Outstanding and timely—this book is the first one of its kind—not only for

the comprehensive approach to the role of the external powers in Latin

America in the 21st century—but also for so many renowned experts
contributing in each of the sixteen case studies in this volume. Understanding
different political and economic external actors’ engagement with Latin
America is crucial to reflect about the past, present and—most
importantly—the future of the region.
Carola Ramón Berjano, Undersecretary for Bilateral and Multilateral
Economic Negotiations, Republic of Argentina, and Director for Latin
America of the Argentine Council of International Relations—CARI

The book by Gian Luca Gardini is essential to understand the role and
activities of external powers in Latin America in the 21st Century. The case
studies successfully connect the debates about the social and political identity
of Latin America with the relations that the region has constructed with its
external partners.
Adrián Bonilla, Executive Director EU-LAC Foundation, and
Secretary General of FLACSO (2012-2016)
External Powers in Latin America

This book examines the role of external powers in Latin America in the 21st
century. Non-traditional partners have significantly increased their political
and economic engagement with the continent. Five key questions arise: why
has this surge taken place; when has it happened; in which regions and sec-
tors is it mostly felt; what is the Latin American perspective; and what are
the actual results? The book analyses 16 case studies: the United States, the
European Union, China, Russia, Japan, Canada, India, Turkey, Iran, Israel,
South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the ASEAN countries, South Africa and
Australia. The spectrum of existing explanations in the literature spans from
neo-extractivism to South-South cooperation. This volume places them in
context and proposes a more multifaceted approach, stressing a combination
of systemic factors and internal dynamics both in Latin America and in the
external partner countries. Geopolitics still matters and so do nation states,
their interests and leaders. Ultimately, this surge in engagement has largely
reproduced past patterns. Are new partners that different from the old ones?

Gian Luca Gardini is Professor of International Relations and Latin

American Politics, and Chair of International Business and Society Relations
with a focus on Latin America at Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlangen-
Nuremberg, Germany.
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Europa-Regional-Perspectives/book-series/ERP
External Powers in Latin
America
Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and
South-South Cooperation

Edited by
Gian Luca Gardini
First published 2021
by Routledge
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Names: Gardini, Gian Luca, editor.
Title: External powers in Latin America : geopolitics between
neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation / edited by
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Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021. | Series:
Europa regional perspectives | Includes bibliographical references and
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Identifiers: LCCN 2020049092 (print) | LCCN 2020049093 (ebook) | ISBN
9780367368593 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429351808 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Latin America–Foreign relations–21st century–Case
studies. | Latin America–Foreign economic relations–Case studies. |
Geopolitics–Latin America.
Classification: LCC JZ1519 .E87 2021 (print) | LCC JZ1519 (ebook) |
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Typeset in Times New Roman

by Taylor & Francis Books
Contents

List of illustrations ix
Acknowledgements xi
List of contributors xiii

Introduction: Analysis and ‘normalization’ of the surge of external

powers in Latin America 1
GIAN LUCA GARDINI

1 The United States in Latin America: Lasting asymmetries,

waning influence? 15
TOM LONG

2 The European Union in Latin America: A ‘neighbour’ of values 29

GIAN LUCA GARDINI

3 China in Latin America: Winning hearts and

minds pragmatically 44
CAROL WISE

4 Russia in Latin America 59

RICHARD MILES

5 Renewed Japanese involvement in Latin America 75

BARBARA STALLINGS AND KOTARO HORISAKA

6 Emergency and opportunity: Canada and the Venezuela crisis 91

YVON GRENIER

7 From Tagore to IT: India’s changing presence in Latin America 106

JORGE HEINE AND HARI SESHASAYEE
viii Contents
8 Turkey in Latin America: Tenacity in a changing international
environment 123
MARTA TAWIL-KURI

9 Iran’s Latin America strategy and the challenges to the balance

of power 138
PENNY L. WATSON

10 Israel-Latin America relations: What has changed in the past

decade and why? 153
ARIE M. KACOWICZ, EXEQUIEL LACOVSKY AND DANIEL F. WAJNER

11 Patron or partner? Asymmetry and complementarity in

economic relations between South Korea and Latin America 167
JUAN FELIPE LÓPEZ AYMES AND JAE SUNG KWAK

12 Taiwan and its Latin American allies: An uphill

diplomatic campaign 186
CHUNG-CHIAN TENG

13 Strengthening Indonesia-Latin America economic relations: A

partnership for a better future 203
SULTHON SJAHRIL SABARUDDIN

14 Latin America and ASEAN: More than a marginal relationship? 219

JÖRN DOSCH

15 Latin America and South Africa in the 21st century: A romance

with no future? The cases of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela 235
GLADYS LECHINI AND AGUSTINA MARCHETTI

16 Distant neighbours: Australia-Latin America relations 249

SEAN BURGES

Conclusion: Geopolitics between neo-extractivism and

South-South cooperation 263
GIAN LUCA GARDINI

Index 277
Illustrations

Figures
5.1 LAC bilateral trade with Japan, 1990–2018 81
5.2 Japanese FDI to Latin America, 1995–2018 82
5.3 JBIC loan commitments to LAC, FY2005–FY2017 84
7.1 Select countries and regions’ share of world GDP based on PPP
(percent of world) 109
11.1 South Korean imports and exports with LAC compared with
South Korea’s trade share with Asia and LAC, 1990–2018
(US $ million) 169
11.2 South Korean ODA and outward foreign direct investment
(OFDI) in Asia and Latin America, 2000–2017 (US $ million) 169
11.3 South Korean trade and FDI concentration in LAC, 2000–2018
(US $ million) 172
11.4 Korean FDI in LAC by sector (US $ million) 173
12.1 Taiwan-Central America merchandise trade statistics
(2003–2019) 192
12.2 Taiwan-Guatemala merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019) 193
12.3 Taiwan-Honduras merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019) 193
12.4 Taiwan-Nicaragua merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019) 194
12.5 Taiwan-Haiti merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019) 195
12.6 Taiwan-Paraguay merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019) 195
12.7 Official development assistance of Taiwan, 2018 197
13.1 Indonesia-Latin America trade relations 1989–2019,
trade share (%) 207
13.2 Indonesia-Latin America trade relations 1989–2019,
trade volumes 208
13.3 Indonesian traditional versus non-traditional markets for the
period 1967–2019 (trade share, %) 209
14.1 ASEAN merchandise exports to South and Central America
and the Caribbean (in US $ million) 229
x List of illustrations
Tables
2.1 Opinion on selected countries/international actors 36
2.2 Opinion on relations between the respondent’s country in LAC
and the EU, the United States and China 37
6.1 Ranking of countries that imported the most Canadian
shipments by Canadian dollar value (2017) 93
7.1 High-level visits between India and the LAC region 113
7.2 The LAC region’s top five exports to India 116
7.3 India’s top 10 trade partners in the LAC region, 2001–2018 118
11.1 South Korean trade structure with selected LAC countries,
2018 (US $ million, %) 174
11.2 Exports and FDI growth and diversification after FTA with
South Korea 176
11.3 Knowledge and scientific base in South Korea and selected
Latin American countries (2007–2016) 178
13.1 Latin American investment in Indonesia (2010–2019)
(US $ million) 210
14.1 South American FTAs with ASEAN member states 227
C.1 Latin America and the Caribbean total trade with selected
partners, 2018 and 2000, absolute numbers and percentages 268
C.2 LAC exports of raw materials and capital goods to selected
established and non-traditional partners, 2018 269
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I am grateful to Cathy Hartley, the Commissioning

Editor at Routledge, who has believed in this project from the very beginning
and who has supported it throughout the process, especially in difficult times,
not least these past few months in the midst of the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic. I also thank Lucy Pritchard at Routledge for her invaluable
assistance.
I launched this project with the panel ‘Extra-hemispheric powers in Latin
America’ at the 2017 Latin-American Political Science Association
(ALACIP) conference in Montevideo, Uruguay. I am indebted to those col-
leagues who participated as panellists in the two early discussion sessions and
for their intellectual input: Nelia Miguel Müller, Gladys Lechini, Marta
Tawil, Juan Felipe López Aymes, Jae Sung Kwak and Takahiro Miyachi.
Andrés Malamud provided excellent contributions to the panel.
Nelia Miguel Müller and Christina Stolte, my former assistants at the
Chair of International Business and Society Relations in Nuremberg, started
the project with us but could not complete it as life offered them other
wonderful professional opportunities. Ladies, thank you for your input and
good luck with your new careers! I would also like to acknowledge the input
and help received from Gonzalo Sebastián Paz during the early phases of
this project.
My staff at the Chair for International Business and Society Relations
have been instrumental to the completion of this project. Their professional-
ism, reliability and support greatly helped me to concentrate on this and
other research projects knowing that they would take care of the rest.
Thanks to Barbara Häfner, Jaime González, Julia Herrmann, Helen Weiß,
Dominik Lauff, Juan Carlos Aguirre and Sandra Zapata.
I would also like to thank all my students at Friedrich-Alexander University.
Their questions and doubts, especially on external powers in Latin America,
during lectures and seminars as well as BA, MA and PhD supervisions,
inspired and clarified my own thinking on the subject. Thank you for your
interest and enthusiasm. I hope I prompted the same feelings in you.
I am of course grateful to all the contributors for their intellectual input
and high-quality work. You are the greatest asset of this book. Thank you
xii Acknowledgements
for accepting the invitation to join me in this project and for making it
possible. It has been a pleasure to work with you.
Finally, and importantly, I extend a big thank you to my family, who are
always by my side with patience and love.

Nuremberg, June 2020

Contributors

Sean Burges is faculty with the Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs at
Carleton University, Canada. Previously, he was a senior lecturer in
International Relations at the Australian National University where he
also served as Deputy Director of the Australian National Centre for
Latin American Studies.
Jörn Dosch is Professor and Chair of International Politics and Development
Cooperation at the University of Rostock, Germany. He holds a DPhil in
Political Science from Johannes Gutenberg University. He has held visit-
ing positions at several Asian universities and was a Fulbright Scholar at
the Asia-Pacific Research Centre, Stanford University, USA.
Gian Luca Gardini is Professor of International Relations and Latin Amer-
ican Politics, and Chair of International Business and Society Relations
with a focus on Latin America at Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlan-
gen-Nuremberg, Germany. In 2012 he was a seconded officer at the Chi-
lean Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he assisted with the organization of
the first EU-CELAC Summit.
Yvon Grenier is Professor of Political Science at St. Francis Xavier University
in Nova Scotia, Canada. He holds a PhD from the University of Laval.
He specializes in Latin American politics (especially those of Cuba,
Mexico and Central America) and Canadian foreign policy. He also is a
Resident Fellow at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government.
Jorge Heine is Research Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of
Global Studies, Boston University, USA, and a Wilson Center Global
Fellow. He is a former Chilean Cabinet Minister and has served as
ambassador to India, to South Africa and to China. He has held visiting
appointments at the universities of Konstanz (Germany), Oxford (UK)
and Paris (France).
Kotaro Horisaka is Professor Emeritus at Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan.
He serves as an executive director for many institutions with a relationship
to Latin America, such as the Japan Association of Latin America and the
xiv List of contributors
Caribbean, and the Association of Nikkei & Japanese Abroad. He
specializes in the political economy of Latin America.
Arie M. Kacowicz is Chaim Weizmann Chair in International Relations and
Professor of International Relations in the Department of International
Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He specializes in
the Middle East and Latin America, theories of international relations,
peace research and globalization.
Jae Sung Kwak is Professor of International Development Cooperation at the
Graduate School of Pan-Pacific International Studies at Kyung Hee Uni-
versity, South Korea. He specializes in international development, foreign
direct investment and comparative Asia-Latin American studies. He holds
a PhD in International Politics from the University of Liverpool, UK.
Exequiel Lacovsky is a PhD candidate in the Department of International
Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
Gladys Lechini is full Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of
Political Science and International Relations, at Rosario National Uni-
versity, Argentina. She is also a researcher at CONICET and a co-director
of CERIR, Argentina. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the University
of São Paulo, Brazil.
Tom Long is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Interna-
tional Studies, University of Warwick, UK. He is also Affiliated Professor
in the División de Estudios Internacionales, Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas, Mexico. He holds a PhD in International Relations
from American University, USA.
Juan Felipe López Aymes is a researcher at the Centro Regional de Investi-
gaciones Multidisciplinarias de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Mexico. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of
Sussex, UK. He specializes in economic development in Korea and East
Asia, and Asia-Latin America economic relations.
Agustina Marchetti is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the
Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Rosario National
University (UNR), Argentina, and a PhD scholar at CONICET. She
holds a BA in International Relations. She also is a lecturer at the Faculty
of Political Science and International Relations at UNR.
Richard G. Miles is a senior associate in the Americas Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, USA. He has
20 years of experience as a diplomat at the US Department of State and
as an intelligence officer with the US Army.
Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin is a First Secretary and diplomatic official at the
Center for Education and Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
 List of contributors xv
Republic of Indonesia. He holds a PhD in Economics from Universitas
Indonesia. He was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Pomona College and at
Claremont Graduate University, USA (2014–2015).
Hari Seshasayee is an independent researcher specializing in India-Latin
America relations and Latin American politics and economy. He has an
MA in Latin American Studies from Stanford University, USA. Pre-
viously, he was a senior researcher with Gateway House, India, and also
led the Latin America desk at the Confederation of Indian Industry.
Barbara Stallings is the William R. Rhodes Research Professor at the Watson
Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, USA. She
was director of the Economic Development Division of the UN Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. She specializes in the
political economy of Latin America and East Asia.
Marta Tawil-Kuri is a researcher at the Centre of International Studies at the
Colegio de México. She holds a PhD in Political Science and International
Relations from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris. She specializes in
the sociology of international relations, foreign policy analysis, and relations
between the Middle East and Latin America.
Chung-Chian Teng is Distinguished Professor in the Department of Diplo-
macy at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. He also is
Director of the International Master’s Program on International Studies
at the College of International Affairs.
Daniel F. Wajner is a PhD candidate in the Department of International
Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
Penny L. Watson is a professor in the Department of Government at Hous-
ton Community College, USA. She is a PhD candidate at the University
of Houston. She is a freelance writer for the US State Department’s Per-
sian language programme Radio Farda. Her articles have been published
in Democracy and Security and Small Wars Journal.
Carol Wise is Professor of International Political Economy at the University
of Southern California, USA. Her most recent book is Dragonomics: How
Latin America is Maximizing (or Missing Out) on China’s International
Development Strategy (Yale, 2020). She holds a PhD in Political Science
from Columbia University.
Introduction
Analysis and ‘normalization’ of the surge of
external powers in Latin America
Gian Luca Gardini

Latin America and external powers

Since the beginning of the 21st century, a growing diplomatic activism has
taken place in and around Latin America. In addition to traditional partners
in the region, such as the United States and the European Union (EU) and
European powers, other countries have strengthened their links with the
continent as well as increasing their presence there (Feinberg 2013; Dosch
and Jacob 2010; Paladini 2018). The Russian Federation and Japan, for
instance, have relaunched their interest and operations in Latin America
after years of maintaining a lower profile. The People’s Republic of China
and other Asian countries, that historically had little interest in or connec-
tion with Latin America, have emerged as significant international partners
for the region. This renewed activism is evident as much at the economic
level as it is in political interactions. Therefore, a study and assessment of the
role of external powers—especially non-traditional ones—in Latin America
in the 21st century is particularly timely and useful. This is even more so in
light of recent developments such as the various economic crises or the out-
break of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in early 2020 as well as the-
oretical debates about the shifts in global power and order and the
flourishing of South-South relations.
The presence and influence of external powers in Latin America have been
constant features in the history of the continent. Even before the arrival of
the European colonizers, the perception of external influence was a concern.
As a 2017 study on the DNA of pre-Colombian populations in Northern
Peru has demonstrated, the native inhabitants were not only culturally but
also genetically distinct from the Inca conquerors (Barbieri et al. 2017). The
Incas—a quintessentially Latin American civilization to our eyes today—
invaded those lands in the 15th century and were in fact an external presence
to the eyes of their contemporary indigenous populations. Moreover, the
native populations of the Chachapoyas region in Northern Peru never
assimilated with the Incas of the heartland even after the conquest.
The perception of what is external and different may be subjective, but a
distinction between ‘we’ and ‘they’—between internal and external—seems to
2 Gian Luca Gardini
be common to most epochs and territories. So, what is an external power?
External to what or to whom? Thus a double-track discussion follows. First,
what is the territorial, cultural or political unit of reference that is considered
‘internal’ and therefore, at least to some extent, cohesive? Second, and conse-
quently, who and what is external to it, and why? In the case of Latin America,
this has as much to do with Latin America itself as with the Americas.
The very definition of Latin America and the criteria needed to circumscribe
and characterize it are problematic. The meaning of Latin America is more
ideational and conventional than objective and substantial. The terms ‘Latin’
and ‘America’ provide fertile terrain for quibbling. The former essentially refers
to a historical, linguistic and broadly cultural heritage but does not offer a
definitive and uncontested solution (Rouquié 1998). For instance, the French-
speaking part of Canada can be said to be more Latin than the English- or
Dutch-speaking parts of the Caribbean and South America. The University of
Oxford defines North America as ‘the territory from the Arctic to the Isthmus
of Panama and including the islands of the Caribbean’ (St Antony’s College
2020); therefore, culturally it comprises the Latin parts of the Western Hemi-
sphere. The EU considers the Caribbean to be part of Latin America for poli-
tical dialogue purposes, but the Union has long assimilated the Caribbean with
Africa and the Pacific when drawing up its development cooperation policies
(European Commission 2020). Yet, in spite of its indeterminacy, the adjective
‘Latin’ provides at least a contrast or opposition to that part of the Americas
that is not Latin, conventionally the Anglo-Saxon part.
This takes us to the second term, ‘America’. The North and the South of
the Americas have long been less dissimilar than one may think, and a clear
distinction—almost an opposition—between the two only became apparent
in the 19th century and even more so in the 20th century (Fernandez-
Armesto 2003). This debate about continental (American) unity, or the
absence of it, is also reflected in the early discussions on Latin American
identity, interests and regionalism among the founding fathers of the newly
independent republics and the intellectuals of the time (Bolívar 1969; Oviedo
2008; Galasso 2008). The conclusion was that, both in philosophical and
political terms, the United States was different from Latin America and
represented an external factor for the Latin part of the Americas. Canada
was either discounted or included in the same reasoning.
Over time, Latin America began to be perceived as a distinct continent
itself. Geographically it was defined from the Rio Bravo, marking the border
between Mexico and the United States, to the Tierra del Fuego—including
the Caribbean islands. Culturally it was characterized by broadly non-Anglo-
Saxon colonization and later immigration, and it was largely Catholic in
religion and Latin in language. Although the diversity within Latin America
makes the term ‘Latin Americas’—in the plural—preferable (Bulletin Hispa-
nique 1949), Latin America has long been a widely accepted label to indicate
a geographically contained territory with both its commonalities and multiple
differences (Rouquié 1998).
 Introduction 3
Therefore, Latin America is the region or continent of reference. The
United States and Canada, in spite of sharing the same continental land
mass, are external powers to Latin America. All other extra-Western
Hemispheric—i.e. non-American—countries are by extension external powers.
European countries, in spite of their cultural and historical links and
commonalities with Latin America, are obviously no exception. Especially
after Latin American independence, as the new republics struggled to find
their autonomous place in the world, the interests and policies of European
powers became clearly alien and external to Latin America. This is epito-
mized, for instance, by the military incursions of several European powers, or
indeed would-be powers, against Latin American states as a tool for debt
collection (Smith 2000) as well as by the crucial European, and especially
British, foreign economic influence on the development and consolidation of
many South American countries in the 1800s (Brown 2009). Russia at the
time of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1820s and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War became important external powers for Latin American and US
foreign policy calculations.
The former colonial masters Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, and the
established (Britain and France) or rising (Italy and Germany) European
powers of the 19th century, as well as Russia (which later became known as
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) or Soviet Union) and the
United States, all became traditional international partners of Latin Amer-
ica. Owing to the geographical and cultural distance, transportation and
communication obstacles, and political events and structures, other countries
played a less important role in independent Latin America’s development
and international relations and are accordingly labelled as non-traditional
external powers in this volume.1
Yet some non-traditional external powers have historically played a role in
Latin America’s international relations too. In the wake of decolonization,
and in order to find a third way between the United States and the USSR
during the Cold War, non-traditional partners emerged and an embryonic
South-South cooperation evolved. Its roots can be traced back to the Non-
Aligned Movement and the 1955 Bandung Conference, and later to the
creation, in 1964, of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) and the ensuing formation of the Group of 77, a coalition
of developing nations designed to promote its members’ economic interests
and negotiating capacity within the UN and the international system.
In spite of these developments, countries from the global South and those
that are geographically distant from Latin America remained marginal eco-
nomic and political partners for the continent from the early 1800s to the
early 2000s. In particular, during the Cold War and the 1990s, the interna-
tional relations of Latin America, and its international agenda, were largely
focused on the United States, Western Europe and—later—the EU, and to
some extent the Soviet Union (Dominguez 1994; Pope Atkins 1999).2 Japan
was a partial exception as it took a prominent position as a trade and
4 Gian Luca Gardini
investment partner for several countries in Latin America in the 1980s. This
prevalence of the United States and Europe in the Latin American external
agenda does not mean that Latin America did not have any room to man-
oeuvre (Long 2015). It means that the international relations of Latin
America were heavily focused on a restricted number of countries with rela-
tively little room for others to play significant economic or political roles in
the continent.
This changed quite suddenly and significantly in the 21st century. The
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has stressed how in the new
century ‘[s]eemingly out of nowhere, fast-growing Asian economies became
major trade partners [of Latin America]’ (IADB 2015: 1). The motives,
weight, significance and endurance of this surge may be debatable but cannot
be ignored. They ought to be understood and explained. This is the purpose
of this book, which focuses on Latin America’s non-traditional partners,
while also taking into consideration the established powers. This is to allow
for comparative analysis and to assess whether the presence of these new
partners is significantly different, in motives, nature and actual results, from
the modus operandi of Latin America’s more established partners.

The purpose of the book and the five questions informing investigation
The purpose of this book is to make sense of the increased presence of
external, especially non-traditional, powers in Latin America, and it does so
in two ways. First, all the authors discuss five key questions about the recent
surge of non-traditional powers in Latin America with reference to a specific
case study: (1) why this surge has happened; (2) when it took place; (3) where
it is mostly felt geographically and thematically; (4) what is the Latin Amer-
ican perspective; and (5) what are the actual results. This part of the con-
ceptual framework is essentially driven by an empirical concern, which is to
investigate and establish facts in order to gather the evidence needed for
further theoretical discussion. Second, throughout the chapters—particularly
in this Introduction and in the Conclusion—the volume also has a theore-
tical concern. It aims to reflect on whether conventional International Rela-
tions (IR) theory provides the necessary tools to interpret this surge, or if
more recent strands such as neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation
are preferable and actually offer genuinely alternative and innovative read-
ings. This topic will be discussed later in the Introduction and resumed in the
Conclusion. Attention now turns to the five questions informing each chapter
and the book in general.

Why has this surge happened?

The central question is why did this surge happen? Why, at some point, did
countries with limited or no relations to one another decide to intensify their
political links? In addition, why did countries and/or companies decide to
 Introduction 5
upscale their economic undertakings in any given region? This activism may
be due to economic reasons. Countries may seek new suppliers of resources,
new trade destinations, new providers of imports, or indeed new outlets for—
or sources of—investments. Especially in the case of Latin America, but also
in Africa, this surge of international activity has readily been attributed to
the commodities boom of the early 2000s. This study intends to scratch the
surface and go further to explore other explanations. Most chapters will suggest
that ‘extractivism’ has played a role but that this is only part of the story.
Alternatively, there may be political reasons behind this rapprochement
between Latin America and non-traditional partners. These reasons may
include a strategic repositioning of the country; the need to attract political
support for a leader’s cause or regime; an anti-hegemonic coalition building
or a more nuanced soft-balancing (Paul 2005) to check the rise of another
country; or it may be designed to achieve ideological affinity. All these
motives may have domestic or even individual roots. These may include a
new orientation in political economy, or a personal vision of international
affairs adopted by a new political or economic leadership. Motives can also
stem from international calculations, such as pressure from peers or markets,
the need for diversification or to exploit opportunities, fluctuations in prices,
or the availability of sought-after goods and services. In each case, there are
two, or more, sides to the story: a Latin American side; an external power
side; and possibly a third party entering the calculations of the others to
upgrade their relations. While this book mainly takes the perspective of the
external powers, it also emphasizes the Latin American perspective, role and
interest in each case study and considers systemic factors and the role of
other involved players too.

When did it happen?

Once it has been established why a certain phenomenon has taken place, the
almost natural follow-up question is why at that point in time? Why not
earlier or later? What correlations between events taking place in different
parts of the world or affecting several regions or countries can be identified?
The why and when questions are strictly connected (Solomon 2014). Still, it
is important, insofar as it may be possible, to determine when a given phe-
nomenon has happened or started. This is not only so that a correct histor-
ical chronology may be obtained but also to facilitate credible political
analysis and explanation (Hom et al. 2016). If one is to assess the results of a
given phenomenon, one has to allow a reasonable length of time to elapse for
the phenomenon to display its effects. So, when have non-traditional (and/or
traditional) external partners started to show an interest in Latin America?
When have they upscaled their political or economic operations? Has that
coincided with any major national or international episodes? Has this acti-
vism occurred in waves? Gradually? Suddenly? Does it appear to be a lasting
or purely contingent feature of Latin American international relations?
6 Gian Luca Gardini
Where is it mostly felt?
A third crucial question concerns where this surge is mostly felt. The new
presence of international partners is not necessarily evenly distributed across
Latin America (OECD 2002; Behre Dolbear Group 2015). International
partners may show a propensity towards certain productive sectors, and
therefore to certain geographic areas. For instance, the need for ores and
metals or energy products and therefore investment in the mining sector and
the extractive industries can target those countries that are more richly
endowed with these assets, but also those with better regulatory frameworks
or, paradoxically, weaker ones. Commercial deals and related investments
may target coastal areas and or infrastructure projects. Certain societal sec-
tors may benefit while others may lose importance. The traditional interna-
tional trade exchange pattern of Latin America has been the exportation of
commodities in return for manufactured products, technology and capital.
Have non-traditional partners significantly altered this dynamic or do they
replicate similar patterns? Are just a few Latin American countries involved
in this surge? Or is it a continent-wide phenomenon? So, in which areas,
countries, sub-regions and productive or societal sectors is the presence of
external partners most felt in Latin America?

What is the Latin American perspective?

Too often in the past, foreign relations have been perceived as exploitation or
unfair deals for Latin America (Galeano 1997). Is the wave of non-traditional
partners’ activities any different? What is the Latin American side of the story?
What does Latin America expect from these new relations? Is it managing
them differently to before? Has Latin America taken the initiative? If so, in
which cases, for what reasons and with what expectations? Are these new
relations with non-traditional external partners more symmetric compared
with those with the United States, Europe or even China (the latter is now a
crucial partner and a unique case of rapid penetration into Latin America)?
Ultimately, the point here is whether or not there is something specifically
Latin American in these new relations, so that Latin America can advance its
own agenda and interests. Furthermore, is Latin America proactive in these
new relations or has it just switched from one form of dependency to
another? One may also wonder whether ‘Latin America’ in this context
actually means something truly regional or whether it has simply been put
forward by and for the benefit of one or more major Latin American players.

What are the actual results and how can we measure them?
Finally, one may wonder what the actual and tangible result is of the pre-
sence of these new extra-hemispheric powers. One may also ask which indi-
cators are truly appropriate for this kind of appraisal. Is this presence really
 Introduction 7
significant? To what extent and with what limits? Is it beneficial for Latin
America and to what degree? Is there evidence of a match between the
declared purposes of the relationship and its results? Do these relations
represent a win-win situation? Do they promote a more balanced interna-
tional system or do they reproduce on a smaller scale already established
asymmetrical relations? These new partnerships can be read as opportunities
for emancipation but they may also pose further challenges in terms of
dependency or ‘sub-imperial’ interactions (Bond 2016).

Methodological discussions and clarifications

A number of methodological questions and concerns arose when deciding
how to approach the subject. One of the first questions was about the scope
and definition of the object of analysis with regard both to the international
partners and to Latin America as a region. A second issue was about how to
account for and balance all the actors’ different views, interests and narra-
tives on such a complex topic. A third concern was about how to render the
conviction that geopolitics matters and that states themselves are still the
driving actors in the international system without falling into an excessively
state-centric or conflict-prone approach.
Initially, when introducing this project at various conferences, the topic of
external powers in Latin America raised a lot of interest but also some eye-
brows, in two senses. On the one hand, it is obvious that to consider Latin
America and the Caribbean as a single entity implies a level of general-
ization. Both the editor and the contributors to this volume are acutely
aware of this caveat. It is redundant to observe, for instance, that different
Latin American countries trade differently with different external partners,
both in terms of volume and in trade composition. On the other hand,
external powers are very different from one another and are heterogeneous
too. The case of China is not easily comparable with any other; in a similar
vein, Israel’s interest in, capacity for and mode of projection towards Latin
America cannot be directly compared with that of India, for instance. In fact,
one of the key arguments to emerge in this book is that external powers are
not evenly interested in Latin America as a whole but tend to prioritize a
restricted number of partners in the region. The purpose of the volume is
precisely to highlight and explain both the commonalities and the differences.
Ultimately, comparative social and political analysis is about this, to recon-
cile differences and similarities. Without a (cautious) level of generalization
and flexibility, no area study or comparative study would be possible. To
study Latin America and its interactions with the rest of the world makes as
much sense as to study the relations of Europe, Asia or Africa with their
respective external partners. There is a plethora of studies on these topics
that are solidly justified in both theoretical and methodological terms.
Second, in analyses such as this one, there is often a double risk. On the
one hand, to privilege the Latin American or the external power side is to
8 Gian Luca Gardini
neglect the other. On the other hand, to emphasize systemic, domestic or
individual circumstances is to downplay the other dimensions. We have
sought to achieve a balanced and comprehensive modus operandi. This book
emphasizes both the Latin American and the external powers’ perspectives.
Too often history, IR and International Political Economy have interpreted
the relations between non-Latin American powers and Latin American
countries from the standpoint of the former as the only driver of the rela-
tionship. Meanwhile, systemic and exogenous factors have prevailed to
explain Latin American external projection. This book answers a call (Lopes
and Zuleta 2016; Long 2015) to rebalance international and internal con-
cerns and perspectives, both in Latin American and extra-continental states.
The chapters in this volume stress the complex interplay between Latin
American institutions and players on the one hand, and international junctures
and actors on the other.
Third, this book is structured by countries3 and discusses both political
and economic relations emphasizing state-to-state interactions particularly
with reference to their institutions. The volume does not address societal
relations in depth, although it does not ignore them. This approach, in
addition to reasons of methodology and systematization, reflects the convic-
tion that states are still the driving players in the international system, par-
ticularly the last instance. At the time of going to press, the whole world is
being shaken by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has invariably shown that
states are the ultimate drivers of and decision-makers in international rela-
tions (Gardini 2020a). In spite of the importance of multinational corpora-
tions, transnational civil society or international organizations, states still
determine international political as well as economic dynamics to a sig-
nificant extent, especially during global crises. It is true that companies
operating in international markets are the ones usually initiating the trade
(Aguinis et al. 2020; Borras et al. 2011), but as the chapters on China,
Russia, Turkey and Iran demonstrate, states still have the capacity, or even
the power and will, to direct or redirect trade and investments. Government
orientations affect international economic activity, not only in authoritarian
governments but also in democracies, as the chapter on South Korea shows,
and the renewed German attention to Latin America indicates (Gardini
2020b).
The rhetoric and the analyses of the past 30–40 years on the weakening or
displacing of the state have to be reconsidered. A rebalancing exercise,
involving a much more careful review of the specific areas of state activity
and power as well as the normative role and value of the state, has to be
conducted (Pospisil and Kühn 2016; Cohen 2006). This is especially true in
the light of global crises, such the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008/09
financial meltdown, but also taking into account that international interac-
tions are not only dictated by economic interests but by prestige, national
pride and history, and where state leaderships and apparatuses as well as
geopolitics still remain central (Limes 2018; Caracciolo 2018).
 Introduction 9
Between neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation: a dialogue with
and contributions to the existing theoretical debates
A number of IR and International Political Economy theories may serve to
interpret and explain the surge of external powers in Latin America. Con-
ventional IR theories based on power, cooperation and social/ideational
construction capture a good deal of the phenomenon. Still, two theoretical
strands have recently gained prominence and claimed a level of originality
and additional explanatory power: extractivism (or neo-extractivism) and
South-South cooperation. The line pursued in this book takes stock of these
contributions but looks at them with a critical eye. On the one hand, while
extractivism and neo-extractivism are certainly central to the discussion, they
are far from exhausting it. This type of approach is hardly new as it picks up
the strands of old arguments about structuralism (Prebisch 1950) and tends
to underestimate differences in context between the international setting of
its original formulations and that of today. Indeed, neo-structuralism has
remained analytically very close to structuralism (Bielschowsky 2009). On the
other hand, this volume acknowledges the value of the South-South cooperation
approach, a central theoretical understanding of the topic, but scrutinizes
both the assumptions and some of the conclusions of such an approach in an
attempt to avoid reducing the wider and more complex subject matter to a
set of normative arguments in favour or against South-South relations.
This book makes a call for a multilevel, multifaceted and pluralist expla-
nation of complex phenomena, without adopting one theoretical stance only,
but in fact accepting many concurrent explanations, with a focus on high
politics and geopolitics as driving forces in the international realm, including
in the surge of non-traditional external powers in Latin America. In other
words, through essentially geopolitical lenses, we propose a ‘normalized’ view
of this surge not as an exceptional but as a recurrent feature of international
relations.
Extractivism, although very important, is not the only or necessarily the
major explanatory factor for the surge of non-traditional powers in Latin
America. The academic literature has insisted on new-extractivism and the
reprimarization of the economy to explain Latin America’s international rise
in the 21st century as well as the intensification of the presence—political
and economic—of non-traditional partners in the continent (Gudynas 2008,
2009; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014; Svampa 2019). This is certainly a crucial
part of the story, especially to explain Latin American growth between 2000
and 2014. Yet this approach tends to overemphasize one productive sector, to
downplay significantly geopolitical and strategic elements that are more per-
tinent to an IR perspective and misses key motives behind the presence of
several external partners in the region. The chapters on Russia, Taiwan, Iran,
Turkey, South Africa, Canada and to a lesser extent Japan, India, South
Korea and the EU will discuss this point. Resource-seeking in Latin America
is not necessarily and then not always a central concern to these countries’
10 Gian Luca Gardini
operations. Political, strategic and ideological factors play a prominent role
too. Geopolitics and soft balancing are central to understanding South
Korea, India, Japan, Taiwan and Israel’s policy vis-à-vis Latin America.
Extractivism does not exhaust the interest of traditional partners such as the
United States, the EU and European countries in Latin America. This is
particularly evident in the case of the EU, at least at the discursive level
(Rosales 2020; Fundación Carolina 2011). This volume situates the extra-
ctivist argument in the context of deeper and broader ideological, political
and economic shifts, whose consequences are evident in the external powers’
policies towards Latin America (Serbin 2019).
The surge of external powers in Latin America can also be read through
the lens of South-South cooperation, a growing area of academic and policy
debate that claims ‘new’ forms of solidarity and emancipatory relations at
the international level (Muhr 2016). In a way, extractivism and sub-imperialism
represent one extreme of the analytical and explanatory spectrum, high-
lighting how non-traditional or emerging powers reproduce existing capitalist
development and economic practices of the (once) dominant North. A
benign assessment of South-South cooperation represents the other extreme,
emphasizing almost uncritically the continued economic and political
advance of the global South and its aspiration to and potential for trans-
forming global order. South-South cooperation is both ‘a key organising
concept and a set of practices in pursuit … of mutual benefit and solidarity
among the disadvantaged of the world system’ (Gray and Gills 2016: 557).
Indeed, a significant portion of both the academic literature and interna-
tional diplomatic statements tends to stress at least two predominantly
benign expectations (Lechini and Morasso 2015; Schweller 2011; Cheru
2016; Muhr 2016; UNDP 2019). First, South-South cooperation is a some-
what new form of cooperation among formerly and/or still relatively mar-
ginal countries guided by different principles set by the established powers.
Second, it could be conducive to fostering a different and fairer international
system that benefits the less well-off in particular. The approach of this
volume can be located between extractivism and South-South cooperation in
the sense that it seeks to balance the two arguments, place them in a broader
context where conventional IR theories already provide perfectly valid
explanations, and call into question key features of both paradigms, such as:

a To what extent do the ‘elites of the Global South and “rising powers”
genuinely have the intention to challenge the dominant structures of
global capitalist development’ (Gray and Gills 2016: 559).
b To what extent has this surge of new powers significantly altered the tradi-
tional trade patterns of Latin America, based on the export of commodities
and the import of manufactured goods, technology and capital.
c To what extent has the growing presence of these external powers helped
or hindered the autonomy and power of Latin America in international
affairs (Kagarlitsky 2016).
 Introduction 11
d To what extent do general concepts such as the global South, emerging
powers and non-traditional powers actually capture dynamics that in
fact may characterize only a few of them, i.e. the BRICS or the most
powerful ones, but may elude a majority of the still marginalized devel-
oping nations in Latin America and elsewhere.
e Conversely, to what extent do some of the expectations raised in the lit-
erature apply to the whole of Latin America and not just to a select
number of countries that are the actual targets of the operations of
external powers in the region.

The Conclusion will resume the discussion on these issues both empirically
and theoretically, following the findings of the case studies in relation to the
five guiding questions. It is important that the reader bears these guiding
points in mind throughout the book.
To the best of our knowledge, this volume is an absolute first in English on
the market in book format. It is the only book to specifically target the role of
external powers in Latin America in the 21st century, with its general scope,
coherent conceptual framework and clear theoretical stance. The book pro-
vides 16 case studies, thus offering a panoramic view of the external powers in
Latin America, ranging from Africa, Europe, Asia, Oceania and the Americas.
The case studies broadly cover the bulk of the recent surge of external presence
in Latin America. They focus on the period from the beginning of the 21st
century up until the present day. Furthermore, no other book offers a common
conceptual toolkit that comprises the five key research questions to assess and
compare the weight and actual effect of the increased presence of external
powers in Latin America. More importantly, the volume offers theoretical
reflections and establishes a dialogue with a number of competing IR theories
and explanations. It ‘normalizes’ the surge of external powers in Latin
America in the 21st century by framing it in a regular and predictable geopo-
litical dynamic situated broadly at the centre of a spectrum between cynical
neo-extractivism and benign South-South cooperation.
The other unique asset of the volume is its team of academic contributors.
All the authors have proven expertise in their field and a solid track record of
publications on their respective case studies. All share an unquestionable
passion for and extensive knowledge of Latin America. Hailing from all over
the world, the contributors come from a variety of scholarly backgrounds,
thus reflecting differing cultural approaches to emerging powers and Latin
American and international politics. Such variety within a truly international
team contributes to the richness of the volume in terms of pluralism,
perspective and analysis.

Notes
1 Russia is a hybrid case. It featured prominently in foreign policy calculations in the
Americas in the 19th century and was a central actor during the Cold War.
12 Gian Luca Gardini
Following the fall of the USSR, in the 1990s Russia ‘retrenched’ from Latin
America and from international relations in general. During the 21st century
Russia, which is a member of the BRICS (a grouping of five major emerging
national economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), has been
associated with rising countries although ‘re-emerging’ would probably better
describe its status as well as that of China.
2 This is even more evident when one compares the list of contents and the discus-
sion in Part 2 of Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System
(Pope Atkins [1999] 2018).
3 With the exception of the EU, which is broadly considered as a unitary actor in
Chapter 2, and ASEAN in Chapter 14.

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1 The United States in Latin America
Lasting asymmetries, waning influence?
Tom Long

Introduction
There is no question that relations between the United States and the various
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are, and long have been,
marked by disparities in material capabilities. Nor is there much doubt that
the United States was, for most of the 20th century, the non-Latin American
country with the greatest influence on the region.
However, the degree of US influence is very often overstated and homo-
genized. First, geographical variation in US influence is often overlooked,
which can lead observers to neglect the independent influence of secondary
powers and other extra-regional powers, especially in South America. US
power has always been greatest in a much narrower area than that captured
by the term ‘Latin America’. Second, US influence is often chronologically
exaggerated. The most egregious clichés refer to unbroken US hegemony
since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine—an anachronistic reading that would have
come as quite a surprise to President James Monroe himself. Third, the
depth and consistency of US political influence is overstated in a way that
fails to recognize the importance of Latin American domestic politics and
Latin American states’ agency in relations with the United States and with
one another. Paradoxically, this third form of exaggeration leads to an over-
estimation of direct US influence even at its zenith. There is, however, one
way in which US influence is often understated—and this is important for
the present day. Despite great attention to political fluctuations and the high-
profile presence of other extra-regional powers, US influence in Latin Amer-
ica benefits from substantial historical weight. While the novelties of the
growing—and indeed important—Chinese presence in Latin America
demand attention, inertia exercises great influence but is rarely as visible.
This weight of the past continues to shape institutions, patterns of relation-
ships, and actors’ worldviews and understanding of their interests, in addi-
tion to the more material legacies of stocks of investment and infrastructure.
This chapter will briefly examine asymmetries and influences in US-Latin
America relations. First, it will summarize perspectives in the literature on
the subject, highlighting some of their commonalities. Second, it will develop
16 Tom Long
the argument about overlooked variation in US influence in Latin America,
giving an historical sketch along the way. Finally, it will assess the current
moment, in which US power is seemingly more diminished and challenged.

Accounts, asymmetry and overlooked variation

As noted above, the relationships among the United States and its Latin
American neighbours are structured by fundamental asymmetries. But what
does that mean, and what does it mean for our understanding of the United
States’ role in Latin America?
Until relatively recently, it meant that scholars focused their attention
overwhelmingly on US interests, decisions and actions. The study of US-
Latin America relations has long provoked sharp divisions, but scholars
across the divide granted ontological primacy to the United States, whether
they saw the United States as a beneficial presence for Latin America or cri-
ticized US avarice and aggression (Pastor and Long 2010). The study of
inter-American relations, until recently, has been dominated by the study of
US foreign policy (Bertucci 2013). Crandall (2008), echoing an early treat-
ment by Lowenthal (1973), described an ‘establishment’ school, in part due
to frequent links between authors and the US foreign policy establishment.
On the other hand, most historical scholarship from the 1980s to the 2000s
formed part of a ‘revisionist synthesis’ (Gilderhus 1992) that strongly criti-
cized US policy for its economic imperialism, recurring misguided interven-
tions and entrenched racial prejudice (Schoultz 1998, 2018; Grandin 2006).
However, scholarship on the Americas has increasingly taken Latin Amer-
ican agency into account, ‘decentering’ old narratives (Darnton 2013) and
producing a more ‘internationalist approach’ (Long 2015: 10–12).
Asymmetry matters for the practice of US-Latin America relations as well,
but its effects are multidimensional. Most obviously, it means that the United
States possesses capabilities, including military coercion, to act in ways that
its neighbours cannot reciprocate. It also means that the United States
generates a gravitational pull that affects the calculations of other states,
particularly those nearest its borders. Thus, US influence may be overt—even
abrasive—or it may work like gravity—unseen, powerful and constant.
Where does this power asymmetry leave Latin American agency? Here, the
dynamics of asymmetry are not quite so obvious. As Womack (2016) points
out, asymmetry shapes perceptions and patterns of attention. The smaller
actor is more consistently focused on the larger actor rather than vice versa,
and each side wants something different from the relationship. ‘Differences in
material capabilities certainly matter, but they are not the only thing that
matters’ (Long 2015: 15). When the United States turns its full attention to a
particular country or crisis, its power can be overwhelming. However, this is
a relatively infrequent occurrence, and at other times asymmetries in attention
can partially counteract asymmetries of power (Darnton 2012).
 The United States 17
Geographical variation
The first source of overlooked heterogeneity in Latin America’s relations with
the United States is geographical. It is a salutary reminder that Washington,
DC, is further from Buenos Aires (5,187 miles) than from Moscow (4,909
miles).1 Although globalization and technology have diminished the impact
of distance, such expanses continue to matter in trade and politics. And if
distance matters today, it counted even more in historical patterns of
influence.
The spectrum of US influence has always had a strong geographical
dimension; the same is true of US perceptions of its interests in Latin
America. Observers often fret that the United States spends more time
obsessing over small countries in the Caribbean and Central America than it
does trying to establish strong and mutually beneficial relations with Brazil
(Hakim 2014). However, this is not unusual. Setting aside sweeping US
rhetoric, whether about the republican solidarity in the 19th century, Pan
American collaboration in the 1930s, or a Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego in the 1990s, US interests, inter-
ventions, influence and indignities have been heavily concentrated around the
Caribbean.
Historically and today, one can observe four geographical tiers in the US-
Latin America relationship. First, Mexico stands in a category by itself, with
a unique bilateral relationship shaped by nearly 2,000 miles of shared border
and frequent exchanges of populations. The US-Mexico relationship is filled
with risks and opportunities, friendships and frustrations, that are unlike
those elsewhere (González 2001; Smith and Selee 2013). The very geography
of the two countries was created by their relationship, in particular the
Mexican-American War of 1846–1848, in which the United States largely
achieved its continental form while Mexico lost nearly half of its territory.
Numerous US soldiers, including the future US President Ulysses S. Grant,
derided the conflict as an unjust war of aggression. Since then, the bilateral
relationship has alternated between hot and cool, although tropes of ‘distant
neighbours’ have often understated the continued ties even during cool
periods.
Beyond Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean find themselves in a
second tier. Here, there is an exaggerated asymmetrical dependence, both
because the United States weighs so heavily, but also because the small
countries of the Caribbean Basin appear only infrequently in the imaginaries
of high-level US policymakers. When they do, they often find themselves the
recipients of intense scrutiny and pressure. Pastor (2001) aptly described this
cyclical pattern of attention as a ‘whirlpool’—slow, gradual and harmless at
its outer reaches but intense and potentially deadly at the centre. It is in this
tier that the United States has most often intervened to shape states’ trajec-
tories. While the nature of these relationships has at times undergone sig-
nificant swings—none greater than the 1959 Cuban Revolution—the patterns
18 Tom Long
of asymmetries that emerged in the late 19th century continue to shape their
contours (Santa-Cruz 2019: Ch. 7).
The northernmost countries of South America constitute the third tier.
Colombia and Venezuela form the heart of this tier, although Ecuador and
Guyana are also included. Here, US attention has been more moderate in
level and nature, allowing for long periods of friendly relations. After healing
the wound caused by Panama’s US-backed independence from Colombia,
Colombian policymakers adopted a consistently friendly stance (Bernal and
Tickner 2017). Although the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás
Maduro make it hard to recall, US-Venezuela relations were also long char-
acterized by comity (Corrales and Romero 2012; Miller 2016), as were US
relations with Ecuador before President Rafael Correa came to power (Hey
1995). Guyana historically hoped to have US support against territorial
encroachments from its larger neighbours—although it suffered covert US
and British intervention as it gained independence.
The fourth tier includes the Southern Cone of South America, broadly
speaking. Although earlier in its history Brazil was ambivalent about its
inclusion in ‘Latin America’ and about its neighbours (Bethell 2010), in
recent years one cannot understand the US role in the region without
immediately bringing Brazil into the picture. Although the United States has
had periods of intense involvement, particularly at the height of the Cold
War, the pattern of relations differs. The southernmost tier has often func-
tioned as a subsystem, in which the United States was one extra-regional
player among several (Teixeira 2012). Relations between Argentina and
Brazil (and sometimes Chile) were often more important to shaping regional
dynamics (Bandeira 2010; Saraiva 2012), including for the smaller states in
the tier. Intra-regional dynamics shaped the creation of institutions at the
regional and domestic level more than did the United States (Gardini 2010).

Temporal variation
US influence has also been marked by chronological change. At the time of
the oft-invoked Monroe Doctrine—initially a message to Congress and not a
foreign policy ‘doctrine’—the United States was a weak international player,
lacking military capabilities to enforce its proclaimed opposition to Eur-
opean recolonization or to create a separate sphere of international relations
in the Americas. Initially, US concerns with the newly independent states to
its south were driven by continental expansion and deeply mired in the poli-
tics of slavery (Sexton 2011). Slavery and racism so conditioned US policy
that the first independent state in the Americas (the United States) refused to
diplomatically recognize the second (Haiti) because its independence had
been achieved by former slaves. Slavery and expansion also marked the
Mexican-American War and early forays into Central America, which
emerged from the need for faster connections to California. US involvement
produced risk and opportunity for local actors, economically and politically.
 The United States 19
Some sought US engagement to promote their own agendas or to strengthen
their hands against domestic opponents or, occasionally, external powers
(Gobat 2018). For example, Mexican Liberals called for the United States to
put muscle behind the Monroe Doctrine and halt the French and Austrian
invasion of 1861–1867, which put a Hapsburg emperor on a Mexican throne.
Mired in its own civil war, the United States declined.
US-Latin America relations beyond Panama were fairly limited until the
late 19th century; South America looked first to its own consolidation and
development and, internationally, to Europe (Burr 1965). In the 1890s inter-
American commercial and political interests began to take root in South
America, but without becoming dominant. Ideas of a particularly American
sphere blossomed; while some in the United States saw this as tutelage, a
proto-multilateral hemisphere was advanced by others in incipient institu-
tions and international law (Scarfi 2017). Inter-American relations gained a
harder edge at the close of the century as the United States sharpened the
Monroe Doctrine’s hegemonic presumption into an instrument of exclusion
and intervention under the Olney and Roosevelt corollaries. The rapid defeat
of Spain in 1898 pushed the former colonial power out of Cuba and Puerto
Rico. The United States reinterpreted its geopolitical interests expansively
and followed its victory against Spain with a series of interventions and
occupations throughout Central America and the Caribbean with the aim of
instilling democratic political culture and stability in supposedly inferior
nations (Schoultz 1998, 2018). The four decades from 1890 to 1930 were
hardly the only period of US imperialism or interventionism, but they were the
most open and blatant. None lasted longer than in Nicaragua, where grow-
ing resistance inspired many in Latin America. None was more brutal than
in Haiti, where the racism of US interveners served to justify repression and
the racism of Spanish American elites dampened sympathies (Renda 2001;
McPherson 2014). The period produced a strong Latin American response,
both in terms of resistance against occupations and diplomatically to curtail
US unilateral militarism. This created a seeming contradiction of opposition
to overt US invasions of Latin America but also increasing institutionaliza-
tion and cooperation under Pan American institutions (Vargas Garcia 2006;
Petersen and Schulz 2018). Often, though, these were sides of the same
coin—growing US power created dangers and opportunities, which Latin
Americans met with cooperation and resistance. US influence increased, but
its limits were clear for those who cared to see them. The great power poured
money into ineffective occupations, which helped to spur a more coordinated
response from geographically distant states in South America (Friedman
and Long 2015).
Cooperation, at least temporarily, won the day. The 1930s were marked by
the termination of several long US occupations, the renunciation of a right
to intervene in Caribbean domestic politics (the Cuban Platt Amendment
and copies elsewhere), and the consolidation of multifaceted international
institutions. The Great Depression and the more ideologically convergent
20 Tom Long
administration of Franklin Roosevelt encouraged early efforts at economic
cooperation, including a stillborn plan for a regional development bank
(Tussie 1995; Helleiner 2014). This took place amid growing concern about
the coming of war in Europe. The era of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy
saw Latin Americans achieve a long-sought-after acceptance of non-inter-
vention and (de jure) sovereign equality (Wood 1967). It also saw deep
cooperation in the Second World War, including Brazilian and Mexican
deployments, and economic contributions from Latin America to the war
effort (Torres 1979; Leonard and Bratzel 2007), with important implications
from domestic politics in the region (Bethell and Roxborough 1997). The
immediate postwar period was reshaped by the United States’ new global
role and the frustrated expectations of Latin Americans of greater postwar
cooperation. However, it also saw the creation of important inter-American
institutions, which initially were born more of the vestiges of ‘Good Neigh-
borism’ and wartime cooperation than the emerging Cold War (Long 2020).
Perhaps the longest-lasting effect of the war was the separation it caused
between the Americas and Europe; old trading relationships declined mark-
edly even for the Southern Cone and European political and military influ-
ence retrenched under the strain of war and reconstruction. The United
States encouraged the European exodus, quickly stepped into the void, and then
sought to preserve the position. As the immediate postwar period faded,
European powers reasserted traditional ties, although at lower levels (Ruano
2013). This was often cultivated by South American leaders who sought to
maintain alternative options to the United States.
The Cold War deeply marked US-Latin America relations, although even
then it was hardly an era of homogenous US domination. US influence was
substantial throughout the period, although probably broadest and most
geographically expansive early in the Cold War when it had clear global
material superiority and its ideology was more widely accepted throughout
the region. However, the global contest was just one element of overlapping
spheres of politics; these included old local conflicts of class, race and party,
regional rivalries, and finally the global Cold War (Brands 2010; Harmer
2014; Moulton 2015). These overlaps could create a particularly venomous
mix when long-standing local conflicts fused with anti-communism, and
conservative elites gained access to material and ideological resources to
prosecute violent campaigns. The Cuban Revolution and ensuing Cuban
alliance with the Soviet Union confirmed the fears of US policymakers and
Latin American conservative elites alike. For a decade, especially, Cuba
actively sought to foment revolution and remained an ideological inspiration
(Harmer 2013). The spectre of Cuba often provoked outsized and brutal
responses from the US and Latin American conservative elites.
US influence could be decisive through covert or overt means, although
even in some classic cases, the focus on the United States overshadowed
more important national and local actors. For example, although the United
States helped to create adverse economic conditions and welcomed the
 The United States 21
outcome thereof, the Chilean military (with encouragement from Brazil’s
military regime) was the decisive force in the 1973 coup against leftist Pre-
sident Salvador Allende (Harmer 2014). Allende’s repressive successor,
Augusto Pinochet, had uneven relations with the United States, curiously so
since the dictator was thought of by many as a US puppet (Morley and
McGillion 2015). Even in this period of peak US influence, Latin American
leaders could achieve substantial successes vis-à-vis the United States on
matters of central importance (Long 2015). Mexico walked a fine line of
symbolic resistance and sub rosa cooperation, turning US aid to its own
purposes (Keller 2015). Brazilian Cold War relations with the United States
oscillated; even strong anti-communism did not always translate into close
alignment (Hirst and Hurrell 2005). Even smaller states could carve out
space and influence US policy. Panama achieved a national ambition with
the return of its canal (Long 2014); Costa Rica retained enviable stability and
development alongside the conflicts of its neighbours (Longley 1997). During
the Cold War’s bloodiest chapter in the Central American conflicts of the
late 1970s and 1980s, the United States found willing anti-communist part-
ners and became complicit in astonishing acts of bloodshed and violence
(Rabe 2011).
The immediate aftermath of the Cold War created a moment of seeming
convergence between US and Latin American priorities, with support for US
leadership on economic policies and promotion of democracy. Following the
Latin American debt crisis, US-backed neoliberal economic policies gained
traction. The first Summit of the Americas in 1994 gave the appearance of a
region ready to follow Washington (Feinberg 1997); however, within a few
years, resistance to US demands eroded support for hemispheric free trade
(Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012), while renewed contestations over democratic
norms emerged (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2019). The reinvigoration of hemispheric
institutions, especially the Organization of American States, as well as global
institutions such as the World Trade Organization, bound Latin America
more tightly to liberal order, but also gave the region new tools. To a great
extent, transnational issues replaced the old ‘Red Scare’, but these problems
were of a very different sort. They often pushed Washington towards policies
of strengthening incumbent regimes instead of overthrowing them. That has
not stopped Washington from embracing the right-wing—willingly over-
looking its transgressions—but this policy and its frequent companion of
militarization have been counter-productive in addressing transnational
challenges (Durán-Martínez 2017).
The degree and nature of US influence have varied tremendously over the
past two centuries. For most of South America, the United States was a sec-
ondary actor during the 19th century, growing in importance only during the
First World War and even more significantly during the Second World War.
The high point of US influence, from the late 1930s until the mid-1970s, was
both shorter and more contested than is sometimes presumed. There is no
doubt that the United States was the weightiest non-Latin American actor in
22 Tom Long
the region; it exercised substantial influence through its actions and mass.
However, in other moments—particularly outside the first two geographical
tiers—local, regional and other extra-regional concerns mattered too.

Depth and domestic politics

The final way in which variation in US influence is often overstated and
misunderstood regards its ‘depth’. Often, the presumed homogeneity of US
influence led to depictions that overstated US control of economic social,
and political processes in Latin America while understating Latin American
agency. Max Paul Friedman (2003) put this best in his call for ‘retiring the
puppets’—the treatment of Latin American leaders as marionettes on strings
held by great powers. The United States did care about domestic develop-
ments, as Friedman (2019) argues elsewhere, when these had a hint of com-
munism or evinced an economic nationalism that threatened to exclude US
corporations.
But most of what happened in Latin America, even during the early Cold
War, was off Washington’s radar or out of its control—even as it could take
extreme steps when it perceived that a security or economic line was being
crossed. In terms of international security, some of Latin America’s bloodiest
conflicts had little to do with the United States. That was true for the worst
interstate war of the 19th century—the Triple Alliance—and of the early 20th
century, the Chaco War (Burr 1965; Brezzo 2004). During the early Cold
War, low-level international conflicts raged in the Caribbean between ideo-
logical opponents (Moulton 2015) to US perturbation. If much happened at
the international level outside the United States’ control, even more did so at
the domestic level. During the 19th century, the United States sought to
reshape domestic politics during the Mexican Revolution, and then most
notably in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Those
efforts involved prolonged occupations and certainly grave and often perni-
cious US influence, but US forces left without achieving their political
objectives. Further afield, the depth of US influence was extremely limited
until much later. During the Cold War, leftist revolutions in the region
usually failed and the United States often had a hand in helping, especially
through military assistance. However, often these failures were over-
determined. The Cuban-style ‘foco’ approach of sending a small group to
ignite a struggle was out of touch with the realities in many countries where
it failed—especially Venezuela and Bolivia, where Che Guevara was killed
(Harmer 2013; Field 2014; Miller 2016). The United States was involved in
both countries, but revolutionaries never had a serious chance of taking
power against their domestic opponents. US culpability for factional and
genocidal violence in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s (Leo-
Grande 1998) contrasted with its marginality for patterns of Colombian
violence until the internationalization of those conflicts in the 1980s (Tickner
2007; Karl 2017).
 The United States 23
In the economic sphere, the United States used direct means to shape
Latin American policies and to support its companies abroad (Santa-Cruz
2019). It also exerted influence through the gravity of asymmetrical economic
relations, which slowly but surely bent the interests of the Latin American
elite in Washington’s direction. The success of more direct attempts was
mixed when these diverged too greatly from the economic plans of Latin
American leaders themselves. Even during the years of greatest influence,
Latin Americans developed earlier inklings of import substitution indus-
trialization (ISI) into a fully fledged approach to national industrialization,
especially in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. US policies were inconsistent; the
United States sometimes supported national and regional ISI-inspired
schemes, sometimes opposed them, and sometimes ignored them. The United
Nations Economic Commission on Latin America, the seedbed for much
ISI thinking, was created at the zenith of US influence, amid US grumbling
but without a US veto (Santa Cruz 1995). Often the greatest economic
influence occurred when US economic power gradually moulded Latin
American interests instead of openly countering them and demanding
change.

The more things change?

Many aspects of US behaviour in Latin America are typical of large powers
in their regions—seeking a sphere from which extra-hemispheric rivals are
militarily excluded or expecting a degree of deference. However, the way in
which the United States exercises its power in Latin America also has parti-
cular characteristics that have been shaped by its view of its own role in
world politics and by the configuration of the economic and political elite.
Starting with its 19th- century expansion, the United States assumed that it
was destined to lead a region that it saw as distinct and in need of its lea-
dership. This assumption has been strongest in Central America and the
Caribbean. The content of that assumed leadership has variously emphasized
US views of racial and cultural hierarchies, ideals of liberalism, and the
provision of protection (whether requested or not) against extra-hemispheric
‘threats’, be they states, non-state actors or dangerous ideas. US economic
interests first turned to Latin America for land and markets, then for com-
modities and investment opportunities, and more recently for support for a
model of capital expansion and protection of investor prerogatives. At least
since the First World War, the United States has sought Latin American
support at a global level for its political positions and economic doctrine; the
actual support offered by or commanded from Latin Americans has varied
tremendously.
Where does this emphasis on variation leave us when considering the US
role and influence in Latin America today? Geographical variation is, per-
haps, more salient than it has been since the early 20th century. Mexico and
Central America and the Caribbean remain tightly bound to the United
24 Tom Long
States, socially through migration and economically through remittances and
markets, licit and illicit. The most distant tier, however, has reduced inter-
dependence with the United States, particularly by accessing Chinese markets
and capital (Paz 2012; Urdinez et al. 2016). The middle tier is divided;
Colombia has been hesitant in its embrace of China, partly due to domestic
political opposition (Long et al. 2019), while Venezuela became a money pit
for Chinese loans (Rosales 2018). The effects for the region’s development
and politics are not yet clear, but the divergence between parts of the region
is.
Another important difference relates to the depth of US influence; in some
regards, it has never been shallower. In other, less obvious ways, the US role
remains substantial. US influence is diminished in that its ability to coerce
and cajole compliance is reduced, especially in South America. Domestic
politics have been increasingly important in shaping Latin American foreign
policies (Gardini and Lambert 2011). Two decades ago, one could argue that
the international systemic level and presidents determined foreign policy, but
that argument, often implicit, has never been less convincing.
In a deeper sense, US influence remains substantial. This sort of influence
by inertia resembles what Susan Strange (1987) called—in an article entitled
‘The persistent myth of lost hegemony’—structural power. China’s economic
presence has grown tremendously and changed international economic rela-
tions in the Southern Cone in many respects. However, US influence in the
region benefits from the weight of history, which has accumulated both
deeply embedded material bases, socially rooted networks of relationships,
webs of formal and informal institutions, and entrenched norms. For exam-
ple, while the opening of Confucius Institutes and the creation of new fel-
lowships draws attention to China’s expanding soft power, these innovative
educational efforts are dwarfed by the US Fulbright programme and its
decades-deep alumni base (including this author). Similar legacy connections
are deep in Latin American military, political and economic elites, shaping
how actors understand the world and define their own interests. Such is the
deep influence of asymmetry, and this sort of influence remains profound,
regardless of who occupies the presidency in Washington or in Latin American
capitals.
The combination of US presumptions, lasting asymmetries and great var-
iation in influence will shape the engagement of extra-hemispheric powers in
the region. As critical reactions from the Trump Administration to China’s
surging economic influence suggested, US hegemonic presumptions mean
that visible manifestations of extra-hemispheric engagement are likely to
provoke consternation from Washington. However, that hardly means that
the Western Hemisphere is closed for business. The United States is not
uniformly hostile: the Obama Administration was more relaxed about Latin
America’s growing ties with China, and many US economic elites perceive
potential benefits. More importantly, the variation in US influence in Latin
America provides opportunities for extra-hemispheric powers to gain a
 The United States 25
foothold without clashing with Washington in the way that extra-hemispheric
powers have around the Venezuelan crisis. China seems to have largely acted
in this way already (Urdinez et al. 2016). The United States will be more
accepting of other powers’ engagement where this is not seen as a direct
challenge; over time, Europe’s major trade and investment role in South
America evolved from a perceived threat to a largely welcome presence. For
Latin American states, a more multipolar world offers greater benefits and
policy space, but only as long as a minimal degree of cooperative order
encompasses emerging and status quo powers. If that order frays and zero-
sum competition reigns, Latin America’s room for manoeuvre within an
unevenly asymmetric hemisphere will be accompanied by greater risk.

Note
1 Distances from Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Distance between capital cities’,
available at http://ksgleditsch.com/data-5.html.

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2 The European Union in Latin America
A ‘neighbour’ of values
Gian Luca Gardini

Introduction
Europe, together with the United States, has historically been one of the
most established partners of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The
legacy of colonialism, European migration, language, religion, culture, as
well as historical events and economic ties have largely shaped the political,
social and economic development of Latin America since independence. The
European Union (EU), as the political and economic expression of a united
Europe, has long played a major role in Latin America. The EU has been a
reference for Latin America’s own dream of regional unity, and an aspiration
in terms of institutional setting, social cohesion, economic success, the
promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights.
Thus, it is difficult to perceive a surge in a strict sense in European or EU
presence in Latin America in the 21st century. On the one hand, the presence
of Europe and later the EU in Latin America has been a constant feature for
five centuries. On the other hand, a significant intensification of EU opera-
tions in Latin America can be traced back to the 1990s and reached its
apogee at the end of that decade. In fact, the new millennium has witnessed a
relative decline of Europe’s importance in Latin America. Yet a recovery of
European interest in Latin America has recently taken place. Overall, the
EU’s influence in Latin America goes beyond mere trade figures or political
summits. It has mostly to do with identity, shared values and a common
understanding of the world. Latin America is very much part of the West
and is largely the product of European ideas and events (Rouquié 2014).
This chapter argues that the EU proposes to Latin America an articulated
mode of relations, which has been able to evolve and adapt itself to changing
circumstances. The first section discusses the historical role of Europe and
the importance of the EU in Latin America. The second section analyses the
geographical areas and productive sectors in which the EU’s presence is
mostly felt. The third section addresses the Latin American perspective.
Finally, the fourth section deals with the present and the future suggesting
that the EU may significantly strengthen its commitment to Latin America in
the years to come.
30 Gian Luca Gardini
Europe and the EU as traditional partners of Latin America
Relations between Europe and LAC have a long and deep-seated history.
Latin America was colonized primarily by Spain and Portugal, and events
that took place in Europe were at the root of Latin American independence.
The languages, religion and economic organization that the colonizers
imposed on the indigenous people still reverberate in LAC today. Spanish
and Portuguese are the most widely spoken languages. Christianity, particu-
larly Roman Catholicism, is the dominant religion. Long-standing problems
such as the concentration of land ownership and of economic and political
power, a reliance on exports and vulnerability to global economic shocks, the
late industrialization of the continent and international dependency, all
remain a tangible legacy of the colonial social and productive structures.
European influence was key to Latin America’s independence. The ideals
of the French revolution deeply inspired the founding fathers of Latin
America (Rinke and Schulze 2010). The Napoleonic Wars were an enabling
factor of independence as they weakened Spain and Portugal politically,
militarily and economically, thus hindering their capacity to retain their
colonies. This gave more space to creole elites as well as more vigour to the
independence movements. The loyalists to the Spanish Crown in Latin
America lost both hope and territory with the 1820 mutiny of Cádiz, when
the troops assembled by the Bourbons to reconquer the Rio de la Plata
colonies refused to embark owing to a dispute over salaries (Williamson
1992). This episode allowed the de facto consolidation of the newly
independent republics.
Up until the end of the First World War Europe maintained considerable
influence in Latin America through its economic presence and massive
migration. The wealth of many LAC countries during the late 19th and early
20th century depended on commercial ties with European powers, particu-
larly Great Britain (Brown 2008). At the same time, the tide of European
migrants from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Poland and other Eastern
European countries brought to Latin America the workforce needed to sus-
tain the flourishing agricultural exports and the nascent local industry. Eur-
opean migrants also brought political ideas and participation, thereby
prompting Latin America to enter mass politics by the 1920s. Latin Amer-
ican art was also moulded by European influences, resulting in a unique
syncretism of local themes and imported expressivity (Sartor 2003).
The years between 1945 and 1985 saw a decline of the European role in
Latin America. Following the Second World War and with the onset of the
Cold War, European former colonial powers lost their status as world powers
and relations with Latin American were put on the back burner (Gardini and
Ayuso 2015). European nations focused heavily on their own reconstruction
and retrenched from international adventures. They lacked the economic
capacity and the political appetite to remain a driving force in Latin Amer-
ica. The parallel ascendancy of the United States made this country the
 The European Union 31
single most influential international player in Latin America during the Cold
War. The establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 did
little to reverse this trend, and LAC increasingly became sidelined in EU
international affairs until the late 1980s.
In the 1990s biregional relations took on a new verve, with European
political and economic presence in LAC reaching new heights. There are
three concomitant explanations for this. First, Spain and Portugal joined the
EU in 1986 and, as former colonial powers, campaigned to include LAC in
the EU external agenda. Second, in its quest for global player status in the
1990s and early 2000s, the EU adopted a rather active and dynamic position
regarding LAC (Gardini 2012); however, then as now the continent was not a
priority for the EU. Third, the ending of the Cold War opened up new spaces
for actors other than the United States, and marked a coalescence of per-
ceived interests—in political and economic terms—between the United States
and Western Europe on the one hand and Latin America on the other. The
US-sponsored political (democracy) and economic (open economies and free
trade) model largely adopted by Western Europe then spread throughout
Latin America. Economic openings and vast privatization attracted many
European investments to Latin America. The process of democratic transi-
tion in the region during the 1980s and 1990s fuelled the relaunch of the
LAC integration project, thus creating more commonalities and shared
interests between the EU, which was eager to promote its own model
overseas, and LAC.
The global financial crisis that shook the world in 2008 and the con-
comitant impetuous rise of the People’s Republic of China and other non-
traditional powers have had a significant impact on the importance of
Europe in Latin America. The European role has declined in relative terms
over the past decade. Europe’s internal problems, such as the UK’s decision
in a referendum to leave the EU (known as Brexit), migration, poor eco-
nomic performance and institutional sclerosis have diminished the attrac-
tiveness of the European model in LAC. The rise of China has eroded the
EU’s share of Latin America’s markets and tarnished its development model
and cooperation activities. Since 2014 China has replaced the EU as LAC’s
second most important trading partner (Pineo 2015), and China has actually
become the leading export market for Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay (OEC
2019). Chinese investments and cooperation are being marketed extremely
well, not least for ideological reasons, and are now challenging European
ones. The space available for the EU in the region is shrinking.
Yet a resurgence in the EU’s attention to Latin America has been palpable
since 2016 (Mori 2018). The EU included Latin America in its 2016 Global
Strategy, signalling a will to relaunch bicontinental relations. In 2016 the EU
also signed the bilateral EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation
Agreement, which set out an agenda for engagement with Havana, still a key
issue in regional politics. The same year the EU adopted a firm position vis-
à-vis the Maduro administration in Venezuela. Brussels urged Caracas to
32 Gian Luca Gardini
restore democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. In that year too Ecuador
joined the free trade agreement that Colombia and Peru had concluded with
the EU since 2013. This relaunched EU economic diplomacy in Latin
America and weakened the intransigence of the radical Bolivarian camp.
Most importantly, these actions demonstrated the EU’s re-engagement with
the continent, which was reinforced in 2019 with even bolder moves (see
‘Present and future: could the EU stage a comeback in Latin America?’).

