Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199

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Economics and Human Biology

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ehb

The nonlinear link between height and wages in Germany, 1985–2004

Olaf Hübler
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, Königsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: Based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel, this article investigates the
Received 18 June 2009 relationship between height and wages by gender. Unlike previous investigations, which
Accepted 18 June 2009 have been limited to an examination of linear effects, this one finds that height influences
on wages are curvilinear, and more so for men than for women. More specifically, it finds
JEL classification: that women who are shorter than average and men who are somewhat taller than average,
J31 but not among the tallest, enjoy significant wage advantages. Furthermore, using Blinder’s
J71
decomposition to determine two components of wage differences, we find that these
Keywords: differences can be partitioned into an endowment component and unexplained influences
Height (discrimination). There is a difference between the public and private sectors and between
Wages men and women as to the degree of the latter effect. This investigation supports the
Men hypothesis that short and very tall men employed in the private sector are disadvantaged
Women the most. The outcome for women is less robust than for men.
Nonlinearity ß 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Discrimination
Private and public sector
Germany

1. Introduction Two contrasting explanations have been offered for the

In recent empirical investigations, aspects of appear-
ance have extended the traditional Mincer earnings
equation. In particular, friendship relations in school,1
beauty,2 weight,3 height,4 and body mass index5 have been
advanced as potential wage determinants. All analyses that
incorporate height confirm that this is a statistically
significant determinant.
E-mail address: huebler@ewifo.uni-hannover.de.
1
Galeotti and Mueller (2005).
2
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) and
Mobius and Rosenblat (2006).
3
Averett and Korenman (1996), Cawley (2004), Cawley and Danziger
(2005), Cawley et al. (2005), Heineck (2006) and Cawley et al. (in press).
4
Persico et al. (2004), Heineck (2005), Case and Paxson (2008) and
Komlos (2009).
5
Kennedy and Garcia (1994), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Conley
and Glauber (2005), Brunello and D’Hombres (2007), Heineck (2006),
Grewe (2008), Johansson et al. (2009) and Villar and Quintana-Domeque
(2009).
fact that shorter employees are paid less than taller ones:
that taller individuals are more productive and that shorter
workers are subject to discrimination. The former expla-
nation is based on hypotheses (Persico et al., 2004; Case
and Paxson, 2008), on one of the following effects: taller
people have a physical advantage, are healthier, better
educated, have greater cognitive abilities or self-select into
high-paying occupations.
First, tall people have physical advantages in the
competition for resources. This used to be more relevant
than it is today, because physical labour no longer
correlates with high earnings. In any case, taller people
are more disease-resistant and therefore more productive
than shorter people (Waaler, 1984; Riley, 1994).6 In
6
However, the height–health association is a controversial issue in the
literature. Samaras and Elrick (2002) and Samaras et al. (2003, 2004)
claim that it is shortness that offers physical advantages. In contrast to
Waaler’s (1984) results theirs show that shorter people live longer than
taller people.

