The ATM
Policy
The case for liberalising
air traffic control
Purpose
Air traffic management (ATM) is a crucial component
of aviation, ensuring the safe separation of aircraft
as they move through the airspace. Under the
Chicago Convention, each State has an obligation
to secure the provision of ATM services in their
airspace, to the extent practicable. In most States,
the provision of these services has been delegated
to a national air navigation service provider (ANSP).
Despite continuing advances in the technology
available to ANSPs and high levels of ATM safety,
the current structure of the ATM industry leaves
much to be desired. There is a strong government
influence and, as a result of the monopoly status of
many ANSPs, a lack of competition in the industry.
This has resulted in an ATM service that can be
fragmented, opaque, charge prices that are often
considered high, is at times resistant to change and
where there are large variations in performance
between different ANSPs.
The purpose of this document is to outline how the
ATM industry could be transformed and improved
through liberalisation. This should bring a number
of benefits, as is demonstrated by the liberalisation
of other similar industries. These include creating
strong incentives for ANSPs to improve their
efficiency, lower their prices, and provide services
that better meet their customers’ needs, while
continuing to offer a high – or even improved – level
of safety.
Institute
The ATM industry is under-performing
Studies into the ATM industry have identified a
number of performance issues. A report by the
European Commission’s Performance Review
Body highlights the problems of excessive profits,
inefficient expenditure, slow adoption of new
systems and technology, and a lack of liquidity in
European ANSPs.1 Meanwhile, the Air Transport
Action Group (ATAG) has voiced concerns about
inefficiencies in airspace as a result of congested
skies worldwide, fragmented airspace and an ATM
institutional framework rooted in the 1940s rather
than the 21st century.2 Many ANSPs have also been
criticised by airlines for their high prices and for
being slow to adopt new technologies that could
reduce costs and improve safety.
The data available on ANSP performance supports
these complaints. A 2015 report by CANSO shows
that over half of the ANSPs surveyed increased
their real unit costs between 2011 and 2014.3 In
Europe, benchmarking data shows that many
performance targets for flight efficiency, capacity
and cost efficiency have not been met, while there
is significant (and often unexplained) divergence in
unit route charges between ANSPs. For example,
unit route charges in French airspace are just under
€68 but increase to almost €83 in neighbouring
German airspace, despite the two sharing many
common characteristics.4
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The lack of competition in the ATM industry

can explain much of the problem
Most ANSPs have some sort of statutory monopoly
on providing ATM services in their country’s
airspace. This is because, to a large extent, to date,
ATM is considered to be a natural monopoly. This
means that the high cost of building fully competing
ATM networks would outweigh the benefits from
any competition. However, even in cases where
competition for some ATM services is feasible,
government policy often limits the provision of the
different elements of ATM to a single provider.

Most ANSPs have As a result of their monopoly status across a

large proportion of their services, most ANSPs
relatively weak have relatively weak incentives to improve their
performance. This is because airlines have no
incentives to improve practical means to change supplier if they are not
satisfied with the service received. ANSPs are not
their performance therefore subject to the sort of pressures on prices
and quality observed in competitive industries, and
have little incentive to develop business models that
will drive customer benefits. If left unchecked, the
result can be high prices, inefficient costs, under-
investment, sub-optimal goods and services, and
excessive profits.

In many industries where a firm has a monopoly, it

is subject to economic regulation. This requires the
firm to follow certain rules, and places restrictions –
such as the maximum price the firm can charge for
its services – in an attempt to make it behave more
like a firm in a competitive market.

However, many ANSPs are currently exempt from

this type of regulation. Even where economic
regulation does exist, in many cases the ANSP is
not sufficiently independent and separated from
the economic regulator, which severely limits the
effectiveness of the regulations. Poor economic
regulation can also add considerable costs
and inefficiencies.

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The monopoly status of ANSPs has also, at times,
led to management complacency and created a
culture of resistance to change in the workforce.
This often manifests itself in entrenched resistance
and staff opposition to any significant changes,
frustrating efforts to introduce reforms. For example,
despite endeavours to consolidate the airspace,
it remains highly fragmented in many parts of the
world, thereby complicating the processes for
aircraft transitioning between ANSPs and, in some
cases, between sectors within the same ANSP.
The problems associated with the monopoly
status of ANSPs are reinforced by ownership
and governance structures. Many ANSPs are
government departments or are in some other
way publicly controlled. This can mean that they
often incentivised to meet political and State-
driven objectives, and are more answerable to the
demands of their government owners than to the
needs of the airline customers.

