Masculinity, Rationality, and Religion - A Feminist - Ahmed, Durre S - 1994 - Lahore, Pakistan - ASR Publications - 9789698217198 - Anna's Archive

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Masculinity,
Rationality and
Religion
A Feminist Perspective
Durre S. Ahmed
Masculinity,
Rationality and
Religion
Durre S. Ahmed
ASR
Maculinity, Rationality and Religion: A Feminist Perspective
First Published in 1994 by
ASR Publications
Flat No: 8, 2nd Floor, Sheraz Plaza,
Main Market, Gulberg II,
P.O.Box 3154, Gulberg,
Lahore, Pakistan.
Phone: 877613
Cable: “SOCFEM” Lahore
This is Volume III of a six-volume Women’s Studies Journal Series.

Other titles include Locating the Self: Perspectives on Women and
Multiple Identities (Vol. 1), Sex Crime in the Islamic Context: Rape,
Class and Gender in Pakistan (Vol. Il), Development Papers (Vol.
IV), In Her Own Write: Short Stories by Women Writers in Pakistan
(Vol. V) and “A Celebration of Women”: Essays and Abstracts from
the Women’s Studies Conference (Vol. V1).
All Copyrights with ASR Publications
© ASR Publications
ASR is grateful to Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) for

supporting the cost of this publication.
ISBN 969 8217 193
Cover by Durre Ahmed: “One and a Half” sculpture in terra cotta.

Photography by Sajid Mansoor
Printed by The Hoshruba Group, 141 V Defence Phase II, Lahore,

Pakistan. Phone No: 893015
For the Silsilah of Bhangis (s.o.b's.)
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A NOTE FROM THE PUBLISHER
Dr. Durre Ahmed wrote the paper Masculinity, Rationality and

Religion: A feminist perspective for the Planning Commission,
Government of Pakistan, over four years ago and presented it in a
seminar organised by the Planning Commission in Islamabad. The
presentation was dramatic, not only because it was “different” in
both content and style, but also because it led to a somewhat
ferocious debate, an uncommon occurrence in Pakistani
academia. Unfortunately the debate focused not’on what was
being argued, but on whether Dr. Ahmed had the right, as a
supposedly “rational” academic, to “personalise” her argument.
Her deconstruction of selected texts was taken, for example, not
as an attempt at understanding a totality but as personal attacks
on the authors, not only by the authors themselves but by others
who heard about it. She was also questioned on her merging, of
research methodologies that stem from different disciplines, and
her attempting to legitimize a challenge to what is considered the
norm in Pakistan in the construction of knowledge.
Even more unfortunate is that these positions were often
taken without those taking the positions having read the paper,
with the result that not only did the debate remain within the
personal domain but Dr. Ahmed’s main arguments seem to have
been strengthened by the type of response that her paper got. The
person or the personality of the writer, she would argue, cannot be
separated from what is wmitten, for the writer brings his or her
identity to the understanding and the analysis. The person
responds to a fact, and in that process constructs the fact in his or
her own image. Thus what she was attempting to analyse got lost
in whom she was analysing. Dr. Hoodbhoy, for example, who
makes an argument for scientific rationality as the ultimate goal
for “mankind”, and who would underplay the role that emotion,
identity or personal history play in the construction of knowledge,
reacted emotionally and personally to what he perceived as an
(i)
Masculinity, Rationality and Religion
attack on himy At the same time by not grappling with what was
being said, ‘he reinforced her argument that the “modem”,
“rational” man is as unable to deal with complexity and
ambivalence as the religious fundamentalist.
One does not have to agree with what Dr. Ahmed is
saying. In any case she would argue that there is nothing to
agree with except that exploration 1s necessary and that ambiguity
must be accepted for what it is, and as it 1s, and that it is not
necessarily something that must be resolved. One might argue
that this in itself is a resolution. One might also question several
other inconsistencies in her paper and indeed bring her own
methodology to bear on understanding her own work in which her
self is never disengaged from her text, and which often leaves one
wondering, why something 1s being said rather than what is being
said. This however does not distract from her tremendous
contribution to research methodology in Pakistan and to her
initiating a process that would allow for a more profound
understanding not only of the construction of knowledge but of
personal and political identities.
Essentially her contribution lies in her argument that a
text cannot be taken at face value and that one must try to
understand the identity that the wnter brings into the text. Thus
she enables one not only to deconstruct the text but to deconstruct
the writer’s identity and to understand the interplay between the
two. It is this dialectic that makes for the wnters’ understanding,
and this process must be understood if we are to make sense of a
text, or to understand what exactly is being said. This is a shift
from imagining the person behind the work to attempting to know
the person in order to understand where the work comes from and
perhaps even why. Thus she argues that the fundamentalist right
and what she calls the “modern” are essentially the same in that
they are both unable to deal with complexity and ambiguity. Both
are also unilinear and both seek resolution within defined
parameters. Both would also deny what might be considered the
femmune, that 1s intuition, emotion, ambivalence. This would
confirm the misogyny that one has often had to contend with in
both the right and the left and indeed dogmatism of any kind. If
fundamentalism means asking a simple question and getting a
(ii)
simple answer, then fundamentalism is certainly much more

rampant in Pakistan than is indicated in the electoral strength of
the religious right.
I read Dr. Ahmed’s paper when it was first written four
years ago when many of these ideas were relatively new. I was
fascinated by it not because I understood or agreed with all of it,
but because it had been said, however tentatively. I encouraged
her to develop the paper into a book. Unfortunately she never did
this, partly because she moved on to explore other areas of study,
but also because she felt it would not then have initiated the type
of debate that we were both hoping for. It may not do that even
now but one hopes that the form in which it is being published
will at least initiate some discussions on the issues that she has
touched upon.
The paper Masculinity, Rationality and Religion: A
Jeminist perspective is considered unusual. The form in which it
is being published is also unusual since it does not fall into the
category of a book, or a joumal, or an anthology, or a debate.
Basically the paper is being published but with lengthy theoretical
appendices so that the reader who is unfamiliar with the literature
should have easy access to it. This in itself is uncommon, but we
have included three commentaries on the paper, and a critical
review of Dr. Hoodbhoy’s “Muslims and Science: Religious
Orthodoxy and the Struggle for Rationality”, since this is the
main text that Dr. Ahmed uses for her analysis. We hope that this
format will encourage the type of discussion that this paper
deserves. I thank Dr. Ahmed for supporting our attempt to
publish her paper in this manner, especially since this book
contains within it, a critique of her paper.
This volume is being published by ASR Publications as a
part of its Women’s Studies Series, which is connected to a
multidimensional Women’s Studies Conference organised by
ASR in March 1994. Many of the essays, papers and articles are
tentative or incomplete. The purpose of publishing them is to
build on these initial thoughts through a process of dialogue and
debate. The purpose is also to present works that are seeking to
break the given parameters of research methodology, and to
introduce, by way of example, feminist methodologies that
(iii)
challenge notions of objectivity and personal distance. “The

Personal is Political” is not a feminist slogan. It is a profound
and complex theoretical concept that challenges both existing
forms of knowledge and of action. It is encouraging that many
women in Pakistan are rising to this challenge even when they are
unfamiliar with its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings, and
we hope that this series will further encourage these women, and
others like them, to continue with this challenge.
Nighat Said Khan

ASR Publications
(iv)
Contents
Preface Vil
Introduction ]
PART |] THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Case History 13
Theoretical Framework pip
PART II MODERNISM IN PAKISTAN
The Macrocosm 38
The Scientist as Saviour 49
The Microcosm 81
PART IJ THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN
The Battle for Pakistan 95
Back To The Future 110
Appendices 119
Bibliography 167
PART IV COMMENTARIES
Commentary by Akbar Zaidi 175
Commentary by Rubina Saigol 182
Commentary by Tariq Banuri 200

PREFACE
Many of the ideas in this monograph were first presented at an

interdisciplinary conference held in 1991 in Islamabad. My main
apprehension at that meeting was how to avoid an anticipated
confrontation with certain religious scholars who hold very strong
beliefs about women and Islam. As it happened, most chose not to
participate and there was not much of a reaction from that
quarter. Instead, there were some exceedingly angry comments
directed at me by some well known ‘liberal’ intellectuals who saw
this tract as an attempt at character assassination and a ‘personal’
attack on them. My trying to explain the difference between
having, used published texts and not private materials made no
difference and the verbal exchanges between us were to say the
least, acrimonious and bitter. Akhtar Hameed Khan was among
the very few individuals who chose to be supportive of my views.
The entire episode left me feeling quite shaken, not
because I felt intellectually out of my depths, in fact that
encounter simply vindicated a contention of the paper that liberals
are as capable of narrow minded fanaticism as their religious
brothers. However, | had not anticipated the intensity of the anger
which faced me and which | believe came from a genuine sense of
hurt, on the part of those who, in good faith, believe that their’s 1s
an enlightened attitude towards women, not to mention science,
knowledge and religion. While letting the paper speak for itself on
these issues, I want to take this opportunity to simply say “sorry”.
One would think that there is no room for notions such as ‘hurt’
and ‘apology’ in contemporary academic discourse, but then this
is Pakistan, so, I apologize to all those who feel they deserve an
apology.
What I am not apologetic about however, is that while I

have chosen to play the academic-intellectual game, | try and do
so in a manner which does not pretentiously suggest that it 1s not
a game. This is a conscious choice motivated both by inner
conviction and outer reality. That is, to the extent that I can be
considered part of the academic world in terms of research and
teaching, I am forced to speak a certain language (jargon).
However, I am also involved in the practice of psychotherapy and
the witnessing of the human psyche which more often than not
functions in ways which are utterly contrary to its modem
academic conceptions. Thus, this paper will be of no use to
readers expecting a ‘scientific’ treatment of the main ideas since. |
question the notion of science itself, as understood and projected
by many Pakistani academics. Given the professional mechanisms
and structures of knowledge as they exist in academe, their
responses are predictable since each is usually located in some
‘school’ of thought and training. The main ideas are addressed to
not only those trained in academic hairsplitting but more so to the
non-academic but astute and intelligent reader, perhaps not very
different from those who read the English papers and magazines
such as Herald and Newsline. My impression is that this audience
tends to invest the academic-intellectual with an aura which is
frequently un-deserved. I am more interested in this non-academic
world and its modes of thought and so my primary audience is the
English reading public, the professional intellectual is a secondary
consideration. :
My main concem is that almost since Pakistan’s
inception and into the present, the religion of Islam has been
steadily distorted and used as a fuel to take us in directions which
can hardly be considered salutary for the individual or society,
certainly not for women. Insofar as it is the academics and
intelligentsia who articulate the ideas which shape and give
direction to a society, by virtue of training, opportunity and
access to conceptual resources, it is they who are best equipped to
articulate different, less grotesque visions of religion and Islam.
Yet, they seem to have nothing much to say except beat their
chests -- if at all -- every time some new law is enacted in the
name of Islam.
(vill)
Preface
Chest beating is good for a personal catharsis perhaps,

but not a substitute for dealing with reality. The fundamentalist
tide facing us today is as much a consequence of geo-politics and
socio-economic factors as it is due to the abdication of intellectual
responsibility (the ability-to-respond) regarding religion and
Islam. Over the last three decades, while the religious fanatics
were mobilizing and consolidating their strength, the Pakistani
intelligentsia was more enamoured of the ‘secular’ Marxist-
development vision which had assumed that as modernization
would proceed, religion would recede. Not only has this not
happened but today the issue of Islam seems to be somewhere in
the center of the eye of the storm msing on the international
political horizon. While I have, to a certain extent, relied on
exaggeration and caricature of the modern Pakistani, I do not
think it is an exaggeration to say that in the light of the
fundamentalist onslaught at home and the increasing hostility
towards Islam abroad, the Pakistani intellectual has been caught
in a posture which can be politely described as a state of sartorial
disarray. We are besieged from both within and without by a
subject (Islam) which most of us had either relegated to the debris
of an un-’developed’ past, or have a knowledge of it which is
largely unconscious, in the same way that we ‘know’ our mother
tongue but are largely ignorant of its underlying semantic and
emotional structures.
From another perspective, the issue is one of
communication between religious fascism and those who oppose
it. One does not need specialist knowledge to realize that human
communication is most effective if there is a common language,
literal and conceptual. The only answer to a religious argument is
through a more knowledgeable religious argument, not a ‘secular
scientific’ one. This is not the same as saying that these two
domains are incompatible. The question I am trying to pose and
explore is that if knowledge is power then why is the Pakistani
intelligentsia so powerless when faced with the power of the
religious fanatic? I for one, am not satisfied with the usual
explanations -- or impressed by chest beating, which is moreg@f a
reaction than a considered response. Th& paper is my way of
trying to pry open some underlying régsons regarding this
(ix)
intellectual impotence. The exercise does not pretend to offer

answers. Rather, in questioning the underlying rules of the
dominant cognitive game, it seeks to prod the reader into asking a
different set of questions.
Finally, | want to take the opportunity to express my
gratitude to the Silsilah of Bhangjs (s.o.b’s). They have provided
me generous support and encouragement and this monograph is
affectionately dedicated to them.
(x)
Introduction
History may well be ending for Francis Fukuyama and other

western observers such as Krauthammer’ who sees the world
moving towards a unipolar political and economic order. Yet, at
the same time, a vast number of human beings are still waiting for
the light at the end of the tunnel called ‘development’ or
‘modernization’.
Given the title of this paper, at this stage one can picture
readers silently girding themselves for another academic
onslaught on these ubiquitous terms. If the average Pakistani
academic has kept even marginally abreast of ‘the literature’ in
the social sciences, development is ‘out’. What is ‘in’is not clear.
Enter the moder religious scholar and my reader may well sigh
deeper, grit his teeth, and prepare to make sense of a bewildering
barrage of Arabic expressions juxtaposed with various social
scientific terminology. This is the way at least I find myself
responding, as a relatively literate Pakistani, to the academic and
intellectual discourse regarding these two aspects of the state of
contemporary Pakistan.
To reassure those who feel similarly (and unabashedly
and try and lure forward those who don’t) it is best to say first
what this monograph 1s not about. To begin with, it will be
offering no optimistic solutions to the dilemma of development.
Nor does it address the issue of how to stem the growing
fundamentalist tide, which people, such as myself, regard with
2 Masculinity, Rationality and Religion
apprehension if not fear. It will certainly not propose/analyze any

particular reading of Islam as applied to economies, sociology
etc.; nor will it discusss the current stand-off between religious
fundamentalism and modernization/development in terms which
despite the jargon of social science, are essentially self evident,
quite correct, and need no further confirmation.
The theoretical approach is of psychology and the paper
will explore a number of interrelated issues. Firstly, what do
Pakistani moderns think (rather than feel) about religion and
modemization? That they pride themselves on thinking differently
from the religious fanatic is clear. Since the substantive focus of
the paper is epistemological that is, how we think about what we
think one will simultaneously be examining, how modem
Pakistanis think about religion and modemity. In the jargon of
psychology, these are called psychodynamics. Psychology means
a logos of the psyche, thus, one will be examining the logical
structures of the ways in which modem Pakistanis see religion,
and themselves as modern individuals. Providing the background
in terms of contrast will be the psychodynamics of religious
fundamentalism, but only in the sense of the stereotype to which
most liberal Pakistani’s respond. Essentially, the subject of the
paper is the modem Pakistani, his understanding of himself and
religion. It concludes that he is as much of a fanatic as the
religious fundamentalist, with some interesting differences in
degree.
TERMINOLOGY
Fundamentalism:
Unlike development, religious fundamentalism is a

relative newcomer to the social scientific milieu which has
responded with considerable alacrity to ‘operationalizing’ an idea
whose one pole flirts with the concept of ‘culture’ while the other
is firmly married to ‘God’. This paper will not get involved in the
currently emerging, hair splitting aspects of the debate as to what
exactly is a fundamentalist, a modern Muslim, a non-Muslim,
Muslim fundamentalist, .a fundamentalist Pakistani, modem
Introduction 3
Pakistani Muslim, etc. Nevertheless, the title demands some

clarification. In keeping with what one hopes will be an
academically acceptable yet popularly accessible tone of this
paper, the dictionary can provide a definition. the following
explanation of “fundamentalism” is useful since it interestingly
also refers to “modernism”.
Fundamentalist:
i A set of orthodox religious beliefs
based on a literal interpretation of a religious text such as
the Bible (e.g., complete acceptance of the story of
creation as given in Genesis and rejection of the theory of
evolution).
I, The movement among some American
Protestants emphasizing this belief: “opposed to
modemism”. (emphasis mine) (Webster’s Unabridged
Dictionary).
That this is a partial definition, framed through the lens

of American Protestant Chnistianity, and the consequences of
which have world wide repercussion may provide a clue to one
theme of the paper. Sidestepping the definition of moderns for a
moment, one can say that as a group, they would most likely
describe themselves as anti-fundamentalist echoing here the
dictionary definition of the fundamentalist being someone who
takes religion literally. and very, very seriously. So seriously in
fact, that many modern Muslims are constrained to constantly
distinguish their faith from that of the fanatic. In this paper
fundamentalism and fanaticism will be synonymous. This is more
in the spirit of realism rather than an abdication of intellectual
effort.
Over the last twenty years, events in Muslim countries
and the filters of the western media have left an image of
‘militant’ Islam. During much of this time, the focus of the
modem Pakistani was on development. After the Gulf war, this
label has adhered even more strongly. As a “western conspiracy”
or the manifestations of natural tendency of humans to think in
compact images, it seems we are stuck with this idea of
fundamentalism as fanaticism. and to the extent that the English

media in Pakistan are ‘western’, to the same extent one can say
that Pakistani modems associate the term fundamentalist with
fanatic. This is someone who wants to impose, through force if
necessary, a literal interpretation of Islam, who ts anti-west, antr-
development and anti-progress. He is especially charactenzed by
his tyrannical attitude to women, and a preoccupation with
matters sexual
Modernisnr
As stated earlier, the paper will focus not so much on

Pakistani fundamentalism as on Pakistant modermsm. Given the
current fundamentalist mood this ts, firstly, sumply safer. Other
reasons have to do with the structural and the practical. Thus, the
specific language of discourse, the vocabulary of the discourse,
the implied demand of its structure and methods, reflects a
‘modem* outlook: here one is expanding on the idea of
modemism, regardless of the nature and extent of religious belief
Social Sciences in Pakistan
Before one gets sucked into the other debate of whether

