RESEARCH ARTICLE

PRIVACY CONCERNS AND DATA SHARING IN THE INTERNET OF

THINGS: MIXED METHODS EVIDENCE FROM CONNECTED CARS1
Patrick Cichy
Bern University of Applied Sciences, Institute for Applied Data Science and Finance,
Bern, SWITZERLAND {patrick.cichy@bfh.ch}

Torsten Oliver Salge

RWTH Aachen University, TIME Research Area, Institute for Technology and Innovation Management,
Aachen, GERMANY {salge@time.rwth-aachen.de}

Rajiv Kohli
Raymond A. Mason School of Business, William & Mary,
Williamsburg, VA, U.S.A. {rajiv.kohli@mason.wm.edu}

The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly transforming the way we work, live, and travel. IoT devices collect,
store, analyze, and act upon a continuous stream of data as a by-product of everyday use. However, IoT devices
need unrestricted data access to fully function. As such, they invade users’ virtual and physical space and raise
far-reaching privacy challenges that are unlike those examined in other contexts. As advanced IoT devices,
connected cars offer a unique setting to review and extend established theory and evidence on privacy and data
sharing. Employing a sequential mixed methods design, we conducted an interview study (n=120), a survey
study (n=333), and a field experiment (n=324) among car drivers to develop and validate a contextualized
model of individuals’ data sharing decisions. Our findings from the three studies highlight the interplay between
virtual and physical risks in shaping drivers’ privacy concerns and data sharing decisions—with information
privacy and data security emerging as discrete yet closely interrelated concepts. Our findings also highlight the
importance of psychological ownership, conceptualized as drivers’ feelings of possession toward their driving
data, as an important addition to established privacy calculus models of data sharing. This novel perspective
explains why individuals are reluctant to share even low-sensitivity data that do not raise privacy concerns. The
psychological ownership perspective has implications for designing incentives for data-enabled services in ways
that augment drivers’ self-efficacy and psychological ownership and thereby encourage them to share driving
data. These insights help reconcile a fundamental tension among IoT users—how to avail the benefits of data-
enabled IoT devices while reducing the psychological costs associated with the sharing of personal data.
Keywords: Privacy, privacy concerns, cybersecurity, psychological ownership, data sharing, data
disclosure, Internet of Things, IoT, connected car, smart products

“[Smart] doorbells and … cams … seemed like a good idea, Introduction

until hackers, stalkers and police tried to get their hands on the
video feed. … Applied to a car, the questions multiply. Can you
just peer in on your teen driver—or spouse? Do I have to share
my footage with the authorities? Should my car be allowed to
kick me off the road if it thinks I’m sleepy? How long until
insurance companies offer ‘discounts’ for direct video access?”
(G. A. Fowler in The Washington Post, February 27, 2020,
emphasis added).
The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly pervading and
transforming the way we work, live, and travel. Consumer
IoT is reshaping fields as diverse as fitness, housekeeping,
home automation and security, and personal mobility. IoT
devices such as fitness trackers, robot vacuum cleaners,
smart meters, smart cameras, and connected cars have

1
Susan Brown was the accepting senior editor for this paper. Saonee Sarker served as the associate editor.

DOI:10.25300/MISQ/2021/14165 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 pp. 1863-1892 / December 2021 1863
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
become constant companions that promise automation,
personalization, and comfort for everyday activities
(Beverungen et al. 2019; Raff et al. 2020).
This value proposition, however, relies on IoT devices
collecting, storing, analyzing, and acting upon a continuous
stream of data generated by increasingly manifold and
powerful sensors. As a result, data streams are collected as an
inevitable by-product of IoT devices’ everyday usage—even
though not all users are fully aware of the actual scale and
scope of such practices. In fact, IoT devices can capture
important information about the device itself, its user,
proximal or distant others, as well as the local context. When
analyzed jointly, IoT data can reveal individuals’ behavior,
preferences, and personality with potentially negative
consequences for them. Data from connected cars, for
instance, can provide insights into drivers’ attention, risk-
taking behavior, and mobility patterns—all of which can be of
considerable interest for actors in the broader connected car
ecosystem including manufacturers, insurers, and regulators.
Hence, data privacy and security concerns are likely to impact
users’ IoT adoption and data sharing decisions. As such, IoT
devices pose a novel, almost paradoxical challenge to users:
The core value proposition of IoT devices is inexorably linked
to the unrestricted sharing of user data. Yet sharing of that data
in the absence of adequate privacy controls exposes the user
to substantial virtual and physical risks. Extant privacy studies
conducted in contexts as diverse as online shopping (e.g.,
Dinev and Hart 2006), location-based services (e.g., Crossler
and Bélanger, 2019), electronic health records (e.g., Anderson
and Agarwal 2011), and online social networks (e.g.,
Krasnova et al. 2010) consistently point to the importance of
privacy concerns in shaping individual data sharing decisions
and highlight the role of data sensitivity, trusting beliefs, and
personalization benefits. However, none of these previous
studies have explored privacy concerns and data sharing in the
emerging IoT context with its unique privacy challenges.
But is the emerging IoT context sufficiently distinct to raise
new privacy challenges, limit the applicability of established
theory and evidence, and warrant dedicated research
attention? Four key properties of IoT set it apart from the
previously examined contexts. IoT devices (1) tend to be
“always on” and generate continuous data streams, (2) give
users little or no power to control the data flows, (3) require
unrestricted data access to fully function, and (4) invade
users’ virtual and physical space given the increasingly
powerful actuators—components that transform electric
impulses into physical actions—they are equipped with.
These four properties alter the very nature of both the
privacy risks that IoT users are exposed to and those users’
decision-making with regard to data sharing.
1864 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
In response, we adopt a privacy perspective relating to data
sharing to explore the rapidly expanding context of
consumer IoT in general and connected cars in particular.
Employing a sequential mixed methods design (Venkatesh
et al. 2013; 2016), we dive deep into car drivers’ privacy
assessments and their data sharing decisions. We seek to (1)
uncover the key determinants of individuals’ data sharing
decisions with a focus on privacy concerns and
psychological ownership, that is, feelings of ownership
toward their driving data; (2) explicate the interplay of those
determinants in the presence and absence of data-enabled
services as incentives; and (3) explore how to incentivize
IoT users to share data for service innovation.
The connected car is an ideal IoT exemplar for our purposes,
as it exhibits high levels of all four distinguishing properties
of IoT devices. Car manufacturers and other players in the
growing connected car ecosystem (e.g., insurers, car rental
companies, car repair shops, and providers of navigation and
infotainment services) have recognized car data as an
essential source of future value creation and service
innovation (McKinsey, 2016)—and are jointly transforming
the connected car into a “rolling self-surveillance machine”
(The Washington Post, 2020). The connected car is not only
an important technological stepping stone toward
autonomous driving, but also a window into a possible future
of consumer IoT more broadly. It provides a unique
opportunity to engage in contextualized theorizing (Hong et
al. 2014) and to review and extend established theory and
evidence on privacy and data sharing in light of the emerging
realities of the IoT. After all, in the history of privacy
research, technological advances have played a vital role in
pushing the boundaries of and stimulating theory
development (Smith et al. 2011).
Given the contextual novelty of our research, we adopted a
sequential mixed methods design to guide the interplay of
our studies (Venkatesh et al. 2013). Below, we describe three
consecutive studies—arranged in a way so that the findings
of one study can inform the next—which allowed us to
develop and validate a model of individuals’ data sharing
decisions. First, short, semistructured interviews (Study 1)
provided rich insights into drivers’ data sharing decisions
and helped identify salient constructs. Second, our survey
(Study 2) formally tested and supported drivers’ privacy
concerns as mediating the relationship between
psychological ownership of their driving data and their data
sharing intentions. Third, our field study (Study 3) employed
a plug-in telematics device and associated app to turn
ordinary cars into connected cars in order to move from
drivers’ intentions to their actual data disclosure decisions
and associated contingency factors (relational trust, security
beliefs, data sensitivity, and incentive design).
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
Conceptual Background
Privacy and Individuals’ Data Sharing
Decisions
Privacy is commonly defined as the ability to control
information about oneself (Stone et al. 1983).2 Empirical
studies seeking to understand individuals’ decisions about the
maintenance or loss of this ability have traditionally relied on
the privacy calculus as the dominant analytical framework
(e.g., Jiang et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2009). This perspective
considers opposing forces that jointly influence individuals in
their decisions regarding whether to reveal or to conceal
personal information (Culnan 1993). Individuals are assumed
to weigh the positive and negative consequences of any
particular disclosure of information—i.e., to perform a cost-
benefit analysis (Culnan 1993; Dinev and Hart 2006) and to
act in a way that will result in the most favorable net outcome
(Stone et al. 1983). This rationale is in line with theories of
human decision-making, such as utility maximization theory
(Awad and Krishnan 2006), expectancy theory of motivation
(Stone and Stone 1990) and expectancy-value theory (Ajzen
1991), which serve as a psychological foundation of the
privacy calculus (Li 2012).
While the perceived benefits of information sharing might
take the form of financial rewards (Hui et al. 2007) or
personalization (Awad and Krishnan 2006), the perceived
costs are assumed to originate first and foremost from the
endangered privacy of individuals (i.e., the partial loss of the
ability to control personal information), manifested in their
privacy concerns (Malhotra et al. 2004; Smith et al. 1996).
Privacy concerns, viewed as a measurable proxy for privacy
itself, constitute the central construct in empirical studies on
privacy-related behavior. They have been identified as the
most influential determinant of individuals’ willingness to
share personal information (Malhotra et al. 2004; Stewart and
Segars 2002). In line with the privacy calculus perspective on
sharing decisions, Dinev and Hart (2006) observed that in
most cases, individuals do not strive to retain absolute privacy,
but are willing to partially sacrifice it for certain benefits that
arise from data sharing.
Privacy is said to be a highly context-sensitive concept
(Altman 1975; Margulis 2003; Westin 1967), meaning that the
perceived costs and benefits individuals have to trade off
against each other can differ significantly across situations.
With this in mind, scholars have examined how privacy-
related behavior interacts with contextual factors, such as what
type of information is being requested, who is requesting it,
2
We use the term “privacy” as a reference to “information privacy”
throughout the paper.
and what it is to be used for (e.g., Anderson and Agarwal
2010; Malhotra et al. 2004). With the rise of e-commerce, for
example, consumers have been asked to share their names and
addresses with online vendors (Dinev and Hart 2006). In
addition, they have had to come to terms with the fact that their
search and buying patterns are tracked by online vendors who
increasingly personalize websites to their customers’
individual product interests (Xiao and Benbasat 2007).
Similarly, the digitization of medical data promised to
enhance the quality and efficiency of care (Agarwal et al.
2010) yet continues to rely on patients’ willingness to share
their personal health data with healthcare providers,
pharmaceutical companies, and public health agencies
(Anderson and Agarwal 2011). As far as the Internet of Things
is concerned, Sheng et al. (2008) were among the first to shape
our understanding of privacy implications associated with the
vision of ubiquitous computing. They predicted privacy
concerns to emerge because enabling technologies like RFID
and sensor networks collect data in a continuous fashion and
often without individuals’ active consent (e.g., in case of
RFID-enabled carts in supermarkets that continuously track
and report customers’ location). Interestingly, such tracking is
commonplace for many of today’s IoT devices, which creates
new opportunities and challenges for research on users’
information privacy (Lowry et al. 2017).
In retrospect, it becomes apparent that technological
innovation is one of the main triggers for new privacy studies.
Novel technologies have often stimulated privacy research
and catalyzed theory development. The privacy implications
of IoT devices and the vision of a fully connected, smart world
they are associated with, have, however, not yet been
adequately examined (see Yun et al. 2018). Given the rapid
diffusion of IoT devices across many areas of life, ranging
from fitness to housing to mobility, there is now a pressing
need for research on privacy and data sharing in the context of
the IoT (Lowry et al. 2017).
Privacy in the IoT Context
The increasingly ubiquitous and expanding class of
consumer IoT possesses several distinct properties with
important privacy implications. First, IoT devices have
previously unseen abilities to sense their environment (e.g.,
the shape, position, and movement of nearby objects, as well
as contextual factors such as air temperature and air quality)
and their inner workings (e.g., mechanical wear and tear and
usage patterns). Depending on the number and types of
sensors they are equipped with, data collection by IoT
devices is characterized not only by its volume but also by
MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1865
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
its specificity and continuity. Indeed, most IoT devices, such
as wearables, smart home appliances, and connected cars,
collect a continuous stream of data when in use (Oberländer
et al. 2018). The decisive factor that determines their level
of intrusion into individuals’ informational space is
determined by the range and activity of sensors embedded in
a particular IoT device, which clearly differ across the
various fields of consumer IoT, as illustrated in Table 1.
Equipped with probably the most comprehensive sensors in
consumer IoT, a connected car captures more diverse and
more revealing information about its driver than, for
example, a smart running shoe does about its wearer. The
most valuable insights about individuals often emerge not
from single points of data but from continuous streams over
time (Shim et al. 2020). Acceleration and braking data, for
example, provide insights into individuals’ general driving
style, their mood, and their attitude toward the environment.
The frequency of refueling and of tire pressure adjustments,
in turn, may serve as indicators of drivers’ general safety
needs. Recurring patterns in the routes traveled reveal not
only frequently visited places, but also how much time the
driver spent there. It might be possible to infer from personal
driving data where a person works, what restaurants are
preferred, or what leisure activities the driver engages in,
with the accuracy of such inferences increasing with the
amount of available data (De Montjoye et al. 2015).
Second, users of IoT devices are often left in the dark as to
how precisely their data is being collected, integrated, and
analyzed. This characteristic is observable across all fields
of consumer IoT and may be partly due to the fact that IoT
devices—in contrast to personal computers—are equipped
with tiny screens or else entirely lack components that
would allow them to display rich information. Users instead
must rely on a second device, such as a smartphone, or a
smart speaker, to interact with the IoT device. Adapted to
these circumstances, IoT devices’ user interfaces tend to
offer only limited information and control options regarding
personal data flows (Bahirat et al. 2018). Moreover,
associated software components, for example a smartphone
app that enables the steering and monitoring of the IoT
device, often cannot be replaced or supplemented with more
privacy-friendly versions. While users have access to
various alternatives for software running on their general-
purpose computing machines and can select the software
that best meets their privacy preferences (e.g., various
messenger and navigation apps for smartphones), IoT
devices are often one-purpose computing machines and are,
in most cases, inherently linked to the firmware they are
3
An actuator is a device component (often a type of motor) that allows the
device—or a part of it—to move or to control some other mechanism in
response to a signal received. Actuators have been described as the “muscle”
of IoT. In the case of a smart vacuum cleaner, for instance, infrared sensors
1866 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
shipped with. IoT device users hence often have to live with
whatever level of transparency and control over personal
data is granted by the manufacturer.
Third, the value proposition of IoT devices is inherently
connected to the unconstrained collection, integration, and
analysis of data. A robot vacuum cleaner, for example,
would simply be unable to operate without a camera and
computer vision algorithms that allow it to find its way
around furniture and other obstacles. Without creating real-
time indoor maps, it would be unable to document the
cleaning process and outcome. Similarly, the core
functionalities and services of connected cars, such as
remote car control, predictive car maintenance, driving style
assistants, and pay-how-you-drive insurance schemes are
reliant on unrestricted access to car data (Seiberth and
Gruendinger 2018). This inherent reliance on car data is
likely to sharply increase over the next decade, during which
time vast amounts of driving data will be needed to train and
validate autonomous driving algorithms (Eady 2019). For
consumer IoT in general, the functionality available to the
user sharply degrades in the presence of data constraints. In
other words, sharing personal data is a necessary
precondition for customer value creation in consumer IoT.
Finally, IoT devices and their increasingly powerful actuators3
go beyond previous technologies in that they invade not only
users’ virtual space, but also their physical space. This adds a
new dimension to the consequences of privacy-related
decisions that users of IoT devices need to include in their
calculus (Dinev and Hart 2006). Outside the IoT context,
privacy risks stem primarily from unsolicited outflows of user
information in combination with the exploitation of that
information in undesired ways. Examples include individuals’
online purchase histories, which are sold to third-party
marketers, social media profiles that are considered during the
selection of job applicants, and personal passwords that end
up in the hands of cybercriminals. Within the IoT context, in
contrast, privacy risks result not only from unsolicited
outflows but also from unsolicited inflows of data. Consider
how faulty signals from sensors or the insertion of malicious
data from the outside may induce general malfunctioning or
even threatening behaviors from an IoT device. The severity
of such threats relates primarily to the IoT device’s physical
impact (i.e., its ability to manipulate the environment and the
amount of mass it can set in motion) and its physical proximity
(i.e., the extent to which it can invade the physical space of an
individual or open it up for intrusion by others).
detect obstacles and send a signal to the processing unit, which in turn triggers
the electric motors on each wheel (the actuators) to respond in such a way that
a collision with the obstacle is avoided.
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things