The European Union in Latin America: economy and institutions

EU-LAC relations are complex and comprehensive. The EU, and its member
states, are widely present in the spheres of politics, economics and develop-
ment cooperation. Although the extent of their engagement depends on sec-
tors, periods and the individual EU member states, nonetheless two aspects
stand out: first, the continuous EU economic relevance to Latin America in
spite of objectively adverse economic conditions and the rise of non-traditional
partners; and second, the institutional engagement and density that
characterize EU-LAC relations.
In terms of trade, the EU is the third largest trading partner of Latin
America, after the United States and China, totalling over €225 billion in
2018 (EU Commission 2019). While this is an increase in absolute numbers
compared with one decade earlier, a study conducted by the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) shows that ‘the
EU’s share of external trade with LAC countries has not changed sig-
nificantly over the course of this century (ECLAC 2018: 81). In 2017 the
EU’s share of Latin American exports was 12%, the same as in 2000 and 1%
higher than in 2013. Also in 2017 5.3% of the EU’s total imports of goods
came from Latin America, while 6.1% of the EU’s total exports of goods
went to Latin America (European Commission 2017). Although between
2014–2016 biregional trade declined, largely as result of concomitant eco-
nomic crises in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, since 2017 there have been
signs that a recovery has taken place.
An interesting aspect is the composition of trade flows. EU imports from
Latin America remain concentrated in only a few products. Of these, two-
thirds are primary products, and 51% alone are commodities. Almost 90% of
EU exports to the region are manufactured goods. This is in keeping with the
pattern that historically has characterized Latin American trade relations
with its established partners. This pattern has often been regarded as posing
a restriction to Latin American development and an obstacle to the produc-
tion of value-added goods. Still, as Nolte (2018) noted, the EU and China
share similar trade patterns with Latin America. In 2016 LAC exported to
China 72% of products from the primary sector, while approximately 90% of
Latin American imports from China were manufactured goods. Thus, if
trade with the EU poses challenges to Latin America’s development, so does
that with China. Additionally, commodities as percentage of total LAC
 The European Union 33
exports to the EU (51%) is less than exports of commodities to China
(approximately 70%), but more than to the United States (14%).1 After all,
one may wonder if a region can sell what others do not want to buy, or if it
has to try to make the best of the existing structural constraints.
Some countries and regions within LAC have a prominent position in the
EU’s commercial presence. Brazil and Mexico absorb around 50% of the
EU’s trade with the region (Mori 2018). In 2017 Brazil accounted for 34% of
LAC’s total exports to the EU and Mexico 23%. Furthermore, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela2 that together comprise the
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común
del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul) accounted for over 46% of Latin America’s
exports to the EU market. Only two Latin American countries ship more
than 20% of their exports to the EU—Honduras and Costa Rica. Mexico
leads the top importers from the EU in Latin America, with a share exceed-
ing 38% of the total. Meanwhile, only two countries receive more than 20%
of their imports from the EU—Brazil and Suriname. In fact, the EU favours
bloc-to-bloc relations for both political dialogue and trade relations when
possible. The EU accounts for 14.6 % of the Andean Community’s total
trade in goods, 12.2% of that of Central America, and 10.3% of that of
CARIFORUM, the association bringing together most Caribbean states
(Grieger 2019).
The EU is losing some ground in trade but it maintains the edge in
investments and cooperation. The EU remains the largest investor in Latin
America in terms of stocks. Between 2000 and 2017 European companies
accounted for 39% of the total declared foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Latin America (ECLAC 2018). The level of EU FDI in the extractive
industry has declined over the past few years, and is likely to reflect the end
of the commodity boom. Projects in telecommunications and renewable
energy have increased sharply, while the automotive sector remains attractive
for EU companies. In 2017 five European countries—Spain, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany—were among the top
10 investors in Latin America (UNCTAD 2017).
Between 2014 and 2020 the EU maintained its leading position as a pro-
vider of aid in Latin America, totalling over €3.6 billion in spending on
bilateral and regional programmes (EU Commission 2019). This is remark-
able considering the challenges posed by new South-South cooperation
models and ideological impact as well as the recent major shift that the EU
cooperation strategy has experienced (Sanahuja 2016). The EU has been
phasing out direct development aid to those states that have achieved strong
economic growth and poverty reduction, including many Latin American
countries. These countries are no longer eligible for bilateral aid, although
they may still request assistance with regional and thematic programmes. EU
aid has thus focused on the Caribbean, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. In 2018 the EU launched the Regional
Facility for Development in Transition to help Latin American countries to
34 Gian Luca Gardini
achieve the 2030 United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals. EU-
Latin America trade patterns may not be ideal from a LAC perspective, but
they are better than many others, signalling that the problem may not lie in
Europe. Moreover, to date the EU has provided very generous, indeed the
most generous, aid packages to Latin America.
In addition to maintaining an economic presence, the other prominent
feature of the EU’s role in Latin America is the institutionalization of regular
forums for political dialogue. This involves dialogue at the subregional level
and region-to-region relations. The process started in 1984 with the estab-
lishment of the San José Dialogue between the then European Community
(EC) and Central America in support of the regional peace process. It
intensified from 1987 with the dialogue between the EC and the Rio Group.3
The initial agreements between the EC and LAC subregional organizations
were formalized first with the Grupo Andino (Andean Group) in 1983 and
then with the Central American Common Market in 1985. These are exam-
ples of the EU’s preference for regional organization-to-regional organization
relations.
In the 1990s EU support for integration in other regions became one of
the pillars of its international strategy. This was one of the results of the
merger of interests and development models between Europe (and the United
States) and Latin America that took place in the post-Cold War years (Lit-
segard and Mattheis 2018). With the second regionalist wave in the 1990s,
Latin American subregional blocs largely abandoned ‘developmentalist’
policies and embraced ‘open regionalism’, hoping to reach world markets
and ripen the promises of globalization. These subregional blocs increasingly
looked at the EU as a model for economic integration, institutional setting
and regulatory policies (Jetschke and Lenz 2013). This convergence resulted
in new subregional political dialogue with MERCOSUR, the Andean Com-
munity and the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (Central Amer-
ican Integration System). In 2019 the EU and the Pacific Alliance,
comprising Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, signed a Joint Declaration to
deepen their partnership, paving the way to a possible fourth subregional
institutionalized political dialogue.
The EU preference for bargaining collectively with existing similar bodies
displayed its influence also at the region-to-region level (Gardini and Ayuso
2015). The strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America was
launched in 1999. Europe tried to distance itself from adopting a purely
commercial approach and to promote a regulatory role incorporating three
dimensions: political (through multilevel dialogues); economic (including
trade and investment); and development cooperation (incorporating social
policies). Interregional political dialogue was institutionalized in the EU-
LAC Summits between Heads of State and Government and in the EU-Rio
Group Summits at ministerial level. With the creation of the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados de América
Latina y el Caribe—CELAC) in 2011, biregional dialogues took the new
 The European Union 35
form of EU-CELAC Summits. Regrettably, this new instrument was used
only in 20013 and 2015 before it was indefinitely suspended.
The EU-LAC strategic partnership was developed not only as a top-down
process led by governments but also as a multiple consultation mechanism
between social partners, business associations, academia, Courts of Justice
and parliamentarians. It formed an inclusive, dense, ‘multi-player’ (Torres
2018) and ‘multi-level’ (Ayuso 2018) inter-regionalism, involving a large
number of actors, constituencies and issues. Inclusiveness, representativeness
and a sense of ownership at different levels are the advantages of the model
proposed by the EU. Cumbersome procedures, limited coordination and
unclear results, costs and cost-effectiveness, and the selection, legitimacy and
accountability of the participants are the challenges of the system (Gardini
and Malamud 2016). Overall, the model that the EU has offered to Latin
America has proved itself to be flexible, inclusive and adaptable. The agenda
is often a shared one. Yet the EU remains in the driving seat.

The Latin American perspective

Europe has been a constant presence in Latin America over the past five
centuries. Interestingly, this closeness is not perceived as a threat or an
imposition. Even Spain, the former colonial master, is perceived favourably
in Latin America (Latinobarometer 2006). This shows how the remote colo-
nial past, far remoter than in Africa, is not a decisive factor in the quality of
EU-LAC relations and mutual consideration. ‘The EU does not run the risk
of being perceived as an “imperial power” like the United States or a “neo-
colonial” one like China’ (Magri 2018: 8). Overall, the image of the EU in
Latin America is positive, yet its reputation is not extremely strong nor is its
role highly valued.
Since the beginning of the 21st century the popularity and appreciation of
the EU has begun to decline in Latin America (Latinobarometer 2018).4
These sentiments reached a low point in 2013 but are now beginning to
recover. In 2000 61.3% of Latin Americans had a positive opinion of the EU,
and only 6.9% had a negative one. By 2013 only 48.7% of Latin Americans
had a positive opinion of the EU, while 19.8% had a negative opinion.
According to the latest available data, in 2018 54.6% of Latin Americans saw
the EU in a positive light, while 15.2% had a negative perception. Consider-
ing the healthy economic interactions, the cordial political relations, the long-
established cultural links, and the generous levels of aid coming from
Brussels, these results are unsatisfactory (see Table 2.1).
Indeed, these results are cause for concern when compared to those of
other states. Despite President Trump’s policies and judgemental remarks
about LAC, the United States enjoys a better reputation that the EU in Latin
America. In 2018 62.9% of Latin Americans had a good opinion of the
United States. This figure stood at 73.4% in 2016, at the apogee of the
Obama Administration’s popularity, and at 70.9% in 2000. In 2018 China,
36 Gian Luca Gardini
despite its mostly predatory policies in Latin America was positively per-
ceived by 56.1% of Latin Americans, slightly better than the EU. The figures
were even higher back in 2010 and 2001 at 56.4% and 57.4%, respectively.
However, other emerging powers are faring worse than the EU. In 2018 the
Russian Federation was rated positively only by 50.7% of Latin Americans,
and India by 31.9%. A general lack of knowledge about the two countries
and their actions in Latin America, as well as their relatively modest presence
in the continent, may explain this result. In fact, many interviewees did not
have an opinion: over 20% on Russia and close to 38% on India. Still, among
the most significant international partners of Latin America, the EU is
trailing in terms of appreciation (see Table 2.1).
Perhaps the most revealing data about the relatively poor—and possibly
undeserved—reputation of the EU in the continent are those pertaining to
relations between individual LAC countries and the EU. Brussels gives rise
to more popular dissatisfaction than Washington or Beijing throughout
Latin America (Latinobarometer 2018; see also Table 2.2). While in 2018
48.3% of Latin American respondents held a positive view (good or very
good) of the relationship between the EU and their country, corresponding
data for the United States and China were 59.3% and 58.8%, respectively.
The situation was similar in 2015, with 64.2% of respondents giving a posi-
tive assessment of the United States, 59.1% for China, and 47.6% for the EU.
While Latinobarometer does not explain the reasons for these results, one
point is clear: despite its widespread perception as a soft power, the EU has
struggled to win over Latin American hearts. Policymakers in Brussels will
need to give this issue careful consideration when planning their future
strategies for Latin America.

Table 2.1 Opinion on selected countries/international actors

European Union United States China
% % %
2018 2013 2000 2018 2016 2000 2018 2010 2001
Very good 9.0 6.3 16.8 14.2 20.0 19.5 11.3 10.5 13.5
Good 45.6 42.4 44.5 48.7 53.4 51.4 44.8 45.9 43.9
Positive 54.6 48.7 61.3 62.9 73.4 70.9 56.1 56.4 57.4
Bad 12.4 15.4 5.7 19.5 11.6 11.3 15.8 15.3 13.0
Very bad 2.8 4.4 1.2 6.9 4.0 2.8 3.6 3.2 3.8
Negative 15.2 19.8 6.9 26.4 15.6 14.1 19.4 18.5 16.8
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from Latinobarometer (2018).
 The European Union 37
Table 2.2 Opinion on relations between the respondent’s country in LAC and the
EU, the United States and China
European Union United States China5
% % %
2018 2015 2010 1997 2018 2015 2010 1997 2018 2015
Very good 14.1 12.6 19.0 18.3 20.3 21.5 23.9 23.3 20.1 17.8
Good 34.2 35.0 48.7 38.5 39.0 42.7 47.7 51.5 38.7 41.3
Positive 48.3 47.6 67.7 56.8 59.3 64.2 71.6 74.8 58.8 59.1
Bad 10.3 10.3 8.2 7.7 14.4 13.9 12.5 11.6 8.3 9.1
Very bad 6.6 5.2 2.1 1.3 13.0 7.5 5.4 2.3 5.6 4.0
Negative 16.9 15.5 10.3 9.0 27.4 21.4 17.9 13.9 13.9 13.1
Source: Author’s elaboration using data from Latinobarometer (2018).

Present and future: could the EU stage a comeback in Latin America?

In 2019 Europe launched a set of new initiatives that will potentially be a
game changer. First, at the EU level, the new strategy for LAC announced
by the European Commission, the political agreement for a trade deal with
MERCOSUR, and the newly elected European Commission for the period
2019–2024 all seem to indicate an upgrade of Latin America in the EU’s
external agenda. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Germany
announced a new policy that will make LAC a strategic ally globally.
The European Commission’s Joint Communication to the European Par-
liament and the Council on EU-LAC relations is entitled ‘Joining forces for a
common future’. The argument it makes is very compelling: the EU and
LAC share common values and interests that go beyond mere rhetoric, and a
stronger partnership is vital to the preservation of such values and the
defence of such interests in the face of global challenges (European Com-
mission 2019). The opening statement of the document, which refers to the
2016 EU global strategy on foreign and security policy, is an additional
indication of the strategic value of the Joint Communication. Three key
points stand out.
The first is a call for the repoliticization of the relationship between the
EU and Latin America. This means a genuine return to the political nature
of the relationship. While trade and other technical matters are important,
the strategic value of the European Commission’s reflection is a central tenet
of the document. It identifies key challenges to EU and LAC interests, such
as the increasing presence of China internationally, the evolving position of the
United States, and the pressing need to adapt to digitalization, preserve the
environment, and guarantee social justice as well as democratic institutions
(European Commission 2019).
The second point is that the document makes a call for action. An inter-
esting point is the combination of traditional instruments and innovative and
38 Gian Luca Gardini
tailor-made solutions. This paves the way to going beyond the established
summit system of political dialogues. It invites states on both sides of the
Atlantic, as well as the EU institutions, who want closer cooperation, to
experiment with new formats. In a partial revision of its recent development
aid policy, the European Commission also places emphasis on cooperation
with the more advanced developing countries in Latin America as an ampli-
fier of the EU’s efforts. It also accepts the need to simplify its cooperation
tools while making them more flexible and responsive to the needs of
recipients.
The third point is the emphasis on societal issues and the role of civil
society. The EU has proposed an engagement with LAC governments and
regional organizations as well as civil society, think tanks, local authorities,
the business sector, cultural organizations, representatives of academia and
the youth. The focus on the concerns of the citizens, accountability and
transparency as drivers of EU cooperation is perfectly echoed by the
demands made during the street protests that took place in several Latin
American countries in the closing months of 2019. The agenda, values and
approach of the EU make it the ideal partner to work together with Latin
American institutions to meet the social and political aspirations emerging
from these mass demonstrations. This is an opportune time to boost the
biregional partnership through the four pillars proposed in the Joint Com-
munication: prosperity, democracy, resilience and effective global governance.
The political agreement reached in June 2019 on a trade deal between the
EU and MERCOSUR is another potential game changer. After 20 years of
negotiations, the EU could be the first major trade partner of MERCOSUR
to have a free trade area in place with the South American bloc. This would
create a free trade area of around 780 million consumers. The agreement
reaffirms the commitment of both parties to rules-based international trade
at a time of increasing protectionism and impending trade wars. It also
includes important clauses on labour and environmental protection, com-
mitting the signatories to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on cli-
mate change. The sticky issue of agriculture, which had long delayed the
agreement, has been addressed with pragmatism satisfying both parties: most
agricultural and dairy products will enter the respective markets free of
customs duties, albeit that they will be subject to quotas (Sanahuja and
Rodriguez 2019).
The third and final promising step is the formation of the new European
Commission for the period 2019–2024. The appointment of Ursula von der
Leyen of Germany as President and Josep Borrell of Spain as High Repre-
sentative for European Foreign and Security Policy, are positive signals for
Latin America. Von der Leyen is very close to German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, and the German government has recently relaunched its Latin
America policy. Echoes of this favourable German position should reach
Brussels, and von der Leyen is likely to back it. Borrell is a very experienced
politician, who has already served as Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, a
 The European Union 39
country that has always had a strong interest and a leading role in Latin
America. Borrell himself is considered a friend of Latin America.
Perhaps the most significant advance for EU-LAC relations is the shift in
policy and vision adopted by Germany in 2019. Berlin has identified Latin
America as a key partner for its international strategy. From several sides
there have been calls for a more assertive role for Germany in Europe and
internationally (Smith 2019). The assumptions that had driven Berlin’s for-
eign policy from the fall of the Wall up until a few years ago—namely a
policy convergence towards open markets and liberal democracy at the
global level and the absence of any real challenges or threats to Germany’s
national interests—have been shaken. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014,
the 2015 refugee crisis, the bold emergence of China and the election of
Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States shook Germany’s
reading of the world as a global community and prompted a serious reas-
sessment of the international milieu and the country’s role in it (Beggar
2018). This is an ongoing process, and Berlin’s new Latin America strategy
may well be a preview of further results to come.
In May 2019 Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas presented Germany’s
new vision, with tangible initiatives, for LAC. He stressed that nowadays the
concept of ‘neighbourliness’ is no longer solely determined by distance but
increasingly by connectedness, openness to learning from one another and
sharing values and interests (Maas 2019). Germany believes that LAC and
Europe can be neighbours in the 21st century. Both regions are strongly
democratic, closely connected in cultural terms and committed to interna-
tional rules, human rights, economic openness and fair social and environ-
mental standards. Such neighbourliness would lead to the development of a
natural strategic alliance to preserve the values and rules that have greatly
benefited both Germany and LAC in the post-Cold War era.
In the current global scenario, Germany feels unprecedentedly exposed.
Quoting the well-known Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez, Foreign
Minister Maas used the metaphor of ‘the solitude of Latin America’, that
sensation of marginalization and powerlessness in a world where the strong
prevail over the weak (García Márquez 1982). Maas empathized with Latin
America and suggested that the feeling of solitude is now shared by Europe.
He acknowledged that neither Europe nor Latin America are superpowers.
The decisive question for both regions is whether they want to be subjects or
objects of global policy. If one wants to be heard, one needs allies. On the
basis of this set of realizations—Maas explicitly remarked—Germany deci-
ded to place LAC higher up on its own foreign policy agenda and that of the
European Union.
Germany has recently undertaken tangible initiatives in several sectors and
forums (Maas 2019). In 2019 it identified over 80 concrete projects in Latin
America. In the field of environmental protection, Germany and the
Dominican Republic cooperated to put climate change and security onto the
UN Security Council agenda. Berlin is helping Costa Rica to launch
40 Gian Luca Gardini
green e-mobility projects. In the field of good governance and the rule of law,
Germany agreed to cooperate closely with Mexico against forced dis-
appearances, and to contribute substantially to the fight against impunity
and corruption in Guatemala and Honduras. Germany has taken a proactive
role in the peace process in Colombia via both the ad hoc UN Trust Fund
and its own German-Colombian Peace Institute. On the economic front, the
Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (Association of German
Chambers of Industry and Commerce) expected German exports to LAC to
increase by 5% in 2019; meanwhile, investments were on the rise, and
German businesses were expected to employ over 600,000 people in the
region.
German concrete action perfectly coincides with the four pillars of the
European Commission’s Joint Communication: prosperity, democracy, resi-
lience and effective governance. Strong emphasis is placed on stimulating and
supporting civil society, a cornerstone of both European and German iden-
tity and international projection. In 2019 Germany launched Unidas, a net-
work designed to promote equal opportunities and gender justice for Latin
American women. The Goethe Institute, the main instrument of German
cultural diplomacy, is expected to intensify its activities in Latin America.
The German Academic Exchange Service has recently launched new pro-
grammes in Ecuador and Paraguay. Moreover, Germany is explicitly com-
mitted to upgrading LAC’s position in the EU agenda. Bilateral and EU
channels are complementary. EU-LAC relations have an additional strong
advocate.

Conclusion
The actual results of the presence and role of the EU in Latin America are
tangible, positive and enduring. Together with LAC countries and their
regional organizations the EU has put in place an articulated and compre-
hensive system of political dialogue at different levels and involving, in
addition to governmental bodies, several civil society and institutional sec-
tors. The EU is still the third largest trading partner of Latin America, the
main investor and the leading provider of aid. Beyond political summits and
economic figures, Europe and Latin America continue to share long-standing
cultural links resulting in commonalities in values and understanding of the
world. This closeness is the basis for the recent EU relaunch of its strategic
presence in Latin America in defence of international norms and practices of
mutual benefit. The recent shift in German policy towards Latin America
gives further credibility and chances of success to the EU diplomatic offen-
sive. Perhaps surprisingly, in spite of undeniably healthy and cordial relations
the EU is losing appeal in the continent. This should be a major point of
reflection for authorities in Brussels and the EU communication strategy.
The ways in which the EU exercises influence over Latin America are
multiple. Yet the EU does not have recourse to imposition but prefers
 The European Union 41
dialogue and negotiation. Its economic and cultural might and huge con-
sumer market, however, do not necessarily guarantee an immediate transla-
tion from potential or actual attributes of power into alignment or
acquiescence in Latin America. The EU largely relies on four channels of
influence: economic incentives and interaction; strongly institutionalized
forums and mechanisms of relationships dominated by rules broadly
designed in Brussels that favour a European style of regulatory framework; a
spread of values and cultural diplomacy advocating commonalities rather
than confronting divergences; and a sort of inertia (see Chapter 1 in this
volume), namely an almost hidden drive that derives its power from history,
dress and behaviour thus perpetuating the influence of those who adhere to
these values. Still, the EU-LAC relationship goes two ways, and room for
actorness and proactivity of Latin America is very much present and indeed
on the rise.
Overall, this chapter makes a case for a closer EU-Latin America asso-
ciation in defence of common values against the current global challenges.
Europe and LAC share respect for international norms and institutions.
They are natural strategic allies and ultimately ‘neighbours’ who share
aspects of history, culture and values.

Notes
1 This relatively low figure is significantly influenced by the heavy weight that
Mexico plays as a platform for re-exports to the United States.
2 Venezuela has been indefinitely suspended from the trading bloc and most
statistics refer to MERCOSUR 4 (excluding Venezuela).
3 The Rio Group was a permanent mechanism of political consultation between
Latin American and Caribbean countries, created in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in
1986. Initially established by eight countries to support the peace process in
Central America, it later became a broadly Latin American forum of political
coordination, which was eventually replaced by the creation of CELAC in 2011.
4 All data in the following paragraphs were extracted from Latinobarometer (2018)
and compared with the equivalent data available for the years cited. See www.la
tinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp.
5 Data for 2010 and 1997 are not available.

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3 China in Latin America
Winning hearts and minds pragmatically1
Carol Wise

Introduction
The emergence of China as a significant external actor in Latin America and
the Caribbean (LAC) has invoked a range of responses. At the level of high
politics, the Trump Administration pointed to this phenomenon as further
evidence of a predatory, imperialistic China that is out to displace the United
States within its own sphere of influence. Trump, having surrounded himself
with protectionists and China-bashers,2 insisted that the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) was the single greatest threat to US interests, broadly defined.
At the level of everyday politics, activists of all persuasions and nationalities
protest against China’s rapacious appetite for extractive resources and its
apparent readiness to trample the environment and workers’ rights in order
to secure its own interests. As true as some of these allegations might be, and
there is no doubt that China needs to improve its practices on both fronts
(Ciccantell and Patten 2016), the fact is that China has very few natural
resources of its own. Beijing’s quest to secure raw commodities from Latin
America is thus a necessity, not just a matter of sticking it to the United
States.
Within the ivory tower, there is a visible cleavage between international
relations theorists, especially those working in the Realist tradition, and
political economists, who insist on the need for empirical data to interpret
the implications of the rise of China in the global economy. For Realists,
‘The rise of China must be seen as a potentially dangerous destabilization of
the international system’ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016: 71). For political
economists (Brautigam 2009; Wise 2020a), China’s trade, lending and foreign
direct investment (FDI) outflows to developing countries have offered new
sources of financing and an escape hatch from narrow Western-based
Washington Consensus prescriptions. This chapter comes down on the side
of political economy, as there are no signs of military sabre rattling or belli-
cose alliance building between the PRC and countries in the LAC region.
China hawks in both Washington and the academy have simply not been
able to wrap their minds around a ‘rise of China’ narrative that calls up both
constraints and opportunities for the Western Hemisphere (Dario 2020).
 China 45
Given the immense diversity between LAC countries, there is obviously no
single China-LAC relationship, but rather a broad array of scenarios at play.
The one unifying theme is natural resource abundance and in this respect China
has had to internationalize its development strategy in order to secure the food
and fuel necessary to spur its economic growth. It is therefore no coincidence
that China has the strongest bonds with the big South American commodity
producers, although even these ties vary considerably by country. I build on
these insights in the following sections. In the first section, I begin with a brief
historical overview of the China-LAC relationship and highlight how LAC
commodity exports to China have been underway since the 1960s. In the second
section, I analyse the surge in China-LAC interactions around raw material
trade, which began at the turn of the new millennium. The third section focuses
on those countries and sub-regions where investment, lending and trade with
China has been most pronounced. The fourth section tells this story from the
Latin American perspective, while the fifth section speaks to the complications
of China’s deeper integration with the region over the past two decades.

When did it happen?

Most of the contemporary literature on China-LAC relations treats this as a
21st-century phenomenon (Armony and Strauss 2012: 1). While this is true
from the standpoint of the post-2000 explosion of Chinese trade, FDI out-
flows and lending to countries in this region, Latin America has been on the
radar screen of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the 1950s. With
the overthrow of brutal pro-US military leaders in Colombia in 1957 and
Venezuela in 1958, not to mention Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolutionary victory
in Cuba, the CCP saw the possibility to launch a ‘people’s war’ with LAC
against US imperialism (Johnson 1970: 37–39). Despite the Cold War and
the US blockade, there began a rich, albeit informal, pattern of China-LAC
interactions, both political and economic. Delegations from both sides of the
Pacific began travelling back and forth, intent on learning more about each
other (Alba 1961).
Chinese officials coined this early phase of the relationship as one of
‘propaganda and invitations’. Apart from wooing fellow or prospective
communists, the goals here were to enhance China’s reputation within the
Latin American region, to tarnish the image of the United States, and to
champion the benefits of the Chinese model in overcoming political and
economic challenges (Mora 1997: 35–38). The heyday of CCP propaganda in
LAC during this period was the success of the Chinese Radio Broadcasting
Agency to secure airtime for pro-China Spanish language programmes in the
region (Johnson 1970: 9), and the circulation of the PRC’s only newspaper at
the time, Xinhua News Agency, in some seven countries. Xinhua branch offi-
ces became important vehicles for intelligence gathering and communist
recruitment (Ratliff 1969: 55). Yet, by 1965, China-LAC political affinities
around the promotion of a worldwide proletarian revolution had faded.
46 Carol Wise
First was the CCP’s strict adherence to Maoist doctrine, which held that
‘the only correct road of revolution for the Latin American people is to …
wage guerrilla warfare, unfold an agrarian revolution, build rural base areas,
[and] use the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them
(Halperin 1967: 118–120). Given the comparatively high levels of indus-
trialization and urbanization in Latin America at that time, Mao’s doctrine
lost its appeal for most communist party organizers in the region. Second
was the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 and a bitter parting of the ways between
Chairman Mao Zedong and Castro in 1965 when the latter declared his
allegiance to the Soviet Union. Soviet aid and ideological influence took hold
over what remained of a radical left in Latin America. Of the 59 Latin
American communist parties that existed across the region in 1970, only
eight still looked to Beijing for guidance.
Still, despite China’s deepening isolation and diplomatic testiness, China-
LAC economic ties had taken on a life of their own. Pragmatic economic
overtures from both sides gradually superseded radical revolutionary ges-
tures. As the PRC’s first decade drew to an end in 1959, CCP leaders faced
the dire results of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, a Soviet-style programme of
heavy industrialization financed with grain proceeds from the hastily col-
lectivized agricultural sector. An estimated 40 million deaths due to grain
shortages, drought and famine compelled Beijing to search abroad for agri-
cultural resources (Dikotter 2010). Argentina, Brazil and Chile had all signed
informal trade agreements with China—based on private, people-to-people
contacts—even before each country’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC.
Argentina, with its rich abundance of grains, sold 28,000 metric tons of
wheat and 50,000 tons of millet to China in 1962, as reports of drought and
starvation in the Chinese countryside continued through that year. Mexico,
too, sold 450 tons of wheat to China in 1964; by 1965 Argentina had sold
over 1 million tons of wheat to the PRC (Johnson 1970: 30).
Around the time of Mao’s death in 1976, China had halted funding for
communist parties in various LAC countries. In the aftermath of the devas-
tating Cultural Revolution, the reformist coalition around Deng Xiaoping
quietly moved the CCP from its ‘third worldist’ revolutionary stance towards
the advocacy of multilateralism and non-intervention. Leadership from Chile
and Mexico had been crucial in lining up LAC votes for China’s entry into
the United Nations (UN) in 1971. This, plus the thawing of Sino-US rela-
tions following Richard Nixon’s 1972 trip to Beijing, opened the floodgates
for diplomatic recognition of the PRC by 11 LAC nations in the 1970s alone.
As the CCP launched its iconic ‘Open Door Policy’ reforms in 1978 based on
external trade, foreign investment and increased cooperation in science and
technology, China had become the world’s third largest buyer of Chilean
copper (Joseph 1985: 140). Peru was now second in the trading queue with
China, exporting copper, lead and zinc, while Brazil had become a crucial
supplier of iron ore to the PRC and Argentina continued to be an important
source of wheat and maize (Connelly and Cornejo 1992).
 China 47
Post-Mao, Beijing redefined its foreign policy as flexible, pragmatic and
non-ideological, and throughout the 1980s brokered a number of noteworthy
agreements with LAC countries. These covered such issues as maritime
transport, science and technical cooperation, and tourism. The CCP also
initiated a new political discourse with Latin America, emphasizing its sup-
port for Argentina’s claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and the efforts
of the Contadora Group to mediate the violent Central American conflict
under way at that time. Despite the capital scarcity that characterized both
China and LAC at this time, considerable sums were exchanged in the form
of trade credits and loans for development projects (Deckers 1989). Such
projects included Argentina’s 1988 contract to build a model farm in China
and a joint Brazil-China accord to construct and launch two satellites in
1988. The PRC also undertook joint ventures, for instance, lumber mills and
iron ore in Brazil, fisheries in Argentina, copper in Chile and even a Chinese
restaurant in Mexico (Li 1991: 159–160).
It was the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, when the CCP ordered a
deadly military crackdown of the student democracy movement, which set a
new tone for China-LAC relations going forward. Refusing to show contri-
tion for the Tiananmen massacre, Beijing now adopted a more formal,
business-like posture toward the West, and this included Latin America.
Although most Western governments were unforgiving, newly democratiz-
ing regimes in Latin America hardly missed a beat in welcoming the PRC
back into the fold. Just a year after Tiananmen, President Yang Shangkun
made China’s first executive-level visit to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
and Uruguay, reiterating the country’s priorities for engaging with LAC
(trade, technology, FDI, joint ventures, etc.). In return, heads of state from
six LAC countries visited China in the 1990s. However, by the turn of the
new century ‘politics’, as such, would become platitudes to embellish the
more narrow business-oriented evolution of China-LAC relations from here on
out.

What caused this surge?

During the period from 2003 to 2013, the world witnessed the biggest com-
modity price boom in modern economic history. Prices of copper, oil and
iron ore tripled on global commodity markets, and those for soybeans and
fishmeal doubled. For LAC, these spectacular gains accrued to 25% of the
countries in the region, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and
secondarily, Ecuador and Venezuela. The price boom caught these LAC
countries at very different points on their respective political economic tra-
jectories. Argentina, for example, was just coming off a massive US $100
billion debt default and rolling back market reforms implemented in the
1990s. Brazil had just elected its first Workers’ Party president, who turned
out to be more market friendly (and corrupt) than expected. Chile had just
completed its decade-long quest to launch a bilateral free trade agreement
48 Carol Wise
(FTA) with the United States. Mexico had finally transitioned to an electoral
democracy and Peru’s president had just faxed his resignation from Japan,
where he had fled to evade charges of murder, graft and conspiracy.
After negative growth rates during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s, these five
countries—each in its own way—had succumbed to pressure at home and
abroad to implement market reforms along the lines of the Washington
Consensus (liberalization, privatization and deregulation). By 2000 all had
made strong inroads with the privatization of state-held assets; governments
had pried open domestic trade regimes, and policymakers had freed, dee-
pened and deregulated financial markets. Yet, with the exception of Chile
(which started on market reforms a decade earlier) and Peru, economic
growth was at a standstill. The reasons vary, including a global recession
related to the 2000 dot.com bust, financial contagion from currency melt-
downs within the emerging economies beginning with Mexico’s tequila crisis
in 1994, and economic shocks from the terrorist attacks perpetrated on the
US mainland in 2001 (known as ‘9/11’). Although Mexico suffered dis-
proportionately due to its close integration with the US economy under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for quite different reasons
Argentina and Brazil were in even more dire economic straits.
Then, seemingly out of nowhere, in 2003 alone Argentina’s exports of
soybeans to China had soared by 16%, and prices for the country’s oil and
energy resources were up by 20% on the commodity index (Wise 2020a).
Similarly, Chinese demand drove prices of iron ore to new heights, pushing
Brazil’s trade surplus up from US $2.6 billion to $25 billion between 2001
and 2004. Policymakers in both Argentina and Brazil watched these indices
rise in a state of disbelief. By 2007 each country’s total trade with China from
1993 to 2000 was now on par with annual patterns of trade between China
and each country. The commodity lottery had struck and would continue for
a full decade. Commodity lotteries are seemingly random and rarely do they
leave a positive footprint once they taper down. In much earlier times Per-
uvian guano (fertilizer) producers and Brazilian rubber barons found this out
the hard way. Yet, unlike the aftermath of past booms, China’s presence in
the LAC region continues to hold strong. Moreover, commodity prices may
have dropped in 2013, but they are still considerably higher than their 2002
baseline.
Why did this explosion of Chinese demand come as such a surprise to
policymakers, politicians, producers and consumers in the Latin American
region? As recently as the late 1990s, there were any number of naysayers
predicting the demise of China’s aggressive export-led model based on rapid
industrialization and heavy state sponsorship (Lin 2012). Thus far, this pes-
simism has missed the mark. Rather than a single causal explanation for the
rise of China in LAC, let me offer a chain of causation. First, like Japan and
Korea before it, China shares some of the long-recognized features of the
East Asian developmental state (Haggard 2018): flexible and pragmatic pol-
icymaking led by technocrats within the government; state–business
 China 49
coordination; agricultural and land tenure reform; the accumulation of capi-
tal and its channelling towards productive endeavours; tying investment to
export-led growth; offering incentives to promote competitiveness; and a
long-term vision of growth and development. Combine these traits with
China’s pre-existing assets, listed below, and the stage was set for China’s
so-called take-off (Hu 2012):

 a strong industrial foundation due to the ‘big push’ strategy under Mao;
 high investment and savings rates;
 solid social infrastructure in the realms of public transportation,
telecommunications, postal services and urban utilities;
 an abundance of cheap labour and a relatively well-educated population;
 the sheer size of the domestic market.

Second, after setting its sights on joining the World Trade Organization
(WTO), China launched a formidable set of reforms in the early 1990s that
were intended to further modernize its development strategy and meet the
bar for WTO accession. Barry Naughton (2008: 116) captures this moment
well:

Under the new decisive policy regime, a succession of milestone reforms

were rolled out over the years. The most striking of these were the fiscal,
corporate, foreign, and financial reforms that were adopted between
1993 and 1998, in a burst of remarkably decisive and effective reform
policymaking [that] transformed every aspect of the Chinese economy.
After 1998, the pace of new policy introduction slowed somewhat, but
important initiatives have continued. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) accession negotiations culminated in late 1999 with dramatic
promises of progressive marketization, commitments that required a
substantial leadership effort to alter the status quo.

This reform window is crucial, as China eschewed the big bang market shock
strategies in vogue at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank at the time, and did so at the very moment when the aforementioned
LAC countries were doubling down on market reforms. Moreover, with the
exception of Chile, the LAC countries considered here were just starting to
get serious about market reform, whereas China was now into its second
decade of economic restructuring. China’s trade relations with Mexico, in
particular, hit rough waters in the early 1990s. Mexico’s unilateral trade and
financial liberalization under NAFTA left the economy vulnerable to China’s
valued-added manufactured exports that were beginning to hit world mar-
kets. As the Mexican peso steeply appreciated under the flood of incoming
imports and capital flows, the Chinese yuan was clearly undervalued. At the
time, Mexican policymakers took little note of the Chinese juggernaut, that
is until Mexico’s current account deficit with China exploded in the late
50 Carol Wise
1990s and China subsequently bumped Mexico down a notch in its ranking
as a US trade partner. Even today, Mexico exports about 10% (in raw
materials) of what it imports back (in intermediate manufactures) from
China.
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 was like a match that lit
international trade on fire. Autor et al. (2016) note the failure of mainstream
economists to fully grasp the impact that the granting of most-favoured
nation status to the PRC would have on world markets. The most-favoured
nation principle at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/
WTO holds that every favour, privilege, or advantage that a member country
affords to another member state must be extended to all other GATT/WTO
members. Western analysts had overlooked the gains that Chinese policy-
makers and entrepreneurs had made in applying technology and adding
value to the country’s manufactured exports, and naively assumed that Chi-
nese goods would hit Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment markets at the lower end of the production curve. Already, China
was on its way to becoming the top producer of intermediate goods (e.g.
parts, accessories or industrial supplies), in other words, imported inputs that
are key to the production of value-added exports that happen to contribute
most to job creation and economic growth. China’s massive trade surpluses
with the United States and Mexico are testimony to this miscalculation,
deficits that neither country has been able to eradicate despite the resort to
WTO-busting protectionist measures.

Where is it mostly felt?

Once the dust had settled on the 2003–2013 commodity price bonanza, the
winners in terms of investment, lending and trade with China were Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Three of these countries had recognized China
officially upon its admission to the UN in 1971, while the Allende adminis-
tration in Chile (1970–1973) had done so a year earlier. As China sought to
strengthen and further institutionalize its ties with these countries, the CCP
gradually approached each and proposed the establishment of a separate
‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP). Although ‘strategic’ tends to imply matters
related to military cooperation and security concerns in the Western setting
(Medeiros 2009), for China it is more of an economic endeavour—albeit one
cloaked in platitudes of friendship, trust and a long-term bilateral commit-
ment between China and a given signatory. It is no coincidence that these SP
countries were chosen due to their highly abundant natural resources, which
are vital inputs for Chinese growth (Xu 2017). In 1993 Brazil was the first to
sign on to China’s offer to form an SP, which included Beijing’s designation
of Brazil as a ‘great power’ (!). From there followed the PRC’s crafting of SPs
with Mexico (2003), Argentina (2004), Peru (2008) and Chile (2012).
In terms of investments, Chinese inflows of FDI have been highest in
Brazil, followed by Peru and then Argentina. Mexico has the strongest trade
 China 51
ties with China, although the bulk of this is still on the import side, while
Brazil, Chile and Peru followed, in that order; in contrast with Mexico, these
last three countries have consistently run a trade surplus with China.
Beijing’s other major capital outflow to LAC consist of loans from its two
policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-
Import Bank (Chexim). As of 2019 the top loans had gone to Venezuela (US
$62.2 billion), Brazil ($28.9 billion), Ecuador ($18.4 billion) and Argentina
($17.1 billion) (Gallagher and Myers 2019). These figures flag some puzzles.
Why, for example, would Ecuador and Venezuela score so large on policy
bank loans from China but rank quite low on FDI inflows (approximately $3
billion each) from the PRC? How could a small, open economy like Peru
attract nearly double the amount of Chinese FDI ($22 billion) than Argen-
tina ($12.5 billion) had received up to 2018? Finally, why has Mexico failed
to stand up to Chinese competition and instead resorted to self-defeating
protectionism?
Let us begin with Ecuador and Venezuela. The two oil-abundant countries
have rejected the kinds of institutional and macroeconomic reforms that
could have helped to harness the China boom more productively. For China,
both countries represented a ‘new’ relationship, as neither figured in the ear-
lier post-1949 history that China shared with the other aforementioned
countries. At the same time, both offered easy entry for the PRC, ready
access to oil, and a way to get its foot in the door of the LAC region with
infrastructure contracts that were high in Chinese content (labour, equip-
ment, etc.) and low on environmental precautions. Hence, Beijing established
an SP with Venezuela in 2001 and Ecuador in 2015. Post-boom, Venezuela
has little to show for the billions lent to it by China’s policy banks. The
country remains mired in hyperinflation, authoritarian backsliding and a
tragic humanitarian crisis. The post-boom milieu in Ecuador is not as dire,
although until at least 2024 the government has mortgaged the bulk of the
country’s oil reserves to China (Kraul 2018).
In his ground-breaking work on ‘patient capital’, Stephen Kaplan (2016)
finds that in both Venezuela and Ecuador these were state-to-state loans
made by China with no transparency or conditionality. Some were ‘loans-for-
oil’ deals, on which both countries are now in steep arrears; former pre-
sidents in both countries funnelled other Chinese loans through special pro-
jects that are now largely untraceable. Ecuador, at least, has some highways,
dams and bridges to show for its Chinese loans. But it also has the US $19
billion China-backed Coca Codo dam, already infamous for its shabby con-
struction and for shorting out the country’s electrical grid. Although Trump’s
Washington accused China of setting a debt trap for developing countries,
the Venezuelan situation is playing out in the reverse: in the absence of con-
ditionality and woefully behind in servicing its debt payments to China,
Venezuela has ensnared Beijing in a creditor trap. Ecuador is not far behind
it. As much as these two cases appear to offer little more than a replay of the
old-fashioned resource curse, leaders in both countries have already sown the
52 Carol Wise
seeds for an entirely new kind of debt crisis—one based on sovereign-to-
sovereign lending, in which the Bretton Woods institutions will hold little
sway.
On the question of inflows of Chinese FDI, despite the obvious disparities
between Brazil and Peru in size and national wealth, at US $48.5 billion and
$22.8 billion, respectively, these two countries have taken the lead for similar
reasons. First, there are diverse and abundant resources in both countries;
second, and in contrast with Chile, natural resources are wide open to FDI
in Peru. While Brazil has maintained more state presence in the economy,
this arrangement has been similarly hospitable to FDI. Although Argentina
has attracted $12.5 billion in Chinese FDI in electronics, mining and fisheries
(Stanley 2019: 128), the country has officially defaulted on its external debt
three times in the 21st century alone. Political and economic instability has
prevented Argentina from realizing its full potential as a destination for
Chinese FDI inflows. In essence, Chile has held out for Chinese FDI in non-
extractive and high tech industries, and this has been slow to materialize.
Although the period from 2015–2018 saw a sudden burst in Chinese FDI
inflows to Chile (in lithium, electricity, renewable energy, salmon and fruit)
bringing the total to $11.2 billion, Chinese FDI in higher value-added sectors
in Chile remains elusive (Mander 2019).
As of 2017, Brazil is the only LAC country to have attracted significant
Chinese FDI inflows in sectors outside of natural resources, including man-
ufacturing and services (electricity and water, transport and storage, and
financial services) (Hiratuka 2019). Mexico represents an unusual case in the
sense that most Chinese FDI does not revolve around the acquisition of raw
materials. During 2000–2018, Chinese FDI inflows to Mexico (US $6.6 bil-
lion) were concentrated in manufacturing (computer equipment and trans-
port equipment) and transactions related to transport and warehousing
(water transport, storage services) (Dussel 2019: 314–315). Why does Chinese
FDI in Brazil tower over that received by Mexico? In spite of the creation of
commissions, elite-level working groups, and any number of other venues
meant to strengthen China-Mexico ties, nearly 30 years of continued trade
tensions continue to stunt the relationship (Cornejo et al. 2013). Remarkably,
although China has backed a $2.4 billion China-Mexico Investment Fund
(Gallagher 2020), there has been little agreement on how to spend these
funds.

What is the Latin American perspective?

The analysis thus far has delineated the ways in which China’s global reach
has crystallized in Latin America. As evidence of its growing commitment to
the region, China obtained permanent observer status at the Organization of
American States in 2004 and paid the US $300 million entry fee to become a
fully fledged member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in
2008. Under an arrangement between the Export-Import Bank of China and
 China 53
the IDB, China also established a $1.8 billion Latin American fund to spur
equity investments in the region’s infrastructure, medium-sized enterprises
and natural resources. China has also set up three separate regional finance
platforms that together total $35 billion in credit for industrial cooperation,
infrastructure and other productive projects. In January 2016 China led the
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for the
explicit purpose of financing transportation infrastructure and connectivity
(Gallagher 2020). Within LAC, Brazil (once it pays its quota) is a founding
member of the AIIB, and Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela are all prospective members. Despite strident US criticism and
Washington’s attempts to thwart the AIIB, all these ventures fall under the
umbrella of standard economic diplomacy.
China has courted Latin American constituencies through the imple-
mentation of a three-pronged public diplomacy approach. First, the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has disseminated two White Papers on LAC, in
2008 and in 2016. Second, since January 2015 China has held two ministerial
meetings with the 33 member countries of the Community of Latin American
and Caribbean States (CELAC). Third, Beijing has now designated a total of
10 SPs within the LAC region: Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico
(2003), Argentina (2004), Peru (2008), Chile (2012), Costa Rica (2015),
Ecuador (2015), Uruguay (2016) and Bolivia (2018). Although LAC coun-
tries have warmly received these soft power overtures, what stands out is the
lack of any cohesive policy response or regional strategy articulated towards
China. This is nothing new for LAC, as these countries have been divided for
decades on issues ranging from a collective response to the external debt
shocks of the 1980s to the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
in the 2000s. When it comes to China, there has been little proactivity at the
country level or collective action as a regional bloc.
China’s three aforementioned public diplomacy strategies contrast sharply
with the US stance towards LAC, which has gone from benign neglect
during Obama’s two terms in office to outright hostility under the Trump
Administration (Guida 2018). As the renowned Mexican historian Enrique
Krauze (2017) describes it, ‘The victory of Mr. Trump has changed all the
rules … a new period of confrontation has arisen, not military but surely
commercial, diplomatic, strategic, social and ethnic’. The marked differences
in US versus Chinese foreign policy approaches towards LAC are readily
apparent in the two White Papers on LAC generated by China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. It is the spirit of these White Papers, rather than their actual
content, that appealed to China’s LAC partners. For the first time, China put
Latin America explicitly and positively on its foreign policy agenda. The
White Papers emphasize China’s intentions to build a comprehensive and
cooperative relationship with Latin America based on mutual benefit, mutual
respect and mutual trust. Both papers contain sections on political ties, eco-
nomic relations, cultural and social exchange, and cooperation on peace,
security and judicial affairs (Stallings 2020: 67–69).
54 Carol Wise
As for the China-CELAC meetings, the first occurred in 2015 in Beijing
and the second in 2018 in Santiago, Chile. During the 2015 summit, the
Chinese government committed to doubling trade with Latin America to US
$500 billion by 2025 and to investing $250 billion in Latin America over the
next decade. The 2018 summit resulted in a joint action plan for 2019–2021
based on areas of common interest identified in China’s 2018 White Paper on
Latin America, such as renewable energy, science and technology, infra-
structure, the environment, and greater connectivity between land and sea.
The PRC delegates also issued a declaration on China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. The initiative
promotes stronger infrastructure links between Asia and Europe, with bil-
lions of dollars of infrastructure investment in roads, ports and railways.
Africa has since been included, and China invited the CELAC nations to join
at the 2018 summit. Some 19 LAC countries rushed to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding with China to join the BRI.
On the expansion of China-LAC SPs, what has China gained from these
arrangements? Apart from its ready access to natural resources and the
expansion of Chinese manufactured exports to these countries, Beijing has
sought to institutionalize these bilateral relationships in order to achieve
some of its own goals. These include advancement on the ‘One China’ policy,
the negotiation of FTAs with Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, and the expansion
of the BRI into the Western Hemisphere. On the ‘One China’ policy, between
2004 and 2018 six LAC countries (Dominica, Grenada, Costa Rica, Panama,
the Dominican Republic and El Salvador) switched diplomatic recognition
from Taiwan to China. The China-Costa Rica SP, as well as a 2013 FTA
signed between the two countries, is rooted in Costa Rica’s diplomatic
recognition of China over Taiwan in 2007. Panama’s 2017 break from
Taiwan was a major affront to the US-Taiwan alliance, at least from the
perspective of Trump’s Washington. Yet China brought considerably more
material resources to the table in Panama, including expensive upgrades to
the Panama Canal, and had established a sound record of working collegially
with Panama.
There is no question that China has been more effective than the United
States over the past two decades in managing both sovereign and people-to-
people relations with governments and civil societies across the Americas.
This is so even if the rich political interactions characteristic of the pre-1989
period in China-LAC relations have been reduced to platitudes and the cul-
tural exchanges largely boiled down to the creation of Confucius Institutes
for Mandarin language training and formalistic Chinatowns cropping up in
LAC capitals (DeHart 2015). Again, the PRC’s more collegial working rela-
tionship has highlighted the long-standing failures and tensions in US-Latin
America relations. China’s comparative success recently surfaced in a Pew
Research Center poll that found that ‘the U.S. image in Latin America …
has taken a major hit since Trump took office’ (Oppenheimer 2019).
Unthinkable even a decade ago, China is outpacing the United States as a
 China 55
preferred partner in the LAC region, with the exception of Brazil, Colombia
and parts of Central America.

What are the results and how can we measure them?

This chapter has presented rich empirical data on the actual ‘results’ of
China’s presence in the LAC region. The quality of the highly variable
China-LAC relationship provides additional considerations. There is no
doubt that China has benefited from the inchoate nature of regional politics
in the Americas. Nor is there a lack of information on the opaque, envir-
onmentally damaging and exploitative nature of some of China’s develop-
ment project contracts in the LAC countries. In short, there has been far too
little pushback on Chinese-backed projects and programmes that are not
necessarily in the best interests of some nations. The weaker a host govern-
ment, the more likely that Chinese investors will violate best practices in this
realm. Does this mean that US officials are justified in their criticisms of
China’s infractions? Yes, but not because China is on the verge of super-
seding the United States in its own sphere of influence. Rather, host govern-
ments must hold China’s feet to the fire and be much more vigilant about
imposing global investment norms around transparency, accountability and
environmental protection.
The best outcomes have stemmed from China-related endeavours where
rule of law, regulatory oversight and a clear strategy exists on the Latin
American side. Brazil, Chile and Peru most approximate these standards.
Ecuador and Venezuela represent worst-case scenarios whereby China lent
populist governments billions of dollars for special projects as part of loans-
for-oil deals, and most of these funds vanished into a vortex of corruption.
The Mexican case remains enigmatic, especially the inability of domestic
policymakers to formulate a proactive China policy and spend down the
China-Mexico investment fund. In the best of worlds, the United States
could play an essential role in the provision of technical assistance and
training for LAC governments on everything from competitive bidding on
procurement to contract negotiation and full disclosure. The strengthening of
business practices and the rule of law vis-à-vis China is precisely the kind of
regional public good that could spark the political vitality and competitiveness
of the Western Hemisphere.
Moving forwards, one benefit is the more heterodox policy options that China
offers the LAC region. This is especially important in the realm of sovereign
debt. As the global economy slips into a severe recession as a result of the cor-
onavirus (COVID-19) pandemic as well as the trade war launched by the United
States on China in 2018, this will no doubt affect the big LAC borrowers. If
China’s sovereign debt policies in Africa are anything to go by, these borrowers
can expect China to ‘address restructuring quietly, on a bilateral basis, tailoring
programs to each situation’ (Acker et al. 2020: 1). Already, Ecuador has won a
moratorium on debt service payments to the China Development Bank through
56 Carol Wise
2021, and Venezuela is in rolling negotiations with Beijing to secure a similar
reprieve. The lack of transparency may fuel suspicions about Chinese intentions,
but this is certainly preferable to the austerity-based debt carousel imposed by
the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s.

Notes
1 Part of this analysis draws on the author’s previous work. See the chapter entitled ‘U.
S.-China Competition in the Western Hemisphere’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szal-
winski and Michael Wills (eds) Strategic Asia 2020: U.S.-China Competition for
Global Influence (Seattle: National Bureau of Asia Research, 2020). See also Drago-
nomics: How Latin America Is Maximizing (or Missing Out on) China’s International
Development Strategy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2020).
2 For instance, Peter Navarro was chosen as Trump’s ‘special trade advisor’ because
of the ideas expressed in his 2011 book (Navarro and Autry 2011).

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4 Russia in Latin America
Richard Miles

Introduction: Russia’s presence in Latin America is real, but not serious

The Russian Federation’s post-Soviet involvement and activities in Latin
America are in line with its broader foreign policies, which in turn reflect
Russia’s domestic political realities. Nearly 30 years after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, those realities are bleak. Having failed to become a liberal
democracy or a flourishing economy, the country has retreated to author-
itarianism and a system of ‘personalized power’ in the form of Vladimir
Putin. As political opposition is crushed, civil society imprisoned and eco-
nomic growth becomes increasingly dependent on declining hydrocarbon
production, Putin must find ways to turn Russian’s attention elsewhere
(Shevtsova 2015).
One of those ways is to pretend that Russia remains a global superpower.
Or, at a minimum, to convince a sufficient number of Russians that their
country can at least harass and disrupt its traditional antagonists, especially
the United States, in places like Latin America where Russia has no other
real interests at stake. Russia also has an interest in promoting the idea of a
‘multipolar world’, a way of flattering aspiring regional powers, with the
intent of having them resist US leadership (FBIS 2008). As long as the
results visibly cause damage to US interests or democratic institutions
somewhere in the world, Putin’s aim to deflect blame is achieved. This
explains, for example, the expansion of the Russia Today (RT) news network
in Latin America. According to Peter Pomerantsev (2014), ‘The point of this
new propaganda is not to persuade anyone, but to keep the viewer hooked
and distracted—to disrupt Western narratives rather than provide a
counternarrative’.
In other words, Russia’s recent efforts in Latin America are real, but they
are not serious. The high-level meetings with anti-democratic governments
are real, the economic subsidies and arms sales to failed states like Cuba and
Venezuela are real, and Russian propaganda in the Western Hemisphere is
real. Yet these tools are not harnessed to achieve any serious objectives.
There is no undergirding (even if mistaken) ideology, philosophy or
commercial interest that guides Russian actions in Latin America.
60 Richard Miles
Latin American leaders and political observers have sounded the alarm
about potential Russian meddling in elections (especially in the presidential
elections that took place in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia in 2018) as well as
its heavy influence in Venezuela and Cuba (Krauze 2018). In general, the
Latin American public has a low opinion of Russia and very little confidence
in Vladimir Putin ‘to do the right thing when it comes to world affairs’ (Pew
Research Center 2020).
Nevertheless, Russia does have some discernible goals in the region. All
these objectives mirror elements of Moscow’s global strategy, including:

 promoting Latin America as part of a ‘multipolar’ world order through

frequent high-level meetings and visits;
 concluding major ‘deals’ on high-profile infrastructure projects involving
Russian state entities;
 propping up anti-democratic client states that are hostile to the United
States, namely Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua;
 seeking diplomatic support in the United Nations (UN) and the Orga-
nization of American States (OAS) for (or acquiescence to) Russian
actions in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine;
 attempting to influence elections through propaganda on social media
campaigns or through the RT news outlets;
 selling Russian weapons and gaining access to facilities that support
military or intelligence activities in the region (Ellis 2015).

An absence of traditional interests

Russia’s official statements of foreign policy reveal the low priority it places
on the region. An official strategy document (Putin 2016) outlined global,
regional and often country-specific foreign policy goals. The section entitled
‘Regional Foreign Policy Priorities’ listed 51 region-specific policy objectives.
Latin America was in 50th place, beating out only Africa as the lowest of
Russia’s global priorities.
Notably, the Latin America paragraph did not single out any country by
name, but instead lists all the regional multilateral institutions in which the
United States plays little or no role. Similarly, a 2019 policy document
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019) dedicated just 25 words to Latin American
and the Caribbean, including that ‘the destructive plans of the United States
and its allies as regards Venezuela were prevented’. Latin America, however,
does serve a minor role when Russian leaders speak of a new world order.
‘Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar
world that is forming’, said then Prime Minister Putin on 17 November 2008,
‘we will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and
foreign policy’ (FBIS 2018).
The relatively low priority accorded to Latin America by Russian policy-
makers reflects the absence of traditional interests, such as commerce. With
 Russia 61
the notable exception of Venezuela (discussed below), no country in Latin
America represents a significant portion of Russia’s global trade and
investment flows.
Russian trade in goods with Latin America is tiny, representing less than
2% of its entire trade with the world. Its biggest trading partner is Brazil,
with total bilateral trade of just over US $5 billion in 2018. Russia’s total
trade in 2018 with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico—the five
largest economies in the region—was $10.8 billion, roughly equivalent to the
amount that the United States traded with Mexico every six days (United
Nations 2020). Although Russia and Brazil are both charter members of the
BRICS (an informal group of emerging major economies comprising Brazil,
Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China and South Africa), the market
optimism that surrounded its creation in 2009 has evaporated. Goldman
Sachs (where an analyst first coined the group’s name in 2001) discontinued
its BRICS investment fund in 2015 due to poor performance by the
members’ economies (Ballard 2020).
A subset of Russia’s trade is arms sales. Between 2006 and 2016 Russian
arms sales to Latin America (mostly to Venezuela) totalled over US $4.5
billion, representing 6.4% of Russia’s arms sales to the world. Since 2017
only $7 million in sales have been recorded, registering 0.04% of world sales
(SIPRI 2020). Although arms sales to the region obviously serve other for-
eign policy purposes, they are no longer a significant source of cash for
Russia.
On a global scale, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Latin America
increased in 2018, totalling almost US $179 billion (ECLAC 2019). The
major recipients of these inflows were Brazil ($88.3 billion), Mexico ($36.9
billion), Argentina ($11.9 billion), Colombia ($11.4 billion), Panama ($6.6
billion), Peru ($6.5 billion) and Chile ($6.1 billion). Chinese investment in the
region fell from the previous year, but it was still the third largest behind
Europe and the United States. Until 2012 about one-third of these invest-
ments were concentrated in the mining industry and coal, oil and gas. Since
then, those industries have represented only about 20% of foreign investment,
offset by interest in Latin America’s renewable energies, transport and
logistics, and consumer goods (ibid.).
In comparison, Russia’s direct investment abroad fell by almost 70%
between 2014 and 2019 (Melkadze 2020). The 2019 comprehensive UN
report on FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean mentions Russia only
twice in terms of investment. In Bolivia, Gazprom, a Russian state-owned
company, was involved in ‘the exploitation and exploration of gas reserves in
the department of Chuquisaca’, and in Peru a Russian firm may be buying
the assets of the China Fishery Group, which declared bankruptcy in 2016
(ECLAC 2019). The amounts of the potential investments are not given. In
sum, Russia’s commercial efforts in Latin America, especially in comparison
with China or Europe, are not compatible with its status as the 11th largest
economy in the world (World Bank 2020) and a member of the G7.
62 Richard Miles
High-profile visits
Few things promote Russia’s image as a global power better than high-profile
visits to far flung capitals around the world. The fall of the Soviet Union in
1991 put Russia’s relations with most other countries on hold. With Latin
America, it was not until Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Primakov vis-
ited the region in 1997 (with stops in Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina,
Colombia and Brazil) that old relationships were renewed (Blank and Kim
2015: 159). Primakov’s initial post-collapse foray turned into an annual pil-
grimage for Russian leaders and senior officials to Latin America. In the first
decade of the new century, Russian presidents visited Latin America 11 times
(Miles 2018).
In 2008 Russia decided to step up its engagement with Latin America,
primarily to offset the global diplomatic isolation over its invasion of Geor-
gia. In response to US-led sanctions, Russia deployed long-range bombers
and warships to Venezuela and began conducting aerial patrols and making
port calls in the Caribbean (Ellis 2015). Yet Russia did not begin a serious
attempt to broaden its engagement until 2013–2015, in the midst of the
Ukraine crisis, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, President
Putin and Minister of Defence Col-Gen. Sergei Shoigu made high-profile
tours to the region, leaving a trail of agreements in their wake.
Between 2010–2013 Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Latin America three
times. His stops included Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala (twice), Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. During the April 2014
crisis in Ukraine, Lavrov returned again to visit Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua and
Peru. A few months later, President Putin travelled to Argentina, Cuba,
Brazil and Nicaragua (Gurganus 2018). In February 2015 Defence Minister
Shoigu went to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela to discuss how those coun-
tries could support Russian military operations in the region (Ellis 2015).
These trips drew much attention, alarming political and military analysts
about Russia’s motivations and strategic endgame, if any. Drawing the most
scrutiny were agreements on infrastructure projects, military cooperation and
arms sales.

Let’s make a deal

The frequent visits by senior Russian officials between 2008 and 2014 usually
were accompanied by announcements of major ‘deals’. These usually took
the form of a partnership or contract involving a Russian state entity.
Andean countries such as Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia provided fertile terrain
for Russia’s declaratory diplomacy. For instance, Putin and Ecuador’s Pre-
sident Rafael Correa discussed US $1.5 billion worth of infrastructure pro-
jects in October 2013, including a 1,800-mile railroad link between Quito,
located in the Andes, and the Pacific coast (Vnesheconombank 2012). As of
November 2019 the rail project appeared to have been abandoned and the
 Russia 63
Russian media reported that officials ‘wanted to speed up implementation of
joint projects’ (News.ru 2019).
Peru offers good examples too. In 2013 Russian and Peruvian officials
discussed partnerships in natural gas pipelines, a liquefied natural gas (LNG)
compression plant, nuclear power plants, and a transcontinental railroad
across Brazil and Peru (Andina 2014a). Follow-up meetings took place in
late 2015 and early 2016, but nothing further developed. During Russian
Minister of Defence Shoigi’s visit to Peru in 2013, he discussed the sale of
110 T-90S tanks (to replace Peru’s archaic stock of T-55 tanks) as well as a
factory to build military and civilian trucks by Kamaz, a Russian trucks and
engines manufacturer. In late 2013 Peru also considered the purchase of
BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers and air defence missiles (Moscow Times
2013). According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data
(2020), none of these purchases took place, although Russia delivered 24
transport helicopters between 2014–2016 from an earlier contract signed in
2013.
In Bolivia, Rosneft, a Russian energy and oil company controlled by the
government, promised in November 2013 to explore for petroleum in Bolivia
(Business Recorder 2013), a commitment that was renewed when Putin visited
Bolivia in July 2014 (Reuters 2014). In 2020 Gazprom, a partially state-
owned energy corporation, had a 20% stake in Bolivian natural gas produc-
tion, but the yield was low (Åslund and Fisher 2020). Rosneft’s 2019 annual
report makes no mention of Bolivia. In 2015 Russia and Bolivia signed a
nuclear cooperation agreement, with the possibility of building a Russian
reactor in the country (Peachey 2019).
The two major South American countries, Brazil and Argentina, were part
of this modus operandi of Moscow. In July 2014 Brazil and Russia agreed to
possible cooperation on construction of a nuclear waste storage facility and a
nuclear power plant (Cunningham 2014). By late 2019 Brazil was still look-
ing for a partner to complete its Angra 3 reactor, with China, France and
Russia as the options (Peachey 2019). During Putin’s 2014 visit to Argentina,
he announced that Russia would bid on the Atucha III nuclear reactor
(Anishchuk and Lough 2014), but a Chinese company won the US $2 billion
contract a few weeks after Putin left. Nevertheless, Russia and Argentina
signed a strategic nuclear cooperation agreement in December 2018. As of
2019 Russia is a prospective partner to help Argentina to build a fourth
reactor (Peachey 2019).
With Mexico, the oil and gas giant Lukoil, the largest non-state-owned
company in terms of revenues in Russia, signed an agreement with PEMEX,
the Mexican state energy company, on oil exploration and technology (Petro
Global News 2014) and Russia’s nuclear power agency Rosatom agreed to
work with the Mexican government on developing a commercial nuclear
power capability (ECLAC 2011). In 2015 Lukoil won a bid to drill in the
Gulf of Mexico and in 2018 it held a 20% stake in a consortium to start
operations. There is no evidence that Rosatom has worked with the Mexican
64 Richard Miles
government on a reactor. Russia’s ‘deal diplomacy’ has not produced many
tangible results.

Support of anti-democratic regimes

Old habits die hard, including Russia’s support of states in the Western
Hemisphere that are hostile to the United States. This takes the form of cash,
subsidies and arms sales to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. Although they
remain irritants to the United States and to their neighbours, they do not
play nearly as large a role as they did during the Cold War. Russia is also
careful not to overplay its hand by provoking the United States into action.
Yet the overt support for foes of the United States is a visible reminder of
Russia’s (diminished) worldwide reach.

Venezuela
Early on, Russia recognized that Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela would provide an
ideal platform for Russia to regain influence in Latin America. Chávez and
Putin had met three times by 2003, including their first 2000 meeting in
Moscow, which Chávez initiated (Herbst and Marczak 2019). In 2006 Russia
began selling large quantities of weapons to Venezuela. Over the next nine
years it sold advanced weaponry worth US $3.85 billion to the Chávez and
Maduro regimes, representing 89% of Russian arms sales to Latin America
in this period (SIPRI 2020). In 2008 the Russians also deployed Tu-160
bombers and ships to Venezuela for highly publicized joint training exercises.
Yet they were careful not to needlessly provoke the United States. Prior to
the arrival of the Tu-160s, the Russians announced that they were not
carrying nuclear weapons. They also shortened the joint naval exercise.
Later, Rosneft, the government-controlled oil company, made major
investments in the Venezuelan oil industry, effectively keeping Nicolas
Maduro in power. Russia’s interest in Venezuela’s oil industry dates back to
the early 2000s, when several Russian oil and gas companies began to
explore an investment in Venezuela. In 2006 Gazprom acquired the rights
to explore for offshore gas and in 2010 a consortium of Russian companies
(including Gazprom) established a joint venture with Venezuela’s PDVSA to
extract oil from the Orinoco River Basin (Herbst and Marczak 2019). In
2014 Rosneft, led by Putin confidante Igor Sechin, bought out the other
Russian companies and took over the consortium. By 2018 total Russian
spending on Rosneft amounted to around US $9 billion, including $6.5 bil-
lion in loans. For Russia, this was a significant amount of money, equal to
one-third of its FDI outflows from mid-2018 to mid-2019 (OECD 2019).
Venezuela’s massive debt to Russia was to be repaid from the revenue
generated by Venezuela’s oil exports. By the end of 2018 analysts calculated
that Russia was at least US $1.5 billion short of recouping its investment
(Lowe and Sagdiev 2019). By mid-2019 Rosneft had become the biggest
 Russia 65
buyer of Venezuelan crude oil (Yagova et al. 2019), but it was not enough. In
a victory for US sanctions, Rosneft sold all its Venezuelan assets to a com-
pany owned by the Russian government (de la Cruz 2020). Although Russia
was obviously still involved in Venezuela, all thoughts of economic profit had
been abandoned.

Cuba
Russia’s relationship with Cuba has been more complicated than with the
rest of the region. As a flash point during the Cold War, the country repre-
sented the Soviet Union’s largest political and military investment in Latin
America but also its most humiliating defeat. Bad feelings also remained
among the Cubans from the sudden ending of Russian subsidies in 1991,
complicated by Cuba’s gradually improving ties with the United States.
Unlike Nicaragua and Venezuela, Cuba did not recognize the republics of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia when they broke away from Georgia in 2008.
Cuba also did not participate in the 2008 joint Russian-Venezuelan naval
exercises and was not chosen to host the Tu-160 bombers that flew to
Caracas.
Yet Russia announced in February 2014 that it would be reopening its
Cold War-era listening station in Lourdes, Cuba. This included sending per-
sonnel. Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu also declared that Cuba was
being considered as a resupply point for Russian ships and aircraft (Ellis
2015). Prior to President Putin’s visit in July 2014, Russia announced that it
would forgive 90% of Cuba’s US $32 billion debt. The Russians also
announced that Cuba would host a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) station, the Russian competitor to GPS (Metzler 2014). Finally,
they promised to build four new power plants and an international airport,
as well as to upgrade the port of Mariel (BRICS Post 2014).
Several years later, these promises had not been completed. When Cuban
President Miguel Díaz-Canel travelled to Moscow in 2018, the GLONASS
station still had not been built. Russian officials also stated that they were
considering a €38 million loan to Cuba to purchase Russian weapons and to
build a light rail network (Pinchuk and Osborn 2018). In late 2019 Russian
officials said that they were still in talks with Cuban officials about energy
projects (Sakalaris 2019).

Nicaragua
Nicaragua, too, had a Cold War past with Russia that in 2007 came back to
life in the form of Daniel Ortega, the Marxist-Leninist leader of the Sandi-
nista revolution from 1979–1990. In his 2013 visit to Nicaragua, Minister of
Defence Shoigu concluded a deal gaining Russian access to two ports,
establishing a counter-narcotics training centre, ramping up arms sales and
securing Russian help to modernize Nicaragua’s armed forces (Interfax
66 Richard Miles
2013). Since 2008 Russia also has expressed an interest in participating in a
new transoceanic canal project in Nicaragua. In 2014 Nicaraguan authorities
announced that they would use Russian equipment should the canal project
proceed (Medi Telegraph 2014).
A ‘police training’ centre was completed in 2017 but it was unclear what
programmes Russian trainers could provide. A GLONASS station also
became operational (Aburto 2017). As of mid-2019 the joint Nicaraguan-
Chinese canal project was nominally still alive but beset by environmental
concerns and corruption charges. No work had started (Muller 2019).
Overall, Russia’s engagement with its closest ‘allies’ has fallen short of the
expectations generated by the 2013 and 2014 high-profile visits. In 2020 it
started winding down its exposure in Venezuela, and has not re-established
anything close to a real military or intelligence presence in Cuba and Nicar-
agua. A shared antipathy to the United States, it turns out, is no longer
sufficient for strong ties.

Seeking diplomatic support for Russian actions in Georgia, Crimea

and Ukraine
Russia was diplomatically isolated after its 2008 war with Georgia over
South Ossetia. This isolation, accompanied by sanctions, deepened after the
2014 invasion of the Crimea and the subsequent war against Ukraine. Both
the 2008 and 2013 interventions became the subject of annual votes in the
UN General Assembly, where all the Latin American countries are repre-
sented. An analysis of the region’s UN voting patterns on 19 separate UN
resolutions between 2008–2019 on Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Crimea and Ukraine show that Russia failed to get what it was looking for
(United Nations 2020).
In May 2008 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution deploring
the ‘arbitrary forced displacement … created by the expulsion of hundreds of
thousands of persons from Abkhazia, Georgia … recognizing the right of
return of all refugees and internally displaced persons and their descendants’.
This subsequently became an annual resolution. The reaction of most
Latin American countries was one of indifference. In the six-year period
between 2008–2013, the resolution garnered only three ‘yes’ votes; two from
Honduras in 2010 and 2011, and one from Costa Rica in 2011. The vast
majority of the 18 Latin American countries abstained, with dependable ‘no’
votes coming from Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
However, after Russia’s move into Crimea in March 2014 the pattern
shifted. The annual Georgia resolution picked up 29 votes from 2014–2019,
with the ‘yes’ votes coming consistently from six countries: Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. Cuba, Nicaragua and
Venezuela continued to vote against the resolution.
The initial 2014 UN resolution on Ukraine drew eight votes of support
from Latin America, the most ever from this region in support of an anti-
 Russia 67
Russian resolution. But over the following five years, similar resolutions
received only the consistent support of four countries (Costa Rica, Guate-
mala, Honduras and Panama), with Bolivia joining the ‘no’ votes. Mexico
decided to split the difference, continuing to support the Georgia resolution
but abstaining on Ukraine. Other abstentions were part of routine diplomatic
quid pro quos. Argentina, for instance, abstained from the 2014 Crimea vote,
not surprising given Putin’s repeated support of Argentina’s claim to the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Nevertheless, as of 2019 seven of the 18 countries
in Latin America had voted for at least one resolution implicitly criticizing
Russia, compared to zero votes in 2008 (United Nations 2020). This represented
a diplomatic failure for Russia.

The Organization of American States

The UN was not the only forum where Russia could seek regional support.
The Organization of American States (OAS) is the most prominent multi-
lateral institution in the Western Hemisphere. Unlike the UN, the OAS
member states (35 countries) rarely vote on resolutions, instead they pass
them by consensus. Russia gained Permanent Observer status to the OAS in
1992 but has had little to do with the organization. In 2001 it contributed
vehicles for OAS use in member countries, and in 2012 gave small in-kind
support to OAS election observers (OAS 2017).
As a collective body, the OAS has been silent on Georgia and Ukraine.
Nevertheless, in December 2018 OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro
expressed

the greatest concern of the news coming from Venezuela about the pos-
sibility that aircraft capable of using nuclear weapons from Russia are in
its territory. The presence of this foreign military mission violates the
Venezuelan Constitution … Therefore, we consider such an act harmful
to Venezuelan sovereignty. Likewise, this action may also be in violation
of fundamental norms of international law.
(OAS 2018)

A second statement (in response to Russian criticism of the first statement)

was released in March 2019:

The General Secretariat rejects the recent Russian military incursion into
Venezuelan territory … It is unacceptable that a foreign government
engages in military cooperation programs with a usurping regime that
has been declared illegitimate by resolutions and Inter-American law,
which also threatens hemispheric peace and security.
(OAS 2019)
68 Richard Miles
The statements by Almagro did not carry the same weight as UN General
Assembly resolutions, but nevertheless they were a clear signal that Russia’s
10-year diplomatic offensive in Latin America to ignore Georgia and
Ukraine had mostly failed.

Spreading disinformation through social media and Russia Today

Sowing distrust of democratic institutions has long been a hallmark of Rus-
sian global strategy. In the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections in
Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, there was widespread fear that the Russians
would attempt to sway the results through disinformation campaigns (Gur-
ganus 2018). These were legitimate concerns, especially given the widely
publicized official investigations then underway in the United States. Special
Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigators eventually found that

The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in

sweeping and systematic fashion … a Russian entity carried out a social
media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump
and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton [and] … a Russian
intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against
entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign
and then released stolen documents.
(US Department of Justice 2019)

In mid-December 2017 then US National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster

told a group in Mexico, ‘We’ve seen that this is really a sophisticated effort to
polarize democratic societies and pit communities within those societies
against each other … you’ve seen, actually, initial signs of it in the Mexican
presidential campaign already’ (Garcia and Torres 2018). Mexican analysts
warned that the campaign of challenger Andrés Manuel López Obrador
(AMLO) had already been infiltrated by Moscow, pointing out that AMLO’s
choice for the top anti-corruption post in his cabinet, Irma Eréndira
Sandoval, was the wife of Jonathan Ackerman, a frequent contributor to RT
(Krauze 2018).
Yet there was conflicting evidence that Russia attempted to influence the
Mexican election through social media manipulation, as it did in the 2016
US elections. Over a 30-day period spanning April–May 2018, a data foren-
sics firm analysed traffic from outside Mexico and claimed to find an
incredible 92 million López Obrador-related posts coming from Russia and
Ukraine (Yucatan Times 2018). This represented over 80% of all AMLO-
related social media posts from outside of Mexico. This stunningly high level
of apparent interference, however, could not be confirmed by other forensic
analysts. In late May 2018 another organization analysed the same time
period and could find only 314,000 social media posts related to AMLO
from both inside and outside Mexico. The vast majority (79%) originated in
 Russia 69
Mexico, with most of the rest coming from the United States. Russia and
Ukraine did not even make the top 10 countries (Medium 2018). Similar
claims of Russian meddling through social media or attempted hacks
appeared during the presidential elections in Brazil (October 2018) and
Colombia (May 2018). As in Mexico, however, hard evidence of Russian
manipulation did not materialize.

