INTRODUCTION

Modern public administration has taken a leaf not only from the legislature's book but also
from that of the judiciary. Administrative Adjudication is the latest addition to the
administrative techniques.

Technically speaking, judicial power/function is the primary function of courts. As mentioned

somewhere else, the FDRE Constitution expressly vested judicial power at the Federal and State
levels in courts. This goes in line with the principle of separation of state powers. However, it
does not necessarily imply that only regular courts shall exercise judicial power. There are
possibilities where judicial power may be delegated to other bodies falling outside the structure
of ordinary courts. As inferred from the wordings of Articles 37(1) and 80(4 & 5) of the
Constitution, such possibilities are not prohibited.

Administrative Adjudication means the determination of questions of a judicial or quasi-judicial

nature by an administrative department or agency. Like a regular court, administrative bodies
hear the parties, sift evidence, and pronounce a decision in cases where legal rights or duties
are involved.

Administrative adjudication is a name give to the administrative exercise of judicial functions. It

is a name given to the various ways of deciding disputes outside the ordinary courts.
Administrative adjudication is constitutional, though it is a negation of the principle of
separation of powers Administrative adjudication is the participation or involvement of the
executive arm of government (administrative agencies) in judicial function. Through the
instrumentality of administrative adjudication, administrative agencies can pass authoritative
and appealable decisions.

Causes of the Growth of Administrative Adjudication:

1. A By-Product of the Welfare State: The Administrative Tribunals rendering Admin-istrative

justice constitute a by-product of the welfare state. In the 18th and 19th century when „laissez‟
faire theory held sway, law courts emerged out as the custodian of the rights and liberties of
the individual citizens. At times they protected the rights of the citizens at the cost of State
authority. With the emergence of welfare state, social interest began to be given prece-dence
over the individual rights. The existing judiciary failed to uphold the new system. In the words
of Robson, “with the extension during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the func-tions
of the government to one new field after another, with the progressive limitation of the rights
of the individuals in the interests of the health, safety and general welfare of the commu-nity as
a whole, with the development of collective control over the conditions of employment and
manner of living and the elementary necessities of the people, there has arisen a need for a
technique of adjudication better fitted to respond to the social requirements of the time than
the elaborate and costly system of decision provided by litigation in the courts of law.” In brief
the new system of administrative adjudication suited new social ends espoused by a welfare
state. It proved a potential instrument for enforcing social policy and legislation.

2. Suitable to Industrialized and Urbanized Society: Administrative Adjudication suits modern

industrialized and urbanized society as well. The latter necessitates positive and prompt action
which is possible if the problems arising out of the new order are not left to the mercy of
ordinary courts. In the words of Robson, “Parliament did not overlook the courts of law but
they found the possibility of setting up new organs of adjudication which would do the work
more rapidly, more cheaply and more efficiently than the ordinary courts, which would possess
greater technical knowledge and fewer prejudices against government, which would give
greater weight to the social interests involved and show less solicitude for private property
rights which would decide with a conscious effort at furthering the social policy embodied in
the legislation. This prospect offered solid advantages which induced the legislature to extend
in one sphere after another the administrative jurisdiction of governmental departments so as
to include judi-cial functions affecting the social services.”

3. Ordinary Law Courts not Competent: (i) Law courts, on account of their elaborate
procedures, legalistic forms and attitudes can hardly render justice to the parties concerned in
technical cases. Ordinary judges brought up in the traditions of law and jurisprudence is not
capable enough to understand technical problems which crop up in the wake of modern
complex economic and social processes. Only administrators having expert knowledge can
tackle such problems judiciously. In the words of White, “Another important consideration was
the desire to secure adjudication by a body of experts in the subject-matter of litigation rather
than by a body of experts in the law.” Lord Summer also held a similar opinion. According to
him, the common law judges are “illequipped to weigh the merits of one solution of a practical
question against another.”