Table 1. Selected Fields of Consumer IoT

Field of Exemplary Ability to sense (SENSORS) Ability to act
application products (ACTUATORS)
Primary data types Continuity Variety of Physical Physical
of data data stream impact proximity
stream
Sports & Wearables like Location/routes travelled, vital signs, low medium low high
fitness running shoes and training intensity and success
fitness trackers
House- Intelligent fridge, Operational data (when and how long low/medium low medium low
keeping and robot vacuum in use, chosen temperatures), content
appliances cleaner (fridge), room data (vacuum robot)
Building Smart meters Water and electricity consumption, high medium medium medium
automation (water and room temperature and heating
heating), blinds system operations, times of darkening
and lights and lighting of specific rooms
Home Door locks, fire & Motion in and around house, heat, high low low high
security smoke detectors, smoke and indoor air quality, door
motion detectors lock position
Personal Connected cars Location/routes traveled, driving medium/ high high high
mobility style and road conditions, high
technical conditions of vehicle

As illustrated in Table 1, the connected car ranks high in both
of these categories and is hence associated with the most
severe data-induced threats to individuals’ physical safety of
all consumer IoT technologies present today. Interestingly,
such threats do not need to be induced by opportunistic,
negligent, or malicious human action, but can result from the
behavior of the autonomously acting IoT artifact itself,
which becomes a critical data-handling actor.
In summary, the IoT radically changes the nature of the
privacy threats that users are exposed to because of several
factors: (1) the unprecedented volume, specificity, and
continuity of data streams collected by IoT devices—with
many IoT devices being “always on”; (2) the opacity of data
collection, integration, and analysis, coupled with the fact
that the user has little or no power to control data flows; (3)
the degradation of functionality in the presence of data
constraints; and (4) the ability of IoT devices to invade users’
virtual and physical spaces. Factors (2) and (3) are mostly
manufacturer-specific, irrespective of the particular type of
consumer IoT. For example, among electronics
manufacturers, Apple incorporates more privacy-friendly
defaults and more granular privacy controls than Amazon
does regarding products of the same type, e.g., smart
speakers (Kelly 2019). Factors (1) and (4), in contrast, are
specific to the type of consumer IoT. This makes it possible
to arrange IoT devices like smart shoes, smart fridges, and
connected cars on a continuum from low to high according
to their ability to sense and to (physically) act (see Table 1).
Once again, discontinuous technological developments are set
to challenge and extend existing theory on privacy and data
sharing decisions. To help privacy research engage with the
emerging realities of the IoT, we explore the specific context of
connected cars and the specific data types that these novel IT
artifacts collect. This is an ideal context for our purposes, given
the presence in connected cars of all four distinguishing
properties of IoT devices, which will be compounded as we
advance toward the vision of autonomous driving.
Mixed Methods Research Design
Mixed methods research generates rich insights by combining
qualitative and quantitative methods in the same inquiry. Mixed
methods allow for deeper and more robust analyses of a
phenomenon by leveraging the complementary strengths of both
approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). While context-
sensitive research is depicted as a promising endeavor to
advance theory in general (Hong et al. 2014; Johns 2006),
Venkatesh et al. (2013) suggest that mixed methods research is
particularly well-suited to examine IS-related phenomena that
closely interact with context, i.e., with the IT artifact. This is
especially true when existing findings are fragmented,
inconclusive, or equivocal (Venkatesh et al. 2016). Mixed
methods research is not only frequently called for (Ågerfalk
2013; Venkatesh et al. 2013) but also increasingly adopted in
research practice—with IS taking a leading role (e.g., Srivastava
and Chandra 2018; Wunderlich et al. 2019).

MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1867

Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
STUDY 1 STUDY 2&3
Why are individuals
How do the identified
reluctant to share
determinants and
personal driving data with
introduced incentives
other parties and what
interrelate in shaping
determinants play a role
individuals’ decisions to
in individuals’ data
share personal driving
sharing decision in the
data?
context of connected
cars?
Survey Field
(n=333) experiment
Interviews
(n=120) (n=324)
Qualitative research Quantitative research
question question
Note: Findings of Study 2 were supported by two replication studies (n1=131/ n2=730); research design of Study 3 was informed by survey-
based pilot (n=346)
Figure 1. Mixed Methods Approach and Research Questions
The execution and interplay of qualitative and quantitative
research in mixed methods designs can be manifold and
should be guided by the objectives of the particular research
endeavor. The overall objective of our work was to derive a
holistic understanding of individuals’ data sharing decisions
in IoT contexts, as exemplified by the case of connected cars.
Toward this goal, and following the methodological
guidelines put forward by Venkatesh et al. (2013, 2016), we
conducted three consecutive studies such that the findings of
one study could inform the next. While an inductive
qualitative interview study (Study 1) helped contextualize our
theorizing, two subsequent deductive quantitative studies—
one a survey (Study 2) and the other a field study (Study 3)—
provided validation for our emerging contextualized model.
This is in line with Venkatesh et al.’s (2013, p. 25) proposal
that “interviews, a qualitative data collection approach, can
provide depth in a research inquiry by allowing researchers to
gain deep insights from rich narratives, and surveys, a
quantitative data collection approach, can bring breadth to a
study by helping researchers to gather data about different
aspects of a phenomenon from many participants.” The
overall purpose of our sequential mixed methods research
design could be depicted as being primarily developmental
with an element of confirmation and completeness according
to Venkatesh et al.’s classification. To further enhance the
richness and practical relevance of our work, we followed the
guidelines for context-specific theorizing put forward by
Hong et al. (2014) in executing our quantitative studies, which
included, among other things, formulating context-sensitive
versions of our measurement instruments. Figure 1 illustrates
the three studies and their interplay.
1868 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
How can individuals’ data
sharing decisions in IoT-
related contexts be
conceptualized and what
managerial opportunities
exist that could enhance data
sharing for service
innovation?
t
Mixed-Methods research
question
Study 1: Data Sharing in the Context of
Connected Cars
Methods
Design: In Study 1, we explored the determinants that shape
individuals’ sharing decisions in the context of connected
cars. In particular, our objective was to discover the origins,
manifestations, and consequences of privacy concerns in this
specific IoT context and to identify additional factors that
influence individuals in their decision to share driving data
with third parties. Given the novelty of connected cars and the
unique privacy challenges associated with them, we employed
an inductive qualitative approach using interviews (Charmaz
2006).
Procedure: We recruited a sample of 120 car drivers in
Germany for our interview study (age: M = 29.2 years, SD =
13.8; gender: 47% female; higher education = 34%; active use
of online social networks = 68%). We ensured that
participants represented a broad range of personal mobility
habits and driving experiences. On average, recruited
participants covered a distance of 10,438 km/year (SD =
9,430; Min = 800; Max = 55,000) and 28% of them had done
so with a car that they said they did not share with any other
person. Following Flick’s (2014) guidelines, we used short
briefings as introductions to the interview. These were meant
to provide participants with information on connected cars,
including indications of their potential to collect, process, and
transmit driving data to enable a broad array of novel services
without framing this in either a positive or a negative way. The
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
introduction ensured that participants had a basic
understanding of the technologies and applications of the
connected car. Brief, semistructured interviews (length: M =
5.4 minutes, SD = 1.9) allowed participants to elaborate on
their beliefs about and associations with the connected car, as
well as their reasons for or against sharing driving data. At the
end of the interview, study participants completed a short
questionnaire on their personal characteristics and their
mobility habits. All interviews were conducted in person,
digitally recorded, fully transcribed, and analyzed for content.
The transcribed interview material amounted to a total of
31,946 words or 114 typewritten pages.
Analysis: Given our goal to arrive at a better understanding of
privacy concerns and data sharing decisions in the emerging
IoT context of connected cars, we employed an inductive
approach in interpreting our interview material, similar to
extant qualitative studies in privacy research (e.g., Karwatzki
et al. 2017a; Krasnova et al. 2009, Parks et al. 2017). In the
first round, we used open coding to label the emotional
reactions, associations, and opinions that the participants
expressed. The first author and an experienced research
assistant did so independently, using both in vivo codes and
provisional category names (Charmaz 2006). In an iterative
process, we then refined, merged, and extended initially
assigned codes into conceptual categories. This step was
characterized by moving back and forth between data, codes,
and relevant literature, and was accompanied by ongoing
discussions among the three authors (Charmaz 2006). The
coding procedure was supported by ATLAS.ti software. As an
additional validation step, and to derive reliable quantitative
statements regarding the perception of negative consequences
of sharing driving data, a previously uninvolved research
assistant reanalyzed this particular category of codes, using a
coding scheme and having no knowledge of the previously
assigned labels (Miles and Huberman 1994). Results were
compared and differences in the assigned codes were resolved
by discussion among the authors.
Findings and Discussion
Privacy concerns and negative consequences associated
with individuals sharing driving data: We observed that
interviewees viewed the adoption of connected cars and the
subsequent sharing of driving data with other parties as a
potential threat to their privacy. 41% of them articulated
concerns over the loss of their privacy, with reactions ranging
from a slight sense of discomfort to serious fears. Answers
indicated that sharing of personal driving data with the car
manufacturer and other service providers creates a sense of
losing the ability to control such data. One participant said:
“There is no way for me to verify what my car manufacturer
really does with this data. I don’t know if they keep their
promises.” Another participant commented: “Let’s say I
transmit the data to my car manufacturer, for example. In this
case, I actually do not really know what will happen to it. I
can’t control it anymore. This somehow scares me.”
Participants came up with various negative consequences
originating from a loss of their ability to control personal
driving data. Table 2 lists these negative consequences in the
order of their prevalence in the interview material.
All negative consequences revealed during our interviews can
be assigned to one or more of the privacy concern dimensions
proposed by Smith et al. (1996). While the basic
dimensionality of individuals’ privacy concerns appears to
hold across technological contexts, our results underline the
need for contextualizing the specific content of these
concerns. First, similar to previous findings on individuals’
fears when providing access to personal information
(Karwatzki et al. 2017a), data sharing in connected cars is
associated with the risk of financial harm (e.g., Items 2, 5, 10,
and 14 in Table 2), social harm (e.g., Items 6, 12, and 15 in
Table 2), and psychological harm (e.g., Items 6, 11, and 13 in
Table 2) to the sharing individual (Moon 2000). However, the
manifestation of data-induced threats to users’ physical safety
(e.g., Items 3 and 7 in Table 2) distinguishes the IoT context
of connected cars from other areas in which privacy is a
concern.
Personal driving data might reveal not only where individuals
live and work, but also their daily schedules and routines. One
participant stated, “The problem with the collection of driving
data is, really, that they see that from Monday until Friday I
leave home at 7 a.m. and return at 6 p.m. And there might be
someone who takes advantage of the fact that nobody is at
home … and robs your house.” He went on, “They can exactly
see where I am and when I am coming back … [and] they
know if I’m in the car with buddies from football or if my child
is with me.” The presence of a child can indeed be detected by
the car through sensors of the seat belt reminder system—a
standard feature in modern cars. As noted above, in the
context of connected cars and IoT devices in general, it is
usually not the individual data point that reveals potentially
sensitive information about users and their habits, but the
inferences made based on recurring patterns in data from a
variety of sources and from multiple points in time.
The individual user typically has little choice in regulating the
content or the quantity of data streaming from the connected
car, unless the user chooses to discontinue connectivity
services altogether, accepting a drastic degradation in
functionality. For instance, only through sharing wear-and-
tear data with the workshop can drivers benefit from
predictive maintenance services.
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Table 2. Commonly Stated Negative Consequences Associated with Data Sharing in the Context of
Connected Cars
Privacy concern
No. Description Prevalence
dimension
(Mis)use of shared driving data for unexpected purposes by the requesting
1 High Secondary use
stakeholder or resale to other companies
Threat of prosecution, fines or loss of driving license in case of recorded
2 High Secondary use
misbehavior (data transmission to the police and to regulatory authorities)
Vulnerabilities that emerge from being monitored in daily routines (e.g.,
3 burglars might find out when no one is at home or know that car is usually not High Collection
locked when parked in one’s private garage)
Unauthorized
4 Theft and manipulation of driving data (data leaks, hacker attacks) Medium
access
Denial of service or increased costs of car insurance or car rental (e.g., for Collection;
5 Medium
risky driving style) and liability issues in case of self-inflicted car accidents secondary use
6 Feelings of surveillance and the move toward a fully transparent society Medium Collection
Unauthorized
7 Manipulation of vehicle functions and car hijacking through remote access Medium
access; other
Increase of unsolicited advertisement and reward program offerings
8 Low Secondary use
(especially by car dealers and service garages)
Incorrect assignment of data to a particular driver and incorrect inferences
9 from driving data as a result (e.g., in the case of a company car or when a car Low Errors
is shared among family members)
Loss of warranty services for the vehicle (e.g., when improper handling is
10 Low Secondary use
recorded)
Feeling of being overwhelmed by the complexity of data flows of connected
11 Low Collection
cars
12 Disadvantages when applying for or performing driving jobs Low Secondary use
Identification as a potentially poor driver (feelings of embarrassment, social
13 Low Collection
stigma)
Unauthorized
Exposure to unfair practices to stimulate spending on car maintenance and
14 Low access; error;
repair (digital manipulations by car manufacturer and workshops)
other
Unintended support of optimized positioning of radar traps (based on
15 Low Secondary use
information of how fast cars drive on certain streets)
Note: Low = 10-19 responses, Medium = 20-44 responses, High = more than 45 responses

Similarly, only through sharing data on driving style with a
car insurance company can drivers obtain discounts for safe
driving. Because of this fact, some participants seem to relate
the adoption of connected cars to the inevitable sharing of
driving data with other parties, for example, “I would never
get into one of those [connected] cars…. My data belongs to
me.” This seems understandable, as privacy-enhancing
strategies, like those observed in individuals’ responses to data
requests on the web (e.g., intentionally entering false
information; see Son and Kim 2008), are not transferable to
the context of connected cars and other IoT devices. The
inevitability of data collection and the lack of control over data
flows make drivers of connected cars feel they are being
observed and exposed (see Item 6 in Table 2).
Study participants also imagined direct threats to their vehicles
and to their physical safety when driving a connected car (Item
7 in Table 2). One participant mentioned that he was concerned
that the manipulation of driving data might cause the engine to
overheat. Another stated that she was afraid that someone could
hack into the system and remotely apply or lock the brakes.
Presumably, those fears stem from media reports describing
how attackers managed to remotely manipulate connected cars
in multiple ways, such as the case of a Jeep Cherokee, which
was intercepted and driven off the road (Wired.com 2015).
Despite manufacturers’ efforts to prevent such incidents
through security systems, the fear of losing physical control
over the vehicle will continue to influence individuals’
perceptions and the adoption of connected cars.