Russia Today network

In December 2005 RT went live with the purpose of presenting ‘a more
balanced picture of Russia’ (Ioffe 2010). Four years later, RT started streaming
a Spanish-language service (RT Actualidad) from Moscow. In October 2014
Argentina became the first country to carry RT on its national cable network
(Russia Today 2014). Other countries quickly followed suit, with RT cable
broadcasts becoming available in Chile in 2015, in Ecuador and Mexico in
2016, and in Peru in 2018. Venezuela and Cuba also began to carry RT pro-
gramming on their state-owned networks. By 2020 RT Actualidad had opened
up bureaux in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Buenos Aires, Mexico City
and Madrid. In January 2020 RT launched a YouTube news channel and
within six months claimed that it had about 3.8 million subscribers.
During its first few years in Latin America, RT has had limited influence.
Telesur, founded in 2005 as a project of Hugh Chávez, already provides news
that is critical of the United States and Europe but which offers very
favourable coverage of Venezuela, Cuba and Russia. It was dubbed the ‘Latin
socialist answer to CNN’ (Lakshmanan 2005). In the decade after its
founding, the Russian network and Telesur have provided remarkably similar
coverage of world events and political developments in Latin America. They
have cooperated by sharing videos and other content, carrying each other’s
correspondents on their live feeds, and airing each other’s programmes.
In 2018 RT was accused of helping to elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador
to the presidency in Mexico (García Ramírez 2017), but the dynamics of the
race had little to do with foreign policy or the United States. Mexican voters
overwhelmingly focused on the issues of corruption and endemic violence,
both of which had received extensive coverage in other media outlets.
Given the US experience in 2016, Latin America is right to worry about
Russia’s intentions and its capabilities of media manipulation. Yet Russian
efforts to disrupt institutions and elections in Latin America, to the extent
they exist, have been desultory and haphazard, with little to show for results.

Conclusion
Some 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no evidence
that Russia thinks of Latin America in a strategic sense at all. Despite its
apparent renewed interest beginning in 2008, Russia continues to have little
to do with major economies like Brazil or Mexico, which have grown
70 Richard Miles
tremendously over the past three decades. Its promises of major deals in
2013–2014 have mostly been unfulfilled. Setting aside arms sales and energy
exploration in Venezuela, Russian trade and investment in the region is close
to zero. Moscow has begun to reduce its commitments to its former client
states and dabbles only opportunistically in the rest of the hemisphere,
thwarting the United States when it can.
This cynical view by Russia is reciprocated by Latin America’s indifference
and negative views of the country and of Vladimir Putin. Aside from very
real concerns about Russia’s demonstrated habit of election meddling, Latin
American governments do not devote much attention to Russia and are very
uneven in their support of Russia in the UN and the OAS. There are very
few trade and investment opportunities, especially in comparison with the
United States, China and Europe.
For Russia, the value of Latin America is largely as a public relations
platform. Images of Russian presidents in Buenos Aires, ministers of foreign
affairs in Lima, or Tu-60 bombers in Caracas, create the illusion for a Rus-
sian audience that it remains a global power and can compete militarily,
economically and politically with China, Europe and the United States. It is
no accident that Russia’s biggest investment in the region since 2009 is the
creation of a Spanish-language media platform upon which the Russian
government can make and shape a ‘brand’ and tell stories, both to itself and
the rest of the world. But these stories are not to further any serious goals,
they have become the goal itself.

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5 Renewed Japanese involvement in
Latin America
Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka

Introduction1
Japan’s relationship with Latin America is a long-standing one. Its modern
history began with Japanese migration to the region more than a century
ago. Trade became important in the 1950s, involving Latin American exports
of raw materials in exchange for industrial goods. In the heyday of the rela-
tionship, in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was the first or second most impor-
tant trade partner for several individual countries, although the United
States remained the dominant partner for the region as a whole. Investment
also centred on raw materials, but some industrial sectors were important
too, especially in Brazil and Mexico. As Japan’s own economic problems
manifested themselves in the 1990s, its links with Latin America declined.
Over the past two decades, Japan has shown renewed interest in the
region, perhaps stimulated by competition from the People’s Republic of
China and promoted by a proactive prime minister: Shinzo Abe (2012–2020).
Economic partnership agreements (EPAs) were signed with Mexico, Chile
and Peru, while one is pending with Colombia.2 The choice of partners
reflects Japan’s interest in the Pacific Alliance and, in general, in countries
with relatively strong and stable economies. Prime Minister Abe made mul-
tiple visits to the region and announced a new model, moving from a
‘complementary relationship’ to one of partnership or ‘Juntos!’.
Juntos is the Spanish and the Portuguese word for together; the change
implied a more equal relationship. There are three components of the Juntos
framework—progressing, leading and inspiring together. ‘Progressing together’
is seen to focus mainly on economic considerations. It would include the
EPAs, but would also stress Japanese investment projects across a variety of
fields, including infrastructure and high technology, as well as the human
capital necessary to develop and maintain them. ‘Leading together’ would
see Japan and Latin America joining forces to defend and promote the rules-
based international order. For example, together with the three Latin Amer-
ican members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—Mexico, Chile and
Peru— Japan took the lead in rescuing the multilateral agreement when the
United States pulled out. ‘Inspiring together’ implies that the partners are
76 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
seeking to pursue international development, as well as peace and justice,
through such mechanisms as the United Nations (UN)’s Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). ‘Triangular cooperation’ with the more advanced
countries in the region is another type of partnership designed to help poorer
countries in Latin America as well as those outside the region.
The chapter is developed in four sections. First, we present background
information that stresses Japan’s long-term, multifaceted relationship with
Latin America, unlike the situation of many of the countries covered in this
volume. Second, we turn to the renewed surge of interest in the region in the
early 21st century and offer some reasons for it. Third, we trace the types of
activities (trade, foreign direct investment—FDI—and finance) and look at
the countries and sectors where Japanese activities have concentrated.
Finally, we conclude with an evaluation of future prospects for the relation-
ship between Japan and Latin America in the light of other partners for the
region.

Background: the 20th century

The modern history of Japan and Latin America began with two waves of
Japanese state-sponsored immigration in the early 20th century and after the
Second World War.3 Seeking new sources of cheap labour, a number of Latin
American countries agreed to accept the Japanese immigrants, which initi-
ated the notion of complementarities between Japan and Latin America
(Kunimoto 1993; Masterson and Funada-Classen 2003). Brazil was the
major destination and now has the largest population of Japanese descen-
dants outside of Japan itself. Other important receiving countries, by size of
Japanese immigrant population, included Peru, Argentina and Mexico.4
The two emigration waves meant that when Japan began to take an inter-
est in trading with and investing in Latin America, it had a ready-made
reception committee that could function as a bridge to local governments
and business communities. Japanese trade with Latin America followed what
some have called a colonial pattern. That is, for the most part Japan expor-
ted industrial goods and imported raw materials. While Latin America was
never very significant as a trade partner for Japan, its importance declined
during the post-war period. Between the 1950s and 1970s around 7% of
Japan’s total trade was with Latin America; recently the average has been less
than 4%.5 From the Latin American perspective, the importance of trade
with Japan varied substantially by country. In the late 1980s and early 1990s
Japan was among the most important partners for a number of countries.
For Brazil, Mexico and Peru, it was second behind the United States in most
years; in Chile it was sometimes the most important partner. Overall, for the
region, Japan represented about 6% of Latin America’s trade in 1990 (figures
obtained from IMF n.d.).
Japanese trade with Latin America—as elsewhere—has been tightly linked
to FDI. Not surprisingly, given its large size, vast natural resources and the
 Japan 77
immigrant population, Brazil was host to Japan’s earliest investments in the
region. They began in the mid-1950s, when Japan was still struggling to
recover from the Second World War and coincided with the push towards
import substitution industrialization in Latin America and the need for for-
eign capital. The largest Japanese investments in the region took place after
the first oil crisis in 1973, when a number of so-called national projects were
launched. These were joint public-private ventures—usually involving one of
Japan’s trading companies, one or more industrial firms and a government
agency—to produce goods that would be exported back to Japan. Most
projects centred on raw materials, such as iron ore (Brazil), non-ferrous
metals (Peru and Chile), grains (Brazil and Argentina), wood (Chile) and salt
deposits (Mexico) (Horisaka 1993).
Later, host country demands for greater local processing coincided with
environmental concerns and rising energy costs in Japan itself, resulting in an
increase in the semi-processing of raw materials before export to Japan.
Often carried out as joint ventures with local state-owned firms, typical pro-
ducts included iron ore, pulp and wood chips, aluminium, and semi-finished
steel (Horisaka 1993). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA
n.d.), the total stock of Japanese investment in Latin America was US $55
billion as of 1994. Of this, $15 billion was in tax havens and $20 billion was
in Panama as the counterpart of the flag-of-convenience trade referred to
above. This left $20 billion in onshore investment in the region, of which the
majority was in Brazil and Mexico.6
In the late 1970s and early 1980s Japanese banks followed the lead of their
industrial counterparts and the trading companies, moving into Latin
America on a large scale. They employed two modes of operation. On the
one hand, they participated in some of the national projects. On the other
hand, they took part in the large syndicated loans that were the main form of
lending in that period. Lacking international experience in general and
knowledge of Latin America in particular, the banks tended to follow the US
lead in the syndicated loans. The timing was important in that the Japanese
banks got in at the end of a decade of sovereign lending. As US banks began
to realize the dangers of a looming debt crisis and withdrew, Japanese
financial institutions took their place. Thus, by 1982, when the Latin Amer-
ican debt crisis broke, US banks held 31% of Latin American debt and
Japanese banks held 16%. As a share of total international loans, however,
Latin American debt constituted 38% of Japanese bank loans outstanding
compared to 36% for the United States (Stallings 1990).
As was the case with other parts of the Japanese private sector, the banks
coordinated their activities closely with the Japanese government. The latter,
in turn, initially followed the US lead in dealing with the debt crisis. The
process typically involved forming creditor committees for individual coun-
tries and providing new loans so that debtors could continue to make interest
payments. With the encouragement of the Japanese government, Japanese
banks participated in these exercises until the mid-1980s. Then they devised
78 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
an initiative to take their loans off their books to free up capital for new
lending, while the Japanese government took the lead in proposing a new
strategy to cut Latin America’s debt payments and thus promote long-term
development rather than simply avoiding interest arrears. Known as the
Miyazawa Plan, the Japanese ideas were incorporated into the US-sponsored
Brady Plan, which eventually led to a resolution of the debt crisis through
allowing banks to exchange their non-performing loans for guaranteed
securities of lesser value or longer term (Stallings 1990).
It appeared in the 1980s that Japan would take a more active role on the
international stage. The government increased its stake in the international
financial institutions, sought a bigger role at the UN, and occasionally
sponsored new international initiatives. In Latin America, Japan stepped up
its activities at the Inter-American Development Bank, provided assistance
during the debt crisis, and helped with reconstruction in Central America. As
it turned out, however, the new activism did not materialize because of the
bursting of an asset bubble in Japan itself. The government’s delayed
response led to a decade of deflation and stagnation that still lingers to some
extent today. As a result, Japanese trade and investment in Latin America fell
off substantially—although they never ended completely.

Renewed interest: the 21st century

While its interest in Latin America lags far behind that with respect to Asia
and the industrial countries, Japan began to take a new look at the region in
the early 2000s. A Japanese academic and former government official said
that this was due to greater stability and growth in Latin America, but he
also hinted that competition with China was partially responsible (Tsune-
kawa 2010). As a matter of fact, higher growth and China’s entry into the
region were closely linked.
China moved into Latin America in a very aggressive way in the early 21st
century. China’s trade with the region increased more than 20-fold between
2000 and the present day. In addition, FDI and bank lending from China
helped to build transportation links as well as new mining and agricultural
projects. The nature of the new relationship, however, proved problematic.
China’s links with Latin America were based on importing natural resources
while exporting industrial goods, just as Japan had earlier. This type of
exchange had the effect of exacerbating the stop-go growth pattern that has
traditionally haunted Latin America due to the volatility of commodity
prices, while driving South American economies back towards their structure
of a century earlier. In particular, it caused serious problems for their indus-
trial sectors. For Mexico and Central America, the impact was even more
marked. Their industries were also disrupted, but they had little to export
that China wanted to buy, resulting in huge trade deficits. Moreover,
environmental problems derived from Chinese investments in natural
resources.
 Japan 79
Japan has increasingly seen China as a competitor, both for trade and
investment. Examples of this competition abound in Asia, particularly for
large-scale infrastructure projects (Zhao 2019). For instance, both Japan and
China bid for a multibillion-dollar high-speed rail project in Indonesia with
China winning out. Japan, by contrast, struck an even bigger deal in India.
In institutional terms, China’s establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank in 2013 is said to have stimulated Japan’s Partnership for
Quality Infrastructure two years later. Outside of Asia, the two countries
have been competing for influence in Africa through their rival political
jamborees—the Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD), which dates from 1993, and the Forum on China-African
Cooperation (FOCAC), which began in 20007 (Kuwayama 2019).
Within this context, China’s dramatic entry into Latin America, where
Japan had traditionally been the dominant Asian power, aroused concern
both on the part of Japanese businesses and the Japanese government. One
manifestation of this concern was the proactive role assumed by Shinzo Abe,
when he began his second period as prime minister in 2012. He visited Latin
America many times, in sharp contrast to his predecessors; the last visit by a
Japanese prime minister had been in 2004. Perhaps Abe’s most important
visit was in 2014, when he travelled to five countries—Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago—and signed multiple trade and
investment deals. It was also on this trip when he made a speech in São
Paulo during which he announced the ‘Juntos’ approach in an attempt to put
relations with the region on a more equal—and thus more attractive—basis.
In addition to competition from China and the new role of Prime Minister
Abe, there were also other factors that encouraged Japan to take a renewed
interest in Latin America. Economic changes on both sides of the relation-
ship constituted one set of factors. The Japanese economy, partly under the
influence of ‘Abenomics’, had begun to regain its footing after a decade of
slow growth. This did not mean that economic problems (especially defla-
tion) had disappeared, but they had moderated, and foreign links were seen
as a way to further stimulate an economy blighted by a shrinking popula-
tion.8 At the same time, Latin America began a trend towards higher growth,
which had started in the 1990s after the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s, and was
further stimulated by Chinese transactions in the 2000s.
Japan’s multilateral diplomacy was also tied to Latin America. Despite the
lack of top-level attention to the region before Abe’s trips began, EPAs had
been signed with Mexico, Chile and Peru. These agreements had been initi-
ated in part at the encouragement of Japanese businesses that feared losing
out to competition from countries that had free trade agreements (FTAs)
with Latin America. The EPAs, in turn, were supposed to be incorporated
into the 12-country TPP agreement, which had been negotiated under the
leadership of the United States and President Obama. When President
Trump pulled out of the TPP, Japan unexpectedly took the lead in rescuing
the agreement through the creation of the TPP-11, formally known as the
80 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Three of the 11 members were from Latin America, including Mexico, Chile
and Peru (Solis 2017).
For a variety of reasons, then, Japan increased its interactions with Latin
America from the early 2000s. In the following section, we look at trends in
trade as well as FDI and finance to see if the greater geopolitical interest was
manifested in stronger economic relations. It should be noted that Japan’s
relationship with Latin America has always been centred on economics and
human capital, rather than on politics or security. This is quite different from
the situation with the United States and Europe, but similar to Japan’s
international relations more generally.9

Trends in trade and finance in the 2000s

Beginning with international trade, it is useful to examine several different
trends related to commerce between Japan and Latin America. Figure 5.1
shows data for bilateral trade between Japan and the region during the
period 1990–2018. These are data from the Latin American side, which are
somewhat different from data originating in Japan.10 Two sets of data are
displayed in the figure. The first involves the absolute value (in millions of
current US dollars) of exports from Latin America to Japan and imports
into Latin America from Japan. They indicate that Latin American exports
to Japan did not vary much between 1990 and the early 2000s, remaining at
around US $7 billion annually. Between 2003 and 2011, by contrast, they
rose substantially (except for the years of the global financial crisis) to reach
a peak exceeding $25 billion before falling off somewhat. Data on trends in
Latin America’s imports from Japan are similar with two exceptions. First,
imports rose from the 1990s to the early 2000s, doubling from around $7
billion to $15 billion. Second, Latin America’s imports from Japan exceeded
the region’s exports to Japan every year after 1990. Indeed, the gap increased
in the 2000s, when the deficit averaged around $15 billion.
Figure 5.1 also shows Latin America’s exports to and imports from Japan
as a share of the region’s total trade during the same period. The trends here
are very different from the ones for absolute value. Rather than rising during
the period, the share fell sharply. This was especially the case for exports to
Japan in the 1990s, which declined from about 5.5% of total exports to only
about 2%; after that, the share remained relatively constant. The import
share also fell, but in a steady way from around 6% to around 3%. Thus,
Japan became less important for Latin America as a bilateral trade partner
when measured as a share of total trade between 1990 and the present day.
As Kuwayama (2019) points out, however, it is not sufficient to look only
at bilateral exchanges to understand the role that Japan has played in the
region’s trade. We must also consider trade with third parties, although no
systematic quantitative data are available. Specifically, Japanese firms have
played an important role as export platforms for goods going to the United
 Japan 81

Figure 5.1 LAC bilateral trade with Japan, 1990–2018

Source: Authors’ elaboration from data provided by the IMF (n.d.).

States and to other Latin American countries. This type of trade is especially
important in the auto industry, where Toyota, Nissan and Honda assemble
autos in Mexico and Brazil and sell them elsewhere in Latin America. Auto
parts are exported to the United States, as Latin America has been incorpo-
rated into Japanese production chains in the hemisphere. In addition, many
Japanese electronic products made in Mexico are exported to the US market.
The Japanese trading companies (sogo shosha) play an important role in
coordinating this type of trade, which is not included in bilateral trade
information.
Beyond the volume of trade, we are also interested in country and sectoral
participation. Japan’s top three trade partners in the region are Brazil, Chile
and Mexico. In terms of Japanese exports to Latin America in the most
recent year (2018), Mexico was by far the largest market, accounting for
almost one-half of the total (49%). Brazil and Chile were the next largest
recipients (16% and 8%, respectively); other important markets were Argen-
tina and Colombia. With respect to Latin American exports to Japan, the
same three countries led the list, but they were of approximately equal weight
(around 25%). Peru was the next largest provider of exports from the region
(figures obtained from IMF n.d.).
82 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
Finally, in terms of the sectoral content of bilateral trade, Latin America
mainly imports industrial goods from Japan. The region’s exports are skewed
towards raw materials; copper, iron ore and petroleum together account for
35% of exports. Other important products include salmon, meat, fruit, wine
and wood products together with some manufactured items. Exports to third
countries were also dominated by industrial products. In comparative terms,
Latin American exports to Japan are much more diversified than those going
to China, where the large majority are unprocessed minerals and soy.
In addition to trade, Japan also provides finance to Latin America in the
form of FDI and loans from Japanese public and private banks. As can be
seen in Figure 5.2, the share of Latin America’s FDI coming from Japan has
been slightly smaller than the share for trade and is much more volatile—
generally ranging from 1% to 4% of the region’s total FDI inflows. Clearly,
there has been an increase in the absolute flows (in millions of current US
dollars) during the past decade; there was also an increase in Japan’s share
that rose from an average of 2% of the total in 1990–2007 to 4% afterwards.
More than trade flows, then, FDI does appear to reflect an increased Japa-
nese interest in the region.

Figure 5.2 Japanese FDI to Latin America, 1995–2018

Source: Authors’ elaboration from unpublished data provided by the Unit of Invest-
ment and Corporate Strategies of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
 Japan 83
Data are available on the modality of FDI flows from the mid-2000s.
Unlike China—where the largest volume of FDI has arrived through mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) of already successful firms—most Japanese FDI has
taken the form of greenfield investment (either new projects or expansion of
existing ones). Thus M&A activity accounted for US $26 billion of invest-
ment by Japan between 2005 and 2018, while greenfield investment totalled
$56 billion. This is an important distinction since only greenfield projects
count as investment from the point of view of the host country, and so they
represent an important contribution to the local economy; M&A is merely a
change in ownership. For greenfield projects, the largest volume went into
automobiles and auto parts, followed by natural resources and services. For
M&A, natural resources and related processing were the dominant sectors.
Not surprisingly, Japanese FDI has been concentrated in the two largest
economies of the region. In the period since the early 2000s, when annual
data on FDI from Japan are available, flows going into Brazil have been
slightly larger than those to Mexico; the annual averages between 2001 and
2018 were US $1,746 and $1,255 million, respectively. Chile, Colombia and
Peru were other locations for FDI in this period, but in much smaller
amounts.11
Looking at individual firms, there were over 1,400 Japanese subsidiaries
and affiliates operating in the region in 2017–2018, representing 6% of the
world total. Their sales amounted to more than US $100 billion in that year.
Excluding finance, manufacturing represents more than 60% of the total,
heavily concentrated in the automotive sector. Other than manufacturing, the
largest share is in wholesale trading, including activities of the sogo shosha.
As discussed above, these firms are export oriented, especially to third mar-
kets. More than 50% of their sales went to third markets, 44% went to
domestic customers, and only 5% went back to Japan.12 Prominent firms
include well-known names such as Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, Nippon Steel,
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni, Itochu and Sumitomo.
In addition to FDI, the other form of Japanese financial support for the
region comes from Japanese public banks, especially the Japanese Bank for
International Cooperation (JBIC), and the major private banks. Some
resources also come through grants and concessional loans from Japan’s aid
agency, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), but generally
Latin American countries are seen as having per capita incomes that are too
high to receive aid. Those who have benefited most from foreign aid are
small countries in Central America and the Caribbean.13
JBIC lending has been extremely volatile even in Japanese currency; when
converted into US dollars it is even more so. Figure 5.3 shows the US dollar
amounts of loan, equity and guarantee commitments for the entire region
between FY2005 and FY2017. Latin America’s average share was 17.4%,
which indicates that this source of finance was substantially more favourable
to Latin America than either trade or FDI. The share varied widely, however,
with a range between 4% (2014 and 2016) and 45% (2006). The average US
84 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
dollar amount for the period was US $3.8 billion; this is about the same
average US dollar amount as FDI for the same period ($4.1 billion). Since
overall FDI amounts were much larger, however, the average JBIC share was
greater.
JBIC provides a figure of 10 trillion yen as the accumulated commitments
of loans, equity and guarantees extended by the bank and its predecessors to
the Latin American region as of FY2017. In US dollar terms, this amounted
to US $92.8 billion, which was distributed through 4,182 separate operations.
Examining the country allocation indicates that the same group of coun-
tries—Brazil, Mexico and Chile—were the main beneficiaries of JBIC lend-
ing as had been the case with trade and FDI. Brazil was the recipient of 32%
of the accumulated amount, Mexico accounted for 22% and Chile received
13%. Following these three were Venezuela (6%) and Peru (5%). Together the
top five recipients represented 70% of JBIC funding over time. The use of
worldwide funding shares indicates that 10% was trade-related; 71% went on
investment projects (of which 31% supported natural resource projects while
40% was earmarked for other types of projects); the remaining 15% covered
guarantees of various types (JBIC 2018).
Japan’s private banks—which were heavily involved in the region in the
late 1970s and during the debt crisis, as discussed above—have again been
seeking international opportunities, including in Latin America.14 The banks
underwent multiple mergers during Japan’s recessionary years, leading to the

Figure 5.3 JBIC loan commitments to LAC, FY2005–FY2017.

Source: Authors’ elaboration from data provided by JBIC (2018).
 Japan 85
formation of three megabanks: Mitsubishi, Mitsui-Sumitomo and Mizuho.
Mitsubishi, the largest and traditionally the most international of Japan’s
banks, has offices in six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru); Mitsui-Sumitomo has offices in five countries,
while Mizuho is present in three. Mitsubishi, in particular, is looking to
expand its activities in the region (Bowen 2018). A comparison of the volume
of credit outstanding by JBIC and Japan’s major private banks is compli-
cated. By one measure, outstanding credit of the latter was about twice the
size of the former in 2018.15 New actors are also involved; for example,
SoftBank plans to start a US $5 billion fund to invest in technology start-ups
in the region.

Conclusion: towards the future

What does the future look like for Japanese relations with Latin America?
Clearly, in quantitative terms, Japan has been displaced by China. China’s
trade with the region was six times that of Japan in 2018, and its financial
largesse far surpasses that of its Asian rival. Of course, we must remember
the trade with third countries generated by Japanese firms in Latin America.
In addition, both the United States and Europe have maintained their eco-
nomic and political presence in the region. With respect to trade, total US
trade with Latin America is more than triple that of China, while Europe
(defined as the eurozone) falls between China and Japan in trade volume.
Europe and the United States continue to be the largest sources of FDI and
bank loans too.
Japan has never tried to compete directly with the United States or Europe
in Latin America. On the one hand, the Western countries have a much
longer history of interactions with the region and thus a larger footprint
there. This is backed up by closer cultural ties in terms of language and
values as well as closer geographical proximity. On the other hand, the
United States and Europe also have a strong political presence in Latin
America, which Japan has never sought; Japanese relations with the region
have concentrated almost exclusively on economics. What Japan seems most
concerned about is competing with Asian rivals, especially China but also the
Republic of Korea and some smaller South-East Asian countries.
Japan has approached the new, more competitive environment in Latin
America in an interesting way, which reflects a similar approach it is trying
elsewhere in the world. In particular, it has emphasized the quality of its
relationships in several ways. First is the quality of its products, both the
goods it exports to the region and the inputs for its investment projects.
Although they are more expensive compared to those of China, the argu-
ment is that they are built to last longer so the cost will even out in the
longer term.
Second is the quality of its main partners in the region. While China has
concentrated on countries that are seen as political allies and which have
86 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
tended to have weak and unstable economies, Japan has emphasized its pre-
ference for Pacific Alliance nations and Brazil, which have stronger econo-
mies, more democratic political systems, and generally good international
reputations. One manifestation is that Japan’s only EPAs in the region are
with Mexico, Chile and Peru as well as the one pending with Colombia.
Third is the quality of the relationship itself. In the case of Latin America
this has been demonstrated in two ways. First is the emphasis on helping
Latin America to increase the value added of its products by incorporating
the region into production chains and putting a strong emphasis on human
capital (Myers and Hosono 2019). Also, it includes a diversification of
investment beyond natural resources, expanding into new areas of advanced
technology and the consumer sector (such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics,
convenience shops and animation) that are of particular interest to Latin
America. A second example of a quality relationship is the Juntos model,
which specifically aims to substitute a partnership for the old patron-client
relationship of yore. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the
three components of the Juntos model include progressing, leading and
inspiring together.16
It is unclear how well this new, quality-oriented approach will work. A
long-term perspective on the quality of products may not appeal to govern-
ments that must face re-election in the short term. Likewise, the Pacific Alli-
ance has been substantially undermined by political events and changes
taking place in the four countries. The election of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador in Mexico, the stand-off between the president and the legislature in
Peru, the recurrence of political violence in Colombia, and the continuing
demonstrations and new constitution-writing process in Chile suggest cau-
tion. It has yet to be determined whether the new Japanese model for the
region will be any more than a set of slogans to be forgotten now that a new
prime minister has replaced Shinzo Abe. Nonetheless, as Horisaka (2018)
remarked, there have been some indications that it is more. With the passage
of time, the concept has gradually become more firmly established.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Bluebook (MOFA
2017: 115) clearly states: ‘Japan’s diplomacy towards the LAC region has
developed under the guiding principle of the three “Juntos.”’ Nowhere else in
the Diplomatic Bluebook can one find another example of such an explicit
guiding principle or concept for relations with a given region as a whole.
Furthermore, recent examples of projects in the spirit of Juntos can be iden-
tified: trilateral technical training aimed at achieving the SDGs and an agri-
cultural supply chain project in north-eastern Brazil, as examples of
‘progressing together’; natural disaster prevention and risk reduction pro-
grammes as examples of ‘leading together’; and the introduction of Japanese-
style community-based police boxes called koban in São Paulo and other
Latin American cities as examples of ‘inspiring together’.
The rescue of the TPP is clearly the most dramatic example of Japan
taking a decisive step in collaboration with Latin American countries. In
 Japan 87
addition, the business community of Japan and the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado
Comum do Sul) issued joint reports calling for the launch of negotiations on
an EPA between Japan and MERCOSUR.17 Since MERCOSUR reached an
agreement in principle on an FTA with both the European Union and the
European Free Trade Association in mid-2019, and the FTA negotiation
with South Korea is underway, the EPA with MERCOSUR will be a note-
worthy test for Abe’s Juntos model in terms of whether it can close a missing
EPA link with the Atlantic coast of the Southern Cone countries. The answer
will provide some evidence on whether Japan really intends to step up its
relations with the Latin American region.

Notes
1 The authors would like to thank a number of people who met with us in Tokyo in
June 2019 to discuss Japan’s relations with Latin America: Akio Hosono, Senior
Research Advisor, JICA Research Institute; Mikio Kuwayama, Research Fellow,
Research Institute for Economic and Business Administration, Kobe University;
Takahiro Nakamae, Director-General, Latin American and Caribbean Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Keisuke Nakamura, Representative, Asia
Office, Inter-American Development Bank; Kazuaki Ohishi, Senior Economist,
Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); and Satoru Satoh, Vice-
Chairman, Japan Association of Latin America and the Caribbean and former
ambassador to Brazil and Spain. We would also like to thank Cecilia Plottier, of
ECLAC’s Unit of Investment and Corporate Strategies, for providing unpublished
data on Japanese FDI in Latin America.
2 EPAs are a broader form of the free trade agreements, which became prominent
internationally from the 1990s. In addition to trade in goods, EPAs include
agreements on service trade, investment and intellectual property.
3 This section draws on previous work by the authors; see Stallings and Székely
(1993).
4 It is generally estimated that 2 million Japanese descendants (nikkei) live in Latin
America and that 300,000 nikkei live in Japan.
5 Data for Japanese exports exclude exports to Panama, which traditionally inflated
export data by including the sale of ships to Japanese companies based there.
6 Even this figure may be inflated. The only way to get country-by-country data on
Japanese FDI is the sum of reported intentions to invest. Thus, the figure includes
investment that did not materialize and excludes withdrawals, but it also excludes
reinvested earnings.
7 No such institution has been established for Latin America since Japan’s Latin
American relationship is a long-standing one in comparison with Africa. Japan
has, however, taken a leading role in the Forum for East Asia-Latin American
Cooperation, which comprises 36 member countries from East Asia and 20 from
Latin America.
8 On Abenomics and the Japanese economy, among others see Yoshino and
Taghizadeh-Hesary (2014) and Patrick (2014). On the ageing and declining
population in Japan, see Heller (2016).
9 Useful analyses of these topics can be found in the publications resulting from a
series of conferences jointly sponsored by the Japan Association of Latin Amer-
ican Studies and the Inter-American Dialogue. See, for example, Myers and
Kuwayama (2016) and Myers and Hosono (2019).
88 Barbara Stallings and Kotaro Horisaka
10 Japanese data on bilateral trade with Latin America show a much closer rela-
tionship between exports and imports; after 2010 they show a Latin American
surplus. See IMF (n.d.).
11 Data on FDI from Japan are unpublished figures provided by the Unit of
Investment and Corporate Strategies of the UN Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
12 These data come from a survey by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry; see Kuwayama (2019: 16–22).
13 On Japanese official development assistance (ODA) in general, see Kato et al.
(2016); on Japanese ODA to the region, see JICA (2017).
14 According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (see Van Rixtel and
Slee 2013), Japanese banks had again become the largest international lenders by
2013, since they were seeking higher returns than could be obtained at home.
15 Data on private bank lending are from the BIS. One of the complications is
whether to include loans to the banking system in the Latin American countries
or just to non-bank borrowers. Much more important is whether to include
Panama. Outstanding credit from Japan’s private banks to Panama is more than
the amount provided to the six largest countries in the region combined. There is
strong reason to suspect that this credit is not going to Panama, but to the Japa-
nese shipping industry based there and/or to the free trade zone.
16 It would seem that Japan has a fairly strong base to build on in Latin America.
Public opinion polls in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago) indicate a relatively positive view of
Japan. On a question about which country would be an important future partner,
Japan is cited by 20% of the 2,000 respondents, exceeded only by the United
States (33%) and China (24%). See MOFA (2019).
17 These reports were issued by the Japanese-Argentine Joint Business Cooperation
Committee and the Japan-Brazil Business Council in May and July 2018,
respectively. See Keidanren (2018).

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6 Emergency and opportunity
Canada and the Venezuela crisis1
Yvon Grenier

Introduction
Over the past few years, Canada has stepped up to the plate in hemispheric
affairs, to speak and act forcefully, as former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chrystia Freeland put it, in solidarity with ‘the people of Venezuela and their
desire to restore democracy and human rights in Venezuela’ (Government of
Canada 2019). Canada was one of the founding members of the Lima Group
in 2017, a hemispheric coalition of the willing, which put pressure on Vene-
zuela to respect human rights and democracy (henceforth HRD).2 On 23
January 2019 Freeland issued the statement that ‘Canada recognizes Juan
Guaidó, President of the National Assembly, as the interim President of
Venezuela’. On that occasion, she called the de facto President Nicolás
Maduro and his regime ‘despicable’: not a common adjective in Ottawa’s
diplomatic dialect (The Canadian Press 2019). In addition to supporting an
opposition leader as caretaker president, Canada imposed targeted sanctions
(under the Special Economic Measures Act and the new Justice for Victims
of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act) against 112 Maduro regime officials and, in
collaboration with five other countries in the Americas, referred the Maduro
regime’s illegitimate hold on power in Venezuela to the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC). Canada has sanctions and related measures in place
against only 19 other countries in the world, and only Venezuela in the
Americas.
On 4 February 2019 the Government of Canada announced close to C $55
million in humanitarian aid and development support, plus an additional C $4
million channelled through implementing partners for regional humanitarian
assistance in the region. This placed Canada among the top donors
responding to address the humanitarian crisis (Government of Canada
2019). To put this in perspective, the total budget for humanitarian assistance
by Canada in 2016–2017 was C $286.03 million, including C $14.61 million
for the ‘Americas’ (Government of Canada 2018a). Canada also supported
the appointment of prominent Canadian human rights defender, former
Liberal Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, to an Orga-
nization of American States (OAS) panel of independent international
92 Yvon Grenier
experts that were examining evidence on possible crimes against humanity in
Venezuela, with a view to bringing these before the ICC should the evidence
support this course (OAS 2018).
What has caused this surge of intensity in Canadian foreign policy towards
a single Latin American country? Nominal support for democracy and
human rights comes as standard in Canadian foreign policy. Forceful sup-
port for democratizers, refusal to recognize the president of a constituted
regime (like Maduro in Venezuela), and efforts to bypass established inter-
national organizations (such as the OAS) in order to urgently achieve
democratization in a foreign country, are all truly extraordinary initiatives.
What has caused this surge during Maduro’s administration and not earlier,
since the authoritarian turn in Venezuela started many years ago? And what
occasions this engagement in Venezuela and why is it much more forceful
than that with other countries in the hemisphere? Subpar human rights and
democratic record have hardly been exceptional in Latin America.
For all the cyclical talk about ‘our neighbourhood’ and ‘our hemisphere’,
the reality is that Latin America does not matter enormously to Canadians
and their governments. Canada only joined the OAS in 1990.3 It periodically
‘rediscovers’ Latin America (Daudelin 2007; Mace and Thérien 2012). But
then it goes back to permanent fixtures of Canada’s foreign policy: the
United States, increasingly the People’s Republic of China, and the European
Union (EU).
The main answer to all these questions, and the point of departure of this
chapter, is that the Venezuela crisis is genuinely exceptional, and as such it
has called for immediate and forceful action. It may be too soon to know if it
is working, but it could be signalling an important new trend in Canadian
foreign policy towards Latin America.

Canada and the temptation of Latin America

Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney once said that the two most impor-
tant files for a Canadian prime minister are national unity and relations with
the United States. Not all Canadians would agree with that statement, but it
is indisputable that Canadian foreign policy is primarily directed at the
United States. Even Ottawa’s relations with other countries are affected by
this intimate relationship. Canada-US relations are more vital for Canadians
than for Americans, and Canada normally takes US sensibilities into
consideration when conducting its business with the rest of the world.
This is not to say that Canada always follows the United States. In the
Western Hemisphere Ottawa has maintained friendly diplomatic relations
with communist Cuba and has never supported the US embargo against this
country. But it is the exception, perhaps the only one.4
Canada has free trade agreements (FTAs) with seven countries south of
the Rio Grande, more than with any other region.5 But with the exception of
Mexico, these agreements have not resulted in significantly increased bilateral
 Canada 93
trade with Canada. They have more to do with Canadian investments in the
extractive industries and, to a lesser extent, the financial sector (the latter in
the Caribbean mostly), in a handful of Latin American and Caribbean
nations. Looking at total trade by region, Latin America comes fourth
(C $66,346 million), behind the United States (C $665,397 million), Asia/
Oceania (C $186,182) and Europe (C $119,874) (Government of Canada
2013).
Venezuela is not a very important trading partner for Canada, and Cana-
dian investments in this country have been modest. The former Crown cor-
poration Petro-Canada, a retail and wholesale marketing brand subsidiary of
Suncor Energy since 1991, left Venezuela after selling its stake to state oil
company Petroleos de Venezuela, SA in June 2007. Rusoro Mining Ltd, a
gold producer and explorer with headquarters in Vancouver, still operates in
the prolific Bolivar State mining region in southern Venezuela, although part
of its assets were expropriated in 2011.6
According to the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service (2018), total
merchandise imports from Venezuela reached C $35 million in 2014. The
data appear to be inconsistent from one source to another about Canada’s
exports to Venezuela, but the relative insignificance of the South American
country in Canada’s trade relations is not in doubt.
Nevertheless, it appears that Canadian oil producers have capitalized on
Venezuela’s economic crisis by increasing their share of the world’s largest
refining market. According to an article published in the Financial Post,
‘Venezuelan heavy oil production competes directly with Canadian oil sands
barrels for space at refineries specially calibrated to process heavy blends’.
For the first time, in 2018, Canadian exports to the US Gulf Coast out-
stripped Venezuelan exports. ‘That’s a fairly considerable shift in the

Table 6.1 Ranking of countries that imported the most Canadian shipments by
Canadian dollar value (2017)
1 United States $319 billion (76%)*
5 Mexico $6.1 billion (1.4%)*
16 Brazil $1.3 billion
26 Chile $682 million
30 Colombia $574.8 million
34 Peru $548.1 million
45 Argentina $343.5 million
47 Cuba $313.1 million
52 Ecuador $240 million
61 Venezuela $152.1 million
Source: World’s Top Exports. Available at www.worldstopexports.com/canadas-top-import-pa
rtners/.
Note: * Percentage of total Canadian exports.
94 Yvon Grenier
balance’, according to Scotiabank commodity economist Rory Johnston
(Morgan 2018). And yet, it is hard to imagine this being a key factor to
explain Canadian foreign policy towards Venezuela.
Electoral politics is not a factor either.7 There does not seem to be mean-
ingful domestic ‘demand’ from Canadian civil society for an assertive policy
in Venezuela. According to the 2016 census, there are 674,640 Canadians of
Latin American origin in the country, out of a total population of 37 million.
According to available (and conceivably not up to date) figures, only 26,345
of them come from Venezuela (Statistics Canada 2016). Unlike Mexico,
Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Venezuela is not a popular destination
for Canadian tourists. Overall, Canadians do not have many reasons to be
directly concerned about Venezuela.
Officially, Canada’s priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean under
the current Liberal administration are as follows: encourage inclusive eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development; support poverty eradication;
promote and defend human rights; strengthen democracy; support climate
change mitigation and adaptation; improve regional security; increase
opportunities for marginalized groups, in particular women, girls and Indi-
genous people (Government of Canada 2018b). While Canada’s policy
towards Venezuela is in sync with these priorities, they are essentially boiler-
plate goals that cannot in themselves explain Canada’s exceptional support
for democratizers and for regime change in only one country in the
hemisphere.

A strong voice for human rights and democracy in the world, sometimes
Canada has ratified all the major international human rights treaties.8 The
HRD agenda has been the third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy since the
foreign policy review process of 1993–1995. In fact, it has been an integral
part of Canadian efforts abroad since the early 1980s (Lui 2012; Nossal et al.
2015). Although they are all officially equal in importance, the other two
pillars (‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’) are clearly ‘more equal’ than the third, to
paraphrase Orwell. This is not surprising: in foreign policy, as Rhoda
Howard-Hassmann argued, human rights ‘rarely, if ever, takes precedence
over other concerns’ (2018: 176–177).
Canada’s firm stance against the Maduro regime is routinely presented by
government officials as evidence of Canada’s consistently ‘strong voice’ in
support for HRD around the world (Government of Canada 2017). In fact,
Canada’s record is spotty at best when it comes to pursuing this agenda. As
Dominique Clément concluded in his history of human rights in Canada,
foreign policy has been ‘the weakest link in Canada’s rights revolution’ (2016:
139).
And yet, HRD have become an objective of Canadian foreign policy in the
past few decades. Since then, as Andrew Lui points out, Canada has played a
leading role ‘in facilitating the diffusion of national human rights institutions
 Canada 95
around the world’ (2012). For instance, he writes that Canada ‘has been one
of the major financial backers of human rights commissions in South
America, most notably the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’
(ibid., 139; see also Legler 2012: 592).
A factor that is relevant to this case study is the perception that Canada’s
default position on international conflicts is to offer a helping hand as an
‘honest broker’, that is to say it takes a neutral position. To some extent this
has been Canada’s approach to conflicts in the Middle East, in particular the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinian territories and between Israel and
its other Arab neighbours, except under the Conservative administration of
Stephen Harper (2006–2015), when Canada was more one-sided in its sup-
port of Israel. Evidently, such a policy can be problematic when the time
comes to muster the moral clarity necessary to defend a meaningful HRD
agenda. Canada was not neutral during the First or Second World War, for
instance, and its foreign policy generally aligned with the West, the United
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Western
Hemisphere, Canada, under the Liberals, participated in a multilateral push
to oust Peruvian strongman Alberto Fujimori in 2000. Under Harper’s
Conservatives, Canada also condemned the coup d’état in Honduras in 2009,
although it was criticized for normalizing the relations too soon afterwards.
In sum, there are precedents for both Canada remaining neutral and for
taking sides. That said, as a middle power Canada fairly consistently opts for
multilateral action and prefers to support a rules-based international order
grounded in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN)
and its many satellites, and in the hemisphere in the OAS.

Democracy in the Americas

The Economist’s 2018 Democracy Index found only 19 ‘full democracies’ in
the world, and only one in Latin America: Uruguay. 9 Today, Latin Amer-
ican countries are mostly ruled by democratically elected governments.
However, it suffice to look at some of the nominally democratic countries to
appreciate the limitations of binary thinking when it comes to HRD. For
instance, Colombia, Honduras and Mexico are all ranked as ‘partially free’
by Freedom House (2019). 10 According to the World Justice Project Rule of
Law Index, out of 128 countries Colombia ranks 77th, Mexico 104th, Hon-
duras 116th and Venezuela 128th.11 Reporters without Borders’ World Press
Freedom Index indicates that out of 180 countries Venezuela is ranked 148th
(only Cuba is worst in the hemisphere at 169th position), but not far worse
than Honduras at 146th and Mexico at 144th.12 Mexico is in fact the most
dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere for journalists.13 Canada has
FTAs and great relations with all three countries.
One could also look at the only country in the region that is arguably a
worse offender of democratic rights than Venezuela, a country that Prime
Minister Trudeau calls ‘our ally’: Cuba (Grenier 2018). While the
96 Yvon Grenier
humanitarian situation there is apparently worse than that in Venezuela, the
contrast between Canadian foreign policy towards these two countries can in
no way be explained by Cuba’s superior ‘democratic behaviour’. Monitoring
organizations such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, Reporters Without
Borders and Freedom House rank Cuba lower than Venezuela in their
indexes of democracy, press freedom, and civil and political rights. Given
how close the Cuban and Venezuelan governments are, one could be excused
for concluding that Canada is excoriating Venezuela for trying to emulate a
country with which Canada is proud to enjoy sunny relations.
Yet other countries in the region are at least nominally democratic, and
they are not, nor are they becoming, significantly less democratic than they
were in recent years. Cuba is more authoritarian than Venezuela. In fact, it is
authoritarian (some would say totalitarian) by design, not because its rulers
do not respect the constitution, like they do in Venezuela. But the Cuban
state is neither ‘fragile’ nor in crisis.
In sum, the official explanation for Canada’s ‘surge’ in interest and com-
mitment to HRD in Venezuela—that it is consistent with the official mission
to uphold the HRD agenda around the world—is at best insufficient.

Why and when?

The Canadian government has never provided a detailed breakdown of its
motives for stepping up to the plate in hemispheric affairs. Prime Minister
Trudeau (and more frequently his minister of foreign affairs) have affirmed
and reiterated that Canada needed to do that essentially for two reasons.
First, ‘in response to attacks on Venezuelans’ democratic and human rights
by the regime of President Nicolás Maduro’ (Government of Canada 2019).
Second, because of ‘the grave humanitarian situation and its increasing
impact on neighbouring countries” (Government of Canada 2018c). These
reasons do not appear to be sufficient to explain Canada’s extraordinary
response, however. Unpacking them, and adding a few more explanatory
variables, results in identifying at least six factors that can help us to under-
stand Canada’s policy.
First, the crisis in Venezuela is unprecedented in a time of peace. By the
time that Justin Trudeau’s Liberals won the parliamentary elections on 19
October 2015, the crisis was well under way. What is sometimes described as
a ‘slow-motion coup’ transformed the regime from a ‘competitive author-
itarian regime’ under Chávez to a fully fledged dictatorship under his former
Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolás Maduro (Polga-Hecimovich et al. 2017:
35). In December 2015 the opposition Democratic Unity coalition won a
two-thirds’ majority in the parliamentary elections. However, Maduro ren-
dered the National Assembly powerless through ‘a combination of pre-
sidential vetoes and favourable rulings from government-stacked courts’
(ibid.). The opposition’s response was to organize a recall referendum, which
was nullified by President Maduro in October 2016. The complete rupture of
 Canada 97
the constitutional order came in March 2017, when the judiciary, which has
been controlled by the executive since 2005, effectively stripped the National
Assembly of all its power, opening the door to the monitored elections of a
new Constituent Assembly controlled by the executive in July 2017. The
action against the National Assembly led the OAS Permanent Council to
adopt a resolution on 3 April, co-sponsored by Canada and others, deter-
mining that there had been ‘an alteration of the constitutional order’ in
Venezuela. The fraudulent presidential elections of May 2018, boycotted by
most of the opposition, was the last nail in the coffin of Venezuelan democ-
racy. Meanwhile, Maduro escalated the imprisonment of political dissidents
and the repression of popular protests that had started in large numbers
from February 2014.
Under Maduro, economic output has shrunk by roughly two-thirds since
the incumbent president took power. This collapse, unprecedented in a time
of peace, has led to the calamitous shortage of revenues for the government,
a shortage of basic goods and medicine, soaring infant mortality and crime,
as well as frequent and lengthy power outages for the population. The turn-
ing point was a sharp fall in international oil prices, from US $147 per barrel
to US $30 per barrel in 2016. As Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro wrote in
early 2018, if petrostates suffered a serious income shock in 2014, ‘only
Venezuela could not withstand the pressure.
While Venezuela is not the only country in the region with a poor human
rights record, it is the only country in Latin America whose record has wor-
sened significantly since 1999, especially under the presidency of Nicolás
Maduro. In fact, according to Freedom House, this decline over a period of
10 years has a score (–17) which is the 10th most severe in the world.14 To
face this crisis, international organizations such as the OAS, the Rio Treaty,
and even the UN seem insufficient, so ad hoc initiatives by individual countries
or group of countries are called for.
Finally, it was predicted that Venezuela, which opened its doors to thou-
sands of refugees during the 20th century, was looking at an exodus of up to
6.5 million Venezuelans by the end of 2020 (Bahar and Dooley 2019). This
unique refugee situation, on par with a country at war like Syria, is perhaps
the most dramatic indicator of crisis and its most international dimension.
Second, the unprecedented momentum within the international community to
actually do something about the crisis is noteworthy. In addition to the Lima
Group, one can mention other similar ad hoc multilateral organizations such
as the International Contact Group,15 created on 31 January 2019 and
including Latin American as well as European countries, as well as the
Group of Friends of the Quito Process, a multilateral initiative of several
Latin American countries created to deal specifically with the problem of
refugees in the region.16 Canada does not belong to either of these two
organizations, but the pattern and the momentum is similar to the Lima
Group. After four pointless attempts to negotiate with the Maduro regime, a
fairly solid consensus is emerging within the international community about
98 Yvon Grenier
the need for a transition government to be put in place, and new presidential
elections to be held as soon as possible.17
Canada and its Latin American allies took the lead in pressuring the
Maduro government, rather than following the United States, as critiques of
Canada’s policy towards Venezuela sometimes suggest. President Trump
famously said that ‘all options are on the table’, meaning that a US military
intervention in Venezuela had not been ruled out as an option. It now
appears that he said this just because Trump always liked the optics of
having all the options on the table, especially the ones that magnified his
image as commander-in-chief. In any case, the United States is the only for-
eign country, among the many countries involved in pressuring Caracas, that
has not rejected the option of a military intervention. One should keep in
mind that sectors of the Venezuelan opposition do not seem to oppose a US
military intervention as a matter of principle either. Indeed, it appeared that
the option was on the table for the Secretary General of the OAS, Luis
Almagro. Perhaps many considered that the threat of a military intervention
would be useful to put pressure on Maduro and the Venezuelan military. In
any case, it can be said that this hemispheric response was not led by the
United States, although the Trump Administration eventually imposed
sanctions of its own and remained broadly supportive of the Lima Group
effort.
Third, the presence of a credible and elected opposition, carried by the lar-
gest anti-government protests in Latin American history, is important. There is
no doubt that the nomination of Juan Guaidó as interim president on 10
January 2019 emboldened not just Canada but an increasing number of
likeminded countries around the world to step up their pressure on Maduro.
There are debates about the constitutionality of his nomination by the
National Assembly (based on Articles 233, 333 and 350 of the Bolivarian
Constitution adopted under Hugo Chávez in 1999), but there is no doubt
that the legislature became the only popularly elected branch of government
after 9 January 2019. Guaidó’s appointment as interim president offered a
constitutional path to regime change that represented a ‘Venezuelan solution’
to the crisis.
Fourth, Venezuela is a Western country with a solid democratic tradition,
unlike countries in the Middle East for instance, which were similarly (and
unsuccessfully) pressured to democratize in recent history. The South Amer-
ican nation was one of the first to democratize in the 20th century. The goal
of Canada and its like-minded partners is to ‘restore constitutional democ-
racy’, not to export it. As a member of the OAS, Canada can invoke the
Democratic Charter, in the drafting of which it was instrumental. Countries
siding with Canada are democracies—although in the case of Honduras and
Guatemala in the Lima Group, perhaps in name only. Maduro’s main
allies—the Russian Federation, China, Cuba and Turkey—are not.
Fifth, Canada’s bold response aligns with its preference as a ‘middle power’
to find diplomatic and multilateral solutions to international crises (Holmes
 Canada 99
1966). Canada and its partners in the Lima Group explicitly and consistently
support peaceful transition and reject military interventions.18
Sixth, Canada’s policy towards Venezuela does not depart from an
unspoken rule of its foreign policy, according to which the promotion of
human rights and democratic values are more easily deployed in countries or
regions where hard Canadian interests are not at stake. Concomitantly, in a
decision-making process marked by the relative absence of hard constraints
tied to national interests, individuals and their agendas can play an enor-
mous role in shaping policies. Although Canada publicly sounded the alarm
about the authoritarian turn under Chávez and Maduro for years before she
became minister of foreign affairs in January 2017 (until November 2019),
Chrystia Freeland brought to the position a particularly idealistic disposition
that conceivably shaped the country’s foreign policy towards countries like
Venezuela, Russia, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia (Coulon 2018).
While various combinations of these factors can be found elsewhere,
perhaps nowhere else do we find all of them in place and reinforcing each
other.

Latin American perspectives: the Lima Group and the OAS

By all accounts Canada played a leading role in the Lima Group and con-
tinues to be a very active member in this alliance of non-traditional powers in
the hemisphere. The first Declaration was signed by 12 countries, and the
‘government’ of caretaker President Guaidó is also represented. Ministers of
foreign affairs from the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador were
present at the last Lima Group meeting held in Gatineau, Québec, in Feb-
ruary 2020. Elections in Ecuador (2017) and El Salvador (2019) resulted in
these countries leaving the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra
América-Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos—ALBA-TCP (Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of our America-People’s Trade Treaty) and becom-
ing critical of the government of Venezuela. All in all, the Lima Group
represents most of the Latin American population and most countries except
the ones ruled by countries that are still supportive of Maduro.
Many describe the Lima Group as a ‘right-wing’ coalition (Donnelly
2019). Governments in Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and of course
Canada, are rather centre-left. But on the whole, it is not far from the truth.
Electoral victories of the left in Mexico and Argentina resulted in these two
important founding members of the Lima Group suddenly distancing them-
selves from it, and rejecting putting heavy pressure on Maduro. The reverse
side of that coin is that electoral victory of the centre-left (as opposed to
Bolivarian or populist left) in Ecuador, as well as the right-wing coup in
Bolivia, resulted in these ALBA-TCP member states switching sides and
joining the Lima Group.
Moreover, leftist/populist governments in Argentina and Mexico recently
condemned the Maduro government’s attempt to physically prevent members
100 Yvon Grenier
of the opposition and interim President Juan Guaidó from entering the pre-
mises of the National Assembly in January 2020 (Singer 2020). Furthermore,
the outspoken Secretary General of the OAS, Luis Almagro, who is perhaps
the most vocal critique of Maduro in the hemisphere, has served as minister
of foreign affairs in a leftist government in Uruguay. While there is a certain
ideological coherence behind the Lima Group, it is simplistic to suggest that
the Lima Group is essentially a right-wing alliance, and it is completely false
to affirm, as did Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza, that the Lima
Group ‘takes its orders from US President Donald Trump’ (Ansa Latina
2020). Finally, it is not the only multilateral organization with a political bent
in the region: think of leftist organizations such as ALBA-TCP, but also the
mostly leftist Union of South American Nations and the Puebla Group, or
think of the mostly conservative Forum for the Progress of South America
(PROSUR).
The Lima Group resembles another multilateral ad hoc initiative called the
Contadora process, that was committed to peace in Central America during
the 1980s. In all these blocs or alliances, a common denominator is the low
profile adopted by the United States, although the Group of Lima, PROSUR
and Contadora have often been accused of providing cover for the US
agenda in the region. Even in the OAS, the United States is taking a less
prominent role than it did during the Cold War, largely because like Canada,
the United States does not care that much about Latin American countries
(with the possible exception of Mexico), especially during the Trump
Adminstration. With a divided OAS, middle powers have an opportunity to
seek partners for common initiatives. Although they tend to be short-lived
and yield modest results, they may well be the way of the future in the
hemisphere.
There is no doubt that the momentum for the Lima Group was amplified
by a particularly activist OAS committed to denouncing the violation of
human rights in Venezuela, thanks to the leadership of its Secretary General
Luis Almagro. Almagro was elected in 2015 as the sole candidate (the other
candidate from Guatemala dropped out of the race for health reasons), with
the support of 33 of 34 countries (Guyana abstained). Almagro’s focus on
human rights and democracy soon put him on a collision course with one of
the countries that supported him: Venezuela. Furthermore, his unprece-
dented criticism of the dictatorship in Cuba and its role in abetting the
authoritarian turn in Venezuela solidified his status in the region as the arch-
enemy of Maduro, if not the whole Bolivarian axis (he was on friendly terms
with President Evo Morales in Bolivia for instance). At his re-election in
2020, Almagro received only 23 of the 33 votes cast by member states, while
his opponent, Ecuadorian candidate María Fernanda Espinosa, a former
minister of foreign affairs in Rafael Correa’s pro-Bolivarian administration in
Ecuador, obtained 10 votes from countries sympathetic to the Bolivarian
agenda, including major countries like Argentina and Mexico. His difficult
victory shows how brittle this international organization can be. With a
 Canada 101
victory by María Fernanda Espinosa, the OAS would have veered in a
completely different direction.19
The division within the OAS exemplifies a structural limitation to this
international organization: simply put, by including all the states in the
hemisphere (except Cuba) it becomes a sort of League of Nations that
cannot agree on any course of action beyond the most minimalist agenda to
provide support to member states (Legler and Gabelli-Ríos 2018). The OAS
is a top-heavy organization that requires a broad alignment of interests in
order to gear up to action. The General Secretariat works with the Perma-
nent Council, to which member states send ambassadors, as well as with the
General Assembly. Managing the Summit of the Americas that is held every
three years also requires all kind of consensus-building efforts to determine
whether or not non-democratic Cuba should be invited to participate, for
instance. By contrast, the Lima Group was created as a nimble coalition of
the willing to actively promote what the Secretary General of the OAS could
only talk about: an end to the ‘usurpation’ by Maduro and a transition to
democracy in Venezuela. In sum, although the Lima Group is supported by
the United States, it is not in favour of military intervention in Venezuela and
it seems to be content to use its middle-power status to build support in the
region (and beyond) to effect political change in Venezuela. The region and
the world are deeply suspicious of US actions and motives in Latin America,
so non-traditional powers like Canada and other members of the Lima
Group can, with more credibility, push for political change in this major
South American country.

Conclusion: review and prospects

It is too soon to know whether or not Canada and its Latin American allies
will succeed in their quest. The Maduro regime may become able to govern
properly and stabilize itself somewhat, as Cuba did after the 1959 revolution
or during the very trying ‘Special Period’ that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Should this occur, the international community could very
well normalize its relations with Caracas, as it did with Havana. A defeat of
the democratic agenda in Venezuela would probably dampen Canada’s new-
found enthusiasm for virtuous foreign policy, and for bold initiatives outside
of the clunky but predictable international organizations like the OAS.
A number of factors can explain Canada’s surge in engagement in Vene-
zuela, in concert with other nations in the hemisphere. The main one, and
the timing of this policy, is caused by the deepening of the crisis between
2015 and 2018. If some of these factors can be found in other countries in
the region and beyond, only in Venezuela can we find all of them, each
exacerbating the others.
Canada had three options: to side with Maduro, to side against Maduro,
or to seek a dialogue with Maduro. It chose the second option. The first was
out of the question: Canada cannot side with the repressive regime of
102 Yvon Grenier
Maduro and its few autocratic allies (Cuba, Russia and China), against the
wishes of dozens of democratic nations. The third option would have
involved less risk, and would perhaps be more consistent with a certain
Canadian tradition of acting as an ‘honest broker’ in foreign policy. But
given past experiences of dialogue with Maduro, this option was deemed
comparable to the first option. Maduro is always enthusiastically in favour of
dialogue so long as there is nothing on the table and no timeline, because it
buys him time. Supporting Guaidó is not tantamount to rejecting dialogue: it
is for meaningful dialogue, with some conditions, as a means to achieve
democratization. For that to happen, Maduro has to step down, at least
temporarily (perhaps he could run for election after a short transition
period).
Overall, the Venezuela crisis has represented an opportunity for Canada
and most countries in the region to act multilaterally and as equals, inde-
pendently (in fact ahead) of the United States. For Canada, it has also been
an opportunity to engage significantly in its hemisphere, where the relative
absence of hard interest usually commands disengagement. In a way, Cana-
dian foreign policy towards Venezuela can be seen as an experiment for its
promotion of HRD, and for its relatively new interest ad hoc multilateralism
in a region where Canada has often expressed a wish to be more relevant,
without knowing exactly how to go about it.

Notes
1 All the figures in this chapter are in Canadian dollars (C $). Over the past five
years, the exchange rate has fluctuated with the US dollar, but on average C $1 =
US $0.75. See www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=CAD&to=USD&view=5Y.
2 The Lima Group was established on 8 August 2017, in Lima, Peru. Meetings of
the group have been regularly attended by representatives from Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Saint Lucia.
3 Before becoming a member, Canada held ‘observer’ status for 28 years.
4 Canada also refused to join US-led military interventions in Viet Nam and Iraq.
5 Canada has FTAs with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Peru
and Mexico. Additionally, Canada has nine Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreements in the region.
6 See www.rusoro.com/s/News_Releases.asp?ReportID=837949.
7 By contrast, electoral politics may help to explain Canada’s bold policy in
Ukraine, since more than 1 million Canadians claim Ukrainian roots.
8 Indigenous rights may be counted as the exception. See Lightfoot (2018).
9 www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index#:~:text=The%20twelfth%20edition%20of%
20the,the%20Democracy%20Index%20in%202006.
10 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat.
11 https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2020/Mexico/.
12 https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table.
13 See the data compiled by the Committee to Protect Journalists, available at http
s://cpj.org/americas/mexico/.
14 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
 Canada 103
15 The International Contact Group includes the EU, eight European countries
(Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and Sweden) and four Latin American countries (Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica
and Ecuador).
16 An International Solidarity Conference on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis of
Venezuela took place in Brussels, Belgium, on 28–29 October 2019. Up to 120
delegations attended, including EU institutions and member states, the most
affected Latin American and Caribbean countries, donor countries, UN agencies,
the private sector, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and
development actors including international financial institutions.
17 There were four attempts to hold negotiations: the Mesa de Negociación y
Acuerdos (2002–2005); the Conferencia Nacional por La Paz (2014); the Mesa de
Diálogo Nacional (2016–2017); and the Mesa de Diálogo in the Dominican
Republic (2017–2018). See Pareja (2018).
18 According to Adam Austen, a spokesman for then Minister of Foreign Affairs
Freeland, ‘We have been clear that the restoration of democracy must be driven
by Venezuelans themselves; we do not support military intervention to resolve this
crisis’ (quoted in Dickson 2019).
19 For a critical perspective on Almagro’s re-election, see the statement by the
Council on Hemispheric Affairs: www.coha.org/coha-deeply-concerned-over-re-e
lection-of-almagro-as-secretary-general-of-the-oas/.

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Government of Canada (2019) Canada and the Venezuela Crisis, 29 March. Available
at www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpem
ent/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng.
Grenier, Yvon (2018) ‘Cuba, sí, Venezuela, No? A double standard in foreign policy’,
OpenCanada.org, 21 June. Available at https://opencanada.org/cuba-si-venezuela
-no-double-standard-foreign-policy/.
Holmes, John W. (1966) ‘Canada as a Middle Power’, Centennial Review 10(4) (Fall),
430–445.
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. (2018) In Defense of Universal Human Rights.
Cambridge: Polity.
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Available at www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela.
Legler, Thomas (2012) ‘Wishful Thinking, Democracy Promotion in the Americas
under Harper’, International Journal (Summer), 583–602.
Legler, Thomas and Gabelli-Ríos, Ornela (2018) ‘La protección de la democracia ante
la crisis venezolana: Los límites del nexo hemisférico-regional de gobernanza en las
Américas’, Pensamiento Propio 47 (September), 159–186.
Lightfoot, Sheryl (2018) ‘A Promise Too Far? The Justin Trudeau Government and
Indigenous Rights’, in Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé (eds) Justin Trudeau
and Canadian Foreign Policy. Canada Among Nations series. Toronto, ON:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 165–185.
Lui, Andrew (2012) Why Canada Cares: Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Theory
and Practice. Montréal, ON and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Mace, Gordon and Thérien, Jean-Philippe (2012) ‘Canada and the Americas: Making
a Difference?’, International Journal, 67(3), 569–582.
Morgan, Geoffrey (2018) ‘Canadian Oil Flows into U.S. Gulf Coast Market as
Venezuela Continues “Death Spiral”’, Financial Post, 23 May.
Naím, Moisés and Toro, Francisco (2018) ‘Venezuela’s Suicide: Lessons from a Failed
State’, Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec.). Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
south-america/2018-10-15/venezuelas-suicide.
Nossal, Kim Richard, Roussel, Stéphane and Paquin, Stéphane (2015) The Politics of
Canadian Foreign Policy. 4th edn. Montréal, ON and Kingston, ON: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, pp. 116–119.
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the Organization of American States and the Panel of Independent International
Experts on the Possible Commission of Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela.
 Canada 105
Panel of Independent International Experts (Santiago Canton, Irwin Cotler,
Manuel Ventura Robles), 29 May. Washington, DC: Organization of American
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el conflicto político de Venezuela (2002–2018)’, Pensamiento Propio, 47 (Jan.–
June), 37–67.
Polga-Hecimovich, John, Sagarzazu, Iñaki and Sánchez Urribarrí, Raúl (2017)
‘Venezuelan Overview’, Lasa Forum 18(1) (Winter), 35–39.
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de Venezuela’, El País, 6 January. Available at https://elpais.com/internacional/
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e-start-of-democracy-protests.html.
7 From Tagore to IT
India’s changing presence in Latin America
Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee

Introduction
The rise of Asia against the backdrop of an increasingly globalized world econ-
omy has been a defining feature of geo-economics in the 21st century. While the
People’s Republic of China may be the chief protagonist of this story, India’s
supporting role has become fundamental over the long term. India’s population
is forecast to exceed that of China by 2025, and the Indian economy is expected
to outgrow that of the United States by 2038 (Hawksworth et al. 2017). Even
the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region’s economic heavyweights, Brazil
and Mexico, are expected to surpass the gross domestic product (GDP) of each
of the European nations (on a purchasing-power parity basis) by 2050.
India-LAC relations should be viewed in this context, whereby the gains of
the past two decades mark the initial stages of a long-term economic part-
nership. While India-LAC ties lack the vigour and intent of Sino-LAC rela-
tions, they are vastly different, and any comparisons between them would do
little justice. Unlike China’s government-led LAC policy, supported with
copious amounts of financial aid and investment, India’s presence in the
region remains innocuous and undisruptive, and is driven by the private
sector rather than by public policy. India’s benevolent image and its non-
alignment policy act as catalysts to work closely and freely with different
political dispensations throughout the region.
The LAC region has become an important provider of resources for India’s
rapid economic growth and industrialization. The stagnating economies and
slowing demand in the West have forced the LAC region to diversify, growing
closer to Asian countries like India and China. Indian industry too is opening
up more each year and is integrating itself with regional and global markets.
As a result, Indian companies are investing in Latin America’s emerging
manufacturing and service sectors, adding value to the local economies.
This chapter will focus primarily on contextualizing India-LAC relations
in the modern era, identifying the reasons and motivations for a deeper
engagement, revealing the ‘ups and downs’ of the relationship such as the
honeymoon period of 2003–2007 and the more recent sluggishness, marking
the varied levels of bilateral engagements in distinct sectors of the economy,
while presenting a Latin American perspective based on historical and
contemporary events, and a summary of the results thus far.
 India 107
What caused this surge?
While there are some decisive domestic factors responsible for the rap-
prochement between India and the LAC region, they are eclipsed by an
overarching theme that has shaped the world economy over the past 40
years: globalization.
Both India and the LAC region, belonging as they do to the global South,
continue to feel the impact of the current wave of globalization. As noted by
David Dollar at the World Bank:

The new wave of globalization, which began about 1980, is distinctive.

First, and most spectacularly, a large group of developing countries
broke into global markets. Second, other developing countries became
increasingly marginalized in the world economy and suffered declining
incomes and rising poverty. Third, international migration and capital
movements, which were negligible during second wave globalization,
have again become substantial.
(Quoted in Collier (2002: 23–51)

A host of developing countries around the world, the so-called new glo-
balizers, which include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay, cut
tariffs by 34 points on average post-1980. In addition to reduced trade bar-
riers and liberalized foreign investment, these countries also benefited from a
gradual reduction in poverty, better health and education standards, and
ultimately increased economic growth and productivity.
The 21st century also brought about a new era known as the ‘digital age’,
with information and communications technology (ICT) that helped to inte-
grate global supply chains. Coupled with the technological advancements in
the global shipping industry, this resulted in a massive spike in global trade
flows. Global container port traffic, measured in 20-foot equivalent units
(TEUs), expanded from 224 million TEUs in 2000 to 792 million TEUs in
2018 (World Bank 2019).
All these factors helped to integrate India and the LAC region with the
global economy. For instance, the trade-to-GDP ratio rose considerably
between 1980 and 2017, up from 15% to 41% for India, and from 30% to
43% for the LAC region. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows as
a percentage of GDP grew from 0.04% to 1.53% for India and from 0.86% to
3.02% for the LAC region.
In addition to this process of globalization, the overlap of two domestic
factors also brought India and the LAC region closer together.
First was the shift in the LAC region’s economic policies. The import
substitution industrialization (ISI) approach to economic development,
which many LAC countries pursued from the 1950s to the 1980s under the
tutelage of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
108 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
and the Caribbean (ECLAC n.d.), began to be replaced by an export-led
model that was more conducive to the new era of globalization. ‘Beginning
in the mid-1980s the primary development paradigm pursued by Latin
American and Caribbean countries undertook a major shift from the concept
of ISI to that of export-led growth and openness to international markets’
noted Taylor (2003: 101–128). The region’s exports grew substantially, up
from 14% of GDP in 1980 to 24% of GDP in 2004. Naturally, this exposed
the LAC region to new markets around the world, including the two Asian
giants, China and India, with a thirst for commodities matched by rapid
economic growth.
Second, India undertook major economic reforms in the 1990s, opening
up the economy to foreign investment, consolidating industrial policy, and
easing regulations and tariffs on trade. These reforms emerged out of India’s
precarious balance of payments crisis in 1991, when the country was left with
foreign reserves worth barely a couple of weeks’ essential imports. This
brought an end to the ‘License Raj’, a labyrinthine system of government
regulations and licenses that made running a business a highly complicated
matter. The Centre for Civil Society, a New Delhi-based think tank, reports
that “the trade policy of 1 April 1992 freed imports of almost all inter-
mediate and capital goods” (IndiaBefore91 2019).
The deeper engagement between India and the LAC region thus remains
rooted in economic grounds: both see each other as a means to diversify and
as potential economic partners. The slowing demand for commodities in
much of the Western world, juxtaposed with the corresponding rise in
demand in Asia, primarily in the youthful populations of India and China,
lured the LAC region closer to Asia’s economic orbit.
This growing economic partnership between India and the LAC region has
not been accompanied by strong political support, as is the case of Sino-
LAC relations. India’s geopolitical calculus remain limited to its neighbour-
hood in Asia and strategic partners like the United States and the Russia
Federation, while Latin America’s political dispensations are still beginning
to grasp India’s emergence on the world stage. In this context, perhaps only
India and Brazil hold a political relationship that is worth mentioning, but-
tressed on multilateral groupings such as the BRICS (a grouping of large
emerging economies, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa), the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral dialogue forum and
the G20. However, India possesses two characteristics that are favourable to
global integration: first, it is the world’s largest democracy and faces socio-
economic challenges that many Latin American countries are familiar with;
and second, India is the world’s second largest English-speaking country and
is thus far more globally integrated.
The rise of Asia as a key growth pole in the world economy, and India’s
place in it, is likely to catch the attention of the LAC region. This is manifest
in Emerging and Developing Asia’s1 share of world GDP based on PPP,
which increased from a mere 8.9% in 1980 to 33.25% in 2018. Looking
 India 109
ahead, India is poised to contribute 15.9% of global growth in 2022–2023,
nearly double the United States’s contribution of 8.5% in the same period
(Tanzi and Lu 2018).

When did it happen?