1570-677X/$ – see front matter ß 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ehb.2009.06.003
192 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199
general tall people also possess more authority than
shorter ones and are more willing to take risks (Dohmen
et al., 2005). This could provide further advantages for
them and may be reflected in higher wages.
Second, one can argue that the correlation between
height and wages is spurious but height is not the cause of
economic success. For example, good nutrition in the early
stages of development of children promotes growth and
fitness. Well-educated and wealthy parents are more likely
to be well informed about good nutrition than less
privileged adults, and they are also more able to afford
goods and services, such as extra tuition, that may help
their children succeed later in life. Moreover, if a tall
generation is successful thanks to specific abilities and if
the next generation inherits both the above-average height
and the above-average abilities, this would induce a
statistical correlation between height and wages.7
Third, height during adolescence influences one’s
chances of accumulating skills at this early stage of
development. Teenagers who are stigmatised because they
are short may have problems developing interpersonal
skills and a positive self-image, and they may even find
themselves excluded from group activities. They tend to be
less easygoing and more risk-averse than their taller
counterparts. Moreover, the phenomenon of the self-
fulfilling prophecy may take effect. Children who stigma-
tized because they are short tend in one of two opposing
directions; either they choose not to invest in long-term
efforts, because it seems futile to try, or they work all the
harder, in order to achieve parity with taller children. In
contrast, tall high-school teenagers are associated with
fewer symptoms of depression (Rees et al., in press) and
tend to think of themselves as leaders, a tendency that
persists after they enter the labour force. They also develop
better interpersonal skills, which will be important for
success in their working lives. Kuhn and Weinberger
(2005) emphasize that high-school leadership is connected
with stamina, energy, the work ethic, persistence and
motivation – all character traits that are highly valued in
the labour market making it easier for taller individuals to
reach positions in the upper echelons of corporate
hierarchy.
Fourth, Case and Paxson (2006, 2008) argue that height
is positively associated with cognitive ability, which is
rewarded in the labour market, and that taller individuals
are more likely than shorter ones to select higher paying
occupations, that require more advanced verbal and
numerical skills and greater intelligence than do lower
paying occupations.
Other researchers argue that height can also be
interpreted as a distinct element of a person’s appearance,
and therefore that height is directly correlated with
earnings. One’s general appearance, of which one’s height
is an element, can affect confidence and communication,
thereby influencing productivity. For example, taller
7
Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006) argue in a similar way when
they discuss the associations between body mass index and labour
market outcomes. A third factor may be the reason that BMI and wages
correlate.
private attorneys are better able to attract and retain
clients than are their shorter colleagues (Biddle and
Hamermesh, 1998). Tall men – Sunder (2006) – have an
advantage when it comes to attracting mates. Further-
more, in today’s society tall persons are presumed to be the
dominant ones; and when it comes to colleagues, tall is
preferred to short (Rubenstein et al., 1998). This argument
leads to the hypothesis: that to favour tall persons over
short persons constitutes discrimination, i.e., that society
retains an established height prejudice long after the
physical advantages of tallness have lost their relevance in
the marketplace.
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the relation-
ship between height and wages for men and for women
using German data. The analysis is focussed on nonlinear
links.
2. Data and descriptive results
The empirical analysis is based on representative
micro-data collected from 1985 to 2004 by the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).8 This investigation is
modelled on that of Schultz (2002) who considers only
full-time and part-time employees aged 25–55. For
technical details on the GSOEP see Haisken-DeNew and
Frick (2003). The panel, formulated in 1984, had a sample
size of 5921 households and 12,290 individuals. In 1991
the sample was supplemented by data from the former
East Germany. In 2004 the sample contained 11,796
households and 22,019 individuals. Height was among the
data collected in the 2002 and 2004 surveys. As height is
time-invariant for people between the ages of 25 and 55, it
is possible to link this information to the preceding and
subsequent waves. However, many of the 2002 and 2004
height data are slightly different from each other, and so
the 2 years’ average is used. The mean difference of height
(x) between 2002 and 2004 is Dx̄ ¼ 0:0146 cm
(sx = 2.2214 cm) for men and women together. Those
people who were not in the age group of 25–55 in one or
both of these 2 years are excluded from the following
analysis (sample 1). Because the height differences may be
due to misreporting, a sensitivity test is used, restricting
the sample to subjects whose height reports of 2002 and
2004 are within 2 cm of each other (sample 2). In this case
the number of observations decreases (less so for men than
for women) but the results are hardly affected. For men,
the hypothesis of the same average height in the two
samples cannot be rejected. Also for women we find nearly
the same average height in the two samples. The difference
is less than 1 mm.
The simple correlation coefficient between height and
wages per month based on a linear relationship is only
rw = +0.070 for women and rm = +0.132 for men. This weak
correlation may be due to a nonlinear relationship.
Preliminary analysis supporting this hypothesis appears
in Fig. 1(a) and (b).
The graphs depict the expected logarithms of real
gross monthly earnings if only a height variable is used
8
http://www.diw.de/english/soep/26636.html.
 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199
Fig. 1. Height effects on (log)wages per month estimated with a fractional polynomial height function. (a) Men. (b) Women.
as the determinant of wages. Height is grouped into nine
5-cm intervals. For each of these intervals the means
of height and wages per month are calculated based
on all individuals in GSOEP aged 25–55 in the period 1985–
2004. In other words, the average height (in 2002 and
2004) is compared to all the wages recorded for the
individual in the survey. The methodological starting point
is a general fractional polynomial (Royston and Altman,
1994). The order of the polynomial is then determined
with the aim of an optimal nonlinear fit between
the polynomial and the data. Fig. 1(a) demonstrates
an obvious nonlinear second-order relationship (confi-
dence interval). Men reach the maximum height–wage
effect roughly 10 cm above the average height, 178 cm.
However, for women (Fig. 1(b)) a weaker curvilinear
relationship is found with maximum at 3 cm above the
193
mean height of 166 cm.9 Part-time work might be
responsible. Therefore, we split the sample into full- and
part-time workers. The wage effects of the former (dashed
line) have nearly the same course as those for the
entire sample (thick solid lines). For female part-
time workers the nonlinear relationship is somewhat
stronger (thin solid line). Part-time work for men can be
neglected because only 3% of male employees do not work
full-time.
9
The average real gross wage per month within the optimal height
interval for males (185–190 cm) is 2072 euro. 1861 and 1734 euros are
the analogous figures for the interval 175–180 and 200–205 cm,
respectively. For women we have determined 1177 euro for the height
interval 165–170 cm, 1016 euro for 150–155 cm and 1085 euro for 180–
185 cm.
194 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199