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 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
Looking at the statements referring to negative consequences
associated with connected cars, we made two further
meaningful observations. First, notable risk spillovers may
occur, such that negative consequences are not limited to the
drivers, but instead also affect individuals in close physical
proximity (e.g., family members, co-workers, car passengers
or other drivers as well as pedestrians) and even society at
large (e.g., collective surveillance) (see Items 6 and 15 in
Table 2). Related to this argument, some negative
consequences emerge when IoT devices, especially those with
high acquisition costs, are shared with others, and the data
become incorrectly associated with another individual (see
Item 9 in Table 2). Second, particularly revealing or
consequential data streams need not necessarily be fueled by
the output of embedded sensors of connected cars only.
Instead, data streams combined from a multitude of IoT
devices can make individuals particularly vulnerable to
unsolicited contacts by commercial entities and attacks by
hackers. Privacy-related risks might hence accumulate and
potentiate within IoT ecosystems (e.g., see Item 3 in Table 2
for home security technologies).
However, it was also insightful to learn that—consistent with
the notion of privacy calculus—participants weighed the
consequential loss of control of personal driving data against
the benefits they could receive in return. In regard to sharing
data with the car manufacturer, one participant stated, “I must
admit, I would be somewhat concerned. But if it would pay
off, I would think about it.” Another said “I don’t want to
become fully transparent, to be honest. At least not if it doesn't
come with any benefits for me.” Study participants mentioned
a broad set of potential benefits that could result from sharing
personal driving data. Among the most cited were monetary
payments, supplementary personalized services, technical
improvements of vehicles, emotional benefits resulting from
supporting research and development projects, and direct
contributions to road safety or improved traffic flows.
Determinants of Negative Consequences
Whether or not connected car drivers will actually face one or
more of the negative consequences identified above will
ultimately be determined by (1) the intentional and
unintentional actions of the party with whom driving data are
shared, (2) the level of data security embedded in connected
car technology, and (3) the types of driving data that are
captured and shared. Drivers seem to make judgments
concerning these three factors through assessing the
trustworthiness of the party receiving the data, the expected
level of data security, and the sensitivity of shared data. For
the participants, trust in the other party meant believing that
any shared personal driving data would be handled
appropriately and not used for purposes other than those for
which they were granted permission. Interestingly, many
participants—even though they were consciously aware of the
potential negative consequences of data sharing—were
convinced that they, themselves, would remain unaffected.
The main reason for attributing a low likelihood to negative
scenarios was, presumably, their trust in the data-requesting
party who they believed “will do everything right.” We found
particularly high levels of trust in cases where participants
imagined that the party receiving data was the manufacturer
of their car: “With the car manufacturer? Of course I’d share
my data, because, after all, I trust them.” In contrast, less
trusting participants stated that other parties “don’t keep their
promises” and generally questioned the integrity of data
requesting parties. Some of these participants were especially
suspicious of internet companies that already engage in
intensive data collection in other contexts. One participant
stated, “Google is already observing everything I do online. I
really would not like them to monitor my driving as well.”
Participants also pointed to the technical issues related to the
protection of driving data. Statements referring to information
security of connected cars were usually negative: participants
stated that data cannot be sufficiently protected. One
participant said: “It’s like the computer. No system is 100
percent secure. Nobody can guarantee you full security.”
Regarding their overall privacy concerns, participants
reflected on the sensitivity of their driving data. Interestingly,
they came up with very different answers. One participant
said, “I don't care about my driving style. I don’t view this as
sensitive data that should be protected.” Another participant
stated the opposite: “I think information on my driving style
is as sensitive as data can get. I would be extremely concerned
if somebody got access to this data.”
Feelings of Ownership toward Driving Data
Participants’ responses indicated that the feelings of data
ownership may play an influential role in their sharing
decisions. Participants often emphasized words such as “my,”
“mine,” and “not theirs” in their answers, and, directly or
indirectly, claimed ownership of the types of data that
connected cars can capture and transmit. Such claims came with
a dismissive attitude toward the sharing of personal driving data
in general and a strong desire to exclusively control such data
in particular: “No one gets my data, simply as a matter of
principle”; “In the end, this is my data, right? Companies should
keep their hands off it.” In contrast to their more detailed
elaborations on their privacy concerns, individuals rarely
differentiated between the types of driving data they claimed
possession of. In their statements, participants instead referred
to personal driving data as a whole. The interviews were also
helpful in shedding light on why individuals wanted to preserve
their feelings of possession toward their driving data.
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Interviewees indicated that preferred car settings, radio
channels, routes traveled, and driving style are indicative of
who they are as individuals. One respondent said, “I think I
have some kind of attachment to my driving data, just as I
have to any other kind of personal information. [Having
control over driving data] is important to me, because it
reflects what kind of driver I am.” Moreover, driving data
seem to help people to take care of their vehicle and operate
it safely and skillfully. One respondent expressed this in the
following way: “The data is important because it can help
me to drive better … For example, if I do not shift gears
correctly, I might damage the engine. So, the driving data
can help me to protect my engine.” Another participant said,
“[Driving data] helps me to better understand how my car
behaves.” Emphasizing a different aspect, another
participant stated, “The way how people drive can be
improved by looking at the data. For example, it can become
more environmentally friendly.” These statements express
feelings of self-efficacy and self-identity, motives that are
said to cause individuals’ desire to experience possession
(Pierce et al 2003). While the state of psychological
ownership relates to a cognitive perception (e.g., “It’s my
private car and my private data is in it”), individuals seem to
experience it as an emotional and affective sensation. Such
feelings of ownership appear to determine participants’
desire to control access to their driving data.
Consistent with Venkatesh et al.’s (2013) statement that
interviews “can provide depth in a research inquiry by
allowing researchers to gain deep insights from rich
narratives” (p. 25), Study 1 complemented extant privacy
research and informed our exploration of data sharing
decisions in IoT contexts. First, we were able to confirm that
privacy concerns play a significant role in data sharing
decisions in the context of connected cars and we shed light
on the nature of those concerns. Most importantly, our
findings highlight the fact that IoT devices introduce an
additional category of the negative consequences of data
sharing—namely, direct threats to users’ physical safety.
These fears originate from the fact that IoT devices are
equipped with actuators that manipulate their immediate
environment based on data signals. It is this intrusion into
users’ informational and physical space that renders the
privacy implications of IoT devices different from those
related to online social networks (Krasnova et al. 2009) or
online services in general (Karwatzki et al. 2017a). Second,
our qualitative study points to the so-called psychology of
possession and property (Peck and Shu 2009) as a fruitful
avenue to arrive at a more holistic understanding of data
sharing decisions in IoT contexts. This is particularly
promising, as psychological ownership might even be a factor
4
Effectance is defined as the state of having a causal effect on an object in the
environment and constitutes the motivational aspect of competence (White 1959).
1872 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
in the sharing of low-sensitivity data, such as information on
cars’ engine oil levels and engine temperatures. Lastly, our
qualitative study highlighted the continued relevance of the
privacy calculus perspective as a basic theoretical
framework—which, however, needs to be expanded into a
contextualized model of sharing decisions that incorporates
psychological ownership effects and contextual risk factors
such as trust, data sensitivity, and data security.
Emergent Conceptual Model
Psychological Ownership
Individuals are known to feel a connection with various
objects of possession—including, and especially, homes and
cars (Dittmar 1992). Feelings of ownership can also emerge
regarding nonphysical objects such as ideas, creative
endeavors, and personal data (Anderson and Agarwal 2010;
Pierce et al. 2003). This is also the case for driving data, as
observed in our exploratory interview study (Study 1). The
concept of psychological ownership generally refers to a state
in which individuals feel as though the object is “theirs” (Pierce
et al. 2003) without presupposing legal ownership (Furby
1980). Ownership feelings develop through individual
experiences of controlling the object, getting to know the object
intimately, and investing the self into the object (Pierce et al.
2001). Such feelings are meaningful in practice as they are
shaped by—and, in turn, shape—individuals’ self-concept and
perceived self-efficacy (Belk 1988). Consistent with this notion,
Pierce and colleagues (2001) proposed that psychological
ownership is rooted in a set of various motives, namely efficacy,
effectance,4 self-identity, and home (i.e., the state of having a
physical space to inhabit). Considering the fundamental role of
perceived possessions in human lives (Belk 1988), it is not
surprising that psychological ownership has been found to
affect individual behavior in significant ways. Such behavioral
consequences include protective behaviors vis-à-vis the object
(Brown et al. 2005) and greater stewardship (Korman 1970).
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) demonstrated that psychological
ownership toward computers increases users’ intention to
protect them by means of antivirus software or firewalls. Other
scholars observed that individuals with feelings of ownership
over their ideas resist sharing them with colleagues (Webster et
al. 2008) and seek to retain exclusive control over them (Choi
and Levine 2004; Pierce et al. 2009). These behaviors appear
because of emotional distress from losing control over objects
that individuals perceive to own (Bartunek 1993) and the
feeling of loss of pleasure (Heidegger 1967).
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
Feelings of ownership toward personal driving data vary
between drivers, not least as a function of whether they own,
rent, or share their car with others (one respondent
commented: “It’s a company car anyway, I don’t care about
the data”). However, consistent with the literature on
psychological ownership and our insights from Study 1, we
expect car drivers’ feelings of ownership toward data
collected by the various sensors of their connected cars to
shape their data sharing decisions. Drivers with strong
feelings of ownership regarding their driving data are likely to
resist any request for data sharing, irrespective of privacy
concerns. Given the theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence as well as our inductive insights from Study 1, we
expect psychological ownership of driving data to trigger
protective behaviors thereby reducing data sharing. Thus,
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the drivers’ psychological
ownership of driving data, the less likely they will be willing
to share that data.
The Mediating Role of Privacy Concerns
We expect privacy concerns to mediate the negative
relationship between feelings of ownership of driving data and
the likelihood of sharing it with other parties. Exhibiting
control over an object was identified as one of the most
important paths to the development of psychological
ownership toward the object (Pierce et al. 2003). In general,
the greater the control over an object, the greater the perceived
loss when control is diminished (Pierce et al. 2003). Applied
to our context, losing the ability to control personal data would
prevent drivers from maintaining and affirming their
emotional attachment to their data. Losing control over
personal data, as we have seen, might also entail more direct
negative consequences, the likelihood and severity of which
individuals anticipate in their overall level of privacy concerns
(Smith et al. 1996). Individuals hence seem to benefit from not
disclosing personal data in two ways: it allows them to
preserve their emotional attachment toward their data and it
reduces their privacy concerns. This is why we expect that
individuals with stronger feelings of data ownership will also
express more concerns about privacy when faced with a
request to share their driving data.
Conceptually, psychological ownership describes a state of
emotional attachment to an object (e.g., driving data)
associated with the desire to maintain control over it and can
exist regardless of legal ownership (Pierce et al. 2003).
Privacy concerns, in contrast, pertain to the negative
consequences an individual associates with a loss of the ability
to control personal information as a result of sharing it with
another party (Xu et al. 2012). In line with their role as the
predominant cost dimension in the privacy calculus, privacy
concerns have been found to negatively affect individuals’
willingness to share personal data (Culnan and Armstrong
1999; Dinev and Hart 2006). Studied extensively in privacy
research, this relationship has been successfully reproduced
across various contexts (see synthesis in Li 2011). Indeed,
some scholars claim privacy concerns to be the single most
important factor in individuals’ disclosure decisions
(Malhotra et al. 2004; Stewart and Segars 2002). Linking the
concepts of psychological ownership and privacy concerns in
shaping individuals’ sharing decisions, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Privacy concerns will mediate the negative
relationship between drivers’ psychological ownership of
driving data and their likelihood of sharing that data.
The Role of Contextual Privacy Risk Factors in
Shaping Privacy Concerns
We conceptualize contextual privacy risk factors as important,
context-informed antecedents of individuals’ privacy
concerns. Behavioral or technological in nature, these risk
factors jointly determine how likely and severe individuals
expect the negative consequences of personal data sharing to
be. The three privacy risk factors that emerged as particularly
relevant in our interviews were relational trust, data sensitivity
and data security.
Consistent with our exploratory insights from Study 1, privacy
literature suggests that relational trust plays an important role
in diminishing privacy concerns (e.g., Gefen et al. 2003;
Krasnova et al. 2010; Pavlou et. Al 2007). Relational trust is
the belief that the other party in a relationship possesses
characteristics that inhibit it from engaging in opportunistic
behavior (Dinev and Hart 2006; McKnight et al. 2002). In line
with this conceptualization, individuals depict data sharing
with a trusted stakeholder as less risky because intentional
data misuse is perceived to be less likely (Gefen et al. 2003).
Because relying on trust is an effective human strategy for
dealing with uncertainty in general (Luhmann 1979), it is
likely to be a part of the decision heuristics that are relevant to
data sharing decisions in IoT settings as well. In the case of
the connected car, as with many other IoT devices, sharing
data with another party is usually not a single, one-time
transmission. Instead, individuals typically agree to
continuous or repeated transmissions of data. In the case of
telematic insurance, for example, drivers let insurers monitor
their driving behavior to receive discounts for careful driving
(Vaia et al. 2012). In this case, it is difficult for the individual
driver to assess ex ante the extent to which the ongoing
transmission of sensor-generated data could become a point of
concern in the future. For example, a car might record and
transmit speeding data, which when combined with other
information, will reveal sensitive insights through the use of
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Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
advanced analytics. Drivers’ privacy concerns are hence likely
to be shaped not only by the type of data to be shared with
another party but also by their expectations about how this
party will handle their data once shared.
Though studies conducted in other settings also point to the
role of trust, they do not provide consistent suggestions on the
positioning of trust in empirical models to explain individuals’
data sharing decisions. While some scholars have suggested
that trust enhances sharing intentions directly (e.g., Dinev et
al. 2006), others view trust as an antecedent (e.g., Krasnova et
al. 2010) or outcome of privacy concerns (e.g., Bansal et al.
2010). These differences, however, seem to be based on how
the risk-mitigating factor was conceptualized, namely as a
general (general institutional trust, as in Dinev et al. 2006) or
context-specific belief (relational trust, as in Krasnova et al.
2010). Adopting the concept of relational trust, we argue that
trust in the requesting stakeholder will directly impact
individuals’ privacy concerns in a given disclosure situation.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of trust in the data-
requesting party, the lower drivers’ privacy concerns will be.
A second contextual privacy risk factor that our interviews
revealed is the perceived sensitivity of personal driving data,
which might be low for some types of data (e.g., outside
temperature) and high for other types of data (e.g.,
acceleration patterns). Data sensitivity can be defined as the
extent to which information, if released or shared, could cause
harm to the subject of the information (Gandy 1993): for
example, in the form of social stigma (being viewed as a poor
driver; see Item 13 in Table 2), discrimination (being charged
higher rates for car rental because one’s driving style was
assessed as risky; see Item 5 in Table 2), criminal prosecution
(in case of serious speeding; see Item 2 in Table 2), or loss of
property (being robbed in times when the car’s location
indicates that nobody is home; see Item 3 in Table 2). Studies
have repeatedly shown that individuals’ willingness to share
decreases as data sensitivity increases (e.g., Nowak and
Phelps 1992; Phelps et al. 2000). Smith et al. (2011) conclude
that the level of data sensitivity might be the most important
contextual factor in individuals’ sharing decisions. As the
sensitivity of data directly relates to the severity of negative
consequences associated with disclosure (Mothersbaugh et al.
2012), it can be conceptualized as a further antecedent of
context-specific privacy concerns (Kehr et al. 2010).
Especially in the IoT context, there is substantial variance in
the sensitivity that individuals assign to different data types
being collected. This simply reflects the broad range of data
types captured by the multitude of sensors that IoT devices
such as connected cars are equipped with. Most types of data
collected are likely to be of low perceived sensitivity,
1874 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
especially those that pertain to the device’s inner workings
(e.g., engine temperature, mechanical wear and tear) and do
not allow inferences to be drawn about individual users’
preferences and behaviors. Findings from basic research on
human cognition suggest that the observed variance in data
sensitivity ratings might also stem from systematic over- and
underestimations. The cognitive biases that lead to such a
phenomenon have been repeatedly observed in situations in
which individuals are exposed to high levels of uncertainty
(Reyna 2004). Indeed, most drivers might struggle to
recognize what different types of sensor-generated data can
reveal about them, especially when combined from multiple
sources and analyzed with advanced machine learning
techniques. The complexity of such data sensitivity
assessments is arguably much higher in the IoT domain than
in contexts that users are familiar with, such as data on health
status as documented in medical records or profile data from
social network sites.
Overall, we expect users’ privacy concerns to increase with
the perceived sensitivity of the data to be collected and shared.
We thus propose:
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of perceived data
sensitivity, the higher drivers’ privacy concerns will be.
A final relevant observation from Study 1 regarding
contextual risk factors pertains to individuals’ perception of
data security. Overall, 24 of our interviewees (20% of the total
sample) mentioned concerns about nefarious actors like
hackers and cybercriminals, evoking the substantial security
challenge that IoT technologies present (Poudel 2016).
Indeed, interconnected systems that involve various devices,
computers, and transmission technologies (e.g., Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi, mobile broadband) offer multiple entry points for
attacks. Given that the vulnerability of a system is determined
by its weakest link, ensuring security in the IoT is particularly
challenging (Lowry et al. 2017). Cybersecurity challenges are
a particular concern in the domain of connected cars, not least
because of their potential physical impact (NHTSA 2018).
Governments around the globe are increasingly aware of such
security threats and are enacting legislation and voluntary
measures to tackle security issues (Lim and Taeihagh 2018).
As scholars have frequently noted (e.g., Belanger et al. 2002;
Landwehr et al. 2012), while information privacy and security
are conceptually related, they are two distinct concepts.
However, this distinction is inadequately reflected in models
of disclosure decisions (Smith et al. 2011). While privacy
refers to the level of control an individual can exert over the
collection and use of information tied to his or her identity,
security refers to the protection of data from unauthorized
access as well as damage (Belanger et al. 2002) and is
associated with three goals (Von Solms and Van Niekerk
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
2013): assurance of integrity (information should not be
altered during transmission and storage), authentication (the
identity of the parties involved and their eligibility to access
data should be verified), and confidentiality (data access and
use should be confined to authorized parties and purposes
only). Meeting these three security goals is a necessary
precondition for privacy (Acquisti et al. 2016; Smith et al.
2011). Indeed, when personal data are protected from, for
example, third-party access, meaningful control over their
usage becomes possible. Since the findings of Study 1
revealed that drivers are aware of the link between security
and privacy, we expect perceived data security to act as an
important contextual risk factor, along with trust and data
sensitivity, for shaping privacy concerns in the IoT. Thus, we
predict:
Hypothesis 5: The lower the level of perceived data security,
the higher drivers’ privacy concerns will be.
The Moderating Role of Incentive Design for Data
Sharing
Notwithstanding the protective tendencies associated with
psychological ownership, individuals are typically willing to
give up (perceived) ownership of an object in return for some
form of compensation (Belk 2010). Virtually all objects of
ownership, whether material or nonmaterial, are exchangeable
for a corresponding countervalue. Offering a countervalue
(e.g., a monetary payment or a service) in this regard typically
serves as compensation for reducing feelings of ownership. In
our final hypotheses, we propose an alternative managerial
strategy to mitigate drivers’ protective tendencies toward their
driving data—namely by understanding and appealing to
those motives that explain why individuals develop feelings
of ownership in the first place (Pierce et al. 2003).
Possessions help individuals define themselves, express their
self-identity to others, and maintain continuity of the self
(Price et al. 2000). This is the case even when the possession
is personal data. As cited earlier, drivers we interviewed
indicated attachment to their driving data. Further,
possessions help their owners achieve desired outcomes, both
socially and physically (Dittmar 1992). As a case in point, our
interviewees viewed their driving data as a means to better
understand their car, avoid damaging it, and, ultimately,
become a better driver.
Pierce et al. (2003) concluded that psychological ownership
must serve the motives of self-identity as well as efficacy and
effectance. It is thus not surprising that some suggest that a
loss of perceived ownership can bring “a sense of shrinkage
of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to
nothingness” (James 1890, p. 293). Loss of possessions can
trigger feelings of depression (Formanek 1991). This raises
the question of whether personal data could be used in such a
way that the motives of self-identity and effectance are
enhanced rather than threatened. In that case, the effect of
psychological ownership on individuals’ data-sharing
decisions might weaken or even change direction, thus
increasing data sharing rather than decreasing it. Such a
change could occur as a result of introducing carefully
designed incentives that enable individuals to enhance their
self-efficacy and contribute to their self-identity as a direct
consequence of disclosing their personal data. Consider the
case of sharing your driving data in exchange for obtaining
access to real-time feedback on your driving style that helps
you improve your driving and confirms your self-image of
being a skillful driver. While the idea of compensation rests
on inhibiting feelings of ownership, such subtler incentives
help to foster psychological ownership as an emotional state
through sharing, thereby redirecting the influence of
psychological ownership on individuals’ behavior. In this
case, both the negative effect of psychological ownership and
the need for compensation might dissipate.
Hui et al. (2006) identified self-enhancement, defined as the
improvement of the self-concept in relation to others, as a
major motivation to share personal data. They found that
incentives that build up one’s self-concept—such as a premier
membership that reflects a certain status in an online
community—increased individuals’ intention to share
personal information. Perhaps the most compelling evidence
for the validity of our arguments, however, is the massive self-
disclosure observable on online social networks such as
Facebook (Chen 2013). Despite expressed privacy concerns
(Krasnova et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2008), large-scale data leaks
(e.g., the Facebook—Cambridge Analytica controversy in
2018), and perceived psychological ownership (Spiekermann
et al. 2012), individuals continue to share highly personal data
on online platforms, with the expression and enhancement of
their identity being the key motivators (Schau and Gilly 2003).
Early privacy research found that individuals do not usually
receive direct benefits from sharing personal data on the
internet but receive indirect benefits when the sharing enables
them to conduct transactions online (Dinev and Hart 2006).
Revealing one’s shipping address and credit card information
to e-merchants, for example, makes it possible to order
products offered in online stores. Similarly, sharing personal
financial information with a banking institution makes it
possible to use e-banking services. Beyond being a
prerequisite for the use of various digital services offered
today, disclosing personal information allows individuals to
increase their ability to derive value from digital services
while decreasing their effort. For example, when registering
for Pinterest, users are asked to specify topics they are most
interested in. This ensures that only relevant content will be
MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1875
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
shown to them during their future visits to the image-based
social network. Other companies infer users’ interests directly
from past interactions with their service: for example, the
viewing histories of YouTube users determine future video
recommendations. Whether the process is enabled by
deliberate data sharing or not, the exploitation of personal data
to make a digital service more relevant allows individuals to
reach their goals more efficiently—e.g., quickly finding
videos that fit their preferences. Some privacy scholars have
tried to capture individuals’ perception of this form of self-
efficacy enhancement via gains in convenience while
performing certain online tasks. Hui et al. (2006), for example,
found that expected time savings can motivate consumers to
share personal information on the web. Similarly, Hann et al.
(2007) showed that users are willing to give up some of their
privacy to gain more convenience when using websites that
are personalized to their preferences. These self-efficacy
enhancing effects are likely to be even stronger for IoT
devices and services that offer data-driven personalization
advantages—for example, smart shoes that suggest the most
effective training plan based on its wearers past running
history and vital signs.
Synthesizing our theoretical arguments, we expect the design
of incentives that appeal to motives of psychological
ownership to be a particularly effective and legitimate
managerial strategy for encouraging data sharing in the face
of feelings of ownership. Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis 6a: Incentive design that enhances drivers’ self-
efficacy will moderate the relationship between psychological
ownership of driving data and the likelihood of data sharing,
such that the higher the self-efficacy enhancement associated
with the incentive employed, the weaker the negative effect
will be.
Hypothesis 6b: Incentive design that is congruent with
drivers’ self-image will moderate the relationship between
psychological ownership of driving data and the likelihood of
data sharing, such that the higher the congruence of the
incentive employed with drivers’ self-image, the weaker the
negative effect will be.
We show our full conceptual model in Figure 2. While the
focus of Study 2 is on testing for mediation (Hypotheses 1 and
2), Study 3 tests the effects of contextual risk factors
(Hypotheses 3 and 4) as well as the moderating role of
incentive design (Hypotheses 6a and 6b). In sum, our
conceptual model provides a sense of continuity with extant
privacy research but also introduces extensions to existing
models of disclosure decision-making that emerged from our
deep engagement with the context of IoT in general and
connected cars in particular. Regarding the determinants of
data sharing that have been detected by studies in other
1876 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
settings (i.e., relational trust, data sensitivity), we advance
current knowledge by explicating their critical role in IoT
contexts. Regarding factors that have been underexplored or
not yet considered by privacy scholars (i.e., data security and
psychological ownership), we provide new insights. These
highlight the important role of individuals’ perceptions of data
security and psychological ownership in shaping their data
sharing behavior. As such, they also illustrate the potential of
a more nuanced view of incentives for data sharing that
connect to more subtle human needs.
Study 2: Psychological Ownership and
Privacy Concerns
Methods
Design: In Study 2, we collected survey data and conducted
structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the extent to
which psychological ownership negatively affects drivers’
willingness to share driving data (Hypothesis 1) and whether
this effect is mediated by privacy concerns (Hypothesis 2). To
test our hypotheses, we measured our core variables after
exposing subjects to a hypothetical data sharing scenario
(Rosenthal and Rosnow 2006). Scenario-based approaches
are appropriate for studying novel technology contexts (Sheng
et al. 2008) and are commonly used in the privacy literature
(e.g., Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Malhotra et al. 2004; Xu
et al. 2009). Accounting for the situational sensitivity of
privacy decision-making (e.g., Anderson and Agarwal 2011;
Acquisti et al. 2012), we provided all subjects with specific
information on contextual factors that have been shown in
previous literature to influence individuals’ sharing intentions.
These comprise the type of data (Phelps et al. 2000), the
requesting stakeholder, and the declared purpose of data usage
(Anderson and Agarwal 2011). We carefully selected
contextual factors to create a realistic scenario related to the
use of connected cars, while minimizing trigger effects on
both the positive (e.g., arguments for sharing) and the negative
(e.g., concerns) side, which could otherwise bias our findings
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix). To further reduce ambiguity,
the scenario description also contained information on
connected car technology.
Procedure: We administered a paper-based questionnaire, in
person, to 333 car drivers in Germany (age: M = 32.3 years,
SD = 15.6; gender: 45% female; car usage: M = 12,765
km/year, SD = 11,448; legal ownership of car: 46%; Facebook
users: 70 %). This data collection approach allowed us to
include in our sample individuals who would normally not
participate in standard mail or online surveys (see Basi 1999),
increasing the variety of views in our study.