The India-LAC relationship began to develop only in the 21st century, as
India’s economic growth story began to take off and the ‘pink tide’ was
sweeping over the LAC region.
Prior to this, there was little stimulus for either party to begin a serious
commercial or political partnership. India played a pivotal role at the Ban-
dung Conference in 1955 and was one of the founding members of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). New Delhi actively courted some Latin Amer-
ican countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, to join the NAM, but was ulti-
mately unsuccessful. For most of the second half of the 20th century, India
was preoccupied with its own economy and the alleviation of poverty, while
embracing a foreign policy rooted in non-alignment. At the same time, many
Latin American economies adopted Raúl Prebisch’s ISI approach, choosing
to focus on their own industrialization.
Two pivotal events in the 21st century pushed the LAC region closer to
India. First were the terrorist attacks perpetrated on the US mainland on 11

Figure 7.1 Select countries and regions’ share of world GDP based on PPP (percent
of world)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, available at http://bit.do/IMFWEO.
110 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
September 2001 (known as 9/11), which shifted the United States’ global
focus almost entirely to the Middle East, leaving the field wide open to new
actors in the LAC region. Washington’s attention shifted from the ‘war on
drugs’ in Latin America to a more urgent ‘war on terror’ in the Middle East.
The extra-hemispherical actor that gained the most from this shift was
China, but India also caught the eye of the Latin American region as a new
economic partner.
Second, the LAC region began to be swept by the ‘pink tide’, a slew of
left- and centre-left governments that came to power in 14 countries. While
the right-wing in Latin America traditionally leans towards the United States
and Western Europe, the left has a greater affinity with the developing world.
None were more enthusiastic than Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da
Silva, who visited India three times, including as chief guest at India’s
Republic Day parade in 2004. Lula was a passionate proponent of South-
South cooperation and used platforms such as IBSA and the BRICS to
advocate for ‘a new world order’ (Indian Express 2010).
These regional events, coupled with India’s economic growth story, gave
impetus to better India-LAC relations. Following India’s economic reforms
in 1991 and Latin America’s return to democratic rule and stable macro-
economic performance, Brazil became the first country in the region to seek
India’s favour, beginning with the visit of Brazilian President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso in 1996, the first by a Brazilian president to India. Car-
doso’s visit was promptly followed by a series of ministerial visits from both
sides, the opening of the first and only Indian Consulate General in the LAC
region (in São Paulo), and by an invitation from Brazil’s minister of heath to
help Indian pharmaceutical companies to set up shop in Brazil.
This set the stage for Indo-LAC ties in the 21st century, and many others
followed Brazil’s lead in the coming years. While no specific event or episode
marks the gradual deepening of ties, especially since India’s bilateral rela-
tionships in the LAC region are maintained at varying levels of engagement,
it is apparent that India-LAC ties began to gain substantial momentum, both
economic and political, between 2003 and 2008. Coincidentally, this period
was also marked by record high levels of economic growth in India, when the
economy grew at an average of 8.8% per annum, more than double that of
the global average of 3.9% per annum. The world began to take notice of
India’s economic growth story during this period.
India’s expeditious economic growth prompted many Latin American
countries to upgrade their ties to the country. In 2004 India signed its first
major trade agreement with the LAC region, a preferential trade agreement
(PTA) with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL,
Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul) comprising Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, that cut tariffs on a host of products.
These South American nations now received preferential access to a large
and growing consumer market hungry for agricultural products. Chile fol-
lowed suit with its own PTA, becoming the first LAC country to sign a
 India 111
bilateral trade agreement with India in 2006. This was part of Chile’s overall
outreach to Asia: the Andean nation signed a free trade agreement (FTA)
with the Republic of Korea in 2003, thereby becoming the first Latin Amer-
ican nation to sign an FTA with an Asia Pacific country, and it signed
another with China in 2005. India was merely the cherry on top.
Brazil formally upgraded its political ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ during
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Brasília in 2006. Their
joint communiqué outlined that the new strategic dialogue would cover
‘regional and global issues of mutual concern such as energy security and the
international security situation’ (Indian Ministry of External Affairs 2006).
In the same year, Brazil opened its Consulate General in Mumbai, aimed at
courting Indian businesses in the country’s financial centre. Mexico was next:
President Felipe Calderón visited India in 2007 and subsequently announced
that the two countries ‘were now entering a dynamic and qualitatively new
phase of Privileged Partnership’ (ibid. 2007).
It was also during this time that India began importing sizeable quantities
of crude petroleum from Venezuela, which previously it had been unable to
do in the four decades since India opened its embassy in Caracas in 1961. In
2006 India imported 1 million metric tons of crude petroleum from Venezuela,
which jumped to 6.6 million tons in 2008.
The deepening of India-LAC ties between 2003 and 2008 had a notable
commercial impact: trade increased from a mere US $2 billion in 2002 to $17
billion in 2008, assisted in part by a commodity boom during the same
period (Helbling et al. 2012: 30–31). As expected, this was followed by an
increase in cross-border investments between India and the LAC region. The
diplomatic relationship also reached new levels: LAC countries opened 13
diplomatic missions in India in the 21st century. In contrast, only 11 LAC
missions were opened in India between 1947 and 2000.
India-LAC commercial ties, measured primarily by trade and investment
figures, remain steadfast in the 21st century. The political relationship, if
measured by high-level visits by heads of government between India and the
LAC region, has also gained momentum. There has been a visible increase in
high-level visits from the LAC region, with 16 taking place in the 21st cen-
tury, compared with 12 during the period 1947–1999. This is reflective of the
increase in India-LAC commercial ties, with the pull factor of India being the
budding export market for the LAC region and India’s increasingly important
role as an investor in the LAC region.
However, there has been a visible slump during Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s administration: only three LAC heads of government have
visited India, and Modi has made official visits to only three LAC countries
(two of which were for multilateral summits, the BRICS and G20, and the
other a short four-hour working visit to Mexico).
112 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
Where is it mostly felt?
India’s outreach to the LAC region is by no means evenly distributed. Today,
the political relationship is heavily tilted towards Brazil, the only LAC coun-
try with which India enjoys an annual dialogue at the highest political level,
primarily through the BRICS Summit. A regular political dialogue has also
been maintained with Argentina and Mexico, which are members of the G20
grouping. Surprisingly, India’s engagement in multilateral fora, such as the
BRICS, G20 and IBSA, has diminished over the past few years—so much so
that the IBSA Summit in New Delhi was cancelled altogether in 2013; it took
place in 2017 after a gap of four years. The BRICS forum has increasingly
become another platform where India looks to drum up support for national
or regional issues, such as counter-terrorism and traditional medicine, which
were issues that Modi introduced at the 2019 BRICS Summit.
A study of the high-level visits between India and the LAC countries
dating from India’s independence in 1947 to 2019, shows that these exchan-
ges have been few and far between. A number of visits have taken place
against the background of large multilateral summits hosted in India or the
LAC region. These include the NAM Summits, the G15 and G20 Summits,
the North-South Summit, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet-
ing, and the Earth Summits in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. These are rarely, if
ever, termed bilateral visits, and include the participation of dozens of
countries and discussions of thematic and multilateral issues, leaving little
space for bilateral exchanges. We have thus excluded summits from our cal-
culations, with the exception of those of the BRICS and IBSA, which allow
for bilateral discussions and are often combined with bilateral state or official
visits.
After excluding summit visits, there have been a total of 41 high-level visits
between India and the LAC region (see Table 7.1 below).
It is apparent that LAC countries have made more of an effort to court
India, with a total of 28 visits since India’s independence in 1947. However,
India’s prime ministers have not yet been able to reciprocate the gesture,
having made only 13 visits to the LAC region, eight of which were by Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1968.
The heads of government of 10 LAC countries have visited India in the
21st century, while Indian prime ministers have made official bilateral visits
to only two countries, Brazil and Mexico. Brazil accounts for roughly one in
every four high-level visit between India and the LAC region, with 10 high-
level exchanges, followed by Mexico with seven and Argentina with five. This
is another sign that India’s entente is still mostly focused on the bilateral and
limited to the region’s heavyweights, and a regional strategy has yet to take
root. This is not entirely surprising; after all, the LAC region does not fall
under the direct purview of India’s minister of foreign affairs nor the foreign
secretary but is instead designated to India’s minister of state for external
affairs, equivalent to a deputy foreign minister.
 India 113
Table 7.1 High-level visits between India and the LAC region
Visits from India Visits from LAC Total visits
country
Brazil 4 6 10
Mexico 2 5 7
Argentina 1 4 5
Chile 1 2 3
Guyana 1 2 3
Colombia 1 1 2
Peru 0 2 2
Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 2
Venezuela 1 1 2
Cuba 0 1 1
Nicaragua 0 1 1
Suriname 0 1 1
Paraguay 0 1 1
Uruguay 1 0 1
Total visits 13 28 41
Source: Authors’ elaboration from various sources provided by the Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, available at https://mea.gov.in.

Even as India’s political relationship with the LAC region rests on the
region’s heavyweights, the commercial relationship tells a slightly different
story. India’s relationship with the countries in the LAC region can be
classified into three tiers.

The strategic tier

This includes three countries, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. India formally
established its ‘strategic’ partnership with Brazil in 2006, and is on a similar
trajectory to that of Mexico, its ‘privileged partner’. Brazil is the only salient
political partner, and India’s private sector has a natural affinity towards the
region’s largest market. Mexico is part of multiple global and regional value
chains that India has a stake in, such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals and ICT.
Both countries were understandably India’s largest trade partners in 2018 and
remain the most important destinations for Indian FDI in the LAC region.
Venezuela’s strategic relevance is owed entirely to its massive oil reserves,
the largest in the world, making it a long-term partner for securing India’s
energy needs. Since 2009 roughly 10% of India’s total crude petroleum
imports have been met by Venezuela.2 These imports are almost entirely by
two of India’s private oil companies, Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy
(formerly Essar Oil), whose complex refineries are capable of processing
114 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
heavy Venezuelan crude. India’s public oil companies have also placed long-
term bets on the country by investing US $2.5 billion in Venezuela’s vast
oilfields (Seshasayee 2019).

The complementary tier

This tier comprises four South American nations—Argentina, Chile,
Colombia and Peru—that enjoy a complementary commercial relationship
with India, i.e. there is little conflict of interest or threat of disruption when it
comes to trade with India. Evidently, all four have actively courted India to
sign trade agreements: while Argentina (which is part of MERCOSUR) and
Chile already have PTAs with India, Peru and Colombia are in the process of
signing bilateral trade agreements with New Delhi. Together, they accounted
for 26% of India’s trade with the LAC region from 2001–2018.3 They are also
becoming notable destinations for Indian exports, accounting for US $3.4
billion in 2018, roughly equal to India’s exports to Brazil.4 We can expect
trade and investment ties between India and this tier of countries to increase
substantially in the coming years.

The contingency tier

This third tier includes countries that have only recently begun to interact
frequently with India, such as Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Paraguay,
Dominican Republic and a host of Central American and Caribbean coun-
tries. In fact, nine of these countries opened their embassies in New Delhi
only in the 21st century. There has already been some progress on the com-
mercial front. For instance, Ecuador has become India’s largest supplier of
teak wood and cocoa beans, and 62% of Bolivia’s gold exports were sent to
India in 2018.5 Whether these countries are able to take their relationship
with India to the next level will depend on their ability to create and foster
new commercial opportunities with India.

It is worth noting that although India’s imports from the LAC region
consist mainly of commodities, Indian investment in the region is heavily
focused on value added and manufacturing sectors. Of the 200-odd Indian
companies with a presence in the LAC region, only a small handful are in the
extractive industries.
While there has been a discernible increase in commercial and political ties
between India and the LAC region in the 21st century, there has been a
slowdown in momentum over the past few years. This can be attributed pri-
marily to the economic slump in numerous LAC countries and the Modi
administration’s fixation on traditional and strategic partners, leaving little
room for Latin America. Until the government of India formulates a con-
crete policy for Latin America, India’s engagement with the region will be
limited to its chief commercial partners, and only intermittent exchanges
 India 115
with the remaining countries, lacking a solid base for a regional partnership.
Here New Delhi can take a page from China’s book and formulate a com-
prehensive strategy for the LAC region, either through White Papers or by
appointing a special envoy responsible for the region.

What is the Latin American perspective?

The LAC region has few historical linkages with India, limited mostly to
Indian-origin indentured workers in the Caribbean and the Portuguese colo-
nization of parts of Brazil and India, and sporadic exchanges in the early
stages of post-independence India. Thus, for the most part, Latin America’s
perception of India has been shaped by cultural elements such as spiritualism
and the Indian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism), literary lin-
kages through Latin American writers and poets such as Pablo Neruda and
Octavio Paz or Indian luminaries like Rabindranath Tagore, or his equally
beguiling muse Victoria Ocampo, and a view of India through the lens of
Bollywood cinema. This has helped to create a benevolent image of India,
personified by Mahatma Gandhi, the non-violent leader of India’s indepen-
dence movement. Yoga was transported from India to Latin America many
decades ago, and is still a relevant measure of cultural cooperation even
today, as international yoga day is celebrated by thousands in the region, in
popular locations such as Machu Picchu and Mexico City’s El Ángel de la
Independencia roundabout. To be sure, these literary and cultural linkages
did not deepen considerably over the years, yet they sustained a feeling of
nostalgia among the peoples of India and the LAC region.
Over the past two decades, the LAC region’s perception of India has
caught up with contemporary reality. News of India in the region tends to
focus more on the nation’s economic growth story, ranging from the start-up
ecosystem in Bangalore, India’s own ‘Silicon Valley’, to the advances in space
technology. The offices of Indian automobile, pharmaceutical and ICT com-
panies that dot numerous cities in the LAC region are helping to create a
new image of India, highlighting the potential to develop the region’s local
economies through partnerships and joint ventures. Slowly, India and Latin
America are bridging this perception gap, bringing present-day realities to
the fore.
In this context, the Latin American perspective remains positive. The
region has taken the initiative to invite Indian investment in various sectors
to strengthen the local economy. Indian companies in the pharmaceutical
sector have helped to increase the share of generic medicine in the LAC
region and reduce the government’s costly public health care expenditure.
India’s ICT companies employ thousands of people, helping the LAC region
to integrate into the global ICT value chain.
Another area that can perhaps benefit most from India’s valuable input in
the LAC region is space cooperation. India’s space agency, the Indian Space
Research Organisation, has formal agreements with numerous LAC
116 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
countries, and has already launched satellites built by Argentina, Chile and
Colombia. More recently, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Paraguay have announced
their intention to cooperate with India’s space and research agencies.
India’s capacity-building role in these sectors and the LAC region’s
enthusiastic response is reflective of a larger regional trend: the presence of
Indian companies in Latin America’s value-added sectors can help the region
to reduce its dependence on extractive and commodity-based industries.
Even so, there is an apparent dichotomy at play: while India invests almost
exclusively in value-added sectors in the LAC region, its imports are still
highly focused on commodity-based products. A cursory look at the LAC
region’s top five exports to India, all commodity-based products, shows that
they account for 83% of the region’s total exports to India.
Five LAC countries, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador,
account for roughly 20% of India’s total petroleum imports.6 There exists a
natural complementarity with India as one of the world’s largest buyers and
the LAC region as a major exporter of crude petroleum. Gold is a surpris-
ingly new element of trade between India and the LAC region: prior to 2011
nearly all of India’s gold was routed through intermediary countries such as
Switzerland, but today 21% of India’s total gold imports (by quantity) are
sourced directly from five countries in the LAC region. Vegetable oils form
an integral part of the Indian diet, and since 2014 India has been the world’s
largest importer of edible oils. It is no surprise that India buys soybean oil
worth more than US $2 billion from Argentina and Brazil each year. Mineral
ores such as copper, iron, molybdenum and manganese are also sourced from
Latin America, and make up 35%–40% of India’s mineral ore imports.7
Meanwhile, only one Indian company, Shree Renuka Sugars Limited (SRSL), is
responsible for the country’s entire trade in raw sugar. SRSL’s four mills in
Brazil can crush 13.6 metric tons of sugarcane per year but have no refining
capacity, so the company exports raw sugar from these mills to two port-based
refineries on India’s east and west coast for refining and re-export.

Table 7.2 The LAC region’s top five exports to India

No. LAC region’s top 5 exports % share of the LAC
to India, 2018 region’s total exports to
(in US $ billions) India, 2018
1 Crude petroleum 13.13 50.37%
2 Gold, unwrought 4.34 16.65%
3 Crude soybean oil 2.09 8.02%
4 Copper ore 1.61 6.18%
5 Raw cane sugar 0.56 2.16%
Total 21.73 83.38%

Source: Trade Map, International Trade Center. Available at www.trademap.org.

Note: Data based on four-digit HS codes.
 India 117
India’s appetite for commodities is bound to increase in the coming years
as the economy develops and consumer demand rises. However, there is a
silver lining to this issue of commodity-based exports: India’s import capa-
city goes well beyond commodities, and there remains much potential for the
LAC region to export more value-added products and services. Latin Amer-
ica can target its exports to India’s growing consumer class. Countries like
Chile have taken the lead by exporting fruits such as apples, walnuts, kiwis
and grapes to India. Another example is Peru’s AJE Group, a non-alcoholic
beverage producer, which established a manufacturing plant in India in 2010
to capture a slice of the enormous consumer market.
In the larger global context, India’s commercial engagement with the LAC
region lags far behind that of China. Sino-LAC trade exceeded US $300
billion in 2018, while India’s trade stood at just $40 billion; New Delhi’s
political interest in the LAC region too pales with that of Beijing. But India
can break away from the so-called Avis syndrome of being number two to
China. Instead of trying to keep up it can learn ‘not [to] compete with its
competitor, but [to] embrace its second-place status’ (Richards 2017). India
rarely competes directly with China in Latin America, and can thus expand
its presence in sectors such as information technology (IT), automobiles and
pharmaceuticals to add even more value to Latin American economies.

What are the actual results?

India-LAC relations have reached a new normal in the 21st century, trans-
cending years of benign neglect and non-committal exchanges. Although
India’s place in Latin American foreign relations has yet to reach the level of
strategic relevance that China, the United States and Europe enjoy, it is a big
leap forward compared to India-LAC relations in the 20th century.
The results of two decades of cooperation are evident in India-LAC com-
mercial ties. Today, India is a serious destination for Latin America’s exports
and has since 2014 been the third-largest export partner for the region,
behind only the United States and China. Nearly two-thirds of India’s trade
with the LAC region from 2001–2018 has been with Brazil (25%), Venezuela
(22%) and Mexico (15%), followed by Chile (8.5%), Argentina (6.9%),
Colombia (6.4%) and Peru (4.1%).
While these figures pale in comparison with China-LAC trade, Latin
America is nonetheless becoming an increasingly significant trade partner for
India, accounting for roughly 5% of India’s global trade. The trade balance is
heavily tilted towards the LAC region: India’s exports stood at US $13
billion in 2018, just half of the $26 billion it earned in imports.
More than 200 Indian companies now have offices scattered across the
LAC region, accounting for US $16 billion in investment and employing
70,000 people (Seshasayee 2017: 226–236). India’s private sector has eagerly
advanced to Latin America over the past two decades, and in most cases it
has been welcomed with open arms. Indian investment in the region is
118 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
Table 7.3 India’s top 10 trade partners in the LAC region, 2001–2018
Trade in US % of India-LAC
$ billions trade, 2001–2018
1 Brazil 98.76 25.09
2 Venezuela 85.65 21.76
3 Mexico 59.09 15.01
4 Chile 33.73 8.57
5 Argentina 27.52 6.99
6 Colombia 25.24 6.41
7 Peru 16.46 4.18
8 Ecuador 6.58 1.67
9 Panama 4.95 1.26
10 Dominican Republic 4.16 1.06
Remaining LAC countries 31.52 6.65
Total India-LAC trade, 2001–2018 393.65 100

Source: Trade Map, International Trade Center. Available at www.trademap.org.

concentrated mostly in the value-added and manufacturing sectors, such as

ICT, pharmaceuticals and automobiles:

ICT
Initially, some Indian companies invested in the region due to its proximity
to the United States, but they stayed much longer than they originally
intended to because they were able to tap into Latin America’s growing
consumer class. Besides building up the domestic and regional ICT industry,
these 30-odd Indian companies also employ a large local staff—Tata Con-
sultancy Services alone has 16,000 employees in the LAC region (Seshasayee
2017: 226–236).

Pharmaceuticals
About 30 pharmaceutical companies from India have established manu-
facturing units, warehousing facilities and representative offices in Latin
America, nearly all of which are located in Brazil, with a sizeable number in
Mexico, Argentina, Colombia and Peru. These companies contribute to the
region’s foreign investment and force local competition to provide more
affordable health care goods and services.

Automobiles
The experience of the automobile sector highlights the vast potential for joint
manufacturing ventures between India and the LAC region. India’s Tata
 India 119
Motors and Brazil’s Marcopolo produce buses for India’s vast public trans-
port system, while the Samvardhana Motherson group, India’s largest auto-
motive parts company, operates 27 manufacturing facilities in Mexico alone
that employ 22,000 people.8 India’s car manufacturing companies, such as
the Mahindra Group and Tata Motors, which owns Jaguar Land Rover, also
have assembly units in Brazil, and India’s Hero Motorcorp, the world’s lar-
gest motorcycle producer, chose Colombia as the destination for its first
international manufacturing plant.

While these investments bolster domestic industry and provide employ-

ment for the local population, a handful of companies from the LAC region
have invested in India to capture a share of the large consumer class and to
join the regional value chains in Asia. A dozen companies from both Brazil
and Mexico, and a few others from Argentina and Peru, have entered India
over the past two decades. These investments are diverse in nature, ranging
from Brazil’s steelmaker Gerdau and its software giant Stefanini to Mexico’s
cinema operator Cinepolis and edutainment theme park company Kidzania.
Competition is fierce, but many multilatinas are still positioning for India,
betting for success in a country with twice the population of the LAC region.
One of the most recent entrants to India is Mexico’s Bimbo, which had
already entered the Chinese market a few years ago.
The results of the India-LAC political relationship over the past few years
have not been as appealing. Even as the LAC region continues to curry
favour with New Delhi, political exchanges remain limited due to India’s lack
of clarity towards a regional policy for Latin America. Still, there have been
some notable advances with Brazil, through mechanisms of South-South
cooperation such as the BRICS and IBSA. The BRICS Bank, formally
known as the New Development Bank, has already approved loans worth US
$8 billion since 2016, and has an AA+ credit rating from Standard & Poor’s
and Fitch Ratings. India also has the opportunity to make its presence felt
through the Pacific Alliance grouping, of which it is an ‘observer’ member.
India’s lost opportunity with the LAC region is perhaps most apparent when
compared with the gains made in the India-Africa relationship over the past few
years. The India-Africa Forum Summit helped to take political relations to the
next level: the 2015 summit in New Delhi saw the participation of all 54 African
nations, 40 of which were represented by heads of state or of government; Modi
himself has travelled to African countries nine times (Bhatia 2018). Further-
more, as India-Africa trade peaked at US $75 billion in 2014, New Delhi
announced the opening of 18 new diplomatic missions in Africa. This stands in
stark contrast to India-LAC ties, which lacks a multilateral summit-level plat-
form, and India’s announcement in 2010 to open three new embassies, in the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay, has yet to bear fruit. An India-
LAC meeting at the level of heads of government or even at ministerial level,
once every three years, would certainly pay dividends. This is also apparent in
the case of Sino-LAC relations, where political exchanges are becoming more
120 Jorge Heine and Hari Seshasayee
frequent and China’s LAC policy is routinely updated by way of policy papers
published by the Chinese government.9

Conclusion
There is a paradox at work in India-LAC relations: as opposed to some
other non-regional actors such as China, Iran or Russia, which are viewed as
outright threats by the United States, India simply does not fall into that
category. One would expect this to open up more possibilities for New Delhi
to engage and deploy both its foreign policy and commercial and financial
resources in the LAC region. However, this has yet to happen, and India’s
footprint in the LAC region is still relatively small, and almost entirely
associated with the private sector.
The vibrancy and speed of Indo-LAC links witnessed in 2003–2007 is no
longer present today, as bilateral ties stagnate amid changing domestic prio-
rities. India’s top commercial partners in the region, Brazil, Mexico and
Venezuela, are all going through internal transformations. Brazil is struggling
to recover from its worst recession in recorded history, flanked by a divided
populace. Mexico is attempting to fix its increasingly strained relationship
with the United States, while leftist president Andrés Manuel López Obrador
embarks on a path of austerity and marked economic reforms. Venezuela’s
future is growing more uncertain by the day, as oil exports dwindle following
the imposition of US sanctions and as the economy spirals towards hyper-
inflation that reached 10,000,000% in 2019. At the same time, India is
focusing even more on Asia, partly due to the conflagration with Pakistan
(which plays to the current administration’s vote base) and also to hedge
against China’s economic influence in the region.
At a time when the question of ‘outside powers’ in the Western Hemi-
sphere has acquired new prominence, India’s role is three-fold: it is first and
foremost an economic partner, whereby ideology and politics become per-
ipheral. These economic linkages are likely to deepen in the coming years,
given India’s continuing demand for resources and value-added products,
and an increase in political will can boost economies ties even further.
Second, India has a benign presence, free from the neo-colonial critique often
reserved for global powers like China and the United States. Instead, India
and Latin America stand on a similar footing, facing many socio-economic
challenges arising from a long colonial history. Finally, India is a democracy
and a developing economy with much in common with the LAC region.
Both can learn from each other’s successes and failures on combating pov-
erty, urban development, and unemployment. These three traits, combined
with India’s growth trajectory, poised to top the list of fastest growing
economies by 2025, can eventually pave the way for transformational India-
LAC ties in the years to come (Center for International Development 2017).
 India 121
Notes
1 ‘Emerging and Developing Asia’ is an IMF categorization of 31 developing coun-
tries in the Asia Pacific region. See www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@
WEO/DA/WE (accessed 12 March 2020).
2 Data calculated from Trade Map, International Trade Centre, available at www.tra
demap.org. See also Export Import Data Bank Version 7.1: TRADESTAT,
Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India, available at https://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/.
3 Data calculated from Trade Map, International Trade Centre, available at www.tra
demap.org.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Data calculated from Trade Map, International Trade Centre, available at www.tra
demap.org.
7 Data calculated from Trade Map, International Trade Centre, available at www.tra
demap.org.
8 Personal interview with officials at the Embassy of India in Mexico City and with
executives at the Motherson Group.
9 See China’s ‘Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean’, published in 2008
and 2016, available at https://china.usc.edu/chinas-policy-paper-latin-america
-and-caribbean and http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1124/c90000-9146474-6.html.

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8 Turkey in Latin America
Tenacity in a changing international
environment
Marta Tawil-Kuri

Introduction
Over the past 15 years, Turkey has extended and deepened its ties with Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC). Regional and international structural vari-
ables have offered the context for Ankara’s assertiveness, and for the positive
response from LAC. Structure is shaped mainly by the international distribution
of political and economic power, which includes external shocks and direct
policies The latter, of economic, strategic or other nature) are mainly imple-
mented by subjects external to the region, such as states, international organi-
zations or other actors. Inside this structure, Turkish (and Latin American)
actors enjoy a certain leeway to translate their calculations and motivations into
specific foreign policy decisions. Indeed, Ankara’s responses to regional and
international pressures have been affected by a wide range of domestic factors
including states’ motives, political identities, domestic institutions, political
economy, and the weight of individuals and societal factors.
Two externally driven cycles of Turkish policy towards Latin America can
be identified. First, the period from 1996–2002, which is marked by the
consequences of the ending of the Cold War and the Gulf War. Second, the
phase from 2003–present day, which is largely defined by the US invasion of
Iraq and its global security, economic and normative repercussions. The first
two sections of the chapter analyse these two cycles, and, from a systemic
perspective, reconstruct the time sequence of the main Turkish-Latin Amer-
ican interactions, and identify crucial turning points in key issue areas.
Finally, the third section discusses the governmental, individual and societal
aspects of Turkey-LAC relations.

A timid reactivation
The ending of the Cold War marked a critical period of uncertainty for Turkish
decision makers. For Ankara, the situation in Iraq after 1991 created serious
economic problems and new security threats. The international economic
embargo against Iraq closed the lucrative Iraqi market to Turkish businesses and
weakened Turkey’s comparative advantage in supplying the Gulf countries with
124 Marta Tawil-Kuri
processed raw materials and agricultural products. Turkey’s exports to the Middle
East fell from 23% to 14% between 1990 and 1996 (Bayart 1996: 773–785).
Between 1993 and 2000, under the presidency of Süleyman Demirel, Turkey
continued its market- and export-oriented reforms. Following the devastating
1994–1995 currency exchange crisis, the economy recovered and. grew by 6.4%.
Liberalization
. intensified, encouraged by the Dış Ekonomik Ilişkiler Kurulu
(DEIK—Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey).
The normalization of Turkey-Latin America relations took place at the
time of the democratic transitions in the continent, resulting in the resump-
tion of relations between South America and most Middle Eastern countries.
The renewal of ties was a joint initiative, accompanied by the exchange of
high-level visits. Then President Süleyman Demirel travelled in 1995 to
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the first visit by a Turkish President to the
region (González Levaggi 2016a: 33). In 1992 Argentine President Carlos S.
Menem, nicknamed ‘El Turco’ (The Turk) had visited Turkey as the first
Latin American head of state ever to visit the Eurasian country.
In 1998 Turkey elaborated the ‘Action Plan for Latin America and the
Caribbean’. It was conceived as a roadmap regarding the policy of opening
to the region (Seyfettin Erol 2016: 56–69). This came a year after Turkey had
received negative responses from the European Union (EU) at the Lux-
embourg Summit. The reactivation of Turkey-LAC relations occurred also in
the framework of the so-called ‘post-neoliberal’ period since 1998, and was
associated with the ‘New Left’. Brazilian diplomacy during the second term
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1998–2002) was in search of new ‘niches of
opportunity’ among countries with strong economic potential, like Turkey
(González Levaggi 2016b: 21–46). Concomitantly, Turkey became an obser-
ver member of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1998 and of
the Association of Caribbean States in 2000, and it has made financial
contributions to both since 2001 and 2000, respectively (Kutlay 2011: 71).
Despite its good intentions, Turkey could not take advantage of the oppor-
tunities that the international developments of the 1990s offered. The main
reason was domestic: its stock market crisis, domestic political instability and a
succession of coalition governments. These variables prevented the imple-
mentation of a coherent diplomacy capable of anchoring itself in the long
term. Latin America did not do well either, as witnessed by the devaluation of
the Brazilian real in 1999, the recession in Argentina in 2001, and the ensuing
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común
del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul) crisis.
From another perspective, the 2001 financial crisis created a window of
opportunity for the transformation of Turkey’s political economy, aided by an
increase, of 74%, in the urban population during the previous decade (Kutlay
2011: 71). The ‘Anatolian Tigers’—the industrial cities in central Turkey that
had driven the country’s economic growth since 1980 (Şen 2010: 72)—began
to dispute economic power with the state elite. Their internationalization
turned out to be the ‘practical hand’ of Ankara’s external policies.
 Turkey 125
One year after the terrorist attacks perpetrated on the US mainland on 11
September 2001 (known as 9/11), the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP—
Justice and Development Party) won the legislative elections. The party’s
leader, Recep Tayyep Erdoğan, promoted a new agenda that combined tra-
ditional values, democracy and market economy. American and European
foreign policy actors quickly labelled Turkey as a model of the compatibility
between Islam and democracy (BBC 2004). Following the AKP’s electoral
success, the rapprochement initiatives carried out previously by the business
associations and the Gülen community1 (Başkan 2010: 404) were trans-
formed into systematic efforts that produced structural changes in foreign
policy. The new economic environment, in addition to high rates of economic
growth in LAC (between 2003 and 2008 their economies experienced average
annual growth of 5.5%), gained the attention of AKP leaders.

A resolute policy
At the turn of the century, Turkey’s willingness to approach LAC with stea-
diness occurred within the framework of three developments. First, the uni-
polarity that for two decades had led to the United States becoming the most
powerful actor in the system changed into a hybrid system. World power
became more diffuse and diversified, thus opening up new spaces for rising
countries. Towards 2006 the predicament of US foreign policy in the Middle
East helped Turkey to regain confidence and to push harder for a regional
(Middle Eastern) and global role (Almuedo 2011). After 2002 the competi-
tiveness of the Turkish industrial sector was one of the main incentives in the
search for such a role and for new markets. Favourable opportunities for
investments worldwide, capital flows and the positive business climate for
emerging economies, together with a politically stable national environment,
undoubtedly contributed to Turkey’s solid economic performance, reflected
in an average annual growth rate of approximately 3.8%. This set of factors
allowed Turkey to reorient its economy and to compete on a global scale
(Donelli and González Levaggi 2016: 93–115).
Second, South-South trade and investment flows rose significantly. Emer-
ging powers in the global economy modified the paradigms of foreign policy in
developing countries. Latin America experienced a boom of exchanges, espe-
cially with the People’s Republic of China. All LAC political leaders perceived
that there was an opportunity to broaden the horizons of their potential eco-
nomic associations. This went beyond the ideological orientation of
governments.
Third, Ankara declared 2006 as the ‘Year of Latin America and the Car-
ibbean’. The Turkish government sought to create an institutional framework
to promote political, economic and cultural cooperation with Latin. America
(Seyfettin Erol 2016: 54–55). State organizations such as the DEIK began to
prepare specific studies on LAC to inform the government and business
organizations (Atli 2011: 116).
126 Marta Tawil-Kuri
Institutionalization of intergovernmental political and economic relations
Under the flag of South-South relations, Turkey and Latin American pol-
icymakers embarked on a flurry of cross-regional visits. The reciprocity of
interest, the increase in presidential visits and the extension of diplomatic
representations confirm the densification of ties. Indeed, the sustained acti-
vism can be illustrated by the frequent multiple state official visits that took
place between 2004 and 2014. Additionally, Turkey’s interest in diversifying
markets and projecting international influence led it to double its diplomatic
presence in LAC, from six embassies in 2009 to 13 in 2017.
Turkey also created institutional ties with several regional organizations. It
shares diverse common platforms with the LAC region, namely the G20
together with Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Furthermore, in 2010 a Political
Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism with MERCOSUR was estab-
lished, and political consultation meetings have been held since. Another
political consultation mechanism was created with the Caribbean Commu-
nity (CARICOM) in 2011. The Framework Agreement for the Establishment
of a Free Trade Area between Turkey and MERCOSUR was signed in 2008.
In 2013 Turkey obtained observer status in the Pacific Alliance. Turkey’s
application to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean was accepted in 2017. Additionally, Turkey signed an
agreement to become an extra-regional observer state in the Central Amer-
ican Integration System (SICA) in 2015 during the visit of Minister of For-
eign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Guatemala on the occasion of the First
Turkey-SICA Foreign Ministers’ Forum.
Between 2002 and 2008 the volume of total trade with the region increased
from around US $900 million in 2002 to more than $4 billion in 2008. However,
LAC accounted for only 0.5% of Turkey’s total trade in 2009. In 2009, under
the negative effects of the global financial crisis, Turkey’s trade volume with the
region fell sharply again. Turkey’s application for membership of the EU stalled
over issues including the divided island of Cyprus, an EU member. In 2011
popular massive protests and unrest (known as the Arab Spring) broke out in
several Arab countries, including the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic. Civil
wars forced Syrians to flee by the millions, mostly to neighbouring countries like
Turkey. In contrast to previous recessions, Turkey could afford to adopt coun-
ter-cyclical polices and the financial markets proved resilient (Rawdanowicz
2010: 2). Moreover, the global financial crisis prompted a search for new
markets (Öniş 2011: 55; González Levaggi 2013: 104).
With the intention of pursuing economic ties beyond political-electoral
alternations, the governments of Ricardo Lagos in Chile and Luiz Inácio
‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil multiplied their initiatives towards Turkey. In 2004
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, visited Ankara. Two
years later the visit was reciprocated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Abdullah Gül. In 2009 Chile became the first country to sign a free
trade agreement (FTA) with Turkey. Negotiations continued for FTAs with
 Turkey 127
Ecuador, Colombia and MERCOSUR, but these were frozen after several
rounds. Some governments, such as Ecuador, have pointed out that Turkish
agricultural supply was not as beneficial in terms of tariff reduction (Emba-
jada del Ecuador en Turquía 2016). Moreover, Turkey’s ability to sign an
FTA with these countries is determined by common EU tariffs, which is why
these agreements should be designed in line with those of the EU (Tahsin
2016: 147–148).
For many years Brazil stood out as Turkey’s main trade partner in Latin
America. Brazilian-Turkish ties were advanced through documents such as
the 2001 bilateral visa waiver agreement. In 2006 Gül’s visit to Brazil spurred
the creation of the Turkish-Brazilian Business Council (Lazarou 2011). The
volume of trade between Brazil and Turkey doubled between 2008 and 2012.
Bilateral contacts continued despite the failure of the brokered deal with
Iran over its nuclear programme,2 and the change in the presidency of Brazil
in 2011. The early period of the Dilma Rousseff administration and the
appointment of Antonio Patriota as minister of foreign affairs led Rousseff to
visit Turkey in October 2011. Both presidents signed a joint declaration
entitled ‘Turkey-Brazil: A Strategic Perspective for a Dynamic Partnership’
and concluded further agreements for bilateral cooperation in higher educa-
tion and justice, among others. On that occasion, the Brazilian president
expressed Brazilian support for the Turkish position regarding the Palestinian
question (Lazarou 2016: 135).
Nonetheless, the bilateral relationship slowed down. The change of prio-
rities in the Brazilian domestic policy under President Rousseff sentenced the
strategic partnership with Ankara to a situation of ‘continuity in positions,
and change in practice’. This meant that Rousseff ‘presented a different
working method in diplomacy, particularly regarding her relations with the
Ministry of External Relations, bringing unexpected consequences on the
links with the Middle East’ (Brun 2016: 47). Furthermore, Rousseff
announced a wide array of new protectionist policies and the use of stimulus
packages to protect the country’s economy from the European crisis.
Mexico gradually replaced Brazil as Turkey’s main commercial partner in
the region. The intentions of Mexico, unlike those of Brasília, were . exclu-
sively economic. At a meeting with a large group of businessmen in Istanbul,
Mexico’s President Peña Nieto stated that both countries were beginning ‘a
new era’ in their bilateral relations; these were elevated to the level of ‘Stra-
tegic Cooperation Framework and Association for the 21st Century’. Pre-
sidents Gül and Peña Nieto underlined the importance of the two countries
in the global economy, as well as the virtues of their geographical positions.
Undoubtedly, an element that facilitated Mexican and Turkish rapproche-
ment was their membership in the G20, in the Organization for Co-operation
and Economic Development, and in MIKTA, an informal multilateral forum
comprising the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia. In 2015 President Erdoğan visited
Mexico, where seven rounds of negotiations were held for the signing of an
128 Marta Tawil-Kuri
FTA. Disagreements over the agricultural and textile sectors, essential for
both national economies, however, could not be overcome.

Trade and investment

Trade relations presented very different profiles according to the country
concerned. Overall, they have been concentrated. The majority of imports
from LAC are primary goods and natural resources. Brazil accounts for
more than three-quarters of Turkish imports of poultry and sugar. Most of
Turkey’s exports to LAC are low-quality manufactured products of medium
to low technology: parts and engines for automobiles, iron and steel, fruits
and edible products, and textiles and synthetic fibres. Latin American exports
are complementary to Turkish imports, which means that markets do not
compete, and spaces can be used to improve the technological content of the
goods exchanged on both sides (Kucher 2018).
In the case of Venezuela, trade exchanges became highly asymmetrical
especially after 2016, when Turkey, along with China and the Russian Fed-
eration, began to emerge as a strategic ally for Caracas as the crisis and the
isolation of President Nicolás Maduro worsened. Presidents Erdoğan and
Maduro found that their interests increasingly became intertwined, and for
Venezuela deepening ties with Turkey became a critical issue (Mourenza
2019). Relations involved an exchange of more than US $800 million in the
first half of 2018, an amount that was characteristic of the bilateral exchange
of the period 2013–2017. In the first nine months of 2018 Turkey exported
food worth $61 million to Venezuela; larger sums profited the regime and its
clientelist network, with Turkey being shipped tons of Venezuelan gold for
refinement and processing. The Maduro government also agreed to cede 4
million hectares of land for agricultural production projects in cooperation
with Turkish companies (Larez Martiz 2018; El Espectador 2018).
There has been a relative increase in foreign direct investment on both
sides. Turkish investment in the region amounted to US $258 billion between
2012 and 2015 (Brun 2016: 49–50). The fields of real estate (luxury) and
especially energy stand out. In 2010 Turkey announced its interest in
obtaining renewable resources for energy consumption. In this context, Tür-
kiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) and its subsidiary, Turkish Petro-
leum International Company (TPIC), have been active in oil producing
countries such as Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, the Bra-
zilian oil company Petrobras and TPAO/TPIC jointly carried out oil
exploration projects in the Black Sea in 2010 and 2011.
The ‘Vision 2023’ programme elaborated by the government of then Prime
Minister Erdoğan considered the objective of increasing bilateral trade and
investment in oil and gas with Mexico (Patiño 2014). After Mexican Pre-
sident Peña Nieto opened up the oil, gas and electricity sectors, which had
been closed to private investment since the 1930s, TPAO expressed its will-
ingness to carry out joint explorations of natural gas and oil not only in
 Turkey 129
Mexico but also in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Cuba. Finally, the
Turkish steel industry, one of the sectors most affected by increasing pro-
tectionism, especially from the United States, turned towards LAC. Further-
more, Turkish construction companies are very active in countries such as
Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia.
Meanwhile, Turkey is perceived, and has served, as an intermediary in trade
diversification strategies. For example, during his 2019 visit to Turkey, Bolivian
President Evo Morales asked Ankara to support his country in opening the
Russian market to Bolivian meat in order to diversify his country’s exports, now
largely concentrated on shipments of quinoa and coffee to China (Sevinc 2019).
The intensification of ties has not necessarily resulted in a general improvement
of Latin American countries. The variation in trade balances, sometimes nega-
tive (as demonstrated in Mexico and Peru between 2013 and 2017), is a
reminder that the intensification of relations can bring additional challenges.
After growing by 4.2% in 2013, the Turkish economy slowed to 2.9% in 2014.
In 2015 the country entered a technical recession. In the domain of foreign
policy, the turmoil in the Middle East, particularly the war in Syria and the
emergence of Islamic State, led to new constraints and dilemmas in Turkish
foreign policy (Kutlay 2011: 67–87). The depreciation of the Turkish lira in 2015
favoured South American exporters that were more competitive than the Eur-
opean ones. In 2016 total trade with LAC accounted for 2% of total Turkish
exports. These figures confirm stable but in fact very modest levels of exchange.
A fundamental obstacle preventing relations from reaching a higher level
is geographical distance or, more precisely, the absence of direct links, and
the lack of interregional infrastructure, which in turn prevents the creation of
new maritime or air links. In order to break this vicious circle, in 2016
Turkish Airlines, in addition to its flights to Buenos Aires and São Paulo,
expanded its network to include Bogotá, Caracas,
. Havana and Panama. In
August 2019 a new air route connecting Istanbul with Mexico City and
Cancún was inaugurated. Turkish Airlines is reported to be seeking to fur-
ther develop its network by offering direct flights to other cities in the region
or through code-sharing agreements with the leading regional airline
companies (Ersoy 2016; Airline Network News and Analysis 2016).

Aid and cooperation for development

Turkish officials adjust their examples of Turkey’s global role to suit their
audiences. Before Latin American ones, they emphasize Turkey’s role as a
donor of development assistance and its liberal visa regime, along with the
sharing of common social and political values (Benhaïm and Öktem 2015;
Cemalettin 2014: 127–145).
Turkey has sought to increasing its visibility through development coop-
eration and humanitarian aid carried out by the Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA). TIKA opened its first regional programme
coordination office in Mexico City in 2015, and a second in Bogotá in 2016.
130 Marta Tawil-Kuri
Ankara conducted humanitarian aid programmes in Central American and
Caribbean countries following a number of hurricanes and major earth-
quakes. Additionally, Ankara offered personnel support to the OAS Peace
Mission in Colombia as well as financial and technical support to a resettle-
ment programme conducted between Belize and Guatemala. Since 2004
Turkish security officers have taken part in the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti and in its successor, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, since
2017. In Mexico, TIKA distributed microbiological water purifiers to the
Casas para Niños Indígenas (Revista Al-Kubri 2016).
Latin American countries have also initiated cooperation programmes. For
example, in early 2014, through the auspices of the Agencia Mexicana de
Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, Mexico contributed to a number
of international organizations in order to ensure the proper functioning of var-
ious Syrian refugee camps in Turkey. In the domain of technical cooperation,
Colombia stands out for informing Turkish diplomats and public officials in
how to proceed in Spanish (Embajada de Colombia en Turquía 2018).

Cultural and public diplomacy

In Turkey, high levels of institutionalization and bureaucratic centralization
in the cultural sector have translated into a rapid institutionalization and
systematization of soft-power strategies (Adar and Ibrahim 2019). These, in
turn, have been reinforced by a unifying ideological project led by the AKP
(Tawil-Kuri and del Rocío Rodríguez 2015: 49–66). The Yunus Emre Cul-
tural Center, which has promoted Turkish culture and language since 2007, is
a pillar of Ankara’s cultural diplomacy around the world and it now has an
office in Mexico City. Anadolu Agency’s LAC office, which plays an impor-
tant role in Turkish public diplomacy, opened in Bogotá in 2017 and launched
its broadcasting language service in Spanish.
Religion has become one of the key elements of Turkey’s soft power
(Özkan 2014). Turkey’s Directorate for Religious Affairs, commonly referred
to as the. Diyanet, inaugurated a Summit of Latin American Religious Lea-
ders in Istanbul in 2014. During the Summit, President Erdogan sparked
considerable controversy by stating that America had not been discovered by
the Italian navigator Christopher Columbus in 1492, but by Muslims, almost
300 years before (Özkan 2014: 22). Through its so-called mosque diplomacy,
Diyanet has provided religious services in the continent to train new con-
verts; it also builds mosques that are presented as being different from those
financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Tourism offers scope for the forging of closer links between Turkey and
Latin America. The elimination or relaxation of visa requirements for vir-
tually all citizens of the region (with the exception of Cuba) was a milestone
in this respect (Tali 2016). The increasing popularity of Turkish soap operas,
particularly in Mexico, Chile and Argentina, has also helped to make Turkey
an increasingly attractive tourist destination. The number of tourists coming
 Turkey 131
from South America, especially from Argentina and Brazil, reached 165,000
in the first eight months of 2018 (Sevinc 2019).

Defence diplomacy
Security concerns have coexisted with political (especially multilateral) links
and economic ambitions in Turkey’s agenda towards the LAC region. The
global ‘war on terrorism’ has provided a fertile ground for rapprochement
(Government of Colombia 2015). However, Turkey’s diplomacy in this field
has wider objectives. It is largely associated with the growing interest of
Turkey in developing modern military technology (Demirtas 2019).
Brazil has significantly increased its participation in military actions
abroad alongside Turkey’s army over the past few decades. Cooperation in
this area started in 2003, with the arrival in Brazil of the Turkish Minister of
Defence, Vecdi Gönül, at the invitation of then Brazilian Minister of
Defence, José Viegas Filho. During that visit, an Agreement on Cooperation
in subjects related to defence was signed. In the aftermath of the visit of
President Dilma Rousseff to Turkey in 2011, renewed emphasis was given to
bilateral
. cooperation in the area of defence. Turkish Minister of Defence
Ismet Yılmaz visited Brazil in 2012. In a meeting with his Brazilian coun-
terpart, Celso Amorim, he discussed a possible partnership in the industrial
production of military equipment. During the meeting, it was decided to
appoint a Brazilian military attaché in Turkey and to accommodate Turkish
military officials in specialized Brazilian military units, such as the Centre for
Jungle Warfare, in Amazonia (Lazarou 2016: 14).
The Turkish industrial-military complex has also been active in Latin Amer-
ica. The satellite communications and radar company Aselsan has successfully
negotiated the sale of its products in Brazil and Uruguay. Turkey has also
exported defence products to Guatemala (Kırıkçıoğlu 2019). In his 2019 visit to
Turkey, Bolivian President Morales pledged to accelerate the purchase of
Turkish defence technology in order to counteract contraband activities.

Individual, governmental and societal aspects of Turkey-Latin

America relations
One of the variables explaining the more independent and assertive style of
Turkey’s foreign policy in Latin America is political leadership. Two political
figures in Turkey who adopted an incisive rhetoric were Erdoğan and Ahmet
Davutoğlu. The latter was minister of foreign affairs from 2009–2014 and
prime minister in 2014. His foreign policy project developed a new concep-
tion of the role and place of Turkey in the international arena. He envisaged
Turkey as a ‘central country’ (González Levaggi 2015; Özkan 2014: 18).
Another, interrelated, element at the individual level of analysis is the exis-
tence of presidential control in foreign policy decisions. In the case of Turkey,
such control was strengthened in 2011, when foreign policy issues were
132 Marta Tawil-Kuri
transferred to the prime minister’s office. One year earlier, and for the first
time in modern Turkish history, a separate government agency, the
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, was founded under
the aegis of the prime minister’s office, and functions, since the launching
of the presidential system in 2018, under the Ministry of Culture and Tour-
ism. The role of the head of state then appeared uncontested in the conduct
of Ankara’s Latin American diplomacy. Diplomatic apparatuses have seconded
Erdoğan’s initiatives.
The exaggerated dependence on the executive could damage the continuity
of the initiatives launched, once the team leaves office and diplomats change
positions. The politicization of the Venezuelan process and the eventual
political transition there, let alone in Turkey, might illustrate this situation in
the future. Paraguay offers another example where the ideological outlook of
leaders and governments can be the determining factor in the strengthening
of bilateral ties. In September 2018, President Mario Abdo reversed the pre-
vious administration’s decision to move its diplomatic mission in Israel to
Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. Turkey praised this gesture and announced that it
would open an embassy in Paraguay (Hürriyet Daily News 2018).
The private sector in Turkey has expanded the . scope of its participation as
an economic actor. In addition, in 2014 DEIK was restructured, and, in
accordance with the 2014 law no. 6552, it was assigned the task of ‘con-
ducting the foreign economic relations of the Turkish private sector’, to
become a ‘business diplomacy’ organization comprising business councils,
private foundations and individual members. In other words, Turkey has been
making domestic reforms and creating ‘interdependencies’ with the region in
the political, economic and cultural spheres which may thus be able to sur-
vive domestic electoral changes. This orientation is likely to continue because
these projects have the support of a broad base of interest groups in Turkey.
Concurrently, other actors emerge in ways that can constrain or enable
Turkey-Latin America relations. One of them is the Armenian diaspora
which has been able, in specific domestic contexts, to pose diplomatic and
foreign policy challenges. Argentina and Brazil are hosts to two of the largest
populations of Armenian descent in Latin America (approximately 150,000
and 50,000 people, respectively). Seven countries in LAC refer to the actions
of the Ottoman Empire against Armenians during the First World War as
‘genocide’ (Agência Brasil 2015): Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile,
Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay have expressed explicit recognition of the crimes
and deportations that caused the deaths of more than 1 million people in
1915. In 2010 Erdoğan was forced to cancel a visit to Buenos Aires where he
was expected in his capacity as prime minister to attend the inauguration of
a bust of Mustafa Kemal. Strong pressure from the Armenian community
caused the city government headed by the former Mayor of Buenos Aires
City, Mauricio Macri, to back down from the project. Then, in September
2013, Erdoğan travelled to Argentina to participate in a session. of the
International Olympic Committee and to support the candidacy of Istanbul
 Turkey 133
as host of the 2020 Olympic Games. On that occasion, there was a strong
mobilization of the Argentinian-Armenian community to repudiate the visit.
This happened again in 2016, during the visit of Turkey’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (Diario Armenia 2017). In spite of the numerical
importance of the Armenian population in Argentina, and the political
inclinations of Macri that bind him close to that community, in this instance
mobilizations against Turkey did not jeopardize bilateral relations.
In a similar vein, Turkey uses the Latin American space for symbolic
confrontation against the United States, and for retaining domestic support
(Mourenza 2019). Venezuela has been emblematic in this regard. Support for
Chavism is one of the few things that can unite Islamists, nationalists and
leftists in a country as politically polarized as Turkey. Although some leftist
Chavismo factions were reluctant to maintain relations with the same gov-
ernment that was working to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
(also an important ally of Caracas), pragmatism finally prevailed—no doubt
also because of the evident failure of Turkey’s objectives in Syria.

Conclusion
By 2014 regional instability in the Black Sea and the Middle East, the slow-
down in economic indicators and a growing political polarization between
the AKP—especially in the figure of Prime Minister Erdoğan—and the
opposition, began to dim the brightness of the ‘Turkish star’ (González
Levaggi 2016b: 21–46). In February 2018 President Erdoğan was forced to
postpone a trip to Venezuela, Brazil and Uruguay after Turkey launched a
massive military operation against the Syrian Kurdish People’s’ Protection
Units in Afrin. The turmoil in Turkey became particularly acute from
August 2018, due to new tensions between Ankara and Washington. The
Turkish lira lost 40% of its value against the US dollar in 2018.
Despite economic crises and political upheavals, the number of bilateral
and regional agreements, high-level visits and diplomatic presence has
declined only slightly. Turkey and its Latin American partners have remained
members of all the institutions to which they belong, and Turkish diplomacy
continues frequently to mobilize material resources, institutions, speeches,
symbols regarding the LAC region. Ankara has signed Memoranda of
Understanding or letters of intent relating to FTAs with several Latin
American countries. There are, thus, clear criteria that allow us to categorize
these actions as progressively defining a Latin American agenda, and not just
as short-term or ad hoc actions.
A common concern of Latin American countries that influences their
policies towards Turkey is the state of their internal economies. Meanwhile,
Turkey’s ongoing problems with Europe continue to provide opportunities
for the Latin American economies in Turkey. The continuation and deepen-
ing of bilateral and interregional rapprochement are part and parcel of the
national development strategies of Turkey and the Latin American countries.
134 Marta Tawil-Kuri
In a context where bilateral trade between the United States and Latin
America declined from US $355 billion in 2012 to $262 billion in 2018—a
26% drop—as part of the overall constriction of global trade, Turkey seems
to offer yet another option beyond the US-China binary. For others, like
Venezuela, it offers an escape route for trade. For Turkey, Latin America
represents a market of 600 million people at a time when it needs alternatives
to its traditional economic partners.

Notes
1 Fetullah Gülen is an Islamist preacher at the head of a powerful movement in
Turkey, which has a gigantic network of schools (in Turkey as well as around the
world), non-governmental organizations and companies under the name of Hizmet
(Service, in Turkish). The Hizmet movement was able to gain considerable influ-
ence in the Turkish state apparatus, particularly within the police and judicial
institutions. Initially allied to the AKP, Gülen became the ‘public enemy number
one’ of President Erdoğan following a corruption scandal in late 2013, which
touched the president’s inner circle.
2 In May 2010 the deal struck with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by Turkey’s
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva required Iran to
transfer about one-half of its enriched uranium to Turkey, and, in turn, Tehran
would be provided with enriched material to be used for medical isotopes. The text
tried to facilitate negotiations between Iran and the international community led
by the United States and to postpone new sanctions. It failed, as sanctions were
adopted by the UN Security Council in June. It was not until the election of
Hassan Rohani as President in 2013 that talks between Iran and the P5+1
(permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) were resumed.

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9 Iran’s Latin America strategy and the
challenges to the balance of power
Penny L. Watson

Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been involved in Latin America for a few
decades. Before the 1979 revolution, Iran only had relations with four Latin
American countries: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile. After the 1979
revolution, Mexico and Chile broke all relations with Iran and closed their
diplomatic missions in Tehran, and relations with Brazil and Argentina
became minimal. From the late 1990s Iran began increasing friendly relations
with several left-wing governments in Latin America. These ties deepened
with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). The
Rouhani government spent the first two years, from August 2013 to July
2015, improving relations with the West during the negotiations on its
nuclear programme. According to Taghizadeh (2016), since 2015 ‘unexpect-
edly the Rouhani government is doing the exact same thing as Ahmadinejad’s
government, that is developing close relationships with left-wing countries in
Latin America’.
There are two perspectives on why there has been a surge in Iran’s activ-
ities in Latin America in the 21st century. The first argues that Iran’s primary
interest in Latin America is to gain economic benefits (Farah 2011; Lofaso
2016). Accordingly, Iran’s activities are at most a nuisance to the United
States, and its political relations with Latin American leftist regimes are fragile
expressions of Third World solidarity.
The second perspective, which is defended in this chapter, argues that
Iran’s activities in Latin America are part of its grand strategy (Watson
2017). Iran’s involvement in Latin America is two-fold. First, Latin America
is rich in the mineral resources that are necessary to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme. Second, Latin America provides a locale from which Iran can
challenge and provide deterrence to a possible US military option against
Iran.
Latin America therefore functions as a venue through which Iran can
counter the United States. Iran’s alliances with Latin American regimes serve
two functions: to secure support from countries in close proximity to the
United States; and provide support for Iran’s nuclear programme. The post-
 Iran 139
revolutionary regime in Iran has been pursuing a nuclear programme for
three main reasons. First, the regime wishes to acquire nuclear weapons
because it perceives that there is a threat to its security. Second, the funda-
mentalist regime would greatly enhance its legitimacy if it were able to
acquire nuclear weapons. Third, the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) actively supports the development of nuclear weapons for
political and ideological purposes (Watson 2020).
Iran’s post-revolutionary regime perceives the United States as a threat
and is constantly wary that the United States might invade and overthrow
the current regime. The United States has felt justified in violating the
sovereignty and replacing the leaders of numerous countries in the Middle
East and North Africa—Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, to name but a few.
Furthermore, the United States has gone into Iran before and replaced its
leader with one that was more pro-America. In 1953 the US Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) and the UK's Secret Intelligence Service (also known as
MI6) orchestrated a coup overthrowing the democratically elected Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and putting back on the throne
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as an autocratic monarch (Gasiorowski and
Byrne 2004).
Possession of nuclear weapons would provide Iran with the enhanced
ability to confront these challenges (Watson 2017). For some, the Iranian
nuclear weapons programme has been too extensive and valuable to stop.
Iran has a hefty investment into it. Iran’s Amad programme, that aimed to
develop and produce functioning nuclear weapons, was also partially
designed to have its own independent uranium mining, conversion and
enrichment resources (Albright et al. 2018a). Part of the plan included both
production costs and costs to purchase weapons-grade uranium from other
countries (ibid.). Iran has focused on preserving and continuing the
programme but has cloaked its activities under a civilian guise (ibid.).
This chapter will examine Iran’s close relationships with anti-US leftist
regimes in Latin America and attempt to explain why there was a surge in
Iran’s activities in Latin America, why it occurred when it did, which coun-
tries have played the biggest role, what are the political and economic impact
of these relations, and what is the Latin American perspective.

Iran’s grand strategy and Latin America

Iran began inserting its tendrils into Latin America in 1982 by holding

an international conference of the Organization of Islamic Movements in

Iran, bringing together over 380 clerics from some 70 countries around
the world, including many from Latin America. The purpose of this
conference was to export the Islamic revolution abroad.
(Humire 2015)
140 Penny L. Watson
In addition, Iran intended to explore the possibility of using Latin America
as an area to gain ‘solid support against the imperialism and Zionism intri-
gues’ (Perdue 2014: 13) with an anti-Israel function. Not much else really
happened until the turn of the century.
The surge of Iran’s presence and activities in Latin America took place
under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The main motive behind
this more assertive policy was Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran has therefore
been cultivating close relationships with Latin American leaders to pursue its
grand strategy. Latin American relations with Tehran are concentrated in key
areas such as trade, energy, nuclear and military cooperation.
Relations also focus on key countries that are able to provide either poli-
tical or material support for Iran’s ambitions. Iran developed close ties to
Brazil prior to Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. Brazil is Iran’s largest trade
partner in Latin America. In the first decade of the 21st century, the United
States had counted on Brazil as a reliable ally or at least as trustworthy
‘watchdog’ in the region; however, Brazil’s ‘keen [desire] to develop extensive,
peaceful, nuclear energy of its own’ (Morgan 2010: 15), as well as its global
ambitions, led it to align with Iran over Iran’s nuclear policy. Brazil was
consistently a defender of Iran’s nuclear programme despite the growing
evidence of Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme.
Venezuela has been a strong supporter of Iran’s nuclear programme and
has been very vocal about it. Iran in turn has pledged support for a Vene-
zuelan nuclear programme. There have been claims that Iran is willing to
explore for uranium in both Venezuela and Bolivia. This nuclear cooperation
between Iran and Venezuela led former President Hugo Chávez to announce
that the two countries were to work on building a ‘nuclear village together in
Venezuela’ (Morgan 2010: 17). Moreover, in order to continue its nuclear
programme, Venezuela has helped Iran to evade sanctions (ibid.).
Iran’s interest in nuclear power has spurred its interest in uranium depos-
its. In 2012 uranium was discovered in Brazil’s Lagoa Real. Discoveries have
also been made in Argentina (by U3O8 Corp at its Laguna Salada deposit),
Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay and Peru (by exploration company Macusani
Yellowcake) (Jamasmie 2012). Thorium is a potential source of nuclear fuel,
which is plentiful in Brazil and Colombia. According to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘Latin America is also a potentially rich
supplier of other raw materials such as beryllium, zirconium and hafnium,
which are widely used in nuclear reactors (n.d.: 19–20). In order to construct
a nuclear weapon, several key minerals are needed. These mineral elements
are located in several Latin American countries with which Iran has been
developing relations.
It is plausible that Iran is obtaining both uranium and nuclear technology
from Latin America. Iran has been extracting minerals such as ‘uranium
from as many as eleven different sites in Bolivia’ (Berman 2012). More
cooperation agreements between Iran and La Paz have declared Iran a part-
ner in mining Bolivia’s lithium, which can be used in the development of
 Iran 141
nuclear weapons (ibid.). Iran has a significant interest in the vast reserves of
uranium in Venezuela and Ecuador. It is also possible that Tehran is
acquiring nuclear technology from Argentina (Lopez 2015; Noriega 2016). A
former Argentine senior ‘intelligence official testified that Iran sought nuclear
technology from that South American country and that … Ahmadinejad was
interested in using technology to produce plutonium bombs’ (Noriega 2016).
Iran and Hezbollah have maintained a visible presence in Peru too. Since
2011 there have been reports of ‘Iranian and Hezbollah operatives in Apur-
ímac’ (López-Dolz 2015). According to Peru’s former Vice-Minister of the
Interior Dardo López-Dolz, ‘Apurímac is a mineral-rich region, with tre-
mendous potential for strategic minerals such as uranium, but the region is
also heavily involved with cocaine production’ (ibid.). Hezbollah is adept at
‘raising funds from illegal activities like drug trafficking and illegal mining,
both heavily related to the economic life of the southern mountain and
jungle areas’ of Peru (ibid.). A plausible explanation for the growing number
of mosques and Islamic cultural centres in Peru, especially in rural areas, is
that these centres serve as cover for covert activities.
Between 2005 and 2013 Ahmadinejad and Chávez made huge promises on
trade and investments. These promises were possible due to two factors: the
substantial rise in oil prices which boosted the revenues of both countries;
and the two leaders’ flamboyant personalities. However, many of these pro-
mises did not come to fruition probably due to the drastic drop in oil prices.
Since 2013 Iran and Venezuela have had leaders who have more subdued
personalities, and the sharp drop in oil prices has left both of their economies
weakened and caused them to address their economic difficulties at home.
Although Iran’s interest in enhancing its Latin American relations had
slackened with the end of Ahmadinejad’s rule, this interest has now reawa-
kened under the Rouhani government too. In 2014 Es’haq Jahangiri, Iran’s
first vice-president, met with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and
declared that ‘Tehran is ready to expand its ties with Caracas at bilateral,
regional and international levels’ (Press TV 2014). These sentiments were
voiced again in 2015 when Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
met with President Maduro. This policy of cementing relations between Iran
and Latin American countries continued when the Iranian Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Javad Zarif, undertook an official tour in 2016 with a 120-
member delegation through Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Venezuela. All six countries had left-wing governments at the time. The
Supreme Leader stated that

we can with using wise policies and increasing cooperation overcome

these conspiracies and animosities [referring to US policies in the
region]. Some think that the United States is invincible; however, this
perception is a huge mistake and the US’s repeated mistakes in the past
fifteen years have made them very weak in the region.
(Quoted in Berman 2016: 1)
142 Penny L. Watson
The Maduro regime, although under considerable strain, is currently being
propped up by the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba
and Iran, all of whom have a vested interest in keeping Maduro in power
(McKay 2019). Teheran’s grand strategy seems to be working.

Illicit activities
Illicit trade between Latin America and Iran has grown steadily. Economic
sanctions were placed on Iran owing to its pursuit of its nuclear programme.
This led to Tehran’s international isolation, which in turn has led Iran to
expand its activities in Latin America. Illicit trade has enabled Tehran to
evade some of the restrictions imposed upon it. Under former US President
Barack Obama, with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPoA), nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the European Union, the
United Nations (UN) Security Council and the United States were lifted.
However, following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the JCPoA,
US sanctions were reimposed. Iran has been utilizing the leftist governments
of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—ALBA),1 and particularly Vene-
zuela, for its money laundering schemes and the evasion of nuclear sanctions.
Suspicious business and banking activities have recently taken place
between Iran and Venezuela. The Iranian government has launched sub-
sidiaries for front companies belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps in Venezuela, and has channelled their funds towards the state-owned
company Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA). PDVSA has then moved
these funds through the local economy and injected them into the interna-
tional financial system (Rodil 2014: 64). Some Venezuelan banks, such as
Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, CA, are owned by Iranian banks, and
serve to finance Iran’s nuclear programme.
Another source of illicit activity is Iran Air, which is Iran’s official airline.
Iran Air had been operating with Venezuela’s government-owned airline,
Conviasa, as a joint venture. Conviasa had been conducting flights regularly
from Caracas to either Damascus or Tehran; however, Conviasa is no longer
conducting those flights. This route was linked to the transporting of drug
shipments, people, weapons and ‘radioactive materials’ (Rodil 2014: 65). This
government-controlled byway was never inspected by customs agents;
therefore, any and all materials and people could be transported
anonymously.
It appears that Iran is utilizing its commercial and economic interests in
Latin America in an effort to mask its true intentions there. These shadowy
networks provide a plausible facade for its physical presence in the United
States’ backyard. According to Roger Noriega (2012: 30), US Assistant
Secretary of State from 2003–2005, Iran’s intention is to ‘use safe havens in
these countries to deploy conventional and unconventional weaponry that
pose a direct threat to US territory, strategic waterways, and US allies’.
 Iran 143
Iran has also deployed Lebanese Hezbollah in Latin America (Levitt
2015). Iran has been utilizing forces abroad in addition to its own. More
than one million Muslims call Brazil home which has made it a prime
recruiting ground and provided a terrorist hub to more than ‘20 operatives
from Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Islamic Jihad’ (Noriega 2012: 32). In
order to advance its interests in Latin America, Iran has opened more
embassies in these countries, many of which do not require visas for Iranians
to travel there. This lack of restriction on travel provides an easy inroad for
Hezbollah, Quds Force,2 and IRGC to infiltrate and unite with local forces
or in the case of some Latin American countries, the local Muslim
communities.
Venezuela has become an important venue for Iran’s operations in the
continent. Margarita Island, for example, has become an outpost for Hez-
bollah. A large number of Iranian diplomats have been stationed in Vene-
zuela. By 2012 there were more than 150 diplomats there (Delgado 2012).
These diplomats are alleged to be involved with intelligence agencies and to
have made it possible for Iran to extend its military presence in Venezuela.
Iran has also constructed petrochemical and small arms ammunition plants
as wells as establishing banks and transport companies in the country (ibid.).
The Venezuelan firearms manufacturer, the Compañía Anónima Venezolana
de Industrias Militares, and the Iranian areospace enterprise, Qods Aviation
Industries, are working together to produce unmanned airplanes (drones).
Hezbollah has an intimate relationship with Iran. It is ‘a relationship in
which the Tehran regime has long used Hezbollah as a militant extension of
its foreign policy … Iran’s nuclear program could therefore play a central
role in Hezbollah’s operational calculus’ (Levitt 2015: 16). As a proxy orga-
nization that is not directly tied to the Iranian government, Hezbollah is able
to conduct terrorist activities at the behest of the Iranian government with-
out fear of reprisal to the government itself. Therein lies the threat to the
United States. These terrorist attacks are then claimed by the terrorist orga-
nization not the Iranian government, and because it is an organization rather
than a state, the United States is at a disadvantage in mounting a reciprocal
attack. General James R. Clapper, director of national intelligence (2010–
2017), stated in 2013 that ‘Iran may be more willing to seize opportunities to
attack in the United States in response to perceived offenses against the
regime’. Iran’s strategic position in Venezuela, and its freedom of action
there, can help to facilitate such an attack (Rodil 2014: 68).

Iran’s involvement with ALBA

According to Hirst (2014: 22), by infiltrating Latin America, Iran is able to
obtain items of specific strategic importance, the ability to ‘build diplomatic
allies, launder sanctioned money, and position its revolutionary Guards and
terrorist proxies to attack Western targets’. ALBA is the vehicle through
which Iran has been able to infiltrate the Americas. It was created by
144 Penny L. Watson
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the Cuban President Fidel Castro in
2004. ALBA was originally conceived as an alternative to the US-led Free
Trade Area of the Americas. The true goal of ALBA is to create a bloc of
power united under Venezuela and Cuba, which is able to challenge US
hegemony in Latin America. This alliance operates through the use of proxy
non-state actors to achieve its ends.
The ALBA member states have solicited the aid of Iran and Hezbollah to
train their militaries in asymmetric warfare. Iran is funding an ALBA mili-
tary training school as well as setting up its own Hezbollah training centres
throughout the region (Hirst 2014: 24). Terrorism is directly linked to asym-
metric warfare, and this link to Hezbollah has allowed Iran and Hezbollah
not only to train personnel, but also to raise funds, collect intelligence and
carry out covert operations in Latin America. Although there is not a shared
commonality in terms of language, religion or culture there are significant
ways in which ALBA is useful to Iran.
Relations between ALBA and Iran are mutually beneficial in terms of
diplomatic, economic, military and illicit activity. For Iran, the ALBA bloc
provides a significant source of diplomatic support. This can be seen in terms
of ALBA nations voting against sanctions on Iran. This alliance with ALBA
has helped Iran to establish itself as a ‘legitimate nation that is not isolated
internationally’ (Hirst 2014: 26). In terms of trade, Iran and ALBA have
signed numerous deals. Iran and Venezuela alone have joined in multiple
ventures such as energy, manufacturing, infrastructure, and housing.
According to Hirst (ibid.), ‘In 2009, Venezuela agreed to invest $760 million
in Iran’s South Pars gas field. In 2010, as collective sanctions on the Iranian
economy started to bite, Venezuela offered an $800 million investment
package in Iran’s Pars Field gas sector’. It is also likely that Iran has been
using ALBA’s virtual currency to launder money (ibid.). This is done by
taking Iran’s sanctioned funds and putting them into Latin American coun-
tries’ financial systems. These ‘lost’ funds signify a significant amount of
money, which ALBA members in turn can use for partisan political
purposes.
Although many regarded the death of Chávez as being highly detrimental
to Iran’s Latin American objectives, current President Nicolás Maduro is in
fact just as big an ally. So long as he remains in power in Caracas, ALBA
and Iran are likely to continue on the same trajectory of increasing Iran’s
influence in the region and offering a constant challenge to the United States.
Despite the fact that Maduro and Rouhani lack the blistering incendiary
rhetoric employed by their predecessors, the underlying relationship between
the two countries remains the same.

Latin American perspectives

Iran’s relations with Latin America increased dramatically during the so-
called ‘Pink Tide’, the wave of left-leaning governments that swept over Latin
 Iran 145
America after the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 and spread between 2003
and 2014. Iran-Latin America relations are largely based on anti-US senti-
ments that question Washington pre-eminence globally and on tactics that
seek to challenge it. This section argues that Latin America is not a pawn
utilized by Iran, but instead it has agency and that it too is attempting to
assert its agenda through Iran in a mutually beneficial relationship. The cases
of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Brazil illustrate both the
common and diverse objectives of these countries.

Venezuela
Venezuela has the closest ties to Iran in the continent. Caracas began pur-
suing these ties in 1960 with the foundation of the Organization of the Pet-
roleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which became the ‘“pivot” guiding its
foreign policy towards the Middle East. Strengthening OPEC became a
formal principle in foreign policy and resulted in the promotion of bilateral
trade with its members’ (Sorio 2016: 101). Venezuela’s relationship with Iran
changed partly because of the shift in the two countries’ relationship with the
United States. The Islamic Revolution (1979) and the Bolivarian Revolution
(1999) have altered the political outlooks of Iran and Venezuela into several
concurrent objectives, which include the ‘questioning of the capitalist order
and imperialism, criticism of US policies in the Middle East, [and] the need
to create a multipolar order free of hegemonic forces (Moya Mena 2012).
The Bolivarian Revolution changed Venezuela’s foreign policy from a pre-
ferential relationship with the United States to an anti-imperialist stance,
which included the adoption of a balancing strategy. Iran became an impor-
tant part of this calculus. The tactic of balancing was part of Chávez’s ideo-
logical foreign policy, which emphasized ‘principles and doctrine over
rational costs and benefits’ (Sorio 2016: 102). The 2002 coup attempt against
Chávez helped to cement Venezuela-Iran relations. The United States’ prior
knowledge of the attempt combined with its support of the temporary de
facto government led Venezuela to pursue deeper ties—as part of its balan-
cing strategy—with Iran and Syria (which is closely tied to Iran). These were
seen in Caracas as ‘allies of “geostrategic interest” in the 2007–2013 national
development plan’ (ibid.: 104).
The commonalities of personalities between Chávez and Ahmadinejad led
to increased cooperative efforts and numerous agreements. In 2009 a defence
agreement was signed which ‘reportedly included a munitions factory and the
upgrading of Venezuelan American-made F5 fighters, while in 2012 Chávez
confirmed Iranian cooperation in the domestic production of a drone (the
Harpy-001)’ (Sorio 2016: 104). Iran was the sole Middle Eastern country to
have meaningful military cooperation with Venezuela. Just as Venezuelan ties
with Syria aided Iran in its balancing strategy, Venezuela benefited from Iran
developing closer ties with Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua as part of its
coalitions in balancing against the United States.
146 Penny L. Watson
The Venezuela-Iran alliance has come at a cost. Israel cancelled a US $100
million upgrade of Venezuela’s F-16 fighter planes under pressure from
Washington in 2005. This tension has extended to Israel’s support of Juan
Guaido as Venezuela’s president in 2019 over Maduro. Venezuela’s alliance
with Iran even diminished its influence within OPEC when Venezuela sided
with Iran against the US-backed Saudi embargo on Iranian oil. Venezuela’s
willingness to negatively affect its own finances or act in ways that appear
not to be in its best interests are an indicator of its deeply ideological
balancing strategy to counter the United States.

