt of the
High Court or Supreme Court of which the Commissioner is member needs to be
authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in view of the reoccurrence of the issue.

On 03.09.1990, the suo motu contempt matter and so also the contempt petition filed by Dr.
Subramanian Swamy came up for consideration before the three Judge Bench of this Court
headed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice.

The proceeding of 03.09.1990 reads as under:

“In Re: Arun Shourie and Anr.

We have seen the editorial in the “Indian Express” of August 13, 1990. We have obtained the
opinion of the Attorney General of India in the matter. We consider that paragraphs 2 and 3
of the editorials tend to fall within the definition of ‘criminal contempt’ in Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. We, therefore, direct that notice returnable on 8th October,
1990 be issued to the alleged contemners calling upon them to show cause why proceedings
for contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution should not be initiated
against them in respect of the offending editorial published by them. The contemners shall be
present in the Court in person on 8th October, 1990. A copy of the opinion given by the
Attorney General in the matter should accompany the notice to be issued to the contemners.
They may file their affidavits in support of their defence on or before 8th October, 1990.

Issue notice to the Attorney General of India to appear and assist the Court in hearing the
matter.”

25
Respondent Arun Shourie submitted his reply affidavit on 13.10.1990. We shall refer to his
defence and objections at an appropriate place little later. Suffice, however, to note at this
stage that in the counter affidavit, the respondent prayed that, in view of the sensitive nature
of the facts, he would choose to refrain from setting out those facts in the affidavit but would
prefer to put them in the form of a signed statement in a sealed cover for the perusal of the
Court which may be treated as an integral part of the counter affidavit. The Court, however,
on 04.03.1991 rejected his prayer and observed that the procedure suggested by the
respondent was not an acceptable procedure and was inconsistent with recognized form of the
pleadings. The respondent was granted liberty to withdraw the sealed cover from the Court.
He was given an opportunity to file additional affidavit.

The matters remained dormant for many years. A three Judge Bench directed that these
matters be placed before a Constitution Bench.

Issues before the Court

The following issues were raised by the court

1. When a sitting Supreme Court Judge is appointed as a Commissioner by the Central

Government under the 1952 Act, does he carry with him all the powers and
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? In other words, whether the functions which are
discharged by the Supreme Court Judge as a Commissioner are purely statutory
functions independent of the jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court?
2. Whether truth can be pleaded as defence in contempt proceedings?

Criminal Contempt in this case

In this case, the criminal contempt that was alleged against the respondents was that by
writing that editorial has committed criminal contempt by insulting a sitting judge of the
Supreme Court.

Stare Decisis

 Here the curt relied upon the judgment of the full Bench of Madras High Court In Re :
Mr. Hayles, Editor of “The Mail” and Anr. That was a case where a sitting Judge of
the Madras High Court was appointed as a member of the Industrial Tribunal
under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The alleged contempt with which the

26
 contemnors were charged with contempt were both in relation to the proceedings for
the Industrial Tribunal, though the Industrial Tribunal was presided over by the sitting
Judge of the Madras High Court.
 The disputes between workers and managements of Amalgamations Limited which
owned the newspaper “The Mail” fell for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal.
The contempt notice was issued by the Tribunal to the counsel for the Editor Govind
Swaminathan and the Editor Hayles to show cause as to why action for contempt may
not be initiated for criticism of the Tribunal.
 The respondent challenged the show cause notice on the ground that the Tribunal,
though headed by a sitting Judge, did not have power to punish for contempt. While
dealing with the above challenge, the full Bench of the Madras High Court held that a
Judge of the High Court when appointed as sole member of the Industrial Tribunal,
did not have the powers of a Judge of that High Court to punish persons for contempt
of the Tribunal even under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
 “A Commission of Inquiry is not a court properly so called. A Commission is
obviously appointed by the appropriate government ‘for the information of its mind’
in order for it to decide as to the course of action to be followed. It is therefore a fact-
finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has
no adjudicatory functions. The government is not bound to accept its
recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted
by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart
to it the status of a court.”
 The term “court” has not been defined in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Its
definition in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not exhaustive and is intended only for
purposes of the Act. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 however, does contemplate a
“court of Justice” which as defined in Section 20, Penal Code, 1860 denotes “a Judge
who is empowered by law to act judicially”. The word “Judge” is defined in Section
19 as denoting every person— ‘Who is empowered by law to give, in any legal
proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not
appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some
other authority, would be definitive....’ The minimum test of a “court of justice”, in
the above definition, is, therefore, the legal power to give a judgment which, if
confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive.