‘modem’ ts the same as ‘western’, a number of points need to be
stated. Earlier, one had alluded to the need for academics to be
more accessible to the public. In the case of English reading
Pakistanis this is admittedly a small number. One sub-theme of
this paper concems the modem view of specialized
scientific/academic knowledge which, while presenibing a certain
world view, rarely opens to public scrutiny the underlying bases
of these views. This censorship through specialization is further
strengthened by technical jargon. Although the distance between
producer and consumer can perhaps be justified in the ‘hard’
sciences it 1s questionable vis a vis the social sciences and their
approach to the-world-as-laboratory. It is unjustifiable since,
according to most social scientists, Pakistan is a mess despite the
proliferation of social science in numerous sections of society.
Introduction 5
Thus, concepts such as ‘western’, ‘fundamentalist’, will

be used keeping in mind a certain image of a particular type of
Pakistani. To what extent the individual reader can identify/reject
specific elements of this image, that is the accuracy of definition.
Obviously, this rather flexible definition may not, by definition,
appeal to the person looking for a more definite one. But I prefer
not to impose one on my subjects and will work instead with what
they themselves state. As one has written elsewhere’, psychology
is one discipline that can connect the individual and society. Its
definitions therefore, should combine elements of both popular
and academic discourse and naturally will have limitations. But it
can possibly be more satisfying (if not more informative) for more
people, than the frequently self-evident, ideologically
propagandist, narrow, and increasingly misleading intellectual
enterprise called social science in Pakistan.
To return to the spectre of ‘scientific’ definitions and the
subject of modem Pakistanis, it is time to take responsibility for
our poverty at every level. Social science in Pakistan 1s virtually
non-existent. A suggested (surrealistic) study may ‘analyze’ this
vis a vis the frequency, standard and availability of journals,
books, conferences, the state of higher education, political
pressures etc. All point to a lack of environment in which such
activity can flourish.
Yet, the Pakistani academic is not dormant; and his/her
stylistic and intellectual grace has been to remain active in the
forums of public discourse such 4s newspapers and magazines.
Insofar as these set the agenda for debate however limited, in and
for the country, academic ideas have a wide impact. Such people
single-handedly, fulfill the function of “think tanks” -- institutions
which serve as a bridge between academia, public policy and the
dominant themes of public discourse. By doing so they yet again
qualify for detailed scrutiny of the foundations of their ideas.
Given the blurring of boundaries then, the ‘purely’
academic, social/scientific view merges with the ideas of
‘intellectuals’. These include not just university teachers and
researchers but a spectrum people whose interest is not primarily
a ‘life of the mind’ but who cab ne considered a part of the
Pakistani intelligentsia and participants in the intellectual arena.
As newspapers and magazine articles show, they include

joumalists, bureaucrats, army generals and captains and
housewives. It is this composite ‘mind’ which reflects the
relationship of the intellectual with Pakistan (and themselves) and
which forms the notion of ‘modern’ in this paper. For example, in
a recent newspaper article titled ‘Can Intellectuals Save this
Country?’, the writer, (an agriculturist by profession) defined
‘intellectual’:
...as being used here to include everyone who (1) has a

mental tendency to think beyond their own immediate
interests and (2) vaguely distinguish between an
“argument” and a “passion” (Frontier Post 14.6.91).
‘Modern’ will also include those who champion the idea

of progress/development as essentially a higher economic
standard of living, and believe that the solution to Pakistan’s
problems is a scientific based, separated from Islam, secular
system of universal education. Keeping this profile in view and
the degree of self recognition of which course will vary, this paper
will treat as synonymous, progress, modermism, modernity,
modem, liberal, secular progressive, feminist, western rational.
One has tried to state, as demanded by the rules of the
scientific method, the parameters of this monograph. These are
primarily about modernism but are linked to fundamentalism
through the dictionary and the public imagination. The
substantive focus is epistemological, that is, an examination of the
assumptions on which a particular science, theory, “‘ism’ or
knowledge is based.
In Pakistan, although a great deal has been written about
the consequences of modemization, apart from Banuri’s critique,
little attention has been paid to the epistemology of modemism.
Pakistani critiques may focus on the negative or disruptive effects
of modernization, but rarely go beyond. At best there are the
currently fashionable views on indigenization and the glorification
of tradition. But the understanding of this tradition/culture
remains within the epistemology of modernity and science. Social
scientific analyes of fundamentalism are more frequent than social
Introduction 7
scientific analysis of the epistemology of modernism. This critique

seeks to redress the imbalance.
METHODS AND SOURCES:
In the discipline of clinical psychology (or even

economics) a popular intellectual device is the case study or case
history method. This involves the observing and recording of
certain salient characteristics of the subject in a manner whereby
a particular profile emerges along with attendant patterns of
significance/diagnoses/prescription. This profile forms the basis
for the extrapolation of results onto larger units, making
generalizations towards meaningful conclusions.
Since one has chosen to locate oneself at a semi-
colloquial, rather than totally academic level, the profiles of
modernism and fundamentalism -- as referred to in this paper --
have been drawn primarily from their own view of themselves and
each other as expressed in the English media by specialists and
lay persons. Thus, for example, there is a column in the weekly
Friday Times, entitled “Thinking Aloud” which gives an idea of
the self and other one is trying to locate. This self/other will also
be examined through letters to the editor of newspapers, articles
in Herald, Newsline and in Parvez Hoodbhoy’s recent book,
Muslims and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the struggle for
Rationality’.
Socio-linguistic and psycholinguistic research shows that
language -- however scientific its content -- has deep connections
with, what is popularly called, an individual’s world view. As in
speaking, it is not simply grammar and syntax which constitute
the meaning of any act of human communication. Seemingly
minor ( to the psychologist unconscious) elements such as tone,
pitch, choice of word and emphases, choice of metaphor and
adjectives, etc, all convey meaning and point to the psychology of
the communicators. As any actor knows, how we say something 1s
as important as what we say and this applies not only to the arts
but also to the most obscure scientific treatise. For the
psychologist, all writing is autobiographical, revealing an
individual’s psychological modes of cognition, values,
preferences, concerns. Even formulations such as E=mc?, tell us

the exceedingly abstract and symbolic level of its author’s “mind’.
In short, written discourse provides not only academic content but
also carries grist for the psychologist’s mill.
Language is one thing that sets us apart from the animal
kingdom. The Biblical statement “in the beginning was the Word”
can be understood as the beginning of consciousness through
language. It is above all through words that we cogitate,
intellectualize, analyze, think. Our ability to reflect on ourself and
in tum convey the mechanism (logic) and fruit of this reflection is
wholly dependent on words. Without words there would be no
consciousness. That there is a consciousness below words was of
course Freud’s great contribution-and to this one can add that his
arch-rival Jung, perceived a consciousness beyond words. Either
way, words mediate between the known and the unknown and the
nature of the unconscious is revealed in the manner in which we
utilize words. The paper then, will be utilizing methods of textual
analysis in order to reveal the psychological base of the utterances
of various individuals.
This method of textual analysis is neither unusual nor
unique. A tremendous amount of research is available on the
relationship between language, culture, belief, gender behaviour,
etc; to the extent that bibliographies run into hundreds if not
thousands of pages. Given the cornucopia, I will refer to only a
few texts and readers desirous of further information may contact
me personally.
Source materials are both secondary as well as primary;
based on almost a decade of the practice of psychology, which in
its widest sense, should be and indeed is, the prerogative of
everyone. I am referring to the notion of commonsense. Both
fundamentalists and moderns are driven by their heartfelt desire to
improve the lot of the “common man’. Yet they will have virtually
nothing to do with his (and hence their own) commonsense. Over
all, this paper will try to salvage the commonsense of the common
man from these saviours, returning to him what has been cruelly
usurped by their ideas of science, rationality and religion. One can
only urge the reader to do the same.
Introduction 9
The paper is divided into three parts. Part I sketches

elements of the case history and provides a theoretical framework
for analysis. Part II elaborates the case history at the individual
and collective levels, that is the microcosm and the macrocosm.
The essence of medicine/therapy is not so much to cure as to
comfort. Part II of the paper will conclude with some
(un)comforting thoughts about Pakistan.
NOTES
I. “Our best hope in American strength and will .. to lead a

uniplolar world, unashamedly laying down the values of a
new world order and being prepared to enforce them”.
Charles Krauthammer in Foreign Affairs (special annual
“American and the World” issue 1991).
Z, David Landes, “Rethinking Development”, The New

Republic 1989.
3, Ahmed, Durre-Sameen; “Ethnic Politics and Collective

Violence: A Psychological Analysis”. Monograph for
UN/Wider Conference on Systems of Knowledge as
Systems of Domination. Karachi. 1988.
4. Banuri, Tariq; “Modernization and its Discontents” in

Dominating Knowledge, Frederique Appfel Marglin and
Stephen A. Marglin (eds). Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1990
5) Vanguard Books, Lahore 1991.
6. Gumperz, J; Hymes, D. Directions in Socio-linguistics:

The Ethnography of Communication. N.Y. Holt,
Reinhardt, Winston, 1971.
e Miller, George, Language and Communication,

McGraw Hill, 1972
Hall, Edward. Beyond Culture, N.Y. Anchor Books,

1977.
Sapir, Edward. Culture, Language and Personality. :

University of California Press 1961.
Giglioli, Pier Paolo, Language and Social Context,

Penguin 1980.
Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth and Logic N.Y. Dover.
Bacich, John. A Little About Language Winnthrop.

Cambridge 1976.
Boulding, Kenneth, The Image, University of

Michigan, 1961.
Lacquer, T. Making Sex Body & Gender from the

Greeks to Freud. Harvard. 1991.
Sigh, Jagjit: Great Ideas in Information Theory,

Language and Cybernetics N.Y. Dover, 1966.
Watzlawick, P. The Language of Change N.Y.

Norton. 1978.
The Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study

of Interactional Paradoxes and Pathologies. N.Y.
Norton. 1965.
The Invented Reality: How do we know what we

Believe we know (Contributions to Constructivism).
N.Y. Norton 1984.
PART I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
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The Case History
In trying to construct a psychological profile of the modern

Pakistani, consider the newspaper The Friday Times, a Lahore
based weekly. It comes across as modem and liberal, yet also
‘for’ tradition insofar as it covers popular culture and, for
example, did a feature on the increasing populanty of black magic
practitioners in Lahore (26.4.90). It has news, analysis,
columnists, pop psychology, in short, it is serious yet colloquial.
Under a Rodin-esque thinker’s image, 1s a regular column titled
“Thinking Aloud”. One entitled “The Savonarola Syndrome’
(15.5.91) provides a good example of the profile one is trying to
outline and discuss (It 1s fully reproduced tn the appendix).
In summary for the moment, the author is a sophisticated
modem. Familiar with European history, he laments
(paradoxically) the fact the cruel cleric Savonarola “has been
forgotten by posterity because the answer to the problems of his
times was a false answer”. Not giving us an example of who did
solve it and gained a ‘different’ immortality, he goes onto observe
that God’s laws are “immediately comprehensible to all men” and
don’t require the mullahs since they are “incapable of
understanding reality which is complex”. Using a _ medical
metaphor, the author observes that the mullahs are of “simple
mind they confuse the symptom with the disease”. “All they do is
promote hypocrisy, superficial piety 1s taken for moral health”.
What ‘moral health’ is, he does not say. But given the earlier
definition of an intellectual by a Pakistani intellectual as partly
someone who can “think beyond his personal interests”, one can
surmise that moral health has to do with “the problems of the
citizenry” and “what is needed is awareness of and more
importantly sensitivity to the needs of the people”. The mullah is
14 Theoretical Framework
incompetent to make laws since “that knowledge must be

combined with a wider knowledge about the existing state of
society”, and this kind of mind is “simply not available among the
priestly class.” the priest is a “social parasite” who does not “eam
his living by economically productive work... The priest is unable
to see the wood for the trees. His interpretation of every divine
injunction is literal and his knowledge of the real state of the
world is no more than hazy”. We get some sense of the
columnist’s priorities, social and individual view on religious
fundamentalism and its anti-dote. He seems to be quite clear
about knowledge, (im)morality and (im)mortality.
The Friday Times frequently reproduces book reviews
and articles from the western press. It has also published
editorials, interviews, panel discussions on the strengthening
fundamentalist presence in Pakistan and India. Most of the
articles draw on the language and perspectives of various social
sciences. “Although the newspaper may not have printed such
specific analysis, nor all of the views which I shall summarize,
giving it the benefit of the doubt and an even broader intellectual
base than it may have, one can say that nsing religious
fundamentalism has been reported/analyzed in the media for the
following, reasons.
The failure of secular ideologies to provide solutions to
rising, social, economic and political problems can be considered
one reason. Another is the rapid social change (such as in Iran)
and the perceived moral bankruptcy accompanying
modernization. In some cases (as in the case of the Sikhs) threat
to group ethnic identity and political cohesion has been a major
factor. The emergence of charismatic leadership has also
contributed in the acceleration towards religious extremism.
Finally, the availability of economic assets, leadership and
organizational resources has helped the fundamentalists gain
political backing of the secular elite and further legitimization.
Between this type of information and the vision of its
columnists one can say that Islam specifically and therefore
religion per se are subjects which have received considerable
modem attention. This is not so. Typically, modern third worlders
embrace technologies not the scientific attitude. Thus, much polite
The Case History 15
lip service is paid to Islam, but the root ideas about religion, its
nature, social or sacred, are given short shrift. There is much
acknowledgement of freedom of religious expression, that it is a
‘private’ matter, that of course everyone is entitled to their
religious views and so on. But no attention is paid to the nature of
a subject, which at least in Pakistan, is not even any longer totally
private and threatens to becomes even less so.
Beneath the seemingly liberal view about religion, (“why
don’t you do your thing and I mine”) there seems to be an
indifference, anger or contempt about it. To the extent that the
latter are fueled by the current Muslim fundamentalist mood, this
is understandable. But that still does not explain the lack of public
discourse on religion as such. It seems that in the same way that
modems cannot get mullahs to open their “minds” and be rational,
modems are equally reluctant to do so about religion. One theme
of this paper will be explore this mind set of certainty.
The common refrain of moderns against religious
fundamentalism is that it intrudes on the ‘personal’. Yet, while
much else including something as personal as sexuality can be
printed hardly anything is published on the personal nature of
religion. One is not referring here to the absence or presence of
interpretations of Islam as applied to everything under the sun,
but religion; in the same category as ‘state’, ‘politics’, ‘the
economy’, ‘work’, ‘power’, ‘sex’, etc. Most moderns are familiar
with the basic elements of structure and vocabulary of these
eminently human concems. But not religion, since here, suddenly,
it becomes a ‘personal’ matter, requiring no analytic effort. The
Mullah does not have a mind to “deal with complexity”, but
modems presumably do. Modern articulation of the complexity
about the concept of religion is done primarily through silence or
then through the laws of the social sciences where the personal
anyway does not matter.
Thus there is a seeming intellectual indifference denoting
a lack of curiosity, which may be understandable for the
uneducated fanatic, but not the person who prizes the intellect, or
then there is a set posture of anger verging on mockery. A
feminist has permitted me to quote her as saying religion (not just
Islam) is “irrelevant and dangerous”. And despite The Friday
Times liberal stance, it consistently refers to Muslim

fundamentalists as “fundos”. This is in keeping with a particular
style of modemism which values ‘irreverence’ as something quite
desirable to be understood in the same ‘you do your thing’ spint.
Finally, there is very little evidence in The Friday Times
of the fact that religious resurgence, of which fundamentalism 1s
onty the extreme pole, is a global phenomenon . Over the years,
magazines such as Time, Newsweek, The Economist , have
carried numerous stories on this groundswell turing into a sea
change. The resurgence is cutting across a wide spectrum of the
globe from the advanced industrialized nations, to those until
recently communist and the Third World. There is a sort of
narcissistic tunnel vision which prevents this recognition and a
tendency like the mullah, to forget the forest for the tree, in this
case remaining nigidly focused on Pakistan and Islam. the
understanding of which, as said earlier is more in the context of
present politics, rather than substantive.
But perhaps one is being premature if not harsh. The
modem Pakistani has other matters troubling the mind to such an
extent that only a public catharsis, a powerful outpouring of
various emotions may be able to ease that most personal hidden
side to us: the conscience. The following letter to The Friday
Times, along with the title is reproduced in its entirety, since it
encapsulates many of the themes in this paper.
THE KHUSRAS’ OF PAKISTAN
Sur,
Ever since I got back to Pakistan I have been depressed as hell.
Everywhere I go people complain incessantly about the state of our
country. Talk to a ‘rickshawallah’ and he’ll complain about the
selfishness of our politicians and rising prices, talk to the average
‘dookandar’ (trader) and hell lament on the pathetic health
facilities and the crumbling educational structure, talk to the elite
and they whine about the traffic and the shortage of Chivas Regal.
But although everyone loves to hog on about the decadence and
evils of this society, quite obviously no one wants to do anything
about it. Least of all me. But then I’m not complaining. I’m just
going to complain about other people complaining.
What really gets me is that while I can forgive the rickshawalla
and the average clerk for bitching about the system and then
The Case History
retreating into the sanctity of their homes (really, what do you

expect underpaid overworked people to do?) I can’t get over the
lousy attitude of our elite.
Like uptight middle aged spinsters we’ll whine and nit-pick
everything and everyone and of course, not do a damn thing about
it! We, with our pert Oxbridge accents and development’ diplomas
keep our: well-fed, well-exercised little butts glued to our insulated
air conditioned offices and expect everything to miraculously
change for the better.
Occasionally we'll meet over a cup of coffee and ease our
terribly burdened conscience by raging on the entire Pakistani
socio-economic structure. It seems to me, of course, I could be
terribly presumptuous, that we, the elite, are the ones who can
actually get things done. I mean, we are the ones with the resources,
education, contacts and powerful patrons. We have the power and
the clout to make a difference. And it just doesn’t become us to
gripe about things and then slink away. All in all, I’d say we, the
fat-cats of Pakistan, are a bunch of smug, self-righteous, spineless,
gutless, degenerate wimps.
And I’m no better. For one thing, although I do partake in my
share of whining, reading World Bank poverty reports and eagerly
tuch tuching over the sickeningly romantic photos of the ‘deprived’.
I’ve never particularly wanted to visit the inner-city ghettos or
shanty towns to view the actual scale of human misery and do
something about it. Well, for one thing it’d probably smell like shit
and then all those naked kids with runny noses would touch me.
Forget it! I mean, I’m someone who drinks Evian. No way Jose.
I’d much rather sit and discuss these issues with my politically
correct cronies in my well padded office or muse about them some
Thursday night and then take in a Rs 1,000 concert to ‘make me
feel better’. But one of my friends, a ‘development’ person, takes
the cake for hokiness. He really kills me everytime he sits in his
fresh wood panelled office and laments about the horrors of
deforestation to some young impressionable journalist. Atta boy.
Keep our spirit alive!
I’ve always had a helluva lot more respect for cut-throat
businessmen or dizzy begums than I’ve had for our intelligentsia. At
least they don’t whimper about something they don’t want to do
anything about. No, a self-obsessed lot, they keep to their takeovers
and jewels. No hogwash from them. Just straight good ole’ greed.
We the ‘enlightened’ elite of Pakistan are the truly pathetic
ones. We whine, whine, whine only to hop onto the next party and
wine, wine, wine. Hey, it’s O.K., by me if you don’t want to do
anything. I myself rather pride my own apathy. I mean, who wants
to shake things up and antagonize powerful powerbrokers for some
mealy faces in Bund Road. But then if we are not going to show
some action let’s shut the hell up and quit depressing the next
person who walks in through our door. No more ‘khusrapan’. Not
more perching high on our chairs and quivering with evangelistic
self-righteousness and indignation while waxing on poverty and
corruption in Pakistan. No more warbling in our perfectly intonated
English on the crumbling of our great Islamic society. Just zip it!
Really, don’t be offended by my spewing. It’s just that since I
don’t work for the World Bank, or any other ‘do-good’ outfit this is
the only way I can ease my conscience
yours etc.
A.Inam
Lahore Cantt.
(15.5.91)
* A Khusra is a male, hormonally imbalanced towards feminine

characteristics. They cannot be classified as transsexuals or
bisexuals since they shun female physical contact and do not have
sex change operations. Dressed as women, they are as close as
one can elaborate the term hermaphrodite. In the Subcontinent,
they constitute a distinct community working most prominently as
entertainers at family celebrations such as at birth and marriage.
The writer is depressed. Alongwith a wonderful, world

weary sophistication and humorous rakishness there is a sense of
helplessness and rage. Again, detailed diagnoses of this existential
angst and those who provoked it, must wait. For the moment, it
should be seen as another part of: our prototype of the modern
Pakistani who 1s the theme of this paper, as A. Inam, as the
Thinker, juxtaposed with the “fundos’.
The problem one is addressing is not the modem
understanding of Islamic religious fundamentalism. As stated; the
problem is his/her understanding of religion per se, which is so
personal as to be almost invisible. Yet these same individuals,
directly and indirectly through the media, advance a certain
ideology of ‘liberation’. Its hallmark is that, unlike the religious
fanatic, theirs is a considered, ‘enlightened’ view (secularism). It
is superior because it is educated, more moral because it is a
rational. The rational understanding of religion is not discussed.
Yet they are to be thought of as tolerant implying again, a moral
superjority over the religious fanatic. Having stated tolerance, in
The Case History 19
basically cynical terms, the subject is closed on the plea of