Explaining the performance issues of the ATM industry

Under-
Current performance
industry Creates of ATM
structure behaviours industry
Historic monopoly status Weak incentives to improve This includes:
performance
Weak economic regulation High prices
Resistance to change
Government control Inefficient expenditure
Management respond to
Fragmented airspace
demands of government
rather than airline Lack of transparency
customers Slow adoption of new
technologies

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Liberalisation of the ATM industry may drive

much of the necessary change
Greater liberalisation of the ATM industry would
help address many of the performance issues
facing ANSPs. Liberalisation would mean greater
competition and the relaxation of ownership and
control rules. Together, these would bring the
industry into the 21st century, and encourage a more
customer-focussed ATM service.

There is significant precedent for the liberalisation

of industries that were previously considered to be
monopolies. This includes the telecommunications,
energy and rail industries in many parts of the world, Liberalisation
as well as the airline industry (see the Appendix
for more information). The success of liberalisation of air traffic
in these industries, combined with technological
advances in ATM - such as the emergence of management
satellite-based systems - strongly suggests that
there is significant potential for the liberalisation of
the ATM industry.

Liberalisation has a high potential to disrupt the

ATM industry. Some ANSPs may consider this a
threat. For example, liberalisation and the resulting
competition may cause some concerns about the Competition Corporatised ANSPs,
risks to jobs, the viability of supply of ATM services for selected operating independent
(particularly in uneconomic airspace), and safety ATM services of government
standards. Similar concerns were voiced in the lead-
up to the liberalisation of the airline industry; the
vast majority of which later proved to be unfounded.

Liberalisation will provide opportunities for those

ANSPs who are willing to adapt and innovate. This
includes opportunities to expand into new markets,
to work collaboratively, and to secure rewards for
better serving airline customers. Learning from the
experience of liberalisation in other sectors, and
therefore ensuring the process of liberalisation is
undertaken in a controlled manner, will also help
ensure that many of the risks associated with
liberalisation can be addressed and mitigated.

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Greater competition in ATM could generate

significant benefits for customers
Standard economic theory notes that competition
between firms for the provision of goods or services
generally results in better outcomes than if those
goods or services were provided by a single supplier
(ie, a monopolist). This is because competition
requires firms (in this case, ANSPs) to distinguish
themselves from rivals in order to retain, or even
increase, their market share as well as the overall
size of the market.

Greater competition in ATM would generate

downward pressure on prices. ANSPs would be
Competition
incentivised to offer more attractive prices than their
rivals in order to gain market share. This would
between firms
have wider benefits for passengers and the aviation
industry as a whole. This is because lower ATM fees
generally results
paid by airlines should, in turn, lead to lower fares
for passengers and stimulate aviation activity that
in better outcomes
results in increased choice for travellers. than if those goods
ANSPs would also have a stronger incentive to
improve their cost efficiency so as to compete
or services were
on price without compromising safety. This may
include, for example, identifying opportunities to
provided by a
collaborate or consolidate with other ANSPs to
exploit economies of scale in areas such as training
single supplier
and development, back-office services, and the
specification, development and procurement of
equipment.

