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Turkish Studies
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Atatürk and the future of Turkey
Andrew Mango a
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School of Oriental Studies, London

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To cite this Article: Mango, Andrew (2000) 'Atatürk and the future of Turkey', Turkish
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 Atatürk and the Future of Turkey
ANDREW MANGO
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Turkey ended the 1990s in a tumult of economic difficulties and political successes. As Turkey
forges ahead into the new millennium, striving for domestic stability and a strong foreign
presence, the legacy of the Republic's founder -- Atatürk -- is ever-present, and includes
Westernization, internationalism, democracy, and secularism as the basic principles that will
guide the Republic's progress.

The last year of the twentieth century witnessed a paradox in Turkey. In

many respects it was a bad year. On August 17, 1999, a massive
earthquake devastated Turkey's industrial heartland east of Istanbul, the
country's largest city. A violent aftershock hit the area on November 12.
The two quakes combined killed an estimated 18,000 people and exposed
a record of longstanding and widespread violations of planning and
building regulations. The absence of adequate provisions for disaster
relief added to the sufferings of about 600,000 people rendered homeless.
To be fair, the authorities did what they could and learned from their
mistakes, but the initial official response was slow.
The economy, already suffering the effects of Russia's 1998 financial
crisis, contracted by an estimated five percent in 1999. Businesses went
bankrupt and workers lost their jobs. The public debt grew. Taxes were
raised. At the end of the year, consumer price inflation was virtually
unchanged at 69 percent, while the rise in wholesale prices actually
increased during the year from 54 percent to 63 percent.
Yet, in spite of this relentless flow of sad news, the index of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange rose by nearly 600 percent, from 2,600 to over
15,000, and at the end of the year the government was able to raise money
domestically at negative rates, paying an interest below 50 percent at a
time when inflation exceeded 60 percent.
But while living standards suffered from a series of natural and man-
made disasters, political prospects improved steadily during the year.
On February 16, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the separatist Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), was captured by a Turkish commando unit in
Kenya. After a Turkish court sentenced him to death on June 29, 1999, he
appealed to his followers to abandon their armed campaign and leave the

Turkish Studies, Vol.1, No.2 (Autumn 2000), pp.113-124

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
 114 TURKISH STUDIES

country. Although there were still instances of violence as the year ended,
the insurrection, which had cost some 35,000 lives since its 1984
inception, had been defeated. In fact, during its seventh congress from
January 2-23, 2000, the PKK resolved to drop its armed struggle.
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On April 18, free and orderly parliamentary and local government

elections were held simultaneously. Veteran center-left politician Biilent
Ecevit, who served as caretaker prime minister at the time of Ocalan's
capture, emerged as the leader of the single strongest party, the Democratic
Left Party (DSP). Unexpectedly, the DSP was followed by a party from the
opposite end of the political spectrum — the Nationalist Action Party
(MHP) — led by a virtually unknown and certainly untested leader, Devlet
Bah9eli. The two parties, whose followers had violently fought one another
during the troubled 1970s, agreed to form a coalition government, and were
joined by the weakened center-right Motherland Party led by Mesut Yilmaz.
The coalition, which took power on May 29, used its solid parliamentary
majority to enact reforms, which its predecessors had lacked the will or the
strength to undertake. There was a limited amnesty; many prisoners of
conscience were released; the grounds for banning political parties were
narrowed; penalties were increased for officials found guilty of torture; the
constitution was amended to allow international arbitration in disputes
between the state and foreign contractors; the supervision of banks was
improved; and a budget was voted which set the target of reducing inflation
to 25 percent by the end of the year 2000, and to single digits by the end of
2001. As part of the austerity program, public employees had to content
themselves with a pay increase of 15 percent, effective January 1, 2000, at
a time when the 12-month average rate of price increases was still at the
level of 53 percent. There were protests, but the government held firm.
Austerity was accepted because, as in the case of public borrowing, the
belief had spread that the government would achieve its targets and that
politicians had finally found the will to end maladministration.
Optimism was fed also by developments in foreign affairs. The United
States had assisted discreetly in the capture of Ocalan, demonstrating that
it could be trusted as Turkey's primary ally. As soon as the new
government was formed, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem set out to improve
relations with Greece. His task was made easier when Greece rushed to
help the victims of Turkey's earthquake, a gesture which Turkey
reciprocated when Athens was struck by disaster in September. The speed
and scope of the international relief effort, with the United States, Israel,
 ATATURK AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 115