(ii) The expedient adopted by the courts is to examine the experts of the subject. The expert
witnesses are only too often hired assassins of the truth; and even if they were just men made
perfect the assimilation of technical facts at short notice, through the testimony of another
individual, is a different thing from a first-hand knowledge of the groundwork based on
personal experience or training. In the recent past in a decision given by Madras High Court, it
frankly admitted that it knew nothing of the subject. That clearly reflects the handicaps of
regular judi-ciary.
 (iii) The court procedures when tested by times are found wanting. Litigants have to face
exasperating delay because of crowded dockets of these courts and an excessive right of appeal
to the higher courts.

(iv) The justice in these ordinary courts has neither been speedy nor cheap. It has been dilatory
or cumbersome. Hence an improvement was contemplated in administrative courts.

(v) Ordinary courts were under too much strain. Hence they were to be relieved of the strain.
Dr. White has graphically summed up defects of the ordinary courts which caused aversion to
them and a swing towards administrative courts, in these words “For a half century, there had
been growing dissatisfaction with the court procedure. Litigants were faced with exasperat-ing
delay… they found the technical rules of evidence sometimes inappropriate and conducive to
dispute among lawyers rather than to a just and early settlement; they were dubious about the
value of jury in many kinds of cases; and the cost of judicial action including Attorney‟s fees
sometimes reduced victory to a hollow success.”

4. Safety to be ensured: A good number of situations are such as require quick and firm action
otherwise health and safety of the people may remain in jeopardy. For instance, ensuring of
safety measures in coal mines, preventing of illegal transactions in foreign exchange, and unfair
business practices necessitate prompt action. Such cases, if to be dealt with in the ordinary
courts of law, would cause immense loss to the state exchequer and undermine na-tional
prestige. However, the administrative courts presided over by the experts would ensure
prompt and fair action.

5. Standards of Conduct to be devised: Besides the points suggested above, the main business
of the ordinary courts is to settle disputes and not to set standards of human behaviour. It is for
the legislature to set such standards. The legislatures are not in a position to prescribe in exact
details the pattern of conduct. This power is delegated by the legislature to the admin-istration.
The disputes arising out of the enforcement of these standards can be properly tackled by the
Administrative courts alone. For instance, the factory rules provide certain safety mea-sures. A
workman working in the factory gets injured. Has he been injured due to bad work-manship or
non-compliance of the safety measures by the management can be decided only by the
administrative expert rather than an ordinary judge? The sporadic rise of administrative
adjudication was, however, widely denounced by the freedom-loving people of the democratic
countries. In England, parliament was compelled to appoint a Select Committee on Ministers‟
Power in 1931 to go into the question. The Commit-tee was, however, of the view that the
system of Administrative Adjudication was not inconsis-tent with the Rule of Law. Still they
suggested certain safeguards to meet the dangers of the practices?

Advantages of Administrative Adjudication:

(a) Cheaper: Administrative justice is cheaper comparatively. In suits, lawyers may or may not
appear. No court fees are to be paid, no solicitors are to be instructed, no counsel is to be
briefed, no pleadings are to be printed, no affidavits are to be sworn. Robson opines that it is
also cheaper from the point of view of the state, if the relative salaries of the official mem-bers
of the administrative tribunals and the judges are taken into consideration.

(b) Speedy Justice: Justice by the Administrative Tribunals is speedy. Oral hearings are
dispensed with. Intricate trial procedures are abandoned. Vexatious rules of evidence are con-
spicuously absent.

(c) Adequate Justice: In the fast changing world of to-day, administrative tribunals pro-vide the
most effective means of rendering fair justice to the individuals. Lawyers steeped in the old
traditions and philosophy of law and environed by procedural dialectism generally discernible in
the ordinary courts of laws, can hardly appraise the needs of the modern welfare society.
Hence administrative courts alone can render adequate justice.

(d) Burden of Courts Lessened: The system provides the much needed relief to the ordi-nary
courts of laws which are overburdened with varied types of ordinary suits. Many of the disputes
coming before the ordinary tribunals are of ordinary nature and do not warrant the attention of
highly paid judges or the necessity of elaborate procedures and rules of evidence. Such cases
can easily be referred to these tribunals.

(e) Useful in Developing Democracies: In developing democracies which experiment with new
social and economic programme, ordinary courts would be completely misfit. All the disputes
arising out of such programmes will get struck, thus giving a setback to the programme itself
unless we switch over to the Administrative Courts.