‘personal’. However, an axiom of human communication states
that it is impossible not to communicate. When we slam a door
shut, we give a certain message. Social scientific ideas tell us very
little. As Barnhardt has observed:
To try and salvage the idea of secularism by saying that what we

are merely witnessing is a backlash against science and modemity
and literate western values is akin to burying one’s head in the
sand and analytically quite fruitless. In the light of global
phenomena this is a particularly unintelligent response having
more to do with ithe framing of questions than an attempt for
coherent answers.
Given its global resurgence the question then is not really

how fundamentalism can thrive in a climate of greater and lesser
modemity or rationality. Rather, it is how can any strain of
religion thrive at all. According to Bamhardt, the fact is that the
conditions that gave rise to the earliest forms of religion have not
significantly changed since the emergence of Homo Sapiens, nor
is there any indication that they will change as long as the species
survives. The conditions in question have different labels and
have been summed up as:
Those conditions that generate in individuals the intense

consciousness of their finiteness. To the degree that any human
response is motivated or affected by this specific form of
consciousness, to that degree it may be described as religious in
its concem.
The issue is one of consciousness, an amorphous idea but

which is colloquially accessible in the idea of ‘T’ and ‘me’. It is
also something which perhaps some modern Pakistanis may have
at moments ‘raised’, ‘blown’, ‘expanded’. For the moment
consider it as that which is the opposite of unconscious.
In the face of a global religious resurgence, human,
economic, social and political activity can be considered as
mechanisms devised as responses to this overarching aspect of
consciousness which simply stated is the idea of death. It 1s one
domain which has little to do directly with politics, society,

culture, economics or any other collective activity and yet can be
seen as the root cause, the psychological fuel behind these
activities. Death is overwhelmingly an individual concern.
Nothing can be more ‘personal’ than death. In order to understand
how the moder Pakistani views it, one perforce must turn to life.
These are admittedly large themes. But so are politics and society.
Let us not forget also, that psychology is different from other
social sciences. By design it is person-al and its arena is such that
it deals directly with the reality of a subject who is more of a
concept in the social sciences. And to be scientific is to describe
reality.
Before any diagnoses of what ails A.Inam and the
psychodynamics of the Thinker, one needs a diagnostic system,
that is, a set of assumptions or what in social science is called a
theoretical framework.
ENDNOTES
1. For a comprehensive review see Emile Sahliyeh (ed)

Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary
World. SUNY series in Religion, Culture and Society.
State University of N.Y. Press, 1991.
2 Hadden, J. & Shupe, A; Prophetic Religions and

Politics: Religion and Political Order. Paragon House.
N.Y. 1986.
Be For example an article on transsexuals (16.5.91). Or on

homosexuality. Frontier Post (3.12.91/26.6.91). In The
News (26.6.91).
4. Sahliyeh (ed), ibid.
Dy For example: Newsweek (10.6.91) (6.5.91) (17.12.90)

Time: (21.1.91) (1.10.91) (6.5.91) The Economist:
(30.3.91) (28.7.90)
The Case History Zh
Watzlawick, et al. The Pragmatics of Human

Communication: A Study of Interactional Paradoxes
and Pathologies. N.Y. Norton, 1965.
Barnahardt, J. 'The Incurably Religious Animal’in

Sahliyeh (ed) Religious Resurgence - ibid.
ibid.
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical frameworks provide the key to any analysis .

and it is vital that they be grasped if any meaningful information
is‘to be exchanged. An underlying contention of this paper is that
modem Pakistanis have some very strange notions about
psychology, which stem not so much from a lack of information
than for two reasons: firstly, that their understanding of
psychology is through the lens of a western consciousness and the
perspective that it gives on human behaviour has been simply
swallowed whole, and unquestioned. terms such as
‘schizophrenia’, ‘paranoid’, ‘depression’, ‘anxiety’ are commonly
used to express thoughts, feelings, ideas, and in a given context
reflect assumptions about what is (un)desirable, pathological,
normal and abnormal behaviour. These terms are commonly used
and they reflect popular assumptions/conceptions not only about
others but onese/f. An interesting aspect of modernism is the view
that since, psychology is a _ science its ‘discoveries’,
pronouncements, practitioners are beyond questioning. Having
accepted what it says about us, when we don’t find ourselves or
others conforming to the standards set out by it, rather than
reflecting and reassessing them, we either quietly continue
struggling to live up to those standards or seek out the
practitioner, who can’t be wrong, uninformed etc., since his/her
knowledge is modem and scientific. Rarely do modems think
about themselves as they are without attaching to this sense of
self, labels derived from modern western psychology, especially
as expressed in Freud’s legacy.
This paper is based on a post-Jungian, radically re-
visioned psychology of human consciousness and behaviour.
Jung was Freud’s star pupil and subsequently his greatest rival.
Theoretical Framework 23
The knowledge that they left us about the human psyche is a tale
of two cities, one of which every psychologist eventually inhabits.
For reasons which have been well documented, but this paper will
not elaborate, by and large the Freudian perspective dominates
our ideas about consciousness to a degree that most people no
longer question it. It is only in the last decade that Freudian
assumptions are being seriously challenged. In Pakistan, however,
whether in practice or the public level, he reigns supreme. (For
examples, of how Freud’s vision permeates thinking till today see
Appendix)
The post-Jungian View:
Although Jung agreed with Freud about the existence of

the unconscious, his attitude towards the’ psyche was radically
different. Based on many years of psychiatric practice and
drawing on a vast knowledge of comparative culture, Jung’s
model of human consciousness relied less upon theoretical
assumptions (none of Freud’s concepts have a biological base),
and more on the structure of the psyche as it exists in human
experience.
The essence of this structure is one of diversity in which
what we term ‘consciousness’ is numerous mosaics flowing
through different levels of awareness. Our everyday life confirms
the existence of this flow which is less like a unidirectional river
and more of a recursive movement. For example, at any given
moment, (pre)occupations, of guilt, loss, and love, may constantly
intrude -- fleetingly or forcefully -- into whatever may be
occupying, our attention externally.
This reality of diverse ideas and emotions, according to
Jung, is a mirror image of what can be called the earliest model of
the psyche which is of mythology. The modern mind regards
mythology as a quaint subject, evidence of a lost age when people
did not have the benefit of science and had to resort to
superstitions and stories of the exploits of gods and goddesses. At
best it is seen as a primitive precursor to the idea of religion, at
worst childish entertainment. Today we use it to refer to a lie,
nonexistence. In fact it may reflect truth and reality.
When one studies comparative mythology, as Jung did,

(and it is important to know that every known civilization/society
has its store of myths) a different picture emerges. Beneath the
seeming confusion of improbable events, there are clear cut
themes, and these recur with variations across cultures throughout
history. A study of these themes reveals not only the nature of the
gods of the ancients, but also the nature, that is the psychology of
the human characters. These myth-themes Jung named
archetypes. Granted that today the orginal idiom of myth is
devoid of meaning, not least because of literal over use. But this
language can lend itself to newer and sometimes more ‘radical’
perspective than provided by most contemporary theories of
human behaviour. The work of Jung, Cassirer, Campbell, Eliade,
Corbin, Durand, Zimmer and Hillman, among others, offers these
perspectives. Thus, the theoretical framework is not located in
ideas of brain and physiology but in what has been called a
“poetic basis of mind”.
Archetypes:
The concept of the archetype was first elaborated by Jung

and despite the fact that it is difficult to define precisely, the word
has been absorbed into general usage. James Hillman further
developed this idea and considers archetypes as axiomatic first
principles, similar to models which are found in other fields, like
“matter”, “energy”, “health”, “society” and ‘art”. These ideas
hold whole worlds together and yet can never be pointed to,
accounted for, or even adequately circumscribed. They are the
deepest patterns of psychic functioning governing the perspectives
we have of ourselves and the world as axiomatic self evident
images to which psychic life and our theories about it ever return.
From the Jungian perspective, archetypes are symbolic
representations of typical human experiences but experienced in
such a way that they have a profound even cosmic significance
for the individual. The fact is that despite advancement of
knowledge in various fields, human nature as such is really no
different from the beginning of recorded history. We have
absolutely no evidence that we are in any sense better than our
forebears. Life remains at heart the same - love, ambition, sexual

desire, power, defeat, security, confusion, competition, betrayal,
despair, and all their opposites and much more. In short, the
“stuff of life’, is unchanging.
All of us, at one time or another, have experienced the
above situations which on the one hand can be considered banal in
their commonness. Yet, to deny that we have never been gripped
by any, to have been moved to tears of joy or sorrow or
desperation; and childish exultation, would be dishonest. When
we have such universal experiences, and where the discourse of
ordinary life is inadequate to express them, it is an archetypal
experience. They are most commonly expressed through symbols
and to study human nature at its most basic level is to study the
symbols of its culture(s), mythology, art, religion, architecture,
drama, epic, ritual.
If psychologically humans are essentially the same the
earliest model of the psyche can be found in mythology. The most
cursory reading of any mythology resonates with psychological
meaning, that is it reflects situations, emotions, strategies, etc.,
which we can identify with at some time or another. The gods in
their relationships closely approximate our far-ranging inner and
outer psychological states. Like in our own psyches, different
archetypes in the symbolic form of god and human, enter and exit
in continuous flow expressing the varied nature of, for example,
love, rage, fear, despondency, prurience and passion. Venus, the
goddess of love, can behave like a fishwife in the throes of
jealousy. Pan -- of the flute and nature, is also a source of the
word panic. Each is a style of consciousness.
In more contemporary images, myths and archetypes are
programs, the software governing the way individuals perceive
‘reality’. Like cultural DNA, they tell about who we are, where
are we are going, and what are the various options about life. They
help organize society, families, individuals in ways which are
simultaneously creative and destructive, quietly maintaining, a
balance. As long as things don’t change, they give stability. But in
times of crisis or rapid change, the duality emerges in its
fundamental polarities, frequently violently so. Constituting a
kind of web of inner meaning, often unavoidable to our direct
inspection, archetypes are the foundations of our basic

assumptions about life and are the controlling images which
determine much of the course of our lives. It is from these inner
predispositions and the feeling and images clustered about them
that we form a sense of who we are collectively and individually.
In sum, myths and the archetypes therein can be considered as
attitudes, perspectives on life, events, relationships -- or as
Hillman calls them structures of consciousness. (One can note in
passing that in its emphasis on difference and diversity this
psychology is seminal to what is today referred to as post-
modernism.)
From our perspective every theory whether in science,
economics or psychology, rests on certain ideas/assumptions
about human nature. Every discipline is a unique way in which
the psyche seeks to describe and understand life. At the
foundations of each branch of knowledge is a psychological
premise of hope, fear, depression, paranoia. There are many
faculties within each of us. Similarly our academic house too has
many rooms and even more windows. The original meaning of the
word ‘idea’ is from the Greek ‘eidos’: not only that which one
sees but also by means of which one sees. For example, the idea
of science as objective and moral has its archetypal premises in
Apollo: detachment, dispassionate, exclusive masculinity, clarity,
formal, beauty, far-sighted aims and a certain elitism. Thus,
theories reveal an archetypal and mythological basis. In trying to
profile the nature of these assumptions from the archetypal
perspective, one may then ask ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ impels us
to think the way we do about ourselves, relationships, social
policy, religion etc.
The Myth of the Hero:
This paper is based on the idea that modem Pakistani

consciousness, despite claiming that it is free from colonial bonds
is in fact still their prisoner. Our consciousness is firstly
dominated by the myth of the hero, a universal story of young,
males learning to become adult men. Briefly, it concems the birth
of a boy, his separation from origins at a young, age, the facing of
Theoretical Framework QT
tremendous trials and dangers, then returning to origins as victor,

ruler, law giver. After some time, either through betrayal or
hubris (arrogance) he falls from favour to decline and death.
Some examples are the stories of Ulysses, Oedipus, Mithras,
Jason. In psychological terms the myth is a symbolic as well as
physical enactment of the emergence of the faculties of will power
and reason, that 1s, rational consciousness. The task of mastering
the sexual impulse and the emergence of the faculties of will
power, rationality, control, organization, are the hallmarks of
such a consciousness. According to Jung and Hillman, these
qualities were further enhanced by the co-optation and fusion with
another powerful archetype, that of monotheistic religion.
Interestingly the life stories of the founders of the
monotheistic religions bear in varying degree close parallels to the
hero myth. Given that the physical dominates in the heroic quest,
there is a predisposition towards the concrete, that is, the symbols
of monotheistic religion were absorbed in a literal way.
Monotheistic ideals of morality, unity and purity blended with
heroic principles to produce a mind set and a self image that is
today considered the norm, that is, most desirable. When we refer
to our ‘self’ the ‘ego’ as Freud called it, this ideal 1s at work as
that which is supposed to be “‘incharge’ of our personality.
Hillman, Jung and others have traced the ascending
cognitive journey of the hero, starting from the Mediterranean and
its fecund matrix of images, through Greece to Northern Germany
in the ideas of Martin Luther and his heroic Protestant Ethic anjd
its fusion with modern science. It is a fascinating history, showing
how psychology itse/f is in fact an archetype of the hero, holding
upto us its masculine principles as models of consciousness and
normal/abnormal behaviour. (See Appendix for more details.)
The literal and the Symbolic:
In order to understand the psychological mechanisms at

work, it is best to briefly discuss these terms. These two concepts
will be referred to frequently, and it is important to understand the
basis of distinction.
Human existence functions as a unified whole but for

heuristic purposes one talks of the ‘mind-body’ spectrum. That is,
there is an awareness of body but there is also a complete inner
world that we inhabit -- consciousness - where body awareness
recedes into the background. (“Don’t kick me”, we say rather than
“don’t kick my legs.”) The first is literal, the second symbolic. To
the extent that we are physical and creative beings, what is
literally so is at some level symbolically true and vice versa. This,
in fact, is the essence of the concept of the archetypes and myths
which expand the above idea into the categories of the individual
and the collective.
The collective/social aspect to us, in order to adequately
express itself requires the symbolic, that is, something which will
unite and yet be transpersonal. Symbols therefore, are flexible,
that is ambiguous and open-ended enough to receive and respect
individual differences. At the same time insofar as we are
hostages of the physical, this symbolic expression cannot but be
expressed through physical means. That is, there has to be an
image (such as a flag), sound, movement or person which gives
form to the symbol. The content, insofar as it pertains to the
individual, is literal and can even be precise, the form reflecting
the collective is more open ended, subject to variation and can
never be totally circumscribed. If this circumscription, or pinning
down, occurs, the symbol loses its unifying ‘power’, the
individual (literal) becomes dominant, and diversity, with its
requirement of interpretation, is excluded. But the power of the
idea lives on in the individual in terms of affect.
The modern understanding of symbols -- such as in
anthropology and semiotics -- although claiming to maintain this
distinction does not do so’. The interpretation of symbols is, in
fact, more an interpretation of signs (such as the matchstick
figures for male/female public restrooms). This is allegorical, not
symbolic. True symbols, that is those which abide over a
considerable period of time, have an affective element capable of
‘holding’ a particular emotion or idea -- the duputta, the Kaba,
the Swastika, Saddam Hussain, mother, Imran Khan. They can
never be fully explained and will always have an element of
mystery, that is, an individually unknowable, transpersonal
element. As Henry Corbin of the Sorbonne states, symbols say

that which cannot be said in any other way|
The element of unknowability brings a sense of limitation
and is an analogue of that universal human limiter: death. The
sense of mystery thus is intimately connected to the most effective
symbolic system created to deal with death: Religion. The element
of mystery within the symbolic is what we call ‘sense of the
sacred’, that which we sense but cannot name. As long as the
mystery remains so does the sense of the sacred. Once the mystery
is ‘explained’, the symbol shrinks; tilting more and more to the
individual, until the collective dimension recedes taking with it
ambiguity, fear, and security, in short, the sacred.
Freudian interpretations of dream symbols rely on a
literalizing approach: A dagger is ‘nothing but’ the penis and
sexual desire, whereas it could also be as Jung claimed, the urge
to analyze, penetrate intellectually, the desire to “see through’ an
idea. The common man and his ‘superstitions’ about life, events,
things, emphasizes this seeing through the thing (except not
consciously). For example when confronted with a bolt of
lightning, he will “see’ as the Greeks did, Zeus, or some other god.
An aspect of divinity (1.e., the unknown) is evoked. The modern
man sees ‘nothing, but’ lightning. Insofar as the symbolic contains
the literal, the common man ‘sees through’, and for him there is a
metaphysical transparency to phenomenon. Both are right,
except that the scale of the symbolic makes the common man feel
small, common, and this proportion is reversed for the modern.
The story of the hero then, is a symbolic enactment of a
rite of passage from childhood to manhood and the dominant
concems of males during approximately the first half of life.
Perforce, the physical body and the general struggle to ‘establish’
oneself at this stage is a central concern, and in this sense the
story has an emphasis on the literal and physical. Yet, the
myth/rite is also functioning as a rite of passage. At the symbolic
level, it teaches about life as process rather than product and
things. It speaks of the need to give up familial security, childish
demands, the acknowledgement of the hurts of life without
whence or why and the surrender of individualism in favour of the
community and collective. It is these larger themes which give the
initiate both the sense of mystery and courage to face ordeals. It is

still present in the military idea of “boot camp’, and college
initiation ceremonies such as “first year fools” .
In sum: Myths, ritual, archetypes, are symbolic
containers for ideas as principles governing individual and
collective human existence. To read them literally is to read them
at the physical level. And to omit their symbolic level is to deny
not only the importance of community but is to also de-sacralize
the ideas therein in the sense of a denigration and denial of their
meaning about death and thus, the sacred. All myths have this
paradoxical structural and pedagogical duality, on the one hand
talking of life, on the other limitation and death; over all symbolic,
yet containing a literal element.
Monotheism of Consciousness
Focused essentially on an upward trajectory of the ‘quest’

(progress) bolstered by monotheistic ideals of morality and
transcendence, moder heroic consciousness is essentially: Aryan,
Apolionic, Germanic, Protestant, Christian, positivistic,
Cartesian, rational and overwhelmingly masculine. It opposes as
immoral and abnormal, anything that is feminine, ambiguous,
dark, symbolic, metaphoric. Such a mind set is excessively
cerebral, denying the reality of body, decay limitation. The
diversity and multiplicity of the mythological pantheon, full of
what Jung called ‘the little people” of the psyche, are repressed,
denied expression and seen only as ‘symptoms’ of a diseased and
disordered mind. Or as he said “the gods have become diseases”.
The “little people” are all those sides to us which do not
subscribe to the heroic ego’s principles of will power, separation,
rulership, control. And if one can bring even a modicum of
honesty towards oneself and the course of our own lives it is
evident that there is much to us which is quite unheroic: moods of
sullen despair, perennially doing/saying things we don’t intend --
from eating too much, to desire and betrayals -- of love,
vengeance, sexual obsession, vulnerability and being tom apart by
a range of conflicts we are too ashamed to admit. Our own
experiences (and Jung) give a picture of human consciousness as
it naturally exists apart from “scientific” and moralistic notions of

how it “should be”. Unlike Freud, Jung never gave a specific
etiology of neurosis. For him it was simply “a one sidedness in
the presence of many” and in this sense schizophrenia is the
natural state of the psyche. The principles of the hero and
literalized monotheism epitomize this idea of neurotic
onesidedness leading to a vision that is inherently anti-feminine,
exclusive and violent. It is this insistence on exclusion which is at
the root of individual and social pathology when what we call
‘ego’ that is:
Number One will not recognize the existence of independent

partial personalities and through this denial places them outside in
the world where they became paranoid fears of invasion by
enemies. On the one hand we have individual insanity, on the
other, insane collective projections upon other people, whole
races and nations.
Instead of remaining one of the many facets of

consciousness, the masculine hero has assumed the role in
totality, to produce a particularly intolerant, exclusivist and
frequently destructive attitude towards all that is different
especially that which is feminine and diverse.
By subsuming the ethos of Protestant Christianity’, that
is, literalizing the symbolic aspects of that particular religion,
modern consciousness reduces all issues to moral ones and sees
difference and diversity as irreconcilable opposites. This kind of
moral reductionism becomes the basis for all types of social
action justified on the basis of unity and morality, which Jung
called “monotheism of consciousness”. Monotheism is not simply
a religious perspective. Insofar as the three traditions incorporate
"It should be noted that Jung had a running battle with Christianity
about these ideas and was frequently labelled a heretic by both
Catholics and Protestants. On the other hand, while travelling through
Africa, he was on more than one occasion called a Muslim, by
Muslims. The anti-Christian label of heresy is similarly the frequent
lot of post-Jungians such a Hillman. The issue of monotheism has
been discussed in detail in the Appendix
multiplicity within an ideal of Unity (god, Yahweh, Allah), at a

symbolic level, it is a religious perspective about religious
perspectives, talking of the unity among all religious. Monotheism
of consciousness refers to a /iteral attitude towards symbolic
events in which one vision, in this case the hero’s dominance of
the natural matrix of multiplicity, overwhelms; swallowing up all
other views in an attempt to extend itself and create ‘unity’. The
resultant lopsided and exceedingly narrow vision of science,
religion, self and society is evident at different levels.
Such a consciousness has no capacity for anything
opposing its view even though life at its most basic physical level
is dual. In the hormones that stream through our blood to
elements of physique we reflect the other sex, males possibly
more so than females. ‘Contradiction’, ‘ambivalence’, ‘opposite’,
‘inconsistent’ are dirty words, a sign of weakness and demand
resolution into a singular frame of meaning and action. These
ideas of singularity rest on the Cartesian assumption about the
mind as separated from the body. Even though medical
phenomena such as phantom pain and indeed as modem
psychiatry and its ‘discovery’ of psychosomatic illnesses show,
the separation is delusional. If anything, the body houses the mind
and modem research across medicine gives the lie to the Cartesian
hypothesis.
Based on such outmoded and male models of
consciousness and drawing strength from moral ideas of a literal
reading of religion, the emergent mindset is one which regards the
world in absolutist, monolithic terms. This is the psychology of
the moder ‘liberal’ (fanatic). The psychodynamics of religious
fundamentalism are different insofar as not usually having had the
benefit of modern education, the Cartesian split is not evident.
Insofar as the same split also gave humans a method of knowing
the material world (science) the mullah’s thinking is different and
will not be detailed in this paper partly because it is unnecessary
since in terms of outcome, that is, the end result it is quite similar
to the modem: Masculine, misogynist, violent. It is simply more
literal and therefore physically so. Whereas, since the modem
prides the ‘mind’, his violence is more insidious, covert and
psychological.
Although this paper will not discuss in any detail