Table 1
Estimates of height coefficients – dependent variable: log wages per hour.

(1) Men (2) Women (3) Men (4) Women (5) Women
*** *** **
HEIGHT 0.0025 0.0010 0.7718 1.0505 0.0709**
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.2620) (0.4189) (0.0309)
HEIGHT2 0.0043*** 0.0061** 0.0002**
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0001)
HEIGHT3/103 0.0081*** 0.0118
(0.0028) (0.0092)

N 22,836 13,918 22,836 13,918 13,918

R2 0.436 0.365 0.436 0.366 0.366
F_1 66.69*** 4.79** 32.33*** 9.03*** 10.81***
F_2 15.12*** 11.15*** 16.85***
F_3 5.53**

Note: The standard errors in parentheses are estimated by the cluster approach, which takes into account intragroup correlation, but the observations are
independent across groups (individuals). Wages per hour are measured in real terms and euros. Control variables in specifications (1)–(5): SCHOOLING,
TENURE, TENURE2, EXPERIENCE (actual experience), EXPERIENCE2, NBULA (dummy; =1, if new German federal state (Bundesland)), 20 TIME DUMMIES (for
1985–2004). F tests of joint significance of the height variables (H0: height effects on wages are zero; H1: height effects are linear (columns (1) and (2)), of third-
order (columns (3) and (4)) or of second-order (column (5)) are presented in the last but two line (F_1), and the F tests of nonlinear height effects (H0: height
effects on wages are linear; H1: height effects are of third-order (columns (3) and (4)) or of second-order (column (5)) are presented in the penultimate line (F_2).
F_3 presents the F test statistic where the second-order approach (H0) is tested against the third-order approach (H1). Source: GSOEP 1985–2004.
*
Significance at the 0.10 level.
**
Significance at the 0.05 level.
***
Significance at the 0.01 level.