(f) Fixing of Standards: The disputes which come for adjudication before the Administrative
Tribunals arc not concerned with the proprietary or other claims of the disputants but the
fixation of public standards of performance. Such standards of performance can be determined
only by these administrative and not ordinary courts. For example, a dispute concerning an
injured employee‟s claim for compensation from the employer is more a problem of enforcing
standards of safety in the factory than a mere dispute of rights between the employer and the
employees. Obviously ordinary courts are not capable of undertaking such work.

(g) Flexibility: The legalistic approach to problems is static, un-progressive and individualistic.
An ordinary court intervenes only when a conflict arises. It moves in the direction of
controversy alone. It is not concerned with the problems arising from the decisions the
complications following such decisions and the other inter-relations involved. The fast changing
society necessitates a progressive attitude and an adaptation of policies to meet changing
conditions. Administrators formulate policy, develop administrative techniques, work out new
methods of adjusting controversies, check and modify their standards in the ordinary functions
and difficulties confronting everyday life and adjust their decisions and attitudes. Thus
conditions fostering controversies are removed through such a type of flexibility.

Problems in Adjudication by Administrative

Administrative justice has been a host of controversies in India. A few common
problems the adjudicative process occurs are as follows:
(i) Number and complexity– A large number of adjudicative bodies have come up in
recent times; every statutory scheme contains its own machinery for decision-making. A
large number of parallel bodies adjudicating on the same kind of disputes give diverse
decisions and adopt a variety of procedures. Because the principles of natural justice are
not rigid and do not apply uniformly in all situations, the consequent results at times in
arbitrary actions.
(ii) Unsystematic system of appeal: No uniform system of appeal is there. Sometimes,
decisions are made appealable before an independent tribunal as in tax cases, and
sometimes before a higher administrative agency. Some acts do not provide for any
appeal.
(iii) Invisibility and anonymity of decisions: Not all the administrative agencies
exercising judicial power publish their decisions; their decisions thus go beyond the Pale
of public criticism. Also, often the decisions are made in a ‘hole and the corner’ fashion.
No one knows where the decision comes.
(iv) Unpredictability and anonymity of decisions: Administrative agencies do not
follow the doctrine of precedent, hence they are not bound to follow their decisions.
This ad hocism not only makes the development of law incoherent but also violates the
principles of the rule of law.
(v) Combination of functions: Except in the case of civil servants, in all disciplinary
proceedings, the functions of a prosecutor and the judge are either combined in one
person or in the same department, in such a situation bias is inevitable.
(vi) No evidence rule: In India, the technical rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to
administrative adjudications. The gap is filled, true inadequately, by the judge-made rule
of ‘No Evidence’.
(vii) Official perspective and official bias: In administrative justice, an official
prospective is inherent. In any disciplinary proceedings of presumption is of guilt rather
than innocence. The actions are taken on the basis of expediency and various other
extra-legal considerations. Official or departmental bias is very common e.g. Strong and
sincere conviction as to public policy or bias results due to pecuniary interest.
(viii) Plea bargaining: It means the bargaining of ‘plea of guilt’ with lesser charges and
punishment. A poor employee is bullied by an overbearing superior to accept the
charge against him on a promise that a lesser punishment will be awarded.
(ix) Political interference: Instrumentalities of Administrative justice are, by their very
nature, subject to some more manner of political interference.
(x) Reasoned decisions: Generally there is no requirement for the administrative
authority to give reasons, which undermines the faith in administrative justice.
(xi) Legal representation and cross-examination: There is no general requirement for
administrative authority to allow legal representation and cross-examination in every
case.

Statutory and constitutional backing of administrative tribunals

Administrative Tribunals for service matter [Article 323A]

Article 323A provides the establishment of administrative tribunals by law made by Parliament for the
adjudication of disputes and complaints related to the recruitment and conditions of service of
Government servants under the Central Government and the State Government. It includes the
employees of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India or of a corporation owned or controlled by the Government.