Pakistani feminism, this perspective obviously raises some
interesting questions about it. As the paper will indirectly show,
Pakistani feminists (men and women) are essentially prisoners of
a world view which is waning even in the west. The point anyway
is not to look to the west necessarily for (dis) confirmation but
more importantly to one’s own individual experience (truth).
With this emphasis on Cartesian rationality (I think
therefore...) and denial/separation of the body, according to
Hillman, wherever one turns, whether in politics or medicine, the
scene is dominated by analogues of the monotheistic hero; as for
example in the political idea of the strong ‘center’ and the
medical model of disease and health. It is significant to note in
passing, that the first two ‘mental’ diseases to be discovered, were
schizophrenia or multiple personality, and hysteria -- the
wandering, uterus, which is a prototypically female condition.(See
Appendix for details.)
Whether in science, psychology, sex or religion, our
views -- as did Descartes’ -- ultimately rest on assumptions about
life and ‘reality’ At heart we are all philosophers, seeking to
construct explanations about self and others. All knowledge is
based on a philosophy, and this has never been a monolithic
enterprise, certainly not today. Indeed it is the enormous diversity
of perspectives in knowledge which can make academic
intellectual activity an exciting pursuit and prevent it from
becoming, demagoguery. Anchored in a post-Jungian approach,
then, this paper seeks to show (up) what the Cambridge
philosopher Jenny Teichman has called the ‘peacock’ or ‘rooster
factor’ in modern modes of thought, that is, that nvalry between
purportedly incommensurable theories is often only an illusion
caused by rivalry between men.
The nature of academic discourse in conference papers
necessitates considerable condensation of material. In the process
many details which may substantiate these admittedly strong
statements have had to be omitted. The structures of westem
consciousness one has just set out are intimately linked to the fact
of the history of western civilization and the role of religion and
science (including psychology) over the course of two thousand
years, especially in the last two centuries. One should also keep in
mind that this theoretical framework is almost entirely based on
enormous scholarly work of males, and has only recently been
added to by feminists.
It is a part of the modern Pakistani mindset not to be too
familiar with the psychological history of some of its cherished
ideas and to simply accept a particular reading of that history, one
which will only confirm the existing Northern European and
increasingly American weltenschauung. Nor does it seem to be
too interested in seeking ways of approaching the
psychological(personal) study of religion. In order to show how
these ideas have, in fact, a substantive base in the history of
science and psychology, there is an appendix at the end of the
paper, spelling out the details of an admittedly complex
theoretical framework.
Modern intellectuals frequently acknowledge the presence
of complexity, but become impatient when this complexity is
articulated. Indeed, one can say that impatience is one of the
hallmarks of modernity. Thus the reader is urged to familiarize
himself either at this stage or then later, with the details of the
theory. It serves the dual purpose of laying bare the nature of
existing paradigms of consciousness (that is, our sense of self and
the world) while simultaneously presenting an alternative view.
ENDNOTES
1. Hillman, James, Re-visioning Psychology Harper &

Row. N.Y. 3rd edition, 1985.
px: See the Appendix for bibliography.
3) Hillman, James. Archetypal Psychology: A Brief

Account. Dallas. Spring Books 1985.
Campbell, Joseph. The Hero with a Thousand Faces.

Princeton/Bollingen - 1975. Also see The Mythic Image.
Princeton/Bollingen - 1978.
See discussion on monotheism/Islam in Appendix.
A typical example is: Combs-Schilling. Sacred

Performances: Myth Ritual and Sacrifice in Islam N.Y.
Columbia University Press. 1991.
Corbin, Henry. Creative Imagination in the Sufism of

Ibn-i-Arabi, Princeton. Bollingen series. 1975.
Female rites of passage are different. Menstruation itself

is a rite of passage. The ntuals for women lead to a
different consciousness, a more reflective mode.
A.Van Gennep. The Rites of Passage U. of Chicago

Press. 1960. M. Eliade. Myth and Reality. N.Y. Harper
and Row.
10. Jung C.G. The Collected Works (Vol 13 # 51). From

now on C.W. All references are from the translation by
Herbert Read, Fordham, and Adler. Routledge and Kegan
Paul. London 1977.
ine See Teichmans' review of Mac Intyre's Three Versions of

Moral Enquiry. Notredame. 1990. In New York Time
Book Review, 6.8.90.
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PART II
MIODERNISM IN PAKISTAN
The Macrocosm
-Modemism in Pakistan has a peculiarly ironic ring to it

and in a sense goes deeper than whatever value we assess to the
results of western consciousness. On the one hand we are trapped
by naive, monolithic conceptions of rationality/science. On the
other, and this is the irony, there have been over the last five
decades, a steady reconsidering of the basic ideas about
modemism in the west leading to what is now being labelled
‘post-modernism’. Post-modernism, whether in literature, or
science, is a move away from cause and effect determinism,
towards the systemic or relational.
In the ‘hard’ sciences it began with quantum physics and
has gained steady momentum over this century -- which overall
can best be described as an ego-trip. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to list in detail, the change of paradigms science has
undergone. However, it is important to note that alongwith the
hairsplitting obsession of knowing more and more about less and
less, science in the west is also an enterpmise in search of different
principles. The idea of causality -- whether in medicine or
chemistry -- is no longer part of the dominant paradigm. Although
specialization, that is, a narrow focus is still valued, the
proliferation of inter-disciplinary areas such as psycho-neuro-
immunology, 1s evidence of a broadening of scientific horizons.
Post-modernism in science is a formal recognition of
complexity, connection, multiple possibilities and necessarily
leads to a more loosely defined idea of what can constitute ‘unity’.
(‘Chaos’ itself is now an established discipline.) Irony, paradox,
ambiguity, diversity, multiplicity, uncertainty, are the elements of
the vocabulary of post-modern consciousness. Two points can be
made here. Firstly, post-modernism is a consciousness that is
The Macrocosm 39
close to the heart of science in terms of science’s mandate to

describe to us the reality of our material world; if not also of the
non-material which we experience as real, such as love and anger,
and the consciousness of their reality. This consciousness,
therefore, can be said to be closer to our ‘indigenous’ -- however,
one qualifies it -- consciousness. In sum: it acknowledges
multiplicity.
Pakistani Psychiatry/Psychology:
An example from Pakistani psychiatry and medicine can

explain this point. Psychiatry and psychology in the west have
undergone tremendous changes in the past century. Although the
mainstream would have us believe that these changes have been a
consolidation of the theoretical and practical level, this is in fact
not the case. By mainstream one means, of course, academia. But
academic medicine and psychology are by nature more
susceptible to public scrutiny in the sense that their theories have
a more direct and practical impact on the general public.
Medicine is about life and death. In response to the many
inadequacies (if not injustices) of the results of academic medical
science and psychology, the last twenty years have brought about
a sea change in the attitudes of the public regarding these issues.
Fueled primarily by the insights of feminism, the appearance of
AIDS and the environmental crisis, this movement, goes under the
name of ‘alternatives’ -- choice -- and is virtually synonymous
with post modernism. It has seriously challenged the medical
establishments some of whom continue to label it as
‘unscientific’, but many others, in the true spirit of science, are
absorbing those ideas into theory and practice.
Thus, for example, Harvard Magazine’ ran a cover story
on two Indian doctors (who teach at that university), and their
research on traditional Indian medicine (Ayurved). Ideas reach a
certain momentum before they are considered ‘solid and
scientific’ enough to be acknowledged by the ruling establishment.
The article leaves no doubt as to the current importance of the
Altemative movement in medical science. And even though
mainstream medicine remains overwhelmingly heroic in outlook,
40 Modernism in Pakistan
the post-modem alternatives are significantly diluting and

enlarging the modem vision.
None of this dilution, or sense of diversity and recognition
of the value of indigenous and altemative systems of healing are
visible in Pakistan. Whatever one may think, hikmat is not taken
seriously by moderns, even homeopathy does not enjoy the same
status as in Britain. The wide range of traditional methods of
healing are more often scoffed at as superstitious and primitive
and their practitioners, as for example, hakims and pirs, are
objects of modernist derision and contempt. * The point is not that
all pirs are adept at all types of healing. Rather, it is the
monolithic, negative view of traditional systems that is the focus.
And there is little evidence, in research or the media, that this
view is not an extreme one; the tendency being to throw the baby
out with the bath water.
Indigenous systems are like any other fields of
knowledge/disciplines. Like modern medicine, they too have a
range of competence and limitations in practice. No one has yet
conclusively proved that the fraud, quackery and incompetence is
any more (or less) in indigenous systems as compared to modem
medicine. Yet most modems assume this without either studying
their theoretical base or then see this base through the lens of a
theory to which these data, by definition, will not conform.
While much is written in the media about the dangers of
these superstitions, rarely does one come across the enormous
range of problems caused by modern medicines. The recent
conclusions about the disastrous effects of anti-biotics, do not
stop their indiscriminate dispensing in Pakistan. Similarly, it is
difficult to believe that no modern Pakistani doctor has ever made
a mess of a patient. Yet, neither the press nor the medical
establishment has ever seriously highlighted or pursued the
frequent mishandling and even fatal outcomes of doctors treating
patients.
Insofar as the essence of the alternative movement in the
west includes the ideas of diversity and the value of traditional
knowledge systems, medicine, psychiatry and psychology in
Pakistan are firmly focused towards labelling (and treating) the
traditional as pathological.
The Macrocosm 4]
This, despite the fact that the ‘progressive psychologist’

is frequently anti-colonial and an ardent admirer of Franz Fanon
who was a passionate participant and observer in the Algerian
war for independence. Fanon analysed the psychology of the
colonizer and colonized in Freudian terms, showing how
colonialism effects the idea of the brown sahib by a continuing
identification with former masters. However, by upholding the
values of the Freudian ego, which is simply an extension of the
_hero’s consciousness, Fanon continued to perpetuate colonial
ideas of consciousness. He too saw religious and spiritual
expression in classic Freudian and Marxist terms: as lack of
modern education, infantile superstition; the opiate of the poor.
Pakistani devotees of Fanon have yet to question his
epistemological premises and their umbilical connection with
colonialism has, in fact, never been cut.
That the modem excolonial mind is, in fact, strangling
itself with the cord it believes has been severed is exemplified by
the enterprise of psychology in Pakistan. Analysis of the Punjab
University syllabus for the “M.Sc” degree in psychology reveals it
to be almost totally saturated in Freudian epistemology. Not a
single text reflects the value of the traditional while a great many
point to the idea of it as superstitions related to religion which are
thus ‘nonscientific’ or ‘primitive’. Traditional systems are
primitive precursors to “Abnormal Psychology”. Out of a total of
eleven theories/models taught at the post graduate level, ten are
ego-oriented while one is purely biological. Students are required
to be proficient in ‘diagnostic testing’, statistics and a
considerable amount of pharmacology. In short, the Freudian
medical scientific model is being replicated. Given the bewildering
array of the ‘therapy supermarket” in the west (more than 300
choices at last count by Newsweek), many Pakistani
psychologists proudly claim that of course, Freud is out of date.
As the Appendix II to this paper has discussed, in fact, his
(epistemological) “legacy” continues, virtually unquestioned in
Pakistan. As usual women bear the brunt.’ The most recent
example of how Freudian psychology has, in fact, become
synonymous with ‘commonsense’ concerns the present
controversy about ‘Recovered Memories’ in so-called child abuse
cases in the U.S. Consider the following extracts from an essay on

‘Ideas’ in Time:
_..the classic theory of psychoanalysis devised by Sigmund Freud

has become this troubled century’s dominant model for thinking
and talking about human behaviour. To a remarkable degree,
Freud’s ideas, conjuectures, pronouncements have seeped well
beyond the circle of his professional followers into the public
mind and discourse. People who have never read a word of his
work nonetheless “know” of things that can be traced, sometimes
circuitously, back to Freud... (his) ricj panoply of metaphors has
become, across wide swaths of the globe, something very close to
common knowledge...”
Returning, to a lack of such awareness and the contempt

for oneself in Pakistan, no existing graduate or post graduate
syllabus in Pakistan, mentions for example, Sudhir Kakar’s path
breaking studies comparing indigenous, frequently spiritually
based systems of psychological healing with contemporary
methods’, nor is Ashis Nandy’s work on epistemology known,
perhaps because both these authors are Indian. Kakar’s research
shows that in terms of desired outcome, indigenous systems are in
fact more successful -- and frequently less expensive and time
consuming than modem methods. Pakistani mental health
professionals constantly claim the ‘danger’ of such ‘superstitious’
belief, even though as said earlier there is no research evidence.
There is no indication at all, in research or the press, that
alternative ideas have affected medicine, psychiatry or psychology
in Pakistan. Whether psychology/psychiatry is inherently fertile or
more likely, a very shaky field, the diversity within the ‘discipline’
is overwhelming, perhaps the most in the social sciences in terms
of printed materials. Insofar as the materials on alternatives are
widely available, one is hesitant to say whether this lack of
awareness 1s entirely due to self serving economic reasons (and
studies in the west show that this is a hidden dimension of
psychiatry), or simply intellectual laziness. Indeed it is a little
baffling, since the current westem interest in traditional systems
of healing is obviously now more than a passing fad and could
have proved to be a source of genuine pride -- as it 1s to some
The Macrocosm 43
extent in India. But it could only happen if we had retained a

certain respect, if not reverence, towards these systems.
If we can no longer claim them and use them it is because
we are trapped in a ‘modem’, that is, outmoded conception of
science. The traditional practitioners meanwhile are trapped in
vicious circles. The better ones must struggle to survive
economically and do not encourage the acquisition of skills which
depend on different, more intensive, and personal methods of
learning. The incompetent ones merge into fraud and quackery --
using the more ‘efficient’ drugs of modern medicine which have,
of course, their own problems. The same is true of faith related
healing systems. Meanwhile, 19 year old medical students
zealously write critiques of traditional systems of healing’. These
studies appear on cgver stories of newspaper magazines and other
popular media, thereby reinforcing the derision and decline.
There are multiple layers of irony here to the extent of
genuine tragedy. On the one hand, Pakistani psychiatrists trained
totally within the western system, lament that there are one
million schizophrenics” in the country and therefore more
practitioners are needed. On the other, their mentors at Harvard
say:
Economists tend to see modemization as unalloyed good, but the

psychologist must acknowledge that in Asia at least,
modernization has been accompanied by a grave worsening of
mental health. What is to be done? Individual psychotherapy can
help somewhat but is hardly available except to a narrow group of
affluent westernized elites. Beyond that what good does it do
when psychology/psychiatry defines problems but has nowhere
near the resources needed to treat them? Does it help to label the
victims of ethnic violence in India or in Sri Lanka as sufferers of
“post traumatic stress disorder?” Such medicalization trivializes
the social and political sources and moral consequences of
suffering, while it offers no health benefits to the millions who
suffer.
One fact is indisputable: Asia cannot follow the Western
model for treating mental health problems...”
So much for the common man whose own systems are

rapidly being, destroyed in Pakistan and replaced with nothing, or
as what has just been said, his life trivialized into pseudo-
scientific jargon. Pakistani medicine and psychology epitomize the
destructive edge of modernity. Ironically they are unaware that
what they are systematically destroying 1s now being, considered
valuable by science itself. The modern Pakistani psychologist is in
an unenviable position. Having cut his nose to spite his face, he
must either deny the amputation and risk being ‘unscientific’ vis a
vis the facts and reality of the history of some cherished ideas, or
equally difficult, is to try and find the proboscis which is
shrouded in layers of conceptual cobwebs whose clearing away 1s
-- as this paper shall illustrate -- a long winded, exhausting task.
Not suited to the modem Pakistani intellect whose preferred form
of mental exercise is newspapers and magazines, neither of which
permit a sustained, in-depth or interdisciplinary attitude towards
issues.
The Herald/Newsline Ethos:
The intelligentsia, the psychologists/psychiatrists and the

media, between them have taken on the task of ‘liberating’ the
common man. An example of modemist consciousness is an
article in The Herald, (March 1990) on the increasing, popularity
of ‘scientology’ among the middle and upper class in Karachi. It
is not clear whether the writer is a psychologist or not, but his
report and analysis belies an attitude of suspicion and
condescension insofar as dianetics and scientology make use of
symbols far removed from mainstream psychology.
Unconsciously reflecting the paranoia which I believe will
pervade this society further, the article is entitled “Mind Control”
and explains the popularity of the method by the usual neo-
Marxist/Freudian view of spiritual ideas being essentially signs of
childishness rooted in fear. As this paper has discussed, such
explanations have more to do with the vision of the hero, rather
than with religion. Unaware of the ideas that control his own
mind, the writer regards his subject as providing “insecure souls
with something, anything, to latch on to”. The usual socio-
The \facrocosm 45
economic point is made about class distinctions and though

lipservice is paid to the idea that scientology is all too mechanical
-- and therefore western and not for us’ -- the overall thrust of the
article is ofa glib, strong, modern; bemused, and quite alarmed at
the naivete of his countrymen who need to overcome their
‘insecurities’ through such techniques.
Setting aside technical matters which would illustrate the
author’s narrow and arrogant world view, the crucial and obvious
question is not addressed: what 1s a quasi-religious philosophy
such as scientology doing in the middle and upper middle classes
of a country whose raison d’étre 1s a religion? Similarly, much is
made of the financially exploitative aspect of scientology as a
therapy. But no comparisons are made regarding the financial
demands of mainstream psychiatry and psychology on their
clients who usually need to be treated for extended periods of
time. A ten day stay in an urban psychiatric clinic can cost Rs
50,000 and more, depending on the usage of modern technology.
Frequently, it leaves the patient no better, other than masking the
symptoms with potent drugs with a range of physically
threatening, side effects. None of these issues were alluded to in
the article. No mention at all of course oftraditional systems since
they are regularly ‘exposed’ as fraudulent and primitive.
One can hazard a guess that in terms of a self analysis,
the writer-like many modern Pakistanis --sees himself as rational,
enlightened, appreciative of indigenous culture and anti-colonial.
Yet a month later, Time magazine, did a similar but more detailed
‘expose’ as the Herald, highlighting primarily the financially
profitable aspects of scientology (Special report May 6, 1991).
It should be clearly stated that I hold no theoretical or
practical brief for scientology as a therapeutic or philosophical
~ system. The main point is that Pakistani intellectuals continue to
unthinkingly mimic certain Western ideas which are repressive
and exploitative, yet are considered modern and rational. The case
of scientology is an example of the growing appeal of the
alternative movement in the west and the efforts of the
mainstream -- in this case psychiatry -- to stem this tide. What is
at stake is not knowledge, but money. As the Time article
inadvertently states, “The disingenously named Citizen's
Commission on Human Rights is a scientology group at war with

psychiatry, its primary competitor”. Scientology’s efforts have
“hurt drug sales”, and “helped spark dozens of law suits” against
a psychopharmacological multinational. In sum: there is a
powerful movement against the medical and psychiatric
establishment in the West. Whereas on the one hand this
alternative view is making an impact, it is also being resisted by
an increasingly besieged psychiatric establishment’ whose own
methods can be considered equally close to those of mind control.
(See Appendix). Articles such as the one in the Herald, are
making sure that modern psychiatry and psychology in Pakistan
emerge to become the social Nazis of our society.
That these trends continue to gain momentum 1s evident
from a recent Newsline report on Depression. As part of the
annual media blitz on Mental Health,, the report consists of
reiterations about the necessity for more psychiatrists to treat
rampant depression in Pakistan. The examples highlighted
concem something as banal as divorce, the recovery from which,
we are told, would have been well nigh impossible, had it not been
for ‘expert’ treatment. What News/ine believes is a ‘service’ to its
redaers, is in fact a transparent marketing and sales pitch for
psychiatry/psychology: (April 1994). By definition meant for the
upper classes, its claim to universality ensures that the less
privileged will also tum to seek solace in the clinics of the
practitioners.
ENDNOTES
THE MACROCOSM
Le Harvard Magazine, Boston. September/October 1989.
on The News, Friday Magazine. May 14, 1991. The latest

example is in the fortnightly edition of Dawn (16.6.94),
where a long article virulently attacks homeopathy and
hikmat. Ostensibly aimed at waming the public, the
implication is that modern medicine is perfect.
The Macrocosm 47
Sudhir Kakar 'Western Science, Eastern Minds'. Wilson

Quarterly, Winter 1991. Woodrow Wilson International
Centre for Scholars. Washington. D.C.
Franz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin. 1963.