Next, we investigate the height effects on (log) wages
per hour and other wage determinants are incorporated.
Nonlinear relations are analysed in greater detail using an
extended Mincerian earnings function.
3. Econometric results
3.1. Linear or nonlinear height wage premium?
We first estimate wage functions, using pooled data
from 1985 to 2004 stratified by gender, and height as an
explanatory variable. The individual height is time-
invariant, but wages vary between 1985 and 2004. In all
tables, the dependent variable is the log of real gross wages
per hour. Control variables comprise not only schooling,
tenure and experience but also time dummies and a
regional dummy. Time dummies are incorporated because
individual invariant time effects of height on wages are
likely. The regional dummy is necessary because without
any causality both wages and heights are greater in
Western Germany than in Eastern Germany.10
Among men, a 10-cm height increase is associated with a
2.5% wage increase (Table 1, column (1)). Among women,
the estimated height coefficient is smaller (Table 1, column
(2)). All of the control variables have the expected effect on
wages, and the coefficients are significantly different from
zero. These results conform with those of other empirical
investigations.
If a third-order polynomial of height is used as the
independent variable, the results confirm the nonlinear
10
Komlos and Kriwy (2003) find that West Germans are taller than East
Germans and that there is a tendency for East German males, but not of
females, to catch up with their West German counterparts. Hence, we
analyse the differences between the two German regions in more detail.
The appendix, Table A.1, Fig. A.1, presents the nonlinear height–wage
relationship separated for gender and the two regions analogously to
column (3) and (5) in Table 1.
hypothesis. For men, all height effects are significant
(Table 1, column (3)), while for women, two of the three
coefficients are (Table 1, column (4)). Second- and fourth-
order height functions were also determined. (With one
exception these are not presented in the tables.) F tests at
the bottom of Table 1, column (3) show that the height
effects are jointly significant (F_1 = 32.33) and that the
third-order height approach is preferred to the linear one
for men (F_2 = 15.12). For women the results are less
obvious. The third- and the second-order approach
(Table 1, columns (4) and (5)) are superior to the linear
model (F_2 = 11.15 and 16.85). However, the decision
between the second- and the third-order model is
ambiguous. At a = 0.01 the F test (F_3 = 5.53) cannot reject
the null hypothesis (H0: second-order height function; H1:
third-order height function) while at a = 0.05 we should
prefer the third-order height function. The maximal height
effect on wages for men is at 191.5 cm (based on Table 1,
column (3)) and for women at 159.9 (based on Table 1,
column (4)).11
As a first robustness check we run additional regres-
sions with a part-time dummy variable as regressor and
separate estimates for full-time and part-time workers are
11
If H0 is preferred at test F_3 in Table 1, i.e. if we decide for the second-
order height function for women, the maximal height effect on wages for
women is at 168.2 cm (based on Table 1, column (5)). A comparison of
these results with those in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) demonstrates that the height
with maximal wage effects increases for men and decreases for women if
log wages per month are replaced by log wages per hour and control
variables are incorporated. In Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) the maximum is roughly
reached at 188 cm for men and at 169 cm for women. Indirect gender-
specific wage effects are a possible explanation of these differences. If
these influences are suppressed as in Fig. 1 the wage–height function is
shifted. For example, a linear schooling (S)  gender (SEX = 1, if man;
SEX = 0 otherwise) relationship (S = c0 + c1SEX + u) could induce this
result. We observe for men a shift to the left (from Table 1, column (3) to
Fig. 1(a)) and for women to the right. Therefore we conclude that c0 > 0
and c1 < 0.
 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199 195

Table 2
Estimates of log wages per hour (in EUR) with height-interval dummies as determinants.

ln w (1) Men (2) Women

Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.

HEIGHT  150 0.1297*** 0.0304

150 < HEIGHT  155 0.0488*** 0.0156
155 < HEIGHT  160 0.0056 0.0082
160 < HEIGHT  165 0.0017 0.0073
Height  165 0.0099 0.0125
165 < HEIGHT  170 0.0352*** 0.0073
170 < HEIGHT  175 0.0054*** 0.0059 0.0082 0.0088
175 < HEIGHT  180 0.0056 0.0127
***
180 < HEIGHT  185 0.0261 0.0061 0.0377 0.0412
185 < HEIGHT  190 0.0383*** 0.0068 0.0918 0.0727
190 < HEIGHT  195 0.0559*** 0.0124
195 < HEIGHT  200 0.0095 0.0210
HEIGHT > 200 0.0843 0.0663

N 22,836 13,918
R2 0.436 0.364

Note: The standard errors are estimated by the cluster approach. The same specification as in Table 1, columns (1) and (2) is used, where height is
substituted by height-interval dummies. The reference group is always the height interval with the average height of the sample under consideration.
Source: GSOEP 1985–2004.
*
Significance at the 0.10 level.
**
Significance at the 0.05 level.
***
Significance at the 0.01 level.

Fig. 2. Adjusted height effects on (log)wages per hour estimated by LOWESS and based on estimates of Table 2.

executed. (The results are not presented in the tables.) The
former check demonstrates that the height coefficients do
not change compared with those in Table 1. Separate
estimates for full-time and part-time workers show that
the full-time worker estimates are nearly the same as those
for the entire sample (full-time and part-time workers).
The estimates for part-time workers differ. However, in
this case all height effects are insignificant due to the small
sample.
As a second robustness check, height is modelled as a
spline function; i.e., height is divided into 5-cm intervals,
and dummy variables for these intervals are incorporated
into the wage function; the estimates are stratified by
gender. The results in Table 2 are similar to the ones with
the estimates in which height is modelled as a third-order
polynomial. Based on these estimates Fig. 2 demonstrates
the nonlinear course of height effects on log wages per
hour.12 Table 2 supports the hypothesis that those men
earn most whose height is well above the mean, whereas
12
We smooth the estimated height effects on wages per hour in Table 2
by means of the lowess procedure, an outlier robust technique (Cleveland,
1979).
196 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199
among women the maximum is reached just below the
mean.
3.2. Endowment and discrimination effects
We next decompose the effect into an endowment and
a discrimination effect. For decomposition A the sample is
divided into two groups (A1 and A2) by height. The first
group (A1) comprises those whose height is within 10 cm
of the ideal (from an economic standpoint) height: of
191.5 cm for men and 159.9 for women (Table 1, columns
(3) and (4)). The second group (A2) comprises those
employees whose heights are outside the interval of the
first group (i.e., who display the low-wage effects
experienced by those who are much shorter or much
taller than those who display the largest wage effects).
Blinder’s (1973) decomposition procedure is as follows:
  