27
  The Commission constituted under the 1952 Act is a fact finding body to enable the
appropriate Government to decide as to the course of action to be followed. Such
Commission is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no
adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations
or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by the Commission
is of a legal character and it has the power to administer oath will not clothe it with
the status of Court.
 Therefore, the court sided firmly on the side of the respondents and held that there
was no criminal contempt committed when the editorial piece was written.

Decision of the Court

In the end it was held by the court that there was no criminal contempt which has taken place
by the author of the article in the newspaper since the piece was written in the context of an
enquiry commission and the mere fact that the commission is headed by a sitting judge of the
Supreme Court does not mean that falls within the term ‘court’ under Contempt Law.

CASE II- RADHA MOHAN LAL V. RAJASTHAN HIGH

COURT [(2003) 3 SCC 427]

Deciding Court: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Name of the Parties: Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court
Coram: Hon’ble Y. K. Sabharwal and H.K. Sema, JJ.
Author: Y. K. Sabharwal, J.
Date of Judgement: February 11, 2003.

Brief Facts of The Case

The facts of the instant case emanate from the following circumstances: -

 In this particular case, the appellant advocate and other petitioners filed a complaint
against the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Rajasthan, Shri R. S. Kejriwal. Through this

28
 complaint, the Appellant also requested for a Bench where Hon’ble Shri R.S.
Kejriwal is not a member due to the lack of faith and the need for impartial judgment.

 The case stems from a civil suit which had been filed by the Appellant Advocate and
four others in a representative capacity. A civil suit was originally filed regarding
access to the temple. The interim order which was granted in favour of the appellant
was criticised in the following revision petition. Observations made by the Learned
Judge led to request by about 50 senior citizens for the petition to be presented before
a different Judge. This eventually led to the initiation of contempt petition
proceedings against the Appellant.

 The Appellant Advocate against whom the criminal contempt petition had been filed
agreed to file an unconditional apology on affidavit for the allegations he made
against Hon’ble Shri R.S. Kejriwal. He took an undertaking that such affidavit will be
filed within a week’s time. Accordingly, he had tendered such apology before the
Learned Judge. The issue then surrounded the quantum of punishment awarded to the
Appellant Advocate for such act of contempt. The matter came up for hearing before
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the punishment of simple
improvement as also the fine imposed on the Appellant. However, the case of
Appellant's advocate Sualal Yadav is different. He maintained that whatever he has
written is as per the instructions by his client and therefore he is not guilty.

 The Supreme Court observed that the advocate cannot escape his responsibility for
drafting a scandalous notice to Magistrate on the ground that he did so in his
professional capacity.

b. Issues

i. Whether the advocates can be held liable for contempt of court in this particular?
ii. Whether the quantum of punishment has been correctly imposed on the Appellant -
Advocates?

Rules:

i. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines criminal contempt and
acts that fall under criminal contempt.

29
 ii. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, provides the punishment for
contempt of court.

c. What amounts to Contempt of Court?

In the instant case, the Appellant Advocate Radha Lal wrongly accused a High Court Judge,
without any basis. The provisions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provide instances
which constitute criminal contempt of court. It includes publication of any matter which
scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court. By
falsely accusing a High Court Judge, the Appellant Advocate has committed criminal
contempt of court.

d. Stare Decisis: -

In the present case, the decision given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has placed reliance
upon cases such as M.Y. Shareef v. Hon’ble Judges of Nagpur High Court [(1955) 1 SCR
757], Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [(1996) 7 SCC 99] and
M.B. Sanghi Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [(1996) 7 SCC 99]. These
decisions in earlier cases thus would account for as stare decisis.

I. Is the court silent on any issue?

In this instant, the Hon’ble Court is not silent with respect to adjudging the acts of the
Appellant Advocates against whom criminal contempt of court proceedings had been
initiated and the quantum of the punishment.

ii. Principle laid down by the court?