Also his Black Skin, White Mask.
Lahore, University of the Punjab. Syllabus for M.A. &

Notification # 2151. 31.12.86.
Newsweek. "Freud's Enduring, Legacy: How His Ideas

Still Shape Psychotherapy" (4.7.88).
Personal observations and records of a private clinic seem

to confirm what are world wide trends regarding drugs.
for women. Muriel Nellis: The Female Fix. N.Y. Penguin
1981. Some facts about drugs, women and mental illness
(in the U.S.): At every age over 15, more women than
men receive treatment for mental illness. Women are
prescribed twice as many drugs than men for the same
psychological symptoms.
The anti-female bias in psychiatry/psychology
was in fact a key determinant of the alternative
movement. See Elane Showalter: The Female Malady:
Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980,
Pantheon 1986. Bibliographies available with me.
Kakar: Sudhir Shamans, Mystics and Doctors: A

Psychological Enquiry into India and its Healing
Traditions, Oxford University Press. 1982.
Ashis Nandy. At the Edge of Psychology. Oxford

University Press. 1980.
10. For a comprehensive review of this issue and also

illustrating the male bias, see "The Parable of the Cheek -
Tumers & Cheek - Smiters', by Sarah Boxer, in the
48 \lodernism in Pakistan
science magazine, Discover August 1987. Volume 8

#8.
The News. ibid.
Arthur Kleinman, Professor of Psychiatry and

Anthropology, Harvard, "Asian's Hidden Health
Problem" Wilson Quarterly. Washington. The Woodrow
Wilson International Centre for Scholars. Spring 1991.
Ibid.
See 'Discover'. Ibid.

The Scientist as Saviour
“It is the theory that determines what we can observe”

- Einstein.
Pervez Hoodbhoy’s book Muslims and_ Science:

Religious Orthodoxy and the Struggle for Rationality is an
example of the modem view of science, rationality and religion
prevailing in the Pakistani intelligentsia. It illustrates many of the
themes which concern this paper regarding monotheistic,
masculine consciousness. The archetypal image to keep in mind is
of a young male hero, setting out, as in the rite of passage, to
become a man. But he chooses instead, to remain for ever
youthful. (Details of the myth are in Appendix I.)
The book is important since it has been given
considerable attention in the press, the author repeatedly lauded
for his contributions, and most importantly, excerpts have been
published in Newsline under the intensified title: Tslam and
Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality’. It
has been the source of inspiration for the title of this paper.
Before proceeding with the analysis, one needs to bring into
focus, the psychology of the hero vis a vis science.
The Psychology of Science:
As said at the outset, the archetypal premise of science is

Apollo. At his best: clarity, detachment, exclusive masculinity,
far-sighted aims and a certain elitism. But there are other sides to
Apollo. Euripede’s tragedy “Orestes” offers a timeless comment
on the connection between excessive reason and insanity. The title
character is a young man given to approaching each issue largely
through the lens of formal logic, until the god Apollo places him
in such an impossible position vis a vis human relationships that
eventually Orestes is driven insane. There is, therefore, a dark
side to Apollo which leads to demagoguery..
Science demands singularity of meaning, a perfectly
appropriate attitude to solving the problems of the material world.
But to an extent only witness the environmental crisis. However,

the modern vision of science also demands to dissect the symbolic
since it cannot bear the sense of mystery and thus the sacred.
Modems tend to forget that as in science, there is similarly a
general and specialized aspect to religion, and as they themselves
keep reminding us, religion is personal. Yet there is an arrogant
demand by science to publicly ‘explain’ a// aspects of religion and
it continuously offers explanations and arguments to prove the
‘inferiority’ of religious thought. Western scientists and
theologians, tum to archaeological evidence for and against
religious beliefs. It was the result of such ‘science’ in this case an
archaeologist’s vision, which sparked off the violence over the
Babri Masjid. In the face of the immovability of faith, the impasse
is resolved by the modem acceptance of ‘allegory’ in religion. As
stated in the section on the literal and symbolic, allegory is not the
same as symbol. The dictionary refers to allegory as “a
description of one thing under the image of another, a story in
which people, things and happenings have another meaning,
useful for teaching and explaining”.
The difference between the allegoric and symbolic can be
understood in terms of the difference between explanation and
understanding. These are two different words, which if not
required, would not have existed. Explanation is an outer, verbal,
analytic, linear process. Understanding is inner, non-verbal,
simultaneous, synthesizing. The etymology of the word ‘symbol’
illustrates the difference from allegory: “together, to throw
together, a sign by which one infers”. The dictionary in defining
allegory, talks of things having another meaning and as useful for
explanation. Symbols address the meaning aspect, which depends
more on understanding.
Words themselves have a symbolic (meaning) and literal
(structural) aspect and modems largely use them, distanced from
the meaning dimension. The replacing of explanation for
understanding, for symbol with allegory, is similar to the
presently almost synonymous usage of sex and love, work and
money. Since allegory does not provide meaning and the modern
must pretend to an understanding of religion, there is a grudging
condescension which comes through. For example, Hoodbhoy in
discussing the Christian fundamentalist’s literal approach to the

Bible and Genesis says: “So for example, the Great Flood is taken
as historical fact, not as mere allegory” (p.30).
One would be curious to know what the author
understands by the ‘mere’ meaning of the allegory of the Great
Flood. Also, one does not have to subscribe to creationism in any
way, to be able to argue against the literal possibility of the Great
Flood as never having occurred. For example, when one
contemplates the scale of devastation in Bangladesh caused by
cyclones, and given that wnitten recorded history is a very, very
recent phenomenon for the species, it can be argued that there
may well have been a great flood sometime in distant antiquity.
The fact that what happened in Bangladesh, (or the bombing of
Baghdad) is no longer prominent in the media and therefore our
memories, does not mean that these societies themselves, over
generations, will completely forget what happened. But one
remains interested in a modern allegorical explanation.
The exclusion or marginalizing of meaning is the
hallmark of modern science which substitutes explanation for
understanding. There is a world of fact and things and a world of
values and meaning. Science firstly separates the two, insists on
holding, the former as superior, the other being ‘merely’ this or
that: since the human quest for meaning remains, more and more
facts are accumulated. Scientists (social and ‘pure’) themselves
know this flood of facts as does any professional who desires to
keep abreast of his subject. The amount of information available
today is so vast that anyone can ‘prove’ any point of view. To
substantiate views for one’s professional peers is one thing. To
present a sliver of information to the general public without
referring to the enormous amount of diverse data present, 1s to be
manipulative. In any event, the information available on a given
subject is mind-boggling. But nothing eventually satisfies. As a
feminist researcher and coordinator of an information-clearing
house once said to me “we are drowning in data, will someone
make sense of it?”
The heroic compulsion is to ‘know’ (and grow) endlessly,
pointlessly. Perhaps the Biblical story of the fall due to eating of
the tree of knowledge, refers to this type of knowledge. Since the
symbolic has been reduced to “nothing but” X or Y, it can no

longer contain awe and mystery, no sense of limitation remains.
Literal elements of the hero’s quest for power, speed, quantity,
become unlimited ends in themselves, the latter part of the story
about the fall due to arrogance, ignored and denied.
Similarly with heroic science and its voracious appetite.
As psychologically with the inward feminine, so outwardly with
the fertility and rich diversity of our natural environment.
Consider just the first two paragraphs of a survey of science by
The Economist (16.2.91). Note its masculine tone, of “assaults”
and boasts of speed and quantity. (The expression ‘rape of the
environment’ seems quite appropriate.) Entitled “Wielding the
Axe’ it is an apt description not only of the dominating
consciousness today, but also revealing of the psychology of
science in which knowledge and destruction of the “forests of
ignorance” go hand in hand.
More than other forms of learning, science is an assault on

ignorance. That knowledge is a good thing is its creed; that
progress depends on knowledge is its boast. In the last decade of a
millennium that has seen accelerating progress and multiplying
knowledge, the fruits of science are ubiquitous; from the
computers that typeset this survey to the knowledge that the
universe is about 15 billion years old. At the end of this
millennium, mankind will be healthier, wealthier and wiser* than
at the last, thanks largely to science.
Today, if anything, the forests of remaining ignorance look
even more extensive: the bigger the clearing, the longer its
perimeter. Whole new forests, such as the genetic recipe for a
human being, have been discovered. Within the clearing
knowledge, little copses of ignorance still resist the axes of
science: what makes a quasar shine so brightly? Other areas, once
cleared, have again succumbed to scrub Superconductivity was
once a fully explained phenomenon; after the discoveries of recent
years, it is again mysterious. Forests that were at one time being
steadily felled have been all but abandoned: whatever happened to
taxonomy? Some whole forests have barely been touched yet: the
question of ageing, for example. (p.3).
In the section entitled “The Brain” the survey says that

“most neuroscientists think that consciousness, whatever that
means, will prove to be their central problem, but they will need
guidance from philosophers to identify it first” (p.8).
If one is to believe the Pakistani scientist Pervez
Hoodbhoy, this cannot happen since the “cumulative and
provisional nature of science distinguishes it from other great
human institutions such as those of religion, art and philosophy --
wisdom is not accumulated but exists from the outset” (p.12). We
will shortly come to his other views. In keeping with western
science’s obsession with specialization it is unlikely that
neuroscience’s central problem of ‘identifying’ consciousness will
be solved in the near future’ given its own lack of understanding
of the history of its ideas. As Gratzer has observed, compared to
the rest of western civilization most scientists see themselves “free
from the crises of purpose and identity that have afflicted western
music, literature, architecture and painting.”?
The feminine ‘sophia’ (wisdom) and its ‘phile’ (lover)
make the word philosopher. Whether or not western
neuroscientists are guided by philosophy in solving their central
problem of identifying consciousness, remains to be seen. Given
Hoodbhoy’s view of philosophy, in terms of who will assist the
neuroscientists to ‘identify’ consciousness the question remains to
be asked: Which philosophers? What philosophy? While the West
solves this issue, let us now tum to the book in detail and see its
hero at work in Pakistan.
The Rational Warrior
Beginning with the title in which the golden fleece of

rationality has to be attained through battle/struggle; the book
reflects the heroic mindset, It can be discussed in many ways not
least for its excessively sexist language. However, not wanting to
be accused of genderism, let us for the moment set aside that
theme, which should anyway be considered more as a minimal
aspect of diversity, rather than a romantic plea for the ‘feminine’.
Indeed by frequently doing so, feminists deny the dark side of
their own nature in the same way that they denigrate the
masculine point of view to the exclusion of its many positive

traits. The question is one of balance and of proportion, not of
either/or right and wrong. But that would be a major reframing
which one will touch upon later.
For Hoodbhoy, rationality and science are synonymous. It
is a Cartesian consciousness, self reflexively ‘proving’ itself by
saying that Descartes’ “supreme discovery of his life was a
framework of thought...”(p.14). Philosophy is philosophy and
ideas are not ‘discovered’ in the same sense that continents are.
Ideas and frameworks are theories, assumptions, not physical
entities in the brain. Indeed if one were to push Hoodbhoy for an
explanation, it would be similar in fact to the theoretical
framework of this paper: That ideas in fact do exist within us a
priori but in the mythical sense. Descartes discovered a
“framework for thought” in the same way that Abdul Shakoor
discovers (invents) frameworks for love and sex and work. He
assumes certain ideas about life and then builds on them. As an
axiom of General Systems Theory states, the map is not the
territory. Hoodbhoy makes it seem as if Descartes was a brain
surgeon in New Jersey, who located a particular “framework for
thought”. It would be far too tedious to go into the millions, if not
more, words which have been wmnitten about Descartes and his
legacy of the ‘mind-body’ problem in the West. Suffice it to say
that it is a philosophical assumption, nothing more. Based on this
logic, rather a misrepresentation of facts, Hoodbhoy tells us about
modemism, science and rationality.
In order to function, organized societies need moder people,

people who can relate cause to effect. (p.165)
Man and Superman
Perhaps the best way of explaining the excessively

youthful, unbalanced and therefore propagandist nature of the
Pakistani hero, is to see how he compares with his father (or older
brother or uncle or any male relationship) signifying the degree to
which modems claim they are modem in terms of their
proscientific link with westem civilization. Hoodbhoy’s book is
for the modern Pakistani not for the specialist and seeks to present
a debate at a popularly accessible level. One can compare it thus
to the survey in the Economist which in terms of the specific
material on ‘science’ in the book, is comparatively shorter. -
Therefore contingencies of condensation and the natural tendency -
towards simplification, should if anything, be greater. In fact it ig
not and in its honesty both about science and religion, the survey
is a far more mature presentation. (All emphases are mine in the
quotations.)
At an early stage, both the book (p.10) and the survey
refer to Karl Popper’s ‘falsification’ criterion. The survey puts it
thus:
Scientists practice a systematic deceit upon themselves, by

claiming to think differently from other people; they do not spend
their days trying to falsify hypotheses, as Sir Karl Popper has
taught them they should. But the one respect in which a scientist
is different from, say, a politician or a priest is that he is (at least
in theory) prepared to change his mind when the facts change. He
positively revels in ignorance, for it is his raw material. (p.3).
Hoodbhoy treats Popper differently. In keeping to the

pretense, he states the criterion and immediately goes on to say
“While this “falsification criterion” is useful and enables us to

separate science from non-science, it is not without flaw. To give
an example, where this criterion is not useful, consider the
“superstring” theory of elementary particles the Theory of
Everything”--.(p.10)
This particular theory is of course still beng formulated.

Hoodbhoy goes on to show that since it is still a theory, it can’t be
tested and therefore “fails the falsification hypothesis”.
The modem complaint is that the fundamentalist is
incapable of tackling complexity, indeed that is the whole problem
with religious fanaticism which incidentally means “unreasonably
enthusiastic, overly zealous”. Hoodbhoy’s book is an example of
similar enthusiastic simplifications, the issue of complexity itself
simplified to finally fit his world view. Thus in discussing the

“Birth of Modern Science” we are told:
“Experimentation, quantification, prediction and control

became the paradigm of a new culture. Gone was the old notion of
an organic, living, spiritual universe. Instead of being mysterious
and beyond the human ken, it could now be understood as
mechanical and orderly. Indeed mankind was transformed into the
self-knowing subject of history and conscious now of mankind for
itself. (p.13-14) Science freed man from the capricious forces of
nature, and gave him the gift of certainty. That was what the
whole scientific revolution was about.(p. 16)
One can note in passing how simular this is to the Thinker

“the self knowing subject of history”. But to move on, after
having made these resounding statements, the author tums
perforce to the issue of ‘reality’ and complexity, in his own field
of physics, quantum mechanics. As one approaches the subject
with Hoodbhoy it is virtually impossible not to get sucked into the
whirlpool of confusion: After having defined “nature”, “the new
consciousness”(p.14)” common sense”(17) in partial, that is
totally masculine, Newtonian terms, he acknowledges quantum
physics thus:
Quantum physics says that common sense is to be trusted no

more, nature at its most fundamental level is not at all like nature
that we see and experience in our daily lives (p.17)
In terms of philosophical implications, after passing a

sarcastic remark about “altematives”, he goes on to admit that
“quantum physics dominates modem physical science today”
(p.17) ending the description with a remark of a physicist “Here is
schizophrenia with a vengeance” (p.19). Then:
Strange, fascinating, bizarre. Surely quantum physics is a

window into an aspect of the universe inaccessible to our common
perceptions. To those unfamiliar with its mathematical
formulation, it is unsettling and incomprehensible. And to those
The Scientist as Saviour Sy)
who would like to be rid of science, disputes over its correct

interpretation are like sweet music to the ear.(p. 19)
The above paragraph deserves a serious re-reading.