and members of the European Union (EU) in the lead, showed that Turkey
did not lack foreign friends.
In October, the Commission of the European Union in Brussels
published a report recommending that Turkey should be designated as a
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candidate for full membership in the Union, on par with other candidates,
but that negotiations should begin only when Turkey adopts the standards
of conduct that determine the behavior of member countries. Later that
month, Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit paid a successful visit to
Washington. In November, U.S. President Bill Clinton arrived in Turkey
for a six-day official visit, culminating in his participation in the Istanbul
summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Clinton's frank and friendly address to the Turkish parliament, in which
assurances of support were accompanied by pleas for respect for human
rights and for better relations with Greece, made a deep impression. There
was solid evidence of American support when President Clinton assisted
at the signing of a political agreement to build oil and natural gas pipelines
from the Caspian basin through Georgia to Turkey.
Further optimism was registered after the EU Council of Ministers,
meeting in Helsinki on December 10, acted on the Commission report and
accepted Turkey as a candidate for full membership with no conditions.
Turkey sought and obtained assurances from EU officials that Turkey
would not be discriminated against and that resolving longstanding
disputes over human rights, relations with Greece, and Cyprus would not
be a precondition to Turkey's candidacy. Finally, on December 22, the
board of the International Monetary Fund, which had long worked with
the Turkish government to combat inflation, accepted Turkey's letter of
intent and awarded Turkey a stand-by credit of $4 billion.
These developments had a profound effect on Turkey's self-
perception. On December 11, commenting on Turkey's official
designation as a candidate for full EU membership, Oktay Eksi, lead
writer for the mass-circulation Istanbul daily newspaper Hiirriyet,
declared: "This is the start of our new millennium." At first glance, his
exuberance might appear excessive. After all, Turkey's eligibility for full
membership had been affirmed many times previously. It stemmed from
the 1963 association agreement signed with the European Economic
Community. Moreover, a customs union with the EU had come into force
in January 1996. But the significance of the December 10 announcement
— despite the stipulation that no date could be set for starting membership
 116 TURKISH STUDIES

negotiations, as well as the vague legal content of the new status — lay in
the fact that it formalized a mutual commitment.
Turkey's eligibility had not dispelled doubts that the EU was not
prepared to accept Turkey as a full member because of its Muslim faith.
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Many in Turkey believed the warnings by some Europeans that a Muslim

nation, with a population set to exceed that of the largest member of the
existing union — Germany — constitutes an alien element in Christian
Europe. Many in Turkey who sounded this argument did not wish to join
the EU. Europe, they claimed, did not want a strong Turkey, and would
not, therefore, contribute to its strength by welcoming it into its union. The
argument was pithily expressed in the Turkish saying Turk'un Turk'ten
ba§ka dostu yok — the Turk has no friends except for other Turks. After
the Helsinki summit, however, the Turkish government accepted Europe
as a friend. This acceptance underlies the commitment to conduct
domestic affairs and foreign policy in accordance with European
standards.
Nothing is irrevocable in politics and the future is always full of
surprises. But this mutual formal commitment determines the guidelines
for future developments. It does not mean that problems will not arise
between Turkey and individual member states of the EU or between
Turkey and the EU as a whole. But the principle has been settled, and not
at the expense of Turkey's long-standing relationship with the United
States, but with the latter's full support. Like Britain, Turkey — or, at
least, official Turkey — is wedded to the ideal of the Euro-Atlantic
partnership. The Helsinki agreement signifies, therefore, an all-around
opening of Turkey to the outside world.