The establishment of such tribunals must be at the centre and state level separately for each state or for
two or more states. The law must incorporate the provisions for the jurisdiction, power and authority to
be exercised by tribunals; the procedure to be followed by tribunals; the exclusion of the jurisdiction of
all other courts except the Supreme Court of India

Tribunals for other matters [Article 323B]

Article 323B empowers the Parliament and the State Legislature to establish tribunals for the
adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the matters specified under clause (2) of Article
323B. Some of the matters given under clause (2) are a levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of
any tax; foreign exchange and export; industrial and labour disputes; production, procurement, supply
and distribution of foodstuffs; rent and it’s regulation and control and tenancy issues etc. Such a law
must define the jurisdiction, powers of such tribunals and lays down the procedure to be followe
risdictional powers of the tribunal constituted under Articles 323A and 323B. The Supreme Court struck
down clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B on the ground that they excluded the
jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Article 226/227 and 32 respectively.

The SC ruled that the tribunals created under Article 323A and 323B would continue to be the courts of
the first instance in their respective areas for which they are constituted. The litigants are not allowed to
approach the High Courts directly by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned tribunal.

No appeal for the decision of the tribunal would lie directly before the Supreme Court under Article 136
but instead, the aggrieved party would be entitled to move the High Court under Article 226 and 227
and after the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, the party may approach the Apex Court
under Article 136

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

In pursuance of the provisions in Article 323A, Parliament passed the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, providing for all the matters falling within
the clause(1) of Article 323-A.

According to this Act, there must be a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT)

at the centre and a State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) at the state level for
every state.
The tribunal is competent to declare the constitutionality of the relevant laws
and statutes. The Act extends to, in so far as it is related to the Central
Administrative Tribunal, to the whole of India and in relation to the
Administrative tribunals for states, it is applicable to the whole of India
except the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Section 1).

Applicability of the Act

According to Section 2 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the act

applies to all Central Government employees except –

 The members of the naval, military or air force or any other

armed forces of the Union

 Any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or any High Courts

 Any person appointed to the secretariat staff of either House of

the Parliament.

Composition of the Tribunals and Bench

Section 4 of this Act describes the composition of the tribunals and bench.
Each tribunal shall consist of a Chairman, Vice Chairman, Judicial and
Administrative members. Every bench must include at least one judicial and
one administrative member. The benches of the Central Tribunal shall
ordinarily sit at New Delhi, Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and such
other place as the Central Government specifies. The Chairman may transfer
the Vice Chairman or other members from one bench to another bench.
Qualification and Appointment of Members

Section 6 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, lays the provisions

specifying the qualifications and appointment of the members of tribunals.

Chairman: To be appointed as a chairman, a person must have the

following qualifications-

 He is or has been a judge of a High Court or

 He has held the office of Vice Chairman for two years or

 He has held the post of secretary to the Government of India or

 He has held any other post carrying the scale pay of secretary.
Vice-Chairman: A person is qualified for the post of Vice-Chairman if he-

 Is or has been a judge of the High Court or

 Has for 2 years held the post of Secretary to the Government or

holding any other post carrying the same pay scale under the
Central or State Governments or

 Has held for 5 years the post of an Additional Secretary to the

Government of India or any other post carrying the scales of pay
of Additional Secretary.
Judicial Member: A person to be appointed as a judicial member must-

 Be or have been a judge of the High Court or

 Have been a member of Indian Legal Service and has held a post
in Grade I of the service for at least 3 years.
Administrative Member: A person to be appointed as an Administrative
member must-

 Have held the post of an Additional Secretary to the Government

of India or another equivalent post for at least 2 years, or

 Have held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of

India or other equivalent post, or

 Have adequate administrative experience.

The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members shall be appointed by the
President. The Judicial Members shall be appointed by the President with the
consultation of the Chief Justice of India. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
other members of the State Tribunal shall be appointed by the President
after consultation with the Governor of the concerned state.

Term of Office

According to Section 8 of the Act, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of the
tribunal shall hold the office for a term of 5 years or until he attains-

1. Age of 65 years, in the case of the Chairman or Vice-Chairman

2. Age of 62 years in the case of other members

Resignation and Removal

Section 9 of the Act prescribes the procedure of resignation by any member and removal of any
member.
The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other members may resign from his post by writing to the
President.