Hidden under double negatives is a silence about Hoodbhoy’s own
intellectual reactions. Those like us, who don’t know
mathematical formulations find it unsettling. Those who want to
be ‘rid’ (paranoia) of science like it. What about those like
Hoodbhoy who ‘wants’ (one cannot help the word since the
adversarial ‘nd’ is given) science and also knows its
mathematical formulations? We are not told, other than in the
reactions of a child at a circus “Strange, fascinating, bizarre’.
The problem of course, is with the premises of what is
“common” and “real” and “natural”, which in the hero’s case do
not admit the feminine, body, darkness, ambiguity, multiplicity
etc. And to keep the circle closed, using a phrase straight from the
Thinker’s column there immediately follows: “But let us not lose
sight of the forest for the trees”, and the amazing somersault that
since quantum physics is scientific and having established that
science is certainty, therefore science is certainty:
... today the vast majority of physicists use quantum mechanics

routinely and with complete confidence; not a single experiment
or observation out of literally millions has ever yielded anything
contradicting it. (p.19)
In contrast the Economist survey embraces the issue of

complexity head on, of how scientists have grown “excited about
non-determinist ideas and in particular chaos”. Stating how
especially physicists were “astonished” by non-determinism, it
tells of the dramatic shift in numerous disciplines, from ecology to
neuroscience:
What happened in the 1980s was that people stopped thinking

of such trains of events as either determinist in principle, or
random, and realised that they could suddenly -- and predictably -
- turn chaotic when just one starting condition was changed.(p. 11)
Adding that: “Generally scientists treat philosophers as

they would mosquitoes: as irritating parasites”, but gamely goes
on to admit as Thomas Kuhn observed “that it is from the
mavericks and heretics that the great breakthroughs come”, and
science like “any profession is easily dominated by an orthodoxy,
which dismisses mavericks”.
To repeat, one is not disputing Hoodbhoy’s views about
science per se, but rather the position that moderns are different
from the fundamentalist tendency to gloss over sticky areas and to
present material in such a way that only the positive side is
highlighted. The context to keep in mind is of the religious
fundamentalist who of course, all of us agree, is “crazy’ or fanatic
in his extremism. Once this label is given, there is an automatic
assumption that we are superior, “morally healthier” as the
Thinker would put it. It is this jump from a certain type oflogic to
a moral superiority which is disturbing. When one examines the
basis of the logic the fuzzy areas are presented with a degree of
certainty that can either be called deceitful or more charitably
zealous. It is the same masculine cast iron circle, only the starting
points are different.
The difference between Hoodbhoy’s book and the survey
is that firstly, the survey gives a more balanced account of
science, since unlike Hoodbhoy, it 1s not trying to appeal (read
preach) for rationality as a philosophy of life which will ‘liberate’
people. It is also secondly, quite open about the reality of the vast
gulf between what scientists say and do within science, and
science and the public (the common man). Thus Hoodbhoy would
have us believe in exceedingly dramatic and emotional tone that
science and rationality have ‘liberated’ humanity, stating outright
or implying that they alone are the required counterweights to the
growing religious fundamentalist tide.
The power of growth and spontaneous movement of living bodies

was, and still very much is infected by deep superstition. (p.30)
Upon science guided by universal moral principles depends the
continuation of civilized existence on earth. The past tells us
so...(p.7)
Unless reality is comprehended there can be no hope for

constructive change. Mankind will continue to suffer an
undignified existence...(p.5)
Modem science brought certainty and banished doubt... A
mysterious and capricious universe could now, for the first time
in man’s history, be understood as mechanical and orderly...(p.2)
Without science mankind was helpless before wind and storm --
terrorized by mindless superstition. Wasted was the incomparable
instrument it possessed: The human mind..Then man created
science and science liberated man from superstition...(p.7)
In contrast to such hyperbole, the Economist survey on

the other hand uses a negative metaphor for science, “tentacles”,
and quite calmly informs us:
Despite spreading its tentacles into every crevice of modern life,

science remains a peripheral part of human culture. In 400 years
of assaulting ignorance it has had almost no effect on superstition,
despite insisting that superstition is a form of ignorance. Religious
faith has not declined much, if at all, since science began
answering some of its questions; and where it has declined, new
superstitions -- Freudian, Gaian or homeopathic -- have quickly
filled the vacuum.(p. 17)
One can note from the last sentence that the survey is not
exactly postmodemist in inclination, that is, it is clearly anti-
alternatives, and like the Economist, firmly a representative of the
establishment. It is coolly dismissive of religion (“the uselessness
of abstract religious theorizing”) Like Hoodbhoy, it is a
spokesman of modem science. However, it is realistic about itself
and therefore more honest and less hysterical. In contrast
Hoodbhoy is evangelical, emotional, talking in absolutes such as
“Science Liberated mankind”. He is also insulting to the species
in terms of denying its achievements throughout history as in the
arts. Hoodbhoy’s essentially narrow (and that is what fanaticism
is in essence) view of man and science becomes evident, if one
considers, the survey’s idea of science:
Stonehenge was, among other things, a scientific instrument, one

that was probably as extravagant for the civilisation of its day as
the supercollider will be for America in the 1990s. For those who
built it, the ability to predict when to plant crops may have been
ample practical reward. (p.17)
The last section of the survey (see Appendix II) is an

excellent summary of the nature of science and its meaning, for the
genieral public (common man). To repeat; all this is not to say that
rationality and science are to be deplored. The question being,
discussed is of fanaticism, which is narrow-mindedness and has a
tendency to present things in absolute and certain terms. It is to
keep in mind the definition of intellectual that was given by a
modem Pakistani as those who have ((1) a mental tendency to
think beyond their own immediate interest those (2) who can
vaguely distinguish between an ‘argument’ and a ‘passion’. It is
interesting to note in passing that even in the definition there is an
implied moral superiority of “being able to think beyond their
immediate interest”.* Thus, in answer to his query ‘Can
Intellectuals save this country”? a gentleman answered a few days
iater; “My answer is an emphatic yes. The only saviours for this
country are the class of persons described by him as intellectual”
(23.6.91).
The examples also mean to point out the nature of private
and public discourse on such matters in connection with modems
who see themselves as more educated, reasonable, rational and
therefore more ‘tolerant’ (read moral health) than religious
fundamentalists. The survey, while equally reflecting the
masculine world view which religious and modem Pakistani
fundamentalists are trapped in, is mature in the sense that it does
not pretend to be self-nghteous. Insofar as this epistemology is
one of power, the survey makes no bones about wielding, it (the
axe), whereas modem Pakistanis pretend in their ‘logic’ that the
issue (and hence the high moral ground) is for the “future of
humanity” the common man, the little people.
It is interesting to note that both the Economist and
Hoodbhoy reveal the logical culmination of the two thousand year
journey of the Hero, whose steps scholars have traced in the
“ascent of man” from the Mediterranean to Norther Protestant
Germany. (see Appendix). The interminable quest requiring
solutions, leading to the Final Solution, are echoed inadvertently

by both. Discussing genetic engineering the survey talks of how
the public is against ‘tampering with nature’ and then in a
parenthetical aside wonders how in the public imagination god
and the Nazi’s are intertwined. Hoodbhoy, looking for what he
calls a “bit” of philosophy to “arm” himself with, wholeheartedly
embraces Nietzsche -- Hitler’s favourite philosopher.
The Pakistani Superman
In the chapter entitled “Attitudinal Philosophic Reasons”

the author begins firstly by making synonymous the pursuit of
science with the “acquisition of positive rational knowledge” (It
should be noted that I am quoting serially, not out of context)...
He also acknowledges that “overall idea systems, by which shall
be meant belief, attitudes, social mores, general assumptions and
specific religious, ideological positions are of the most profound
importance in human history”. He then moves to Nietzsche’s
“succinct” definition of rationality as “a matrix of connections
which assign cause to effect” One might as weil quote the entire
passage for its full impact:
Looking for the roots of rationality, Nietzche delved deep into the
psycho-biological roots of epistemology. He argued that
rationality was the inescapable consequence of man’s “will to
power,”. Buried in the human psyche, he argued, is a deeply
seated -- and possibly inexplicable -- urge to have control over
events of the outer world. (p.145)
This is an outright fraudulent justification for making

rationality seem medically ‘scientific’ according to the author’s
view of science, or vice versa; similar to Descartes’ “discovery”.
Neither Nietzsche nor anyone else has yet located the
“psychobiological roots of epistemology”. As one quotation from
the survey stated, neuroscientists are still deciding what is
‘consciousness’ leave alone find the “roots” of its epistemology.
The latest on the subject in fact is the Oxford physicist, Roger
Penrose who argues that a new kind of physics will be necessary

to understand consciousness and these have yet to be invented.’
Having thus established his epistemological base, that is,
the foundations of a logic and knowledge system, Hoodbhoy goes
on to say that this “will to power” is the “psychological
mainspring of all creative activity”. Then, the inevitable (Freudian
‘thrust’):
Rationality is essential for sublimation of this urge because

without it there can be no chance for any biological species to
understand much less control, its environment. Stripped of the
‘will to power”, humans become mere buoys that float on the
waves.
Armed with this bit of philosophy we can _ proceed
...(p.145)(emphases mine).
The entire chapter 1s a masterpiece of a monotheistic

consciousness, of false justifications and outright leaps from
man’s unquenchable quest for power to its inevitable cosmic
analogue. Since man is driven by controlling power then so is
God: “If Divine intervention is complete, then curiosity,
imagination and ambition become superfluous” .(p.145).
There is an insufferable smugness throughout the book,
which for reasons of space one must set aside describing in detail.
As one example, the author quotes the Catholic Church’s
declaration in 1983 about its treatment of Galileo and recognition
of learning through (in the Pope’s words): “humble and assiduous
study -- to dissociate the essentials of the faith from the scientific
systems of a given age”. His immediate response:
The apology comes 350 years too late. It also omits far more than
it admits. Nevertheless to the Holy Pontiff's declaration of intent
we can all say with deep feeling, Amen” .(p.31).
In terms of omitting more than admitting, as one will

discuss, so does the author. Even as compared to a popular
magazine survey. Incidentally there is considerable research about
the Galileo affair which does not cast him as someone totallv
above ambition and other human shortcomings.
The author’s statements are so extreme, that in the same

way that moderns (nghtly) perceive the crazy obsessions of
mullahs with sexual matters, one cannot resist, like Freud, in
seeing, similar imagery in the way modems glorify and express
themselves vis a vis science. An entire paper can be written on
Hoodbhoy’s narrow and sexist “selling” of science in language
which1s significant for what it belies: the terrors, joys, confusions
and demands of adolescent (heroic) male sexual awakening of a
powerfully phallic nature. For the vast majority of teen males the
phallus is indeed “inexplicable” a “mysterious and capricious
universe”, “difficult to master” and to get to behave in a
“mechanical and orderly fashion”. And it is at this age especially
that boys are most “infected”, “ terrorized by superstitions” about
the “power of growth and spontaneous movements of living
bodies”. No, wonder “rationality is essential for the sublimations
of this urge”, of this “incomparable instrument”: hence, the
compulsion to “penetrate” the universe through “hard” facts
whose “sterility” must be overcome by finding out the precise
nature of the Big Bang...(And thereby “exploding” the myth of
religion.)
The difference between the survey and the book is
between a husband still ruthlessly repressive but showing signs of
exhaustion or perhaps even a widower by choice, in either case
realistic about the ‘facts of life’ and the “birds and the bees’
whereas the book reflects the despair of adolescence and the need
to satisfy those inexplicable urges; alternating as it does between
a pseudo-seductive tone, (“science will liberate us”) and desperate
declarations that the entire business is one of life and death (“the
future of humanity and science are inextricably tied together,
unless reality is comprehended there can be no hope for
constructive change”).
To protest that this is a literal reading of science is to beg
the question, since as stated earlier the literal and symbolic reflect
each other. The common man seeing through the meta-physical
transparency of phenomena responds to the ideal of unity/mystery
as symbolized by it on earth and male/female. Despite modem
man having (dis)missed one half of the mystery (body/female) and
thereby finding his urges as “inexplicable”; as long as he is
articulate there is no escaping, the judgement of the word. In any

event, the above is not really in jest and is in fact a classic
Freudian reading which as said earlier is a richly elaborate and
highly accurate understanding of psychologically adolescent
males.
And before one is accused of being flippant, consider the
latest on the subject:
The metaphors of science are, indeed, filled with the violence,

voyeurism and tumescence of male adolescent fantasy. Scientists
‘Wwrestle” with an always female nature, to “wrest from her the
truth” or to “reveal her hidden secrets.” They make “war” on
diseases and “conquer” them. Good science is “hard” science; bad
science (like that refuge of so many women, psychology) is “soft”
science, and molecular biology, like physics, is characterised by
“hard inference.””*
Thus the present analysis is along the lines of

considerable scholarly work done in the history of science per se
and also as related to gender. These studies seriously undermine
existing conceptions of science as objective and value free
knowledge and put in perspective Hoodbhoy’s enthusiastic
assertions that “Science freed man from the capricious forces of
nature and gave him the gift of certainty. That was what the
whole scientific revolution was about’(p.16). However, studies
show that differences between the sexes were formerly expressed
in metaphysical/cosniological terms which were as persuasive as
biological aid scientific facts are now’. The real nature of the
revolution in 18th century thinking was that biology and medicine
began supplying evidence for what had been previously
understood on a spiritual level. It is a fact that the deepest
spiritual and mystical philosophies universally employ symbols of
male/female sexuality for the expression of metaphysical truth. As
Jung said “where would the spirit be without the flesh”. Even
more appropriate was his remark, only half in jest, that the “penis
is ‘nothing, but’ a phallic symbol””. And so we remain, firmly
within science, in seeing the heroic world view, not of course
personally, but as an illustration of an archetypal theme summed

up by Teichman thus:
The creative, ethnographic reading, imagination tells us, surely,

that these dogmas represent nothing more or less than the tribal
mores of teenage human males...why do philosophers elevate the
temporary instinctual behaviour patterns of the male teenager,
into (allegedly) self-evident truths? The creative imagination
readily suggests an answer, but it is not a very polite one.”
Paradox and Doubt
When we consider characters of mythical stories or more

importantly our own behaviour/thoughts, we seem to be as bound
to paradox as we are to gravity. If we are -- as most of us are --
unable to grasp Russell and Whitehead on the subject, we can at
least accept the evidence of our own body. Science itself tells us
that the human sensorium functions on the law of contrast. The
human perceptual apparatus as related to cognition can provide
information only if there is contrast in the sensory field. If placed
for example, in a room painted (ceiling/floor and all) in a uniform
shade of white, perceptual distortions start occurring, until
eventually a ‘blindness’ sets in and no more visual information
can be processed in that situation. The same applies to all the
senses. Thus whether in our perceptual apparatus, sexual
hormones, or even physical make-up, humans are essentially
paradoxical creatures; and consciousness even from a biological,
chemical, utilitarian point of view reflects this existence of
opposites within a larger multiplicity’.
Insofar as this paper is not a plea to dismiss and deny
rationality and science, the imagery used by Hoodbhoy is quite
correct and in fact feeds into the themes under discussion. With
reference to our matrix of paradox, the first half of life is fueled
by an urge to ‘solve’ the paradox as it must, since physical
survival demands singularity of mental focus, material knowledge
and assistance towards physical growth. Youth by necessity must
ignore the opposite, the ‘pit-falls’ and by and large. single-
mindedly pursue its urges. But insofar as paradox is the law, once
physical maturity is achieved, the species perpetuated and duties

done, the same sharp focus, prevents preparation and
development towards the culmination of life which is death.
“Growth” in old age has connotations of cancer rather than
development. Nature itself assists the demands of the empty nest,
faltering body and other limitations, if only we would let it.
Willingly or unwillingly one is dragged towards the other side and
the body, as in youth, showing the way; inexorably hinting and
even moving into opposite shades. Hormonal balances change,
and as a result women broaden, men shrink, voices change etc.
Jung named this tendency of phenomena tuming physically and
(psychologically) into opposites, enantodromia.
For consciousness to evolve, struggling against paradox
is indeed a vital necessity in the first half of life. Rationality is a
powerful ‘tool’ and as myths show and Hoodbhoy affirms, it is
vital for physical survival. But nature as we can see is not static.
“Forever and ever” are words either lovers say (and we see the
frequent results of that too), or it is part of the Chnstian “Lord’s
prayer”. The demands of the second half of life are meta (above)
physical, that is they concern the mystery of death and the slow
retum to a different Mother. One has observed this reality time
and again with modems and what is popularly called ‘mid-life’
crisis. Essentially it occurs when strategies, attitudes which were
perfectly appropriate for the first half of life, simply do not work.
We feel stuck. Prometheus chained, possibilities paralyze. To
many ‘little people’ keep confusing or holding one back, and we
wonder, alongwith family and friends, as to “what has come over”
us.
When we feel we are “falling apart” we are considering in
negative, judgmental terms, a basic law and fact of life.
Remaining under the tyranny of the hero, we struggle against
‘ambivalence’, ‘inconsistency’, trying to remain incharge by
holding ourselves together with pills, drugs, work. (Religion
meanwhile, is ‘nothing but’ an ‘opiate for the poor’ and a means
of their oppression). By and large the business of psychology sells
optimism and then strains to justify this optimism with an even
more inflated view of life. It is indeed a ‘growth’ industry’, as are
the corresponding pharmaceutical concerns. All assist in the
denial of decline and the perpetuation of a lucrative enterprise.

Meanwhile the reality of the fragmentation of the nation-state and
body politic gain momentum. |
In any event, paradox or the ‘opposite’ at this stage, if
realistically, that is according to nature, attended too, can lead to
a healing that can be as satisfying and strengthening as the most
potent tranquilizer and leave the individual less drugged, more
able to respond (response-ability) to himself and the environment.
At this stage response to paradox is, naturally the opposite.
Whereas earlier solution and struggle, now it is acceptance and
re-solution.
To think about the possibility of the other, is to
experience doubt. People go to ‘shrinks’ only when they are ‘not
sure’ any longer and in doubt about themselves. To accept
paradox and to doubt, is to possibly make space for the other(s)
the little people. This deflation of the ego, is to possibly
experience humility and in fact is the only real way of
acknowledging, the other. Otherwise it is hypocrisy. Whether
individually or collectively, perhaps humility is the only gift that
humans can offer each other. It is, according to the sages, the only
gift one can offer God. This re-solution during the latter stage of
life as acknowledgment of the other, is expressed in the symbolic
connection of opposites and the archetype of man’s geometric
quest of uniting the circle and the square, as in the ntual of Hajj.
Hoodbhoy or Freud are not wrong in their view. But their
“sift of certainty” can become a: curse. Although one may
verbally acknowledge the other, space is a body-related concept
and one will return to this subject later in the context of the
hypocrisy of fundamentalist and modern alike. Retuming to
Hoodbhoy’s book, suffice to say and as the quotations illustrate,
the greater the denial of the other the more emotional and thus
fanatical the tone.
Religion and Rationality
What one has thus far called paradox is from the modem
psychological point of view undesirable, ‘pathological’; but from
a realistic view point unavoidable. Pathology is something, that
makes us uncomfortable (from ‘pathos’, suffering, incidentally

also linked to way, path). Disciplines and ideas therein also
contain pathology in the sense of opposing elements within
themselves.” Ideational systems such as worked out religious
beliefs or ethical and scientific attitudes are means devised for
keeping pathology/paradox at bay.
Most disciplines, as Jung observed, tend to forget their
archetypal explanatory principles, that is, the psychic premises
that are the sine qua non of the cognitive process. One would
rather ‘think’ away the aspect of discomfort and this is usually
done by denying that which is, in fact, the blue-pnint of the idea of
discomfort, the body. Each archetypal premise is a (interestingly
feminine) Hydra or Gorgon with many heads, showing in our
dreams, emotions, symptoms, preferences, style of behaviour and
mode of thought. To cut off the head from the body and call it
‘pure’ is once again a masculine tendency as in ‘pure Being’
(Hegel), “pure logic” (Husserl) “pure Act” (Aquinas) “pure
reason” (Kant), “pure prehension “(Whitehead) .
Similarly, there is no such idea as “pure science”.
Beneath its psychological premises it is stuck with what can be
called religious or psychological ideas. In the same way that our
symptoms do not let us forget our weaknesses, religion is the
pathology in science. In order to illustrate this and highlight
related themes (death, ‘other’ limitation, feminine, ambiguous,
dark), one can continue to consider Hoodbhoy’s book. It is
evident that the capacity for paradox is minimal:
“...One must recognize at the outset that the environment for

science in Islamic countries is replete with paradox..
Muslim modernists and pragmatists have persistently sought to
amalgamate the new with the old. But the attitude towards science
is oftentimes a schizophrenic one...(p.33)
The horror of the ‘other’ and the delusion of purity and

new-ness come across in terms such as mankind being ‘infected’
by superstition; which interestingly finds its mirror image in a
question used by Hoodbhoy himself to dismiss the present effort
by many Third World (male) scientists for a non-western
approach. It too talks of “penetration” except here it is by the

west seeking “immunity” from “germ carriers of the Western
virus” (p.99). The modern males’ horror of impurity, that is
anything, different and its deep connection with the body, is best
summed up in Hoodbhoy’s closing sentences in his discussion of
quantum physics. In what can only be described as a menstrual
metaphor: “Science improves and _ cleanses itself
periodically”(p.20). The image of course has once again been
hijacked into the masculine world view of moral linearity,
“improve”. Menstruation improves nothing, and is simply
cyclical.
To be even more precise about how religion is the
pathology in science, and not be accused of being ‘unscientific’
one will continue to stay close to Hoodbhoy’s own statements.
Thus at the outset in framing the crucial question ‘what is
science’, he gives a glossary of “concepts which lie at the heart of
modem scientific thinking” (p.8) and the first item is “facts”.
These are essential to frame laws. “But”, as he goes on
....facts by themselves are sterile until there is a mind capable of

choosing between them -- a mind which under the bare fact can
see the soul of the fact. This is what distinguishes a good scientist
from a mediocre one.(p.8)
Crucial to the foundations of science are the ideas of