Bolivia
President Evo Morales sought to construct Bolivia’s foreign policy to move
away from dependence on the United States and to increase its geopolitical
role by pursuing relationships with other countries with anti-US and anti-
Western agendas. Iran was one such case. Bolivia formed close ties with the
ALBA countries. Its close relationship with Venezuela led to increased rela-
tions with Iran. This pro-Iranian policy challenged the regional status quo in
the Middle East and helped to increase ‘Bolivia’s international visibility and
leverage to advance long term national interests and Morales’s proclaimed
goal to reform of global governance’ (Morales 2016: 181).
There was a tendency towards a conspiratorial mindset, which increased
bonds between Bolivia and Iran. In both countries, there was concern that
the protests against Chávez, Morales and Correa of Ecuador were part of the
global web of domination spun by the United States. The same applied to
the Middle East’s ‘Arab Spring’, as it was believed that US- and West-led
external public and private interests were behind the mass manifestations
that took place in 2011 (Morales 2016: 183). Tehran and La Paz were united
against US intervention and regime change. In a show of unity with Iran,
Bolivia removed visa restrictions on Iranian visitors and provided support for
Iran’s sovereign right in its quest for nuclear energy. Iran also provided both
funding and training at ALBA’s ‘regional defence school’ in Bolivia to stave
off imperialist threats.
Jeanine Añez Chávez, a religious conservative, replaced Morales as pre-
sident of Bolivia in 2019. With a watershed change in both leadership and
ideology in La Paz, Bolivia’s relationship with Iran is likely to wane.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s foreign policy towards the Middle East is rooted in its engagement
with Iran. Although Ecuador’s relationship with Iran began under OPEC in
the 1970s, Ecuador was at the time closely tied to the United States. There-
fore, Ecuador’s relationship with Iran really began under Rafael Correa
(2007–2017) through Venezuela and the ALBA bloc. Ahmadinejad actually
first met Correa during the Ecuadorian leader’s inauguration. This
 Iran 147
introduction was part of Chávez’s promise to aid Iran in combating its dip-
lomatic isolation as a result of the US-imposed sanctions. According to
Espinosa (2016), the mere presence of Iran’s president at Correa’s inaugura-
tion sent a defiant signal to the United States. Although Ecuador has sided
with Iran over nuclear energy and has at times signed agreements with
Teheran, its foreign policy has not followed typical ALBA policy and has
instead adopted a more autonomous and pragmatic approach (ibid.). Ecua-
dor, like most Latin American countries, seeks autonomy from the United
States. However, pragmatism prevailed over ideology in Correa’s foreign
policy. Ecuador continued to maintain relations with US allies in the Middle
East, like Israel and several Persian Gulf Arab States.

Nicaragua
Nicaragua does not have a large Iranian or Muslim community to factor into
its foreign policy. President Ortega has been in power since 2007 (and before
then between 1979 and 1990 as leader of the Sandinista revolution) and
during his presidency he has sought to align himself with ideologically simi-
lar countries. Chávez, as one of Ortega’s biggest supporters, was a proponent
of a Nicaragua-Iran alliance. Ortega joined ALBA after his inauguration,
thus signalling a concurrence of ideological views. According to Aviel (2016:
230), during the first Sandinista administration, Iran gave political support,
signed trade agreements and supplied oil. In 2007, upon taking power,
Ortega bestowed Ahmadinejad with two of Nicaragua’s most prestigious
awards. In 2012 Iran announced that it would forgive the US $164 million
Nicaraguan oil debt from the 1980s and Iran pledged an additional loan of
$250 million for development projects (Iran Times n.d.). In 2014 Nicaragua
sided with Iran over its right to have peaceful nuclear energy. From 2007 to
2014 several Memoranda of Understanding and other agreements were
signed between the two countries. The ability to carry out these agreements
was hampered by the sanctions and Iran’s ability to move money. Overall,
the relationship between Teheran and Managua is based on a shared anti-US
stance and was cemented by a mutual relationship with then President
Chávez.

Brazil
Brazil’s relations with Iran grew significantly under President Lula da Silva
(2003–2010) and continued under Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer to a
lesser degree. Brazil has been largely pragmatic in its diplomatic relations and
has not held the anti-US sentiments voiced by other Latin American coun-
tries. According to Brun (2016), Brazil has aspired to be able to assert itself
as a global player and Lula and his successor Rousseff sought to utilize
South-South relationships to help to achieve this goal. As part of its quest
for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, Brazil tried to broker a
148 Penny L. Watson
deal with Iran and Turkey over a nuclear fuel exchange. The Tehran
Declaration was signed by all three countries in May 2010. This was an
attempt by Brazil to stymie the adoption of new sanctions by the UN
Security Council against Iran, which if successful, would have shown Brazil
to be a global player (ibid.: 40–41). Although it was unsuccessful, this move
illustrated Brazil’s ambitions and Iran’s part in trying to realize them. Iran
has been a trade partner with Brazil but has not occupied a significant
portion of either imports or exports (ibid.: 44–47).
Right-wing parties in Latin America tend to favour close relations with the
United States. Left and centre-left parties in Latin America tend to emphasize
relations with countries of the global South as part of their global foreign
policy view. This is epitomized by Brazil’s foreign policy over the past few
years. President Rousseff was not as close to the Iranian government as her
predecessor Lula, but she did not distance herself from Iran in any formal way.
Her successor, Michel Temer, who only served as president from August 2016
to December 2018, held talks with Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif
indicating that in spite of political cooling economic and trade ties would have
continued. However, following the election of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency
of Brazil in October 2018, these ties were put on hold. Bolsonaro, a far-right
populist, decided to pursue a close alignment with both US President Donald
Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Watson 2019).
According to Eduardo Bolsonaro, a member of the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies, and son of the president, Brazil also looks to strengthen its ties with
Saudi Arabia, a rival of Tehran in the Middle East (Saudi Gazette 2019).
These changes of orientation could result in a downgrade of Iran in Brasília’s
foreign agenda. In conjunction with crises in the ALBA countries, this may
also be a big blow to Iran’s grand strategy in Latin America.

Conclusion
The surge in Iran’s activities in Latin America was possible largely because of
the rise of the Pink Tide and a close alliance with Venezuela and then Pre-
sident Hugo Chávez, who was instrumental in helping Iran to cement rela-
tions with other Latin American countries These alliances have proved
invaluable for both sides. For Latin America, Iran is part of a South-South
cooperation, which has enabled some Latin American countries to pursue
more autonomous and diversified foreign policies or to assert themselves as
global players, like Brazil. This alliance has helped various leaders to retain
power and to counterbalance the hegemonic power of the United States. For
Iran, these alliances have provided support for its nuclear ambitions. Latin
America also provides a close locale from which Iran can make difficulties
for the United States.
Iran’s desire to possess nuclear weapons is clear and long-standing, and
Latin America offers a venue not only to obtain the materials and technology
required to do so, but also provides a locale in close proximity to the United
 Iran 149
States from which the two entities can engage in asymmetric warfare, use a
bargaining chip to prevent regime change, and alter the balance of power.
The United States’ previous grand strategies of containing Iran, offshore
balancing and rapprochement have not addressed Iran’s activities in Latin
America and the threat that they potentially pose to the United States
(Kazemzadeh 2018: 56). Iran’s influence in Latin America combined with the
decline of US influence in the region ‘has nurtured anti-American sentiment
among the countries of this region, and exposed new threats to US security,
from proliferation to the spread of Islamic radicalism to political processes
that can dramatically reshape allied governments’ (Berman and Harrison
2013). Although Russia, China and Iran are all attempting to exert influence
in Latin America through their presence in those nations, ‘the activities of
Iran present the most direct and immediate challenge to US security’ (Evan
and Ortiz 2017).
With the United States reimposing oil and financial sanctions on Iran, it is
possible that Iran-Latin America relations will resume the level of impor-
tance that they possessed prior to the JCPoA. It is also possible that coun-
tries that once aided Iran in evading US sanctions will do so again. It is
unclear yet to what extent Trump’s Iran policy could address its proxy groups
acting outside of the Middle East. Up until early 2020 the Trump Adminis-
tration had focused on Iran’s activities in the Middle East and neglected the
Iranian presence in Latin America. Perhaps Trump’s bold proposals addres-
sing regime change in Venezuela in March and April 2020 could suggest
concern for the Iranian presence too. On the one hand, with the receding of
the Pink Tide throughout Latin America, Iran will have to rely even more
heavily on its few remaining leftist partners. On the other hand, as it has
done in Peru, Iran might bypass non-receptive governments through alternative
groups in order to maintain its strong presence in Latin America.

Notes
1 ALBA is a radical regional grouping based on a quasi-utopian vision of social
welfare, bartering and mutual economic aid. The nine formal member countries
are Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela. Two pro-
minent former members, Ecuador and Bolivia, withdrew from the organization in
2018 and 2019, respectively.
2 The Quds Force is a unit in Iran’s IRGC specializing in unconventional warfare
and military intelligence operations.

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10 Israel-Latin America relations:
What has changed in the past decade
and why?1
Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and
Daniel F. Wajner

Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the evolution of the relationship between Israel
and Latin America in general and with specific countries in the region in
particular. The past decade has witnessed the adoption of very antagonistic
and very empathetic positions towards Israel by several important Latin
American countries. Following a succinct historical review of the gradual
development of diplomatic stances since the adoption of the United Nations
(UN) Partition Plan for Palestine of 29 November 1947 until the beginning
of the new millennium, we focus on the shifts that have taken place in the
past decade. Within the framework of the chapter, we ask the following
questions: (1) What caused this surge? Why have some Latin American
countries intensified their links with Israel in the past decade? Conversely,
why did other Latin American countries (such as Venezuela, Bolivia (until
late 2019) and Nicaragua (until 2017) break diplomatic relations with the
Jewish state? (2) In which particular issue areas is this surge mostly felt? (3)
What are the Latin American and Israeli perspectives? (4) What are the
actual results on the ground? Among the varying explanations for this surge
in the relationship between the two entities, we examine the relative decline in
the relevance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the systemic change in the
structure of the post-Cold War era, Israel’s economic and technological
clout, religious changes within Latin America, and domestic political cleavages
in the region.

Historical background and evolution of relations, 1949–2009

No region of the global South has had a more continuous and relatively
benign relationship with Israel in the past 70 years than Latin America.
Apart from Nicaragua (1979–1992 and 2009–2017), Guyana (before 1992),
Cuba (after 1973), Bolivia (between 2009 and late 2019), and Venezuela
(after 2009), most Latin American countries have maintained relatively warm
diplomatic ties with Israel since its inception. Most of them supported the
UN Partition Plan for Palestine that granted an official international political
154 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
legitimation for the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. Fur-
thermore, since the early 1950s Israel has been a significant source of tech-
nological, scientific and agricultural know-how, and an important supplier of
military equipment to the region after the 1970s (Kaufman et al. 1979).
During the early UN debates on the question of Palestine in 1947, demo-
cratic and liberal Latin American regimes generally supported the creation of
a Jewish state in parts of the British Mandate over Western Palestine,
embodying a just struggle for decolonization from the European powers. For
example, Guatemala and Uruguay, embodied in the diplomatic figures of
Jorge García Granados and Enrique Rodríguez Fabregat, followed a marked
pro-Zionist line in the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP),
which prepared the Partition of Palestine proposal (Granados 1949). So did
Brazil’s Osvaldo Aranha as President of the UN General Assembly in charge
of the procedures during the vote of Resolution 181, based on the UNSCOP
Plan that recommended the partition of Palestine into two states—a Jewish
one (eventually Israel) and an Arab one. Ultimately, 13 out of 20 Latin
American countries voted in favour of the Partition Plan in November 1947
(while only Cuba voted against it), and 18 Latin American countries
supported Israel’s admission to the UN in May 1949.
In the 1960s relations between Israel and most Latin American states
continued to prosper, partly due to Israeli agricultural aid programmes. At
the diplomatic level, there were about 14 Latin American embassies in Israel
(of which 10 were located in Western Jerusalem), while the number of Israeli
embassies in Latin America had risen to 16. As an exception to the rule, the
usually benign relations between Israel and Argentina were negatively affec-
ted by Israel’s clandestine capture of Adolf Eichmann in May 1960 and the
ensuing bilateral diplomatic crisis (Rein 2002). Yet both countries turned the
page after a very short period of time.
In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, Latin American
countries, with the exception of Cuba, justified Israel’s right to self-defence
more than any other regional group. Yet by the beginning of the 1970s
Israel’s continued presence in the territories conquered during the Six-Day
War and the increasing influence of revolutionary and progressive forces in
Latin America led to a reduction in the support for Israel at the UN. Several
Latin American countries, in unison with the emerging Afro-Asian bloc of
‘non-aligned’ states, gradually started to identify with the Palestinian cause
based on a rhetoric of promotion of human rights and self-determination
that continues today. Their neutral or negative position vis-à-vis Israel
became evident at the UN in 1975, following the passing of the resolution
equating Zionism with racism, with the support of Mexico and Brazil
(Herzog 1978).
Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Latin America became one of the
chief export markets for Israel’s arms industry. Yet Israel’s military and
commercial successes in the region did not endear it to populations repressed
by military regimes. For instance, Israel maintained normal diplomatic
 Israel 155
relations with the Argentine military junta of 1976–1983, despite its gross
violations of human rights and the massive repression that included the
murder and ‘disappearance’ of thousands of citizens, including several hun-
dred Jews (Kaufman 1989). Consequently, Israel’s role in selling arms to
military regimes cast it in an unfavourable light among progressive and lib-
eral political actors, thereby overshadowing the goodwill that had been gen-
erated through technical assistance programmes, agricultural aid and
community development. Moreover, Jerusalem’s engagement in the Central
American civil wars of the 1980s as a US proxy also adversely affected its
image among the progressive sectors of the Latin American society (Bahbah
and Butler 1986; Metz 1993).
Moreover, different events in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict reso-
nated across the Latin American region in different ways, thus directly
affecting Israeli-Latin American relations. For instance, in 1980, of 13 coun-
tries that maintained embassies in Jerusalem, 12 were Latin American. Two
years later, reacting to the Israeli parliament’s resolution legitimating the
unilateral annexation of east Jerusalem, all the Latin American countries
moved their embassies to Tel Aviv, except for Costa Rica and El Salvador,
which eventually followed suit. The issue of the recognition of Jerusalem as
the capital of Israel still looms large in the diplomatic agenda of Israel-Latin
America relations, following the decision of US President Donald Trump to
move the US embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018.
Similarly, Israel’s military involvement in Lebanon between 1982 and 2000
also brought about negative repercussions in the region. Following the killing
of Abbas-al-Musawi secretary-general of the pro-Iranian Lebanese guerrilla
group Hezbollah, by the Israeli army in Lebanon in February 1992, Hez-
bollah, in connivance with Iran, retaliated by staging two lethal terrorist
attacks in Buenos Aires, Argentina, one against the Israeli embassy in March
1992, and the other against AMIA, the Jewish community centre, in July
1994. In the case of the attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires,
Israel was less interested in pursuing the investigation through the Argentine
courts. Presumably this course of action was aimed at not tarnishing its ties
with the Argentine government, as both countries were considered then to be
US proxies. The bombing of AMIA, which was allegedly carried out on the
orders of Iran’s supreme political and religious leaders, was the deadliest
terrorist attack in Argentine history, leaving 86 people dead and another 300
wounded. The inconclusive investigations into the AMIA attack have con-
tinued to loom large over relations between Israel and Argentina. Possible
explanations for this terrorist attack included Argentina’s cancellation of the sale
of uranium to Iranian nuclear reactors after Carlos Menem became president
of Argentina in 1989, and Argentina’s subsequent involvement in the Gulf War.
In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the past 20 years have been
characterized by new and virulent cycles of violence: the second intifada of
2000–2005; the Second Lebanon War of July 2006; and the recurrent wars
between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2014.
156 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
Peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion—in 2007–2008 and 2011–2014—have ultimately failed. The Israeli-
Palestinian peace process is currently stagnant, despite the cacophony following
the publication of the Trump Plan in January 2020. At the same time, the
events precipitated by the ‘Arab Spring’—including the 10-year civil war in
Syria—have led to a growing lack of interest in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, insofar as it is successfully managed. For instance, the January 2020
Trump Plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not generate sig-
nificant reactions in Latin America, and even gained some mild support from
several countries leaning towards the United States, such as Chile, Colombia,
Honduras and Brazil.

The surge in relations, 2009–2019

In the past decade or so, Israel and Latin American countries have increased
their economic links, as epitomized by signing of the the Israel-Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común del Sur/
Mercado Comum do Sul) free trade agreement (FTA) of 2007, and the
acceptance of Israel in February 2014 as an observer state of the Pacific
Alliance that includes Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Conversely, the
violent events in the Middle East have negatively affected Israel’s position in
the region, leading to the suspension or breaking of diplomatic relations with
Bolivia and Venezuela (2009), and Nicaragua (between 2010 and 2017).
It should also be mentioned that on 3 December 2010 Brazil recognized
the Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders, followed by similar
declarations from Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile, with the notable
exception of Colombia until 2018 (Wajner 2017). Furthermore, in 2012 the
majority of Latin American countries—with the exception of Panama’s
opposition and the abstentions of Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Para-
guay—voted in the UN General Assembly for the recognition of Palestine as
a non-member observer state. While the Israeli official diplomatic reaction to
the support for a Palestinian state framed it as a zero-sum game, the Brazi-
lians and Latin Americans in general did not present it as a hostile diplo-
matic act towards Israel. Rather, they explained it as the diplomatic
completion, or the full-circle momentum, of Latin American general support
for the 1947 UNSCOP Partition Plan, which led to the creation of the State
of Israel.
The outreach to Latin America of Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin
Netanyahu over the past decade has been similar to diplomatic efforts across
Africa, Asia and the Persian Gulf. It has been geared towards enhancing
Israel’s international stature. Netanyahu has sought to strengthen Israel’s
political and economic ties with the region while simultaneously boosting his
leadership credentials (Wermenbol 2019). Likewise, in May 2014 the Israeli
government adopted a resolution to deepen its strategic relations with Latin
American countries, including cooperation in anti-terrorism and security
 Israel 157
matters, economic cooperation and the enhancement of technological cap-
abilities. The rationale behind this decision was to expand exports and to
show the diversification of commercial ties with new extra-hemispheric part-
ners other than the traditional European countries. This comprehensive plan
was worked out by the Prime Minister’s Office in cooperation with the min-
istries of foreign affairs, finance, tourism, agriculture, science and technology
(Prime Minister’s Office 2014).
A few years later, In September 2017, Netanyahu travelled to Argentina,
Colombia and Mexico in an historical and unprecedented visit of a sitting
Israeli prime minister to the region. Although former Israeli presidents had
visited Latin America before, this was a first for a prime minister. The fact
that it had never happened before can be attributed to a matter of relatively
low importance and priorities in terms of the relationship between Israel and
Latin America. The 2017 visit led to an increase in economic cooperation in
the form of bilateral FTAs (in the case of Colombia-Israel and refurbished in
the case of Mexico-Israel), as well as investments (in the case of Mexico-
Israel). This surge is also expressed in intelligence and security cooperation
(regarding Colombia; Paraguay in its tri-border area with Argentina and
Brazil; and with Mexico contributing to its border control). Israel’s techno-
logical edge and its security/defence sector deals in the region, that already
amount to the sum of about US $550 million annually, could increase further
(Jerusalem Post 2017a).
In Netanyahu’s words, ‘the trip marks a new era in the relations between
Israel and Latin America’ (Jerusalem Post 2017b), and it should be under-
stood in the context of changing political contexts in Latin America (the
recent turn to the right) as well as the security, technological and cyber
power of Israel. Furthermore, the visit must be interpreted as an Israeli act
of ‘showing presence’ in a region that, in recent years, has enjoyed frequent
visits by Iranian and Palestinian leaders.
Netanyahu’s visits to the region in September 2017 and to Brazil in Jan-
uary 2019 had an additional symbolic significance in terms of the relation-
ship between Israel and the Jewish communities in the region, particularly in
the cases of Argentina (about 200,000 Jews), Mexico (about 50,000 Jews) and
Brazil (about 100,000). Yet Israel’s symbolism as the Jewish state in its reli-
gious links to Latin America is not only connected to the Jewish commu-
nities in the diaspora, but also to the evangelical Christian communities,
which number several millions of believers in Brazil and in Central America.
For instance, Jair Bolsonaro, who was inaugurated in January 2019 as
president of Brazil in a ceremony attended by the Israeli prime minister,
has proved to be a willing partner for Netanyahu. In an attempt to attend to
his evangelical supporters and garner favour with US President Donald
Trump, Bolsonaro played up his pro-Israeli stance and hinted about moving
the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem, although he never implemented it.
During his visit to Jerusalem a few months after his inauguration, Bolsonaro
was the first sitting world leader to accompany the Israeli leader to the
158 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
Western Wall. His visit, a few days before the Israeli Knesset elections on 9
April 2019, provided an opportunity to engage in bilateral economic part-
nerships and, in line with Bolsonaro’s flagship domestic policy project,
cement security agreements, including the sale of Israeli unmanned aerial
vehicles (‘drones’) equipped with facial recognition capabilities to pursue
criminal suspects in Brazil (Wermenbol 2019). The Israeli government
claimed that Netanyahu’s 2019 visit to Brazil boosted the economic rela-
tionship between the two countries to the value of US $1.2 billion (Abdul
Rahman 2019).

The Latin American perspective

The most significant change in the pattern of the Israel-Latin America rela-
tionship can be found in the Latin American perspective towards Israel. In
contrast to the traditional ‘distance’ that Latin American governments in the
first 60 years of the relationship chose in their relations with Israel, the past
decade has shown a deeper engagement in two opposite directions: either
closer relations or increased alienation and rupture. In the first half of the 2010s
the attitudes of several countries towards Israel took a very negative shift,
partly in response to Israel’s actions (and inaction) vis-à-vis Palestine. The
Chavista camp led this opposing path, as identified with Maduro’s Vene-
zuela, Ortega’s Nicaragua, Morales’ Bolivia and Correa’s Ecuador. Con-
versely, in the second half of the decade, we can identify a more active,
almost enthusiastic attitude towards Israel, marking a significant foreign
policy shift in a more positive direction (including that of Nicaragua and
more recently in Ecuador and Bolivia). What are the explanations for these
shifts from a Latin American perspective?
First, considerable sectors of the Latin American societies and polities
refer to the relationship with Israel through the prism of its ‘special rela-
tionship’ with the United States, with which Israel has been allied for dec-
ades. Thus, the Latin American approach towards Israel is entrapped in the
ideological cleavage between left and right. Hence, the shift to the left that
several Latin American countries experienced from the early 2000s had a
negative effect on their policies towards Israel. The cases of Venezuela, Bolivia
and Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent, Brazil and Argentina, are sympto-
matic of these trends. The lingering popular belief in Latin America that
Jews, and thus by extension Israeli Jews (wrongly identified in Latin America
as Israelitas rather than as Israelis2), control the US government and the
global economy bolstered these anti-Semitic prejudices. On the contrary,
when economic and institutional crises in the region led to a political shift to
the right around 2015, several countries (beginning with Argentina in 2015 to
Brazil in 2018) experienced a drastic positive shift in their foreign policy
towards the global North in general, the United States in particular, and
thus, by extension, to Israel. Thus, the recent rise (or return) of right-wing
governments is one of the political changes that are currently driving the
 Israel 159
region’s positive embrace of Israel. For instance, following the election of
Mauricio Macri to the presidency of Argentina (2015–2019), Israel’s
relationship with Argentina improved dramatically (Wermenbol 2019).
Second, the Latin American perspective towards Israel has been strongly
affected by the position of the US government towards Israel. In this sense,
we can compare the attitudes of the Obama Administration with that of the
Trump Administration. President Obama had signalled in his Cairo speech
of June 2009 that he would pursue a rapprochement with the Arab and
Muslim world. He also put pressure upon Israel to change its policies
towards the Palestinian territories. This may have influenced, either tacitly or
explicitly, Latin American governments to follow a similar activist path to
end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Hence, from December 2010
many Latin American countries, led by Brazil, started a wave of recognition
of the Palestinian state and the domino effect of this resulted in the Palesti-
nian issue being delivered at the UN General Assembly in 2011 and 2012.
Some Latin American countries, including Venezuela in 2009, Bolivia in 2009
and Nicaragua in 2010, went further and broke or froze diplomatic relations
with Israel. By contrast, the Trump Administration in 2017, followed by
conservative governments and growing like-minded parties in Europe, signalled
an opposite direction supporting the status quo policies of the right-wing
Israeli government.
The desire to garner favour with Trump, who displayed an explicit pro-
Israeli agenda, provided another rationale and impetus for several Latin
American countries to inch even closer to Israel. In this sense, Trump’s
decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to move its embassy
there in May 2018, in addition to his growing alienation from the Palestinian
leadership, signalled to several Latin American countries that they should
follow a similar path. In May 2018 Guatemala moved its embassy to Jer-
usalem, followed by Paraguay during the last months of the presidency of
Horacio Cartes, although the decision was reversed by his successor Mario
Abdo Benítez in September 2018. Honduras is expected to follow in the near
future. The decision by some Latin American nations to support Israel over
the past few years may be linked to their ‘appeasement’ of the US govern-
ment because they were largely dependent on aid from Washington. This
appears to be the case of Guatemala and Honduras. Several Latin American
leaders are seeking to win over the United States’ support. Some of them are
trying to do so by strengthening ties with Israel too. Yet this is not their
major focus. Their relationship with the United States is their major goal.
Third, and directly related to the previous point, deep social and religious
changes have occurred in Latin America in the past few decades. Primarily
these relate to the growth, consolidation and professionalization of different
evangelic communities in some countries that identify with the right-wing
Israeli government of the last decade. Thus, evangelic communities in Latin
America mostly follow the pattern of the evangelical communities in the
United States by adopting pro-Israel policies. Historically, evangelical
160 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
support for Israel is premised on a theological basis. The evangelical groups
believe in the Hebrew Bible (the ‘Old Testament’) and in the Jewish right to
sovereignty over the Holy Land that should hasten the return of the Messiah
(Grin et al. 2019). In the Latin American case, the religious elements are
combined with a rapid growth in their influence on and support for a right-
wing agenda that has matched the worldview of the Israeli right-wing ruling
coalitions since 2009. The impact of these networks and their access to poli-
tical power in countries such as Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay
has also strengthened their support for Israel. In contrast to the efforts at
delegitimization, isolation and boycott promoted by Latin American left-
leaning and progressive movements, the evangelical groups build on Israel’s
image for their own domestic political purposes. In parallel, the Catholic
Church and the Vatican have continued to expand their relations with Israel,
as illustrated for instance by Pope John Paul II’s five-day pilgrimage to Israel in
March 2000. Popes Benedict and Francis even deepened the bilateral rela-
tions by vising the country in 2014 and 2019, and Pope Francis hosted Israeli
President Reuven Rivlin in 2018. In 2019 Israel and the Holy See celebrated
the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Consider-
ing the importance of Catholicism in Latin America, this rapprochement also
benefits Israel’s image in and its relations with the continent.
Fourth, a growing Latin American perception of Israel’s economic and
technological clout, as the ‘start-up nation’ in terms of high technology,
security and cyber industries, has increasingly shaped the view of Israel in
Latin American eyes, and has contributed to a rise in scientific and security-
oriented joint ventures (Grassiani and Müller 2019). For example, Modi
Ephraim, head of Latin American division at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, boasted:

Today there are about 150 Israeli companies operating in Mexico, more
than 100 companies in Colombia and Argentina. And in Brazil, there are
about 200 Israeli companies that produce advanced technology equip-
ment, 42 Israeli companies producing security systems and equipment,
and 17 companies producing medical devices and equipment.
(Quoted in Abdul Rahman 2019)

The Israeli perspective and the results of the recent surge

Israeli former Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Ehud Barak declared
in 2011 that Israel ‘was facing a political tsunami most of the public was not
aware of ’. Barak warned that ‘there is an international movement that will
recognize a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. It would be wrong to ignore
this tsunami’ (Haaretz 2011). Paradoxically, the expected tsunami had
already began in Latin America, as previously explained, since 2010. At that
time, Brazil recognized the Palestinian state, leading to its recognition by
other Latin American countries. Shortly afterwards, Argentina, Bolivia,
 Israel 161
Ecuador, Chile, Peru and Uruguay followed suit. Israel was aware of the new
political climate in the region. In 2009, when Benjamin Netanyahu was again
re-elected Prime Minister, he appointed Avigdor Liberman as minister of
foreign affairs. Liberman set the task of diversifying Israeli ties with Africa
and Latin America. He made good on his promise and embarked on diplo-
matic trips to both continents. In the case of Latin America, Liberman vis-
ited Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Colombia in mid-2009. Some months later,
President Shimon Peres visited Argentina and Brazil. Almost a decade later,
in 2017, Benjamin Netanyahu completed the cycle by becoming the first
serving Israeli Prime Minister to visit Argentina, Colombia and Mexico.
Netanyahu’s visit to the region can be explained as part of a ‘charm
offensive’ and a diplomatic effort to broaden the political horizon of Israel’s
foreign policy beyond North America and Europe. In 2017 and 2018 the
Israeli leader visited countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia,
Kazakhstan, Singapore, Australia and Liberia, none of which had previously
hosted Israeli prime ministers. During these visits, Netanyahu stressed
Israel’s technological and economic edge, ignoring references to the stagnat-
ing Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In January 2019 he attended the inau-
guration of Brazilian President Bolsonaro in Brazil. Taking the Israeli
perspective into consideration, we should ask why Israel decided to upgrade
its relations with Latin America. There are several factors explaining Israel’s
new interest in the region.
First, as previously mentioned, by 2010 Israel sought to engage in a kind
of ‘preventive diplomacy’, expecting the tsunami of the recognition of the
Palestinian state, which is regarded in Israeli foreign policy in zero-sum
terms. The Israeli view contrasts with the Latin American perspective, which
regards the recognition of the Palestinian state as coming full-circle to com-
plete the support for the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and the concomitant
‘two states for two peoples’ solution. It is worth recalling that in 2009–2014
the Palestinian leadership had embarked on a diplomatic strategy aimed at
internationalizing the conflict and gaining statehood through the overall
support of the international community. To prevent that scenario, Israel
reached out to regions and countries that it had mostly overlooked in the
past, such as Latin America, or those that had shunned Israel, such as
sub-Saharan Africa since the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
Second, Israel became increasingly concerned about the extent of Iran’s
influence in Latin America. Having established close relations with Hugo
Chávez’s Venezuela, Iran reached out to other countries in Latin America. In
a very short period of time, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
(2005–2013) visited Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia. Iran and several
Latin American countries in the ‘Bolivarian axis’ increased their mutual
trade as well as their military and diplomatic cooperation. In this context, we
can refer to Brazilian President Lula’s attempt to mediate in the conflict
around the Iranian nuclear programme in 2010. Israel was also concerned
about the activities of Iran and its Shiite proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, that
162 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
was held responsible for the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Argentina in
1992 and 1994. Consequently, Israel embarked on a series of diplomatic
overtures to balance Iranian influence in the region.
Third, as mentioned above, significant political factions in the left-wing
governments that ruled in many Latin American countries during the first
decade of the 21st century, while not openly hostile to Israel, were very cri-
tical of its policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians on the grounds of serious viola-
tions of human rights. This criticism was largely reflected in civil society,
including universities, cultural centres, trade unions and centre-left political
parties throughout the region. Thus, from an Israeli perspective, it became
imperative to promote close ties with conservative right-wing governments
that sustained more empathetic attitudes. By doing so, Israel strengthened its
ties with the former government of Santos (and today Iván Duque Márquez)
in Colombia, Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, Horacio Cartes (2013–2018) in
Paraguay, Mauricio Macri (2015–2019) in Argentina, and most recently, Jair
Bolsonaro in Brazil. In addition, Israel recently recognized Juan Guaidó as
the acting president of Venezuela, thereby aligning itself with the majority of
the European and Latin American countries, and by extension, supporting
Trump’s approach to the Venezuelan crisis.
Fourth, Israel has a strong interest in expanding its trade and economic
cooperation with Latin America. In 2007 Israel became the first non-Latin
American country to sign an FTA with MERCOSUR, the economic block
comprising Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela (currently
suspended). The agreement sought to lower customs duties on exports and
imports in industrial and agricultural trade between Israel and members of
MERCOSUR. In 2014 the Netanyahu government approved a plan to
strengthen economic ties with the Pacific Alliance nations. The plan involved
the opening of new commercial offices, the promotion of tourism in Israel,
cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank, signing of free
trade and research and development agreements and the promotion of agri-
cultural projects. In that same year Israel became an observer member of the
Pacific Alliance.
Thus, Netanyahu’s visits to the region in 2017 and 2019 emphasized eco-
nomic cooperation and opportunities. For the Israeli business community,
Latin America is a growing market of more than 600 million people. Annual
trade between Israel and Latin America was about US $3 billion in 2016,
including $900 million with Mexico (Wermenbol 2019). Israel and Mexico
have had a bilateral FTA since 2000, and Israel is Mexico’s major trade
partner in the Middle East and its second most important foreign investor
after the United States.
Beyond the anticipated support in international fora such as the UN,
Israel benefits from closer economic ties with Latin America, not least due to
its ability to leverage demands for security, as is demonstrated in its security
cooperation agreements with Colombia, Argentina and most recently with
Brazil. In Mexico, Israel has been able to introduce private sector
 Israel 163
agricultural innovations. In 2018 the Mexican industrial group Mexichem
acquired 80% of the Israeli company Nefatim, the world’s largest provider of
drip irrigation systems; since then, it has established an investment hub in
Israel to scout for start-ups operating in the field of water scarcity and
flooding prevention (Wermenbol 2019).
The economic growth potential of Latin America makes it an attractive
destination for Israeli investors. According to forecasts, despite ongoing
economic volatility, the region is set to expand over the next few years. As
usual, Israel has used its economic statecraft to win over Latin American
countries and to improve its own economic prospects. Netanyahu’s economic
moves began in 2014 when he declared that ‘the Pacific Alliance of Latin
America is the next economic goal that will enable the Israeli economy to
continue to grow’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel 2014).
Fifth and most recently, Israel sought recognition of its sovereignty over
Jerusalem after the boost of President Trump’s decision to move the US
embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. By doing so, Israel was able to persuade
a number of Latin American countries (Guatemala and, briefly, Paraguay) to
move also their embassies to Jerusalem. President Jair Bolsonaro promised to
move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem but instead he only opened a
diplomatic trade office in Israel’s capital in December 2019.
Sixth, security is an additional explanation for Israel’s surge in its relations
with the region. In particular, Israel has provided Colombia with training
and military equipment to combat the former guerrilla group known as the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC—Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia). Israel and Colombia have maintained a very
close security relationship for years. Several Israeli agencies (official and less
so) have assisted the Colombian government in its conflict against the FARC,
while Colombia has been Israel’s staunchest ally in the region. Today, Israel
assists Colombia in clearing land mines following a peace agreement signed
in November 2016. In addition, Israel is the main supplier of drones to Latin
America, with Brazil being its main customer (Grassiani and Müller 2019).
Israeli officials from the Ministry of Defence also claim that the sale of
Israeli weapons has helped to strengthen bilateral relations, thus translating
into political support for Israel in international fora (Abdul Rahman 2019).

Conclusion
The surge in Israel-Latin America relations is based on changes in the global
distribution of power and on domestic political shifts in Latin America, from
right to left and back again (Robinson 2019). At the global level, factors
include the rise and fall of the traditional US hegemony in the West in gen-
eral, and in the Americas in particular. As we move into a more multipolar
context, both Israel and Latin America have been searching for new oppor-
tunities beyond Europe and the United States, by embarking in new diplo-
matic overtures and engagement with the People’s Republic of China, India,
164 Arie M. Kacowicz, Exequiel Lacovsky and Daniel F. Wajner
the Russian Federation and other emerging powers. In that sense, there is an
inherent logic in the fact that both Israel and several Latin American coun-
tries are ‘rediscovering’ each other and embarking in joint ventures focusing
on scientific, economic and security cooperation.
Moreover, as a ‘Jewish state’ Israel has also played a significant role in the
relationship between Latin American countries and their local Jewish com-
munities, and the existence of Israel has undoubtedly influenced decisions made
by Latin American governments regarding policies that affect the welfare, safety
and rights of their Jewish citizens. Therefore, Israel’s existence has created a
situation in which the actual or contemplated persecution of Jews has ceased
to be a purely internal matter, even for the most important countries in the
region, including Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (Kacowicz 2017).
From the Latin American perspective, the clout of the small (and often
influential) Jewish communities have to be balanced against the larger pre-
sence of millions of immigrants from Arab backgrounds, including hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians living in Chile, Brazil and other Latin American
countries (Bisharat 2019). In this sense, the quality of the relations between
Latin American countries and Israel has been a function of the complex,
dynamic and changing realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular (Munck and Pozzi 2019). For
instance, the relative stagnation of and fatigue surrounding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, in addition to the massive recognition of the Palestinian
state by the majority of Latin American countries has paradoxically led to
the loss of one of the main tools of political influence in the conflict.
There has been a recent and increasing interest in the study of Israel-Latin
America relations in the last decade, following a surge in its intensity in two
opposite directions. On the one hand, Israel has notably increased its pre-
sence in the region, through the establishment of economic, security and
political links with countries such as Colombia, Mexico and most recently
Argentina and Brazil. On the other hand, reflecting trends in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and its reverberations upon the Jewish and Muslim
communities in the region, many Latin American governments have become
increasingly critical of Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian territories,
following episodes of violence in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip (Munck and
Pozzi 2019). This culminated in the rupture of diplomatic relations with
Bolivia (until December 2019), and with Venezuela. Moreover, seesawing
relations between Israel and Latin America have reflected the political chan-
ges in the Latin American region from centre-right to left, and back to the
centre-right. Today, an important focus in this evolving relationship is the
growing presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America (Velez de Berliner
2016). The relations between Israel and Latin America will continue to
evolve and progress as a function of the changing political waves within the
Latin American countries, the US policy towards Israel and Latin America,
as well as the unfolding of the different types of conflicts lingering in both
the Middle East and in Latin America.
 Israel 165
Notes
1 We would like to thank Leonardo Senkman, Mauricio Dimant and Fabian Calle
for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2 The term Israelita (Israelite) historically refers to the inhabitants of the Ancient
Land of Israel and has been used synonymously for Hebrews or Jews. By contrast,
in the present day Israelis are citizens of the State of Israel.

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11 Patron or partner? Asymmetry
and complementarity in economic
relations between South Korea and
Latin America
Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak

Introduction
The presence of the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) in Latin
America is often misunderstood and prone to mystification. South Korea’s
achievement in developing industrial prowess in a brief period (SaKong and
Koh 2010) is a fact. The South Korean government and its policies were
crucial in that process, as was the role of family companies and the diligent,
educated and, at times, oppressed labour force. However, what is less recog-
nized is that a strong and nationalistic regime made South Korea’s export-
driven industrialization possible, nurturing local capitalists and maintaining
a vigilant and restrictive approach towards foreign investment (López Aymes
2015). As a result, by 2017 Korea was the fifth largest exporter in the world
in terms of value and had the fourth highest share of patent applications to
the World Intellectual Property Organization, after the People’s Republic of
China, the United States and Japan (WIPO 2018). Its principal exports are
machinery and electronic equipment, transportation (shipbuilding, auto-
motive), metals (steel) and chemicals, among other technology-based and
capital-intensive industries. A heavy dependence on the external sector has
accompanied such an impressive accomplishment. In 2010–2017 trade
accounted for 94.5% of South Korea’s GDP.1 South Korea is thus obliged to
work its way towards open markets and ensure the supply of a full range of
raw materials in order to survive. This is key to understanding the strategic
purpose of South Korean actors and policies in Latin America.
This chapter is organized in four sections. The first sets the context of
South Korean economic internationalization, closely linked to its dependence
on the external sector. The second analyses the economic relations between
South Korea and Latin America, stressing the reasons behind Latin Amer-
ica’s strategic value for Seoul. The third offers a critique of the current state
of economic relations and the prospect for deeper engagement. The fourth
section links the South Korea case study to the five key questions posed in
this volume.
168 Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak
Latin America as a stepping stone to South Korean
internationalization
South Korea has undergone several changes in its economic structure: from
light manufacturing in the 1960s and 1970s to capital-intensive industries in
the 1980s, technology in the 1990s and knowledge-intensive production in the
2000s. The internationalization of its firms is partly a response to these
structural changes. However, it is also a result of industrial maturity, with
several firms seeking access to resources, markets and technologies that are
not readily available through traditional trade exchange. Each stage of South
Korea’s economic evolution has required a different way of engaging with
external markets. Large corporations known as chaebol 2 have adjusted
accordingly by expanding their networks overseas (Kwak 2007; Yang et al.
2009; Yoon 2007).
The government remains an important agent in facilitating the inter-
nationalization of firms and in reducing the business environment risks by
negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) and extending the reach of its
international cooperation for development (ICD) system. The main pillars of
South Korea’s ICD system are the Economic Development Cooperation
Fund (EDCF) administered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea
Eximbank) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency, founded in
1987 and 1991, respectively. Official development assistance (ODA) pro-
grammes and special export-import credits, along with economic, energy,
social and physical infrastructure projects and concessionary loans, are some
of the instruments that the government uses to facilitate the inter-
nationalization of South Korean corporations around the developing world.
However, the international expansion of South Korea’s large firms, their
subsidiaries, affiliates and traditional suppliers is a recent phenomenon
spanning the past three decades. South Korea is also a newcomer to the
international development architecture, where the government has been
increasingly active in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation
programmes.
Latin America is part of the South Korean globalization strategy to keep
up with its dependence on the external sector (Kim 2018). However, despite
increasing economic partnerships and constant expansion of trade, invest-
ment and cooperation throughout the region for the past two decades, South
Korea’s economic activities in Latin America represent a small percentage
when compared to its operations in Asia (see Figures 11.1 and 11. 2).3 In
2017 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) absorbed 4.6% of South
Korean exports, while the East Asia and Pacific region accounted for 58% of
the total. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and ODA follow similar patterns.
In 2018 16% of South Korean investment went to Latin America and 34% to
Asia. In 2015 Korea disbursed 9% of its ODA in Latin America and 39% in
East Asia.4
 South Korea 169

Figure 11.1 South Korean imports and exports with LAC compared with South
Korea’s trade share with Asia and LAC, 1990–2018 (US $ million)
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Korea International Trade Association (KITA)
data, ‘K-Statistics’, available at www.kita.org/kStat/byCountEcon_SpeCountBloc.do
(accessed 31 May 2019).

Figure 11.2 South Korean ODA and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in
Asia and Latin America, 2000–2017 (US $ million)*
Note: * Korea Eximbank includes investment in tax havens such as Cayman Islands
and Bermuda, which substantially inflates the figures. For instance, during the 2012–
2018 period, South Korean investment in Cayman Islands was US $ 23,880 million,
equivalent to 62% of all South Korean investment in LAC in that period.
Source: Authors’ elaboration. For ODA see OECD (2019) ‘Distribution of net ODA
(indicator)’, available at https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of-net-oda.htm#indica
tor-chart; for OFDI see Korea Eximbank (n.d.) ‘Foreign Investment Statistics’,
available at https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do (accessed 31 May 2019).
170 Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak
Latin America’s attractiveness for South Korea
South Korean OFDI was not a significant feature of its economic inter-
nationalization before 1990. A surge occurred during the 1990s as part of the
liberalization of financial markets, which prompted South Korean firms to
expand overseas. South Korean investors were also motivated by concerns
over the formation of trading blocs like the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union and the Association of South
East Asian Nations. South Korean OFDI soared in the early 2000s, triggered
mainly by additional domestic post-crisis liberalization reforms and the
accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Asia
became the primary target of South Korean investors and interest in Latin
America came later in the decade, mostly after the 2008 global financial crisis
(see Figure 11.2). Although the levels of South Korean trade, investment and
international cooperation with LAC are significantly lower than with Asia,
their surge since the turn of the century is undeniable and deserves some
scrutiny of the South Korean government and business interests in the
region.
The international business literature has acknowledged that the rationale
for choosing where to invest varies according to the objectives of the leading
firms, but also to the location advantages of the host economies (Narula
2018; Dunning 2011; Mercado et al. 2008). For instance, firms may be
attracted by the market size, availability of resources and assets of recipients,
but also by the regulatory framework, the quality of infrastructure and the
existence of industrial agglomerations. What, then, attracts South Korea to
Latin America?

Fragmented political economy in Latin America

Latin America is a resource-rich region, which traditionally has played a
peripheral role as a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour in the inter-
national economic system, with sporadic and often failed attempts at
autonomous industrialization. Unresolved historical issues and fragmented
interests and political economies still divide the region. Despite several
regional and subregional integration mechanisms and initiatives, differences
and discontinuities remain the pattern (Contipelli 2017).
Economic nationalism easily turns into eccentric patriotism, rather than
serving as the basis of industrialization by fostering national capitalists and
domestic technologies as in East Asia (López Aymes 2009, 2010). Large
Latin American corporations, the ‘multilatinas’, are family business cliques
in low-technology sectors such as food processing, construction, extraction,
and services (those in telecommunication services do not produce their own
equipment). They tend to generate low-technology spillover effects and fail to
integrate into regional or global value chains despite their financial cap-
abilities and close links with government and political elites (Salas-Porras
 South Korea 171
2007). Commercial banking throughout the region is mostly foreign-owned
and focused on consumption credits, which helps neither to foster a national
or regional industrial base other than export platforms, nor to nurture local
capital. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure is uneven and mostly
underdeveloped, and the institutional framework is weak (ECLAC 2009,
2019). As a result, direct investments often face bottlenecks and high trans-
action costs and offer no incentive (nor obligation) to transfer technology.
Consequently, regional production chains are fragmented, dependent on
extra-regional firms and concentrated in extractive and labour-intensive eco-
nomic activities (Silva Flores et al. 2018; Zaclicever 2017). This context
makes long-term commitments challenging for anyone.
The lack of a functional integration process led by regionally based firms
and the competition among national and provincial governments to attract
fragments of global production chains provoke a race-to-the-bottom reg-
ulatory spree (Amaro and Miles 2006; Drezner 2001; Gallagher and Chud-
novsky 2009). This in turn deepens distrust and undermines the formulation
of common goals and cooperation mechanisms. However, these conditions
also bestow extraordinary concessions to extra-regional economic interests in
exchange for creating revenues and jobs, regardless of their precariousness
(Duarte 2018). The preceding situation makes it hard for Latin American
countries to follow their own path of economic development. Such efforts,
however, are self-constrained by the development models themselves—whe-
ther of a socialist or neoliberal nature—which regard foreign capital as either
a threat or a panacea; in neither case are policies and resources fully devoted
to building domestic capabilities as a pathway to autonomy.

Beyond fragmentation: South Korea’s enduring interest in

Latin America
Despite these unpromising circumstances, South Korea has continued to seek
to engage with the region in several ways. The fragmentation is apparent in
the way South Korea approaches individual countries. This means that South
Korean relations with Latin America are tailored in a functional fashion,
according to the specific conditions and advantages that each of the econo-
mies offers. In this sense, there are broadly two groups of countries attracting
the Seoul government and South Korean economic actors: on the one hand,
those countries offering labour and markets (Mexico and Brazil), and on the
other those offering natural resources (the rest of LAC).
The fragmentation in the region thus reinforces the role of each country in
the regional economic system and therefore the concentration of South
Korean trade and investment in few economies. Mexico and Brazil have no
FTAs with South Korea but are its major trade partners and main recipients
of FDI (see Figure 11.3). These countries also have the greatest trade deficits
(US $12,327 million and $2,162 million in 2017, respectively5) owing espe-
cially to intra-industry and -firm trade (ECLAC 2015: 30; Estevadeordal et
172 Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak
al. 2015). About 80% of the $12 billion deficit shown by Mexico with South
Korea relates to the import of parts and components by the chaebol and
their networks for assembling and exporting finished goods to the United
States.
There is a growing belief in Latin America that exports will help economies
to thrive, especially if countries become export platforms of manufactured
goods and if they are able to attract transnational corporations. For the most
part, South Korean corporations take advantage of the willingness of gov-
ernments to grant rights over natural resources and to facilitate the exploi-
tation of production factors (i.e. labour) to invest and establish their own
traditional manufacturing networks, along with maintaining the exchange
structure of trading finished value-added goods for raw materials. As shown
in Figure 11.4, the manufacturing and mining sectors are the most common
destinations for South Korean FDI.6 These also concentrated in a small
number of countries: from 2000–2018 82% of South Korean investment in
manufacturing in LAC went to Mexico (34%) and Brazil (49%), and from
2015–2018 Peru alone received 53% (US $928.5 million) of all South Korean
investment in mining in the region.
In addition to the chronic trade deficit run by Latin America with South
Korea since the 1990s (see Figure 11.1) the trade structure sets both parties
clearly at opposite ends to one another: a large and resource-rich region on
the one hand and a relatively small but technologically advanced economy on
the other (see Table 11.1). However, bearing in mind the South Korean
industrial development trajectory and the organizational characteristics of its

Figure 11.3 South Korean trade and FDI concentration in LAC, 2000–2018 (US $
million)
Note: * Excluding Bermuda (2000) and Cayman Islands (2001–2018).
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Korea Eximbank data, ‘Foreign Investment Sta-
tistics’, available at https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do, and from Korea
International Trade Association data, ‘K-Statistics’, available at www.kita.org/kStat/
byCountEcon_SpeCountBloc.do (accessed 2 June 2019).
 South Korea 173

Figure 11.4 Korean FDI in LAC by sector (US $ million)*

Note: * Excluding Bermuda (2000) and Cayman Islands (2001–2018).
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Korea Eximbank data, ‘Foreign Investment Sta-
tistics’, available at https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do (accessed 2 July 2019).

large corporations, which tend to dominate investments and trade (Kwak

2007: 15–17), the idea of complementarity needs to be reassessed.
Several legal agreements have progressively formalized and protected this
pattern of economic relations. These agreements, apart from reciprocal
market opening, do not stipulate entry conditions to foreign firms (i.e. joint
ventures) nor do they require knowledge transfer from South Korean com-
panies. On the contrary, agreements protect intellectual and industrial prop-
erty rights, regardless of the development concerns of the host economies. To
date, South Korea has three bilateral FTAs in force with LAC countries
(Chile 2004, Peru 2011 and Colombia 2016), one multilateral FTA with
Central American countries and investment protection agreements with most
states in the region (except Ecuador). FTA negotiations with Ecuador and
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado
Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul) are currently ongoing.7
These agreements should be seen in the light of South Korean export
promotion as well as competition with China and Japan for gaining pre-
ferential access to mineral, agricultural, forestry and fishery resources, as well
as entry rights to participate in government procurement. However, instead
of utilizing this context to extract more from South Korea and the other
Asian powers, Latin American partners were simply hopeful that the FTAs
could work as instruments leading to trade diversification, attracting new
sources of investment to create jobs and stimulate technology transfer (Romo
2003). As shown in Table 11.2, trade and investment growth and diversifica-
tion actually occurred after each FTA entered into force, although exports
have not changed their structure and there is no evidence of any significant
Table 11.1 South Korean trade structure with selected LAC countries, 2018 (US $ million, %)
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Argentina 291,531 643,056 Colombia 627,432 819,273
Capital goods 0.09 45.32 Capital goods 0.11 33.08
Consumer goods 3.25 24.41 Consumer goods 2.15 27.05
Intermediate 6.63 30.22 Intermediate 6.38 39.82
goods goods
Raw materials 50.41 0.04 Raw materials 91.35 0.05
Chile 4,342,295 1,870,911 Peru 2,462,131 972,135
Capital goods 0.01 28.92 Capital goods 0.11 24.13
Consumer goods 1.7 52.51 Consumer goods 18.89 45.14
Intermediate 51.39 18.51 Intermediate 5.21 30.69
goods goods
Raw materials 46.89 0.04 Raw materials 75.79 0.04
Brazil 3,437,333 5,380,880 Mexico 2,283,814 16,726,998
Capital goods 1.55 68.54 Capital goods 22.83 58.01
Consumer goods 1.72 12.73 Consumer goods 11.72 16.36
Intermediate 49.33 18.59 Intermediate 7.42 19.11
goods goods
Raw materials 47.39 0.14 Raw materials 57.8 0.29

Source: Authors’ elaboration from World Integrated Trade Solutions data, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/ (accessed 2 December 2020).
 South Korea 175
technology transfer despite the unprecedented increase in South Korean FDI
in Chile and Peru. As for Colombia, it is too early to make conclusions but
nothing seems to indicate a different pattern.
Consequently, by institutionalizing this trade structure and protecting the
interests of foreign firms, Chile, Peru and Colombia clearly have a trade
surplus in primary goods, but also a significant deficit in value-added indus-
trial goods. It seems, though, that the implications of this structure of eco-
nomic exchange is a matter of perception. The United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has noted that
Chile exports large volumes of primary products and processed natural
resources to South Korea, and that the surplus from these sectors ‘more than
compensates the deficit in sectors with greater technological content’
(ECLAC 2015: 57, emphasis added). This sort of argument is compatible
with the idea that, in order to maintain or restore the trade balance, Latin
America must export more of its primary resources. Speaking about the
Chilean experience, Cesar Ross suggests that such a trade and investment
structure can be conceived as ‘virtuous asymmetry’ as long as the export
drive is accompanied by a parallel (domestic) effort to gradually add more
value to the goods sold to Asian markets. However, industrial policies in
LAC are absent and, as ECLAC itself has recognized, it is unlikely that trade
and investment agreements alone will change the structure of the exchange
between South Korea and Latin America (ibid.: 67).

Trade composition as a proxy for asymmetry

The problem with this narrow economic perspective is that it ignores the
importance of the exchange composition and the potential of advances in
technology. One may point out that it is not the trade balance but the trade
structure that lies at the heart of the problems of development. For example,
while it may sound reasonable that the Mexican trade deficit with South
Korea is compensated by the fact that Mexico enjoys a trade surplus overall
(thanks to triangular exports to the United States), the fact that 80% of
Mexican imports from South Korea are intermediate goods and components
to be assembled by South Korean companies in Mexico and then exported as
finished goods means that Mexican firms are not being included in the value
and production chains. Perhaps no Mexican (or Latin American) firms are
capable of producing such goods and components in the necessary quan-
tities, to a high standard, and in a manner that ensures timely delivery; thus,
South Korean companies must acquire them externally or from other South
Korean firms. It is also possible that South Korean networks are closed in
order to protect technology and know-how and ensure swift coordination,
which are key advantages in world market competition.
Either way, the prevailing perspective considers this structure to be a
complementary division of labour based on the concept of comparative
advantage. Ross (2008: 111) refers to it as an ‘almost natural
Table 11.2 Exports and FDI growth and diversification after FTA with South Korea
Country (year Exports (US $ million) Growth Main export products Share of total Partner South Korean FDI Growth
before FTA YBFTA- (US $ million) YBFTA-
(YBFTA)) 2018 2018
YBFTA 2018 YBFTA 2018 YBFTA 2018 YBFTA 2018 YBFTA 2018
Chile (2003) 1,079,911 4,342,295 302.1% Metals 45.19% Minerals 4.99% 5.75% 4 4 5,500 105,116 1811.2%
Minerals 30.23% 38.5%
Metals
29.6%
Peru (2010) 895,993 2,462,131 174.8% Minerals 84.29% Minerals 2.50% 5.14% 11 4 48,269 266,410 451.9%
Fuels 4.92% 79.6%
Metals 5.2%
Colombia 229,363 627,432 173.6% Metals 38.23% Fuels 68.7% 0.64% 2.78% 30 14 12,264 6,338 –48.3%
(2015) Vegetable 31.71% Metals
23.9%

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions data, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/ (accessed 2 December 2020) and Korea Eximbank, ‘Foreign Investment
Statistics’, available at https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do (accessed 28 June 2019).
 South Korea 177
complementarity with Asia Pacific’, although he believes it can be ‘virtuous’
when it becomes a form of cooperative trade integration sustained by com-
modity exports and by the importation of manufactured goods from East
Asia. Although Ross recognizes that asymmetry in international relations
reflects differences in power and thus relationships of domination and sub-
ordination, he and those who embrace economic complementarity as an
approach seem to overlook the negative implications of setting equal rules
between unequal ‘partners’. Consequently, economic and technological
asymmetry becomes a normal feature of the relationship and efforts to catch
up are often met with resistance from advanced economies protecting their
interests.
The notion of complementarity becomes part of the discourse with all
parties accepting their respective roles, thus shaping the institutions that
govern the relationships between South Korea and LAC. Advances in science
and technology are constrained not only by the rules of knowledge produc-
tion, sharing and accumulation, but also by the mediocre domestic policy
currently governing the development of skilled human resources in Latin
America.
From 2006–2016 gross domestic expenditure on research and development
(GERD) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in Argentina
averaged 0.55%, while in Brazil it was 1.17%, in Chile 0.35%, in Colombia
0.23%, and in Mexico 0.5%. Conversely, the GERD in South Korea as a
percentage of GDP was 3.67%. South Korea thus averaged nearly 5,800
researchers per million inhabitants in the same period, which contrasts with
1,115 in Argentina, 742 in Brazil, 374 in Chile, 138 in Colombia, and 293 in
Mexico (see Table 11.3). In 2017 South Korea was able to apply for 204,775
patents at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) compared to
3,443 from Argentina, 25,658 from Brazil, 2,894 from Chile, 2,372 from
Colombia, 17,184 from Mexico and 1,219 from Peru. In addition, patent
applicants in South Korea are mostly South Korean residents, by a rate of
almost 3:1, while in Latin America the opposite is the case, with non-resi-
dents applying at a ratio of 4:1 or even 5:1 (for Mexico the rate is almost 10:1
non-resident applicants with respect to residents).8 It is no surprise that
South Korea ranks among the top five patent applicants at WIPO, while
Latin American countries are far down the list.
Given these characteristics of the workforce, the prospects for upgrading
local technology seem unfeasible and unattractive for long-term investment
in advanced stages of the production process. This reinforces the view of
Latin America in the interregional division of labour as an extractive market
with only a few centres featuring low-skilled manufacturing and the assem-
bling sectors concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. This is particularly evident
in the electronics and automotive industries, and to a lesser extent in metals,
finance, textiles, marketing and sales (ECLAC 2015: 76–77; Estevadeordal et
al. 2015: 22–3).
Table 11.3 Knowledge and scientific base in South Korea and selected Latin American countries (2007–2016)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

South Korea GERD/GDP 3.01% 3.14% 3.30% 3.45% 3.74% 4.03% 4.15% 4.29% 4.22% 4.23%
R (FTE) 221,928 236,137 244,077 264,118 288,901 315,589 321,842 345,463 356,447 361,292
Rp/M(FTE) 4,603 4,867 5,001 5,380 5,853 6,362 6,457 6,900 7,087 7,113
Patents* 172,469 170,632 163,523 170,101 178,924 188,915 204,589 210,292 213,694 208,830
Argentina GERD/GDP 0.46% 0.47% 0.59% 0.56% 0.57% 0.64% 0.62% 0.59% 0.61% 0.53%
R(FTE) 38,681 41,523 42,136 46,199 49,029 50,489 50,785 51,665 52,970 54,046
Rp/M(FTE) 968 1,028 1,033 1,121 1,177 1,199 1,194 1,202 1,220 1,233
Patents* 5,743 5,582 4,976 4,717 4,821 4,813 4,772 4,682 4,125 3,809
Brazil GERD/GDP 1.08% 1.13% 1.12% 1.16% 1.14% 1.13% 1.20% 1.27% 1.34% 1.27%
R(FTE) 116,270 120,529 129,102 138,653 145,710 157,136 168,563 179,989 N/A N/A
Rp/M(FTE) 603 619 656 698 733 783 833 881 N/A N/A
Patents* 21,663 23,170 22,406 24,999 28,649 30,435 30,884 30,342 30,219 28,010
Chile GERD/GDP 0.31% 0.38% 0.35% 0.33% 0.35% 0.36% 0.39% 0.37% 0.38% 0.36%
R(FTE) 5,551 5,959 4,859 5,440 6,078 6,798 5,893 7,585 8,175 8,993
Rp/M(FTE) 337 358 289 320 353 391 335 427 460 502
Patents* 3,806 3,952 1,717 1,076 2,792 3,019 3,072 3,105 3,274 2,907
Colombia GERD/GDP 0.18% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.21% 0.23% 0.27% 0.31% 0.29% 0.27%
R(FTE) 6,821 7,490 7,813 8,369 7,798 6,845 5,490 5,491 3,305 4,305
Rp/M(FTE) 154 167 172 182 168 146 116 115 69 88
Patents* 1,990 1,944 1,679 1,872 1,953 2,061 2,032 2,158 2,242 2,203
Mexico GERD/GDP 0.47% 0.52% 0.54% 0.51% 0.51% 0.49% 0.50% 0.53% 0.52% 0.49%
R(FTE) 37,930 37,639 42,973 38,497 39,826 29,094 29,921 N/A N/A N/A
Rp/M(FTE) 335 327 368 325 331 238 242 N/A N/A N/A
Patents* 16,599 16,581 14,281 14,576 14,055 15,314 15,444 16,135 18,071 17,413

Source: Authors’ own elaboration. Data from: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS.Stat), available at http://data.uis.unesco.org (Note: No data available for
Peru); WIPO, “WIPO IP Statistics Data Center,” available at https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.htm?tab=patent (retrieved on June 2, 2019).
* Patent total applications.
 South Korea 179
Other means of engagement
In order to deepen its relationship with Latin America and consolidate its
position in the region, in addition to signing FTAs, South Korea has also
joined several regional and extra-regional organizations. It has been a per-
manent observer at the Organization of American States since 1981, the
Latin American Integration Association since 2004, and the Pacific Alliance
since 2013. In 2005 South Korea joined the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), and this became the main vehicle for the provision of South
Korean multilateral cooperation funds and projects in the region. Through
the IADB Syndicate Loan Program, South Korea’s EDCF has provided
financial aid for infrastructure projects in developing countries in Latin
America since 2015 (totalling US $100 million), and in 2017 it agreed to
increase the funding to $300 million. South Korea is also an active associate
of the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (the FEALAC
Cyber Secretariat is based in Seoul). In addition, South Korea is a founding
member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a forum where dialogue
can be conducted at various levels with Mexico, Chile and Peru. In 2010
Korea became a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Despite the increasing resources for cooperation programmes in Latin
America (see Figure 11.2), there is no clear correlation with FDI flows. For
instance, neither Brazil nor Mexico—the main recipients of South Korean
investment in the region—are substantial beneficiaries of South Korean
cooperation. The reason may be that these countries are upper-middle-
income economies, and hence are not eligible as beneficiaries of South
Korean ICD policies. Yet Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Paraguay and Peru are in the same
category as Mexico and Brazil, but are among the top 15 recipients of South
Korean cooperation. Overall, the fact that 12 of the top 15 ICD recipients
are also on the top 15 list of South Korean FDI (excluding Mexico and
Brazil) reveals a plausible linkage between private economic interests seeking
natural resources and the government’s ICD policies.

A critique of the new Asian partner: the issue of complementarity

The supposed complementarity of trans-Pacific relations is framed by a dis-
course emphasizing comparative advantages and theories of economic inte-
gration (ECLAC/BID 2010; Kim 1998; Meng 2013; Ross 2008; Shixue 2011).
The neoclassical development discourse often implies that economic differ-
ences bring dynamism. This narrative assumes that economies are always
moving towards ‘superior’ stages of production and consumption capacities,
thus rendering asymmetries a temporary and natural attribute of inter-
regional relations. In fact, development theories based on the notion of
comparative advantage accept asymmetries as a sort of optimal friction-free
180 Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak
state of mutual benefit (IADB 2013; Estevadeordal et al. 2015: 7–9; Mesquita
Moreira 2011).
This chapter takes a more critical perspective, whereby complementarity
conceals the reality of capitalist competition, based on the international, or
regional, division of labour. Neoliberal ideology supports establishing level-
led trade and investment regimes, as well as restrictive international rules for
intellectual property. Thus, industrial and trade policies, government pro-
curement, patent flexibility, regulation of foreign investment and trade are all
harshly criticized as being ‘economic non-sense’, inefficient, rent seeking,
corrupt and unfair. Levelling the playing field is the favourite mantra of
international organizations and neoliberal epistemic communities, and
ultimately this allows the ‘grown-ups’ to compete unfairly with the ‘infants’.
Even international cooperation programmes and South-South cooperation
sometimes lead to the neglect of domestic development. Advanced econo-
mies, now including China, finance and promote infrastructure for export
platforms, build the capacities of an export-oriented labour force and advo-
cate appealing ideas such as mutual benefit and the shared values of market
economy and democracy. Yet this narrative hides the fact that advanced
economies did not achieve their status by following such prescriptions or by
letting outsiders gain control over key industries. From a critical perspective,
complementarity reinforces a static view of the international economic
system and development, which does not reduce dependence and frequently
hinders emancipation.
By maintaining the current forms of commercial exchange and invest-
ment—justified by South Korea with complementarity—asymmetrical rela-
tions are likely to persist and the technology gap will widen. Such framing
justifies production and value chains led by South Korean firms. Accord-
ingly, there is no need to nurture local ‘infant’ industries or to include local
suppliers as South Korean partners have already filled those positions. This
trend was clear after the business upsurge of China, Japan and South Korea
that sparked the commodities boom in the first half of the 2010s. This also
suddenly lifted several Latin American firms, landlords and governments to a
wealthy status. Sometimes, it contributed to temporary market and financial
diversification. However, the commodities boom did not lead to an upgrade
in technological capabilities. On the contrary, it strengthened the tendency
towards ‘productive reprimarization’ (Bolinaga and Slipak, 2015; Gallagher
et al. 2012; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2009; León Manríquez 2011).
The use of concepts such as complementarity provides the ideological
ground to identify the ‘proper’ role of each party in the South Korea-LAC
relationship. The South Korean government and businesses provide technol-
ogy, while Latin American countries provide market access, natural resources
and labour, as these represent their comparative advantages. South Korean
capital can settle in manufacturing segments in Mexico, Brazil and perhaps
other countries in the region without compromising ownership and remain-
ing competitive in the global and US market. Latin America gains jobs. Both
 South Korea 181
parties win, to an extent. However, in the long term, the limits to Latin
American capacity to catch up industrially and technologically are evident.
They are also politically irrational given the long-term consequences for
sustainable economic development and political autonomy.

Conclusion
The South Korean presence in Latin America is modest and recent compared
to that of China and Japan. Among the reasons that explain the surge of the
past two decades, two stand out. First is the South Korean response to its
own structural changes and increasing dependence on the foreign sector. The
other is the fact that Latin America has welcomed Asian countries as a
counterweight to the presence of the United States and Europe. The inter-
nationalization processes of South Korea and Latin America are, however,
quite different in nature. The former is proactive and seeks varied and stable
ways of engagement. The latter tends to be passive and reactive to foreign
initiatives.
South Korea’s engagement with Latin America started slowly in the 1980s.
It experienced its first surge in the 1990s, coinciding with the creation of
NAFTA. Since then Mexico has remained the largest trade and investment
partner in the region. A second, more significant surge took place in the 21st
century, and even more intensely in the second half of the 2000s. By this time
South Korea was facing a major challenge owing to the entry of China into
the WTO and its ‘going global’ strategy, which threatened South Korean
interests in South-East Asia. Latin America then essentially became a source
of natural resources at reasonable prices.
Consequently, South Korean engagement in Latin America is felt mostly
in trade and investment, buttressed by ICD programmes and a formal pre-
sence in regional organizations and trans-Pacific economic forums and
cooperation mechanisms. South Korea has also extended its influence and
protected its interests by negotiating trade and investment agreements with
Latin American countries and subregional groups. Seoul has successfully
combined the aura of a country deprived of freedom during Japanese occu-
pation and devastated by war with the narrative of a newly industrialized
economy that has graduated from the periphery to the centre of the world
system. South Korea also portrays itself as a benevolent and trustworthy
partner, which shares its wealth of knowledge and capital with the develop-
ing world through FDIs and cooperation, mostly out of solidarity. All this
certainly resonates in Latin America, nourishing the hopes and aspirations of
breaking old moulds of structural dependence. The concept of
complementarity is a cornerstone in this win-win discourse.
Latin America’s assessment of its relationship with South Korea is positive
and the idea of complementarity is generally accepted. However, such ‘nat-
ural complementarity’ somehow hides the developmental discussion on
industrial catch-up and technological autonomy. On the back of the East
182 Juan Felipe López Aymes and Jae Sung Kwak
Asian industrialization experience, this accomplishment is not contingent
upon market forces alone, but is mostly the result of the support and coor-
dination of state-led economic policies. Accordingly, we argue that South
Korean FDI, the composition of trade and the cooperation programmes in
LAC match South Korean needs, but hardly benefit the recipient countries in
their aspirations to close the technological gap and pursue sustainable
development.
The present structure of South Korea-Latin America relations normalizes
the asymmetrical economic exchanges within the conventional North-South
pattern. Growing trade, FDI flows and cooperation may give the impression
of a win-win relationship. However, we reiterate that there is significant scope
for further improvement and a more balanced exchange. Emphasis on
investment in human resources (scientific, technical and managerial), the
integration of local firms in upstream and downstream linkages, and a
clearer assessment of the impact of South Korea’s cooperation would be
suitable tools for this purpose. However, Latin American political and eco-
nomic elites are ultimately responsible for the region’s enfranchisement and
development.

Notes
1 World Integrated Trade Solutions (n.d.) ‘Republic of Korea’, available at https://
wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KOR/StartYear/1990/EndYear/201
7/Indicator/NE-TRD-GNFS-ZS (accessed 20 June 2019).
2 A chaebol is typically a large and highly diversified private business group com-
posed of several industrial and non-banking financial enterprises, many of which
are dominant in their own market, tied together by cross-investment, and con-
trolled by the strong leadership of family owners, most of whom are descendants
of the founders of each big conglomerate. Groups such as Samsung, Hyundai and
SK are examples of chaebol.
3 Vietnam alone receives more ODA from South Korea than the whole of Latin
America.
4 For exports, see World Integrated Trade Solutions (n.d.) ‘Rep. exports, imports
and trade balance by Region 2017’, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/Coun
tryProfile/en/Country/KOR/Year/2017/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-region#;
for FDI, see Korea Eximbank (n.d.) ‘Foreign Investment Statistics’, available at
https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do (accessed 31 May 2019); for ODA, see
OECD-DAC (2018: 103).
5 WB-WITS, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/ (accessed 22 June 2019).
6 We did not include investment in financial and insurance activities in Bermuda and
the Cayman Islands assuming that these mostly related to deposits made to tax
haven regimes and would heavily distort the description. For instance, during the
period 2012–2018, South Korean investment in the Cayman Islands was 62% of
total South Korean investment in LAC. See Korea Eximbank, ‘Foreign Investment
Statistics’, available at https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/en/enMain.do (accessed 24
June 2019).
7 Trade negotiations with Mexico were interrupted a few years ago.
8 WIPO, ‘WIPO IP Statistics Data Center’, available at www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.
htm?tab=patent (accessed 3 June 2019).
 South Korea 183
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12 Taiwan and its Latin American allies
An uphill diplomatic campaign
Chung-Chian Teng

Introduction
When the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) leader Tsai Ing-wen won the
presidential election of the Republic of China in Taiwan (hereafter ROC/
Taiwan) in 2016, Taiwan’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) again attracted media attention. The reason was the DPP’s political
platform advocating Taiwan’s independence and international autonomy.
President Tsai Ing-wen intended to abandon the core policy towards the
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter PRC/China) of her predecessor, Ma
Ying-jeou, based on the ‘1992 Consensus’ with different interpretations.1 The
diplomatic truce with China terminated in January 2016 resulting in inter-
national diplomatic competition. Over the past few years Taiwan has suf-
fered a series of diplomatic setbacks in Latin America after Panama, the
Dominican Republic and El Salvador shifted their diplomatic recognition
from Taiwan to China.
The negative trend in Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with Latin America
remains. An additional warning signal came from Paraguay, a 63-year old
ally of the ROC’s, in April 2020, when the Paraguayan Senate debated whe-
ther to urge the president to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to
Beijing. Although the proposal was defeated, it signalled that Paraguay’s
powerful agribusiness sector intends to increase its beef and soybean exports
to China (Long and Urdinez 2020). Moreover, the ‘Taiwan cost’ is far larger
for Paraguay than are the benefits of aid and investment from Taiwan as a
show of support for its diplomatic loyalty. It is estimated that ‘Paraguay was
missing out on US$138 million in Chinese investment and $224 million in
Chinese development finance each year’ because of the ‘Taiwan cost’ asso-
ciated with the recognition of Taipei and therefore the absence of formal
diplomatic relations with Beijing (Youkee 2019).
The ongoing tensions with China have prompted Taiwan to seek strategies
to back its position internationally. In particular, Taipei engages with its
allies in Latin America through trade and aid cooperation in exchange for
diplomatic support. This chapter examines the political economy of Taiwan’s
external relations in Latin America. First, it assesses the influence that China
 Taiwan 187
and the United States have on Taipei’s projection in the region. Then it
analyses trade and cooperation flows between Taiwan and LAC.