Westernization and Democracy

Over the past decade, Turkish nationalists have realized that the process of
globalization serves the national interest. In Turkey's case, globalization is
the latest incarnation of the process of Westernization, which began in the
nineteenth century, and which, in the words of one of Turkey's greatest
diplomats, the late Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp, became a state doctrine
under the Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. It is surely
significant that the present Turkish government, which has resumed
political dialogue with the EU, is a coalition of center-left and right-wing
nationalists. Perhaps only nationalists could have taken this step, which
 ATATURK AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 117

promotes Turkey's integration in the political structures of the democratic

Western world. It was, after all, a Turkish nationalist, Atatiirk, who, to quote
Zeki Kuneralp again, "gave realism and wholeness" to Turkey's
Westernization.
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It is true that Atatiirk defined his goal as "contemporary civilization"

rather than Westernization. But as Zeki Kuneralp remarked:
For the last few centuries the center of civilization has been in the
West. And what is intended by the term "civilization" is obvious: it
is the Western principles which ensure material well-being and
political order for humankind ... If a country wishes, in the face of
present-day conditions, to have a place in the world community of
nations, she is obliged, like it or not, to adopt Western civilization.1
The Turkish Republic has never deviated from this principle. But there
have been periods of hesitation. In 1979, for example, during Bulent
Ecevit's tenure as prime minister, there was talk of "alternatives" to the
Western alliance. Then, in 1996-97, Turkey turned east to its fellow
Muslim countries under Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
This second episode sheds light on one aspect of the continuing debate
regarding Atatiirk's secularism. Since their fall from power in 1997, and
their re-emergence as the opposition Virtue Party, Turkish Islamists have
used Western examples in their campaign for the legalization of political
Islam. They point out that in the West, religious parties are allowed,
women may cover their hair whenever and wherever they want, and no
one objects to bearded civil servants. It follows that their claims amount
to no more than the recognition of normal Western democratic rights. This
argument is bound to be used with increasing frequency as Turkey moves
closer to EU membership.
The argument is plausible. Yet when one remembers Islamist resistance
to Atatiirk's reforms and the patchy record of the Erbakan government, and,
moreover, when one reads the Islamist press today, the impression of fear of
the outside world, and of the West in particular, is overwhelming. Islamists
make, of course, an exception of foreign Muslims in their image of a
malevolent outside world. But there are nationalists who believe they are
continuing in Ataturk's tradition, who make no such exception. They
(wrongly) equate Kemalism with xenophobic nationalism.
Although Atatiirk had saved the country from partition at the hands of
the leading Western powers of the day, his admiration for the civilization
 118 TURKISH STUDIES

which they had developed did not diminish. He was convinced that in
order to survive and prosper, his people should join the mainstream of
universal civilization and cooperate with erstwhile adversaries in
upholding the settlement that followed the end of the war. Immediately
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after the final victory in the War of Independence in 1923 — and before
the peace treaty had been concluded in Lausanne — Ataturk had this to
say to a group of teachers:
We cannot fence off our country and live isolated from the world.
The opposite is true: we shall live in the area of civilization as a
progressive and civilized nation. Only knowledge and science can
make such a life possible. We will take knowledge and science
wherever they are to be found and we shall introduce them into the
head of every individual. No limits, no condition can be set to
knowledge and science.2
But many of Ataturk's supporters were not so open-minded. Many
were affected by the xenophobic nationalism that had been widespread in
the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose policies had led
to the Ottoman state's downfall in World War One. Others suspected the
West of wishing Turkey harm. Many lacked the self-confidence that
allowed Ataturk to open out to the outside world. Fearful Turkish
nationalists were to be found in the ranks of Ataturk's Republican People's
Party and also in the armed forces. The chief of staff, Marshal Fevzi
Cakmak, believed all foreigners were potential spies and was fond of
establishing forbidden zones from which foreigners were excluded. In a
country which had just defeated a foreign invasion, such attitudes were
not surprising. The outside world and foreign residents of Turkey were
objects of suspicion to many high-placed officials in the young republic.
Some foreign observers, including the generally benevolent Italian liberal
Count Sforza, thought that Ataturk himself was a xenophobic nationalist.
They were wrong, as is evidenced by Ataturk's foreign policy. Indeed, he
was a nationalist who believed in international cooperation: the Turkish
Republic joined the League of Nations; it took part in sanctions against
Mussolini's Italy; it tried to shore up peace in the region by forming alliances
with its neighbors. Contrary to the views of some leftists, Ataturk did not
favor neutrality. Although he was a staunch defender of Turkish
independence, he saw the Balkan Pact, which he had helped form in the
1930s, as an embryonic union, and, it seems, toyed with the idea of resigning
 ATATURK AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 119

the presidency of Turkey in order to become the president of such a Balkan

Union. Even if this was a daydream, it is indicative of Ataturk's thinking.
Ataturk did not realize the establishment of a functioning democracy
in Turkey, but he did bequeath to the country democratic institutions.
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True, some Turkish liberal critics of Ataturk's legacy, known today as