CO NTEXTUAL PRIVACY RISK FACTO RS
Relational Data
Trust Sensitivity
H3 (-) H4 (+)
Privacy
Concerns
H2 (mediation)
Psychological H1 (-)
Ownership H6a
(moderation)
Self-Efficacy
Enhancement
INCENTIVE DESIG N
Figure 2. Research Model
We asked participants to imagine a situation in which they
were approached by the manufacturer of their car with a
request for real-time driving data on braking, acceleration, and
speed, which would be used in an internal research project
(full scenario description in the appendix). The driver retained
the right to opt out at any time. No compensation was offered
in return for data sharing. After reading the scenario
description, participants filled out a set of survey questions.
Whenever possible, we adapted measures from previously
validated multi-item scales to ensure adequate reliability and
validity. Drivers’ willingness to share driving data served as
a proxy for actual data sharing and was measured by a single
item linked to the specific connected car scenario (“How high
is your willingness to participate in the research project and
let your car transmit the aforementioned driving data to your
car manufacturer?” measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale
where 1 = very low and 7 = very high).5 To capture privacy
concerns, we drew upon the widely employed concern for
information privacy scale (CFIP) developed by Smith et al.
(1996) and followed the common procedure of adapting the
wording of the items to the study context (e.g., Xu et al. 2012).
CFIP is conceptualized as a reflective second-order factor
comprising four first-order components: collection of
personal information, unauthorized secondary use of personal
5
A single-item measure is appropriate here, as the concept pertains to a single
concrete object (specified set of driving data) and a single concrete attribute
(willingness to share data) (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007).
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
Data
Security
H5 (-)
Sharing of
Personal
H6b Driving Data
(moderation)
Self-Image
Congruency
information, errors in personal information, and improper
access to personal information. Agreement to statements was
measured on a 7-point scale (where 1 = strongly disagree and
7 = strongly agree). The construct of psychological ownership
originally formulated by Pierce et al. (2001) was captured by
a well-established four-item measure employed in previous
studies (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Peck and Shu 2009).
Table A4 in the Appendix lists all measurement items and
their respective sources. In addition to the core constructs, the
survey also captured relevant control variables, including age,
gender, education, higher education, car usage (in km/year),
and whether the participant is an active user of online social
networks (OSN usage).
Analysis: We used covariance-based SEM techniques, as
implemented in AMOS 25, to test the proposed
relationships. Following a two-step approach, we first
assessed the quality of our measures through the
measurement model and then tested hypotheses through the
structural model. Maximum likelihood estimations were
employed for the model assessment. To establish mediation,
we followed the procedure proposed by Preacher and Hayes
(2004) and examined the significance of the indirect effect
with bootstrapped data.
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Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
Table 3. SEM Model Explaining Differences in Drivers’ Willingness to Share Personal Driving Data (Study 2)
PO → Willingness to share driving data
PO → PC
PC → Willingness to share driving data
PO → PC → Willingness to share driving data
(indirect effect)
Note: n = 333; PO = psychological ownership; PC = privacy concerns; controls = age, gender, education, higher education, car usage (in
km/year), OSN usage; estimates are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Findings and Discussion
Results of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) supported the
convergent and discriminant validity of all multi-item scales.
The reliability of all scales exceeded the generally accepted
threshold of a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978). Model
fit indices suggested that the proposed factor structure has a
reasonably good fit with the data (CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.99, SRMR
= 0.04, and RMSEA = 0.04) (Hu and Bentler 1999). The
unstandardized regression weights of the structural model
provided support for the hypothesized relationships (Table 3).
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, we found a statistically
significant negative effect of psychological ownership on
individuals’ willingness to share driving data (Model 1: B = -
0.568 p < 0.01). Hypothesis 1 was thus supported.
To test whether this effect is mediated by a third variable, as
expressed in Hypothesis 2, we estimated indirect effects. In
this regard, bootstrap analyses with 5000 replications revealed
that the negative effect of psychological ownership on
willingness to share is indeed mediated by privacy concerns,
as indicated by a significant indirect effect (Model 2: B = -
0.316, 95% BC CI [-0.480, -0.179]). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was
supported. The weakened but detectable direct effect of
psychological ownership on willingness to share (Model 2: B
= -0.253, p < 0.01) suggests a complementary mediation
(Zhao et al. 2010). We replicated the empirical findings in
support of H1 and H2 across two additional independent
samples. One sample (n1=131) was composed of active users
of Facebook, the other of technically educated employees of a
major German car manufacturer (n2=730). In the light of
arguments that, for example, digital natives or individuals
with technical knowledge might systematically differ in their
disclosure decision-making (Dinev and Hart 2006; Marwick
et al. 2010), the successful replication of our findings
increased our confidence in their validity.
1878 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
Model 1 Model 2
-0.568*** -0.253***
(0.066) (0.088)
0.505***
–
(0.050)
-0.625***
–
(0.122)
-0.316***
–
(0.077)
After establishing the basic mediation of our proposed
research model, we designed Study 3 to examine the role of
incentives and contextual privacy risk factors in individuals’
sharing decisions. As such, Study 3 benefits from and builds
upon Study 2, which explicated the fundamental interplay
between psychological ownership, privacy concerns, and data
sharing, in order to establish a more comprehensive model of
individuals’ sharing decisions.
Study 3: Privacy Risks and Service
Design in Data Sharing Decisions
Methods
Design: In Study 3, we examined how contextual privacy risk
factors affect individuals’ privacy concerns (Hypotheses 3-5)
and the extent to which incentive design can mitigate the
protective tendencies associated with strong feelings of
ownership (Hypotheses 6a and 6b: Moderation). To test these
extensions of our previously established mediation model, we
conducted a field study designed to observe drivers’ actual
data sharing decisions in the presence of an incentive.
We conducted a survey-based pilot study to inform the design
of our field experiment. We surveyed car drivers in Germany
(n=346) to identify incentive mechanisms that would mitigate
the negative effect of psychological ownership on drivers’
data sharing decisions. Consistent with our theoretical
perspective, only those incentives that appealed to the motives
of psychological ownership neutralized the negative effect of
psychological ownership. This was especially true of the data-
enabled service of real-time driving analysis (digital driving
assistant), which can potentially enhance both one’s self-
identity as a skilled driver and one’s perceived self-efficacy of
being able to control the car at all times. To translate these
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
insights from our survey-based pilot study into our field study,
we established a research collaboration with TomTom
Telematics, a leading automobile device company, to obtain
access to a retrofittable plugin telematics device known as the
TomTom Curfer along with its associated mobile app.
Procedure: In the first step, through an online survey, we
identified 324 individuals who met our selection criteria of (1)
owning or having regular access to a car built in 2004 or later
and (2) having a smartphone with a mobile data plan. Our final
sample (age: M = 32.2 years, SD = 15.0; gender: 43% female;
frequent driving: 80%; legal ownership of car: 58%; online
social network users: 76%) contained car drivers who were all
capable of making use of the telematics service we offered
from a technical viewpoint. In the second step, the 324
selected participants were asked to provide information on key
constructs described below and to decide whether or not to
enroll as a test driver and share driving data through the
TomTom Curfer with real-time driving analysis capabilities.
The device they would then receive is easy to install and
transmits personal driving data6 to TomTom, the service
provider. In return for agreeing to share their driving data,
participants obtained full access to all functionalities of the
digital driving assistant—real-time feedback on acceleration,
cornering and braking, insights into car performance, trip
review, and driving style badges—through the TomTom
Curfer smartphone app. To enable informed decisions, we
provided individuals with background information on the
underlying technology and the associated data flows.
Our dependent variable, sharing of driving data, constitutes a
discrete choice and was hence measured by a binary variable.
This variable takes the value of “1” if a participant agreed to
share her driving data and physically installed the telematics
device in her car and of “0” otherwise. As such, Study 3 is one
of the first in the field of privacy research to go beyond
intentions to share and has captured actual data sharing
decisions in a field setting.
To measure privacy concerns associated with the digital
driving assistant, we relied on the same scale as in Study 2
(i.e., CFIP, again modeled as a reflective second-order
factor). We also used the same instrument to measure
psychological ownership toward the requested personal
driving data. We captured participants’ perception of the
service provider’s trustworthiness (relational trust) with a
four-item scale (Tax et al. 1998) with 7-point Likert-type
response options (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly
6
The requested data comprised “Information related to your vehicle and how
you drive it such as time of start/stop, idling time, speed and speed distribution,
distance driven, braking, cornering, acceleration, battery levels and status,
agree). We asked participants to rate the sensitivity of the
requested data (data sensitivity) on a scale of 1 (not sensitive)
to 7 (very sensitive) (Kehr et al. 2015). To assess how much
the driving analytic service that was offered appealed to
participants’ self-identity, we used the self-image
congruency scale developed by Sirgy et al. (1997). Self-
efficacy enhancement referred to how much the drivers
believed that using the digital driving assistant would
improve their driving ability; our measurement here was a
reformulated scale that originally assessed how well a
specific website supports an individual in online shopping
(Childers et al. 2001). In the absence of suitable established
scales for individuals’ perceptions of data security that are
sufficiently distinct from privacy concerns, we developed a
new instrument that captures the extent to which individuals
consider their personal data in a specific setting to be at risk
of being corrupted, manipulated, deleted, or accessed
without authorization during data collection, storage, or
transfer. As part of the scale development process, we
generated an item pool based on prior data security literature.
We tested this item pool among a student sample (n=159;
detailed results are available from the authors upon request).
Based on results from exploratory factor analyses, we
eliminated items with low loadings and retained four items
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83).
We also captured relevant control variables pertaining to
personal characteristics including age, gender, education,
higher education, and active use of online social networks
(OSN usage). Additionally, we captured information on
whether an individual used his or her car frequently
(frequent driver = more than two rides per week) and
exclusively (exclusive driver).
Analysis: Given the binary nature of our dependent variable,
we used Bayesian structural equation modeling (BSEM) as
implemented in IBM SPSS Amos 25 to test our hypotheses
(Byrne 2016). In contrast to the frequentist approach, the
Bayesian method views parameters (e.g., the mean) as
variables instead of constants. This requires making fewer
asymptotic assumptions than, for example, maximum
likelihood estimation (Muthén and Asparouhov 2012). We
set noninformative priors and used the Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to draw random values of
parameters from a high-dimensional joint posterior
distribution (Gelman et al. 2004). To test our moderating
hypotheses, we specified latent interactions in our model
using the matched pairs approach (Marsh et al. 2004).
engine load, engine throttle levels,” together with “Information that identifies
you, your vehicle, your OBD2 dongle, and your smartphone.”
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Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things