“heart and soul”. What Hoodbhoy means by them, he does not
say, especially the operative ‘soul’ upon which all is contingent. If
pushed, in good scientific fashion for a definition of ‘soul’ it
would be perhaps something akin to ‘essence’ which strictly
speaking is not precise and objective given the definition of what
is ‘science’ and its emphasis on quantification etc. Indeed essence
is not so much to be explained as understood. Hoodbhoy’s use of
heart and soul is in fact not too different from the idea of
archetype, which may be able to give us a more comprehensive
idea of what soul means. Originally synonymous with “psyche”
here is an amplification by Hillman:
“Soul is not a scientific term, and it appears rarely in psychology

today, and then usually with inverted comas, as if to keep it from
infecting its scientifically sterile surround... There are many
words of this sort which carry meaning, yet which find no place in
today’s science. It does not mean that the references of these
words are not real because scientific method leaves them out... Its
meaning is best given by its context. The root metaphor of the
analyst’s point of view is that human behaviour is understandable
because it has inside meaning. The inside meaning is suffered and
experienced. Other words long associated with “soul” amplify it
further - mind, spirit, heart, life, warmth, humanness, personality,
essence, innermost, purpose, courage, virtue, morality, wisdom,
death, God ... “Primitive” languages have often elaborate concepts
about animated principles which ethnologists have translated by
“soul”. For these peoples, soul is a highly differentiated idea
referring to a reality of great impact. The soul has been imaged as
the inner man, and as the inner sister or spouse, the place or voice
of God, within, as a cosmic force in which all living things
participate, as having been given by God, as conscience, as a
multiplicity.. One can search one’s soul, and one’s soul can be on
trial. There are parables describing possession of the soul by a
sale of the soul to the Devil ... of development of the soul... of
joumeys of the soul... while the search for the soul leads always
into “depths”... This exploration of the word shows that we are
dealing not with a concept, but a symbol. Symbols, as we know,
are not completely within our control, so that we are not able to
use the word in an unambiguous way, even though we take it to
refer to that unknown human factor which makes meaning
possible, which tums events into experiences, which is
communicated in love and which has a religious concern. The
soul is a deliberately ambiguous concept.. in the same manner as
all ultimate symbols which provide the root metaphors for the
systems of human thought. “Matter” and “nature” and “energy”
have ultimately the same ambiguity; so too have “life”, “health” .
The present analysis of Hoodbhoy’s book (and other

materials) can be considered in accordance with the principles laid
down by it, itself One has been attempting to choose between
(some fertile) facts as they have been presented in a manner which
will enable us to see its heart and soul. The book is
fundamentalist, presenting itself as a philosophy of salvation not
The Scientist as Saviour 4/3
interested so much in the facts as they are but in pushing a

moralistic propagandist line. That the same can be said for this
paper, and the ensuing game of ping pong, one will leave for later.
Presently, one is trying to illustrate the ping pong between
modernist/fundamentalist.
Mention has been made earlier of the nature of doubt
which if accepted leads to tolerance. Its psychological relationship
to religion has also been discussed, in the context of
acknowledging connection between self and the other. Both
fundamentalism and modermism have made it their mission to
deny doubt/fear, basic elements of human reality. In recognition
of which perhaps is the Quranic injunction “Approach Me with
fear and hope”. The earliest quotations from Hoodbhoy’s book
reflect this preoccupation with fear, doubt, certainty, salvation,
and are too tedious repeat.
Psychologically doubt is closely linked to fear and the
need to feel secure, bringing into consciousness that sense of
limition. In childhood familial protection provides this sense of
security. The wniter of the Herald article on scientology seems to
be one of the few mortals who has transcended this instinct.
Hence his contempt for those who feel “insecure”. That it remains
an abiding theme throughout life is evident from our experiences.
For some people doubts and fear are allayed by the accumulation
of material things, relationships, love, or pursuit of success, or
knowledge, while others turn to religion. The modern/scientist
thus;
“We are fairly secure in our knowledge of how the universe began
some 15 billion years ago and of key events which occurred a few
microseconds thereafter” (p. 17)
The younger one is, the farther the sense of disease, decay
and death. Beyond youth, religion addresses this concern, but on
an increasingly adult level. Its mntes and mituals provide the
containers to hold these emotions, if not also some answers. It is a
moot point whether the rites rituals and symbols of science can
match the sensory richness of religious symbols, and provide
adequate answers. Moot in the sense that science, as the examples
7) Modernism in Pakistan
show, does fulfill this function for certain individuals. “Science

freed man and gave him the gift of certainty’, says Hoodbhoy. But
it is unlikely that the vast majority of human beings can derive
any sense of comfort, hope, and courage once they know with
certainty what transpired a fraction of a millisecond after the Big
Bang. Certainly, most of them will have no access on a large scale
to the symbols and rituals of the accelerators and laboratories of
particle physics’. Religious rituals provide this sense of
participation and access. Those who are alienated from it, thanks
especially to a ‘scientific’ outlook, have lost or tried to break the
symbols which could contain fear and make paradox bearable. In
_ short both within the heart and soul of science lurks religion:
alleviating fear, insecurity and doubt, talking of ongins and
demise as well as of places that no human being will ever see,
hear, or touch.
‘The Last Crusader
In the same way that religion, including Islam has its

schisms and heretics so does science and in the same way that
religious fanatics give short shnft to diverse perspectives which
may dilute the intense focus of a single minded vision, so does
modernism. In the case of Hoodbhoy’s book at an early stage, the
author refers to the significance and existence of ‘alternative
science’, but chooses to postpone a review for later. When he
does there is the bizarre discussion on quantum physics, no
mention of the alternative movement across science, thereby
diminishing its importance. Insofar as his own field is physics, his
example of quantum physics is perhaps appropriate. But insofar
as the book is for a general audience of intellectuals, the
alternatives movement is downplayed in mocking terms and in so
doing perpetuates the notion of scierice’s “gift of certainty”.
Cynicism towards alternatives and the presenting of a
partial picture of science/rationality leads to a confusing game of
hide and seek. On the one hand the earliest statements of the book
ask the reader to believe the author that: “the continuation of
civilized existence depends on science. The past tells us so” (p.6)
On the other hand, the idea that the most profound sources of
The Scientist as Saviour US
wisdom are to be found in the distant past” should be dismissed

since they are “romantic” (p.90) Anyway “history is not a
science” (p.155)
The author’s discussion/understanding of history as
juxtaposed with science is a supreme example of an- overzealous
physicist tured social evangelist; straining to justify the ‘cause’
in the most ludicrous ways. One can only urge a reading; in
summary it says that history is not a science because it is not as
precise as particle physics in its prediction of every single
occurrence. Whereas science/rationality in the author’s
conception is essentially deterministic, causation in history is
fraught with danger”(p.115)
The implication that science is solid and monolithic (and
therefore a reliable leader) is highlighted by the following
observation:
...Unanimity is not to be expected: different historians if asked to

provide an answer, will fish into the same bag of facts with each
one pulling out a different bunch...”(p.115).
This is of course as true for science as anything else and

the reader can contact me personally for different bunches of
bibliographies on the examples of science/rationality that the book
offers. But the public is not told so and is kept dazzled by the
singular, optimistic certainty the author offers in a confusing,
confused and disintegrating society.
Fundamentalists want to obliterate doubt, by presenting
only the rosy side of their program for salvation, denying their
own weaknesses and exploiting the fears of others. Hoodbhoy,
although making passing reference to killer technologies and the
devastating, side of science, chooses to separate them as the
applicauons of science. This is similar to the Thinker returming to
‘pure’ Marx and the fundamentalist proclaiming, that it is not
Islam but peoples’ practice which has to be ‘supervised’. Finally,
no mention at all of the fallibility of science and scientists and
their increasingly evident tendency for committing outright fraud.
It is currently a major subject of concern in the west with articles
appearing in numerous professional, semi-professional journals

and popular media.
Nowhere is the closed mind as ‘open’/superior position
more evident than in Hoodbhoy’s treatment of Hussein Nasr as an
exponent of “Islamic Science”. Hoodbhoy is unable to fault
Nasr’s sense of rationality and logic as to the foundations of
knowledge including scientific knowledge and goes a step further
in acknowledging that:
I believe that Nasr has. indeed raised an important point by

questioning an assumption which lies at the heart of the Islamic
modernist thesis-and one which is rarely explicated or given much
thought to.(p.86)
And that is it. Given that it is the modern Muslim who

feels besieged by fundamentalist Islam and Hoodbhoy’s stated
aims to see if Islam and science are compatible or not, we are
given no more. Unable to fault Nasr intellectually, that is
rationally, about his views on both religion and_ science,
Hoodbhoy dismisses Nasr, not on any ground, other than that
Nasr rejects modem science. The entire text is thus:
To conclude the discussion on the difference between the

epistemological and philosophical presumptions of modem
science from those of medieval Islamic science, I believe that
Nasr has indeed raised an important point by questioning an
assumption which lies at the heart of the Islamic modernist thesis
and one which is rarely explicated or given much thought to. But
his strident rejection of modem science as anti-Islamic can only
be accepted by the rigidly orthodox.(p.86).
It should be noted that earlier Hoodbhoy refers to Nasr as

“the most sophisticated and articulate” exponent of modemist
Islam. He refers to his (Nasr’s) MIT and Harvard degree and his
“well-deserved” reputation due to his “large number of impressive
books as a “scholar and historian of Islamic Science”. There
follows the modern’s obsession with ‘originality’ (futuristic) in
the backhanded compliment of “It is the brilliance and clarity of
his expositions, rather than. onginality of research, which is the
The Scientist as Saviour WS
more striking” (p.82). Having said all this, in an overall context

presumably meant to explore the possibilities of connection
between Islam and science/rationality; not being able to fault
Nasr’s reasoning -- all is dismissed and ‘brilliance’ becomes
‘strident’. The last sentence of the quoted passage merits a re-
reading in order to gauge the ‘logic’ of the moder fanatic.
If one further traces the reasons for Hoodbhoy’s rejection
of Nasr it lies in his grotesque monolithic ideas about morality,
basically masculine stereotypes(p,86) They are literally like the
Thinker’s stereotype of ‘holy piety’ and less like the common
man’s, who loves and hates with an equanimity and has his own
ways of resolving moral problems which is to live with them,
humbled. Religion is not a monolithic idea: Only a monolithic
mind would see all religions as similar. Like most matters
conceming human life, religions are enormously complicated
systems, exceedingly diverse in their perspectives. Each religion
emphasizes a particular aspect of morality, and is a different style
of relationship with the unknown (Divinity). It is not a question of
whether for example, Christianity or Islam is better. The point is
that each has a different emphasis. This is evident even in the
paradigmatic images of the lives of their founders. Hence Islamic
ideas of morality, although subsuming the Chnstian (and vice
versa), are different in terms of what they may highlight
regarding, morality, knowledge, relationships etc. And until
difference (contrast) is recognized, there is no point in discussing
concepts, whether of culture, sex, or religion. This not a matter of
theology but commonsense’.
Hoodbhoy’s is a typically modem monolithic view,
ignorant of the ideas of religion -- not to mention many other
dimensions of human existence. Hence the stereotypical notions of
‘piety and holiness’. It should be noted in passing that, obviously
unknown to Hoodbhoy, Hossein Nasr is a leading exponent also
of what may be the most diverse form of Islam loosely called
sufism. And Nasr’s_ perspective (which evokes cosmic
correspondence of male/female) gives the greatest room, if not
outright prominence to the idea of the feminine: literally,
theologically, symbolically and psychologically. The review of
Nasr ends with an exceedingly insulting conversation “between
scientist A & B”. This is a ploy the book is littered with and can
only be dismissed, given the heroic mind-set, as immature.
Given that Nasr’s forte is epistemology, the foundations
of knowledge, it is not surprising therefore, that in his closing
pages and the proposed program to ‘save’ Pakistan, Hoodbhoy
very early suggests “truce needs to be declared in the continuing
opposition to modem sciences as epistemological enterprise”.
Truce, at the most basic level about what is throughout a “battle”
for an ideology that claims sa wisdom (p.12), and no relationship
to justice, “Justice is a concept which lies outside science” (p.100)
The religious fundamentalist at least says that only God can judge
him.
In sum: When ‘one examines the case for modernism,
rationality and science in Pakistan, one can say that at heart it is
similar to fundamentalism. Both ultimately frame themselves as
philosophies of salvation. Like religion, science too is concerned
with ultimate philosophical questions, where are we coming from?
Where are we going? And in the same way that fundamentalists
deny and denigrate the truths of science, the rational modern pays
lip service to religion but essentially denies its essence. Both have
an extremist, masculine, lopsided view of human nature, and
blindness towards the negative aspect of one’s own preferred
perspective. Overall, they are virtual mirror images. Both directly
or indirectly, insist on the separation of the two dimensions which
nevertheless remain stubbomly interconnected. For to
acknowledge connections would be to acknowledge the presence
of doubt, and to doubt would be to feel humble.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that even mainstream
sociological and historical accounts of the Reformation in the
west show that the critical changes in cosmological schemes and
religious values had a continuing affinity in developments in
economics and science. (Weber, Merton, and Lovejoy ). As
Tambiah states:
We ought to remind ourselves all the time of the necessary gap

between the elite conceptions of the intelligentsia -- scientists,
theologians, dogmatists -- and the masses at large for whom
intellectual hairsplitting was_less important than the tasks of
The Scientist as Saviour /.
practical living and everyday realities. We must also bear in mind that for the
discipline of intellectual history it is the thought categories of the ruling elites
and intelligentsia that have constituted the dominant paradigm and
legitimating ideology of a society
ENDNOTES
Interestingly, the translator's commentary may help put

things in perspective... "there is implicit in the play more
than a veiled attack on contemporary social and political
evils. For example, Orestes' everlasting, desire to discuss
each issue as though it were a subject for formal debate is
seen as Euripides’ indictment of the newer educational
tendencies of the time. The playwright is protesting
vigorously against the dangers of demagoguery". Oates &
O'Neill. The Complete Greek Drama. Two Volumes
N.Y. Random House.
Gratzer, Walter (ed). A Literary Companion to Science

N.Y. Norton. 1991.
Penrose, Roger. The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning

Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. Oxford
University Press 1991.
Feyeraband, Paul: Against Method. P.352 Verso. 1988.
4a. Lewontin, R.C: “Women versus the Biologist”, review

essay in the New York Review of Books, April 7, 1994.
Lewontin, who also holds a chair in Biology at Harvard,
discusses these and other issues related to science and
gender. Among the books reviewed:
Ruth Hubbard (and Elijah Ward): Exploding the Gene
Myth: How Genetic Information is Produced and
Manipulated by Scientists, Physicians, Employers,
Insurance Companies, Educators and Law Enforcers.
N.Y. Beacon 1994.
Genes and Gender II: Pitfalls in Research on Sexual

Gender. Teachers College Press/Eurospan 1994.
The Politics of Women’s Biology, Rutgers University
Press 1994
The following statement by Lewin may alert the reader to
the spectrum of the debate in science. Commenting on Hubbard’s
meticulously researched opus:
The problem of science as she sees it is not that it embodies

masculine as opposed to feminine values, but that it is a mirror of
a structure of social domination, that it produces falsely
“objective” legitimization of that structure, and in so doing, fails
to live up to its own standard. It is, after all, the established
academy, including professors of Harvard, Stanford, Princeton,
that claimed authoritatively to have shown that blacks,
Mediterraneans and the working class in general were biologically
inferior, using canons of evidence that violate even the
rudimentary demands of logical and empirical demonstration.
(Ibid).
Russet, Cynthia. E. Sexual Science: The Victorian

Construction of Womanhood, Harvard University Press.
1991.
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women,

Nature, and the Scientific Revolution, 1980 Harper
and Row, San Francisco.
Schiebinger Londa; The Mind has no Sex? Women in

the Origins of Modern Science. Harvard, U. Press
Jordanova, Ludmilla: "Natural Facts: A Historical

Perspective on Science and Sexuality" in Nature,
Culture and Gender. MacCormack and Strathern
eds. CUP. 1980.
Thomas Lacquer.. Making Sex: Body and Gender from the

Greeks to Freud, Harvard 1991.
The reader can contact me personally for a detailed

bibliography.
Martin, Emily. The Woman in the Body: Beacon

Press. Boston. 1987.
Gupta, Bina: Sexual Archetypes, East and West N.Y.

Paragon. 1990.
Jung C.G. Collected Works. The Symbolic Life. p.559

ibid.
Bateson, Gregory. "Interaction between parts of mind is

triggered by contrast" ..Mind and Nature, N.Y. Dutton
1980. See also in same, his discussion on the importance
of the image in human perception p.32-38.
Hillman, ibid. Re-Visioning Psychology. Harper and

Row. 1975.
ibid. p.103
See: "The Lesson Every Child Need Not Learn: Scientific

Literacy for All is an Empty Goal". In The Sciences. New
York Academy of Sciences. July 1988.
Li Robert Root - Bernstein, Breaking Faith, in The Sciences

New York Academy of Sciences. Nov./Dec. 1989.
Robert Kanigel and Geoffrey Cowley. "The Seamy Side

of Science". The Sciences ibid. July/August 88.
Taubes, Gary: Nobel Dreams, Power Deceit and the

Ultimate Experiment Random House N.Y. 1988.
Lewin, Roger. Bones of Contention: Controversies in the

Search for Human Origins. Simon and Schuster, 1988.
For a documentation of the role played by major figures

in academic science in creating “scientific racism” see
S.J. Gould, The Mismeasures of Man and RC.
Lewontin, S.J.Rose and Leo Kamin Not in Our Genes.
12. Kohlberg, Lawrence. The Philosophy of Moral

Development, San Francisco, Harper and Row. 1981. In
response to Kohlberg's ideas is the work of Carole
Gilligan. In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press
1982. Gilligan debunks Kohlberg, showing how
masculine morality is not universal and a woman's
conception of it is more situational/contextual/relational.
See also the following:
Marielouise Jurrie't Sexism: The Male Monopoly on

History and Thought. N.Y. Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
1982. It includes substantial material on science and
the themes under discussion.
Clark and Lange. The Sexism of Social and Political

Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to
Nietzsche, University of Toronto Press 1979.
The Microcosm
Having established the detailed psychodynamics of the modem

Pakistani, one can finally tum to their manifestation in the
individuals constituting the case history: The Thinker and A Inam.
The full text of their statements appear towards the beginning and
end of the paper.
The Thinker
According to the psychiatrist Carothers, literate and non-

literate people exhibit mental distress differently. Oral people
(usually non-Westerners) commonly externalize schizoid
behaviour, whereas literates (largely modern) interiorize it:
Literates often manifest tendencies (loss of contact with

environment) by psychic withdrawal into a dream world of their
own (schizophrenic delusional systematization), oral folk
commonly manifest their schizoid tendencies by extreme external
confusion, leading often to violent action, including mutilation of
self and other .
As Walter Ong has observed, these behaviours are

frequent enough to have given rise to special terms to designate
them: the old time Viking Warrior going “berserk” (Norse), the
southeast Asian person running ‘amok’ (Malay).
From Carother’s perspective, The Thinker is in a state of
delusion. “God’s laws do not change”, he says “They are
immediately comprehensible to all men”. This is true - perhaps -
only from God’s point of view. And the stark reality is that these
laws are not immediately comprehensible to all men hence the
fundamentalist’s problem. Of course, the Thinker is referring to