Ikinci Cumhuriyetgiler (advocates of a Second Republic), argue that the
First Republic — Ataturk's Republic — was authoritarian and practiced
ethnic nationalism, and that the time has come for a fundamental liberal
restructuring.
This is an anachronistic reading of the history of the Republic.
Ataturk's recorded statements make clear that he believed in an inclusive
civic nationalism, that he aspired to democratic freedoms, and that he
sought the friendship of democratic countries. It is, of course, legitimate
to argue that he could have done more to realize these ideals. But it is
doubtful, given that many European countries that were richer than
Turkey and had a higher level of education, were unable at the time to
sustain democratic practice.
Whatever one thinks of the shortcomings of Ataturk's Republic, there
is little doubt that its founder would have welcomed the doors that are
today opening for Turkey. In foreign affairs, these include not only
eventual membership in the European Union and a strategic partnership
with the United States, but also closer ties with the successor states of the
Soviet Union, primarily the Turkic republics. There are some who
consider ties with these republics as contrary to Ataturk's determination to
repudiate irredentism and pan-Turkism. But they are not comparing like
to like. Cooperation with the Turkic republics is not a revival of the pan-
Turkish policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is rather the
extension of the principle of regional cooperation which Ataturk had
practiced in the Balkans, and which is now finding another expression in
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization. There are references
today to a prediction by Ataturk that the Soviet Union would collapse one
day and that Turkey would then be able to march together with its kinsmen
in the east. This prediction, like some others attributed to Ataturk, is
apocryphal. But it is unreasonable to suppose that Ataturk, who worked
for close ties with Balkan neighbors and signed a treaty (admittedly of
limited application) with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, would have
disapproved of common projects with the Turkic republics.
Internally, there is a prospect of greater stability, which is the
precondition for better governance. The year 2000 has been chosen —
 120 TURKISH STUDIES

somewhat arbitrarily — for the celebration of the seven hundredth

anniversary of the founding of the Ottoman state. But there is another
anniversary which has gone largely unmarked — the fiftieth anniversary
of the first free elections held in the history of the Turkish Republic, on
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May 14, 1950. These elections ushered in free parliamentary rule, which
was, at the same time, what the Italians call partitocrazia, the domination
of all aspects of national life by an ever increasing number of political
parties, degenerating into mutual protection societies.
Turkish partitocrazia is ripe for reform. But it has undeniable
achievements to its credit. It liberated latent energies and gave individuals
more room to advance their fortunes and, at the same time, the fortunes of
the country. It ushered in rapid progress, which was achieved at the cost
of order. When disorder threatened to get out of hand, the military
intervened. It did so three times — in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Each time,
the armed forces went back to their barracks in the hope that
parliamentary government could proceed in a more orderly fashion. But,
the end of another decade — the late 1980s —- saw stability once again
compromised. The military did not intervene, and ten years of unstable
coalition governments followed.
The prominent Turkish industrialist, Btilent Eczacibaji, has described
the 1990s as a wasted decade. It may be too harsh a judgment, but there is
little doubt that there was a drift in governance. Now the politicians who
were themselves largely responsible for the drift have finally responded to
public pressure for better government. The pressure had been building up
for some time and had become irresistible by the April 1999 elections.
Hence, the union of opposites in Ecevit's coalition government, which
promises stability and reform. This too is a return to the Atatiirk principle
that order and progress march hand in hand. Authoritarianism is not an
integral part of Ataturk's legacy. He said, after all, "I do not wish to pass
into history as a man who bequeathed a tyranny." But orderly government
is an integral part of his legacy.