Table 4. Bayesian SEM Model Explaining Data Sharing Decisions (Study 3)

Model 1 Model 2
Trust → PC (H3) -0.243 (0.070) *** -0.249 (0.071) ***
Data Sensitivity → PC (H4) 0.190 (0.043) *** 0.192 (0.043) ***
Data Security → PC (H5) -0.505 (0.064) *** -0.501 (0.064) ***
PO → Data Sharing 0.243 (0.182) n.s. 0.223 (0.177) n.s.
PC → Data Sharing -0.819 (0.271) *** -0.754 (0.274) ***
Self-efficacy enhancement
0.583 (0.164) *** –
→ Data Sharing
Self-efficacy enhancement x PO
→ Data Sharing (H6a) 0.649 (0.303) ** –

Self-image congruency
→ Data Sharing – 0.772 (0.299) ***

Self-image congruency x PO
→ Data Sharing (H6b) – 0.201 (0.175) n.s.

Note: n= 324; PC = privacy concerns, PO = psychological ownership; Controls = age, gender, education, higher education, OSN usage,
frequent driver, exclusive driver; Estimates are unstandardized coefficients. In lieu of standard errors, Bayesian estimation procedure in
SPSS Amos provides “posterior standard deviation” (in parentheses). n.s.= not significant
* 90% posterior interval does not contain zero (i.e., 95% of posterior draws is positive or negative),
** 95% posterior interval does not contain zero (i.e., 97.5% of posterior draws is positive or negative),
*** 99% posterior interval does not contain zero (i.e., 99.5% of posterior draws is positive or negative).

Findings and Discussion negatively related to individuals’ privacy concerns (Model

A CFA supported the convergent validity for all multi-item
measures (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The discriminant
validity of our measurements is supported in all cases except
one. In the case of self-image congruency and self-efficacy
enhancement, the square root of the average variance
extracted (AVE) exhibits a slightly lower value than the
interconstruct correlation. Testing the hypothesized
moderators by estimating one model only is hence not
feasible (Hair et al. 2010). The reliability of all scales
exceeded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978). Model
fit indices suggest that the proposed factor structure has a
good fit with the data (CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97, SRMR = 0.04,
and RMSEA = 0.05) (Hu and Bentler 1999).
Table 4 summarizes the median estimates of the structural
relationships and indicates whether their 90%, 95%, and
99% posterior intervals contain zero. The results for both
models were obtained with 500 burn-in samples and 50,000
iterations. Relying on the measure suggested by Gelman et
al. (2004), our analysis exhibited a sufficient convergence of
the chains with final values reaching 1.0014 (Model 1) and
1.0018 (Model 2).
1: B = -0.243; Model 2: -0.249; 99.5% of posterior draws are
negative). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. We further
found that the more sensitive the requested data were, the
higher the individuals’ privacy concerns tended to be (Model
1: B = 0.190; Model 2: 0.192; 99.5% of posterior draws are
positive). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported. Regarding our
third contextual privacy risk factor, we found that an
individual’s perceptions of data security significantly
affected his or her privacy concerns. The more negative
perceived data security was, the higher the privacy concerns
reported by the study participants (Model 1: B = -0.505/
Model 2: -0.501; 99.5% of posterior draws are negative).
Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported.
Among the study participants, 24 participants (7.4%) agreed
to install the telematics device in their car and transmitted
verifiable personal driving data to the service provider. The
results of the BSEM explaining such sharing of driving data
are consistent with findings from Study 2 on sharing
intentions. They indicate that privacy concerns significantly
reduce the likelihood that a driver will decide to share
personal driving data (Model 1: B = -0.819; / Model 2: -
0.754; 99.5% of posterior draws are negative).