In the instant case, the Hon’ble Court has laid down the principle of judicial independence
which is free from unwarranted attacks. The independence and impartiality of the system
should be protected from disparaging and derogatory remarks from not only the executive or
the legislative but also members who form the judiciary.

iii. What is the Obiter Dicta?

The obiter dicta in the instant case as dictated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court states that there
is a need to control and curb the tendency to malign the reputation of judicial officers through
such false and baseless allegations. As an office of the court, an advocate must make sure not
to impede, obstruct or prevent the administration of justice.

30
 iv. What is the Ratio Decidendi?

The Hon’ble Court while ruling the Ratio Decidendi has relied upon the precedents and other
circumstances relevant in the present case to rule that both the appellants are found guilty of
committing criminal contempt against the court. The act of filing an application with baseless
and false allegations against Hon’ble Shri R. S. Kejriwal is decided as criminal contempt of
the court. For committing such acts amounting to contempt of court, as per the provisions
under the Contempt of Court Act, the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded
may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Firstly, the Appellant
Advocate Radha Mohal Lal has committed contempt however, has also tendered an apology
for the same. As such apology has been accepted, the punishment of simple imprisonment
and fine has been set aside. Secondly, Sualal Yadav is also found guilty for signing such
application and the punishment has been imposed.

v. Is the decision Per Incuriam?

The decision in the instant case is not decision per incuriam as the Hon’ble Court has placed
bearing upon the earlier judgments that stand to be relevant as per the facts of the instant
case. The Hon’ble Court has quoted the cases of M.Y. Shareef v. Hon’ble Judges of Nagpur
High Court, Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, and M.B. Sanghi
Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana. With the help of these cases, the Hon’ble
Court observed the effects of accepting an apology in revising the quantum of the punishment
and reiterated what is considered as criminal contempt of corut.

e. What is the decision of the Supreme Court?

The Hon’ble Apex Court announced the decision wherein the Appellant Advocates were held
liable for committing the offence of criminal contempt against the court. Accordingly, they
were punished with fine as provided in the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

Issue 1: The Appellant Advocate was found guilty of committing criminal contempt to filing
an application with false allegations against the High Court Judge. With regards to Sualal
Yadav, he had signed the complaint scandalizing the court without reasonably justifying
adequate grounds for the same. The Hon’ble Court also observed that the claim about free
expression made by the Appellant cannot be equated or confused with making such
irresponsible allegations against the judiciary.

31
Issue 2: The undertaking and affidavit on which the Appellant Advocate Radha Lal Mohan
provided his apology affected the quantum of punishment originally imposed on him. The
Court accepted his apology and sent aside his punishment. There were few other
considerations in this regard: his age and his practice. The Appellant is a senior citizen aged
81 years. Moreover, he is not actively practising law and he had tendered the apology on his
own accord. The facts also provide that he has undergone one day of imprisonment. Thus, the
object of punishment is achieved even if there is a reduction in the sentence.

With respect to the punishment imposed on Sualal Yadav, the appellant had been sentenced
to three months’ simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000. In case he defaults in paying
such fine, it would lead to an extension of the simple imprisonment for 15 days. Thus, to
prevent such occurrences in future and to hold the advocate responsible for committing acts
of this nature in the professional capacity, the punishment has been imposed on Sualal.

CASE III- MAHIPAL SINGH RANA V. STATE OF U.P. [(2016) 8

SCC 335]
Deciding Court: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Name of the Parties: Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P
Bench: Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph, Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.
Author: Justice Anil R. Dave
Date of Judgement: 5 July, 2016.
th

a. Brief Facts of The Case

The facts of the instant case emanate from the following circumstances: -

 The present appeal under s. 9 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was preferred
against order dated 02.12.2015 of the H.C. of Allahabad where the High Court found
the appellant guilty for intimidating and threatening a Civil Judge (Senior Division)
and was sentenced to simple imprisonment of 2 months with a fine of Rs. 2000.

 Hence, reference was made under s. 75(2) of the Act to the High Court through
learned District Judge, Etah (U.P.) on 7.6.2003 recording two separate incidents dated
16.04.2003 and 13.05.2003 which had taken place in his court in which the Appellant

32
 had appeared before him and conducted himself in a manner which constituted
‘criminal contempt’ u/s. 2 (c) of the Act.