The Domestic Scene

The prospect of better government does not remove from Turkey's agenda
two major domestic preoccupations, which have become acute during the
half-century of partitocrazia: the conflict between secularists and
Islamists, and the Kurdish problem. Islamists, Second Republicans,
 ATATURK AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 121

Kurdish nationalists, and some Turkish liberals believe that these two fault
lines running through Turkish society can only be cured by repudiating, or
at least amending, Atatiirk's practice, if not his principles. However one
should remember that Atatiirk's practice depended on the requirements of
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the day and changed in accordance with circumstances. He was a supreme

pragmatist, but he was true to his principles.
Atatiirk regarded the Kurds as inextricably linked by common interests
to the Turks and other Muslim ethnic communities inhabiting the area
within the 1918 armistice lines, which was to become the territory of the
Turkish Republic. The administrative arrangements which governed their
co-existence depended on the circumstances of the day. During and
immediately after the War of Independence, he thought that a degree of
provincial self-government would accommodate ethnic specificity. After
1924, he opted for a strong centralized government on the French model.
In both cases his views reflected the mood in Ankara, the Turkish
nationalist capital.
Today, in different circumstances, the mood of informed Turkish
opinion is changing. But the premise that the citizens of the Republic
share common interests which require mutual accommodation for the sake
of national unity remains valid. The prevailing mood favors civic
nationalism — not inconsistent with Atatiirk's principles. The
administrative arrangements which will preserve unity in diversity, or, to
use the currently fashionable term, unity and pluralism, are a matter for
the citizens, or rather their elected representatives, to determine.
The conflict between secularists and Islamists can be approached in a
similar spirit. Secularism is certainly a basic principle of Kemalism. It had
to be because, as Professor Elie Kedourie has pointed out, the state's
secular character is a logical consequence of popular sovereignty, an ideal
to which Ataturk pledged himself at the start of the War of Independence
in 1919. Professor Kedourie is worth quoting on the subject:
The sovereign people comprises the totality of the citizens. Through
long and bitter experience, from the onset of the Protestant
Reformation onwards, it has come to be recognized that belief and
opinion cannot serve as a criterion of citizenship, which must
therefore be solely a matter of birth or choice. Thus, implicit in
popular sovereignty is the idea of the secularity of the state — an
idea now indispensable to good government and a free society.3
 122 TURKISH STUDIES

However, secularism can be expressed in a variety of legal and

administrative arrangements. The state is effectively secular in all Western
democracies. Yet they all differ in the provision they make for the religious
beliefs of their citizens. Some subsidize religious education; others do not.
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Some allow ministers to represent the state in marriage contracts; others do

not. Moreover, these different arrangements are themselves subject to
adjustment over time. In Turkey too, the practice of secularism has not
been constant. Rather, it has been gradual. It was not until 1928 that Islam
ceased to be the official religion of the state. Secularism was written into
the constitution even later, in 1937. Secularist legislation was tightened
further after Atatiirk's death in 1938, only to be relaxed after the Second
World War. There have been many changes since then, notably in the
constitution accepted in 1982, which provided for compulsory instruction
in "religious culture" (in effect in Sunni Islam) in schools.
Few people would claim that the present situation is perfect. In his
recent study, Islam and Society in Turkey, David Shankland spoke of "the
secular authorities' increasingly active interpretation of the place of
orthodox religion within the modern, reformed, changed Republic."4 In
other words, by controlling and bankrolling orthodox Sunni Islam through
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the secular state in effect tends to
impose it on society, which can be more relaxed in its religious practices
or lack thereof. Thus, there may be a case for easing official pressure not
only on believers, but also on unbelievers or lax believers. But while
change in the practice of secularism is inevitable, the principle of the
secularity of the state is as valid today as it was in Atatiirk's time.
Shankland rightly drew attention to the "complex and profound
interconnection (although not always in a predictable way) between our
activities in Europe and the religious situation in Turkey."5 Current Islamist
political leaders in Turkey are fond of saying that they would be content
with secularism, provided it was in the form applied in Switzerland or
Germany. But the status of religion differs in these two countries, and it is
bound to be different in Turkey too. As Shankland pointed out: "We
[Europeans] cannot take a position on telling people how to believe."6
In a lecture to the Turkish Area Studies Group (TASG) in London in
1999, Professor Sina Aksin spoke of what he termed the counter-
revolution in Turkey, particularly in the partitocrazia period, and cited the
abandonment of Ataturk's belief that cultural and material progress should
go together as an example. There have certainly been losses. The closure
 ATATURK AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 123