ln w̄1  ln w̄2 ¼ ðx̄1  x̄2 Þ0 b1 þ ðb1  b2 Þ0 x̄2 þ ðb0;1  b0;2 Þ
¼: E þ D ¼: E þ C þ U ¼: R (1)
where the index 1 denotes group A1 and 2 is group A2.
ln w̄k is the average of estimated (log)wages per hour in
group k = 1; 2, b0 is the estimated constant term, b* is the
vector of estimated coefficients of regressors and x̄ is the
vector of average regressors. These are the control
variables in columns (1) and (2), Table 1. E, the endowment
component, is based on differences in the averages of the
two groups’ wage determinants. D is split into the effect C,
induced by the differences in the coefficients of wage
determinants, and the unexplained effect U, which is
measured by the difference between the intercept of group
1 and the intercept of group 2. Although Blinder denotes D
as discrimination effect we should emphasise that this
term may also be due to omitted variables, especially to
unobserved productivity differences.
The results in Table 3 indicate that the wage differences
can be largely explained by differences in the endowment
(E). More precisely, men who benefit from a positive height
effect on their wages are better educated, but have less job
experience and less tenure than other men. Among
Table 3
Blinder decomposition (as %) of log wage differences between height
groups.
Men Women
Explained variation
100  (E/R) 83.5 90.6
Unexplained variation
100  (D/R) 16.5 9.4
Note: The decomposition is based on the first specification in Table 1,
columns (1) and (2) without height; R = E + D; E = endowment component
of log wage differences between group 1 and 2 (see Eq. (1));
D = unexplained component due to unobserved productivity differences
or discrimination (see Eq. (1)). A positive sign of E/R indicates advantages
in the endowment component to employees within group 1 (A1: height
with high-wage effects) compared with those in group 2 (A2: height with
low-wage effects). A positive sign of D/R indicates that the employees in
group 2 suffer discrimination relative to those in group 1. Source: GSOEP
1985–2004.
women, the opposite is the case for tenure and experience
– see Appendix, Table A.2.
Unobserved productivity differences or discrimination
are not negligible, especially for men. Differences amount-
ing to 16.5% in the log wage per hour of the men in groups
A1 and A2 are explained by the weighted differences in
coefficients (D). This figure for women is smaller, 9.4%, but
not negligible.
3.3. Differences between the private and public sectors
If height discrimination in the workplace,13 affecting
wages, exists (Table 3 lends support to this hypothesis),
employers and customers may be responsible. This
hypothesis is tested via a procedure, suggested in
another context by Biddle and Hamermesh (1998)
who distinguish between employees and the self-
employed and between the public and private sectors.
This study leaves the self-employed out of consideration
because of the small number of observations available in
our sample. From an economic viewpoint wage differ-
ences between employees of group A1 and A2 (see
Table 3) can be expected in the private sector if members
of one group have more authority, are less risk-averse or
if employers see that (other things being equal)
customers prefer to interact with moderately tall sales-
men and with moderately short saleswomen. Then these
favoured employees will generate higher earnings not
only for themselves but also for their employers. In the
public sector this reasoning is largely irrelevant, because
the profit motive is absent.
If the height effect on wages is more important in the
private sector than in the public sector, this can be
interpreted as evidence of discrimination on the part of
customers or of unobserved productivity. To test this,
separate regressions are run for the private and public
sector. Again, the specification from Table 1, columns (1)
and (2) is used. Table 4 presents the estimates, where
height is measured by a dummy variable HEIGHT_A14
using decomposition A in Table 3. Tests about the
difference in the coefficients on HEIGHT_A between the
private and the public sector reject evidently the null
hypothesis for men as well as for women. Additionally,
the Biddle–Hamermesh test finds significant height
effects for men in the private sector whereas the height
coefficient observed in the public sector is very small
and insignificant. This finding is compatible with the
hypothesis that discrimination takes place in the private
sector.
The sign for the height coefficient of men in the public
sector is negative but insignificant. Perhaps such an effect
exists because this group includes men in the low-effect
13
Rosenberg (in press) finds that there exists discrimination against
short men and tall women in employment in the United States though
existing federal law already prohibits against height discrimination.
14
The modelling of height by the dummy HEIGHT_A (=1, if member of
group A1; =0, if member of group A2) means a nonlinear specification. The