 In the letter that was received by the High Court along with a forwarding letter of the
District judge which denoted the behaviour of the Appellant when the Appellant has
made threatening to the Civil Judge. Such behaviour of Shri Mahipal Singh Rana,
Advocate resulted in hindering and obstructing the judicial work and it falls under the
ambit of committing the contempt of Court.

b. Issues

i.Whether a case has been made out for interference with the order passed by the High Court
convicting the appellant for criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple imprisonment
and fine of Rs. 2000 and further imprisonment for two weeks in case of default?
ii. Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to practice?

Rules:

i. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines criminal contempt and
acts that fall under criminal contempt.
ii. Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 provides for High Court’s power
to take action in criminal contempt cases.
iii. Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for the qualifications entitled to be
enrolled into the Bar.
iv. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides the punishment for the misconduct
on part of the advocates. It lays down orders such as dismissal, reprimand, suspension
and removal of name from the State roll depending on the nature of the offending act.
v. Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides the grounds for filing an appeal to
the Supreme Court.

c. What amounts to Contempt of Court?

33
 In the instant case, the Appellant intimidated and threatened a Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Etah in his court. The provisions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provide instances
which constitute c nriminal contempt of court. It includes interfering or intending to interfere
with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.

d. Stare Decisis: -

In the present case, the decision given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has placed reliance
upon cases such as Lily Thomas v. Union Of India, Manoj Narula v. Union of India, Election
Commission v. Venkata Rao and other relevant cases. These decisions in earlier cases thus
would account for as stare decisis.

I. Is the court silent on any issue?

In this instant, the Hon’ble Court is not silent with respect to adjudging the acts of the
Appellant against whom criminal contempt of court proceedings had been initiated and the
quantum of the punishment. The Court has gone into the details of each relevant fact in this
particular case.

II. Principle laid down by the court?

In the instant case, the Hon’ble Court has reconsidered the principles governing the
punishment of a public servants found guilty of offences involving moral turpitude. The Apex
Court has stressed the need to consider permitting the convicted persons to resume practice
after a period of two years. Emphasis has been given to curbing corruption in this noble
profession.

III. What are the Obiter Dicta?

The Hon’ble Court also observes the role of the Bar Council in such circumstances. In the
present case, despite the direction of the High Court, the Bar Council failed to take any action
for over 10 years. This shows failurf the statutory obligation of the State Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh. This Court observed that where the Bar Council fails to take action in spite of
reference made to it, this Court can exercise suo motu powers for punishing the contemnor
for professional misconduct. The appellant has already been given sufficient opportunity in
this regard.

IV. What is the Ratio Decidendi?

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Owing to the failure of fulfilling of statutory obligation on part of the State Bar Council, the
Hon’ble Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction in view of the proved misconduct calling
for disciplinary action. The conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court to the
appellant is upheld. Sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant is set aside in view of
his advanced age but sentence of fine and default sentence are upheld. Thus, apart from
upholding the conviction and sentence awarded y the H.C., the appellant suffered the
immediate consequences of his conviction under s. 24A of the Advocates Act which is
applicable at the enrollent stage.

V. Is the decision Per Incuriam?

The decision in the instant case is not decision per incuriam as the Hon’ble Court has placed
bearing upon the earlier judgments that stand to be relevant as per the facts of the instant
case. The Hon’ble Court has quoted the cases of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and
Amit Chanchal Jha v. Registar, High Court of Delhi. In accordance with these cases, the
Court upheld the order of debarring the advocated from appearing in court.

What is the decision of the Supreme Court?

Issue 1: While exercising its Appellate Jurisdiction provided under s. 38 of the Advocates
Act, it was decided that the licence of the Appellant stands suspended for a period of 5 years
and will remain debarred from appearing in any court in District Etah even after 5 years
unless he purges himself of contempt in the manner laid down by the Court in precedents
mentioned down.

Issue 2: An advocate can be debarred if he is convicted for contempt. The decision passed by
the Apex Court debarred Mahipal Singh Rana for a period of two years.

The Bench also lays down a request before the Law Commission of India to analyse all the
relevant aspects related to regulation of legal profession in consultation with all concerned.