Taiwan and China in Latin America: a geo-economic game

Since 1911 the ROC has regarded itself as a sovereign state in international
society and maintains formal diplomatic relations with 15 countries. Yet
Taiwan’s status remains problematic in practice and is increasingly ques-
tioned by scholars (Long and Urdinez 2020). Its position has been a unique
case in international relations since 1971, when it was expelled from the
United Nations as the legal and legitimate representative of China. After
that, more and more countries have switched their diplomatic recognition
from Taiwan to China. In accordance with its ‘One China’ principle, the
PRC insists that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is either a part of
it or a renegade province. Under these circumstances, Taiwan’s international
space has been squeezed and the country faces issues concerning its internal
and external sovereignty. With regard to the latter, it is imperative for Taiwan
to cling to its few remaining allies internationally, and those in Latin America in
particular.
As a result of PRC President Xi Jinping’s assertive policy in Latin Amer-
ica, Taiwan faces political and economic competition from China in the
region. Politically, it is of paramount importance that Taipei should avoid
diplomatic isolation. One major goal of China’s diplomacy has been to iso-
late Taiwan generally, and notably in LAC (Ellis 2009: 15; Jiang 2008; Zhu
2013). Except for a short period of ‘diplomatic truce’ from 2008–2016, China
and Taiwan have been locked in fierce diplomatic confrontation and
competition in Latin America (Zhu 2013: 87–90).
China’s economic might is a key tool through which it can assert its
influence in Latin America. With the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive
economic presence, China has penetrated LAC through its financial instru-
ments, especially loans from state-owned and -run banks such as the China
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China (Gallagher and
Ray 2016: 74; Guajardo 2016: 71–72). According to the Inter-American
Dialogue, the value of China’s loans to Latin America increased from US $7
billion in 2012 to $29 billion in 2015 (Gillespie 2016). The amount of Chi-
nese loans to Latin America in 2015 were nearly twice as much as the grand
total of loans from all of the Western multilateral development banks,
including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the
Latin American Development Bank (Ray et al. 2016). The four main bene-
ficiaries of China’s financial loans in Latin America are Venezuela, Brazil,
Argentina and Ecuador (Myers et al. 2016).
Overall, China has maintained closer and more prosperous trade and
investment relations with South American nations while paying less attention
to Central America and the Caribbean, economically and politically (Aven-
daño and Dayton-Johnson 2016). Indeed, Paraguay is the only Latin
188 Chung-Chian Teng
American country to have maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and
it is difficult to forecast how long this alliance may last. The critical factor is
the high level of cohesion among political and economic elites in Paraguay,
who trumpet the assistance projects offered by Taiwan for their own political
sake and benefit (Long and Urdinez 2020). The golden rule is that the ruling
Partido Colorado in Paraguay has always garnered the largest share of
material benefits from foreign aid.
China’s economic relations with Central America and the Caribbean have
been negligible thus far. Beijing has imported foodstuffs and mineral resources
from Mexico and micro-processers from Costa Rica (León-Manríquez 2016:
268). Yet China has been very cautious in this region, partly to avoid any
friction with the United States. However, it is conceivable that China will make
strategic manoeuvres in Central America and the Caribbean too. This would
have a major impact on Taiwan. Greater Chinese penetration would most
likely lead to a lessening of the economic appeal of Taipei in the region but
especially to reduced political support and diplomatic recognition for Taiwan.
Currently, China maintains diplomatic relations with four countries in the
region: Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. In
addition to their strategic position as world sea lanes (MacDonald 2019),
these four countries are the most important economic and trade actors in the
region. After China established formal diplomatic relations with the four
countries, it immediately initiated plans for economic cooperation. The case
of Panama is the best example. Panama is the fastest-growing economy in
Central America and its strategic position has turned it into a global mar-
itime hub. For China, diplomatic relations with Panama are a means not
only to give it a more extensive diplomatic presence, but also for securing
access to the Panama Canal as one of the most important maritime hubs, a
symbol of China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere (Sun 2017). Eco-
nomic and geopolitical goals characterize China’s presence in Central
America and the Caribbean.

Taiwan in the context of the changing US grand strategy

Traditionally, one major pillar of Taiwan’s diplomacy has been the country’s
reliance and dependence upon the United States as its supporter and broker
in the international milieu. Taiwan’s relations with Latin America are no
exception. It is natural for Taiwan to solicit official assistance from the
United States in this region. From the US side, the support of Taiwan in
the Western Hemisphere has a lot to do with the US national interest and the
containment of China. If the United States fails to back its ally Taiwan,
more Latin American governments would develop closer relations with
China (Ellis 2018). For US conservatives in particular, preventing China
from gaining a foothold in the region should be a crucial part of the US
grand strategy. Accordingly, the national strategy pursued by the Trump
Administration is of relevance.
 Taiwan 189
The Trump Administration’s perception of China in global affairs was
captured in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, in which China is
described as a revisionist power challenging the influence, value and wealth
of the United States (Landler and Sanger 2017; Zhang 2017). China is posi-
tioned as a ‘strategic competitor’ utilizing its military modernization and
economic aggression to coerce neighbouring countries and to reset the order
of the Indo-Pacific region (Haenle and Grace 2018). The new focus of the
US security strategy is shifting from decade-long anti-terrorism to power
competition with China as well as the Russian Federation.
With the repositioning of its strategic thinking, the United States has
continued its campaign targeted at China and extended it to Latin America.
Prior to the Summit of the Americas in 2018, White House officials criticized
China strongly describing it as an aggressive external state. However, they
failed to take into account the fact that China is the top trade partner for
Latin American countries (Huang 2018). Under these circumstances, Taiwan
can play a significant role as a US ally in the Indo-Pacific and can expect to
garner assistance and support for its Latin American strategy from the
United States.
The Trump Administration adopted a series of new foreign policy mea-
sures signalling a friendly and supportive posture towards Taiwan. The US
Congress passed legislative acts to show friendship to Taiwan and to support
official contacts between two countries. One of the first steps in this direction
was a visit to Taipei by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong. His
presence at the 2018 Annual Hsieh Nien Fan Business Dinner, sponsored by
the American Chamber of Commerce, was unprecedented. During a speech
given at the dinner, Wong spoke about the new direction of US-Taiwan
relations:

We can be certain that the United States’ commitment to the Taiwan

people, to their security, to their democracy, has never been stronger …
Because our relationship isn’t transactional … The United States has
been, is, and always will be Taiwan’s closest friend and partner.
(American Institute in Taiwan 2018)

These words foretold the upcoming model for interaction between the
United States and Taiwan, with the latter holding an important role on the
US strategic chessboard.
In March 2020 President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Allies Inter-
national Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019. The
TAIPEI Act required the US government to take action to support Taiwan’s
presence in international affairs, to strengthen Taiwan’s diplomatic relations
with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region, to advocate for Taiwan’s
membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a
requirement, and to grant Taiwan observer status in other appropriate inter-
national organizations (Zhou 2020). The United States’ new direction of
190 Chung-Chian Teng
foreign policy towards Taiwan can be appreciated on the policy level and on
the operational level.
At the policy level, several public speeches made by US high-ranking
decision-makers expressed support for Taiwan in international affairs, espe-
cially with regard to its maintaining diplomatic relations with countries
around the world. In his 2019 speech on policy towards China, Vice
President Mike Pence specifically mentioned that

through checkbook diplomacy, over the past year China has induced two
more nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing,
increasing pressure on democracy in Taiwan … The international com-
munity must never forget that its engagement with Taiwan does not
threaten the peace; it protects peace in Taiwan and throughout the
region.
(The White House 2019)

In a similar vein, when US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of

East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell met Taiwan’s Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs Szu-chien Hsu in October 2019, he reiterated concerns
that China should not be able to capture Taiwan’s existing diplomatic allies
through the unilateral political manipulation (Chiang 2019). This resonated
as an endorsement for Taipei’s presence in Latin America. Practical
consequences followed.
At the operation level, joint US-Taiwan cooperation initiatives in Latin
America and the Caribbean gained new momentum. A seminar on ‘the
Evolving Role of Taiwan in Promoting Development in Latin America and
the Caribbean’ was sponsored by and convened at the US think tank Center
for Strategic and International Studies in late September 2019. Officials from
both Taiwan and the United States participated in the event. Both Taiwan’s
representative to the United States Stanley Kao and US Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Western Hemisphere Kevin O’Reilly attended the opening
ceremony. Government agencies and public institutions from both sides par-
ticipated in the event. These included officials from the ROC Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the ROC International Cooperation and Development Fund
(TaiwanICDF), the ROC Central Bank, the US Department of State, the US
Agency for International Development, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC). Both the TaiwanICDF and the OPIC have already
worked together and provided Paraguay’s Banco Regional with a credit line
to finance micro and small businesses (Yang 2019).
Still, some hurdles and frictions remain and challenge the collaboration
between the ROC and the United States. The most recent challenge is the
case of Nicaragua. In order to consolidate its friendship and relationship
with Managua, the ROC government offered economic assistance and made
every effort to approach President Ortega and his wife despite the fact that
the Nicaragua government is left-leaning and authoritarian. In February
 Taiwan 191
2019 Nicaragua’s National Assembly passed a resolution to accept US $100
million in economic assistance from Taipei (Lopez and Lee 2019). To express
gratitude for Taiwan’s financial generosity, Nicaragua’s representative at the
World Health Organization expressed support for Taiwan during a meeting
of the executive committee (Shi and Yang 2019).
In fact, Taiwan’s foreign policy towards Nicaragua is very different from
that of the Trump Administration. In December 2018 President Trump
signed the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act (NICA) into law. The
purpose of the NICA is to block any loans issued by international financial
institutions (e.g. the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank)
to the Nicaraguan government (Mathison and Goetz 2018). Trump also
alleged that communism in Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela was doomed
(Lopez and Lee 2019; Mathison and Goetz 2018). In early 2019 the Trump
Administration imposed economic sanctions on businesses supporting the
Ortega regime (Paris 2019). This demonstrates how Taiwan’s policies has at
times been at odds with those of the United States.
The strategy adopted by the DPP administration in Taiwan has been to
position the country closer to the United States and to distance it from
China. Taiwan has born a major financial burden to assist countries in Latin
America with a view to containing China’s penetration of the region, while
the support from the United States has mainly remained rhetorical. This
echoes Mearsheimer’s criticism (2001) that the United States seems to go for
a buck-passing strategy rather than for balancing strategies when facing
China. Still, the US and Taiwanese interests are compatible and com-
plementary, both globally and in Latin America. The role and objectives of
the United States and China are crucial in shaping Taipei’s Latin American
strategy and to understanding its presence in the continent. The analysis
turns now to Taiwan’s trade and aid cooperation in Latin America.

Taiwan’s trade with Latin America and the Caribbean

In order to sustain its diplomatic strategy and its own survival, the ROC
government perfectly realizes the importance of its robust economic and
trade performance globally. This also applies to LAC where economic and
cooperation incentives are vital tools of Taipei’s diplomatic strategy and
objectives. Two major disadvantages affect Taipei’s trade with the region.
First, geographical distance means high transportation and insurance costs
for trade. Second, export products from Central America—the area in Latin
America of major interest to Taipei—are not very popular on the Taiwanese
market, except for Guatemala’s coffee supplies to 35°C, a well-known
Starbucks-style chain of coffee shops located in both Taiwan and China.
In the era of globalization, free trade agreements (FTAs) are regarded as
pivotal instruments to promote trade relations. Taiwan has signed FTAs with
five countries in the region: Panama (2003), Guatemala (2005), Nicaragua
(2006), El Salvador, and Honduras (2007). The FTAs with Panama and El
192 Chung-Chian Teng
Salvador are still operational despite the fact that Panama cut diplomatic ties
with Taiwan in June 2017; El Salvador followed suit in November 2018.
There follows an analysis of trade relations between Taiwan and Latin
America, focusing on Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti and Paraguay,
some of the most relevant commercial and political partners for Taipei in the
region.
Statistics for trade between Taiwan and Central America from 2003–2019
(see Figure 12.1) reveal that both total trade and Taiwan’s exports to Central
America have grown over the period, with the exception of 2009 when the
figures were impacted by global financial crisis that broke out in the preced-
ing year. Furthermore, the signing of FTAs has been a positive factor for
bilateral trade relations. However, Taiwan’s imports from Central America
present a flat curve. Overall, Taiwan has enjoyed a steady trade surplus.
Foreign trade between Taiwan and Guatemala from 2003–2019 (see Figure
12.2) shows the positive impact of the 2005 FTA on two-way trade and the
steady growth of both imports and exports, with Taiwan enjoying a steady
surplus.
Trade between Taiwan and Honduras from 2003–2019 (see Figure 12.3)
was characterized by the growth of both imports and exports, with Taiwan
enjoying a surplus. Furthermore, the 2007 FTA played an important role,
clearly stimulating constant growth from 2008 onwards, with the exception
of 2009 due to the financial crisis.
Trade between Taiwan and Nicaragua from 2003–2019 (see Figure 12.4)
also shows a positive trend of both total trade and imports from Nicaragua.

Figure 12.1 Taiwan-Central America merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.
 Taiwan 193

Figure 12.2 Taiwan-Guatemala merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.

Figure 12.3 Taiwan-Honduras merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.
194 Chung-Chian Teng
It is noteworthy that Nicaragua’s exports to Taiwan were higher than its
imports. The 2006 FTA prompted a boom in Nicaragua’s exports to Taiwan
and resulted in a trade surplus for Managua.
Trade between Taiwan and Haiti from 2003–2019 (see Figure 12.5) dis-
played considerable fluctuations. After 2009 Taiwan’s exports to Haiti
increased greatly and imports from Haiti declined, with Taiwan enjoying a
large surplus. In terms of total trade, Taiwan-Haiti trade is significantly
lower than Taiwan’s trade with Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. This
may be explained by the poor infrastructure in Haiti and the absence of an
FTA between the two countries.
Trade between Taiwan and Paraguay from 2003–2019 (see Figure 12.6) shows
a surge in imports by Taiwan from Paraguay while exports stagnated, resulting
in a trade surplus in favour of Asunción. This can be explained by the essen-
tially political nature of the bilateral relationship and the ensuing composition
of trade flows. As a result, total trade in merchandise goods between Taiwan
and Paraguay has been lower than the total trade of Taiwan with its three key
partners in Central America—Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
In sum, Taiwanese trade with Latin America has improved, but it remains
a small percentage of Taiwan’s international trade. Furthermore, Taiwan has
enjoyed a trade surplus with all of its allies except for Nicaragua and Para-
guay. As this kind of economic exchange does not favour Latin America, it is
relatively difficult for Taiwan to rely upon foreign trade as an effective
instrument to promote and maintain diplomatic relations in that region

Figure 12.4 Taiwan-Nicaragua merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.
 Taiwan 195

Figure 12.5 Taiwan-Haiti merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.

Figure 12.6 Taiwan-Paraguay merchandise trade statistics (2003–2019)

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Finance.
Imports and exports statistics from customs. Available at https://portal.sw.nat.gov.tw/
APGA/GA35E.
196 Chung-Chian Teng
(Peralta 2012). Development assistance and cooperation is a much more
effective tool.

Taiwan’s official development assistance: the role of the Sustainable

Development Goals
In order to secure diplomatic and political support in Latin America, Taipei
has made ample use of official development assistance (ODA) to provide
incentives to its allies in the region. Aid cooperation has also compensated
for the limited number of trade exchanges in Latin America, which have not
been sufficient to maintain the allegiance of Taiwan’s regional partners.
Taiwan has emphasized the effective use of ODA as a reliable tool of influ-
ence, a sort of combination of soft and hard power. Following the ODA
model of the industrialized countries, TaiwanICDF, which is the ODA arm
of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has played a major role and has
contributed greatly to Taiwan’s international presence and diplomacy.
As early as 1998, the Taiwanese government earmarked US $240 million
to set up the Central American Economic Development (CAED) Fund,
whose secretariat is located at TaiwanICDF headquarters. Additionally, the
Central America Trade Office (CATO) was established in Taipei with funding
from the CAED and to stimulate Taiwanese investment in Central America
and assist Central American nations in improving their capacity to reach
Taiwanese markets (Peralta 2012). The joint efforts made by the CAED
Fund, the CATO and the TaiwanICDF were the foundations to consolidate
Taipei’s relations with Central America.
Taiwan’s ODA is organized in five areas: social infrastructure and services;
economic infrastructure and services; economic sectors; sustainable develop-
ment; and special purpose grants (see below). A breakdown of funding
appropriations per area of intervention shows that social infrastructure and
services has received the largest share of TaiwanICDF resources spent by
Taiwan in Latin America over the last few years. Figure 12.7 illustrates the
situation for 2018. Under the framework of social infrastructure and services,
interventions covered initiatives in fields such as education, scholarships,
vocational training, health care, water supply and sanitation, and govern-
ment and civil society. The creation of the Taiwan-Paraguay Polytechnic
University in Paraguay in 2018 is an example of successful Taiwanese coop-
eration in the region (Strong 2018). Projects in the area of economic infra-
structure and services accounted for 16% of the total in 2018, and included
transportation and storage, information and communications, and energy.
Overall, education, health care, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, govern-
ment and civil society, humanitarian assistance, and transportation are the
crucial sectors of Taiwanese aid cooperation in Latin America (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China 2019).
In a similar vein, the TaiwanICDF’s 2018 cooperation projects in Central
America and the Caribbean confirm the importance of social and economic
 Taiwan 197
infrastructure and services (ICDF 2019: 104–107). Of the eight cooperation
projects in Guatemala, five dealt with social and economic infrastructure and
services; in Belize they numbered eight out of 12, in Honduras six out of 13,
in Nicaragua nine out of 13, in Haiti two out of three, in Saint Kitts and
Nevis four out of six, in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines six out of seven,
in Saint Lucia four out of six, and in Paraguay three out of six. It is also
noteworthy that the special purpose grants category, which include assistance
grants, donations in kind, loans, emergency humanitarian assistance, disaster
recovery relief, administrative expenditure by partner countries, and dona-
tions to non-governmental organizations accounted for over 20% of all
cooperation projects in 2018, thus continuing the pattern of previous years.
Traditionally, this ‘special purpose grants’ funding line has been closely
related to the material benefits that the presence of Taiwan brings to local
elites, mainly governments and ruling parties in Latin America. In other
words, Taiwan uses about 20% of its ODA to reward those Latin American
elites who recognize it and by so doing ensures its very existence. In sum,
Taiwan’s assistance to its allies in LAC has been helpful to and fruitful for
the recipients of its aid and, consequently, it has been playing and will continue
to play a central role in consolidating Taiwan’s international status.

Figure 12.7 Official development assistance of Taiwan, 2018

Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by the ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, International Cooperation and Development Report, 2018.
198 Chung-Chian Teng
Conclusion
The Taiwan Strait is a major flashpoint in East Asia and in international
relations more broadly. The reasons behind this are the tensions and the
various degrees of confrontation between China and Taiwan, which in turn
involve the United States and the struggle for world leadership. China’s ulti-
mate goal is reunification with Taiwan. As a result, Beijing is seeking to
reduce Taiwan’s influence in the international sphere by denying it access to
international organizations and by reducing its diplomatic allies. This has
been particularly evident under the Taiwanese administration of President
Tsai Ing-wen, who has implemented a more assertive and autonomous pos-
ture in both Taipei’s Chinese and international policy. Latin America is a
major theatre for such triangular competition.
For a long time, Taiwan has maintained a strong diplomatic hold in Latin
America, in particular in Central America and the Caribbean. In the past,
China had adopted a prudent foreign policy posture in the Western Hemi-
sphere in order to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. However,
given the deteriorating cross-Strait relations over the past few years and the
adoption of balancing and bandwagoning strategies by the DPP government,
China has started to take a very assertive posture in Central America too.
China’s success in its diplomatic activities also has something to do with the
strained relationship between the United States and the Latin American
nations during the Trump presidency. Again, triangular relations explain
many aspects of Beijing and Taipei’s diplomatic and economic activism in
Central America.
Taiwan has made great economic progress. As a result the country has
abundant financial assets that enable it to provide various kinds of develop-
ment assistance to solicit political support among the circle of powerful
political elites in Third World countries and consolidate its relationship with
countries in LAC. To a certain extent, this leverage has been able to offset
the negative impact of the so-called Taiwan cost whereby opportunities that
countries that recognize Taiwan miss out on with China. Furthermore, Chi-
nese economic might is accompanied by increasing global political influence.
Consequently, China has managed to get the upper hand in its diplomatic
struggle with Taiwan in recent years.
The question is to what extent can China penetrate the Western Hemi-
sphere, given its anti-Taiwan goals, without provoking a reaction from the
United States? One of the reasons why the Trump Administration contained
so many conservative figures and views is Beijing’s increasingly assertive
policy under Xi Jinping,. This conservative element has traditionally
emphasized the importance of Latin America as the United States’ backyard
and has vehemently opposed the penetration of China into the region.
Accordingly, the United States has taken a series of actions to support
Taiwan and cooperate with it in Latin America with a view to containing
China.
 Taiwan 199
Ultimately, Taiwan’s scope for manoeuvre is limited, internationally and in
Latin America. Taiwan can seduce and keep its allies in Central America and
the Caribbean for a while. Yet its future in the region as well as its own survival
depend on China’s intentions as well as the unfolding of the relationship
between the United States and China.

Note
1 The ‘Consensus of 1992’ or the ‘One China’ Consensus, although with different
interpretations in Beijing and Taipei, refers to the outcome of a meeting in 1992
between the semi-official representatives of the People’s Republic of China of
mainland China and the Republic of China of Taiwan. Whether such a Consensus
exists is under dispute in Taiwan, and the Democratic Progressive Party has denied
the existence of the 1992 Consensus.

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13 Strengthening Indonesia-Latin America
economic relations
A partnership for a better future
Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin

Background
President Jokowi of Indonesia has consistently maintained that economic
diplomacy is a priority on his administration’s agenda. On 9 January 2020, in
the opening speech at the meeting with Indonesia’s top diplomats and Retno
Marsudi, the minister of foreign affairs, President Jokowi stated that 70%–
80% of the Indonesian official representatives’ focus should be on economic
and commercial cooperation (Bhwana 2020). President Jokowi urged the
Indonesian chief of missions to build up economic diplomacy. Furthermore,
Foreign Minister Marsudi reiterated the so-called 4+1 formula of Indonesian
foreign policy 2019–20241 according to which strengthening the performance
of Indonesian economic diplomacy is the highest priority on the agenda. The
Indonesian economic diplomacy agenda within the 4+1 formula is as follows:

Indonesian economic diplomacy among others will emphasize the

enhancement of domestic and traditional markets, with further break-
throughs in non-traditional markets. Reinforcement will be carried out
through trade and investment negotiations (CEPAs/FTAs/PTAs2), trade
promotion, and integrated investment along with outbound investment
encouragement. Economic diplomacy will also cover Indonesia’s strate-
gic economic interests, for instance fighting discriminatory actions
against palm oil. Furthermore, the strategy will be driven by the 4.0
economy covering digital industries, creative economy, and capacity
buildings for Indonesian human resources.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 2019).

Latin America, Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and East-
ern Europe are among the regions defined as Indonesia’s non-traditional
markets. Sabaruddin (2016) identified a cluster of 12 countries that were
designated as Indonesia’s traditional markets: Australia, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Netherlands, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and the
People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong).
204 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
During the past 15 years, Indonesia has pushed for deeper economic
cooperation with many countries around the globe, diversifying its trade
deals beyond its traditional partners. At present, there are at least 40 eco-
nomic initiatives that are being studied and negotiated, or which have
already entered into force (Asia Regional Integration Center 2020). So far,
Indonesian free trade initiatives are still mainly concentrated on partners in
Asia and the main traditional trading partners. However, in recent years,
Indonesian trade initiatives have started to appear in the non-traditional
markets, particularly the African states, where there are now six ongoing
trade initiatives (Directorate General International Trade Negotiation 2020).
In Latin America at least three trade initiatives are currently being pur-
sued: the Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
(IC-CEPA); the Indonesia-Peru Preferential Trade Agreement (IP-PTA); and
the Indonesia-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (IC-FTA). Of these, by 2017
the IC-CEPA was the only one to have been signed; it entered into force in
2019. The other two initiatives are still in the study and negotiation phase.
Despite the relatively low number of concrete initiatives in the Latin America
and the Caribbean region, Indonesian economic diplomacy towards Latin
America was upgraded when Jakarta decided to engage with these CEPAs/
FTAs/PTAs, which were given higher priority within the Indonesian foreign
trade policy agenda (Center for Foreign Trade Policy 2013).
In the realm of trade, the current interest and initiatives by the Indonesian
officials and indeed their Latin American counterparts have not yet success-
fully boosted the volume of bilateral trade. As an illustration, in 2019 Indo-
nesia’s largest trade partner in Latin America was Brazil (US $2.93 billion)
followed by Argentina ($2 billion), Mexico ($1.19 billion), Chile ($275 mil-
lion) and Peru ($264 million). These are not very high figures, and Indonesian
trade relations with the smaller Latin American countries account for even
lower volumes. Indonesia-Latin America trade relations have yet to meet
expectations, but there is significant potential for Indonesia in the emerging
countries of Latin America. Jakarta should not only consider this, but also
try to rapidly reap the benefits that Latin American countries could offer.
This is true at both the bilateral and regional level. For instance, the
Pacific Alliance member states (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and two
potential members (Costa Rica and Panama) are considered the newly
emerging economies in Latin America. The ‘Pacific Pumas’, as these coun-
tries are called, all border the Pacific Ocean, share a preference for free
market liberal policies, adopt favourable policies relating to the private sector
and foreign investment, and keep government involvement in the economy
low. Furthermore, the Pacific Alliance has as an explicit goal to engage more
deeply with the Asia-Pacific. Another important subregional group in Latin
America is the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL)
(Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul). Indonesia considers the
trade bloc, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,3 as a
potentially important partner too. Jakarta has a positive and cordial
 Indonesia 205
relationship with all members of MERCOSUR including Venezuela. Fur-
thermore, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-MERCOSUR
ministerial meetings have already discussed ways to strengthen inter-regional
ties, including through trade and investment cooperation. However, efforts to
do so have remained quite sporadic.
This chapter unfolds as follows: the second section provides a general
overview of Indonesia-Latin America4 relations. The third section discusses
Indonesian relations with select Latin American states, namely Argentina,
Chile and Peru. The study will also discuss Indonesian relations within
regional and inter-regional mechanisms such as the Pacific Alliance, MER-
COSUR and the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation
(FEALAC). Finally, the chapter provides some policy recommendations to
take Indonesia-Latin America relations to a new higher level.

Overview of Indonesia-Latin America relations

After Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, President Sukarno (1945–
1967) developed personal contacts and close friendships with prominent
Latin American leaders of the era such as Ernesto Che Guevara and Fidel
Castro of Cuba, Arturo Frondizi of Argentina, Martín Echegoyen of Uru-
guay and Adolfo Lopez Mateos of Mexico. Sukarno paid official visits to
Latin America in 1959, 1960 and 1961. He made it his mission to invigorate
solidarity among the South-South countries during the decolonization
period. Meanwhile, leaders such as Mexican President López Mateos paid an
official visit to Indonesia in 1962 and Che Guevara travelled to the country
in 1959 as part of his official ‘friendship’ trip to 14 states in Asia and Africa,
particularly with countries which had signed the 1955 Bandung Declaration
(Sabaruddin 2017).
During this period, Indonesia established diplomatic ties with Brazil and
Mexico (1953), Argentina (1956), Venezuela (1959), Cuba (1960), Bolivia
(1963), and Chile and Uruguay (1965); these countries became known as
Indonesia’s ‘old friends in Latin America’. But this solid political relation-
ship was not followed by the strengthening of the economic relationship.
This may be explained by the fact that, at the time, the foreign policy priority
of African and Asian states was political cooperation, particularly with the
aim of gaining international recognition during the struggle for independence
and support in the immediate aftermath of decolonization.
Indonesia-Latin American relations during the administration of President
Suharto (1967–1998) can be divided into two distinct periods. In the earlier
period, relations remained distant and quite formal. The president’s agenda
focused on domestic socio-economic development. Foreign policy essentially
targeted regional and international cooperation with East Asian countries,
Western Europe, the Middle East and North America, with an emphasis on
economic cooperation. Compared to the previous period, under President
Sukarno, Suharto’s diplomatic policy shifted away from ‘Third Worldism’
206 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
and relegated Indonesian relations with Latin American and African states
to a secondary plane. The rationale behind this was that, similarly to Indo-
nesia, the Latin American countries were debtor countries, and therefore in
Jakarta they were considered as potential competitors for official develop-
ment assistance from their traditional and developed partners such as the
United States, Japan and Western Europe. Furthermore, the Cold War ideo-
logical confrontation played a major role and some Latin American coun-
tries had similar ideologies and/or had close relations with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in contrast with Suharto’s position.
In the late 1980s, particularly since the ending of the Cold War, a different
phase began. The government of Indonesia sought to broaden cooperation
beyond its traditional partners, which were usually the developed countries
and looked to collaborate with its non-traditional partners, which had been
neglected for more than two decades. During the post-Cold War era, Indo-
nesia renewed its interest in Latin America and Africa and also looked to the
Central and Eastern European states and Central Asian states, which
previously were part of the USSR or the Soviet bloc.
In addition to the respective domestic and foreign policy paradigm chan-
ges in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the establishment of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) also triggered new mutual interest between
Indonesia and the Latin American countries. In this framework, economic
cooperation took priority while political issues were put to one side or
downgraded in importance. In 1994 Indonesia hosted the APEC Economic
Leaders Meeting, which adopted the Bogor Goals that sought to initiate free
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, in the
same year, Chile joined APEC, while Mexico had done so the year before,
and Peru followed a few years later. APEC membership prompted these
countries to strengthen their bilateral and regional relations in Asia yet
further.
In the 1990s a number of visible initiatives and high-level official visits
took place. President Carlos Menem of Argentina paid an official visit to
Indonesia in 1996 and brought with him around 40 Argentinian business
representatives. Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Chilean
President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle paid working visits to Indonesia to attend
the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in Bogor (1994). President Suharto
reciprocated the interest with an official visit to Mexico in 1991 as part of his
journey to attend the G-15 High Level Summit in Caracas.
Chile, Peru and Mexico were the forerunners of Latin America’s interest in
Asia. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, China and South Korea received
the most attention from Latin America, while South-East Asia, including
Indonesia, was viewed as a peripheral region and a second tier priority.
Similarly, in Indonesian foreign policy strategy, Latin America received low
attention compared to the United States and to some extent Canada. In the
economic realm, Indonesia did not consider Latin American countries to be
potential partners who could support Indonesian economic development.
 Indonesia 207
Additional factors such as geographical distance, product similarities, lack of
awareness and historical connection, and relatively few business-to-business
contacts, hindered further Indonesia-Latin America links.
The period between the late 1990s until early 2000s marked a transition
phase for Indonesia. The country had to face economic and financial crises,
democratic transition and political recovery, all at the same time. The Indo-
nesian economic crisis and reform period occurred roughly during the period
1998–2004. In 1997–1998 the Asian financial crisis hit the Indonesian econ-
omy particularly hard, and, therefore, caused a loosening of Indonesia-Latin
American relations. At that time, Indonesian foreign policy emphasized sup-
port for economic and political recovery at home and the restoration of a
positive image of Indonesia abroad.
In the post-reform period, from 2005 onwards, the Indonesian government
re-engaged with its Latin American and African counterparts. The Latin
American region started to receive more attention particularly for the pur-
pose of economic cooperation. Indonesia started to explore and foster eco-
nomic cooperation with other friendly countries around the globe beyond its
traditional partners. The US economic recession and the global financial
crisis from 2008 prompted Indonesia and Latin America to be more proactive in
the exploration and strengthening of their economic relations.
During this period, bilateral relations between Indonesia and Latin
American countries were generally positive and cordial. Political and ideolo-
gical differences no longer gave reason for concern on either side. Both par-
ties had a common interest in strengthening economic relations. As a result,
during the period 1989–2019, Indonesia-Latin American trade volume
increased from US $410 million to a remarkable $7.75 billion. However, in
terms of relative trade share the increase was much less significant, up from

Figure 13.1 Indonesia-Latin America trade relations 1989–2019, trade share (%)
Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by World Integrated Trade Solution
(2020).
208 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
1.29% to 2.29% (see Figure 13.1 and Figure 13.2). On the one hand, the
global financial crisis in the Indonesian traditional markets, including the
United States and Western Europe, prompted Jakarta as well as many other
developing countries in the global South to seek new alternative markets in
order to diversify their export and market portfolios. On the other hand, the
present scenario provides significant challenges to non-traditional trade and
cooperation. The current VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and
Ambiguity) world situation including the ongoing US-China trade war, the
proliferation of a nationalistic and anti-globalization agenda in many coun-
tries, and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in early 2020,
have all posed new challenges to future Indonesia-Latin American relations.
The period that followed the global financial crisis was particularly posi-
tive for Indonesia-Latin American relations, indeed the best in terms of
bilateral trade relations. During the period 2011–2019, Indonesia-Latin
America trade relations experienced an all-time high, totalling around US $8
billion annually. This was a huge leap compared to any point in the past. The
level has declined slightly since 2014–2015, coinciding with the crisis in many
Latin American countries and the low international prices of commodities.
During President Jokowi’s period in office (2014–), Indonesian economic
diplomacy has been receiving the greatest attention within the foreign policy
agenda. President Jokowi views economic diplomacy essentially as ‘commer-
cial diplomacy’, meaning that the main purpose of Indonesian economic

Figure 13.2 Indonesia-Latin America trade relations 1989–2019, trade volumes

Note: Amselkar is in the South American and the Caribbean region, and Amuteng is
in the Northern and Central American region.
Source: Author’s elaboration from data provided by World Integrated Trade Solution
(2020).
 Indonesia 209
diplomacy is to enhance trade, tourism and investment, which together
comprise the three pillars of Indonesia’s commercial diplomacy.
The Indonesian government’s attempts to diversify its export and market
portfolios by engaging more closely with its non-traditional counterparts have
led to positive results over the years despite a relatively slow pace. Sabaruddin
(2016) developed a ‘clustering concept’ for the Indonesian traditional and non-
traditional markets. Using this clustering concept, in 1967 traditional markets
accounted for 87.36% of Indonesian total trade, with a volume of US $1.13
billion. In 2018 the share of the traditional markets in Indonesia’s total trade
declined to 66.61%, with a volume of $225.28 billion (see Figure 13.3). Indone-
sian trade relations no longer highly concentrate on the traditional counterparts;
instead, the role of its non-traditional partners is steadily rising.
Latin America’s importance for Indonesia has grown accordingly too. In
1989 Latin America’s share of Indonesia’s total trade was only 1.29%, with a
volume of US $495 million. In 2019 Latin America’s share rose to 2.29%,
with a trade volume reaching $7.75 billion (see Figure 13.1). Over the past 30
years, Indonesia-Latin America trade relations have made very slow but
steady progress. In 2016 Indonesian trade share in the Latin American region
reached a peak at 2.69%, with a trade volume of $7.53 billion. Indonesia and
Latin America have not yet made a substantial breakthrough in their trade
relations. China and India, for instance, have made much greater and faster
progress. In 1992 China’s trade share in the region was only 1.79% and
totalled $2.96 billion, while in 2018 China’s share reached 6.81%, at a total
value of $305.48 billion. As for India, in 1992 Latin America’s share of its
total trade was only 1.08%, at a total value of $487.3 million, but by 2018
this had increased to 4.8%, worth $45.14 billion.

Figure 13.3 Indonesian traditional versus non-traditional markets for the period
1967–2019 (trade share, %)
Source: Author’s estimation based on data provided by World Integrated Trade
Solution (2020).
210 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
Indonesia’s main exports to Latin America are chemical products, rubber,
textiles and apparel, coal, electronic and motor components and equipment,
footwear, plastic equipment, household supplies, polyesters, and palm oil.
Indonesia’s main imports are soybeans, chemical products, pulp, ores, fish
products, copper, food and beverages, aluminium, minerals, and fertilizers.
Indonesia follows a similar trade pattern to that of Latin America, albeit
with some nuances, whereby international partners essentially buy commodities
and sell manufactured and value-added products.
Investments between Indonesia and Latin America are still limited. During
the period 2010–2019, the total Latin American investment in Indonesia was
only worth around US $522.12 million and involved a total of 458 projects
(Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board 2020). The Brazilian Compan-
hia Vale do Rio Doce bought Indonesia’s INCO-CVRD Limited operating
in the nickel mining sector. Also PT. INCO (Soroako) of Brazil, Tenaris of
Argentina, and AJE Group of Peru announced major investments in Indo-
nesia. Indonesian investment in Latin America includes that of the cigarette
manufacturer Djarum in Golden Leaf Tobacco Ltd in El Salvador, and the
investment by the Rajawali Garuda Mas Group in the cellulose company
Bahia Pulp in Bahia, Brazil.

Table 13.1 Latin American investment in Indonesia (2010–2019) (US $ million)

No. Country Number of Total investment
projects (US $ thousand)
1 Brazil 124 373689.82
2 Panama 141 141069.4
3 Venezuela 7 1919.75
4 Colombia 14 1755.8
5 Mexico 27 1265.4
6 Argentina 31 996.91
7 Chile 8 675
8 Suriname 4 231.4
9 Belize 34 223.18
10 Uruguay 1 200
11 Bolivia 4 56.67
12 Bahamas 37 29.64
13 Ecuador 1 4.47
14 Guatemala 9 0.9
15 Barbados 6 0.6
16 Jamaica 5 0
17 Peru 3 0
18 Nicaragua 2 0
Source: Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (2020).
 Indonesia 211
Indonesian bilateral relations with select Latin American states and
regional groups

Indonesia-Argentina relations
Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Argentina officially began in
1956 and the Indonesian embassy in Buenos Aires started to operate one
year later, while the Argentine embassy in Jakarta opened in 1959. Bilateral
relations have been generally positive, cordial and increasingly intense. In
recent years, there have been frequent visits by high-ranking officials of both
countries in an effort to increase cooperation, particularly in economic,
trade, education, sports and civil society exchange. President Mauricio Macri
of Argentina, and his Vice-President, Gabriela Michetti, visited Indonesia in
June and May 2019, respectively. Talks focused on strengthening bilateral
economic relations.
Both countries are seeking to strengthen their economies by boosting
exports and diversifying their markets, shifting from traditional markets to
non-traditional ones. Indonesia views Argentina as one of its key partners in
South America. Argentina is the third largest economy in Latin America
after Brazil and Mexico, with a gross domestic product (GDP) at current
prices of US $449.663 billion, a population of 44.43 million and a gross
national income (GNI) per capita of $11.200 in 2019 (World Bank, 2020).
Argentina sees Indonesia as a large potential market in the South-East Asian
region. In the economic sphere, Indonesia-Argentina bilateral trade relations
have shown some positive results. During the period 2015–2019, average
bilateral trade growth reached 6.2% per annum. In 2015 total bilateral trade
amounted to $1.53 billion, and in 2019 it reached $2 billion. The bilateral
trade relationship is Indonesia’s second largest in the Latin America region
after Brazil.
Indonesia’s main exports to Argentina are natural rubber, footwear,
engines and electrical appliances, motor vehicles and spare parts, staple
fibres, fruits, textiles, chemical products, iron and steel, and plastic products.
Argentina’s main exports to Indonesia are soybean oilcake, cereal, maize,
casings, tubing and drill pipes, cotton, dairy products, fruits, medicines, and
leather products.
The Argentinian government views the Asia-Pacific region (and particu-
larly the East Asian countries, e.g. China, Japan and South Korea) and
South-South cooperation and trade as potential market opportunities, and
therefore they are ranked highly in Buenos Aires’s foreign policy agenda
(Zelicovich 2011). However, the impetuous rise of China may overshadow
such opportunities and even disrupt economic relations in other South-East
Asian countries. Argentina sees South-East Asia as peripheral to its foreign
policy agenda. Furthermore, Rubiolo and Baroni (2012) argue that the
Argentinian government seems intent on pursuing an imbalanced trade rela-
tionship with its ASEAN counterparts (including Indonesia), with huge
212 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
surpluses in its own favour, in order to partially compensate for the high
trade deficit that Argentina has accumulated with China over the years.
Indonesia’s trade deficit with Argentina has become a concern to Jakarta,
which has demanded a more balanced trade relationship. The Indonesian
government has raised concerns over the Argentinian tariff barriers (average
tariffs are around 30%) and non-tariff barriers including the administrative
documents for export in the Spanish language as required by the Argentinian
translator association, anti-dumping, and other safeguard measures. The
current Indonesian government clearly follows a mercantilist doctrine,
believing that a trade surplus is key to boosting economic growth. Given the
shared interest in advancing bilateral economic relations, both sides should
find ways to address these issues and take their relationship to a higher level.
Some policy recommendations can be made at this stage. In regional and
interregional fora, both countries can push to establish joint feasibility stu-
dies for Indonesia-MECOSUR and ASEAN-MERCOSUR PTAs and FTAs.
Both sides could encourage civil society exchanges and activities in order to
increase mutual understanding between the citizens of the two countries as
well as improving the business environment, trade facilitation and infra-
structure. This set of initiatives would increase efficiency and competitiveness,
thus ultimately promoting economic engagement and mutual links.

Indonesia-Chile relations
Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Chile were established in 1964.
Since then, bilateral relations have been generally warm and cordial. Also in
the case of Indonesia-Chile the emphasis of their bilateral relations is on
economy and trade. Chile is the only country in Latin America that has a
formal trade agreement in place with Indonesia, the IC-CEPA, which entered
into force in August 2019. In that year, Chile was Indonesia’s fourth largest
trading partner in Latin America, with a total value of US $275 million,
behind only Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
Chile attracts Jakarta’s interest for several reasons. Chile is one of the most
politically and economically stable countries in the region. Trade liberal-
ization has been the cornerstone of Chilean foreign policy since 1992. Since
then, Chile has proactively established FTAs with many trading partners
worldwide. In 2003 Chile made an important breakthrough by adopting the
most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff of 6% for all its trading partners, and
today Chile still has the lowest MFN rates in Latin America. Geographically,
Chile is strategically located to become a potential hub for the whole of the
Latin American region. The country has FTAs covering over 60 countries.
Chile is also a high-income country, representing an interesting opportunity
for Indonesian exports in sectors such as chemicals, electrical equipment and
telecommunications, industrial machinery, and motor vehicles.
Despite this very promising background, and notwithstanding the IC-
CEPA that entered into force in 2019, so far bilateral trade relations have not
 Indonesia 213
reflected their vast potential. In order to bring these favourable conditions to
full fruition, both countries should be more prompt to identify strategic
complementary goods and expedite several important matters that were
pending in 2020, such as the Air Transport Agreement5 and the Double
Taxation Avoidance Agreement (Sabaruddin and Marks 2016) Furthermore,
both countries should further strengthen their cooperation in various inter-
national fora including the Non-Aligned Movement, APEC and FEALAC.

Indonesia-Peru relations
Indonesia and Peru formally established diplomatic relations in August 1975.
Compared to its other ‘old friends’ in Latin America, Indonesia’s relations
with Peru are relatively recent. Over the years, diplomatic relations have been
cordial, although they have been confined to ‘low politics’ because neither
country has a direct interest in common and specific political and security
issues. Bilateral relations have mainly concentrated on economic and socio-
cultural issues. Initially, relations were rather limited, and both states made
only a few contacts. For instance, in 1967 total bilateral trade amounted to
just US $251.16, rising to $264 million by 2019, representing a marginal
increase. Still, both countries consider economic diplomacy as being instru-
mental to enhancing their economic growth and to improving citizens’ well-
being. This is a potential starting point for the improvement of their bilateral
relations.
In the economic realm, one of the key initiatives is the IP-PTA. The IP-
PTA Joint Feasibility Study (JFS) was resumed in 2016. It found that trade
complementarity between Indonesia and Peru had improved over time and
that full trade liberalization would result in an increase in welfare, GDP and
job creation in both countries. The JFS also concluded that both countries
were ready to start formal negotiations and suggested that trade cooperation
could be approached through an incremental scheme, starting with trade
liberalization of goods (Indonesia-Peru Trade in Goods Agreement/INDO-
PERU TIGA) (Ministry of Trade for the Republic of Indonesia 2016). Upon
completion of the JFS, the two countries followed it up by starting the
negotiation process. In 2018 Indonesia’s minister of foreign affairs paid a
work visit to Lima, where it was agreed to step up economic cooperation
starting with a TIGA to intensify trade exchanges (Sheany 2018)
Indonesia and Peru have common economic interests and international
agenda preferences. Peru is an upper-middle-income country with GDP per
capita of US $5,400. Lima supports free market liberal policies, maintains a
favourable stance towards the private sector and foreign investment, and is
one of the continent’s fastest-growing economies. For all of these reasons
Peru has attracted Indonesia’s interest and Jakarta should consider elevating
Lima’s status in its foreign economic policy agenda. However, both countries
should advance their bilateral agenda beyond the IP-PTA. One of the
obstacles is the lack of mutual awareness and the paucity of civil society
214 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
contacts. To overcome these problems, both countries should encourage
business and youth exchanges and initiatives. In addition to economic coop-
eration, sociocultural cooperation should also be fostered including joint
academic and research collaboration, engaging youth, and promoting
awareness to enhance understanding and friendship between the two countries.

Indonesia’s relations with MERCOSUR, the Pacific Alliance and FEALAC

At the regional level, attempts to advance political and economic coopera-
tion have resulted in the creation of inter-regional mechanisms such as
ASEAN-MERCOSUR, ASEAN-Pacific Alliance and FEALAC. In 2012
Indonesia joined as an observer member of the Pacific Alliance. Additionally,
three Latin American states, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, signed a Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, thus confirming Latin American
interest in ASEAN, given that the South-East Asian bloc represents 3.4% of
global GDP and 7% of world trade.
MERCOSUR, a subregional bloc with a customs union, and a common
external tariff and trade policy, has attracted the attention of Indonesia as
well as other Asian states. Indonesia has repeatedly proposed the conclusion
of a trade partnership with MERCOSUR, starting with a JFS Indonesia-
MERCOSUR FTA (Puput 2019). ASEAN has also established formal rela-
tions with MERCOSUR. There have been two ASEAN-MERCOSUR Min-
isterial Meetings, one in 2008 in Brasília and the other in 2017 in New York.
The summits came to an agreement to explore ways to strengthen inter-
regional ties including trade and investment, energy and food security, con-
nectivity, innovation and civil society exchanges (ASEAN Secretariat 2019a).
Total inter-regional ASEAN-MERCOSUR trade reached US $25.98 billion
in 2017. Total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow from MERCOSUR to
ASEAN in 2018 was $80.82 million (ibid.).
The Pacific Alliance, created in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru, is probably the Latin American regional bloc that attracts most interest
from Indonesia and Asia current interest. On the one hand, its slim institu-
tional structure and procedures, its preference for an open economy and free
trade, and its openness towards the Asian markets challenge the established
roles of other Latin American trade blocs, such as MERCOSUR. On the
other hand, international partners find it a welcome novelty in the Latin
American depressed panorama of regional integration. Among the ASEAN
members, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are already
observer members of the Pacific Alliance.
ASEAN was swift to establish a formal dialogue and relations with the
Pacific Alliance, which, as a group, represents the eighth largest economy in
the world and 38% of LAC GDP. One of the Pacific Alliance’s main goals is
to foster economic relations with the Asia-Pacific (ASEAN Secretariat
2019b). ASEAN-Pacific Alliance total trade reached US $21.23 billion in
2017. The inflow of FDI from the Pacific Alliance to ASEAN amounted to
 Indonesia 215
$35.99 million in 2018 (ibid.). The ASEAN-Pacific Alliance ministers have
meet regularly. At the Sixth ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Ministerial Meeting,
which took place in 2019 in New York, the two parties agreed to explore
cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as trade and investment, con-
nectivity, education, civil society exchanges, science, technology and innovation,
and sustainable development (ibid.).
Another important inter-regional forum is FEALAC, which was launched
in 1999 with the aim of increasing inter-regional cooperation and under-
standing between East Asia and Latin America. FEALAC is the only exist-
ing formal body of cooperation between East Asia and Latin America. This
inter-regional organization comprises 36 members and represents 34.9% of
global GDP, 33.1% of global trade, and 38.1% of the global population
(FEALAC 2020). Indonesia was one of the first countries to join FEALAC
and is one of its first supporters because Jakarta sees the potential and
opportunities that the forum offers, especially in the economic and socio-
cultural sectors. Yet different levels of industrialization among members,
product similarity and/or competition, and a certain lack of political will
have up until now hampered the flourishing of the organization.

Conclusion and recommendations

Since 2005, after its political and economic crisis and transition phase,
Indonesia has started to look at non-traditional partners with renewed
interest. Latin America has gained increasing attention in Jakarta. The actual
results are promising but there are still challenges and room for further
enhancement, especially in the area of trade.
At the political level, results of the recent Indonesian engagement with
Latin America are positive. Indonesia currently has 11 embassies and three
offices acting as trade promotion centres in Latin America.6 Over the years,
Indonesia has established a positive and cordial relationship with most Latin
American states. Relations are intensifying: Indonesia and Latin American
states have signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), estab-
lished bilateral consultation mechanisms, and formalized partnerships such
as the Indonesia-Brazil Strategic Partnership (2009) and the Indonesia-Chile
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2019).
There is now an opportunity to turn this positive political relationship into
a thriving economic relationship too. Indonesia’s main interest in Latin
America is to boost bilateral trade, tourism, investment and services. Latin
America can be an alternative source of energy (particularly oil and gas),
agro-industry cooperation, and technical and development cooperation for
Jakarta. Latin America can find in Indonesia a potential hub in South-East
Asia. Indonesia is now a democratic and stable country, with an open econ-
omy and a fairly liberal trade policy, and a potential market with a popula-
tion of 270 million people with a growing middle class and rising GDP per
capita.
216 Sulthon Sjahril Sabaruddin
Yet there are structural and objective challenges to enhancing Indonesia-
Latin America relations. Geographical distance with no direct flights or
shipping transportation, high transportation costs, poor infrastructure and
connectivity, and trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers) may hinder the
strengthening of commercial ties. A lack of historical connections and
mutual knowledge, cultural differences, language barriers, limited mutual
interest and scarce access to information, along with a negligible diaspora
hamper civil society exchange. Factors that have explained the traditionally
low level of the relationship, such as different patterns of integration, limited
available resources, prioritization of relations with traditional partners
(usually the developed countries), and competitive/similar production are still
broadly valid. The recent US-China trade war and the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic may further damage bilateral links.
However, there are also ways to reduce the impact of these factors. Pri-
marily, strong political will on both sides is an absolute precondition.
Sabaruddin (2017) identified facilitating conditions too. Using a gravity
model approach, he discovered that three variables, namely Latin American
countries’ GDP, the establishment of Indonesian embassies in Latin America
and of Latin American embassies in Indonesia, and the number of MOUs
can have a positive effect on Indonesia-Latin America bilateral trade perfor-
mance. Additionally, a common colonial past under the Netherlands seems
to favour trade relations, but essentially this only really applies to Suriname
in Latin America. The same study could not find conclusive evidence about
the role of geographical distance per se. Still, countries sharing the Pacific
shore seem to have a natural advantage. The prominence of the Pacific
Alliance in Indonesia’s Latin American projection illustrates the point.
Overall, there are very good reasons for Indonesia to keep looking closely
at Latin America and to upgrade it in its foreign policy agenda and priorities.
A bold step to enhance bilateral relations would be the appointment of a
special envoy for Latin America, tasked with the establishment of a focused
and eye-catching partnership able to raise attention in the political, economic
and civil society circles, such as an ‘Indonesia-Latin American Partnership
for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity’. This would have the potential to
foster all aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Notes
1 The Indonesian foreign policy priorities 2019–2024 are focused on: (1) improving
economic diplomacy; (2) protection diplomacy; (3) sovereignty and nationality
diplomacy; (4) Indonesia’s role in the region and globally. The ‘plus’ is the
improvement of diplomacy infrastructure (human resources, bureaucratic reform
and diplomacy digitalization). The 2014–2019 priorities emphasized maintaining
sovereignty, protection of citizens and economic diplomacy. For the 2019–2024
period, however, economic diplomacy comes first. (Djumala 2020).
2 Comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA), free trade agreement
(FTA), and preferential trade agreement (PTA).
 Indonesia 217
3 Venezuela is a full member of MERCOSUR, but it has been suspended since 1
December 2016.
4 Latin America is understood here as comprising all the Latin American and Car-
ibbean states in the Americas that have formal diplomatic ties with Indonesia but
excludes the United States and Canada.
5 In Latin America, Garuda Indonesia has a codeshare agreement with the Aero-
méxico airline. Meanwhile, in Asia, LATAM Chile has codeshare agreements with
Air China, Cathay Pacific, Japan Airlines, Korean Air and Malaysian Airlines.
6 In Latin America, Indonesia has 11 representative offices (embassies) in Mexico
City, Havana, Panama City, Bogota, Caracas, Paramaribo, Quito, Lima, Brasília,
Santiago, Buenos Aires and three Indonesian trade promotion center offices based
in Mexico City, Santiago and São Paolo.

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14 Latin America and ASEAN
More than a marginal relationship?
Jörn Dosch

Introduction
Around the turn of the millennium Latin American hopes were high that
closer ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would
make an important contribution to diversifying foreign and economic poli-
cies, strengthening their international bargaining power, and reducing
dependencies on intra-hemispheric relations. ASEAN was founded in 1967
and by 1999 comprised all 10 South-East Asian states at the time.1 The
organization had rapidly established itself as an economic and political
powerhouse on the international stage, represented one of the fastest growing
regions in the world, and was globally known and admired for its well-
developed network of institutionalized relations with great and leading
medium powers, including but not limited to the United States, the European
Union (EU), the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Russian Federation
and Australia. Public interest in South-East Asia followed suit. A drastic
surge of articles on ASEAN in Latin American newspapers can be pin-
pointed to 2004, the same year that also marked the beginning of the China
boom in the sub-continent as well as a rapidly growing academic interest in
Asia-Latin America relations. Glowing political rhetoric coupled with a large
number of academic conferences, books and papers on ASEAN-Latin
American multilateralism gave the impression of an emerging new axis in
global international relations. However, today a more sober analysis reveals
that cross-Pacific inter-regional fora have suffered from poor outcome-oriented
performance, low profiles and visibility, and the inability to influence the
policies of national governments.
Has multilateralism in relations between ASEAN and Latin America
failed? Alternatively, is the seemingly reduced relevance of inter-regionalism
just a matter of perception? What is the role of bilateralism, which has
increasingly gained importance with the signing of eight free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) between individual South-East Asian and Latin American
states since 2006? Perhaps the most crucial question is how politically and
economically important is South-East Asia for Latin America and vice versa?
In addressing these questions, the chapter first revisits the main arguments of
220 Jörn Dosch
the inter-regionalism discourse, applies them to multilateral arrangements in
ASEAN-Latin America relations, and takes stock of the Forum for East
Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), the ASEAN-Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común del Sur/
Mercado Comum do Sul) dialogue and other frameworks for cooperation.
The chapter then turns its attention to trends in bilateral relations between
the countries of the two regions before concluding with some synthesized
findings. The chapter argues that while there has been no shortage of initia-
tives to strengthen economic and political links between the two sides of the
Pacific, ASEAN’s role in Latin America and inter-regional relations in
general remain marginal in global structural terms.

Inter-regionalism in ASEAN-Latin America relations

There are phenomena in the study of international relations that appear to be
more significant and substantial than they actually turn out to be at second
glance. Inter-regionalism—the process through which patterns of relations
between geographical regions are institutionalized (Sanchez Bajo 1999:
927)—might be one of those. As constructivists have rightly and convincingly
taught us, the key to understanding our world does not lie in objective
material truths but rather ideas, identities and interactions that shape our
perception of realities. In this never-ending process of socially constructing
international relations, academics play an important role because they pos-
sess the power of interpretation. Following the ending of the Cold War and
at the dawn of a presumed new world order in the early 1990s, fresh ideas
flourished as to how relations between and among established and emerging
actors of the international system would or should be structured. As an
important contribution to this debate, the term inter-regionalism was coined
for a process that links up entire geographical regions or even continents in
an attempt to increase the level of institutionalization in relations between
them. The inter-regionalism discourse emerged and differentiated itself from
regional integration theory when scholars started to understand that regions
were becoming actors in their own right. Regions such as Western Europe,
South-East Asia or Latin America exercised this status by developing their
own external relations.
The second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s were the heydays of inter-
regionalism. Against the backdrop of a uni-multipolar order with the United
States at its centre and the EU, China and Japan as further pillars of the
international system, institutionalized relations between regions seemingly
provided answers to the challenges of the post-Cold War global structures.
All the main contributors to the first and main wave of literature on inter-
regionalism agreed on several key defining criteria: inter-regionalism emerged
as a response to specific configurations and the increasing complexity of the
international system. Hence, in the light of a perceived erosion process of
nation-states’ steering mechanisms in the era of globalization, inter-
 ASEAN 221
regionalism, similarly to regionalism, appeared to offer state actors new
action corridors and a tool to explore and to regain (lost) political steering
competencies.
In short, according to the mainstream view, inter-regionalism serves as a
political vehicle for the cooperative management of general problems related
to globalization and interdependence (e.g. rule-setting, regime creation, crisis
prevention and management) and provides a framework for the cooperation
between governmental and non-governmental actors. It performs certain
balancing functions, contributes to agenda-setting and institution formation
in the multilayered system of global governance, and strengthens the process
of identity-building in international relations (Maull 2000; Hänggi et al.
2006; Rüland 2014; Rüland et al. 2008; Doidge 2007, 2011; Robles 2008;
Hwee 2007).
Relations between Europe and Asia, particularly the EU-ASEAN dialo-
gues, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), were the best studied examples.
Both the EU and ASEAN started early to develop and institutionalize rela-
tions with extra-regional actors. In 1972 the European Community (EC)
became ASEAN’s first ‘dialogue partner’, and in 1980 ASEAN was the first
regional organization to sign an official cooperation agreement with the EC,
the predecessor of the EU. Beyond EU-ASEAN relations, new patterns of
interactions between regions on the periphery of the global power centres
also moved into the analytical focus. Relations between South-East Asia and
Latin America became a prime empirical case for—as hypothesized at the
time—the growing relevance of non-triadic or South-South inter-regionalism.
Until the late 1980s the Pacific used to be an institutional desert as it
lacked the formal cooperation structures of the Atlantic area. Since then,
and particularly in the early 1990s, new frameworks for cooperation began to
mushroom, mainly involving state and non-state actors from Pacific Asia,
and North and South America. In 1995 ideas for an exclusive ASEAN-
MERCOSUR2 dialogue mechanism emerged. While it seems that actors
from both South-East Asia and Latin America ‘came to the same conclusion
almost simultaneously that it [was] convenient to intensify their relations’
(Stuhldreher 2010: 186), the most noteworthy early proposal for specific
action was made in early 1997. That year the Argentine President Carlos
Menem encouraged the creation of a joint business council and even a free
trade area between MERCOSUR und ASEAN (ibid.; FDCH Political
Transcripts 1997).
It is not documented how ASEAN responded to the proposal but any
initiatives for a deepening or broadening of South-East Asia’s intra- and
extra-regional relations had to be put on hold when the Asian financial crisis
hit the grouping in July 1997, causing a deep recession and destabilization of
some of the member economies, particularly those of Indonesia and Thai-
land. The negative effects of financial globalization were regarded as the
trigger of the crisis, which quickly spilled over to Latin America where
financial crises had occurred before.
222 Jörn Dosch
It was against the backdrop of a perceived need to strengthen regional
mandates and steering capacities in response to the challenges of globaliza-
tion that, in 1998, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed to
Chilean President Eduardo Frei the establishment of an East Asia-Latin
America Forum (EALAF). Goh was inspired by the creation of ASEM two
years earlier. ASEM, which was also a Singaporean initiative, is considered
the prototype of inter-regional cooperation schemes. Although Latin Amer-
ican governments initially showed reserved reactions, EALAF was launched
in September 1999 to promote political and economic cooperation between
the two geographic entities (Abad 2010). In 2001 it was renamed the Forum
for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) and is also known
under its Spanish name Foro de Cooperación América Latina-Asia del Este
(FOCALAE). The formation of the forum was ‘the result of a diversification
strategy aimed at enhancing the position of the participants in the North
South dialogues’ (ibid.: 212) and thus a perfect example for the reasons that
motivate governments to enter into inter-regional cooperation. ASEAN’s
additional motivation was driven by an interest not to lose out on a potential
widening of economic integration in the Western Hemisphere, particularly
the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as an extension of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Dosch and Faust
1999). However, the FTAA (also known as the Área de Libre Comercio de
las Américas—ALCA) never materialized.
FEALAC comprises 33 members3 and has become the main—and only
permanent—mechanism for inter-regional participation from Latin America
and East Asia. The organizational structure rests on three pillars. Regular
meetings take place at three levels: the Foreign Ministers (FMM), the Senior
Officials (SOM) and the Working Groups (WG). While the forum claims to
have intensively promoted ‘regional cooperation between East Asia and
Latin America, by hosting multiple workshops and meetings to facilitate
mutual understanding and related political dialogue’ (FEALAC 2018: 4), its
impact on the international system is still very low (Rubiolo 2018: 11).
In an effort to strengthen relations between ASEAN and individual Latin
American regional organizations, a symposium on cooperation between
ASEAN and the Andean Community4 took place in Bangkok, Thailand, in
2000 without, however, resulting in any notable follow-up activities. After
more than a decade of deliberations, the ASEAN-MERCOSUR dialogue
finally took off in 2007 when representatives of the two groupings met infor-
mally for the first time—at the sidelines of the 3rd FEALAC Foreign Min-
isters’ Meeting—and then in the following year for the first official ASEAN-
MERCOSUR Ministerial Meeting in Brasília, Brazil. However, only one
further Ministerial Meeting has been held so far: in September 2017 at the
margins of the 72nd United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York.
Ministers, inter alia, highlighted the need to ‘revitalise and strengthen their
engagement’, and proposed to develop an ASEAN-MERCOSUR plan of
action and to ‘explore the possibility of ASEAN-MERCOSUR Secretariat-
 ASEAN 223
to-Secretariat cooperation’. While there was agreement to ‘further enhance
sustainable development cooperation, tourism, connectivity, innovation and
people-to-people links … there has yet to be any follow up actions to the
decisions of this Meeting’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2019: 2). Perhaps the most
visible development in inter-governmental relations to date has been the
accreditation of ambassadors from Brazil (2011), Argentina (2012) and
Uruguay (2014) to ASEAN (Rubiolo 2016: 226). At the non-state level, a
MERCOSUR-ASEAN Chamber of Commerce (MACC) was established in
June 2015 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Its main objectives include, but are not
limited to, the promotion of trade and investment, match-making activities
between small and medium-sized enterprises in Latin America and ASEAN,
and to facilitate the resolution of commercial disputes (Rubiolo 2018: 11).
One of the most recent attempts at reinforcing high-level multilateral
cooperation across continental borders was made in September 2014 with the
founding of the ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (PA) Framework for Cooperation.
According to its own description, the PA5 is an ‘an area of deep integration
to move progressively towards the free mobility of goods, services, resources
and people’ (Pacific Alliance 2020). The inaugural ASEAN-PA Foreign
Ministers Meeting took place on the initiative of the PA ministers who invi-
ted ASEAN to consider ways to cooperate based on the PA’s mandate of
building links in trade, investment, services and people-to-people con-
nectivity. As in the past, the Latin American countries were driven by a
motivation to diversify their foreign economic relations. While the PA states
had established a policy infrastructure conducive to expanded trade and
investment, intra-PA trade remained low at 4% (as opposed to ASEAN’s
25%, for example) mainly due to Mexico’s trade dependence on the United
States and the reliance of Chile, Colombia and Peru on commodity exports,
particularly to China (Desker 2015). In 2016 the ASEAN and PA ministers
of foreign affairs agreed to ‘meet regularly at the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly in New York’ and to focus on four priority areas:
economic cooperation; education and people-to-people contacts; science,
technology and innovation; and sustainable development (ASEAN 2016).
The last documented evidence of an encounter between ASEAN and the PA
dates back to May 2017 when the Committee of Permanent Representatives
to ASEAN and the Group of External Relations of the Pacific Alliance met
at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, to renew their commitment
to strengthen cooperation between the two regional organizations (ASEAN
Secretariat 2017). No progress has been recorded since then. For a short
while in early 2017, against the backdrop of the US withdrawal from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), ASEAN-PA cooperation came into focus
again as a potential avenue towards an alternative trans-Pacific trade agree-
ment. In the words of Indonesian Vice-President Yusuf Kalla, ‘If TPP does
not pan out, why don’t we initiate a cooperation between ASEAN and the
Pacific Alliance? That is better than TPP’ (Bellefleur 2017). However, before
the idea could gain any traction, the Comprehensive and Progressive
224 Jörn Dosch
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as a TPP light had become the new
game in town.
If Rubiolo (2018:1) is correct in asserting that ‘South America relations
with Southeast Asian countries have flourished during the last decade’, inter-
regionalism has not made any substantial contribution. What was true 15
years ago still applies today: multilateral cooperation mechanisms in
ASEAN-Latin America relations have not markedly moved beyond political
rhetoric and lack tangible results (Dosch 2005). One of the reasons for this
lies in the nature of inter-regionalism itself. Inter-regionalism usually
addresses ‘low politics’ rather than larger political and strategic goals (Gar-
dini and Malamud 2015: 3) and is often marked by certain common char-
acteristics such as ‘soft’ institutional structures and processes, which in turn
are characterized by informality, consensus orientation and pragmatism
rather than legally binding agreements. This concept resembles ASEAN’s
internal cooperation mode, the ‘ASEAN Way’, which has firmly established
itself as the main alternative model to the EU’s legalistic approach of
supranational institution building.
The ‘ASEAN Way’ has—either explicitly or implicitly—been adopted by
all other organizations or fora in the Asia-Pacific and in trans-Pacific rela-
tions, including but not limited to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) group, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asian Summit forum,
FEALAC and the ASEAN dialogues with MERCOSUR and the PA. Some
of these have been more successful than others but none has fulfilled initial
expectations regarding the setting of norms and rules, the coordination and
harmonization of members’ positions towards regional and global chal-
lenges, or—at least—the provision of channels for results-oriented
cooperation.
In 2012 the Asian Development Bank found that relations between Asia
and Latin America were particularly under-institutionalized as links
remained less developed than each region’s engagement with other geo-
graphical regions (Asian Development Bank et al. 2012: 107). This finding is
still valid today. Neither FEALAC, the ASEAN-MERCOSUR dialogue nor
the ASEAN-PA Framework for Cooperation have ever met a presumed key
objective of inter-regionalism as postulated by some of the literature, namely
effective balancing against hegemonic actors and structures in the interna-
tional system such as the role of the United States and the global financial
architecture shaped by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank.
On the plus side the non-committal, lowly institutionalized nature of
ASEAN-Latin America multilateralism provides a broad and flexible frame-
work in which members feel comfortable and are not pressured into formal
negotiations on trade and other matters. There is no need or ambition to
sign binding agreements. By that, the intra-regional dialogues provide vital
channels for communication in the absence of other formalized interchanges
and have substantially reduced the ‘psychological distance’ that existed
 ASEAN 225
between South-East Asia and Latin America in the late 1990s (Aggarwal
1998; Dosch and Faust 1999: 49). However, the inter-regional fora are, ulti-
mately, also ‘talk shops’ in the sense that they lack the mechanisms and
incentives to go beyond structured communication. Pathways to concrete
action have been established only to a limited extent in the case of FEALAC,
which, in 2018, launched two FEALAC-wide projects: ‘Value Chain Devel-
opment for Deeper Integration of East Asia and Latin America’ and ‘Redu-
cing inequality in FEALAC Member Countries: innovative policymaking
that leaves no one behind’. Both are implemented by the two regional UN
commissions: the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) (FEALAC 2020).
A further challenge is related to actorness. In inter-regional relations
South-East Asia is represented by ASEAN as a well-established organization,
which has clearly established ‘regional actorship’ (Hettne 2014). On the Latin
American side, however, ASEAN does not have a natural counterpart that
speaks and acts for the whole region. The inter-governmental organization
Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA) identifies five
regional organizations as relevant actors in Latin America’s relations with
ASEAN, i.e. the PA, MERCOSUR, the Central American Integration
System (SICA), the Andean Community and the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) (Permanent Secretariat of SELA 2016: 3).
Furthermore, a new brand of more ideology-driven, political and politi-
cized concepts of regional integration emerged in the wake of electoral vic-
tors of leftist governments across the subcontinent and materialized in
organizations such as the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra
América (ALBA—Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) and the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) (Doctor 2015). While these organiza-
tions have now become defunct mainly due to shifts to conservative govern-
ments in several countries and the crisis in Venezuela, they were symptomatic
for the general trend in Latin American regionalism, namely the proliferation
rather than consolidation of integration efforts.
Unlike in ASEAN’s external relations with Europe, inter-regionalism with
Latin America does not take the form of a group-to-group partnership. It is
thus more difficult and challenging to develop and maintain a clearly defined
focus and agenda in South-East Asia-Latin America relations. The only
organization which comprises all 33 Latin American and Caribbean nations,
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)—which
was established in 2011 to replace the Rio Group and the short-lived Latin
American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development
(CALC)—is an ‘informal forum, deprived of legal structure, headquarters,
competencies and budget’ (European Parliament 2017: 49). Moreover, the
Venezuela crisis has created a deep rift between CELAC members who sup-
port and those who oppose the Maduro government. In September 2014 an
ASEAN-CELAC Ministerial Meeting took place in New York, USA, to
226 Jörn Dosch
explore possible areas for cooperation. CELAC reportedly articulated an
interest in agriculture and fisheries, nanotechnology, disaster management,
the promoting of human rights, education, poverty reduction and statistical
system development (ASEAN 2015: 14). However, unlike the EU and China,
ASEAN has not established a regular dialogue with CELAC.
In sum, although inter-regionalism has not achieved the originally antici-
pated political and economic relevance and effectiveness in shaping relations
between South-East Asia and Latin America, mutual interest has undoubt-
edly grown, also within the public sphere. The year 2004 was a watershed
and—particularly as the result of China’s charm offensive and President Hu
Jintao’s first extensive tour of Latin America—marked a surge in news items
on Asia-related topics in the Latin American media.
ASEAN, which made international headlines in 2003 with the announce-
ment of the gradual implementation of a highly integrated economic, socio-
political and cultural community, was no exception. According to a search of
the Nexis database, which features 35,000 publications including all major
newspapers and news services in most languages, there were hardly any new
items about ASEAN in Latin American media outlets before 2004. That
year, however, the number shot up to 346 with a similar quantity of ASEAN-
related articles in the following years. A peak of 388 was reached in 2017
when ASEAN celebrated its 50th anniversary. Since then the numbers have
dropped slightly and 277 news items were counted in 2019. Although these
figures are a far cry from the European coverage of ASEAN—in Germany
alone around 1,000 articles mention ASEAN every year—the statistics show
that ASEAN is known and generates interest in Latin America.6

The development of bilateral relations

Whether or not one agrees that inter-regionalism is long past its peak and
has been replaced by other forms of activity (see Baert et al. 2014 for a dis-
cussion), it is hard to ignore the fact that bilateralism has grown in impor-
tance in ASEAN-Latin America relations—least at first glance. As Table 14.1
shows, since 2006 eight bilateral FTAs between Latin American and South-
East Asian economies have come into effect. Some also include economic
integration agreements (EIAs). Chile signed four FTAs (with Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam), Peru two (Thailand and Singapore) and
Costa Rica and Panama one each with Singapore. A Singapore-MERCO-
SUR FTA (since 2018) and a Singapore-Mexico FTA (since 2000) are under
negotiation. Several other FTAs have either been proposed or are currently being
studied: Indonesia-Colombia (2019), Indonesia-Peru (2014), Philippines-
Mexico (2015), Thailand-Colombia (2013) and Thailand-MERCOSUR
(2006).
A comparison of trade data from the year before the respective FTA came
into effect and most recent figures reveals that only the Chile-Thailand, Peru-
Singapore and Peru-Thailand FTAs resulted in an increase in both exports
Table 14.1 South American FTAs with ASEAN member states
Trade Agreement Coverage Type Date of entry Bilateral trade in the year Bilateral trade in 2018 Increase
into force before the FTA
La. La. La. La. Exp. Imp.
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
Chile-Indonesia Goods FTA 10 Aug. 2019 – – 92.0 194.0 – –
Chile-Thailand Goods and FTA 5 Nov. 2015 286.8 795.7 (2014) 419.3 986.8 31.6% 19.4%
services and EIA (2014)
Chile-Malaysia Goods FTA 25 Feb. 2012 211.4 168.9 (2011) 119.1 246.8 –43.7% 31.6%
(2011)
Chile-Viet Nam Goods FTA 1 Jan. 2014 307.0 280.8 (2013) 230.8 768.2 –24.8% 63.4%
(2013)
Costa Rica- Goods and FTA 1 July 2013 62.0 (2012) 43.5 (2012) 20.8 65.2 –66.5% 33.3%
Singapore services and EIA
Panama-Singapore Goods and FTA 24 July 2006 72.9 (2005) 1,782.5 9.4 1,748.9 –87.1% –1.9%
services and EIA (2005) (2016) (2016)
Peru-Singapore Goods and FTA 1 Aug. 2009 4.2 (2008) 45.5 (2008) 9.7 68.0 56.7% 33.1%
services and EIA
Peru-Thailand Goods FTA 31 Dec. 2011 98.4 (2010) 372.4 (2010) 126.6 401.0 22.3% 7.1%

Source: data compiled from WTO OMC. Regional Trade Agreements Database (https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx); Asia Regional
Integration Center, Free Trade Agreements Database (https://aric.adb.org/database/fta); World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution Database (wits.
worldbank.org).
La. Imp.: Imports from the respective South-East Asian country by the respective Latin American country.
ASEAN 227
228 Jörn Dosch
and imports on the Latin American side. The Chile-Thailand, Chile-Malaysia,
Chile-Viet Nam, Costa Rica-Singapore and Panama-Singapore FTAs led to
a drastic decline in exports from the respective Latin American countries to
the respective South-East Asian economies. In the case of the Panama-
Singapore FTA both exports and imports shrank. The overall effect of bilat-
eral FTAs on inter-regional trade has been small, which is also confirmed by
aggregated data.
According to Figure 14.1, the combined export volume of the 10 ASEAN
member states to Latin America increased steadily between 2004 and 2011,
only shortly interrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008–2009. Exports
then stagnated before declining year-on-year mainly due to the economic
slowdown that had gripped Latin America since 2011. Exports have slightly
increased since 2016 as the result of Latin America’s ‘subdued recovery’
(ECLAC 2019: 41). However, while ASEAN’s exports from Latin America
grew five-fold from US $4.4 billion in 2000 to $23 billion in 2017, they have
only slightly increased in relation to the group’s overall exports and remain
marginal. More specifically, ASEAN exports to Latin America as a share of
the group’s global exports increased from 1.03% in 2000 to 1.75% in 2017
(WTO n.d.).
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)’s trade is dominated by the
United States and China. In 2018 the former accounted for 32.02% of LAC
imports and 43.04% of exports; the latter’s share of LAC imports was 18.94%
and 12.33% of exports. Malaysia (1.24%, 15th), Thailand (1.21%, 16th) and
Vietnam (0.97%, 18th) were among LAC’s top import partners. Among
export partners the highest ranking ASEAN states were Vietnam (0.62%,
23th), Singapore (0.54%, 27th) and Malaysia (0.38%, 34th) (World Bank
2020).
It is also important to note that the signing of bilateral FTAs can have the
opposite effect:

[O]n the one hand [bilateral FTAs] indirectly [make it possible] to bring
the regions closer by promoting access to the regional market through
the unilateral entry to individual markets; on the other it discourages
multilateral trade and economic cooperation in South America because,
unlike ASEAN, Mercosur does not allow the signing of unilateral FTAs
by its members. Thus, the fact that some South American countries sign
agreements unilaterally is opposite to multilateral trading initiatives and
can hardly result in a step towards an interregional approach through
regional institutions of trade.
(Rubiolo 2018: 10)

However, the headline trends and figures hide important developments in

some bilateral relationships. For example, trade between Argentina and
Vietnam more than doubled from US $1.4 billion in 2013 to $2.9 billion in
2018 (EFE-EPA 2019), making Viet Nam Argentina’s fifth largest export
 ASEAN 229

Figure 14.1 ASEAN merchandise exports to South and Central America and the
Caribbean (in US $ million)
Source: Data compiled by the author from https://timeseries.wto.org/.

partner in the world (World Bank 2020). The economic complementarity

between Argentina and Viet Nam benefits the bilateral trade relationship.
Argentine’s exports to Viet Nam include animal feed, textiles, corn, wheat
and some seafood products, while imports comprise garment materials,
footwear, machinery, equipment and spare parts (Viet Nam News 2018).
Indonesia, to give another example, has been strengthening its trade rela-
tions with Latin America in order to expand the market opportunities for
Indonesian products and foster cooperation in the mining sector. In 2017
bilateral consultations and joint commission meetings were carried out with
previously ‘unchartered territories for Indonesia’s products and business-
people’, i.e. Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Jamaica
(Oxford Business Group 2018). In 2019 an Indonesia-Latin America and
Caribbean Business Forum was created to mitigate challenges in Indonesia’s
trade and investment relations in Latin America such as geographical distance,
connectivity, as well as tariff and non-tariff barriers (IDN Financials 2019).
Singapore is the main South-East Asian investor on the sub-continent and
foreign direct investment (FDI) into LAC grew at a compounded annual
growth rate of 9% between 2010 and 2015, reaching US $6.9 billion in 2015.
Between 2015 and 2017 the number of Singaporean companies active in LAC
doubled to approximately 100 (Leong 2017).
Singapore’s growing economic relations with Latin America are mirrored
by the city state’s foreign policy and diplomacy. President Tony Tan Keng
Yam is the only South-East Asian head of state to have visited Latin Amer-
ica in recent years. In 2016 he conducted a bilateral state visit to Mexico to
commemorate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between the two nations. It was the first visit by a Singaporean head of
230 Jörn Dosch
state to Latin America. He travelled again to Mexico in 2019 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Government of Singapore 2020).
In the previous decade most South-East Asian heads of state or of gov-
ernment only visited the sub-continent on the occasion of multilateral meet-
ings, but some have not set foot on Latin American soil at all. For example,
Indonesian President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi), who assumed office
in 2014, has not visited Latin America. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla repre-
sented Indonesia at the 2016 APEC summit in Lima, Peru, and at the 2018
G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, indicating that Latin America was
not a priority for the Indonesian government at the time. ‘Kalla defended
Jokowi by saying that the President’s no-show was simply a division of labor
between the two leaders, where Kalla was assigned to bigger, global forums
while Jokowi would take care of the smaller regional summits’ (Halim 2016).
However, Widodo was scheduled to participate in the 2019 APEC summit in
Santiago de Chile, which was cancelled.
On both sides of the Pacific APEC summits have usually been the only
opportunity for South-East Asian and Latin American state leaders to meet.
This is particularly surprising in the case of the Philippines, which have tra-
ditionally maintained close trans-Pacific relations. By early 2020 President
Duterte had made 21 presidential trips to 20 sovereign states since his inau-
guration in June 2016 and it is rather untypical for a Philippine president to
leave Latin America largely off the agenda. By contrast, during her 10-year
presidency (2001–2010) Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited Mexico three times,
Colombia twice and Brazil, Chile and Peru once each (Government of the
Philippines 2020). In the past five years, Argentine President Mauricio Macri
was the only Latin American head of state and of government to visit indi-
vidual ASEAN countries on a bilateral basis: Indonesia and Vietnam in
2019. The President of Chile Sebastián Piñera visited Singapore in 2018 at
the invitation of Prime Minister Lee to attend the 33rd ASEAN Summit and
related meetings as a guest of the ASEAN Chair of Singapore (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Government of Singapore 2020). For example, Dilma Rous-
seff, President of Brazil from January 2011 until her impeachment in 2016,
did not visit South-East Asia at all.