They shall be removed from their office only by an order made by the President on the ground of
proved misbehaviour or incapacity after an enquiry made by a judge of the Supreme Court. They
shall have the right to be informed of the charges against them and shall be given a reasonable
opportunity of hearing. The Central Government may make rules to regulate the procedure for
the investigation of the charges against them.

Jurisdiction of Central Tribunal

Section 14 states that the Central Tribunal from the day of the appointment shall exercise all the
jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to the following matters which were within the
jurisdiction of other courts (except the Supreme Court) before the enactment of this Act:

1. Recruitment of any civil service of Union or All India service or civil post under
the Union or civilian employees of defence services;

2. All service matters of the above-mentioned employees, and also of employees of

any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India or any corporation or society owned or controlled by the
Government;

3. All service matters of such persons whose services have been placed by the State
Government or any local or other authority or any corporation at the disposal of
the Central Government.

Procedure and Powers of Tribunals

Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 lays down the powers and procedure of
tribunals discussed below-

1. A tribunal is not bound to follow the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. It has the power to regulate its own procedure but must abide by
the principle of natural justice.

2. A tribunal shall decide the applications and cases made to it as rapidly as possible
and every application shall be decided after scrutinizing the documents and written
submissions and perceiving the oral arguments.

3. Tribunals have the same powers as vested by the civil courts under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, with regard to the following subject-
matter-

4. Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on
oath;

5. Production of documents;

6. Receiving evidence on affidavits;

7. Ask for any public record or document from any office under Section
123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872;

8. Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents;

9. Reviewing its decisions;

10. Deciding the case ex-parte;

11. Setting aside any order passed by it ex-parte;

12. Any other matter prescribed by the Central Government.

13. Leading Case Laws

Case: S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India[2]

Facts: The constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was predominantly
challenged on the ground that this Act excludes the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles
226 and 227 with regard to service matters and hence, destroyed the concept of judicial review
which was an essential feature of the Indian Constitution.
Judgment: A five-Judge Bench of the Court upheld the validity of the Act except Section 6(1)
(c). The court held that although this Act has excluded the jurisdiction of judicial review
exercised by the High Courts in the service matters it has not entirely excluded the concept of
judicial review. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and 136 has not been
excluded by this Act and kept unscathed.

Thus, there still exists an authority where matters of injustice can be entertained by judicial
review. The judicial review which is the part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution can
be taken away from a particular area only if an alternative effectual institutional mechanism or
authority is provided.

However, Section 6 (1)(c) of the Act was held to be unconstitutional as it gave unrestricted
power to the Government to appoint the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of the
tribunals. These appointments must be made by the Government in a meaningful and effective
manner only after consulting the Chief Justice of India.

The court recommended that the term of 5 years prescribed under the Act for Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and other members of the tribunal is not rational because it would act as dissuasion for
the good and generous people to accept the job in the tribunal and should, therefore, be
reasonably extended.

The directions given by the Supreme Court came into effect through the Administrative
Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987.
Courts Administrative Tribunal

The administrative tribunal is an agency

A Court of law is a part of the
created by a statue endowed with judicial
traditional judicial system.
powers.

A Court of law is vested with It deals with service matters and is vested
general jurisdiction over all the with limited jurisdiction to decide a
matters. particular issue.

It is not bound by the rules of the

It is strictly bound by all the rules of
Evidence Act and the CPC unless the
evidence and by the procedure of the
statute which creates the tribunal imposes
Code of Civil Procedure.
such an obligation.

It is not mandatory in every case that the

It is presided over by an officer
members need to be trained and experts in
expert in the law.
law.

The decision of the court is objective

The decision is subjective i.e. at times it
in nature primarily based on the
may decide the matters taking into
evidence and materials produced
account the policy and expediency.
before the court.

It is not obligatory to follow precedents

It is bound by precedents, the
and principle of res judicata but the
principle of res judicata and the
principle of natural justice must be
principle of natural justice.
followed.

It can decide the validity of

It cannot decide the validity of legislation.
legislation.

The courts do not follow

Many tribunals perform investigatory
investigatory or inquisition functions
functions as well along with its quasi-
rather it decides the case on the basis
judicial functions.
of evidence.