Case IV- Rakesh Tiwari v. Alok Pandey (AIR 2019 SC 2549)

A. Facts

Sri Rakesh Tripathi, Advocate (the appellant in the instant case), on 21 December, 2012
st

without taking permission from C.J. M., Allahabad entered into his chamber along with 2-3
colleagues and at the said point of time, he started hurling filthy abuses to the CJM and the

35
matter did not end there, as he also raised his hand to beat the Chief Judicial Magistrate and
also threatened him of dire consequences.

A complaint was made against the act terming the act criminal contempt within the meaning
of Section 2(c). The advocate was convicted by the High Court vide impugned judgment
under the Contempt of Courts Act for his undesirable conduct and was sentenced to simple
imprisonment of six months and a fine of Rs. 2000. He was also directed not to enter the
premises of the District Judgeship, Allahabad for a period of six months w.e.f. 15 July, 2015
th

and the contemnor was to remain under constant watch of the District Judge, Allahabad, for a
period of two years. The advocate appealed the order of the High Court.

B. Issue

Whether appellant was guilty of criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act?

C. Rules

a.Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines the term “criminal contempt” as
“the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which -
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court;
or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner”.

b. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 describes the punishment to be

ascribed to a convict guilty of criminal or civil contempt of court.

D. What amounted to criminal contempt of court?

The appellant advocate was accused of forceful entrance into the CJM’s chamber and
verbally abusing him and his authority. A complaint was made to that effect. The High Court
found that the conduct of the appellant contemnor constituted criminal contempt within the
meaning of Section 2(c) of Act, 1971.

E. Stare Decisis

Is the court silent on any issue?

The Court is not silent on any issue.

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What is the principle laid by the Court?

The appellant advocate acted in contrary to his obligations to the Court. His misdemeanour
was utterly intolerable and therefore, the order of conviction pronounced by the High Court
could not be overturned by the Supreme Court.

Is there any obiter dicta?

An advocate is duty bound to act as per the higher status conferred upon him as an officer of
the court. He plays a vital role in preservation of society and justice delivery system.
Advocate has no business to threaten a Judge or hurl abuses for judicial order which he has
passed. In case of complaint of the Judge, it was open to the advocate to approach concerned
higher authorities but there is no license to any member of the Bar to indulge in such
undignified conduct to lower down the dignity of the Court. Such attempts deserve to be
nipped at the earliest as there is no room to such attack by a member of noble profession.

The role of a lawyer is indispensable in the justice delivery system. He has to follow the
professional ethics and also to maintain high standards. He has to assist the court and also
defend the interest of his client. He has to give due regard to his opponent and also to his
counsel. Advocates are held in high esteem in the society. The dignity of court is in fact
dignity of the system of which an advocate being officer of the court. The act of the advocate
in the present case is not only improper but requires gross condemnation.

What is the ratio decidendi in the case?

The High Court observed that the acts of abusing and misbehaving are on increase. The
action of the advocate amounted to lowering the dignity and majesty of the court. A
deliberate attempt to scandalize a judicial officer of subordinate court is bound to shake the
confidence of the litigant public in the system and has to be tackled strictly. Damage is not
only to the reputation of the Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Judges cannot be
tamed by such tactics into submission to secure a desired order. The foundation of the system
is based on independence and impartiality of the Judges as well as responsibility to impart
justice. In case their confidence, impartiality and reputation are shaken the same is bound to
adversely affect the independence of the judiciary. The High Court noted that, the concerned
advocate did not apologize and has maligned and scandalized the subordinate court. He made
bare denial and did not show any remorse for his misconduct. In the instant case, the advocate
acted contrary to the obligations. He set a bad example before others while destroying the
dignity of the court and the Judge. The action had the effect of weakening of confidence of

37
the people in courts. The judiciary is one of the main pillars of democracy and is essential to
peaceful and orderly development of society. The Judge has to deliver justice in a fearless
and impartial manner. He cannot be intimidated in any manner or insulted by hurling abuses.
On account of the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court concluded that the act amounted to
criminal contempt of court.

Is it decision per incuriam?

It was not a decision per incuriam.