Conclusion
Relations between Latin America and South-East Asia seem to be perpetually
at an early stage. Once considered as a promising case of inter-regionalism,
actual developments have not resulted in an effective cooperative manage-
ment of jointly perceived problems and challenges related to globalization
and interdependence, or to South-South cooperation as stipulated by the
mainstream literature. The economic and political relations between the two
regions remain weak. To be sure, from a Latin American perspective South-
East Asia is no longer the terra incognita that it once was some two decades
ago (and vice versa) and interest in—and attention to—ASEAN has grown
 ASEAN 231
markedly since 2004. Furthermore, FEALAC has already entered its third
decade and thus has proved to be more durable than some observers might
have thought in the beginning. While not having produced any tangible
region-to-region cooperation agreements on trade or in other policy areas,
FEALAC has seen some institutional evolution and recently some orienta-
tion towards concrete trans-Pacific projects in support of strengthening inte-
gration and reducing inequalities.
At the same time, exclusive ASEAN dialogues and fora with regional
organizations in Latin America, such as MERCOSUR, the PA, CELAC and
the Andean Community, were short-lived or have not fully taken off. Yet
some limited progress is evident; for example, the establishment of a MER-
COSUR-ASEAN Chamber of Commerce. However, the far-reaching objec-
tives that all fora stated on their starting agendas have not been reached.
Communication channels nevertheless do exist and have been maintained
over the years. Consultations and exchanges between ASEAN and Latin
American heads of states and of government as well as ministers of foreign
affairs usually take place at the sidelines of APEC summits and UN meetings.
While multilateral cooperation has not lived up to the participating actors’
own expectations (if various official strategy documents, statements and
reports are taken as a yardstick), the scope and importance of bilateral rela-
tions between individual ASEAN and Latin American states have seemingly
grown. Eight bilateral FTAs, which have come into force since 2006, are the
most visible indicator of this. However, notwithstanding some notable
advancements, particularly the increasing relevance of Singapore and Viet
Nam for Latin America in terms of trade and/or FDI, a closer look puts the
quantitative expansion of bilateral ties into perspective. The value of ASEAN
exports to Latin America and the Caribbean as a share of the group’s total
exports has only increased by 0.73% since 2000 and still hovers well below
2%. Undoubtedly ASEAN and Latin America have firmly established a trans-
Pacific relationship; however, it remains marginal in the global context.

Notes
1 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Thailand, Singapore and Viet Nam. Timor-Leste became a sovereign state in 2002
but is not (yet) an ASEAN member.
2 MERCOSUR comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
3 Asia-Pacific: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Latin
America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.
4 The Andean Community comprises Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
5 The Pacific Alliance comprises Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru and was offi-
cially established in April 2011. See https://alianzapacifico.net/en/what-is-the-pa
cific-alliance/.
232 Jörn Dosch
6 The figures presented here are meant to provide an indicative trend in the media
coverage of ASEAN in Latin America but not the exact number of news items. As
Nexis does not include all of the sub-continent’s newspapers and news services, the
actual number of articles on ASEAN is likely to be higher.

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15 Latin America and South Africa in the
21st century
A romance with no future? The cases of
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela
Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti

Introduction
The relations between Latin America and South Africa have gone through
periods of varying intensity, under both military and democratic govern-
ments. In general, the initiatives originated in Latin America, except during
the 1970s, when Pretoria grew closer to the military governments of the
Southern Cone, since it had been excluded from the regional and interna-
tional scene due to its apartheid policy, and it needed new allies. In other
words, South Africa sought to reposition itself in the context of the ending of
the Cold War. The establishment of authoritarian regimes in most of Latin
America piqued Pretoria’s expectations, and South Africa targeted those
links that could contribute to the defence of its western flank, as well as
providing market and investment opportunities to counteract international
isolation (Lechini 2006). In the 1970s Latin America and South Africa
intensified their ties for strategic and economic reasons.
Since Nelson Mandela’s ascendancy to the presidency, Latin American
actors have promoted rapprochement towards the newly democratic South
Africa, which showed unique leadership qualities to develop new South-
South cooperation dynamics. This mutual interest deepened during the first
decade of the 21st century, both at the bilateral and multilateral level. The
latter developed through the revitalization of existing relations—such as the
South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (SAPCZ) and the Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) (Mercado Común del Sur/
Mercado Comum do Sul)-Southern African Customs Union (SACU)—and
through the promotion of new alliances, such as IBSA (India-Brazil-South
Africa), the BRICS (an informal grouping comprising Brazil, the Russian
Federation, India, the People’s Republic of China and South Africa) and
ASA (Africa-South America). During the first decade of the 21st century,
coalition building was the main strategy.
In the second decade of the 21st century, due to the scarcity of resources,
domestic realities and systemic crises, there has been a relative hibernation of
bilateral connections which have been affected by domestic and international
factors on both sides of the Atlantic.
236 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
This chapter analyses the place of Latin America in South Africa’s foreign
policy1 throughout a succession of administrations of the African National
Congress (ANC), which has become the dominant political force since
Nelson Mandela’s presidency in 1994. Considering that there has been no
joint regional policy from Latin America towards Africa, this chapter focuses
on the cases of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. The choice of these coun-
tries is mainly based on the fact that Brazil, Argentina and, to a lesser extent,
Venezuela have been the continent’s major players in relation to Pretoria
since the beginning of the Mandela era, and whose governments developed
proactive South-South policies.
Within the Southern Cone of Latin America, Brazil has the strongest tra-
dition of relations with Africa, followed by Argentina. Venezuela was a late-
comer. A concrete and active ‘African policy’ began in the 21st century, just
after Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency and established the ‘Agenda
Africa’. (Lechini 2006, 2011a; Pimentel 2000; Sombra Saraiva 2002; Bolívar
2008; Lucena Molero 2013).
Mandela’s electoral victory turned South Africa into an exemplary case of
peaceful transition from a racist and segregationist regime to a multiracial
democracy. In a context of exclusion, international isolation and economic
sanctions that were applied against the apartheid regime, the ‘new South Africa’
decided to start its reinsertion into a changing world in order to ‘become a
responsible global citizen’ (Landsberg 2010: 95). South Africa turned from being
an isolated state that was politically belligerent, regionally militaristic and having
a global defensive agenda to adopting an opposite position: it showed a strong
commitment to Africa and to global governance; defended multilateralism; and
maintained an active presence in regional, continental and global affairs.
As a result of Mandela assuming the presidency, Latin American democracies
turned their attention towards South Africa, promoting relations with the
world’s example of peaceful transition to democracy. The new South African
foreign policy displayed new values (patriotism, loyalty, Ubuntu and Batho
Pele,2 equity and integrity) and principles, which structured the strategic goals of
the country. Among the governing principles, the most notable involved a com-
mitment to human rights, democracy, justice and international law, international
peace, agreed mechanisms of conflict resolution, and economic development
through regional and international cooperation (DIRCO 2009: 6).
The ANC’s continuation in power has influenced the nature and imple-
mentation of the country’s foreign policy, as well as its priorities. The eco-
nomic imperatives marked the clear predominance of pragmatism over
principle. In this sense, a certain natural dislocation between lexis and praxis
exist, as illustrated by the fact that although successive ANC governments
sustained a cooperative South-South discourse based on solidarity, Latin
America has been a low priority in South African foreign relations. None-
theless, there has been a slow process of increasing politico-diplomatic,3
commercial and cooperative linkages, which have been more visible in the
case of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina and Venezuela during the
 South Africa 237
golden first decade of the 21st century. These relations will be further
analysed by considering each of the ANC administrations.

Latin America in Mandela’s foreign policy: initial steps

With the return to democracy, Nelson Mandela’s government (1994–1999)
started a period of expansion of international activities with the aim of
increasing diplomatic, commercial, scientific, technological and cultural
relations at the subregional, continental and global level. In his inaugural
foreign policy speech, Mandela stated that South Africa’s future was set in
Africa, and that South Africa was destined to become a political and eco-
nomic regional leader with responsibilities and duties, for which it had ‘to
follow an idealist path by resting its diplomacy on ethical and principled
foundations’ (Landsberg 2010: 97).
Mandela’s administration began with an extremely moral stance, under the
influence of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs Aziz Pahad and the Department of Foreign Affairs (the South Afri-
can Foreign Office). However, over time it became more pragmatic in terms
of promoting South Africa’s economic interests and considering the domestic
necessities of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.4
Based on the aforementioned principles, Mandela supported South-South
cooperation and proposed South Africa as the host country for the 12th Non-
Aligned Movement Summit, which was eventually held in Durban in 1998. On
the other hand, he was also drawn to the ‘walking on two legs’ theory, which
meant maintaining stable relations with the central powers—in order to ensure
South Africa’s survival—as well as with the global South countries—mainly
with those which had supported South Africa’s struggle against apartheid.
In this context, there was an expansion of South Africa’s relations with
Latin America, mainly promoted by Latin American countries, which aimed
to boost relations with Mandela, a charismatic and symbolic figure, who had
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. This bilateral rapprochement
between the restored Latin American democracies and the rising South
African democracy had its ‘ups and downs’. Moreover, it depended heavily
on the personal initiatives of accredited ambassadors on both sides of the
Atlantic, as well as on those of high-ranking government officials. One
example of this was the relationship between Brazil’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995–2001), and the South African Minister
of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin (1996–2004), who promoted the MER-
COSUR-Southern African Development Community (SADC) agreements.
Erwin noted that part of the solution to easing the vulnerability of the
emerging markets lay in the strengthening and development of the global
South. He also referred to how South Africa could unleash its true potential
by developing strategic links with other regions, illustrating this proposal
with the image of a butterfly. According to Erwin, South Africa should con-
solidate its relations with the European Union, its main trading and
238 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
investment partner, that is, the butterfly’s head. These firm relations would
prompt a spillover effect on the body of the butterfly—South Africa within
its own continent—whose wings would unfold to embrace Latin America
and Asia. This description clearly and visually shows the position that the
Latin American region occupied in South African strategies (Erwin 1998).
The 1990s were a prolific decade for South Africa, in terms of new con-
nections, the promotion of politico-diplomatic and cultural relations, and an
increase in trade. At the same time, there were negotiations with Brazil and
Argentina to create a free trade zone between MERCOSUR and SADC.
Brazil was very active in pursuing good relations, and high-level visits were
made (Lechini 2006). President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited South
Africa in 1996 and Foreign Minister Lampreia made three official visits
during his tenure. On the South African side, Mandela travelled to Brasília in
1991, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo in 1995, Vice-President Mbeki
in 1997, and Mandela returned to the continent in 1998 to attend the
MERCOSUR presidential meeting in Ushuaia, Argentina, before going on
to Buenos Aires and Brasília.
Argentina, under Raúl Alfonsín’s administration, had terminated diplo-
matic relations with South Africa in 1986, thereby signalling the end of a
period of ambiguities with Pretoria. President Menem restored relations in
1991and in 1995 he became the first Argentine and American head of state to
visit South Africa. During his administration and even before Mandela’s
presidency, in 1993 both countries carried out the first joint naval operations
named ‘Atlasur I’ in Argentine waters, without the presence of other Latin
American partners because the apartheid regime was still technically in force
(Lechini 1995). In 1995 Brazil and Uruguay joined ‘Atlasur II’, which was
based in Cape Town. ‘Atlasur III’ was carried out in 1997, on the 75th
anniversary of the South African Navy.
Venezuela’s relations with African countries date back to the 1950s when
Caracas established its first diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and Egypt.
Although the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa took
place as early as 1993, during Mandela’s administration there was only
minimal activism. This was because Caracas was still implementing the ‘old
diplomacy’ of keeping maintaining its distance from the South and giving
priority to alignment with the United States and its partners in the North
(Bolívar 2008). This changed dramatically in 1999, with the ascendency to
power of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa.

South Africa’s foreign policy towards Latin America in the

21st century: from hyper-activism to a low profile

Mbeki’s globalism
President Thabo Mbeki came to power (1999–2008) within a favourable
regional and international context. This led to the implementation of more
 South Africa 239
pragmatic policies on the one hand, and a greater global outreach on the
other. He promoted stronger links between South Africa and Latin Amer-
ica—mainly with Brazil—in the context of minilateralism. Mbeki, who was
known as the ‘Foreign Relations President’, achieved international recogni-
tion for South Africa as a regional power and as an actor with global pro-
jection. Yet he was heavily criticized for the neoliberal economic orientation
of his government and for departing from the traditional positions adopted
by the ANC ‘old guard’ and its political basis.
Under Mbeki, South Africa consolidated its presence in Africa through
policies such as the ‘African Renaissance’ and the New Economic Partner-
ship for African Development (NEPAD). He was also a promoter of South-
South cooperation in terms of what Landsberg (2010) called ‘the neo-Bandung
spirit’. He actively participated in all the initiatives coming from the ‘South’,
contributing to the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement, establishing
the G20 on multilateral trade in 2003—which emerged at the fifth ministerial
World Trade Organization conference, held in Cancún, Mexico—and the
IBSA Dialogue Forum with India and Brazil, as well as holding the
presidency of the G77+China in 2005.
Despite the evident differences with Brazil and India in terms of socio-
economic indices, IBSA enabled Mbeki to increase his presence at the global
level, thereby raising South Africa’s status. Through this trilateral strategy, he
revived, in a certain way, Erwin’s butterfly wing metaphor, focusing on Asia
and Latin America. In the former case, he looked towards the East, in 2003,
with the first Asian-African Sub-Regional Conference and in 2005 with the
first New Asian-African Strategic Partnership summit. Although with less
intensity than in the relationship with the Asian continent, Mbeki also
directed his attention towards the Atlantic west coast, by actively participat-
ing in bi-regional meetings, such as the ASA summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in
2006 and the sixth SAPCZ conference in Luanda, Angola, in 2007 in order
to relaunch interregional cooperation.
South African activism towards Latin America developed in every possible
sphere in bi-regional, minilateral and bilateral modes. The new century had
given fresh hope to the new ‘leftist’ Latin American governments. Brazil was
the centre of Pretoria’s attention, as it shared with South Africa a similar role
and aspiration as the emerging regional leader.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva contributed to the development of an
active and prominent policy, where South-South cooperation, Africa and
South Africa had a relevant position. This would not have been possible
without President Cardoso’s previous achievements and policies, since he had
promoted the relationship with South Africa and conducted negotiations
with MERCOSUR. Mbeki visited Brazil in 2000 to launch the Agreement
for the Creation of a Free Trade Zone between MERCOSUR and South
Africa. These negotiations continued until they bore fruit in 2004 with the
conclusion of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) between MERCOSUR
and SACU,5 along with a Dispute Settlement Protocol and a Memorandum
240 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
of Understanding. The PTA eventually came into force in 2016 (see Morasso
2007 and Organization of American States n.d.).
President Lula and Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorím, together
with their South African and Indian counterparts created the IBSA Dialogue
Forum in 2003. The association among the three big democracies of the South
embracing the three subcontinents heralded a new phase for these
governments, which aspired to play regional and global roles.
Under the Lula administration, South-South cooperation was a priority
for Brazil both in regional and trans-regional affairs, as illustrated by IBSA,
ASA and SAPCZ (South Africa is also a member of the three initiatives), the
Summit of South American-Arab Countries and the Community of Portu-
guese Language Countries. According to Lula, ‘There is no global challenge
that Africa and Latin America could not face together’ (da Silva 2009).
During his two terms in office, the president made 11 tours throughout
Africa, in which he visited 23 states and went to Pretoria in 2003 (his first
African trip as soon as he took office), in 2006, in 2007 for the IBSA summit,
and in 2010.
In the field of cooperation on security and defence, Brazil continued to
participate with Argentina and Uruguay in the subsequent ‘Atlasur’ naval
exercises. Furthermore, in 2003 Brazil signed an agreement with South Africa
on military cooperation that included defence industries, research and devel-
opment, the acquisition and supply of military materials and the exchange of
peace operation experiences (Valderrama Menes 2013).
Trade relations between Brazil and South Africa underwent substantial
changes during Mbeki’s presidency. At the beginning of his tenure, South
African imports totalled US $214 million while exports amounted to $165
million. In 2008 there was an increase in the volume of South African
exports to Brazil, but there was an even greater increase in imports of Bra-
zilian products, which reached $1.58 billion (OEC 2019), and this increased
Pretoria’s trade deficit with the South American country.
The signals sent by the South African government to Argentina did not
have the same warmth as those sent to Brazil, and nor did the response.
Minister Dlamini Zuma of South Africa was present at the inauguration of
President Fernando de la Rúa in 2000 signalling the potential interest of
Pretoria. The Argentine crisis of 2001 brought this possibility to a halt. A
few year later President Mbeki had to postpone his presidential visit to
Buenos Aires owing to the complications in Néstor Kirchner’s agenda, sug-
gesting a limited interest in Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, the synergy between
the respective ambassadors led to slow but steady advances in the creation of
a network of agreements that helped to strengthen the bilateral relationship.
The appointment in 2005 of the Argentinian Ambassador Carlos Sersale di
Cerisano to Pretoria and the South African Ambassador Peter Goosen to
Buenos Aires resulted in increasing contacts, which culminated in the pro-
posal of an Argentina-South Africa Binational Commission (BICSAA).
BICSAA was inaugurated in 2007 in Pretoria and reconvened in Buenos
 South Africa 241
Aires in the following year (Lechini 2011a). In terms of bilateral economic
exchange, in 1999 South African exports to Argentina totalled US $88 mil-
lion dollars while imports were valued at $257 million. This deficit widened
and reached its highest point in 2008, at $1.02 billion (OEC 2019).
Cooperation on the joint ‘Atlasur’ naval exercises continued with Brazil
and Uruguay. In 1999 ‘Atlasur IV’ was carried out in Latin American waters.
In 2002 ‘Atlasur V’ took place in South Africa. In 2006 ‘Atlasur VI’ was held
in Montevideo, Uruguay, and in 2008 ‘Atlasur VII’ took place again in South
Africa (Lechini 2011b).
After many years of alignment with the United States, Venezuela’s foreign
policy changed direction following Chávez’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’. ‘Afri-
canness’ was rediscovered. From the onset, in 1999 the Chávez government
proposed a foreign policy that would strengthen national sovereignty, diver-
sify external relations and create new cooperation networks. In that context,
the government decided to promote relations with African countries, using
both a flamboyant rhetoric and quite impulsive actions. On the one hand,
Caracas highlighted the role and value of the Afro-descendant segments of
the Venezuelan population, just as Brazil did. On the other hand, it backed
its African ventures with petro-diplomacy.
Caracas’s African strategy started to gain importance in 2005, with a sig-
nificant presidential and diplomatic activism and with the creation of the
position of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs for Africa; Reinaldo Bolívar was
assigned to the post. Venezuela launched the plan ‘Agenda Africa’, estab-
lishing the legal framework for comprehensive cooperation in every field, but
targeting economic complementarities and political influence in particular.
To achieve economic expansion, Venezuela resorted to triangular coop-
eration with Cuba, Brazil, China, Iran and Russia for its African strategy
(Lucena Molero 2013). Between 1957 and 2004 the country concluded some
30 cooperation agreements with Africa, and by 2010 there were more than
200 in place (Aporrea 2009a). In the early years of Mbeki’s mandate, South
African exports to Venezuela barely surpassed US $16 million but by 2008
exports had increased to $34.7 million. South Africa’s imports of Venezuelan
products in 1999 totalled $2.2 million, while in 2008 they were over $297
million, of which 99% were oil imports. Although these export volumes were
not particularly significant for South Africa, there was an increase during the
first decade of the 21st century (Department of Trade and Industry,
Government of South Africa 2019; OEC 2019).
In order to increase its political influence, in 2008 Caracas established
formal diplomatic relations with Madagascar and opened 10 new embassies.
The first presidential tour of Africa took place in 2006, when Hugo Chávez
paid three visits to the continent6 and attended the first ASA Summit in
Nigeria. In 2008 Chávez visited South Africa to establish South-South
cooperation and to conclude one cooperation agreement and three energy
agreements. One of the energy agreements established that the oil companies
of South Africa (PetroSA) and Venezuela (Petróleos de Venezuela, SA—
242 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
PDVSA) would work jointly to explore the Orinoco Belt. In 2005 the African
Union granted Venezuela observer status, a symbolic and formal gesture that
had little practical impact. Overall, Venezuela’s efforts did not achieve parti-
cularly remarkable results and remained inconsistent with its declared
objective of achieving economic complementarity.

The legacy of Zuma

When Jacob Zuma (2009–2018) took office, he used the slogan ‘together
doing more and better’ to express the guidelines of his administration (Pre-
sidency, Republic of South Africa 2009), thus establishing an ‘open for busi-
ness’ South Africa, in the context of a foreign policy with a developmentalist
discourse and a more utilitarian and commercial practice. In his own words,
‘our foreign relations must contribute to the creation of an environment
conducive to sustainable economic growth and development’ (DIRCO 2014).
Although he made efforts to differentiate his foreign policy from that of
Mbeki, it was more an issue of form than substance, as seen in changing the
name of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). As Wheeler (2011)
noted, Zuma’s foreign policy consisted in preserving and maintaining what
Mbeki had created.
During Zuma’s administration, insofar as Latin America was concerned,
there was a consolidation of the relationship with the preferred partner—
Brazil—but there was not an outline of a policy for the region as a whole.
Both IBSA and BRICS are restricted tricontinental fora, where South Africa
works together with Brazil, not with Latin or South America. The govern-
ments of Zuma and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) inherited an important
legacy regarding the bilateral relations promoted by their predecessors,
Mbeki and Lula, respectively. Although neither country was part of the
other’s priority list, nonetheless they had a precise place on each other’s
agenda, particularly in minilateral instances.
Zuma travelled to Brazil in 2009 during the first year of his mandate, in
2010 for the IBSA summit—taking advantage of the opportunity to conclude
a special agreement on Strategic Partnership—and again in 2014, for the
sixth BRICS summit. Furthermore, Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane travelled to Brazil in 2013. President
Rousseff included South Africa in her first African tour in 2011 and she
returned to Pretoria for the fifth IBSA summit in 2013. Presidential visits,
however, did not have the same strategic or political salience as they did in
the previous decade.
The international economic and financial crisis had a strong impact on
commercial ties. Trade between South Africa and Brazil declined, while
South African exports to Brazil decreased from US $770 million to $400
million in the year from December 2008 and December 2009. Imports fell, to
a lesser extent, from $1.58 billion to $1.17 billion (OEC 2019; Centro de
 South Africa 243
Comercio Internacional 2010). During the second year of Rousseff’s man-
date, there was a remarkable recovery of trade in general. However, due to
the steady decrease in the price of commodities globally, a dramatic drop
occurred in 2015 (Dussort 2016). The Brazilian recession which followed, the
worst up to that point in Brazilian history, did not make things any better.
From Argentina’s perspective, political and diplomatic relations remained
steady and there was a major development of scientific and technological
cooperation, especially in agriculture, mining, trade, national parks manage-
ment and sustainable development, university cooperation, human rights,
sports and art. In 2012 the third BICSAA meeting in Pretoria was co-chaired
by Foreign Ministers Timerman and Nkoana-Mashabane. The resulting joint
communiqué reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening political and
economic relations through South-South cooperation and strategic associa-
tions in various sectors, such as mining and agriculture. In 2013, at the
fourth BICSAA meeting in Buenos Aires, the relationship was positively
albeit unenthusiastically described as being ‘based on strategic cooperation
through high diplomatic convergence’ (DIRCO 2013).
The low profile of the relationship was further evidenced in supposedly
high-level visits. The level of the representatives involved was far from the
top. In 2010 Frederik de Klerk, former president of South Africa, visited
Buenos Aires and in 2011, Alberto D’Alotto, the Argentinian deputy foreign
minister, visited South Africa twice. The following year, the Argentinian
government approved the appointment of Zenani Mandela-Dlamini—Nelson
Mandela’s daughter—as South Africa’s ambassador to Argentina. These are
meagre results indeed, which relegate the relationship to a second, if not to a
third or further, tier of consideration.
During this period, agricultural and naval cooperation projects were par-
ticularly prominent, despite a lower political profile. In 2011 public and pri-
vate entities from both sides launched a project involving direct drilling in
South Africa, the provision of technical assistance to South Africa, and the
supply of Argentinian agricultural machinery to update the South African
fleet (Morasso 2015). In the field of naval cooperation, the joint operations
continued with the participation of Brazil and Uruguay. The ‘Atlasur’ naval
exercises celebrated their 10th edition in Brazil in 2014. However, in 2018
Argentina did not take part in ‘Atlasur XI’ in South Africa due to domestic
financial problems.
Also in the sphere of trade, Argentina-South Africa relations declined
sharply towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century. Trade
between South Africa and Argentina dwindled owing to the impact of the
2008 global financial crisis. South African exports reported a significant
decline, from US $202 million in 2008 to $92.7 million in 2009, before sur-
ging upwards again to $178 million in 2017 (OEC 2019). South African
imports reached $1,000 million in 2008 before decreasing to $783 million in
2009. Imports fell even further by the end of Zuma’s administration in 2018,
totalling $481 million. The import tariffs implemented by the Argentinian
244 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
government only partly explains this trend. Considerable structural limita-
tions, different interests and priorities, and Argentina’s poor economic
performance all contributed to the disruption of bilateral economic relations.
Venezuela-South Africa political and economic relations reached their
highest point and then fell dramatically under the tenure of Jacob Zuma. In
2009 the second Bi-regional ASA Meeting took place on Margarita Island,
Venezuela, and it brought relations between Caracas and Pretoria to their
peak. According to Lucena Molero (2013), the second ASA summit was the
most tangible indication of the qualitative success of Caracas’s relations with
Africa during the Chávez administration. This heralded new achievements
for Venezuela, such as the progress made in terms of political dialogue,
agreements and conventions, and a greater consolidation of bilateral and
multilateral ties, as illustrated by the approval of Caracas’s observer status in
the SADC and in the Economic Community of West African States. Vene-
zuela and South Africa signed a Mature Field Joint Evaluation Agreement
between the oil companies PDVSA and PetroSA and they reinforced coop-
eration in the field of mining, establishing a Technical Committee (Aporrea
2009b).
The 2008 global financial crisis hit both countries hard and the bilateral
commercial relationship was no exception. In 2008 South African exports to
Venezuela totalled US $34.7 million, but declined to $26.9 million in 2009 as
a result of the crisis. However, worse was to come. The collapse of the Vene-
zuelan economy under President Maduro had an obvious impact on trade
exchanges with South Africa. In 2018 South African exports to Venezuela fell
to $7.67 million. Meanwhile, South African imports of Venezuelan products
in 2008 totalled $29.7 million, of which 99% were oil imports. In 2010 the
lowest value of imports in the 21st century was recorded: $0.3 million. More
recently, imports have begun to increase, reaching $8.8 million in 2018.
Venezuela is the only one of the three South American countries under study
with which South Africa had a trade surplus, but quite an insignificant in the
light of Pretoria’s overall trade balance and its balance of payments (Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, Government of South Africa 2019; OEC 2019).
South-South solidarity and South Africa’s central role in the global South
constituted two of Pretoria’s foreign policy pillars. They are central to all the
strategic plans and rhetoric outlined by subsequent South African govern-
ments in regional and multilateral fora. However, the initial activism of the
Zuma administration in Latin America occurred at the height of the rise of
the global South and the apogee of the so-called Pink Tide of left-leaning
governments in Latin America. As these propitious but fragile conjunctures
waned (owing to the collapse in the price of commodities globally and the
negative impact of the financial crisis), pragmatism as well as necessity
demanded less adventurism and boldness in foreign policy, in order to
address domestic problems and priorities. Pretoria relegated relations with
Latin America to second tier in the case of Brazil and further down the
agenda with Argentina and even more so with Venezuela.
 South Africa 245
Conclusion
In the 21st century, Latin American countries promoted South-South coop-
eration and included Africa—chiefly South Africa—in their foreign policy
agendas. Mandela’s imprint promoted South Africa’s regional leadership and
international status due to its newfound sense of democracy, economic
conditions and potential for growth, turning the country into a beacon of
hope for Africa. Although Latin America as a region was not a priority, a
number of key countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela offered a
good opportunity to forge political alliances, increase trade and promote
international awareness of the region.
Brazil had a special connection with South Africa, because Pretoria was its
main African trading partner. As would-be emerging middle powers both coun-
tries used their bilateral relationship to reinforce their growing regional global
aspirations. Bilateral bonds and minilateral (IBSA, BRICS) or multilateral (ASA,
SAPCZ, UN) fora were used to advance national interests. The acute domestic
crises, both political and economic, which prompted abrupt changes of govern-
ment—Temer and Bolsonaro in Brazil and Zuma’s forced exit and his replace-
ment by Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa—brought the relationship to a halt. It
is difficult to forecast how this might evolve in the near future.
Argentina accompanied Brazil in its rapprochement with South Africa and
developed its own initiatives too, mainly in agricultural cooperation. Yet
Africa and South Africa were not part of Buenos Aires’ external priorities.
Venezuela is a peculiar case. It was at the behest of Chávez’s political tra-
jectory, and under the principle of ‘pluripolarity’, that Caracas directed its
attention to South Africa. Despite its good intentions, the implementation of
any Venezuelan African policy fell short of consistency and results. The
deeply entrenched Venezuelan political and economic crisis froze the
relationship with Pretoria.
Throughout intra-South Atlantic cooperation, interpersonal relations and
visions prevailed over strategies. Mandela’s charisma and later the synergies
generated at the level of high officials had a positive effect on the bilateral
relationship.
Although the emergence of interactions was mostly linked to domestic and
mainly political issues, the economic-commercial dimension achieved an
appreciable expansion of trade and cooperation in multiple sectors with an
increase in public-private exchanges. Trade was perhaps not a central issue,
but it was still important. In 2018 South African global exports totalled US
$108 billion, of which 0.83% went to Latin America. Of the total exported to
the region, 48% went to Brazil, 22% to Argentina and 0.5% to Venezuela.
Meanwhile, South Africa’s global imports totalled $81.9 billion, of which
32% came from South America. As its main partner, Brazil provided 60%;
Argentina 21% and Venezuela 0.63% (OEC 2019; WITS 2018).
For Latin American countries, relations with South Africa were not parti-
cularly relevant in quantitative terms, but they proved advantageous, as
246 Gladys Lechini and Agustina Marchetti
South Africa became an additional and alternative partner even without
being a priority. Furthermore, these relationships were more symmetrical
compared to the traditional North-South ties and all the countries involved
benefited to some extent. South-South cooperation as an enfranchising con-
cept was very much part of the foreign discourse and actual policies of both
the South African and Latin American partners. Despite the optimism and
‘meeting diplomacy’ of the first decade of the 21st century, fuelled by
favourable regional and systemic conditions, the present phase is a sort of
hibernation period, characterized by a combination of an unfavourable
international environment and domestic political and economic crises.
Prospects for the future are as uncertain as ever.

Notes
1 Foreign policy is understood as an ‘intermestic’ public policy that expresses the
purposes of a state and the interests of its multiple public and private actors in
relation to the international system (Morasso 2015).
2 South Africa uses the Ubuntu concept as a means to define what the country is
and how it relates to other countries. The Ubuntu philosophy means ‘humanity’. It
has played an important role in shaping the South African national consciousness
and in the process of its democratic transformation and nation building. The
‘White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’ (2011:
4) clarifies the concept: ‘South Africa’s unique approach to global issues has found
expression in the concept of Ubuntu. This philosophy translates into an approach
to international relations that respects all nations, peoples, and cultures. Similarly,
national security would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a
universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first). In the
modern world of globalization, a constant element is and has to be our common
humanity. We therefore champion collaboration, cooperation and building
partnerships over conflict.’
3 For more information regarding South African embassies in Latin America, see
www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/sa_abroad/hom.html.
4 The Reconstruction and Development Programme was a policy framework
designed and implemented in 1994 by the ANC to address the socioeconomic
problems caused by apartheid. In 1996 it was replaced by the Growth, Employment
and Redistribution Programme.
5 The creation of the Southern Africa Customs Union dates back to the early 20th
century, although in 2004 a new and revised agreement came into force.
6 Chávez visited Benin, Mali, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Senegal, Algeria
and Libya.

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16 Distant neighbours
Australia-Latin America relations
Sean Burges1

Introduction
Historically, the ties that have bound the overarching sense of being ‘Aus-
tralian’ rested in linkages to the colonial metropole of England with approx-
imation to the other great Anglo-Saxon power, the United States, fast taking
on a critical role in the national psyche from the 1980s. While both of these
countries continue to represent critical psychological anchors for the con-
struction of Australian identity today, policy planners as far back as the
1980s were aware that geographic realities required increased attention to the
more immediate neighbourhood of the Asia-Pacific (Chagas-Bastos and
Woodford-Smith 2019). Japan was the obvious first candidate, being both a
steady consumer of Australia’s mineral and agricultural production as well as
a technologically advanced partner for high value-added economic ventures.
As Australia turned towards a neoliberal, export-oriented economy in the
1990s (Carr and Minns 2014a; Senate of Australia 1992), a sparse handful of
more cautious thinkers floated the idea that perhaps some attention should
be directed further afield than the immediate region and alternative markets
explored, namely Latin America. This murmur that more attention should be
paid to Australia’s distant neighbours to the East across the Pacific Ocean
has never gone away, but it has also failed to gain any serious traction as a
major policy driver despite quiet evidence that much could be gained from
enhanced trans-Oceanic interaction.
The idea of building relations with Latin America has consequently
remained something of a passing footnote in official policy planning and an
option only pursued by those with specific interests looking East across the
Pacific. The dilemma for advocates of enhanced Australian relations with
Latin America is simple. Apart from specialized sectors and industries with
truly globalized outlooks, policymakers and their political masters have
simply not seen the potential for sufficient pay-offs to devote serious resources
and time to the relationship.
The argument derived from these experiences and presented in this chapter
can be simply stated thus: Australia-Latin America relations are those of
distant neighbours, marked by a general level of benign indifference on the
250 Sean Burges
part of government and opportunistic exploitation on the part of private
economic actors. With the notable exception of the education industry, pro-
gress that has occurred in trans-Pacific relations has been dependent on the
dedicated work of engaged individuals, not systematic change in institutional
priorities or structural changes in the global political economy. Looking
forward, there remains some possibility of change in this situation driven by
increasingly vocal diaspora communities and a growing penetration of Latin
American culture in Australia, but propositions that this will evolve into a
dynamic and vibrant trans-Pacific partnership are overly optimistic and
stumble on simple geographic realities and persistent cultural and career
prejudices among senior decision-makers in Canberra.
The underlying backbone of data for this chapter is closer to a participant-
observer memoire than the standard foreign policy analysis research strategy.
From 2010–2018 I was a permanent faculty member in the School of Politics
and International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU)
and a central figure in the institution’s Australia National Centre for Latin
American Studies. Over this eight-year period, I consequently had hundreds
of formal and informal interactions with policymakers at the Commonwealth
and state level, business interests, civil society actors, academic sectors, and
their respective Latin American interlocutors. Insights drawn from this pro-
fessional experience will be combined with reference to the standard range of
primary materials as well as the limited existing scholarly literature on Aus-
tralia-Latin America relations. The chapter will proceed in a largely chron-
ological format to address the guiding questions in this volume of why the
‘surge’ in relations, when this change happened and its manifestation, what
results have been delivered, how Latin America has reacted, and what pro-
spects are held for the future. Ultimately, the best that can be said is that
relations will remain benignly disinterested and largely unexciting, which is
not necessarily a bad outcome when it comes to foreign relations.

A distant, but neighbourly history

As with most bilateral relationships—and one must remember that depend-
ing on how we define Latin America there are at least 18 different bilateral
relationships for Australia to manage—the more one digs into the back-
ground the more apparent it becomes that there is an untold story of pre-
existing linkages and mutual awareness. One of the repeated case studies in
Latin American development asks why Argentina failed to experience the
same success as Australia despite starting at the same place in the early
1900s. Indeed, the Argentine economist and founding head of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), Raúl Prebisch, undertook a fact-finding mission to Australia and
New Zealand in 1924 (Dosman 2008: 48–52). Movement also went in the
other direction, but most notably in the form of escape; for example, the
brief colony of ‘New Australia’ was founded in Paraguay in 1893 by refugees
 Australia 251
from the 1891 Queensland Sheep Shearers strike (Whitehead 1998).
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Australian linkages with the
region retained this low-profile character with very limited diplomatic repre-
sentation on either side of the ocean (Abbott and Esposto 2016). From the
Australian perspective Latin America remained a distant land of adventure,
one that could capture the hearts of the intrepid wanderer (Adams 2012), not
the more serious business of foreign policy and high politics as run by the
mandarins in Canberra.
The question then is where does the impetus, however tentative, for grow-
ing trans-Pacific relationships in the 2000s come from? One foundational
element is the Latin American diaspora in Australia. As both Uribarri et al.
(2016) and del Rio (2014) characterize it, there were two major waves of
Latin American migration to Australia. The first occurred in the 1970s and
1980s when the active recruitment of skilled labour through the White Aus-
tralia policy combined with refugee flows driven by highly repressive South-
ern Cone and Central American regimes to create an anchor community who
then used family unification policies to increase their numbers. The second
wave took place in the 1990s. Rather than being driven by political factors in
Latin America, this group was largely comprised of applicants for permanent
residency by skilled labour and students deciding to remain in Australia at
the completion of their studies. The origins and nature of the second wave
were also different, coming from the larger, more industrialized Latin Amer-
ican countries with the individuals being predominantly middle class of
relatively higher levels of education.
The language of immigration ‘waves’ aside, the reality was nevertheless
closer to a trickle. By 1997 the total number of Australians born in Latin
America numbered just 80,000 (ABS 2020). While that number had grown
significantly by 2019 in nominal terms to just over 195,000, proportionally
Latin Americans only went from being 1.9% of foreign-born Australians to
2.6% in 2019, or 0.4% of all Australians in 1996 and 0.8% in 2019. Despite
the relatively small size of the diaspora, its cultural energy combined with
outward-looking business interests to bring Latin America onto the political
agenda in the early 1990s, resulting in a 1992 parliamentary investigation
into trade and investment with South America (Senate of Australia 1992).
The recommendations issued by the Commission were unambiguous, namely
that Australia was at risk of missing the boat in terms of opportunities linked
to the democratic and economic transitions sweeping the Americas. Yet, as
Carr and Minns (2014a) note, decision-makers in Canberra failed to follow
this advice and did almost nothing to boost Australia’s capacity to
understand and engage with the region.

Why a Latin turn for Australia?

By 2000 parliamentary attention had again returned to the Americas in the
form of another set of hearings by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
252 Sean Burges
Affairs, Defence and Trade. After noting that the Australian government had
failed to follow advice from Parliament in 1992, the Joint Standing Com-
mittee repeated recommendations that serious attention be turned East
across the Pacific to mitigate growing economic dependence on South-East
Asia. To its credit, the Australian government took the critique on board and
made two inspired decisions. First, in 2001 it founded an advisory body
named the Council on Australia-Latin America Relations (COALAR), which
forms a particularly apt acronym when pronounced with a classic Aussie
twang. The second critical decision was to select Bernard Wheelahan as the
founding chairman of COALAR.
As Abbott and Esposto (2016), van der Eng and Kenyon (2014a, 2014b),
and Esposto and Fien (2016) have all noted, Australian trade and foreign
policy tends to be driven by the trade numbers and preconceptions about the
ease of doing business in a new market. All these factors have long cast an
official pallor over the prospect of building linkages with Latin America.
Indeed, Latin America has never been more than a marginal destination for
Australian exports, taking just 0.7% of the total in 1996, rising to 1.6% in
2005, before falling back to 0.8% in 2018.2 It is in this context that Wheel-
ahan became a critical factor. A leading Australian oil executive, Wheelahan
served as president of Shell Venezuela from 1996–1999, returning to Aus-
tralia to become the chairman of Pacific Hydro. He consequently brought a
new perspective to developing the relationship based on his extensive
experience on the ground. The key insight that Wheelahan offered up was
the need to look past the relatively thin trade potential to instead embrace
the enormous possibilities of foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in
the energy and minerals sectors. More to the point, Wheelahan’s tenure as
chairman of COALAR from 2001–2010 coincided with Pacific Hydro’s
major expansion of renewable energy investments in Chile and Brazil that he
directed as company chairman. Any suggestions by sceptics that Pacific
Hydro was an exceptional case were immediately undercut by another
COALAR board member, Jose Blanco, who was heavily involved in facil-
itating trans-Pacific investment flows as the Australian representative for
Banco Santander and also as chairman of the Australia-Latin America
Business Council (ALABC).
Wheelahan’s approach to building Australian relations with Latin America
directly addressed the major economic preconception hobbling progress with
foreign policy planners: a tight focus on trade flows. For the most part there
simply is not a lot of complementarity in the Australian and Latin American
economies. While there were some exceptions, most notably the Australian
purchase of airplanes from Brazil and auto parts from Mexico before the
Australian car industry was shuttered, most of the economies encompassed
in this relationship are concentrated in extractive industries and agriculture.
As a business-oriented consultative council to the Australian government’s
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) COALAR afforded its
board enhanced access to senior policymakers and political actors.
 Australia 253
Wheelahan and his COALAR colleagues were able to use this access to
highlight the business community’s view that it was major investment and
service provision, not trade opportunities that offered lucrative prospects for
Australian businesses in the Americas (Michaelides 2018).
The commodity boom fuelled a surge of capital available to Australian
extraction companies and undoubtedly helped to drive this point home.
Although FDI data is notoriously hard to track accurately (Fujita 2008),
there is a clear pattern in the changes in Australian FDI stocks in Latin
America. In 2002, a year after COALAR was launched, Australian FDI
stocks in Latin America stood at US $672 million, rising to $7,683 million
two years later and to $15,353 million in 2011 (UNCTAD 2014). As detailed
by van der Eng and Kenyon (2014: 122), a significant proportion of these
FDI stocks were in the form of Australian acquisitions of Latin American
firms in the mining and energy sectors with a particular emphasis on firms in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. Significantly, the flow was bilat-
eral. Latin American stocks in Australia also grew over this time period,
jumping from $123 million in 2001 to $19,970 million in 2012. The rising
Latin American presence in Australia was dominated by Cemex’s massive
$19 billion purchase of the Rinker Group, a building products company;
equally major transactions for the wider Australian economy included a
series of acquisitions by the Brazilian company JBS to take control of almost
all of the Australian meat packing sector, and Vale’s major investment in a
series of Australian mining projects.
A critical innovation that Wheelahan introduced as chairman of
COALAR was an explicit recognition of education as a major Australian
economic and export sector. Indeed, by the 2010s education had emerged as
Australia’s fourth largest export sector. To this end, the decision was made in
2003 to launch the COALAR Education Action Group (EAG). At the time,
Australia was hosting some 160,000 foreign students across the various post-
secondary educational sectors, of which Latin Americans comprised 3.4%, or
5,400 individuals. Led by Margaret Gardiner, then the Vice-Chancellor of the
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (Australia’s largest tertiary insti-
tution), the EAG helped to drive a surge in numbers in the 2000s, pushing
Latin American enrolments to 24,000 students by 2009, or 6.6% of the
364,000 foreign students in Australia. As the number of international stu-
dents going to Australia retracted in the 2010s, Latin American enrolments
stayed relatively constant in the 22,000–24,000 range, averaging 7.5% of the
foreign student population (Burges 2014). Indeed, Latin America provided
an important safety valve for an Australian education sector that was
increasingly reliant upon the ‘cash cow’ of foreign students to replace eroding
public financing (Craig 2010; Gilmore 2009).
Despite the dependence on foreign student income to maintain operating
budgets, by the late 2000s post-secondary institutions in Australia were
becoming increasingly concerned that the available pool of talent in South-
East Asia capable of completing their programmes was approaching
254 Sean Burges
exhaustion. In an experience I saw at first hand at my own institution and in
conversations with colleagues throughout Australia, the dilemma was simple.
International rankings that draw in students depend on institutional quality,
which in this case meant that there was a growing need to fail poorly per-
forming foreign students. Yet failing these students in order to maintain the
required standards in the league tables would signal to the next cohort that a
qualification from the institution was perhaps not realistically obtainable
(Birrell and Betts 2018). A new pool of capable students was needed, which is
precisely what was offered by the burgeoning middle class in Latin America,
particularly in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru
and Mexico. The decisions by governments in these countries to roll out a
series of lucrative scholarships for international undergraduate and post-
graduate training only made the region more attractive to Australian
universities seeking to balance their emerging market dependence issues.

Australia’s Latin American medium tide

The profile for Latin America created by COALAR did translate into posi-
tive movement in terms of government policy and wider engagement even if
it was modest in scale. Officials within the DFAT immediately exercised a
high level of creativity to leverage other forums to build political interest in
Latin America. Most notable in this respect was the repeated use of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summitry process. Specific mention is
repeatedly made in the DFAT annual reports to Parliament from 2002
through 2019 of how both the preparatory meetings and the APEC summits
themselves provided important avenues to get Australian political leaders
round a table with their Latin American counterparts. As one DFAT official
remarked to the author in 2011, the challenge was actually to get a govern-
ment minister to visit cities like Mexico City, Santiago and Buenos Aires in
order to visibly impress upon them that while highly unequal, the region was
also very sophisticated and in many ways on a par with Australia. Under-
pinning the mindset shifts caused by these visits was the emerging economic
reality that the major economies in Latin America, flush with the windfall of
the commodity boom, had moved from being economic ‘basket cases’ to
increasingly stable market-based economies of the liberal vein so dear to the
Australian government’s heart.
Increased interaction with Latin American counterparts at the ministerial
and national leadership level did bring a series of notable results from the
mid-2000s and generated a feeling of optimism among regional aficionados.
Chief among these achievements were a series of bilateral cooperation
agreements with countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico on
issues ranging from scientific cooperation, through the establishment of
bilateral trade and investment commissions, all the way to free trade agree-
ments, most notably with Chile in 2009 and with Peru in 2020. Perhaps the
most telling indicator of Australia’s changed prioritization of Latin America
 Australia 255
came with the DFAT reorganization in 2006 when the Americas and Europe
Division was split into two separate divisions. This meant that considerably
more attention could be devoted to the Americas by an expanded region-
specific staff. The fruits of this bureaucratic reform are evident in the DFAT
annual reports for the following several years. Expanded agricultural coop-
eration talks began with Argentina in 2006. A Joint Experts Group on
Strengthening Bilateral Relations was formed with Mexico in 2007. In 2008
Australia seconded an officer to Peru to help with the country’s preparations
as upcoming APEC host. Even Paraguay and Uruguay received expanded
attention through specific mention of visits to Australia by senior officials
from those countries. Perhaps the highlight of the process was the opening of
new Australian diplomatic missions, re-establishing the embassy in Lima
(2010) and opening a consulate in Bogotá (2012), which was upgraded to an
embassy in 2017. Nevertheless, it would be overly optimistic to claim this as
anything more than a medium tide in trans-Pacific relations.
While there was definitely a significant expansion of bilateral linkages at a
political and policy consultative level in the 2000s, it is difficult to argue on a
governmental level that the scene was particularly vibrant outside specific
areas of shared concern such as fisheries management, whaling regimes and
Antarctica. APEC remained an important venue to meet and discuss mutual
approaches to the issues on the table, but nowhere in the official DFAT
reports is there a sense that the Latin American linkage was a major priority.
Ostensibly, the Forum for East Asia Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC)
should have been a prime venue for Australia to advance and possibly even
lead a multilateralized approach to enhanced interaction. The reality was
very different, with the 2007 parliamentary enquiry into relations with
Mexico and Central America recommending in its second point ‘that DFAT
review the viability of FEALAC and, if is determined to be viable, ensure a
greater effort is made to fulfil its potential’ (Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2007). In the 2000s DFAT also gave
explicit emphasis to Australian cooperation at the World Trade Organization
with a number of Latin America countries through the Cairns Group, an
exercise in bureaucratic spin which completely ignored the extent to which
the G20 trade coalition of developing countries championed by Brazil and
many of its Latin American neighbours deliberately sought to sideline coun-
tries such as Australia in global trade talks (Hopewell 2015; Narlikar 2010).
Real and lasting partnerships at a government-to-government level conse-
quently appeared hard to nurture and consolidate, leaving open the question
of what the reality was behind much of the Australian engagement with
Latin America.

Vulturus Australianus
Surveying DFAT annual reports from 2002–2019 demonstrates a very clear
focus on economic considerations in relations with Latin America. Indeed,
256 Sean Burges
almost all of the discussion of trans-Pacific linkages with the Americas
during the 2000s concentrated on building the architecture for expanded
economic relations. Results, while modest, were palpable. From an average
baseline of absorbing 1% of Australia’s annual exports in the 1990s, by the
middle of the 2000s the region was destination for 1.3%–1.6% of national
exports. The import picture was similar, but with a slightly higher rise in
Latin America as a source of imports from 2010 onwards. Where it sat
around 1% in the 1990s, by the late-2000s a baseline of 2.0% was emerging as
the norm for Latin America’s share of Australian imports. Austrade and the
DFAT were quick to attribute these gains to their activities, and while it is
likely that they did not hurt, it is probably optimistic to give governmental
intervention too much credit.
Events such as the 2012 University of Melbourne Latin American Dialo-
gue and the rising membership of the ALABC made it clear that it was
business and education/research institutions, not Australian government
officials who were in the vanguard. As a case in point, from 2014 the Aus-
tralian National Centre for Latin American Studies at the Australian
National University (ANCLAS) worked with the state government of Vic-
toria to give a series of presentations in Melbourne, attracting senior deci-
sion-makers from leading consultancy, legal, resource extraction and energy
firms. Conversely, the large number of similar events run in Canberra
attracted limited interest from civil servants outside of those with an
immediate career interest in the file, with even this dropping off with the start
of the Liberal-National coalition government in 2013. The Canberra-based
Latin American diplomatic corps itself faced significant access challenges.
Under the leadership of Argentinian Ambassador Pedro Villagra Delgado it
turned away from attempts at bilateral meetings to ‘hunting in a pack’ by
seeking to get senior officials and politicians to meet with all of the regional
representatives as a group in an effort to at least put some ideas before the
Australian government. As several regional ambassadors repeatedly men-
tioned on the margins of events organized by ANCLAS from 2010–2016, the
key to advancing their work was to get out of Canberra and to the state
capitals.
The issue here was an underlying sense of short-term mercantilism in the
Australian government’s approach to Latin America. A strikingly public
example of this was the announcement that A$94.5 million in official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) would be provided to the region in the 2010–2014
budgeting cycle. Although the programme was evaluated as having been
effectively delivered with a recommendation that it had created important
opportunities for deepening a number of bilateral relationships (John Far-
gher & Associates 2014), the programme was not renewed. After the Aus-
tralian government shifted from centrist Labour to the right-wing Liberal-
National coalition at the 2013 election, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs
Julie Bishop (2014) wasted little time in labelling the funds as a naked vote
purchase during Australia’s campaign for a United Nations Security Council
 Australia 257
seat. She went on to state that henceforth bilateral aid spending would be
focused on Australia’s immediate neighbours. Those programmes in Latin
America that were maintained in the next allocation cycle either got Aus-
tralia a link to institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank,
or helped to underwrite the inward draw of skilled labour through pro-
grammes such as the Australia Awards scholarship programme. Singularly
absent from Bishop’s vision was the approach being adopted at that time by
New Zealand, which was to use ODA as an avenue for launching proof of
concept pilot projects in key areas such as agricultural skills training as a
deliberate effort to build lasting, independent bilateral society-to-society lin-
kages anchoring government-to-government cooperation (Adam Smith
International 2018).
The education and research field is a key area in Australia’s trans-Pacific
relationship that is deserving of greater study than that offered in the existing
literature (Burges 2014; Calderon 2016). Perhaps the most proactive and
positive actor in this space was the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO), an Australian federal government agency
responsible for scientific research. Officials and researchers at CSIRO con-
sistently engaged Latin American counterparts to advance major initiatives
(del Rio 2016). The massive volumes of funding that became available in
Latin America for study abroad and international research collaboration also
drove something of an Australian feeding frenzy in the early 2010s. Of par-
ticular interest was Brazil both for the scholarships provided through the
Science Without Borders programme as well as the funding available through
agencies such as the São Paulo State Research Fund (FAPESP), although
there were also similar opportunities with Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico
and Peru in the 2010s.
An example of the mobilization of efforts to attract these resources can be
found at the ANU, which in a span of just a few weeks mobilized the very
limited course offerings on Latin America linked to ANCLAS to approve
and launch an inter-disciplinary BA in Latin American studies that could be
used by the vice-chancellor on his trips to the region to present his institution
as the most engaged partner with the region. As the flow of students and
funds from the region dried up, so too did the degree programme. Indeed,
this pattern was repeated across the academy with an emphasis on pulling in
resources not being matched by structural support of stronger links to the
region. For example, despite the presence of a perhaps unexpectedly strong
cohort of Latin America-oriented scholars in the country, the Australian
Research Council has repeatedly failed to fund projects of international
impact on the region despite simultaneously seeking to establish collaborative
funding mechanisms with agencies in the Americas. At the individual level
trans-Pacific linkages have grown, but there are serious questions about the
resilience of the underlying structural support needed to nurture them further.
The pattern of the Australian government taking a short-term view to
building relationships was a key theme in submissions and testimony to the
258 Sean Burges
2007 and 2011 parliamentary commissions treating with Latin American
relations. Among the issues raised in submissions and testimony from Latin
American diplomats was the question of why the Australian Quarantine and
Inspection Service seemed unable to respond to requests for certification
when the counterpart agency in New Zealand was able to agilely apply simi-
lar rules. Another perennial issue related to sheer difficulty of obtaining entry
visas for Australia. A key strut in Canberra’s regional engagement strategy,
and one highlighted in the 2012 ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ White
Paper’s mention of Latin America, was to position Australia as a gateway to
the Asia-Pacific, an idea which became ludicrous given the need for an
expensive visa just to change planes; more disturbing were private complaints
from some diplomats in South America that visas were being blocked if the
applicant had any sort of pre-existing health condition or physical disability.
Perhaps most indicative of the Australian government’s unstated official non-
interest in the region was the repeated complaint from ambassadors of the
failure to match the increasing number of ministerial visits from the region
with reciprocal trips.
With the easy money of the commodity boom gone by the early 2010s and
most of the low-hanging fruit harvested in the various bilateral relationships
it should perhaps not have been a surprise that Latin American interest in
Canberra waned. Complicating matters for the Latin American diplomatic
corps in Australia was the ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ White Paper.3
Across the document’s 320 pages, Latin America received the briefest of
mentions with the idea that Australia could join the Pacific Alliance as a
connecting rod between the bloc and the Asia-Pacific (p. 21). No considera-
tion was given to the limited transportation connections and the reality that
New Zealand offered more air routings to South America. This is not to
suggest that there were no efforts within the Australian government to capi-
talize on the possibilities of the Asian pivot. Indeed, by 2015 one group of
civil servants reportedly had prepared a comprehensive whole-of-government
Latin American strategy only to see it summarily squashed with the warning
that half of Canberra’s mandarins had built their careers on the People’s
Republic of China and nobody wanted anything to do with Latin America.
The comment was prescient and foreshadowed coming changes within the
DFAT that saw the Latin American division shuttered and merged with the
East European desks in 2017.
Of course, the Latin American response to Australia was hardly one of
naïve optimism. The evidence for this comes from the curious position that
Australia held in the diplomatic career hierarchy for many of the Latin
American missions. A posting to Canberra appeared to serve three main
functions for ministries of foreign affairs. The first was as a parking place for
diplomats who may not have aligned well with the political priorities of the
government at the time or who were looking for a regeneration period after
intense postings elsewhere. Argentine Ambassador to Australia Pedro Villagra
Delgado was appointed in 2005 and remained in post until the end of the
 Australia 259
Cristina Fernández Kirchner presidency in 2015, when he was recalled to
Buenos Aires to serve as vice-minister for foreign affairs. While not embed-
ded in the same domestic political tensions, Peru’s Ambassador in the mid-
2010s, Luis Felipe Quesada Inchaustegui, returned to Lima as lead diplomat
when his country held the rotating APEC presidency. A second key use
related to the Australian tradition of making education of all levels free to
the family of diplomats sent to Canberra, which made the post a key benefit
for diplomats with children, one that many admitted was a major attraction.
Finally, a family unification theme emerged as some diplomats sought out
the Australian assignment because their children had immigrated to the
country. When the children of Raúl Gangotena, Ecuador’s ambassador to
Australia from 2010–2017, finished their university studies and elected to
immigrate, he joined them. As several diplomats who had previously been
posted to New York or Geneva pointed out to the author, Canberra served
as a really nice break where they could focus on family and recharge. While
these scenarios and comments pointed to a lower level priority for Australia
in the foreign policy of the respective Latin American governments, it also
meant that some of the most capable rising diplomats from the region were
spending part of their careers in Canberra. This in turn offered important
opportunities, which on the whole were not exploited, for Australian officials
to build strong networks with individuals who could be key interlocutors in
the future at major international institutions and multilateral negotiations.

Conclusion
Perhaps the greatest boon to bilateral relations between Australia and the
different countries in Latin America is that no party harbours particularly
great expectations for deep, vibrant, and heavily consolidated, broad-based
interconnections. The target is instead the tactical exploitation and develop-
ment of individual and mutual opportunities. Indeed, this is very much the
pattern that marked the ‘surge’ in Australia’s various bilateral relationships
with the region from the 2000s onwards. Thanks to the hard work of a group
of private sector individuals with a clear vision of what is possible the trans-
Pacific relationship has reached the status of being relatively dull and quite
predictable in terms of what will drive it: trade and investment considera-
tions. While disappointing for proponents of deeper connections and mutual
dependencies, from a strictly foreign policy perspective this is far from a bad
thing because it ensures that surprises do not happen and that clear avenues
of communication are open and available even if they are not always used.
Of course, this somewhat minimalist positive conclusion does miss out on
a whole range of areas where there could be highly effective mutual coop-
eration to address shared challenges such as urbanization, desertification,
water quality, fisheries management, natural disaster preparedness, global
agriculture trade management, and clean technology development, to name
just a few areas. It is in these kinds of areas, where major mutual gains could
260 Sean Burges
be made, that the official Australian end falls shortest with limited acknowl-
edgement in Canberra that there is a lot to be learned from Latin America,
not just lessons that should be taught to the group of developing economies.
The contrast is with educational institutions, private firms, and civil society
groupings, all of which are engaged in highly innovative trans-Pacific part-
nerships kept within very narrow silos. While so far this non-federal activity
has not been sufficient to indelibly drive attention in Canberra away from
China, equally it has succeeded in ensuring that the region is not discarded.
It is here that the future of Australia-Latin American relations is likely to
rest, requiring a further deepening of the emerging foundations of trans-
Pacific engagement, private partnership and cultural awareness to turn the
region into a key partner for a wider diversification of Australian foreign
policy.

Notes
1 The author would like to thank Deborah Barros, Fabrício Chagas Bastos and
Elizabeth Kath for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. All
errors and oversights remain the author’s.
2 Author’s elaboration from COMTRADE database, available at https://wits.
worldbank.org/.
3 www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_asian_century_white_
paper.pdf.

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Conclusion
Geopolitics between neo-extractivism and
South-South cooperation
Gian Luca Gardini

The 16 case studies in this book have attempted to answer five key questions.
First, why has there been a surge in the presence of non-traditional partners
in Latin America in the 21st century; second, when did that happen; third, in
which countries, regions, and productive and societal sectors was this surge
mostly felt; fourth, what is the Latin American perspective; and fifth, what
are the actual results? The surge itself is undeniable. Economic data, political
and diplomatic activism, and analyses provided by the academic literature,
think tanks and national and international policy institutions prove it
beyond doubt. Consensus on the five answers is less obvious.
These complex answers also raise further issues, such as the identification
of a comprehensive theoretical ‘explaining and understanding’ (Hollis and
Smith 1990) of this surge, and whether or not these non-traditional partner-
ships have altered consolidated patterns of interaction between Latin Amer-
ica and its international partners. In the light of the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic that broke out in early 2020, one may also wonder if its con-
sequences will significantly affect the position, interests and strategies of
Latin America and its partners.
This Conclusion will first summarize the findings related to the five ques-
tions. It will then discuss conventional International Relations (IR) theories
and more recent approaches and their ability to make sense of this surge.
Finally, it will address the relationship between COVID-19 and Latin America’s
international partnerships.