Competition would also drive ANSPs to differentiate

themselves by their service offering and quality,
adapting to the needs of their users and resulting
in a more customer-focussed ATM service. ANSPs
would have strong incentives to make the necessary
improvements in quality, adopt new technologies,
innovate, and undertake investments that enable
them to meet the demands of their customers in
order to retain or even increase their customer base.
This has the potential additional benefit of further
stimulating innovation in the wider aviation industry.
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What would competition in ATM look like?
We have identified a number of areas in the ATM
industry where we consider it would be feasible to
introduce greater competition in the short to medium
term. This includes areas where we consider
suppliers could compete for the right to be the sole
provider of a particular service (competition for the
market), and where suppliers could compete directly
with each other to provide specific services to
individual customers (competition in the market).
Unbundled data, training and
infrastructure services
Many of the supporting services that enable
an ANSP to perform its ATM role could be
unbundled and outsourced. This is already
occurring in some countries. It includes
the provision of aeronautical information
such as meteorological, environmental,
mapping and flight plan data. Competition
for the provision of training services should
also be encouraged as should, wherever
possible, competition for the provision and
maintenance of the infrastructure.
Outsourcing has been present in the US
since the 1980s, with flight service stations,
ADS-B, training and data communication
services now provided by private suppliers.
Many ANSPs in Europe that are seeking
to make cost savings have also started
to unbundle non-core services including
training, meteorology, aeronautical
information management, maintenance,
engineering and surveillance. However, there
is significant scope for further unbundling,
especially with advances in technology.
The ATM
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Terminal Air Navigation Services (TANS)
Competition for TANS would require ANSPs
to compete (for example, through a tender
process) for an exclusive contract to operate
tower services at a particular airport for a fixed
period of time. This can include aerodrome
services as well as potentially approach
services. It may also extend to data processing
and analysis services on behalf of the airport
and individual airlines, as well as operating
local flow control services that could streamline
airport operations.
Markets for TANS are already being developed
in a number of countries, including Germany,
Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. However,
there is still significant progress to be made to
fully open up tower services at all airports to
competition in these markets, and to include all
tower-related services in the TANS market.
Where competition for tower services does
exist, it is broadly considered to be a success.
In Spain, changes in the provider of TANS
are estimated to have resulted in cost savings
of around 50%, while in Sweden savings
of 30-40% have been reported.5 In the UK,
changes in the provider of TANS are also
considered to have reduced costs significantly
while maintaining highly efficient operations.
Furthermore, it has reported to have resulted
in the incumbent ANSP (NATS Services
Limited) becoming more customer-centric,
adopting cost-saving measures and accepting
performance-linked payments in a broad range
of markets.6
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Franchised en-route services
There is scope for competition between
ANSPs for the contract to provide ATM
services in a specific country or a sector
within a country. Similar to TANS, the
successful ANSP would then have the
exclusive right to provide en-route (and
potentially approach) services in the airspace
for a fixed period, subject to meeting specific
performance indicators.
This model has been adopted in upper
Kosovan airspace and in the Middle East,
where private contractors provide ATM
services using the government-owned
infrastructure. The model means that the
State maintains ultimate control of the
airspace, thereby avoiding any concerns
about the State’s ability to exercise
sovereignty over its own airspace.
This concept would be particularly attractive
in regions where skills and experience in ATM
are lacking, or where the scope to exploit
economies of scale is limited. However, the
benefits of this sort of competition for the
market would also be applicable in more
developed airspace. Recent developments
in ATM technology would also enable this
service to be provided remotely, using virtual
centres.
The ATM
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Oceanic services
There is significant potential for competition
between providers in oceanic airspace. The
increasing use of automation in this airspace,
including self-separation, enables aircraft
to take over much of the traditional role of
controllers. Instead, ANSPs could compete
with each other to provide individual airlines
with the necessary data to enable them
to self-separate and plan their routes over
oceanic airspace. This could be extended to
the provision of ADS-B data for free-routing,
where this exists. As with competition for
en-route services discussed above, it is
also possible for many sectors of oceanic
airspace to be competitively tendered.
Liberalisation
will provide
opportunities for
those ANSPs who
are willing to adapt
and innovate
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Flow management
Flow management relates to the optimisation
of the flows of traffic across the network,
or particular regional or airport-level parts
of the network, using the surveillance and
communications infrastructure.
Longer-term
In the longer-term, technological advances (such
as those emerging from the NextGen program in
the US and SESAR in Europe) and the successful
introduction of competition in ATM may enable
competition to be expanded into other areas of an
ANSP’s activities, including further competition
for the provision of en-route services. It is worth
noting that the delivery and design of ATM services
may also change as the aircraft avionics become
increasingly sophisticated. This would allow much
of the work that has historically been performed on
the ground to be more accurately performed in the
cockpit.

In Europe, this role has been centralised

to some extent. Eurocontrol, on behalf of
the European Commission, is responsible
for optimising traffic flows according to
airspace capacity across Europe’s 41 Flight
Information Regions (FIRs). Elsewhere, this
type of network management remains far
more distributed. There are however some
initial discussions on the potential to create a
centralised role in the Middle East.