choice of HEIGHT_A assumes implicitly – as consequence of the results in
Table 1 – that short and very tall male employees (A2) have smaller height
effects on wages than those from A1 members.
 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199
Table 4
Estimates of log wages per hour in EUR with height effect in the private
and public sectors.
Private sector Public sector
Men Women Men
HEIGHT_A 0.0563*** 0.0054 0.0053
(0.0106) (0.0169) (0.0067)
N 17,208 8445 5394
R2 0.461 0.325 0.424
Note: Standard errors estimated by the cluster approach are in
parentheses. Control variables are the same as in Table 1, columns (1)
and (2). HEIGHT_A is a dummy (=1, if height is within 10 cm of the height
with the strongest wage effects (191.5 cm for men and 159.9 cm for
women) – see decomposition A in Table 3). Source: GSOEP 1985–2004.
*
Significance at the 0.10 level.
**
Significance at the 0.05 level.
***
Significance at the 0.01 level.
height range who have moved here from the private sector,
calculating that they will suffer less discrimination in the
public sector. This self-selection process would make for
more type-A2 managers and workers in the public sector
than in the private sector. Type-A2 managers favour type-
A2 subordinates. Indeed, in the sample the average height
in the private sector (mean(HEIGHT)_private = 174.39)
exceeds that in the public sector (mean(HEIGHT)_pub-
lic = 172.34). The same phenomenon is observed among
employees in managerial positions – MPOS (mean
(HEIGHT)_private_MPOS = 178.36; mean(HEIGHT)_public_
MPOS = 175.51).
The estimates in Table 4 support the hypothesis of
discrimination against not only short but also very tall
men employed in the private sector. In addition, height is
associated with productivity effects, a fact that becomes
apparent when the private sector is split. Research into
individual industries (results not reported here) reveals
that impressive height–wage premiums are paid in
sectors such as agriculture, stone quarrying, sand-and-
clay industry, recycling and computing, while extremely
low premiums are recorded in the service sector. A
plausible interpretation of these findings has yet to be
provided. However, the correlation between the height
coefficient and height based on private-industry data15 is
positive (rm = + 0.16 for men). This outcome demon-
strates that male employees in industries in which the
height effect on wages is important are taller than
average. Thus, the wage premium could be interpreted as
an incentive for self-selection: moderately tall men
choose to work in those industries in which their height
will be a financial advantage. Nevertheless, there remains
a puzzle why some industries offer a premium and others
do not.
In conformity with Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the results for
women differ markedly from those for men. In the private
sector the height effects are insignificant among women
but large and significant among men. The null hypothesis
‘‘no discrimination between A1 and A2’’ cannot be
rejected for women. In the public sector the HEIGHT_A
coefficient for women is positive, significant at the 0.10
level and absolutely larger than in the private sector. A
197
plausible reason is that short male managers are over-
represented in the public sector and tend to discriminate
in favour of shorter workers. The right hand estimate
of Table 4 says us that women of group A1 (short but not
Women too short) earn more on average than those from A2
0.0316*
(very short or tall) if we control for the major wage
(0.0175) determinants.
5290
0.392
4. Discussion
In contrast with previous studies, which concluded
that there is a positive linear relationship between wages
and height, this paper provides evidence for the pre-
valence of nonlinearities. The maximum height effect is
experienced by moderately tall men at 191 cm and
moderately short women at 160 cm. The results of the
latter are sensitive to the modelling of height effects. This
pattern is due not only to endowment differences but also
to unobserved factors related to productivity and dis-
crimination. 16% of the difference in wages can be
explained by discrimination among men and 9% among
women. Discrimination against short and very tall men in
the private sector and against tall and very short women in
the public sector is confirmed. The coefficient on
HEIGHT_A = 0.0316 is significant at the 10% level. This
means that members of group A1 (moderately short
women) earn more than those in group A2 (very short and
tall women). This result is interpreted as discrimination
against members of group A2 because the estimation
controls for the major wage determinants (endowment)
and we cannot see that there exist unobserved produc-
tivity advantages of group A1.
The theoretical approaches presented in the litera-
ture, based as they are on productivity arguments, fail to
explain neither this evidence of nonlinear relationship
nor the difference in the effect for men and women. For