Consistent with the theoretical arguments, Bayesian Our moderation Hypotheses 6a and 6b suggested that
estimates indicated that perceptions of the trustworthiness of incentives—in our case, digital driving assistants—that
the requesting stakeholder—the service provider—were enhance drivers’ self-efficacy or are congruent with their

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 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
self-image may contain the negative effect of psychological
ownership on data sharing. High correlation between self-
efficacy enhancement and self-image congruency (r = 0.82)
and VIFs above commonly recommended thresholds
suggested that results would be more reliable if the
hypothesized moderating effects of both variables were
tested separately (see Model 1 and Model 2) (Hair et al.
1995). The coefficient for the interaction term of self-
efficacy enhancement and psychological ownership was
positive and significant (Model 1: B= 0.649; 97.5% of
posterior draws are positive), lending support for Hypothesis
6a. The nonsignificant coefficient for self-image congruency
x psychological ownership (Model 2: B = 0.201, 95% of
posterior draws are positive and negative), on the other hand,
does not indicate a moderating effect. Hence, Hypothesis 6a
was supported and Hypothesis 6b was not supported. This
7
might result from the fact that the design of the digital
driving assistant was more effective at enhancing drivers’
self-efficacy in the driving task (Mean= 3.65, SD=1.54) than
at facilitating the expression of their self-identity (Mean=
2.85, SD= 1.46). One possible explanation for rather low
average ratings of the digital driving style assistant’s level of
self-image congruency lies in the design of its user interface.
It could be described as rather neutral in the sense that it did
not contain visual cues that would evoke associations with
appealing themes in the context of personal mobility (e.g., a
helmet for motorsport or a leaf for environmental
awareness). Apart from this, Carter and Grover (2015)
suggest that an IS artifact, in general, will be viewed as
integral to a person’s sense of self when it is woven into
personal and social routines, which might apply less to the
digital driving assistant employed in this study.
General Discussion
The IoT, in general, and connected cars, in particular, are
important and rapidly expanding contexts in which the
physical and the virtual converge. This introduces novel
privacy challenges that are both increasingly prevalent and
still largely unexplored. We contribute to a deeper
understanding of data sharing decisions and possible
managerial options to enhance data sharing for service
innovation. The model of data sharing decisions that we
developed and validated in three complementary studies
provides new insights into the nature and interplay of
psychological ownership, privacy concerns, incentive
design, and data sharing in the context of connected cars.
7
We also tested all hypotheses using standard logistic regression techniques
and corresponding moderation analyses. This yielded qualitatively identical
Implications for Research
Our findings contribute to the interdisciplinary field of privacy
research with contextual, theoretical, and methodological
extensions of the literature on individual data sharing.
First, regarding our connected car context, we respond to calls
for extending the boundaries of privacy research by exploring
novel empirical settings (Smith et al. 2011). The four
characteristics we identified to be determining for the nature
of the privacy threats that users are exposed to while
interacting with IoT devices (see section “Privacy in the IoT
context”) underscore the need for dedicated privacy
research—both empirical and conceptual—in this domain
(Lowry et al. 2017; Shim et al. 2020). These characteristics
exemplify both similarities to and differences from what has
been detected in other settings. For example, our findings
point out that individuals’ privacy concerns in the domain of
IoT are triggered not only by virtual risks but also by physical
ones like exposure to burglars, manipulation of vehicle
functions, and car hijacking through hacker attacks. This
amalgamation of the virtual and the physical in the IoT points
to the need to treat informational and physical privacy as
interdependent rather than independent concepts (Smith et al.
2011). Similarly, the technological developments associated
with the IoT increase the potential for cross-fertilization
between research on behavioral aspects of privacy and
technical aspects of security (Shim et al. 2020). Our Studies 2
and 3 provide quantitative evidence for the link between
privacy and cybersecurity in the connected car context, with
privacy concerns increasing as data security decreased. We
also argue that data sharing and device usability are uniquely
intertwined in the IoT. Typically, IoT users only benefit from
the value proposition if they engage in unconstrained data
sharing despite the virtual and physical risks as well as the
psychological costs associated with it. This dilemma makes
the question of appropriate compensation and incentive
mechanisms for users, as well as our theory and evidence in
this regard, particularly relevant in the IoT. We argue that such
insights extracted from connected cars might well generalize
to the broader class of IoT devices.
Second, with regard to theory, our research makes several
additions to extant conceptual models of data sharing
decisions that may well enhance the explanatory power and
relevance of privacy research against the emerging realities of
the IoT. This is of particular value in light of the growing
criticism of the privacy calculus perspective and its focus on
privacy concerns as the predominant, if not the only,
perceived cost assumed to affect individuals’ sharing
decisions (Acquisti et al. 2015; Dinev et al. 2015; Keith et al.
conclusions with regard to all hypotheses. Results are available from the
authors upon request.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1881
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
2012). Indeed, individuals are often reluctant to share their
data even under conditions of anonymity, when privacy
concerns are unlikely to be at play (Chellappa and Sin 2005;
Coy 2001). Hence, extant privacy-centered models are unable
to sufficiently explain the sharing of anonymized and
seemingly low-sensitivity data, the kind of data that is of
practical relevance to service innovation in the IoT. In this
regard, our qualitative analyses from Study 1 suggest that the
perceptions about the costs of data sharing are more diverse
than previously assumed. In that regard and similar to
previous findings, we show that individuals exhibit strong
feelings of ownership not only with regard to physical IT
artifacts (like a computer as in Anderson and Agarwal 2010),
but also in terms of the data that those artifacts process (like
social network profile information, as in Spiekerman et al.
2012). The sharing of personal data—even if less sensitive—
might thus be perceived as a loss of psychological ownership
that threatens individuals’ emotional attachment to their data.
Consistent with these arguments, our quantitative findings
reveal that feelings of ownership have important behavioral
implications in the context of data sharing decisions—
especially when legal ownership is ambiguous, as is still the
case in many IoT domains (Kohler and Colbert-Taylor 2014;
Zmud et al. 2016). Our results also indicate that a deeper
understanding of the motives underpinning psychological
ownership can inform the design of effective incentives to
compensate individuals for sharing their data. Incentives in
the form of data-enabled services can be designed so that they
appeal to the fundamental motives that underpin
psychological ownership (e.g., self-efficacy), letting the act of
data sharing enhance rather than threaten this desired
emotional state.
Third, regarding methods, our study illustrates the
complementary nature of qualitative and quantitative research
methods. Qualitative methods provide context-specific insights
into salient factors that influence key behaviors or outcomes,
which can then be measured through quantitative methods. For
instance, without context-specific understanding through
qualitative analysis, we may not have identified psychological
ownership as a main determinant of individuals’ willingness to
share driving data. Our mixed methods approach and the
opportunities for methodological triangulation it provides,
however, also put us in the position to contribute to two
methodological debates among privacy scholars. The first
debate pertains to the potential biases induced by survey studies,
the predominant approach in privacy research. There is growing
awareness among privacy scholars that participants’ exposure
to a privacy concern scale might trigger such concern in the first
place, given the emotional and cognitive processes it initiates
(Alashoor et al. 2017). The established multidimensional scales
(e.g., Smith et al. 1996; Malhotra et al. 2004) might draw
participants’ attention to areas of personal data misuse that they
might not have thought about before (e.g., excessive collection
1882 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
or unauthorized access to data). That said, our qualitative and
quantitative studies converge in highlighting the significance of
privacy concerns regarding connected cars. Perhaps most
importantly, 41% of participants in Study 1 associated
connected cars with a threat to their privacy. The strong privacy
concerns observed across our three studies are, hence, not a
methodological artifact of the priming effect of survey
instruments. Our work also has implications for a second
methodological debate that encourages privacy researchers to
advance from explaining data sharing intentions to observing
actual data sharing behavior (e.g., Belanger and Crossler 2011;
Dinev et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2011). As the first attempt to
examine both outcome variables in the same empirical
context—data sharing intentions in Study 2 and data sharing
behavior in Study 3—we found that our results converge across
the two outcome variables.
Implications for Practice and Policy
Our research also contributes to the ongoing public
discussion on how to balance organizations’ interests in
collecting and monetizing personal data with users’ interests
in controlling and benefitting from that data. Several IS
scholars have called for research to advance the
understanding of privacy and cybersecurity by addressing
these controversial and unresolved issues (Lowry et al.
2017) rather than trying to fill gaps in literature without
making any practically relevant contributions (Rai 2017).
Indeed, engaged IS scholarship has an important role to play,
not only in developing a better understanding the perceived
and actual vulnerabilities of IoT users, but also in deriving
countermeasures and incentive mechanisms that enable
value creation in IoT ecosystems. As such, our work helps
address a practical issue that ranks among the most persistent
barriers to the adoption of connected car services, such as
telematic insurance, digital driving assistants, and predictive
maintenance (Foley 2017; Jean 2020).
The contextual privacy risk factors that we uncovered offer
multiple points of departure for managerial action. As our
findings indicate, building relational trust with users helps to
alleviate their privacy concerns and ultimately enhances data
sharing, the central precondition for connected car services.
Data-requesting stakeholders could signal their integrity and
reduce perceived risks of data sharing through transparent data
usage policies, user-friendly privacy settings, and external
guarantees of privacy through privacy seals provided by third-
party organizations (Rifon et al. 2005; Xu et al. 2011).
Moreover, car manufacturers and technology providers would
be well-advised to take seriously drivers’ beliefs about
security, which are closely intertwined with privacy concerns
in IoT-related contexts, as our study shows. This will involve
embedding resilient security systems into IoT devices,
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
informing users of any residual security risks, and educating
them on how best to contain them. For the latter two, the
negative consequences revealed in our interviews represent
possible starting points for better communication with drivers.
In addition, policy makers could implement certifications that
stipulate a sufficient level of data security as a precondition
for the launch of an IoT product. Our analyses of contextual
privacy risk factors also revealed that privacy concerns—and
subsequently data sharing—varied notably across the levels of
perceived data sensitivity. Hence, rather than simply
depriving car drivers of their privacy and maximizing the
collection and use of connected car data, service providers
may adopt more selective and tailored approaches to design
data-enabled services that stand out from the competition by
offering the best possible ratio of customer benefit to data
consumption, especially at the high sensitivity end of the data
spectrum. Alternatively, sensitive data could be processed
only locally, i.e., on users’ IoT devices without transferring
the data to the cloud and hence shielding it from further central
storage and analysis (see edge computing, Shi and Dustdar
2016). Our findings also underline the promise of “privacy-
by-design” principles (Cavoukian 2011) when designing and
evaluating solutions to create value from the data generated by
connected cars and other smart and interconnected devices.
Perhaps most profoundly, our findings reveal that, despite
strong feelings of ownership, drivers may be willing to share
their data in exchange for appropriate compensation in the form
of offers that address the motives underlying their feelings of
ownership. As illustrated in our Study 3, this compensation can
take the form of a digital driving assistant that helps users learn
about their driving style. Rather than attempting to suppress
users’ feelings of ownership toward their data, stakeholders in
the connected car and broader IoT arena could partner with
users in an open innovation environment to design services that
appeal to drivers’ self-identity, enhance perceptions of self-
efficacy, and further enforce drivers’ psychological ownership
regarding the data that their connected vehicles and other IoT
devices generate. As a case in point, it would be interesting to
consider how gamification elements could further enhance the
experience of self-efficacy (Hamari et al. 2014) and be
integrated in services such as the driving style assistant
employed in our Study 3. We believe that psychological
ownership will gain in relevance as policy makers seek to
empower users and provide them with greater control over the
collection, storage, and use of their data. The 2018 reform of
European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Rules
(GDPR) has empowered users and strengthened their
bargaining position in the emerging data economy. Overall, we
hope that our findings will help practitioners and policy makers
better understand drivers’ concerns about sharing driving data,
placing organizations in a better position to recognize their
digital responsibility and design technologies, services, and
policies centered on users’ privacy and ownership needs.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our study has theoretical and empirical limitations that
offer several meaningful opportunities for future research.
First, as with all self-reported data, our research is exposed
to a possible common method bias, as in our Study 2, which
uses data sharing intentions as a dependent variable. We
sought to reduce this threat ex ante by implementing
procedural remedies recommended by Podsakoff et al.
(2003), including guaranteeing the anonymity of survey
participants, providing contextual information and
definitions to reduce ambiguity, and informing participants
that there were no right or wrong answers. Moreover,
results from Harman’s single-factor test, the unmeasured
latent method construct approach (Liang et al. 2007), and
the specific bias test (Serrano Archimi et al. 2018) jointly
suggested that common method bias was unlikely to affect
the results of Study 2. Future research could go a step
further and measure data sharing intentions at a later point
in time using a different instrument.
Second, the design of our field study, Study 3, may have
limited our ability to detect the moderating effect associated
with increased self-image congruency (Hypothesis 6b). As
outlined above, it might well be that the digital driving
assistant did not allow for a meaningful expression of
drivers’ self-identity, given its limited integration into the
drivers’ daily life (Carter and Grover 2015). We encourage
IS scholars to refine our study design and further examine
the effect that incentives with high self-image congruency
could have in terms of redirecting the effect of psychological
ownership on data sharing.
Third, our empirical focus on the data sharing decisions of car
drivers in Germany, who are known to be particularly
hesitant to share data with connected cars (McKinsey, 2016),
allowed for local theorizing and interpretation (Chiasson and
Davidson 2005) but might constrain the generalizability of
our empirical findings (Seddon and Scheepers 2011). Future
replication studies could seek to establish the statistical
generalizability of our empirical findings to other
geographical settings that differ in terms of cultural beliefs,
prevalent attitudes toward possession, and privacy norms
(Dinev et al. 2006; Lowry et al. 2011). However, we expect
our theoretical model to be generalizable to a broad set of
smart, connected devices in the IoT that generate continuous
streams of data as by-products of everyday use (Porter and
Heppelmann 2014).
Lastly, mixed methods research is associated with additional
sources of bias that pose a threat to the inference quality of
such study designs. One of these limitations results from
making statistical generalizations from a sample population to
a larger population (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006). It is
MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1883
Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things
possible that our interview participants and the participants
recruited for our quantitative Studies 2 and 3 were not
representative of the population. This would limit the
transferability of findings between studies and would affect
the meta-inferences that emerge from our mixed methods
design. However, the concerns associated with the integration
of multiple samples are mitigated as our data are from a
relatively large number of interviewees (n=120) and survey
respondents (>300). Study participants were recruited through
the same channels and exhibited similar sociodemographic
characteristics across all our studies. A second potential
limitation of our mixed methods design pertains to a possible
bias that originates from the sequence in which our studies
were conducted (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006). It is
possible that some of our findings are dependent on the order
in which the studies were administered and that our
interpretation could be different if the order of the quantitative
and qualitative phases had been reversed.
Conclusion
The connected car represents a critical stepping stone toward
the vision of a fully interconnected and enriched experience of
personal mobility. As a significant IS artifact in consumer IoT,
the connected car simultaneously presents substantial
opportunities for data-enabled value creation and
unprecedented threats to drivers’ informational and physical
privacy. This calls for refined models of data sharing that
account for the emerging realities of the connected car and the
broader IoT. Against this backdrop, we conducted three
complementary studies to develop and validate a conceptual
model based on the interplay of psychological ownership,
privacy concerns, and data sharing. We found evidence that
drivers exhibit feelings of data ownership that reduced their data
sharing propensity, both directly and indirectly, because of
heightened concerns about privacy. Privacy concerns, in turn,
were shaped by relational trust toward the data-requesting party,
perceptions of data security, and the perceived sensitivity of the
data requested. We demonstrated that drivers with high
psychological ownership were willing to share their driving
data if they were offered adequate compensation in exchange.
We found that incentives that appealed to the motives of
psychological ownership (enhancing self-efficacy or
contributing to self-identity) alleviated the negative effect that
psychological ownership had on individuals’ decisions to share
personal data. Our conceptual model and empirical findings
promise to promote data sharing with adequate compensation
of drivers and to encourage future privacy research in the IoT
context. Only then will privacy research be able to keep up with
the technological advances and contribute to sustained value
creation in the IoT era.
1884 MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the senior editor, Susan Brown, the associate
editor, and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable
feedback and guidance throughout the review process. We thank
participants of the 35th International Conference on Information
Systems, the 2015 Innovation Research Seminar in Aachen, and
participants of research seminars at the University of Melbourne
and University of Wollongong for their helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. We also thank
Rodrigo Barboza and team for the cooperation, inspiring
discussion, and technical support. Finally, we acknowledge the
excellent research assistance of Edda Glase.
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About the Authors
Patrick Cichy is a professor at the Institute for Applied Data
Science & Finance at Bern University of Applied Sciences,
Switzerland. He received his Ph.D. in technology management
from RWTH Aachen University, Germany. During his studies, he
was a visiting scholar at the School of Computing, National
University of Singapore. In the past years, Patrick has published
articles in international scientific journals and contributions in
proceedings of leading international conferences. His work has
been accepted for publication in outlets such as MIS Quarterly,
Electronic Markets, R&D Management, Health Care Management
Review, and Proceedings of the International Conference on
Information Systems.
Torsten Oliver Salge is a professor and co-director of the Institute
for Technology and Innovation Management (TIM) within the TIME
Research Area at RWTH Aachen University, Germany. Oliver is also
a fellow of Cambridge Digital Innovation, University of Cambridge.
He received his PhD from the University of Cambridge and has held
(visiting) appointments at universities in Auckland, Buenos Aires,
Bochum, Cambridge, Duisburg, Oxford, and Philadelphia. Oliver’s
work has been published in Academy of Management Review,
Information Systems Research, Journal of Applied Psychology,
Journal of Management, Journal of Product Innovation
Management, Journal of Service Research, MIS Quarterly, and
Research Policy, among other outlets. He currently serves as a
associate editor for Information Systems Research.
Rajiv Kohli is the John N. Dalton Memorial Professor of Business
at the Raymond A. Mason School of Business, William & Mary.
Prior to joining academia, he was a project leader in Decision
Support Services at Trinity Health. His research has been published
in MIS Quarterly, Management Science, Information Systems
Research, Journal of Management Information Systems, MIS
Quarterly Executive, and Journal of Operations Management,
among other journals. He is a co-author of the book The IT Payoff:
Measuring Business Value of Information Technology Investment,
published by Financial Times Prentice-Hall. He currently serves as
a senior editor for Information Systems Research.
 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things