There is significant scope to open up the

flow management role to competition. This
includes the allocation of departure or arrival
times and the coordination of local airspace
networks into a regional continuum. The role
could be tendered on a cross-border, regional
or cross-regional basis. Major airports can
also have a flow management process that
ties in with regional network management.

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For competition to be effective, ANSPs ANSPs worldwide found that the change in
should operate as corporatised entities structure resulted in, amongst other benefits,
a greater focus on the needs of the ANSPs’
In order for competition in ATM to be successful,
customers, improvements in service quality and a
ANSPs need to act like commercial entities.
reduction in costs.8
Currently, many ANSPs remain closely controlled by
their governments, meaning they do not have the
autonomy or flexibility to respond to competition.

This issue can be best achieved through the

corporatisation (also known as commercialisation) Examples of current ANSP
of the ANSP, whereby the ANSP is given greater
managerial and financial authority. This encourages
ownership modelss

Degree of government control

the ANSP to behave more like a private-sector
1.Government
firm, ensuring a focus on customer service and
department Algeria, Brazil, China,
performance alongside good governance. It also
France, Greece, Israel, Japan,
helps ensure the separation of service provision Luxembourg, Kenya, Mexico
from regulation, thereby avoiding obvious conflicts
of interest. 2.Government
There are several alternative options for the agency
structure, ownership and management of
Nigeria, USA
corporatised air navigation services. This includes
fully publicly owned entities, co-operatives, and
public-private partnerships as well as functionally 3.State
separate ANSPs. It may also involve privatisation, enterprise Australia, Belgium, Egypt,
although corporatisation does not require that the Netherlands, Portugual, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand
ANSP is transferred to private ownership.

The considerable diversity among ANSPs means 4.Corporatised

that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. Different entity Austria, Croatia,
national and regional cultures, levels of maturity Estonia, Germany, Ireland,
in the organisation and business models, levels of New Zealand, Norway
traffic density and complexity, and ATM technology
and infrastructure may lead to different optimal 5.Partly
structures and governance models. privatised
entity Canada, Italy,
A number of ANSPs have been successful Switzerland, UK
corporatised already, and the concept of
corporatisation is widely supported by ICAO,
airlines and by CANSO.7 Where it has occurred, the
corporatisation of ANSPs is generally considered to
have been a success. One study of ten corporatised

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Alongside greater competition and Regulation will also continue to be necessary

corporatisation, there is a need for more in the areas of safety and standards to
effective performance-based regulation provide reassurance and ensure these are not
compromised. Like other safety crucial industries,
In areas where competition is not currently feasible,
whether privately or publically owned, the State has
desirable or politically acceptable and an ANSP
a duty to its citizens to ensure that such services are
therefore retains its monopoly status, these activities
provided as safely as reasonably possible and to at
should be subject to effective performance-based
least a set of minimum standards. ICAO therefore
regulation. This type of regulation creates incentives
currently requires States to provide safety oversight
for an ANSP to improve its performance and
of ANSPs.
produce appropriate outcomes. Rewards (typically
financial) are offered for good performance, with An additional consideration in the case of ATM is
penalties imposed if performance falls below a that the airspace is used by both civil and military
defined standard. users and that – at times of domestic unrest or even
international conflict – it is important that the needs
The use of performance-based regulation to
of the State and its armed forces can retain primacy.
encourage monopolists to behave like a firm in
This should also be provided for in legislation and
a competitive market is becoming increasingly
governance structures for the operation of airspace.
standard in industries where firms have a monopoly.
However, as discussed, many ANSPs are not
currently subject to effective economic regulation.

Some sort of performance-based regulation may Many ANSPs are not

also be necessary in areas where competition
is introduced but where an ANSP still retains
currently subject to
significant market power. This may include cases
where the ANSP has been awarded the exclusive
effective economic
right to operate a service as a result of competitive
tender, or where alternative providers of ATM
regulation
services require access to a national monopoly ATM
infrastructure.

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Where do we go from here?