example, Case and Paxson (2008) presume in their
analytical model that cognitive ability is a linear
function of the unobserved individual’s endowment
and that height is a linear function of the endowment,
making for a linear relationship between height and
wages.
Saturation is the most obvious explanation for non-
linearity. The height effect has a ceiling. This is partially
incorporated by the log modelling of wages. Nevertheless,
there remain additional curvilinear effects. Why is the
gender difference for saturation so considerable? Fewer
women are in managerial positions in which the projection
of authority, power and risk-aversion are important. With
women beauty compensates height as a factor for
employment. Furthermore, social norms and discrimina-
tion are responsible; two supplements should be men-
tioned.
15
This means the regression in Table 4 for men in the private sector is
estimated separately for 62 private industries (i = 1, . . ., 62) using the
GSOEP data. Eight industries with less than 100 employees in the sample
are excluded. Then the 54 resulting coefficients on HEIGHT_A are
correlated with the average HEIGHT_A, i.e. the ratio of male employees,
which belong to height group A1, to all male employees in industry i.
198 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199
First, most men and women prefer the company of
those close to the statistical norm, and similar to
themselves. This preference helps to explain the inverse
U-shaped relationship between individual height and
wages. Those who are far from the statistical norm tend
to be the objects of discrimination but the optimum for
men is above the mean. Furthermore, the U-shaped pattern
is reinforced by the fact that health problems are
associated with both ends of the height spectrum (Nettle,
2002a).
Second, there is a gender-specific asymmetric deviation
from the mean. Women but not men consider above-
average height to be a positive characteristic in a mate, so
moderately taller boys but not girls have an advantage in
the dating game. The fact that women find good posture
attractive correlates with the finding that they prefer men
who possess confidence and physical strength. Evolution-
ary psychology provides an explanation for this prefer-
ence; a woman whose mate is endowed with superior
physical traits has a better chance of survival than others,
and therefore she does as well. In many cultures tall men
are granted a certain social status, which is extended to
their mates. Although women are no longer as economic-
ally dependent on their mates as they used to be, men who
are taller than average are still considered more attractive
than others. Short men are less likely to be married or live
in a permanent relationship than their taller counterparts
(Herpin, 2005).
The curvilinear phenomenon for women is more
difficult to explain and less obvious as the empirical
investigations have shown. Nettle (2002a,b) has found a
similar U-shaped relationship between reproductive suc-
cess and stature: specifically, a significant quadratic
relationship between a woman’s height and the total
number of children she bears, whereby the maximal
number of children is correlated with a height well below
Fig. A.1. Adjusted height effects on (log)wages per hour in Eastern and Western Germany estimated by LOWESS stratified by gender and region based on
estimates of Table A.1.
the mean. Most men prefer women shorter than them-
selves. Sunder (2006) has found that girls who are slightly
shorter than average have an advantage over other girls in
the dating game. He argues that this phenomenon may be
explained with Nettle’s (2002a) finding that girls with
below-average height have an earlier onset of menstrua-
tion, while girls with late sexual maturity will be taller
because they are growing longer.
Not only does height plays a key role in the private
realm of intimate, marital, and social relationships, but it
plays a key role in the labour market as well. In the private
sector, discrimination takes place in favour of moderately
tall men. In the public sector, we observe that moderately
short women earn most on average. If this nonlinear
relationship between height and wages is due to dis-
crimination that persists the labour market is not in an
efficient equilibrium, and if productivity is not a function of
height, then one can conclude that height discrimination
has negative economic consequences. If someday one finds
less height discrimination in the marketplace, it may mean
that the instincts that underlie personal and professional
judgments and choices have undergone an overdue
evolution.
Acknowledgements
I thank Christian Dustmann, Knut Gerlach, Robert A.
Hart, Dominik Hübler, John Komlos and three referees for
many very helpful suggestions and comments.
Appendix A
See Fig. A.1, Tables A.1 and A.2.
 O. Hübler / Economics and Human Biology 7 (2009) 191–199 199

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