F. What is the decision of the Supreme Court?

In view of nature of misconduct, while upholding the conviction for criminal contempt, the
order of sentence was slightly modified. The sentence of imprisonment of 6 months remained
suspended for further period of 3 years subject to his maintaining good and proper conduct
with a condition that he should not enter the premises of the District Judgeship, Allahabad.
The period should commence from 1 July, 2019 to 30 June, 2022. In case of non violation of
st th

aforesaid condition, the sentence after three years should be remitted. However, sentence of
imprisonment may be activated by this Court in case it is found that there is breach of any
condition made by the appellant during the period of three years. He shall deposit fine of Rs.
2000 as imposed by the High Court. In case of failure to deposit fine, he shall not enter the
premises of District Judgeship for a period of three months. The appeal is, accordingly,
disposed of.

CASE V- IN RE: ARUNDHATI ROY VS UNKNOWN

DETAILS OF THE CASE

Court: BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Citation: AIR 2002 SC 1375, 2002 (1) BLJR 811, 2002 CriLJ 1792, JT 2002 (2) SC 508
Coram: Mr. Justice G Pattanaik & Mr. Justice R Sethi
Date of Judgement: 6/03/2002

FACTS
 During the course of a writ petition by grassroots-movement Narmada Bachao Andolan,
the Court addressed issues of environmental damage and displacement of marginalized
communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river Narmada.

38
 Following a Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam to be increased,
the Respondent wrote an article criticizing this decision. Subsequently, protests were
staged in front of the gates of the Supreme Court by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the
Respondent.
 This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the
proceedings, all Respondents denied the allegations concerning specific slogans and
banners and the proceedings were dropped.
 However, along with her denial, Roy’s response to the show cause notice criticized the
Court for issuing proceedings in the first place.
 By entertaining a petition based on an FIR [First Information Report] that even a local
police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court is doing its own reputation
and credibility considerable harm.
 On the basis of the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated
against the Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. In her reply affidavit to the
contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and stressed her continuous dissent
against the decision of the Supreme Court. She further noted that she believed this to be a
matter of her right to express her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer.

ISSUES
1. Whether the statements and articles published by respondents amount to contempt of
court act, 1971?

RULES
1. Section 2(c) in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: criminal contempt means the
publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which:
 scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court;
or
 prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or
 interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of
justice in any other manner;

39
2. Section 14 in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Procedure where contempt is in the
face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.
3. Article 19(1)(a) in The Constitution of India 1949: to freedom of speech and expression.

WHAT AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT

In the offending portion of her affidavit, the respondent has accused the court of proceeding
with absurd, despicable and entirely unsubstantiated petition which, according to her,
amounted to the court displaying a disturbing willingness to issue notice. She has further
attributed motives to the court of silencing criticism and muzzling dissent by harassing and
intimidating those who disagree with it. Her contempt for the court is evident from the
assertion "by entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even a local police station does not
see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court is doing its own reputation and credibility
consideration harm". In the affidavit filed in these proceedings, the respondent has reiterated
what she has stated in her earlier affidavit and has not shown any repentance. She wanted to
become a champion to the cause of the writers by asserting that persons like her can allege
anything they desire and accuse any person or institution without any circumspection,
limitation or restraint. Such an attitude shows her persistent and consistent attempt to malign
the institution of the judiciary found to be most important pillar in the Indian democratic set
up. This is no defence to say that as no actual damage has been done to the judiciary, the
proceedings be dropped.
IS THE COURT SILENT ON ANY ISSUE?
The hon’ble Supreme Court has extensively dealt with all the issues contained in the
following case and is not silent on any issue.

Analysis
 The assertions in the aforesaid contempt petition attributed that the contemnors shouted
abusive slogans against the court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity and
dishonesty to the institution undoubtedly made the action of the contemnor gross
contemptuous and as such the court had initiated the contempt proceedings by issuing
notice. But in view of the denial of the alleged contemnors to the effect that they had
never shouted such slogans and used such abusive words as stated in the contempt
petition, instead of holding an inquiry and permitting the parties to lead evidence in
respect of their respective stand, to find out which version is correct, the court thought it

