Essay based questions Answer both parts of the questions below. Page 171 of Textbook.

1. Why did Germany become involved in the Spanish Civil War? ‘By the end of 1938, Hitler
had completely destroyed the Treaty of Versailles.’ How far do you agree?

i. In first place, the Spanish Civil War provided an opportunity to test the efficiency and
capability of Germany’s rearmament programme. Moreover, the nationalists in Spain, led
by Franco, were fascist and nationalist forces. Germany, under Hitler's leadership, shared
similar ideological leanings. Supporting Franco's regime aligned with Hitler's goal of
spreading fascism and combating communism in Europe.

ii. Firstly, Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 directly contravened the
demilitarised status imposed by the Treaty. This move significantly weakened the military
restrictions placed on Germany after World War I.

Secondly, Hitler's annexation of Austria (Anschluss) in March 1938 violated the Treaty's
prohibition on the unification of Germany and Austria.

Thirdly, the Munich Agreement in September 1938, while avoiding immediate conflict,
effectively allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia,
demonstrating the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to prevent German expansionism.

Lastly, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, a non-aggression pact
between Germany and the Soviet Union, paved the way for the invasion and eventual
partition of Poland, further unravelling the post-World War I order established by the
Treaty of Versailles.

While these actions certainly undermined the Treaty of Versailles and its intended purpose
of maintaining peace and stability in Europe, it's debatable whether Hitler completely
destroyed it by the end of 1938. However, one could argue that while Hitler significantly
weakened and disregarded the Treaty of Versailles, its complete destruction occurred with
the onset of World War II rather than by the end of 1938.

2. Why was Stalin prepared to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact? ‘A foolish and pointless gesture.’
How far do you agree with this assessment of Britain’s guarantee to support Poland in
1939?

i. Firstly, Stalin sought to buy time to strengthen the Soviet Union's military capabilities. By
signing the pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939, Stalin aimed to delay a potential
German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the pact provided Stalin with territorial gains and strategic advantages. This
allowed Stalin to expand Soviet influence and gain control over territories that had
historically been part of the Russian Empire.
Thirdly, Stalin viewed the pact as a means to prevent the formation of a united front against
the Soviet Union. By entering into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, Stalin aimed
to disrupt the anti-German alliances that were forming in Europe, particularly between
Britain, France, and Poland.

In conclusion, from Stalin's perspective at the time, it served as a pragmatic move to protect
Soviet interests and buy time to prepare for the threat of war with Nazi Germany.
Therefore, Stalin's decision to sign the pact can be understood within the context of
realpolitik and the pursuit of strategic goals.

ii. Britain's decision to issue a guarantee to Poland was a calculated move based on various
factors:

Deterrence: The guarantee was intended to deter Nazi Germany from further aggression in
Eastern Europe. It was part of a broader strategy to contain Hitler's expansionist ambitions
and maintain a balance of power in Europe.

Moral obligation: Britain had moral and historical reasons to support Poland. The
guarantee reflected Britain's commitment to upholding international law and standing
against the violation of sovereign rights, especially in the face of Nazi aggression.

Strategic interests: Poland's geographical position was strategically significant for Britain.
By guaranteeing Polish independence, Britain aimed to prevent Germany from gaining
further control over Eastern Europe, which could threaten British security interests in the
long run.

In conclusion, while Britain's guarantee to support Poland in 1939 may not have achieved
its intended objectives and ultimately led to war without effective military support, it was
not a "foolish and pointless gesture." Instead, it reflected Britain's commitment to principles
of international law, strategic interests, and efforts to contain Nazi aggression in Europe.