of People's Houses and Village Institutes after the Second World War set
back the process of cultural modernization. But the Turkish state
continues to support cultural activities, such as the establishment of the
impressive cultural center currently being built in Istanbul with public
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funds. In any case, a richer and a better educated public can and does play
a greater role in funding and organizing cultural activities. In Turkey, as in
the West today, the state does retain a role in promoting culture, but is not
the only or even the main actor. Turkish civil society, which swung into
action to help victims of the earthquake last year, is also active in the
realm of culture.
Professor Erik Ziircher, in another TSAG lecture delivered in 1998,
stressed that Ataturk had been the leader of a Muslim, rather than a
specifically Turkish, resistance movement against the Allies. It is true that
Islam played a mobilizing role in the Turkish War of Independence. But
there were also Islamic rebellions against Atatiirk's Turkish nationalist
movement and it modernizing agenda. Atatiirk's secularist legislation,
which followed the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, was the
culmination of a long process, described nearly forty years ago by Professor
Bernard Lewis in his standard work The Emergence of Modern Turkey.
Ataturk, as a secularist, was the successor not only of the Young Turks, but
also of the reforming Ottoman statesmen of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion
Turkey can no more repudiate Ataturk today than France can repudiate the
French Revolution. It is fashionable these days in Turkey to speak of the
need to make peace with the country's history (tarihimizle ban§mak). But
Ataturk and his reforms are the essential core of Turkish history as the
country enters the new century. Just as Republicans have come to see the
merits of the Ottoman empire, Islamists and other conservatives will come
to recognize the merits of Ataturk and his reforms.
This recognition will come more easily if the story of Ataturk — the
facts of his life, what he said and what he did, his gesta and dicta — are
researched objectively and related accurately. Ataturk must be
demythologised both by his advocates and his detractors.7
The Turkish Republic was shaped by Ataturk on the lines of
republican France. It is, therefore, natural that French observers
should have a particular insight into the problems of Atatiirk's Republic.
 124 TURKISH STUDIES

One such observer is Francois Vinot, who concluded a recent study

with these words:
In the lengthy evolution of secular institutions in Turkey in the
direction of greater democratic control, the issue of the debate
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between political Islam and secularism dominates the question of

the final convergence between Turkish and European democracy. In
Western Europe, the debate in France and elsewhere, was decided in
every case in favor of the secularists. A similar conclusion in Turkey
would probably indicate that the country has finally come to rest in
the West, as far as civilization is concerned, even if economic and
diplomatic relations with the European Union continued to cause
difficulties. But the fundamental tendencies witnessed in Turkish
society in the last decades are different, and they do not allow us to
forecast the result of the conflict.8
It is always wise to be cautious in one's forecasts. But, after the events
of 1999, and particularly after the December 1999 Helsinki summit, one
can say that the prospects of Turkey's convergence with the democratic
West have been strengthened. And as Francois Vinot implies, Atatiirk's
reforms will form the ground on which that convergence will take place.
This need not alarm either Muslims or ethnic Kurds. Atatiirk's Republic
can accommodate them both. And liberals have least of all cause to be
alarmed. For they are the most likely beneficiaries and the heirs of the
reforms which have brought them to the threshold of the world of liberal
democracy.

NOTES

1. Zeki Kuneralp, Just a Diplomat, translated by Geoffrey Lewis (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992),
p.108.
2. Ataturk'iin Soylev ve Demecleri (Ataturk's Speech and Lectures), Vol. II (Ankara: Atatiirk
Arastirma Merkezi, 1989), p.48.
3. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, D.C.: Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), p.5.
4. David Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey (Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1999), p. 68.
5. Ibid., p. 176.
6. Ibid., p.176.
7. Andrew Mango, Atatiirk (London: John Murray, 1999; Overlook Press, New York, 2000).
8. Francois Vinot, "Armee, laicite et democratic en Turquie", CEMOTI, No.27 (1999), p.93.