40
 fit not to adopt that course and decided to drop the proceedings. But in the very show
cause that had been filed by Ms. Arundhati Roy, apart from denying that she had not used
any such words as ascribed to her, she had stated in three paragraphs, as quoted earlier,
after denying that she had never uttered the words ascribed to her and those paragraphs
having been found prima facie contemptuous, the suo motu proceedings had been
initiated and notice had been issued.
 However, the Court felt that Ms. Arundhati Roy was found to have, prima facie,
committed contempt as she had imputed motives to specific courts for entertaining
litigation and passing orders against her. She had accused courts of harassing her as if the
judiciary were carrying out a personal vendetta against her. She had brought in matters
which were not only not pertinent to the issues to be decided but has drawn uninformed
comparisons to make statements about the Court which do not appear to be protected by
law relating to fair criticism. It was stated by her in the court that she stood by the
comments made by her even if the same are contumacious. For the reason recorded
therein, the Court issued notice in the prescribed form to the respondent herein asking her
to show cause as to why she should not be proceeded against for contempt for the
statements in the offending three paragraphs of her affidavit, reproduced herein earlier.
 In her reply-affidavit, the respondent has again reiterated what she had stated in her
earlier affidavit. It was contended that as a consequence of the Supreme Court judgment
the people in the Narmada Valley are likely to lose their homes, their livelihood and their
histories and when they came calling on the Supreme Court, they were accused of
lowering the dignity of the court which, according to her is a suggestion that the dignity
of the court and the dignity of the Indian citizens are incompatible, oppositional,
adversarial things. She stated: 'I believe that the people of the Narmada valley have the
constitutional right to peacefully protest against what they consider an unjust and unfair
judgment. As for myself, I have every right to participate in any peaceful protest meeting
that I choose to. Even outside the gates of the Supreme Court. As a writer I am fully
entitled to put forward my views, my reasons and arguments for why I believe that the
judgment in the Sardar Sarovar case is flawed and unjust and violates the human rights of
Indian citizens. I have the right to use all my skills and abilities such as they are, and all
the facts and figures at my disposal, to persuade people to my point of view.'
 She also stated that she has written and published several essays and articles on Narmada
issue and the Supreme Court judgment. None of them was intended to show contempt to

41
 the court. She justified her right to disagree with the court's view on the subject and to
express her disagreement in any publication or forum. In her belief the big dams are
economically unviable, ecologically destructive and deeply undemocratic. In her affidavit
she has further stated: 'But whoever they are, and whatever their motives, for the
petitioners to attempt to misuse the Contempt of Court Act and the good offices of the
Supreme Court to stifle criticism and stamp out dissent, strikes at the very roots of the
notion of democracy.
 In recent months this Court has issued judgments on several major public issues. For
instance, the closure of polluting industries in Delhi, the conversion of public transport
buses from diesel to CNG, and the judgment permitting the construction of the Sardar
Sarovar Dam to proceed. All of these have had far-reaching and often unanticipated
impacts. They have materially affected, for better or for worse, the lives and livelihoods
of millions of Indian citizens. Whatever the justice or injustice of these judgments
whatever their finer legal points, for the court to become intolerant of criticism or
expressions of dissent would mark the beginning of the end of democracy.
 An 'activist' judiciary, that intervenes in public matters to provide a corrective to a
corrupt, dysfunctional executive, surely has to be more, not less accountable. To a society
that is already convulsed by political bankruptcy, economic distress and religious and
cultural intolerance, any form of judicial intolerance will come as a crippling blow. If the
judiciary removes itself from public scrutiny and accountability, and severs its links with
the society that it was set up to serve in the first place, it would mean that yet another
pillar of Indian democracy will crumble. A judicial dictatorship is as fearsome a prospect
as a military dictatorship or any other form of totalitarian rule.
 The Tehelka tapes broadcast recently on a national television network show the repulsive
sight of Presidents of the Bhartiya Janata Party and the Samata Party (both part of the
ruling coalition) accepting bribes from spurious arms dealers. Though this ought to have
been considered prima facie evidence of corruption, yet the Delhi High Court declined to
entertain a petition seeking an enquiry into the defence deals that were referred to in the
tapes. The bench took strong exception to the petitioner approaching the court without
substantial evidence and even warned the petitioner's counsel that if he failed to
substantiate its allegations, the court would impose costs on the petitioner.
 On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too busy, the Chief Justice of India
refused to allow a sitting judge to head the judicial enquiry into the Tehelka scandal, even