The liberalisation of the ATM industry will not be an
easy task. The innate conservatism of an industry
built around safety, a natural desire to preserve the
status quo, and other institutional, regulatory and
legal barriers currently limit the ability of ANSPs to
compete with each other. Political will to implement
change is weak, particularly as the use of airspace
is often wrapped up with considerations of state We intend to lead
sovereignty. There are also a number of technical
and practical issues that must be addressed before the debate on
how to improve
competition can be introduced in some areas. But
this does not mean the goal of liberalisation is not
worth pursuing.
the efficiency and
There is clearly a need throughout the aviation
industry for greater understanding of the potential efficacy of ATM
through market
for, and value of, liberalising ATM. For example,
the key decision makers - governments and civil
aviation regulators - need to be persuaded of the
benefits to the economy and to passengers of liberalisation, and
enabling greater competition in ATM activities, and
that these benefits should prevail over political and to communicate the
institutional barriers. At the same time, regulators –
and the travelling public - will need to be convinced benefits of enabling
that safety will not be compromised.
ANSPs to compete
The ATM Policy Institute has been created to
fulfil this role by providing research on ATM policy with each other
issues. In particular, we intend to lead the debate on
how to improve the efficiency and efficacy of ATM
through market liberalisation, and to communicate
the benefits of enabling ANSPs to compete with
each other. The ATM Policy Institute will also
act as a means for like-minded members of the
aviation community to collectively pursue this goal
and, through our workshops, to share ideas and
research.

More information on the ATM Policy Institute can be

found at www.atmpolicy.aero.

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Appendix: Precedent for liberalisation
A number of industries that were previously
considered to be monopolies have been
successfully liberalised. These industries share
many characteristics with ATM. For example,
they are often considered to provide an essential
service, and as a result many were government-
owned and had a statutory monopoly. In other
cases, competition was not thought to be feasible or
desirable due to the high fixed costs of establishing
rival businesses (ie, they were considered to be
natural monopolies).
This appendix outlines how some of these industries
were liberalised, and the resulting impacts on prices,
quality and other aspects of the service.
Airline liberalisation
Prior to liberalisation, most airlines were state-
owned carriers. There were strict rules about where
and when carriers could operate, as well as how
much they could charge. However, concerns about
high fares, difficulties in establishing new routes,
and industry inefficiency led to the deregulation of
the domestic airline industry in the US in the late
1970s. Following this example, a series of reforms
led to the creation of a Single European Aviation
Market in the 1990s, and the opening up of a
number of international routes to competition. Now,
large parts of the airline industry are liberalised.
Overall, the liberalisation of the airline industry is
considered to have been a success. Liberalisation
has led to the emergence of new business models,
including low-fare airlines. Numerous studies have
identified the positive impacts that the increased
competition has had. This includes significantly
lower fares, increased traffic, an increase in
jobs in aviation and related industries, increased
foreign investment and growth in economic output.
Meanwhile, many of the concerns voiced in the lead-
up to airline liberalisation – including the potential
negative impact on safety, jobs, connectivity and
security - have proved to be unfounded.
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Telecommunications
In many countries, the telecommunications market
has been liberalised despite previously being
considered to be a natural monopoly.
In some cases, the development of new
technologies in the telecoms industry, such as cable
or satellite, has enabled firms to establish separate
rival networks to the monopoly incumbent.
Meanwhile, local loop unbundling (LLU) has
enabled competition without the need for new
entrants to build their own networks. LLU requires
the incumbent monopoly provider to make its
infrastructure available to other telecoms firms to
use, for a fee that is generally determined by the
economic regulator. Firms then compete on quality
and price by combining their own equipment,
software and retail services with access to the
existing monopoly infrastructure, usually through the
local telephone exchange.
The liberalisation of the telecommunications industry
is estimated to have reduced prices, increased the
uptake of broadband and resulted in higher average
broadband speed.9 However, the large fixed costs
of establishing rival networks and the value of
network effects - whereby the more subscribers to
a particular network, the greater the incentives for
other subscribers to join - means that competition
between rival networks is often limited to a few
suppliers and to particular regions. While LLU
largely avoids this issue, it has been slow to take off
in many countries amid accusations of excessive
pricing for access to the monopoly infrastructure and
of delay tactics by the incumbent telecoms provider.
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Appendix: Precedent for liberalisation
European passenger rail services
A number of European countries have liberalised
their passenger rail services (many countries have
also liberalised their rail freight services to some
extent). The degree of liberalisation varies across
countries, with some allowing competitors open
access to the rail network (on-rail competition), and
others using franchising to select a single provider
for specific passenger services and routes. In both
cases, competitors pay an access fee for using
the rail network, which is usually operated and
maintained by a government-owned monopoly.
Countries with on-rail competition for passenger
rail services include Austria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. However,
competition is generally limited to a few specific
routes that are considered commercially viable
(and therefore not subject to any public service
obligations or subsidies).
Competitive tenders for passenger rail services
have been introduced on various routes in Denmark,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
UK. Individual routes and services are offered for
public tender. Bidders are then assessed based on
the amount offered (or subsidy required) for the right
to operate the service, and on initiatives to improve
the quality of service for passengers. The successful
bidder then acquires the right to operate the service
for a fixed period, with some contracts extending up
to 15 years.
Where liberalisation has occurred, it is generally
considered to have been successful. For example,
on-rail competition has been found to lower fares,
improve service quality (including, for example, the
introduction of wi-fi and more frequent services),
and result in efficiency improvements and increased
demand for rail services.10 Meanwhile, competitions
for rail franchises in Germany, Sweden and the
Netherlands are estimated to have led to saving in
public funds of as much as 20-30%.11
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Energy sector
Many countries have liberalised their energy
sectors with the aim of introducing competition
wherever possible. This includes competition for the
generation of energy and for the provision of retail
services to end-consumers.
In those countries with liberalised energy sectors
a wholesale market is typically created to enable
competition for energy generation. This market
allows individual generation companies to sell
the energy they produce and for energy retailers
and consumers to buy the energy they require
at the lowest price offered. The energy is then
transported through the national transmission and
local distribution infrastructure (which are typically
regulated monopolies).
Competition in the retail market for energy is created
by allowing customers to choose between energy
retailers, who attempt to differentiate themselves
through price plans and products. These retailers
then purchase energy from the wholesale market to
fulfil the demands of their customers.
While the impact of liberalisation on energy prices is
difficult to identify, various studies have found that it
has led to the more efficient use of generation plants
and the associated energy transmission assets.
Labour productivity has also improved, although this
has also resulted in job losses. Liberalisation is also
found to have increased transparency, for example
highlighting where cross-subsidies were occurring
previously. In many cases, this has led to effective
adjustments to countries’ energy policies.12
However, the sector still has significant potential
to improve the level of competitiveness. Some
markets are dominated by just a few generators,
while government policies and restrictions can often
distort the market, particularly for retail competition.
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List of footnotes