Appendix
Table A1. Goodness-of-Fit Assessments for Covariance-Based SEM (Study 2)
Fit index Description Measurement model Structural model
CHI/df Fit-function-based index 1.528 1.639
RMSEA Error of approximation index 0.040 0.044
GFI Goodness-of-fit index 0.938 0.913
Incremental index with no correction for
CFI model complexity
0.988 0.974
Incremental index with adjustment for
TLI model complexity
0.985 0.967
Standardized Root Mean Square
SRMR Residual
0.0368 0.0401

Table A2. Reliability, Convergent Validity, and Discriminant Validity Test Results of the Constructs (Study 2)
Interconstruct
Standard Cronbach’s Composite
Mean AVE correlation*
deviation alpha reliability
1 2
1. Privacy concern 4.12 1.27 0.95 0.89 0.66 0.81
2. Psychological
4.33 1.88 0.92 0.92 0.73 0.68 0.85
ownership
Note: *Diagonal cells represent the square root of AVE of the respective construct

Table A3. Reliability, Convergent Validity, and Discriminant Validity Test Results of the Constructs (Study 3)
Standard Cronbach’s Composite Interconstruct correlation*
Mean AVE
deviation alpha reliability 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Privacy Concern 4.37 1.35 0.95 0.87 0.64 0.80

2. Psychological
4.73 1.66 0.92 0.91 0.73 0.59 0.85
Ownership

3. Data Security 4.74 1.49 0.89 0.88 0.64 -0.70 -0.45 0.80

4. Trust 4.75 1.22 0.83 0.83 0.71 -0.46 -0.22 -0.39 0.84

5. Self-Efficacy
3.65 1.54 0.92 0.92 0.75 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.16 0.87
Enhancement
6. Self-image
2.85 1.46 0.76 0.77 0.63 -0.04 0.04 -0.21 0.17 0.82 0.80
Congruency
Note: *Diagonal cells represent the square root of AVE of the respective construct.

MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1889

Table A4. Construct Measurements
Construct Measurement items Source
Privacy concerns
CFIP: Collection It usually bothers me when the company asks me for personal driving data. Smith et al. 1996
When the company asks me for personal driving data, I sometimes think
twice before providing it.
It bothers me to give personal driving data to the company.
I am concerned that the company is collecting too much information about
me.
CFIP: Unauthorized I am concerned that the company may not devote enough time and effort to
access preventing unauthorized access to personal driving data.
I am concerned that computer databases that contain personal driving data
may not be well protected from unauthorized access.
I am concerned that the company may not take measures to prevent
unauthorized access to personal driving data.
CFIP: Error I am concerned that all the personal driving data in computer databases
may not be double-checked for accuracy.
I am concerned that the company may not take steps to make sure that my
personal driving data in their databases is accurate.
I am concerned that the company may not well establish the procedures to
correct errors in personal driving data.
I am concerned that the company may not devote time and effort to
verifying the accuracy of personal driving data in their database.
CFIP: Secondary use I am concerned that the company may use the personal driving data for
other purposes without notifying me or getting my authorization.
I am concerned that the company may sell personal driving data in its
databases to other companies.
When I give personal driving data to the company for the use of its
services, I am concerned that the company may use the information for
other purposes.
I am concerned that the company may share personal driving data with
other parties without getting my authorization.
Psychological This is my driving data. Pierce et al. 2001
ownership
I feel a high degree of personal ownership for this driving data.
I sense that this is my driving data.
I feel that this driving data belongs to me.

Data Security I am critical about the data security embedded in this technology. (reverse Author-developed
coded)
I believe that hackers can easily access to driving data from this
technology. (reverse coded)
I doubt that driving data is secure from unauthorized access in this
technology. (reverse coded)
I believe that this technology poses a real risk to the protection of driving
data. (reverse coded)
Relational Trust I believe that this organization is trustworthy. Tax et al. 1998

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 Cichy et al. / Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things

I would find it necessary to be cautious in dealing with this organization.

(reverse coded) †
I believe the organization could not be relied upon to keep its promises.
(reverse coded) †
Overall, I believe this firm is honest.
Self-efficacy The driving style assistant would help me to become better driver. Childers et al.
enhancement 2001
The driving style assistant would truly support me in my driving.
The driving style assistant would make driving easier for me.
The driving style assistant would assist my driving in a meaningful way.
Self-congruence The driving style assistant suits me well. † Sirgy et al. 1997
The driving style assistant would allow me to express my personality.
I imagine the typical user of the driving style assistant being very much like
me.
Note: †Removed from the further analysis in Study 3 due to low loadings / high cross-loadings.

Please imagine the following scenario and state how you would react in the described situation:

Modern cars are nowadays equipped with various sensors that generate all kinds of digital data while the car is in use.
Examples of such driving-related data comprise information on outdoor temperature, braking- and acceleration figures, or
travel speed.

Your car manufacturer would like to use such driving-related data for an internal research project and asks you if you if you
are willing to share such data. If you give permission to use your driving-related data, your car will automatically and in real-
time transmit the data collected to your car manufacturer. There is nothing else that you need to take care of.

How it works
Your car manufacturer promises not to disclose the driving-related data to third parties, such as other companies, your
employer or the police. Instead, your driving-related data will be solely used for internal research purposes and will be
deleted afterwards. Please assume that no technical modifications to your car are necessary to participate in this research
project. You can terminate your participation in this project at any time, without any consequences for yourself.

In concrete terms, your car manufacturer requests the following set of driving-related data (exclusively, no other data are
requested), which your car will transmit in real-time (that means continually):

> Braking and acceleration figures (Data on the frequency and intensity of your braking and acceleration maneuvers -->
these data provide insights into your driving style).

> Travel speed (how fast you drive, in km/h)

Figure A1. Sample Scenario Description Text (Study 2)

MIS Quarterly Vol. 45 No. 4 / December 2021 1891

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