42
 though it involves matters of national security and corruption in the highest places. Yet
when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition in which all the
three respondents happen to be people who have publicly - though in markedly different
ways - questioned the policies of the government and severely criticized a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court, the Court displays a disturbing willingness to issue
notice. It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence criticism
and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it. By entertaining a
petition based on an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the
Supreme Court is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm.
 In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm that as a writer I have right to state my opinions and
beliefs. As a free citizen of India, I have the right to be part of any peaceful dharna,
demonstration or protest march. I have the right to criticize any judgment of any court
that I believe to be unjust. I have the right to make common cause with those I agree with.
I hope that each time I exercise these rights I will not be dragged to court on false charges
and forced to explain my actions.' In the aforesaid backdrop, the Supreme Court dealt
with the question whether the offending paras in her affidavit amounted to contempt of
court. In the proceedings, a preliminary objection was raised by the contemnor that the
Hon’ble Judges who issued notice in Criminal Petition No. 2 of 2001 should not be a
party to the present proceedings and the case be transferred to some other Bench.
Rejecting the plea of recusal, the Supreme Court held that cognizance of the criminal
contempt against the respondent has been taken by the Court, suo motu under Section 15
of the Act. Whereas sub-section (2) of Section 14 permits a person charged with the
contempt to have charge against him tried by some judge other than the judge or judges in
whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed and the court is
of opinion that it is practicable to do so. No such provision is made under Section 15 of
the Act.
 Obviously for the reason that when action is at the instance of the Court, there is no
question of any motive of and prejudice from any judge. The Court also held that
accepting the plea raised by the respondent would amount to depriving all the judges of
the court to hear the matter and thus frustrate the contempt proceedings, which cannot be
the mandate of law. The apprehension of the respondent was found to be imaginary,
without basis and not bonafide. The oral prayer made for one of the judges not to be a
member of the Bench, hearing the matter was rejected.

43
 It is stated that the aforesaid view of the Supreme Court is totally erroneous as the alleged
contempt was committed infacie curiae inasmuch as the offending affidavit was filed
before a Bench of the Supreme Court and hence falls within the purview of section 14 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which deals with the procedure where contempt is in
the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. A bare reading of the provision would
indicate that in cases of contempt in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court where
a person charged with contempt under this section applies whether orally or in writing to
have the charge against him tried by some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose
presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed and the court is of
opinion that it is practicable to do so, and that in the interest of proper administration of
justice, the application should be allowed, the same has to be done.
 Thus, the view of the Supreme Court is highly convoluted inasmuch as suo
motu cognizance can be taken and in fact has been taken by the Supreme Court under
section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and therefore to this extent, the judgment
suffers from a serious infirmity. Moreover, the logic of the court in not entertaining the
plea of recusal is highly fallacious. It is not understood as to how the acceptance of such
plea would deprive all the judges to hear the matter. The plea was against a particular
judge (and not even the Bench) in whose presence the contempt allegedly took place.
 Even otherwise, the principles of natural justice demand that the learned judge ought to
have recused on his own without even waiting for the contemnor to request to the same
effect. Justice is rooted in confidence and it is destroyed when right minded people go
with the impression that the judge was biased. It is submitted that after Maneka Gandhi's
case, procedural fairness is part and parcel of our constitutional scheme and consequently
the refusal to recuse by the judge can hardly be termed as procedurally fair. It is
submitted that principle of natural justice, due process requirement after Maneka and
ordinary notions of justice demanded the judge to refuse to hear the matter and to recuse
from the Bench.
 It is submitted that in the present case, no charge was framed to this effect much less any
finding recorded thereon and consequently it is writ large that as far as the sentence of
one day is concerned, it is totally illegal, bad in law and contrary to statutory mandate. It
is stated that the scheme of section 13 of the Act is clear in that as a rule the punishment
in case of contempt has to be by way of fine and it is only when the court is satisfied that
the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to
interfere with the due course of justice, a punishment by way of sentence is warranted. In

44
the present case, no attention was given to section 13 and punishment by way of sentence
was imposed and therefore the judgment of the court is not sustainable to this extent as
well. It is submitted that sending a citizen for exercising his or her right to freedom of
speech and expression (even amounting to contempt) in a functioning and vibrant
democracy is indeed a very poor reflection on our judicial system and the laws. Some
urgent action on the part of the law makers is needed to rectify such judicial deviance.

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