1
Performance Review Body ‘PRB White Paper:
RP3 Performance Objectives’ June 2016
2
ATAG ‘Revolutionising Air Traffic Management:
Practical Steps to Accelerating Airspace Efficiency
in Your Region’ November 2012
3
CANSO ‘Global Air Navigation Service Performance
Report 2015 – The Industry View’ 2015
4
Performance Review Body ‘PRB Annual Monitoring
Report 2014’ 2015; Eurocontrol Central Route
Charging Office, adjusted unit rates applicable to
August 2016 flights
5
Helios ‘Study into Air Navigation Service to be
Opened to Competition in Norway: Part 1’ 2015
6
Thompson, I, Pech, R et al ‘An Assessment of
Delivery Changes for UK Terminal Air Navigation
Services’ in Journal of Air Transport Management 57
(2016)
7
ICAO ‘Manual on Air Navigation Service Economics’
2013; IATA ‘Commercialisation of Air Navigation
Service Providers’ 2007; CANSO ‘Guide to Separation
of Service Provision and Regulation’ 2013
8
McDougall, Glen and Roberts, Alasdai ‘Commercializing
Air Traffic Control: Have the Reforms Worked?’ 2007
9
See, for example, Nardotto, M, Verboven, F and Velletti, T
‘Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence from UK Broadband’
in Journal of the European Economic Association April
2015; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
‘Changes in the Prices Paid for Telecommunications
Services In Australia 2012-13’ 2014
10
Competition and Markets Authority ‘Competition in
Passenger Rail Services in Great Britain: Discussion
Document’ 2015
11
Communication from the European Commission ‘ The
Fourth Railway Package – Completing the Single European
Railway Area to Foster European Competitiveness and
Growth’ 2013
12
International Energy Agency ‘Lessons from Liberalised
Electricity Markets’ 2005

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