Five questions, but many more complex answers

The first question to be considered concerns the causes of the surge of
external powers. The overall answer of this book broadly reflects the thinking
of the English School of International Relations about international coop-
eration (Bull 1977; Evans and Wilson 1992; Watson 2004; Buzan, 2004; de
Souza 2008). This points towards the complex interplay between the actors’
preferences and the systemic setting and limitations. The 16 case studies
show a variety of motives and characteristics. Yet they do not show sig-
nificant differences from the behaviour, patterns and motivations of the so-
264 Gian Luca Gardini
called established powers in Latin America. Some systemic and domestic
factors are recurrent.
At the systemic level, two main phenomena have increased the space for
emerging powers. First, and crucially, globalization—or more accurately the
deepening and widening of it from the 1990s, although arguably intended to
favour the United States and Western interests more broadly—has in fact
endowed non-traditional international players with additional economic and
political resources and prompted them to widen their interests and diplo-
matic reach (Christensen and Xing 2016; Lang and Mendes Tavares 2018;
Bieler and Morton 2018: 159–188; Tsunekawa 2019). The need for new
markets and providers, and the necessity to compete globally have prompted
the international expansion of ‘the rest’ to rebalance the international order
which was largely created and managed by the West. Second, the perceived
retreat of the United States has opened up new international spaces to be
filled in. In the 21st century—after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the global
financial crisis of 2008, and in particular during the Trump presidency—the
United States has concentrated or even reduced the scope of its international
action by focusing on fewer issues and targeted regions (Florig 2010; Lun-
destad 2012; Stephens 2019; Wright 2020). The United States has recently
disengaged from multilateralism too.
The result has been three-fold for Latin America. First, Latin America,
similarly to other developing regions, has become stronger and more asser-
tive internationally (Journal of International Affairs 2013: vii). The newly
acquired economic stability and high growth rates in Latin America for most
of the first two decades of the 21st century have placed the region under the
radar of several emerging countries, namely the People’s Republic of China,
Japan, India, Turkey, Israel, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and
Indonesia. Second, the rising powers were searching for new partners to be
able to compete in economic and political terms at the global level. They also
had more resources to support their foreign ambitions. The perceived US
neglect of Latin America, along with the natural richness of the continent,
raised the interest in Latin America shown by these non-traditional partners.
Third, there was a political and ideological component, particularly the
desire of the developing world to count for more internationally, and the
rhetoric of South-South cooperation which increased the interaction and
understanding among these once very distant—and not only
geographically—countries.
The power shifts at the global level were also central to the surge, as the
ambition to somehow balance US power and the rise of China also played a
role for several countries, such as India, Japan, the Russian Federation,
South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan, not to mention China itself, in their
competition with the United States. Some of these countries found in the
Latin American states the ideal partners to enhance their own claims to
global status and to promote their discourse on an alternative world order.
 Conclusion 265
This applied to India, Turkey and South Africa in particular, but also Iran to
a lesser extent.
At the domestic level, national interests and genuinely local factors were
fundamental in all the case studies. The appetite for raw materials to feed
booming economies was a relevant consideration in a majority of cases. Yet
strong neo-extractivist arguments are not predominant in the case studies
analysed. At the other end of the spectrum, benign South-South cooperation
efforts often hide national interests and economic advantage and are far
from uninterested endeavours. The cases of Taiwan and South Korea, along
with China, come to mind but this also applies to Turkey and its mosque
diplomacy for instance, or to Israel. Even Canada’s posture in favour of
human rights and democracy in Venezuela can be read as a test for its own
foreign policy and its attempt to gain space in the Americas.
Domestic dynamics and foreign policy reorientations in the countries
investigated were indeed crucial. China’s own economic model and policies,
‘Abenomics’ and the ‘three togethers’ in Japan, the Justice and Development
Party in Turkey, the Ahmadinejad administration in Iran, or the Netanyahu,
Jokowi, Mbeki and Tsai Ing-wen governments in Israel, Indonesia, South
Africa and Taiwan, respectively, all illustrate this point. National strategic
and political calculations clearly overshadow economic returns in the cases of
Russia, Iran and Taiwan, while national economic needs and considerations
largely prevail over political strategies in Indonesia and Australia. A complex
interplay of domestic factors within a changing international setting and
order is the formula that best describes the reasons behind the surge of non-
traditional partners in Latin America.
All these factors impetuously emerged and converged between 2002 and
2008, which answers the second question about when this surge actually took
place. However, further qualifications are needed to link the why and the
when, situating systemic and domestic circumstances chronologically and
correlating them. A major leap in relations between Latin America and non-
traditional partners materialized between 2003 and 2013, largely coinciding
with the commodities boom and the apex of South-South cooperation. In
many cases, the timeline of the surge directly reflected domestic dynamics in
the partner countries, but much less so in Latin America. For instance,
India’s interest in Latin America increased from 2003, and Iran and Indo-
nesia’s from 2005, thus reflecting domestic policy choices and strategies. The
creation of the Council on Australia-Latin America Relations in 2001 piqued
the limited interest that Australia had in Latin America. The Mbeki admin-
istration marked the heyday of South Africa’s engagement with Latin
America, thereby reflecting the president’s personal views. Russia upgraded
its operations in two waves, in 2008 and 2014, when the conflicts in Georgia
and Ukraine prompted Moscow to search for international support. Not
surprisingly, the reaction of both the United States and the European Union
(EU), the prototypical established powers, materialized in the following
years. In 2016 the Obama Administration resumed formal diplomatic
266 Gian Luca Gardini
relations with Cuba and made major achievements in Central America
(Margolis 2017). In the same year the EU strengthened its Cuba policy and
explicitly signalled a re-engagement with Latin America in its global strategy
(Mori 2018).
The third question relates to where this surge is mostly felt in Latin
America, both in terms of countries/regions and sectors. Geographically, the
new actors are interested only in a select number of Latin American coun-
tries, mainly the larger markets and political players, and resource-rich
countries. This is a clear and general pattern. China prioritized six countries;
Japan’s trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is heavily concentrated in
Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Chile and Colombia; India has significant political
relations only with Brazil and to a lesser extent with Mexico and Argentina,
and is also concentrating its economic activities in the same countries along
with Venezuela, Colombia, Chile and Peru; Iran prioritized Brazil, Venezuela
and Bolivia, while Turkey did the same with Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela;
Israel also focused heavily on just a few countries, namely Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina and Colombia; for political reasons Taiwan concentrated its dip-
lomatic efforts and economic inducements in Central America and Paraguay;
Indonesia focuses primarily on Brazil, Argentina and Mexico and addition-
ally on Chile, Peru and Colombia. South Africa elected Brazil, Argentina
and Venezuela as privileged partners, while South Korea made Mexico and
Brazil its first targets for market access reasons. The established powers, as
the literature on great powers indicates (Berridge and Young 1988; Hurrell
2006; Narlikar 2010; Russell Mead 2015), have the most general interests and
outreach, so the United States and the EU—and to a lesser extent China—
are more present in the continent in political, economic and cultural terms.
Yet they too tend to narrow their spheres of influence: the United States
maximizes its influence in the Caribbean and Central America, while the EU
concentrates its economic activities in Mexico and Brazil.
In terms of sectors and patterns, non-conventional powers largely repro-
duce traditional terms of trade: i.e. the import of raw materials in exchange
for manufactured goods. Mining and energy are sectors of major attraction
for both established and emerging powers. Yet the picture is more variegated
and nuanced than a purely neo-extractivist and predatory argument would
suggest. The EU countries are investing heavily in the Latin American tele-
communications, renewable energy, and automotive industries. Japan offers
quite a wide portfolio, in which quality plays a prominent role, especially in
infrastructure and high technology. India too is significantly engaged in
information and communications technology, pharmaceuticals and the
automotive industry. Israel focuses on security equipment, technology sys-
tems, and agriculture. China, despite epitomizing the typical neo-extractivist
partner, has recently diversified and upgraded its investment portfolio and
modes of operation (Dussel Peters 2019).
Ultimately, one may wonder if the reasons for this pattern have less to do
with external predatory attitudes and more to do with Latin America itself in
 Conclusion 267
two respects. First is what Latin America has to offer and the rest of the
world wants or needs to buy. Second is the way in which the continent
manages FDI and trade and more broadly its domestic institutions and
international relations. This pattern of primary goods for manufactured
goods may well be explained by local structural conditions and short-
comings, rather than by often ideologically charged arguments about external
exploitation.
The quality of local political classes and institutions makes a difference for
development (Meredith 2005; Reid 2007; Acemoglou and Robinson 2012;
Easterly 2001, 2014). After all, Australia, Canada and Russia are largely
extractivist economies, but their institutions and power broadly understood
do not mean that they are perceived as subjugated or exploited at the inter-
national level—quite the contrary. Latin America must take responsibility for
its present and future.
The fourth question looks at the Latin American perspective. There seems
to be much more proactivity, interest and even enthusiasm on the side of the
extra-hemispheric counterparts than in Latin American countries, whose
policies remain essentially reactive. The new partners bring significant
advantages to Latin America, in terms of political options, economic dyna-
mism, technological cooperation and cultural variety. Despite the endurance
of consolidated terms of trade, the potential gains are significant also in the
economic realm. Assets such as high technology and capital-intensive exports
(South Korea and Israel), information technology (India), a diversified trade
and investment portfolio (Japan and the EU), and political support (Turkey,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and South
Africa, just to name a few) may facilitate development. The impression
remains that the role of new external powers in the continent will be what
Latin America makes of it.
Indeed, the actual results are quite mixed, and this answers the fifth ques-
tion. In the political sphere, the surge is clear, both in quantity and quality.
Doubts remain about the capacity of non-traditional powers to turn this acti-
vism into actual and consistent (not just ad hoc) influence on policy (Jacobs
and Van Rossem 2016). China is perhaps a unique case because it exerts a
considerable degree of influence on policy in several Latin American countries
and beyond (see Chapters 3 and 12 in this volume). The other case studies
show at best a fluctuating, inconsistent capacity of influence. Perhaps the entire
debate on influence might be misplaced or exaggerated. Even the ability of the
United States to influence Latin American policies may often have been over-
estimated according to Long (Chapter 1). In this sense, this volume has
embraced the call to rebalance international and internal concerns and per-
spectives, both in Latin American and extra-continental states (Lopes and
Zuleta 2016; Long 2015). Still, the full investigation of Latin American inter-
nal dynamics, positions and constituencies in the management of the presence
of external powers exceeds the mandate of the contributors to this volume.
This remains a proposal for further research to complement our results.
268 Gian Luca Gardini
On the economic front, while the surge in trade and investments is unde-
niable, trade exchanges remain relatively low both in absolute and compara-
tive terms with the established partners (WITS 2020). The only notable
exception is China. Table C.1 illustrates this point in comparative terms of
shares of exports and imports. The comparative analysis between 2018 and
2000 also shows that most non-traditional partners have progressed but that
this progress has not been uniform. This further strengthens the point of
uneven advance and the need for a cautious assessment and targeted analy-
sis. Traditional powers may have lost ground but they are far from being
displaced from Latin America by the newcomers.
Furthermore, the traditional trade pattern in commodities for manu-
factured goods has largely remained unaltered. This confirms historical ten-
dencies, although it is slightly less pronounced than in the past (WITS 2020).
The qualitative analysis in Table C.2 demonstrates this point. In 2018 over
60% of Latin American exports comprised raw materials, vegetables, miner-
als, metals, livestock and wood. The equivalent figures for Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, for North America and for China were 25%, 30% and 12%,
respectively. In the same year, exports from Latin America and the Car-
ibbean (LAC) of capital and consumer goods accounted for about 48% of
total exports, while the corresponding figures for Europe and Central Asia,
for North America and for China were 65%, 55% and 80%, respectively. The
LAC region is characterized by a very complex trend in trade. In 2000
exports of consumer and capital goods accounted for 44% of total exports

Table C.1 Latin America and the Caribbean total trade with selected partners, 2018
and 2000, absolute numbers and percentages.
Trade in 2018 Trade in 2000
Partner country % of imports % of exports % of imports % of exports
United States 32.02 43,04 48,90 58,37
Europe + 15,52 12,41 15,55 12,85
Central Asia
China 18,94 12,33 2,31 1,11
India 1,45 1,27 0,28 0,32
South Korea 2,88 1,44 2,10 0,71
South Africa 0,15 0,24 0,18 0,19
Indonesia 0,44 0,33 0,31 0,13
Israel 0,25 0,17 0,28 0,09
Turkey 0,33 0,58 0,07 0,14
Russia 0,76 0,58 0,43 0,34
Iran 0,01 0,28 0,02 0,23
Japan 3,13 1,93 4,01 2,20
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the WITS (2020).
 Conclusion 269
from the region, while raw materials, vegetables, minerals, metals, livestock
and wood accounted for about 46% of the total. This means that on the one
hand a little diversification of exports and a slight increase of industrializa-
tion have occurred. On the other, the tendency to reprimarization is quite
clear. On balance, after almost 20 years of enhanced interactions between the
continent and its non-traditional partners it is not obvious that the terms of
trade have actually improved for Latin America or that they are any less
dependent on foreign buyers and the fluctuations of the commodities market.
If one can argue that new partners have brought more diversified interna-
tional relations to Latin America, offering more political and economic
options, it is also true that these non-traditional relations have not yet
established new canons of international behaviour or cooperation, nor have
they led to a very significant emancipation of Latin America from the
traditional framework of centre-periphery relations (Hart and Jones 2011;
Cooper and Flemes 2013). Some peripheries have just taken a more central
role and adopted similar behaviours to those of the established centres of
power (Bond 2013, 2016). It is for Latin America to handle these relations to
its own benefit as the new partners do not look very different from the old
ones.

Table C.2 LAC exports of raw materials and capital goods to selected established
and non-traditional partners, 2018
Capital goods Raw materials
(% of total exports/imports (% of total exports/imports
with target country) with target country)
Partner country Exports Imports Exports Imports
United States 46,46* 29,32 10,46 7,82
Europe + 14,42 39,27 37,02 1,95
Central Asia
China 2,17 53,36 76,98 0,59
India 7,47 19,64 33,89 1,38
South Korea 4,13 53,86 58,52 0,21
South Africa 26,56 17,00 22,67 18,66
Indonesia 5,97 23,19 29,63 7,62
Israel 10,93 30,63 63,93 1,98
Turkey 3,33 28,16 65,96 4,03
Russia 10,17 2,39 68,68 10,44
Iran 2,61 1,08 70,95 59,28
Japan 8,13 56,38 68,12 0,16
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from WITS (2020).
270 Gian Luca Gardini
The return—or in fact the persistence—of geopolitics
Traditional theories of power and cooperation as well as more recent
approaches such as neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation all help
to conceptualize this new surge. Yet they all think in terms of existing mental
categories. None of them provides genuinely new concepts or understandings
of international—and in particular non-traditional—interactions. One may
wonder if we really need any novel mental category to understand a world
that has profoundly changed since our tools to understand it were created
and became mainstream; or, on the contrary, if human behaviour evolves in
form but essentially remains the same in substance and motives; in the latter
case then existing tools suffice. Perhaps, the fact that there has been a surge
in non-traditional partnerships constitutes itself a novelty in terms of inter-
national institutions, norms and values. Their significance and endurance are
still in the making.
These partnerships may signal new forms of constraining traditional
powers through new forms of dialogue, potential bloc coalitions, and inno-
vative forms of interdependence. These may broaden political and economic
scope for manoeuvre for supposedly weaker or marginal states. Or they may,
less benignly, lead to new forms of dependence and suzerainty. Whether
genuine partners, opportunistic intruders or outright exploiters, these new
actors do not behave very differently from the established ones, and neither
does Latin America towards them. What does this tell us then about the
theoretical explanations for this surge?
IR theory has provided generalizable explanations why countries establish
relations with others. The realist strand argues that countries historically do
so in the pursuit of power with four main reasons in mind: the search for
territorial gains and security; the imposition or promotion of a religion; the
imposition or promotion of ideology and values; and the achievement of
economic gain and wealth (Heffer 2011). Liberal institutionalists and coop-
eration theorists emphasize institutions prompting states to seek cooperation
with others. State elites may seek international partners in order to promote
a common order of expected and accepted behaviour (Friedrich 1968). States
may cooperate with others on specific issues that exceed state competence or
capacity (Mitrany 1966). Over time, states may have to expand the areas in,
and the actors with which they cooperate, because of the increased com-
plexity of the international realm (Haas 1964). Constructivists argue that
support for preferred norms and the logic of appropriateness may also be
good reasons for states to engage with others (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein
1996). These theories explain all the case studies in this volume.
More recently, a significant body of literature has specifically focused on
the surge of non-traditional partnerships and cooperation. This literature
thus does not deal with generalizable reasons for cooperation, but rather
with specific forms of, and motives for, the launch and/or strengthening of
non-traditional partnerships. The spectrum is ample. It goes from a quite
 Conclusion 271
cynical appreciation of these new partnerships as sub-imperialism (Bond
2016) to a quite benign assessment of South-South cooperation as an eman-
cipatory tool inspired by common values—rather than interests—run by and
in favour of developing countries (Muhr 2016). The neo-extractivist argu-
ment also takes a critical stance (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014; Svampa 2019)
and stands close to the sub-imperial one.
Two sets of observations are in order: one general and one more specific.
Sub-imperialism, neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation have a quite
circumscribed scope. They are in fact approaches rather than theories, pre-
cisely because they are not universally applicable. In other words, they are
not theories explaining cooperation and interactions among countries. They
are specific approaches to explain the surge in non-traditional partnerships
and apply only to these and not even to all of them. Indeed, their explana-
tory power may be quite strong in specific cases (China between 2003 and
2013, for instance), but perhaps narrow in that they do not capture well cases
where geopolitical concerns are as important as (or even more important
than) the economic, developmental or extractivist gains (Taiwan and Russia,
for instance). The more specific points concern each of these three
approaches.
The sub-imperial argument broadly reflects the main findings of this book.
A possible problem might arise conceptually with the use of the term
‘imperialism’ because ‘empire’ is a contested notion. Without starting a dis-
cussion of the concept here, it is worth noting that the use of the word
‘empire’ for external powers in Latin America has been questioned, and
eventually discarded, with reference to both the US early interventionism
and influence (Smith 2014) and the British economic and cultural penetra-
tion in the 19th century (Brown 2008). While the meaning of the term is
evident, its ontological appropriateness may be less so. In any case, while
neo-extractivism and South-South cooperation deal more with the reasons
for the surge in non-traditional relations, sub-imperialism deals more with
the effects of such a surge.
The neo-extractivist argument also captures a good deal of the surge.
However, there are some caveats. First, it applies pertinently to the economic
models adopted internally by Latin American countries rather than to the
intentions of external actors. Of course, internal choices may be driven by
external demands, but this applies to all countries. Second, this argument
tends to overlook significant variations across trade and investment partners
and their motivations. China plays a preponderant place in this narrative.
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2011), in 2010 92% of Latin American exports
to China were commodities, while 85% of Chinese FDI in Latin America
went to extractive industries. In 2018 raw materials represented 76% of Latin
America’s total exports to China, 70% to Iran, 68% to Japan and Russia,
65% to Turkey and 63% to Israel. However, raw materials accounted only for
33%, 29% and 22% of the region’s total exports to India, Indonesia and
272 Gian Luca Gardini
South Africa, respectively (WITS 2020). Third, the argument essentially
applies to motives in the economic sphere but downplays the political sphere
(both in strategic and ideological terms), which is central in international
relations, as discussed in the chapters on Russia, Taiwan, Turkey and Iran.
South-South cooperation has recently gained prominence in academia and
policymaking. The interpretation of this phenomenon is not univocal (Gray
and Gills 2016). Some understand South-South cooperation as a manifesta-
tion of the rise of the political and commercial interests of the global South
within a capitalist framework, and hence as an almost natural consequence
of power rise. Others interpret these processes as new forms of solidarity and
power rebalancing by the global South. The theoretical and empirical foun-
dations of South-South cooperation too are quite heterogeneous (Santander
and Alonso 2017; Li 2018).
The unifying factor of the debates on South-South cooperation is that they
tend to share two predominantly benign expectations. First, South-South
cooperation is a somewhat new form of cooperation among formerly and/or
still relatively marginal countries that are guided by different principles from
the established powers. Second, it is conducive to a different and fairer
international system, especially for the benefit of the less well-off. Our
empirical investigation invites caution about these views. On the first point,
the case studies have shown that China is now central in the system, that
traditional patterns of trade and investments have not changed much as a
result of South-South cooperation, and that the motives behind trade and
investment falling under South-South cooperation are not always altruistic
or different from past attitudes and practices. On the second point, the
emphasis placed on the idea of complementarity among economies of the
global South may be misleading. The chapter on South Korea by Lopez
Aymes and Kwak makes a compelling warning against an over-benevolent
assessment of complementarity in that it does not differ significantly from
North-South patterns and often hides strategic interests behind laudable
narratives. The point applies to most of the other case studies.
Ultimately, this book concludes that this surge can be aptly understood within
the established paradigms of IR and political economy theories. This surge has
its peculiarities, of course, which sub-imperialism, neo-extractivism and South-
South cooperation capture and stress. Yet this surge does not differentiate itself
substantially in motives and modes of operations from past practices and phases
of transition, which mainstream theories have already and satisfactorily under-
stood and explained. To paraphrase William Shakespeare, perhaps there is too
much ado about not so much. Relations between Latin America and its non-
traditional partners, as Wise notes (Chapter 3), largely fall under the umbrella
of standard diplomacy, especially economic diplomacy.
In this respect, there is space to contemplate the usefulness of geopolitics,
upgraded and modernized. Geopolitics does not necessarily have to be
understood as a separate discipline in a strict sense. Rather, it is a useful way
to look at and understand international relations as much as the surge of
 Conclusion 273
external powers in Latin America in the 21st century. Much criticized and
thus often neglected, geopolitics is today a ‘way to understand the world’, a
world in which ‘economic rivalries are integral part of geopolitical rivalries,
they do not replace them’ (Boniface 2017: 36 and 33). Modern geopolitics
has been able to escape geographic determinism and to purge excessive
emphasis on conflict so that it can instead concentrate on order, conditions
of equilibrium and strategy—all of which are still largely in the hands of
nation-states. These are recurrent themes both in traditional theories and
recent approaches to international relations and in this volume. Indeed, these
conceptual lenses have never ceased to be relevant when looking at
international relations, and neither has geopolitics itself.

COVID-19: Pedal or steer?1

At the time of this volume going to press, the Americas have become the
epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic, with incommensurate human losses as
well as economic and job losses. Uncertainty still reigns. At this stage it
would be quite imprudent to make political and economic forecasts, espe-
cially on how the pandemic may affect the presence and strategies of external
powers in Latin America. However, in the past all major pandemics have
significantly affected the direction and development of human civilization
(Snowden 2019). An important question is whether this pandemic will
require a pedal—speeding up or slowing down processes that are ongoing—
or whether it will require a steer—prompting a change of direction in the
way we live and organize our societies and our international interactions.
And if so, who will have the power to drive such change? What will be Latin
America’s role in the process?
The prospects for Latin America are not rosy. COVID-19 is likely to be an
aggravating element in the sustainable and inclusive development traps
(Chica Builes 2020), namely the productivity trap, the social vulnerability
trap, the institutional trap and the environmental trap. This may make the
continent less attractive to well-meaning investors, traders and political
partners, and more vulnerable to predators. At the same time, political, eco-
nomic and social instability may weaken Latin American states’ weight and
capacity to negotiate internationally.
Under such circumstances, international cooperation is indispensable to avoid
another lost decade for Latin American development (Sanahuja 2020). Such
efforts, if they materialize, would be subject to many of the issues and concerns
discussed in this book: a dichotomy between North and South cooperation on
the one hand, and the reproduction of the debates around the spectrum between
sub-imperialism and South-South cooperation on the other, both in conceptual
terms and policy practices. At a time of crisis in multilateralism and US lea-
dership, bilateral or minilateral ventures may fill the void, thus reinforcing and
extending the relevance of this book and its arguments.
274 Gian Luca Gardini
Note
1 I have borrowed the metaphor from Andés Malamud at the University of Lisbon,
Portugal.

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Index
Abbas-al-Musawi 155
Abdo, Mario 132
Abe, Shinzo 75, 79, 86
Ackerman, Jonathan 68
Adam Smith International 257
Africa-South America (ASA) group 235,
239, 240, 241, 244, 245
African National Congress (ANC),
foreign policy of 236–7
Agência Brasil 132
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 134n2, 161,
265; Latin America, Iran and 138,
140, 141, 145, 146–7
Airline Network News and Analysis
129
Alfonsin, Raúl 238
Allende, President Salvador 21
Almagro, Luis 67–8, 98, 100, 103n19
American Institute in Taiwan 189
Amorim, Celso 126, 131, 240
Andean Community 33, 231n4;
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and 222, 225, 231;
European Union (EU) and 34
Andina 63
Ansa Latina 100
Aporrea.org 241, 244
Arab-Israeli conflict, effects of 155–6
Argentina: Argentina-South Africa
Binational Commission (BICSAA)
240–41, 243; Argentine Israelite
Mutual Association (AIMA) 155;
Australia, trade relationship with 253;
Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
European Union (EU) relationship
with 32, 33; India, complementary
commercial relationship with 114;
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019)
210; Indonesian relations with 211–12;
Iran, relationship with 138, 140;
Israel, relationship with 162; Japan,
relationship with 76, 77, 81, 85,
88n16; market reforms in 47–8;
Russian Federation, relationship with
63; Russian Federation, trade with 61;
South Africa, relationship with 238,
240–41, 242–3, 245; ‘Strategic
Partnership’ (SP) and relationship
with China 50–51; trade partnership
with Indonesia 204; trade structure
with (2018) South Korea 174
Armenian diaspora, Turkey-LAC
relations and 132–3
Arreaza, Jorge 100
Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal 230
Asia: Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) 180, 224, 254,
255, 259; Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), membership of
231n3; Asian Development Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank
and Asian Development Bank
Institute 224; Australia, Asia-Pacific
trans oceanic interaction with 249;
East Asia-Latin America Forum
(EALAF) 222; Europe and, relations
between 229; growth of (and India
within) 108–9; Regional Integration
Center 204, 227
Al-Assad, Bashar 133
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) 219–32, 267; Andean
Community 225; ASEAN-Latin
American multilateralism 210–20,
231; ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (PA)
Framework for Cooperation 223, 224;
ASEAN Secretariat 214–15, 223; Asia
and Europe, relations between 229;
278 Index
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) group 224; bilateral relations,
development of 226–30; Bolivarian
Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)
225; Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) 225; Central American
Integration System (SICA) 225;
Chile-Indonesia FTA 227;
Chile-Malaysia FTA 227;
Chile-Thailand FTA 227;
Chile-Vietnam FTA 227; Community
of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC) 225–6, 231; Costa
Rica-Singapore FTA 227; East
Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF)
222; Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP) 225; Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) and 225; Forum for East
Asia-Latin America Cooperation
(FEALAC) and 220, 222, 224, 225,
231; inter-regionalism in
ASEAN-Latin America relations
220–26; Latin American and
Caribbean Summit on Integration and
Development (CALC) 225–6;
merchandise exports to LAC
(2000–2017) 229; MERCOSUR-
ASEAN Chamber of Commerce
(MACC) 223, 231; Panama-Singapore
FTA 227; Peru-Singapore FTA 227;
Peru-Thailand FTA 227; Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR) and
220, 221, 222–3, 224, 225, 226, 231;
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
223–4; Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) 225
Australia 249–60, 267; Argentina, trade
relationship with 253; Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) 254,
255, 259; Asia-Pacific trans oceanic
interaction 249; Australia-Latin
America Business Council (ALABC)
252, 256; Australia National Centre
for Latin American Studies
(ANCLAS) 250, 256, 257; bilateral
cooperation agreements with Latin
America 254–5, 259–60; Brazil,
research collaboration with 257;
Brazil, trade relationship with 253;
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 251; Chile,
research collaboration with 257; Chile,
trade relationship with 253; COALAR
Education Action Group (EAG) 253;
Colombia, research collaboration with
257; Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO) 257; Council on Australia-
Latin America Relations (COALAR)
252–3, 254; Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 252–3,
254–5, 255–6, 258; diplomatic
missions Latin American in, career
prospects for 258–9; distant,
neighbourly history with Latin
America 250–51; Ecuador, research
collaboration with 257; foreign
students, need for income from 253–4;
Forum for East Asia Latin America
Cooperation (FEALAC) 255; Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB)
257; Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
255; Latin America, relationship with
249–50, 259–60; Latin America,
short-term view to building
relationships in 257–8; Latin
American diaspora in 251; Latin
American interest in, waning of 258;
Latin turn for, rationale for 251–4;
medium tide for Australia-Latin
America relations 254–5; Mexico,
research collaboration with 257;
Mexico, trade relationship with 253;
national economic needs of, Latin
America and 265; official development
assistance (ODA) to Latin America
(2010–2014) 256–7; Paraguay, ‘New
Australia’ in 250–51; Peru, research
collaboration with 257; Peru, trade
relationship with 253; Quarantine and
Inspection Service 258; São Paulo
State Research Fund (FAPESP) 257;
Science Without Borders programme
257; Senate of 249, 251; trans-Pacific
partnerships 250; United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) 250; Vulturus Australianus
255–9
Bahamas, Indonesian investment in
(2010–2019) 210
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
(BID) 179
Bandeira, M. 18
Bandung Conference (1955) 3

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
88n14–15
Barak, Ehud 160
Barbados, Indonesian investment in
(2010–2019) 210
Behre Dolbear Group 6
Belize, Indonesian investment in
(2010–2019) 210
Pope Benedict 160
Bishop, Julie 256–7
Blanco, Jose 252
Bolívar, Reinaldo 236, 238, 241
Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our
America (ALBA): Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
amd 225; Canada and People’s Trade
Treaty (ALBA-TCP) 99; Iran,
involvement with 142, 143–4, 146,
147, 148, 149n1
Bolivia: contingency tier relationship
with India 114–15; Indonesian
investment in (2010–2019) 210;
Iran, relationship with 140–41, 146;
Russian Federation, diplomacy in
62–3
Bolsonaro, Jair 140, 148, 245;
Israel-Latin American relations
and 157–8, 161, 162, 163
Borrell, Josep 38–9
Brazil: Australia, research collaboration
with 257; Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; European Union (EU),
relationship with 31, 32, 33; India,
‘strategic partnership’ with 111,
113–14; India-Brazil-South Africa
(IBSA) trilateral dialogue 235,
239–40, 242, 245; Indonesian
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Iran,
relationship with 138, 140, 147–8;
Israel, relationship with 162; Japan,
relationship with 75, 76, 77, 79, 81,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87n1; market reforms
in 47–8; military participation with
Turkey 131; recognition of Palestine
state by 156; Russian Federation,
relationship with 63; South Africa,
relationship with 239–40; ‘Strategic
Partnership’ (SP) and relationship
with China 50–51; trade partnership
with Indonesia 204; trade relationship
with Australia 253; trade structure
with South Korea (2018) 174; trade
with Russian Federation 61; trading
partnership with Turkey 127
Index 279
BRICS Group (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa) 11–12n1, 61,
108, 110, 111, 112, 119, 235, 242, 245;
BRICS Post 65
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
125
Bulletin Hispanique 2
Business Recorder 63
Calderón, Felipe 111
Canada, Venezuela crisis and 9, 91–103,
267; Americas, democracy in 95–6;
anti-government protests, credible
elected opposition in Venezuela and
98; Argentina, Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of our America-People’s
Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP) 99; Brazil,
Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
Canada, Government of 91, 94, 96;
Canadian Press 91; Canadian Trade
Commissioner Service (2018) 93;
Chile, Canadian shipments to (2017)
93; Colombia, Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; crisis in Venezuela, nature
of 96–7; Cuba, Canadian shipments
to (2017) 93; democracy and human
rights, Canadian interests and 94–5,
96, 99, 102; democracy and human
rights, strength of Canada in 94–5;
democratic tradition and Western
values, importance of 98; development
support 91–2; diplomatic and
multilateral solutions, Canadian pre-
ference for 98–9; economic output in
Venezuela, collapse of 97; Ecuador,
Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
foreign policy towards Venezuela 99;
foreign policy towards Venezuela,
cause of surge in intensity of 92;
Forum for the Progress of South
America (PROSUR). 100; free trade
agreements (FTAs) with Latin
American countries 92–3; hemispheric
affairs, step-up for Canada in 96;
humanitarian aid 91–2; international
community, momentum for action
within 97–8; International Contact
Group 97–8, 103n15; Justice for
Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials
Act 91; Latin American perspectives
on 99–101; Lima Group 91, 97–8,
99–101; Maduro government,
Canada’s leadership in pressure on 98;
280 Index
Mexico, Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; ‘middle power’ alignment
of Canada in international affairs
98–9; military intervention, threat by
US of 98; North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) 95; options for
Canada (and choice) 101–2;
Organization of American States
(OAS) 91–2, 95, 97, 98, 99–101; Peru,
Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
priorities in LAC for Canada 94;
Special Economic Measures Act 91;
temptation of Latin America for
Canada 92–4; Trade Commissioner
Service 93; Venezuela, ‘alteration of
constitutional order’ in 97; Venezuela,
anti-government protests in 98;
Venezuela, Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; Venezuela, democratic
tradition in 98; Venezuela as trading
partner for Canada 93; Venezuela
crisis, exceptional nature of 92
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 110, 124,
238
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
126, 225
Cartes, Horacio 159, 162
Castro, Fidel 46, 144, 205
Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt 133
Center for Foreign Trade Policy 204
Center for International Development
120
Central America: Central America Trade
Office (CATO) in Taipei 196; Central
American Common Market,
European Union (EU) and 34;
Central American Economic
Development (CAED) Fund 196;
Central American Integration System
(SICA) 126, 225; civil wars in, Israeli
engagement with 155; countries of,
contingency tier relationship with
India 114–15
Centro de Comercio Internacional 242–3
Chávez, Hugo 64, 69, 96, 98, 99, 161;
Iran-Latin American relations and
140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148;
South Africa-Latin American
relations and 236, 238, 241, 244, 245
Chávez, Jeanine Añez 146
Chile: Australia, research collaboration
with 257; Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; Chile-Indonesia
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (IC-CEPA) 204; exports
and FDI growth and diversification
after FTA with South Korea 176; free
trade agreement (FTA) with Turkey
126; India, complementary
commercial relationship with 114;
Indonesia-Chile FTA 227; Indonesian
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Iran,
relationship with 138, 141; Japan,
relationship with 75, 76, 77, 79, 80,
81, 83, 84, 85, 86; Malaysia-Chile
FTA 227; market reforms in 47–8;
relations with Indonesia 212–13;
‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP) and
relationship with China 50–51;
Thailand-Chile FTA 227; trade
relationship with Australia 253; trade
structure with South Korea (2018)
174; trade with Russian Federation
61; Vietnam-Chile FTA 227
China, People’s Republic of 1, 7, 8,
44–56; Argentina, market reforms in
47–8; Argentina, ‘Strategic
Partnership’ (SP) and relationship
with 50–51; Brazil, market reforms in
47–8; Brazil, ‘Strategic Partnership’
(SP) and relationship with 50–51;
Chile, market reforms in 47–8; Chile,
‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP) and
relationship with 50–51; China-
CELAC meetings 54; China-Mexico
Investment Fund 52; commodity price
boom (2003–2013) 47–8; competition
in Latin America from Japan 75,
78–9; contemporary literature on
China-LAC relations 45; demand
from, explosion of 48–9; Deng
Xiaoping and advocacy of
multilateralism and non-intervention
46; diversity of LAC-China relation-
ships 45; Ecuador, relationship with
51–2; emergence as external actor in
LAC, responses to 44; global
economy, implications of rise for 44;
inflows to Latin America of Chinese
FDI 52; LAC exports of raw materials
and capital goods to (2018) 269; Latin
American perspective on relations
with 52–3; Maoist doctrine, CCP
adherence to 46; Mexico, market
reforms in 47–8; Mexico, strength of
trading ties with 50–51; North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 48, 49; One China

Consensus (1992) of 54; opinions on
China in LAC 36; opinions on
relations between LAC countries and
37; Peru, market reforms in 47–8;
Peru, ‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP) and
relationship with 50–51; policy of,
influence on 267; post-Mao Beijing
foreign policy 47; pragmatic economic
overtures between Latin America and
46; presence in LAC region, results of
55–6; ‘propaganda and invitations’
phase of LAC-China relations 45;
search for new partnerships in Latin
America 264–5; sovereign and people-
to-people relations in Latin America,
effectiveness of 54–5; ‘Strategic
Partnerships’ (SPs) expansion in LAC
countries, Chinese gains from 54;
Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and 196, 197; tensions with Taiwan
186–8; Tiananmen Square tragedy
(1989) 47; trade with Latin America
and Caribbean (2108 and 2020) 268;
Venezuela, relationship with 51–2;
World Trade Organization (WTO)
membership 49–50
Colombia: Canadian shipments to
(2017) 93; Colombia-Indonesia Free
Trade Agreement (IC-FTA) 204;
complementary commercial
relationship with India 114; European
Union (EU), relationship with 32, 34,
39, 40; exports and FDI growth and
diversification after FTA with South
Korea 176; Government of 131;
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019)
210; Israel, relationship with 162;
Japan, relationship with 75, 79, 81, 83,
84, 85, 86, 88n16; research
collaboration with Australia 257;
trade with Russian Federation 61
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO) 257
Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) 34–5,
41n3, 53; Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 225–6,
231; China, meetings with 54;
European Union (EU) and 34–5, 41n3
Correa, Rafael 18, 62, 100, 146–7, 158
Costa Rica 21, 53, 54, 66–7, 107, 116,
155, 179, 188, 204, 226; Costa Rica-
Singapore FTA 227–8; European
Union (EU) and 33, 39–40;
Index 281
International Contact Group and
103n15; Lima Group and 99, 102n2
Cotler, Irwin 91–2
Council on Australia-Latin America
Relations (COALAR) 252–3, 254
Covid-19 pandemic 1, 8, 55, 208, 216,
263, 273
Crimea, Russian Federation and 66–7
Cuba 19–20, 22, 113, 129, 141–2, 144,
153, 179, 191; Canada, Venezuelan
crisis and 92, 94, 95–6, 98, 100, 101–2;
Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and
Cooperation Agreement 31; Global
Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) and 65; Indonesia,
diplomatic ties with 205; Iran,
relationship with 141–2; Revolution in
(1959) 17–18, 20, 45, 59–60; Russian
Federation support for 59–60, 62, 64,
65–6, 69; United States, resumption of
diplomatic ties with 265; Venezuela,
triangular cooperation with 241
Da Silva, Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ 110, 126,
134n2, 161; Iran-Latin American
relations and 147, 148; South Africa-
Latin American relations and 239–40,
242
D’Alotto, Alberto 243
Davutoğlu, Ahmet 131
De Klerk, Frederik 243
Demirel, Süleyman 124
Deng Xiaoping, advocacy of
multilateralism and non-intervention
46
Diario Armenia 133
Díaz-Canel, Miguel 65
Directorate General International Trade
Negotiation 204
Dlamini Zuma, Nkosazana 240
Dollar, David 107
Dominican Republic 22, 54, 94, 99, 107,
118, 119, 179, 186, 188; contingency
tier relationship with India 114–15;
Germany and, relationship between
39–40
Duterte, Rodrigo 230
East Asia-Latin America Forum
(EALAF) 222
Echegoyen, Martín 205
Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 225
282 Index
Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
33, 61, 63, 82, 87n1, 88n11, 108, 250,
271; Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and 225, 228;
European Union (EU) and 32; South
Korea and 171–2, 175, 177, 179
Economist 2018 Democracy Index 95
Ecuador 18, 47, 99, 100, 103n15, 136,
158, 161, 187, 229, 257; Canadian
shipments to (2017) 93; China,
relationship with 51–2, 53, 55;
contingency tier relationship with
India 114–15; Embassy in Turkey 127,
130; European Union (EU),
relationship with 32, 40; India,
relationship with 114–15, 116, 118,
119; Indonesian investment in
(2010–2019) 210; Iran, relationship
with 141, 146–7; research
collaboration with Australia 257;
Russia Today network and 69;
Russian Federation diplomacy in
62–3; South Korea, relationship with
173, 179; Turkey, relationship with
127, 128, 129
EFE-EPA Press Agencies 228–9
Eichmann, Adolf 154
El Salvador 33, 54, 62, 155, 210, 231n3;
Lima Group membership 99; Taiwan,
relationship with 186, 188, 191–2
Ephraim, Modi 160
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyep 125, 127–8, 130,
131, 132, 133, 134n1–2
Eréndira Sandoval, Irma 68
Erwin, Alec 237–8
El Espectador 128
European Commission 2, 32, 33, 37–8
European Parliament 225
European Union (EU) 1, 9, 10, 29–41,
267; Andean Group and 34;
Argentina, relationship with 32, 33;
articulated mode of relations,
proposal for 29; biregional relations
(1990s) 31; Brazil, relationship with
31, 32, 33; Central American
Common Market and 34; collective
bargaining, preference for 34–5;
Colombia, relationship with 32, 34,
39, 40; comeback in LAC for? 37–40;
Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) 34–5,
41n3; Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) and 32; economic openings
in LAC for 31; Ecuador, relationship
with 32, 40; established partner of
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
29; EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and
Cooperation Agreement 31; EU-LAC
relations, economy and institutions
32–5; EU-LAC relations, Joint
Communication to Parliament and
Council on 37–9, 40; European
influence key to Latin America
independence 30; Germany, initiatives
in Latin America of 39–40; global
financial crisis (2008–2009), effects of
31; influence in LAC, multi-faceted
nature of 40–41; influence in Latin
America, decline of (1945–1985)
30–31; integrationist tendencies of 34;
intensification of EU operations 29;
Latin American perspective on
relations with 35–7; Mexico,
relationship with 33, 34, 40, 41n1;
opinions on China in LAC 36;
opinions on relations between LAC
countries and 37; Peru, relationship
with 31, 32, 34; Regional Facility for
Development in Transition 33–4;
reputation in Latin America (as
compared to United States) 35–6;
resurgence in attention to Latin
America, power of 31–2; Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR) and
33, 34, 37, 38, 41; trade flows with
Latin America 32–3; traditional
partners of Latin America 30–32;
Venezuela, relationship with 31–2, 33,
41n2
extractivism 9–10
FDCH Political Transcripts (1997) 221
Fernanda Espinosa, María 100–101
Fernandez-Armesto, F. 2
Fernández Kirchner, Cristina 259
Financial Post 93
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) 59, 60
Forum for East Asia Latin America
Cooperation (FEALAC) 179, 205;
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and 220, 222, 224,
225, 231; Australia and 255; Indonesia
and 213, 214, 215
Forum for East Asia-Latin America
Cooperation (FEALAC) 215, 222, 225

Forum for the Progress of South
America (PROSUR) 100
Forum on China-African Cooperation
(FOCAC) 79
Pope Francis 160
Freedom House 95
Frei, Eduardo 222
Frondizi, Arturo 205
Fujimori, Alberto 95
Fundación Carolina 10
Gandhi, Indira 112
Gandhi, Mohandas K. ‘Mahatma’
115
Gangotena, Raül 259
Gardiner, Margaret 253
geopolitics 7, 8, 9; Bolivia, geopolitical
role of 146; China, geopolitical goals
of 188; India, geopolitical calculus of
108; Japan, geopolitical interests of
80; modernized geopolitics, usefulness
of 272–3; persistence of 269–73; soft
balancing and, Latin American policy
vis-à-vis South Korea, India, Japan,
Taiwan and Israel 10; United States,
geopolitical interests of 19
Georgia, Russian Federation and 66–7
Germany, initiatives in Latin America of
39–40
Goh Chok Tong 222
Gönül, Vecdi 131
Granados, Jorge García 154
Grant, President Ulysses S. 17
Guaidó, Juan 91, 98, 99, 100, 146, 162
Guatemala 33, 40, 62, 98, 100, 126, 179,
194, 231n3; contingency tier
relationship with India 114–15;
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019)
210; Israel, relationship with 154, 156,
159, 160, 162, 163; Lima Group
membership 102n2; merchandise trade
statistics with (2003–2019) Taiwan
193; Russian Federation, relationship
with 66–7; Taiwan, relationship with
184, 191–2, 197; Turkey, relationship
with 130, 131
Guevara, Ernesto ‘Che’ 22, 205
Gül, Abdullah 126, 127
Gülen, Fetullah 134n1
Haaretz 160
Haiti 18, 19, 22, 130, 156; Taiwan, trade
relationship with 182, 194, 195, 197
Harper, Stephen 95
Index 283
Hezbollah in Latin America, deployment
of 141, 143–4
Honduras 33, 40, 95, 98, 102, 231n3;
Israel, relationship with 156, 159, 160;
Russian Federation, relationship with
66–7; Taiwan, relationship with
191–2, 193, 194, 197
Hosono, Akio 87n1
Hsu, Szu-chien 190
Hu Jintao 226
Hürriyet Daily News 132
Hwee Yeo Lay 221
IDN Financials 229
India 7, 9, 106–21, 267; Argentina,
complementary commercial
relationship with 114; Asia growth
(and India within) 108–9;
automobiles, trade with Latin
America in 118–19; bilateral ties,
stagnation of 120; Bolivia,
contingency tier relationship with
114–15; Brazil, ‘strategic partnership’
with 111, 113–14; BRICS Group 108,
110; capacity-building role 116;
Caribbean countries, contingency tier
relationship with 114–15; Central
American countries, contingency tier
relationship with 114–15; Chile,
complementary commercial
relationship with 114; Colombia,
complementary commercial
relationship with 114; commercial
impact of deepening India-LAC ties
111; commodities, Indian appetite for
117; Dominican Republic,
contingency tier relationship with
114–15; economic reforms in (1990s)
108; Ecuador, contingency tier
relationship with 114–15; exports to,
LAC top five products 116; factors in
rapprochement between India and
LAC 107; growth of economic India-
LAC partnership 108; Guatemala,
contingency tier relationship with
114–15; ICT, trade with Latin
America in 118; import substitution
industrialization (ISI) approach to
economic development 108; India-
Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral
dialogue 108, 110, 235, 239–40, 242,
245; India-LAC high-level visits
112–13; India-LAC political
relationship 119; India-LAC relations,
284 Index
actual results of 117–18; India-LAC
relations, context for 106; India-LAC
relationship, beginnings of 109–10;
Indian Express 110; industrialization
in, Latin America as resource provider
for 106; LAC exports of raw materials
and capital goods to (2018) 269; Latin
American investments in 119; Latin
American perspective on relations
with 115–17; Mexico, ‘strategic
partnership’ with 113–14; Ministry of
External Affairs of 111, 113; new
globalizer nations 107; outreach to
LAC region, variability in distribution
of 112; Paraguay, contingency tier
relationship with 114–15; Peru,
complementary commercial
relationship with 114;
pharmaceuticals, trade with Latin
America in 118; ‘pink tide’ in LAC
region and 110; pivotal events in
India-LAC relationship 109–10;
preferential trade agreement (PTA)
with the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) 110–11; search for
new partnerships in Latin America
264; Shree Renuka Sugars Limited
(SRSL) 116; trade partners in the
LAC region (2001–2018) 118; trade
with Latin America and Caribbean
(2108 and 2020) 268; Venezuela,
petroleum imports from 111;
Venezuela, ‘strategic partnership’ with
113–14; world GDP growth, Asian
share in 109
Indonesia 203–17; Argentina, investment
in (2010–2019) 210; Argentina,
relations with 211–12; Argentina,
trade partnership with 204; Bahamas,
investment in (2010–2019) 210;
Barbados, investment in (2010–2019)
210; Belize, investment in (2010–2019)
210; bilateral consultation
mechanisms, establishment of 215;
bilateral relations with Latin
American states and regional groups
211–15; Bolivia, investment in (2010–
2019) 210; Brazil, investment in
(2010–2019) 210; Brazil, trade
partnership with 204; Chile,
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Chile,
relations with 212–13; Chile-Indonesia
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (IC-CEPA) 204;
Colombia, investment in (2010–2019)
210; Colombia-Indonesia Free Trade
Agreement (IC-FTA) 204; economic
cooperation, push for 204; Ecuador,
investment in (2010–2019) 210;
foreign policy, 4+1 formula of
(2019–2024) 203; Guatemala,
investment in (2010–2019) 210;
Investment Coordinating Board 210;
Jamaica, investment in (2010–2019)
210; LAC exports of raw materials
and capital goods to (2018) 269;
markets, traditional and non-
traditional 203, 209; Mexico,
investment in (2010–2019) 210;
Mexico, trade partnership with 204;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of 203; Ministry of Trade for
the Republic of 213; Nicaragua,
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Pacific
Alliance, relations with 214–15; Pacific
Alliance and 204; Panama, investment
in (2010–2019) 210; Peru, investment
in (2010–2019) 210; Peru, relations
with 213–14; Peru-Indonesia
Preferential Trade Agreement
(IP-PTA) 204; prospects and
challenges for future relationships
with LAC 215–16; relations with
Latin America, overview of 205–10;
search for new partnerships in Latin
America 264–5; Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR), relations with
204–5, 214–15; Suriname, investment
in (2010–2019) 210; trade initiatives in
Latin America 204; trade share with
Latin America (1989–2019) 207; trade
volumes with Latin America (1989–
2019) 208; trade with Latin America
and Caribbean (2108 and 2020) 268;
Uruguay, investment in (2010–2019)
210; Venezuela, investment in
(2010–2019) 210
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights 95
Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) 4, 13; Australia and 257;
Japan and 78; South Korea and
179–80
inter-regionalism 35; in ASEAN-Latin
America relations 219, 220–26, 230
Interfax 65–6
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) 140

International Contact Group 97–8,
103n15
International Cooperation and
Development Fund (ICDF) 190,
196–7
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 76,
81, 88n10, 109, 121n1
international relations (IR) theory 4, 8,
9, 10–11, 263, 270, 272
International Trade Center 116, 118,
121n2–7
Iran 8, 9, 138–49; activities in Latin
America, context for 138–9, 148–9;
Argentina, relationship with 138, 140;
Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our
America (ALBA), involvement with
142, 143–4, 146, 147, 148, 149n1;
Bolivia, relationship with 140–41, 146;
Brazil, relationship with 138, 140,
147–8; Chile, relationship with 138,
141; Cuba, relationship with 141–2;
Ecuador, relationship with 141, 146–7;
Hezbollah in Latin America,
deployment of 141, 143–4; illicit
activities 142–3; Iran Times 147;
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) 139, 143, 148n2; Israeli
concerns about influence of 161–2;
LAC exports of raw materials and
capital goods to (2018) 269; Latin
America, grand strategy in 139–42;
Latin American perspective on
relations with 144–8; Mexico,
relationship with 138; national
strategic and political calculations in
265; Nicaragua, relationship with 141,
147; nuclear programme in 138–9,
148–9; Peru, relationship with 141;
‘pink tide’ in LAC region and 144–5,
148; post-revolutionary regime in,
United States and 139, 149; trade with
Latin America and Caribbean (2108
and 2020) 268; United States,
imposition of sanctions on 149;
United States, Iranian alliances in
Latin America and 138–9; Venezuela,
relationship with 140, 141–2, 145–6
Israel 7, 153–65, 267; Arab-Israeli
conflict, effects of 155–6; Argentina,
relationship with 162; Argentine
Israelite Mutual Association (AIMA)
155; Brazil, recognition of Palestine
state by 156; Brazil, relationship with
162; Central American civil wars,
Index 285
Israeli engagement with 155;
Colombia, relationship with 162;
economic and technological clout,
LAC recognition of 160; economic
ties with LAC, benefits for 162–3;
Foreign Affairs Ministry 163;
Guatemala, relationship with 162;
Iran, Israeli concerns about influence
of 161–2; Israel-Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR) FTA (2007)
156, 162; Jerusalem, call for
recognition of sovereignty over 163;
Jewish communities in Latin America,
links with 157, 164; LAC exports of
raw materials and capital goods to
(2018) 269; LAC-Israel relations,
history and evolution of (1949–2009)
153–6; LAC-Israel relations, interest
increasing in 164; Latin American
perspective on relations with 158–60;
Lebanon, effects of Israel military
engagement in 155; Netanyahu
outreach to Latin America 156–8,
161, 162; Paraguay, relationship with
162; Partition Plan for Palestine (UN,
1947) 153–4, 156, 161; ‘preventive
diplomacy’ of 161; Prime Minister’s
Office 157; search for new
partnerships in Latin America 264–5;
Six-Day War (1967), aftermath of
154; social and religious changes in
Latin America, effects of 159–60;
surge in relations (2009–2019) 153,
156–8, 163–4; surge in relations
(2009–2019), Israeli perspective and
results of 160–63; trade with Latin
America and Caribbean (2108 and
2020) 268; UN Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) 154, 156; United
States, ‘special relationship’ with,
LAC-Israel relations and 158–9;
Venezuela, relationship with 162;
Yom Kippur War (1973), aftermath of
154–5, 161
Jahangiri, Es’haq 141
Jamaica 179, 229; Indonesian investment
in (2010–2019) 210;
Lima Group membership
102
Japan 3–4, 9, 75–88, 267; ‘Abenomics,’
influence of 79; Argentina,
relationship with 76, 77, 81, 85,
88n16; Bank for International
286 Index
Cooperation (JBIC) 83–4; bilateral
trade, sectoral content of 82; Brazil,
relationship with 75, 76, 77, 79, 81,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87n1; Chile,
relationship with 75, 76, 77, 79, 80,
81, 83, 84, 85, 86; China, competition
in Latin America from 75, 78–9;
Colombia, relationship with 75, 79,
81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88n16; competitive
environment in Latin America,
approach to 85–6; economic
partnership agreements (EPAs) with
Latin America 75; financial
institutions, operations in Latin
America of 77–8; foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows to Latin
America from, modality of 83; Forum
on China-African Cooperation
(FOCAC) and 79; future prospects for
Japan-LAC relations 85–7;
Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) 78; International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) 83, 88n13; Japanese
Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC) 83–5; Japanese FDI to Latin
America (1995–2018) 82–3; JBIC loan
commitments to LAC (2005–2017)
83–5; Juntos framework for LAC
relationship 75–6, 86, 87; LAC
bilateral trade with Japan (1990–2018)
81; LAC exports of raw materials and
capital goods to (2018) 269; Latin
America and Caribbean, trade with
(2108 and 2020) 268; longstanding
relationship with Latin America 75;
Mexico, relationship with 75, 76, 77,
78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88n16;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
77, 86, 88n16; Miyazawa Plan 78;
modern history of Japan-LAC rela-
tions 76–8; Peru, relationship with 75,
76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86;
search for new partnerships in Latin
America 264–5; Tokyo International
Conference on African Development
(TICAD) 79; trade and finance trends
in (2000s) 80–85; trade with Latin
America, foreign direct investment
(FDI) and 76–7; Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) 75–6, 79–80, 86–7;
‘triangular cooperation’ objective of
76; Trinidad and Tobago, relationship
with 79, 88n16; 21st century
Japan-LAC relationships 78–80
Jerusalem, call for recognition of
sovereignty over 163
Jerusalem Post 157
John Fargher & Associates 256
Pope John Paul II 160
Johnston, Rory 94
Jokowi (Joko Widodo), President of
Indonesia 203, 208, 230, 265
Journal of International Affairs 264
Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign
Officials Act in Canada 91
Kalla, Jusuf 230
Kao, Stanley 190
Keidanren (Japanese Business
Federation) 88n17
Kemal, Mustafa 132
Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali 141
Kirchner, Néstor 240
Korea, Republic of see South Korea
Korea International Trade Association
(KITA) 169, 172, 173
Kuwayama, Mikio 79, 80–81, 87n1,
88n12
Lagos, Ricardo 126
Lampreia, Luiz Felipe 237, 238
Latin America: assertiveness of,
development of 264; Australia,
relationship with 249–50, 257–8,
259–60; Canada, perspectives on
Venezuela crisis and 99–101; China,
perspective on relations with 52–3;
Cold War international relations 3;
Covid-19 pandemic, prospects in 273;
definition of, problem of 2–3;
diaspora in Australia 251; domestic
dynamics within 265; European links
with 3; European Union (EU),
perspective on relations with 35–7;
external powers and 1–4; foreign
policy reorientations of countries of
265; geopolitical dynamic and surge
of external powers in 11;
globalization, economic and political
resources released by 264; India,
investments in 119; India, perspective
on relations with 115–17; India, policy
vis-à-vis, soft balancing geopolitics
and 10; Iran, activities in, context for
138–9, 148–9; Iran, grand strategy in
139–42; Iran, perspective on relations
with 144–8; Israel, perspective on
relations with 158–60; Israel, policy

vis-à-vis, soft balancing geopolitics
and 10; Japan, competitive
environment in, approach to 85–6;
Japan, policy vis-à-vis, soft balancing
geopolitics and 10; Jewish
communities in, Israel’s links with
157, 164; Latin American and
Caribbean Summit on Integration and
Development (CALC) 225–6;
Mandela’s foreign policy for 237–8;
positivity in relationship with South
Korea 181–2; power shifts at global
level, effects on 264; reactive politics
in countries of 267; rising powers,
search for new partnerships in 264;
Russian Federation, presence in
59–60; South African activism
towards 239; South Korea, policy
vis-à-vis, soft balancing geopolitics
and 10; South Korea’s fragmented
political economy in 170–71; surge of
external powers in 10–11; surge of
external powers in, beneficiaries of
266; surge of external powers in,
causes of 263–4; surge of external
powers in, distribution across 6; surge
of external powers in, major leap
(2003–2013) 4–5, 265–6; surge of
external powers in, measurement of
results of 6–7; surge of external
powers in, pattern of benefits from
266–7; surge of external powers in,
perspective of Latin American
countries on 6; surge of external
powers in, reasons for 4–5; surge of
external powers in, timing of 5; surge
of external powers in, trade exchanges
and 267–8; Taiwan, policy vis-à-vis,
soft balancing geopolitics and 10;
United States, rebalancing of
international order on perception of
threat from 264; United States and
Europe in agenda of 4; United States’
influence in 16, 17, 18–19, 20, 21–2,
23, 24
Latinobarometer 35, 36–7,
41n4
Lavrov, Sergei 62
Lee Kuan Yew 230
Liberman, Avigdor 161
Lima Group: Canada, Venezuela crisis
and 91, 97–8, 99–101; establishment
of 102n2
López-Dolz, Dardo 141
Index 287
Lopez Mateos, Adolfo 205
López Obrador, Andrés Manuel 68–9,
86, 120
Macri, Mauricio 132–3, 159, 162, 211,
230
Maduro, Nicolás 64, 128, 158, 244;
Canada, Venezuela crisis and 91, 92,
94, 96–8, 99, 100, 101–2; Iran-Latin
America relationship and 141–2, 144,
146
Mandela, Nelson 236, 243, 245; Latin
America in foreign policy of 237–8
Mandela-Dlamini, Zenani 243
Mao Zedong 46, 49
Maoist doctrine, CCP adherence to 46
Márquez, Iván Duque 162
Marsudi, Retno 203
Mbeki, Thabo 237, 242, 265; globalism
of 238–42
Medi Telegraph 66
Medium.com 69
Menem, Carlos S. ‘El Turco’ 124, 155,
206, 238
MERCOSUR see Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR)
Merkel, Angela 38
methodologies and analyses 7–8
Mexico: Canadian shipments to (2017)
93; election in Russia, influence on?
68–9; European Union (EU),
relationship with 33, 34, 40, 41n1;
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019)
210; Iran, relationship with 138;
Japan, relationship with 75, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88n16;
market reforms in 47–8; research
collaboration with Australia 257;
‘strategic partnership’ with India
113–14; strength of trading ties with
China 50–51; trade partnership
with Indonesia 204; trade relationship
with Australia 253; trade with Russian
Federation 61, 63–4; trading
partnership with Turkey 127–8
Michetti, Gabriela 211
Miyazawa Plan 78
Modi, Narendra 111, 114, 119
Monroe, President James 15
Monroe Doctrine (1823) 3, 15, 18, 19
Morales, Evo 100, 129, 131, 146, 158
Morales, Jimmy 162
Moscow Times 63
Moya Mena, S.I. 145
288 Index
Mueller, Robert 68
Mulroney, Brian 92
Nakamae, Takahiro 87n1
Nakamura, Keisuke 87n1
Neruda, Pablo 115
Netanyahu, Benjamin 148, 265; outreach
to Latin America 156–8, 161, 162–3
New Economic Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) 239
News.ru 63
Nicaragua: free trade agreement (FTA)
with Taiwan 191–2; Indonesian
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Iran,
relationship with 141, 147;
merchandise trade statistics with
(2003–2019) Taiwan 194; Nicaraguan
Investment Conditionality Act
(NICA) in Taiwan 191; support for
Russian Federation 65–6; Taiwan,
relationship with 190–91
Nixon, President Richard 46
Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite 242, 243
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 3, 109,
213, 237, 239
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 48, 49, 170, 181, 222
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 95
Nzo, Alfred 238
Obama, President Barack (and
administration of) 24, 35, 79, 142,
159, 265
Observatory of Economic Complexity
(OEC) 31, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245
Ocampo, Victoria 115
Ohishi, Kazuaki 87n1
’One China Consensus (1992) 54;
Taiwan and 186, 187, 199n1
O’Reilly, Kevin 190
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) 6, 64
Organization of American States (OAS)
124, 130; Canada, Venezuela crisis
and 91–2, 95, 97, 98, 99–101; Russian
Federation and 60, 67–8, 70
Ortega, Daniel 65, 147, 158, 190, 191
Oxford Business Group 229
Pacific Alliance 126, 156, 162–3, 179,
258; ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (PA)
Framework for Cooperation 223;
European Union (EU) and 34; India
and 119; Indonesia, relations with
204, 205, 214–15, 216; Japan and 75,
86; membership of 231n5
Pahad, Aziz 237
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 139
Panama 2, 18, 19, 21, 54, 77, 129, 156,
204, 226; free trade agreement (FTA)
with Taiwan 191–2; India, trade with
118; Indonesian investment in (2010–
2019) 210; Panama-Singapore FTA
227, 228; Russian Federation and 61,
66, 67; Taiwan, relationship with 186,
188, 191–2
Paraguay 33, 40, 102, 132, 140, 179,
204–5, 231n2–3, 266; Australia,
relationship with 250–51, 255;
contingency tier relationship with
India 114–15; India, relationship with
107, 110, 113, 114, 116; Israel,
relationship with 156, 157, 159, 160,
162, 163; merchandise trade statistics
with (2003–2019) Taiwan 195; ‘New
Australia’ in 250–51; Taiwan,
relationship with 186, 187–8, 190, 192,
194, 195, 196, 197
Partition Plan for Palestine (UN, 1947)
153–4, 156, 161
Patriota, Antonio 127
Paz, Octavio 115
Peña Nieto, Enrique 127, 128
Pence, Mike 190
Peres, Shimon 161
Peru: Canadian shipments to (2017) 93;
complementary commercial
relationship with India 114; European
Union (EU), relationship with 31, 32,
34; exports and FDI growth and
diversification after FTA with South
Korea 176; Indonesian investment in
(2010–2019) 210; Iran, relationship
with 141; Japan, relationship with 75,
76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86;
market reforms in 47–8;
Peru-Indonesia Preferential Trade
Agreement (IP-PTA) 204;
Peru-Singapore FTA 227;
Peru-Thailand FTA 227;
pre-Colombian populations in north
of 1; relations with Indonesia 213–14;
research collaboration with Australia
257; Russian Federation diplomacy in
62–3; ‘Strategic Partnership’ (SP) and
relationship with China 50–51; trade
relationship with Australia 253

Petro Global News 63
Pew Research Center 54, 60
Philippines, Government of 230
Piñera, Sebastián 230
‘pink tide’ in LAC region 244; India and
109, 110; Iran and 144–5, 148, 149
Press TV in Iran 141
Primakov, Yevgeny 62
Putin, Vladimir 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 70
Quarantine and Inspection Service in
Australia 258
Quesada Inchaustegui, Luis Felipe 259
Ramaphosa, Cyril 245
Regional Facility for Development in
Transition (EU) 33–4
Religious Affairs Directorate in Turkey
130
Reuters 63
Revista Al-Kubri Online 130
Rivlin, Reuven 160
Rodríguez Fabregat, Enrique 154
Rohani, Hassan 134n2
Roosevelt, President Franklin D. 20
Rosneft 63, 64–5
Rouhani, Hassan 138, 141, 144
Rousseff, Dilma 127, 131, 147, 148, 230,
242–3
RT Actualidad in Moscow 69
Rúa, Fernando de la 240
Ruiz-Tagle, Eduardo Frei 206
Russian Federation 8, 9, 59–70, 267;
anti-democratic regimes, support for
64–6; Argentina, relationship with 63;
Argentina, trade with 61; attention in
Latin America for, lack of 70; Bolivia,
diplomacy in 62–3; Brazil, relation-
ship with 63; Brazil, trade with 61;
Chile, trade with 61; Colombia, trade
with 61; Cuba, Global Navigation
Satellite System (GLONASS) and 65;
Cuba, support for 65; deal-making
62–4; Ecuador, diplomacy in 62–3;
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
to Latin America 61; Georgia, Crimea
and Ukraine, seeking support for
actions in 66–7; global strategy and
goals in Latin America 60;
high-profile visits 62; hybrid case of
11–12n1; LAC exports of raw
materials and capital goods to (2018)
269; Latin American presence of
59–60; Mexico, election in, influence
Index 289
on? 68–9; Mexico, trade with 61,
63–4; Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
60; national strategic and political
calculations in 265; Nicaragua,
support for 65–6; objectives in Latin
America of 60; Organization of
American States (OAS) and 67–8;
Peru, diplomacy in 62–3;
policymakers in, relatively low
priority accorded to Latin America by
60–61; Russia Today 59, 60, 68;
Russia Today, spread of
disinformation through 69; social
media, spread of disinformation
through 68–9; strategy in Latin
America, lack of evidence for 69–70;
trade with Latin America and
Caribbean (2108 and 2020) 268;
traditional interests, absence of 60–61;
Venezuela, support for 64–5;
Venezuela, trade with 61
St Antony’s College 2
Salinas de Gortari, Carlos 206
São Paulo State Research Fund
(FAPESP) 257
Saudi Gazette 148
Science Without Borders programme
257
Sechin, Igor 64
Senkman, Leo 165n1
Sersale di Cerisano, Carlos 240
Sheany at Jakarta Globe 213
Shoigu, Sergei 62, 63, 65
Shree Renuka Sugars Limited (SRSL)
116
Singapore: Costa Rica-Singapore FTA
227–8; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Government of 230;
Panama-Singapore FTA 227, 228;
Peru-Singapore FTA 227
Singh, Manmohan 111
Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y
del Caribe (SELA) 225
Six-Day War (1967) in Israel 154
South Africa 9, 235–46, 267; activism
towards Latin America 239;
Africa-South America (ASA) group
235, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245; African
National Congress (ANC), foreign
policy of 236–7; Argentina,
relationship with 238, 240–41, 242–3,
245; Argentina-South Africa
Binational Commission (BICSAA).
290 Index
240–41, 243; Brazil, relationship with
239–40; Department of International
Relations and Cooperation,
Government of (DIRCO) 236, 242,
243; emerging markets, easing
vulnerability of 237–8; financial and
economic crises (2008–2009), effects
of 242–3, 244; foreign policy after
Mandela’s election victory in 236;
foreign policy towards Latin America
in 21st century 238–44; India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) trilateral
dialogue 235, 239–40, 242, 245; LAC
exports of raw materials and capital
goods to (2018) 269; Latin America in
Mandela’s foreign policy, initial steps
237–8; Mbeki’s globalism 238–42;
MERCOSUR and Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) 235;
MERCOSUR-Southern African
Development Community (SADC)
agreements 237–8; New Economic
Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) 239; Non-Aligned
Movement 239; Presidency of
Republic of 242; search for new
partnerships in Latin America 265;
security and defence cooperation with
Latin America 240–41; South Atlantic
Peace and Cooperation Zone
(SAPCZ) 235, 239, 240, 245;
South-South cooperation, Mandela’s
support for 237; South-South
solidarity, Latin America and 244,
246; Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and 235, 237–8; Trade
and Industry Department in 241, 244;
trade with Latin America and
Caribbean (2108 and 2020) 268;
Venezuela, relationship with 238,
241–2, 244, 245; Zuma’s legacy
242–4
South Korea 8, 9, 167–82, 267;
Argentina, trade structure with (2018)
174; Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation 180; attractiveness of
Latin America for 170; Brazil, trade
structure with (2018) 174; Chile,
exports and FDI growth and
diversification after FTA with 176;
Chile, trade structure with (2018) 174;
Colombia, exports and FDI growth
and diversification after FTA with
176; complementarity, issue of 177,
179–81; Development Assistance
Committee of OECD 180;
export-driven industrialization of 167;
exporting strength of 167; FDI in
LAC by sector (2000–2018) 173;
imports and exports with LAC 168;
industrial prowess of 167;
Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) 179–80; interest in Latin
America, endurance of 171–5, 181;
internationalization of, Latin America
as stepping stone to 168–9; LAC
exports of raw materials and capital
goods to (2018) 269; Latin America,
fragmented political economy in
170–71; Latin America, positivity in
relationship with 181–2; ODA and
outward foreign direct investment
(OFDI) 168; Peru, exports and FDI
growth and diversification after FTA
with 176; research and development
expenditure 177; search for new
partnerships in Latin America
264–5; trade and FDI concentration
in LAC (2000–2018) 172; trade with
Latin America and Caribbean
(2108 and 2020) 268
South-South cooperation 4, 264, 265,
269–71, 273; complementarity and
272; evolution of 3; global order,
potential for transformation of 10–11;
lens of, surge of external powers in
Latin America through 10; Mandela’s
support for 237; non-traditional
partnerships and cooperation, surge
of 270–71; policymaking,
predominance in 272; solidarity in,
South Africa and 244, 246; theoretical
debates and dialogue concerning
9–11; trade and investment flows of
Turkey, rise in 125; unifying factor of
the debates on 272; value of 9
Southern Common Market (MERCO-
SUR): Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and 220, 221, 222–
3, 224, 225, 226, 231; European
Union (EU) and 33, 34, 37, 38, 41;
Indonesia, relations with 204–5,
214–15; MERCOSUR-ASEAN
Chamber of Commerce (MACC) 223,
231; South Africa and 235, 237–8;
Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) and 235; Turkey and 124,
126, 127

Soviet Union 3, 20, 46, 59, 62, 65, 69,
101
Special Economic Measures Act in
Canada 91
Stilwell, David 190
Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) 61, 63, 64
Suharto, President of Indonesia
(1967–98) 205–6
Sukarno, President of Indonesia
(1945–67) 205
Suriname 33, 113, 213, 231n3;
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019)
210
Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
34, 76, 86, 196–7
Tagore, Rabindranath 115
Taiwan 9, 186–99; Central America
Trade Office (CATO) in Taipei 196;
Central American Economic
Development (CAED) Fund 196;
China, economic and diplomatic
relations with LAC 188; China,
tensions with 186–8; Democratic
Progress Party (DPP) political
platform 186; El Salvador, free trade
agreement (FTA) with 191–2;
geo-economic game in Latin America
between China and 187–8, 198;
Guatemala, free trade agreement
(FTA) with 191–2; Guatemala,
merchandise trade statistics with
(2003–2019) 193; Haiti, merchandise
trade statistics with (2003–2019) 195;
Haiti, trade relationship with 194;
Honduras, free trade agreement
(FTA) with 191–2; Honduras,
merchandise trade statistics with
(2003–2019) 193; International
Cooperation and Development Fund
(ICDF) 190, 196–7; negative trend in
diplomatic relations with Latin
America 186; Nicaragua, free trade
agreement (FTA) with 191–2;
Nicaragua, merchandise trade
statistics with (2003–2019) 194;
Nicaragua, relationship with 190–91;
Nicaraguan Investment Con-
ditionality Act (NICA) 191; official
development assistance (ODA) for
LAC 196–7; ’One China Consensus
(1992) of People’s Republic 186, 187,
199n1; Panama, free trade agreement
Index 291
(FTA) with 191–2; Paraguay,
merchandise trade statistics with
(2003–2019) 195; Paraguay, trade
relationship with 194; search for new
partnerships in Latin America 265;
Sustainable Development Goals,
development assistance and 196–7;
Taiwan Allies International Protection
and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI)
Act (US, 2019) 189–90;
Taiwan-Central America merchandise
trade statistics (2003–2019) 192;
Taiwan Straight, flashpoint in East
Asia 198; trade with LAC 191–6;
United States grand strategy changes
and 188–91; US-Taiwan cooperation
initiatives in LAC 190
Tan Keng Yam, Tony 229–30
Temer, Michel 147, 148, 245
Tiananmen Square tragedy (1989) 47
Timerman, Hector 243
Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD) 79
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP):
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and 223–4; Japan
and 75–6, 79–80, 86–7
Trinidad and Tobago: India, high-level
visits from 113; Japan, relationship
with 79, 88n16
Trudeau, Justin 95–6
Trump, President Donald J. (and
administration of) 24, 35, 39, 79, 98,
100, 264; China in Latin America and
51, 53, 54; Iran in Latin America and
142, 148, 149; Israel in Latin America
and 155, 156, 157, 159, 162, 163;
Taiwan in Latin America and 189,
190, 191, 198
Tsai Ing-wen 265
Turkey 8, 9, 123–34; ‘Action Plan for
Latin America and the Caribbean’
(1998) 124; Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi (AKP, Justice and
Development Party) 125; aid,
development cooperation and 129–30;
‘Anatolian Tigers’ 124; Armenian
diaspora, Turkey-LAC relations and
132–3; Brazil, military participation
with 131; Brazil, trading partnership
with 127; business diplomacy,
interdependencies and 132; Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and 126;
Central American Integration System
292 Index
(SICA) and 126; Chile, free trade
agreement (FTA) with 126; cultural
and public diplomacy 130–31;
economic indicators in Turkey,
slowdown of 133; Foreign Economic
Relations Board (DEIK) of 124, 125,
132; governmental aspects of Turkey-
LAC relations 132; individual aspects
of Turkey-LAC relations 131–2;
intergovernmental political and
economic relations,
institutionalization of 126–8; LAC
exports of raw materials and capital
goods to (2018) 269; maritime and air
links with Latin America, problems
with 129; Mexico, trading partnership
with 127–8; policies towards LAC
region of 123; political polarization in
Turkey 133; private sector in,
expansion of 132; reactivation of
links, timidity in 123–5; regional
instability 133; Religious Affairs
Directorate in 130; resolution,
approach of Turkey to LAC with
newfound (post-2006) 125–31; search
for new partnerships in Latin America
264–5; societal aspects of Turkey-LAC
relations 132–3; South-South trade
and investment flows of, rise in 125;
Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and 124, 126, 127;
tourism, potential for 130–31; trade
and investment 128–9; trade
diversification strategies 129; trade
with Latin America and Caribbean
(2108 and 2020) 268; Turkey-LAC
national development strategies
133–4; Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA) 129–30;
Turkish-Latin American interactions
123–31; United States, symbolic
confrontation against 133; Venezuela,
trading partnership with 128; ‘Vision
2023’ programme 128–9; ‘Year of
Latin America and the Caribbean’
(2006) 125
Ukraine, Russian Federation and
66–7
Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) 225
United Nations (UN) 61, 66–7;
Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) 3, 33, 253;
Development Programme (UNDP)
10; Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
32, 33, 61, 63, 82, 87n1, 88n11, 108,
171, 175, 177, 179, 225, 228, 250, 271;
Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP) 154, 156; Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) 34, 76,
86, 196–7
United States 1, 10, 15–25; asymmetries
and influences in relations 15–16,
24–5; China in LAC, opinions on 36;
cooperation, Roosevelt’s Good
Neighbor Policy and 19–20; depth of
relations, domestic politics and 22–3,
24; established partner of Latin
America and Caribbean (LAC) 29;
geographical variation in relations
17–18, 23–4; geopolitical interests,
reinterpretation of 19; grand strategy
changes by, Taiwan and 188–91;
hegemonic presumptions of 24–5;
import substitution industrialization
(ISI), Latin America and 23;
imposition of sanctions on Iran 149;
influence of, variations in 15, 17–18,
18–22, 22–3, 24–5; Inter-American
relations 19; intertia, influence by 24;
Iranian alliances in Latin America
and 138–9; LAC exports of raw
materials and capital goods to (2018)
269; large power behaviour 23; Latin
America, influence in 16, 17, 18–19,
20, 21–2, 23, 24; material capabilities,
disparities in 15; Mexican-American
War 18; Monroe Doctrine (1823) 3,
15, 18, 19; relations between LAC
countries and, opinions on 37;
resumption of diplomatic ties with
Cuba 265; ‘revisionist synthesis’ on
US economic imperialism 16; ‘special
relationship’ with Israel, LAC-Israel
relations and 158–9; symbolic
confrontation by Turkey against 133;
temporal variation in relations 18–22;
trade with Latin America and
Caribbean (2108 and 2020) 268; US
and Latin American priorities, post
Cold War convergence of 21–2; US-
Latin America relations, effect of
Cold War on 20–21, 22; US-Latin
America relations, geographical tiers
of 17–18; US-Taiwan cooperation
initiatives in LAC 190
 Index 293
Uruguay 31, 33, 47, 53, 66, 204, 205, Viegas Filho, José 131
223, 231, 255; Canada, Venezuela Viet Nam News 229
crisis and 95, 100, 103n15; India, Villagra Delgado, Pedro 256, 258–9
relationship with 107, 110, 113, 119; Vnesheconombank 62
Indonesian investment in (2010–2019) Von der Leyen, Ursula 38
210; Israel, relationship with 154, 156,
161, 162; South Africa, relationship Wheelahan, Bernard 252
with 238, 240, 241, 243; Turkey, White House 190
relationship with 131, 132, 133 Wong, Alex 189
World Bank 61, 107, 211, 228, 229
Venezuela: ‘alteration of constitutional World Integrated Trade Solutions
order’ in 97; anti-government protests (WITS) 174, 176, 182n1, 207, 208,
in 98; Canadian shipments to (2017) 209, 245, 268, 269, 271
93; China, relationship with 51–2; World Intellectual Property
crisis in, exceptional nature of 92, Organization (WIPO) 167, 177, 178
96–7; democratic tradition in 98; World Trade Organization (WTO) 21,
European Union (EU), relationship 170, 181, 227, 228, 239, 255; China
with 31–2, 33, 41n2; India, petroleum membership of 49–50
imports from 111; Indonesian
investment in (2010–2019) 210; Iran, Xi Jinping 54, 198
relationship with 140, 141–2, 145–6; Xinhua News Agency 45
Israel, relationship with 162; South
Africa, relationship with 238, 241–2, Yang Shangkun
. 47
244, 245; ‘strategic partnership’ with Yılmaz, Ismet 131
India 113–14; support for Russian Yom Kippur War (1973), aftermath of
Federation 64–5; trade with Russian 154–5, 161
Federation 61; as trading partner for Yucatan Times 68
Canada 93; trading partnership with
Turkey 128. see also Canada, Zarif, Javad 141, 148
Venezuela crisis and Zuma, Jacob 245; legacy of 242–4