God’s laws such as the Sharia etc. Like the fundamentalist, and
Hoodbhoy, he too puts Descartes before dehorse, not too
interested in the paradoxical laws of God’s creation, nature, man,
woman, consciousness, and the laws which govern real, physical,
concrete Jife.
In psychiatry, the most common forms of delusions are
those of grandeur and the column reflects this, Indeed almost
everything that he accuses the mullah of being, applies to himself.
Having claimed immediate comprehensibility of God’s laws, our
understanding of His nature is simply assumed, including the
nature of information processing which, whether human or
mechanical, requires a binary minimum. The Marxist’s Cartesian
inspired ‘synthesis’ here being attained through seeking “Unity” in
consciousness (but not body), no further paradox remains. And
with this sense of unity comes the power of its morality -- here
medicalized as “moral health” (in contrast to the mullah’s
“superficial piety”).
The Thinker’s ideas on morality and (1m)mortality are
monolithic monsters, similar to the fundamentalist’s vision of
seeing these concepts in judgemental and transcendant terms.
Savonorola’s immortality is “different” from whose? We are not
told. What is implied of course is that Savonorola is notorious,
that we can become immortal in a ‘good’ way if one is good. The
Thinker also implies a Protestant Christian work ethic regarding
the priest and morality, even though the same could be said for
any type of academic/intellectual activity: the priest “does not
eam his living by economically productive work” and “exhibits a
terrible certainty”. “In fact he (the priest) is never anything more
than a social parasite”. Finally, there is that favourite modern
delusion of grandeur about “what is needed is awareness of (and
more importantly, sensitivity to) the needs of the people”. “The
citizenry”. The common man.
The preoccupation with power remains evident in the
columns. And the Mullah’s slogan of Islam “being in danger”
finds its reflection in the Thinker’s devotion to Marx. In the same
- way that we are told that Islam is good, people are not, or do not
understand it ‘properly’, the Thinker, after being astounded by the
The Microcosm | oon.
passage of the Shariat Bill, in the next column continues as

paranoids perpetually do, to reflect on power. At the time of this
writing, he has diagnosed us as suffering from alienation and
anomie and promises to offer Marxian analysis/(prescription) for
the malaise.
If Pakistan is evidence that Islam does not ‘work’ and it
does not politically, events in Easter Europe and the former
Soviet Union have yet to register on the Thinker. John Stuart
Mill’s astute observation that “every erroneous inference involves
the intellectual operation of admitting insufficient evidence as
sufficient”, is essentially an academic way of describing the
nature of paranoid delusion. The paranoic person only seeks
confirmation for his delusions, excluding all other information.
The Thinker and Hoodbhoy’s book are almost identical in
language and thought. One could call them soul brothers. It is one
of Absolute Certainty and superior morality, as justified by their
concem for the people. Both focus on progress, the future, and yet
lament that people do not learn from history, not realizing that in
order to learn from it one has to Jook back, which Hoodbhoy finds
romantic and useless. What is not understood is that meaningful
learning depends on the recognition of pattern. But children are
too busy establishing pattern and only later, can any ‘sense’ be
made, of individual and collective. history. This of course is pre-
empted by the hero’s ‘progressive’ forward looking vision .
A detailed comparison would be tedious. The following
serially running, condensation of the Thinker’s column can give a
good idea of the psychology being discussed, in this case his own:
The Dominican friar and demagogue, Savonarola...ended up

by becoming a tyrant as bad, if not worse, than those he had
overthrown.. During the period of his rule all he did was vent (sic)
and rave against the immortality (sic) He did not address the
underlying problems nor, perhaps, did he ever understand them...
Fanatics may cause a great deal of misery but never achieve the
goals they set for themselves. They are incapable of understanding
reality which is complex, and they can never tackle the different
problems that they are inevitably confronted with.
But there is a clerical mentality that is common to priests of
all the different religions...nor the lessons of history make any
different to it. Being of simple mind, they confuse symptoms with

the disease and feel that treating one is the same thing as curing
the other. Their basic prescription is to promote hypocrisy.
Superficial piety is taken for moral health. The insidious disease
is then free to eat away at the body politic from within... Who
would have thought that the close of the twentieth century would
witness yet another oversimplification being taken seriously... the
problems of the citizenry being ignored... Savonarola, though he
was probably quite genuinely convinced that he had found the
ultimate solution to society’s ills has been forgotten by posterity
because his answer to the problems of his times was a false
answer. God’s laws do not change because they are eternal
verities.... they are immediately comprehensible to all men,
requiring little if any interpretation by the wise... what is needed
is a awareness of (and more importantly, sensitivity to) the needs
of the people. -- God’s sovereignty is not dependent upon its
recognition by his (sic) creatures -- The interpretation of these
man made laws can be entrusted only to those trained for this
particular job... That knowledge must be combined with learning
of a host of matters that have a direct connection with the existing
state of society. This kind of mind is simply not available
amongst the priestly class... The priest can never see the wood for
the trees. His interpretation of every divine injunction is literal
and his knowledge of the real state of the world is no more than
hazy. He does not, after all, live as other people do. He does not
eam his living by economically productive work. In fact he is
never anything more than a social parasite... He goes about
attacking the morals of the people or imposing doctoral purity on
society like Savonarola, his methods are tyrannical. Like
Savonarola, he is forgotten.
It would be futile to explain to the Thinker that his

column itself is evidence that Savonarola has not been forgotten.
And if so the same can be said for Marx.
One could go on in great detail if quantification of data is
a virtue, but ‘systematic delusional specialization’ is simply
another phrase for ‘empiricism’. The data have been provided, the
point made, one must attend to Anam and that extremely
infuriated appeal to the Khusras of Pakistan.
The Microcosm 85
Pakistani Feminism
An informal survey on A.Inam’s letter, with just one

sentence deleted, indicated that most readers of that lively epistle,
thought the author was a man (The sentence, at the end of the 4th
paragraph was:”.. No way Jose. You are not getting me in there to
play the charitable begum and dish out bug-infested blankets”).
The letter is interesting in a number of ways. Although
A.Inam does not specifically say she is a feminist one can imagine
her to be an ardent believer in women’s rights, female equality
and the anything-a-man-can-do-so-can-I school of feminism. The
signing off is quintessentially feminist.
A.Inam typifies the modem Pakistani feminist who
believes herself liberated but, in fact, remains totally oppressed at
the individual, real, psychological level. The irony of the modern
Pakistani woman, if not her tragedy, is similar in nature and
magnitude to the common man’s. As discussed in the section on
psychiatry, while modernization is destroying his indigenous
systems of healing, it is not able to offer an adequate substitute
which anyway is not so much alien as brutal and oppressive. The
Pakistani feminist, believing that modernity would liberate her,
has similarly colonized herself, by placing “‘incharge’ the mindset
of the hero. Whereas earlier she was physically oppressed now the
masculine also rules internally.
Feminism is a truly desperate topic and one would prefer
to steer clear of it since the issues are enormously complex,
deserving of a separate full fledged analysis. Although this paper
itself has referred to categories of gender this is more for reasons
of conceptual clarity rather than to suggest warring opposites.
There are thousands of things about us which have nothing to do
with gender. What one has referred to are certain structures of
consciousness, archetypal patterns which historically emphasize
certain qualities at the expense of others. The main point is firstly,
.the present lopsidedness in these matters, which is extreme to say
the least. And secondly, that although we do share a spectrum of
consciousness, there is also a stark difference. A.Inam if she were
aware of this, would perhaps flippantly refer to it as a difference
in ‘plumbing’. Physically men and women are different. The
effort here then, is to highlight the present imbalance in the

spectra of qualities and yet not lose sight of fundamental
differences.
Returning to A.Inam her heroic mindset insisting on
singularity of meaning is inherently anti-diversity and therefore
also anti-feminine. The matrix of the psyche is diverse and
essentially what the hero has suppressed belongs to the feminine
side of human nature. By accepting the hero’s world view,
feminists have obliterated difference, emphasizing instead the idea
of equality.
The idea of equality itself is a never ending treadmill and
has emerged from heroic morality which is based on black and
white notions of good/bad. It is related to a linear schema of
up/down, either/or and is strengthened by the tendency co-opted
from a masculine view of monotheism which reduces all issues to
moral issues. The resultant consciousness of modern men and
women indeed sounds morally superb, except two things are lost
sight of. Firstly, that this morality draws its power from religion
and only from its perspective are we indeed equal. Secondly,
perhaps more importantly, to deny the laws of nature and
diversity at a personal level is perhaps ultimately a matter of
personal choice. But to deny them in the wor/d is myopic. The
fact is that humans are different. We are a spectrum of
corruption, devotion, lust, spirituality, intelligence, bravery,
cowardice and stupidity. Indeed it is our successes that set us
apart and our flaws which unite us. Modern notions of morality
are delusional to say the least, in wanting somehow, to
grandiosely reverse the pattern.
The modem vision, transfixed to a goal of earthly
transcendence, does not recogmize that people, including
themselves, are the same since time immemorial. Different ‘isms’
may suggest that human nature can be fundamentally changed for
the “better” (or worse, if not ‘educated’), but this is simply not
true. The bombing of Baghdad when viewed through T.V., at one
level gave the impression of newness, modern, hi-tech almost
futuristic in its aerial images. Yet on earth, the carnage, the gore,
the despair of rescue and expiring hopes -- these were all the same
as they'd ever been. And if anything, the world was given an
The Microcosm 87
unforgettable demonstration of the logical consequences of heroic

psychology as it is incarnated in the U.S.A. And it is this reality,
its moral aspects, here on earth, which is addressed by religion.
The fact is that while sharing many perspectives, men and
women are also morally different beings, neither perhaps better,
simply different. In keeping with the increasing interest in the
West on such matters Harvard scholar Lawrence Kohlberg spent
almost a decade studying “moral development”’. His findings
were consistent with masculine heroic psychology, until a woman
colleague Carol Gilligan examined the same issue from a gender
based framework. Her conclusions clearly show that there is a
difference in the conception and manifesting of moral behaviour
between males and females, the former more decided, definite,
black and white, the latter more relational, situation/context
oriented. Incidentally, Kohlberg recently committed suicide.
Most Pakistani feminists in their quest for equality, have
swallowed whole, ideas of self and other, and as said earlier, are
reluctant to consider reality, since in theory these male notions of
morality sound irresistible. That they are delusional and self-
mutilatory 1s of no consequence. To point to biological and
scholarly research evidence indicating how much of this has to do
with Cartesian/Freudian ideas of male/female sexuality 1s beyond
the scope of this paper, but has nevertheless been alluded to in the
discussion on Hoodbhoy’s book. As was discussed, the lopsided
vision of science, religion, self and other is not ‘natural’ or
universal but the consequences of the Cartesian disconnection of
mind from body, which Freud refined and imposed on men and
women alike. And having done so, he proceeded to ask the
mystified/exasperated question “what do women want?”
Keeping these ideas in view, despite A.Inam most
probably violently disagreeing, one can see her letter as an
eloquent appeal for freedom from the masculine hero. Given the
Thinker’s delusions of grandeur and the paradigm he offers of
knowledge, civility, behaviour, values and morality, no wonder
she is angry and upset. Struggling to liberate herself from
‘monolithic and therefore impossible to live up to notions of
masculine morality and unity of thought, her outburst is a
refreshing response to the Thinker’s sense of total moral and

intellectual certitude.
If she sounds a little “hysterical” it is only appropriate,
given that this was the basis of Freud’s claim to fame in
‘identifying’ a condition which by definition (wandering/lost
uterus) men cannot have. Her ‘hysterical’ manner has pejorative
connotations only if one sees her (as she does herself) through the
Freudian lens.
As said earlier, if one reads the letter, except for one
sentence there is nothing to indicate gender. If anything, the words
which come to mind have essentially masculine connotations:
delightfully rakish and cavalier. She aims for a neutered identity.
And she is describing herself as much as lashing out at her mostly
male, peers. Indeed she classifies herself as a Khusra; but in an
obviously insulting and denigrating manner. Weighed down by the
Thinker and his terrible burdens of morality and unity, A.Inam
feels crushed and trapped from all sides, angry (if not hating)
herself and her peers. It does not strike her that the Thinker may
be her tormentor, and that she would be in no way a /esser
person, if she were to reassess the basis of his ideals. Instead she
strains -- as he has taught her -- to be better, more equal than the
rest, in this case less hypocritical. She achieves “moral health” in
that most existentially of modern ways; in her vocabulary “letting
it all hangout” (there are no female flashers). As she says, this is
the only difference between her and the hypocrites.
One must resist the temptation to discuss the abiding
theme of hypocrisy in the Quran. Suffice it to say here two things.
Firstly, A.Inam makes a heroic but unsuccessful effort to escape
from the bonds of moder consciousness. Secondly, that the issue
of feminism and modernity and religion is a complex theme,
beyond the scope of this monograph. Simplifications are
inevitable and all this is not meant to suggest a continuation of the
status quo and brutality meted out to women in Pakistan. On the
other hand most Pakistani feminists seem to be unaware that
feminism in the west is undergoing profound changes not least
because of feminist scholars of religion. Their work is indicative
of a growing effort towards reclaiming religion from its
masculine, literal, monotheistic base.
The Microcosm 89
To wrap up the discussion on A.JInam in_ her

unquestioning acceptance of modern ideas of knowledge, thought,
morality, etc., she violently rejects essential sides of herself as
undesirable. When one considers her choice of image, perhaps it
is a little more clear about what was meant by the ‘metaphysical
transparency of things’. In this case the underlying themes are the
sense of the symbolic and the denial of the feminine side to
consciousness. The Khusra for most modems especially males, is
an object not only of derision but of fascination -- the ultimate
physical mystery, blurred gender. As Hoodbhoy might say:
“Strange, fascinating, bizarre”.
The Khusra is of course unacceptable to the hero
psychologically (despite physical evidence to the contrary). And it
is that which we deny most violently which will come forward to
meet us. It is to the credit of A.Inam’s incipient (unconscious)
post-modernism that she has ‘seen through’ the ‘heroism’ of the
Pakistani intelligentsia. But in her revulsion at the figure, she has
yet to see through herself. It seems that in her anger and desire for
total moral purity (superiority), the Pakistani feminist unwittingly
stands to become the ‘fundo’ of consciousness; not too different
from her religious counterpart in Pakistan or other Muslim
countries such as Algeria, where women march ahead of men as
they demonstrate for an ‘Islamic’ polity.
Intellectuals in Pakistan are so busy in helping the
common man that they have lost sight of human reality. Drawing,
firstly on an image of science as perpetuated by Hoodbhoy’s
book, the ideas are consolidated further by drawing on the
assumptions and insights of that thoroughly modem enterprise:
social science. Notions of religion, rationality, self and other are
handed down to us through the jargon and perspectives of
sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, etc. Frequently
they are dressed up in elaborate statistics and give an even greater
impression of being close to ‘science’ and therefore indisputable.
The problem of social science in Pakistan is that it
exhibits the same sense of inferiority that afflicts much of its
mainstream counterpart in the west -- and to which the
Alternatives movement is a reaction. But here, alternatives are not
sought. Tradition is acknowledged at the literal level of “ethnic
90 . Modernism in Pakistan
chic” in the same way that The Thinker “immediately

comprehends the laws of God” -- but not nature of which he is a
part. Since religion per se remains to be studied and since it is a
personal matter, the social scientific community has reached its
explanatory limits regarding the phenomenon of religious
fundamentalism. As noted on the section on the literal and
symbolic, anthropological and other social scientific readings of a
primarily symbolic system such as religion, in fact deny its
symbols. Instead of seeing the symbolic/analogic, the approach is
digital, substitutive. Religion is (merely) desacralized and the
essence of its ideas bypassed in favour of more concrete and
manageable concepts where it can be studied as part of ‘culture’,
in museums and primitive artifacts; like the vermiform appendix,
evidence of a vestigial, now largely unnecessary consciousness.
Or it is related to dimensions of class, wealth, power, in resonance
with it being “nothing but” the opiate of the poor.
The point is that despite the reality of the fundamentalist
tide facing us, the intelligentsia continue to be enthralled of an
ideal to the extent of delusion. Believing as Barnhardt said, like
ostriches, in a counterforce: science/rationality. This
automatically assumed counter balance is not incorrect as much
as an extremist view of life, problems, self and society as filtered
through the jargon of social science and further distorted through
journalism, which by its very structure, is ill-equipped to examine
in detail and depth. Thus the modem Pakistani intellectual and
academic continues to reinforce and perpetuate ideas about
religion and science which have little to do with the reality of
either. Rather than reassess their assumptions about these
concepts, commentators are content to repeat tired and hackneyed
explanations of social change, economic policy etc.; invariably
saying how they are not against religion, but at heart it is
incompatible with science. Underlying the polite lipservice to
religion, privately there is contempt. If this is less so publicly
now, it is not because of any shift in vision but because, well,
moder people are tolerant. The tolerance is cnly there because
the fundamentalist 1s real, not the ideas of religion as such. (And
if today, Islam is becoming an ‘intellectual’ topic it is after Bosnia
The Microcosm 9]
and the eerie realisation that simply because of being bom to

Muslim parents, we are being framed as the ‘other’.)
More often than not, the thrust of these modem visions is
towards a Marxist inspired utopia (“nowhere”) combined with a
bleeding heart liberalism. A grotesque, uncontainably powerful
sense of morality about the rch and poor, such as the Thinker’s
and the one that drives A.Inam crazy, is the norm. Thanks to
masculine consciousness, the central concerns of western thought
are the questions of free will and determinism. Both have to do
with Nietzschien power. There is the heroic and juvenile notion
that meaning in life has to do only in the political (power) sense.
Otherwise “there is no point”. Any contact with a realistic
depiction of life is rejected. For example, an economist reviewing
the latest novel of the South American writer Marquez ends the
review:
“". One can understand Marquez’s mood, but one cannot

permit him this foray into pessimism. If one did, one could only
reach the conclusion, that there was no point to life at all. For the
sake of his readers at least, one hopes that is not where Marquez
stands today...” (The Herald. June 1991).
The crisis in Pakistan is neither of religion nor rationality

but above all one of values; not so much of the common man’s
but of the ruling elites, fundamentalist and modern alike.
Hoodbhoy’s resounding “Upon science-but guided by universal
moral principles -- depends the continuation of civilized human
existence”, tells us nothing of this “universal” morality. And a
closer look reveals that these principles are neither universal, nor
are the ones presented as such, particularly moral. At stake is not
the common man’s welfare but something else.
ENDNOTES
, Carothers. J.C. "Culture, Psychiatry and the Writ...

- Word" in Psychiatry 22-307-20.
Ong. Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing

of the World. Methuen N. York 1982.
This is another framework leading to similar conclusions
about differences in consciousness between East and
West, male and female, oral and literate societies.
See Bateson, Gregory: Mind and Nature: A Necessary

Unity N.Y. Dutton 1979. One of the best expositions on
the mind/body ‘problem’.
See Appendix I.
Marxist historians are especially prone to a heroic,

forward looking view of ‘history while simultaneously
being morally reductionist in seeing individuals as the
‘root’ of the problem. A recent column in the Frontier Post
entitled 'Heroes and Democracy offers some choice
illustrations of the denial of human nature and an implicit
desire to 'make' the people something else: "In order to
use them, he (the hero) makes then imbeciles, docile.....
the myth of greatness creates servile worship.... the myth
of greatness is anti-people, anti-democratic. In Pakistan it
is in the psyche of the people to worship heroes. They
have inherited this tendency from their past..." (F.P.
23.6.91). Dr. Mubarak.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. The Philosophy of Moral

Development. San Francisco, Harper and Row. 1981.
Gilligan, Carole. Jn a Different Voice Harvard University

Press 1982.
Goldenberg, Naomi. Changing of the gods. Boston,

Beacon Press 1979.
PART III
THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN

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The Battle for Pakistan
If this has been an excessively long winded, at times

polemical exposition, it has been so because firstly the language
one has been examining is itself polemical and the entrenchment
of the modernist view all-pervasive. The ethos of social science
similarly reflects the masculine mindset of insisting on ‘efficient’
linear and preferably ‘empirical’ expositions. A more
discursive/recursive format such as the present one, is viewed
frequently from a narrow definition of science and an armory of
_ labels ranging from the ‘anecdotal’ to “what is the point’?
Von Neumann’s work on game theory states that the
rules of the game are all important and the rules of modem
discourse themselves insist that one must respect rules. It is only
after going on and on -- by coming to a point of exhaustion -- that
maybe someone will ask what is the game? There is no other way
out. And the chances are, of course, before reaching the point of
exhaustion, the reader dismisses all by labelling it polemic, loud,
‘strident’, repetitious and a host of other evaluative terms, which
would prevent arriving at the point of questioning the nature of
the game, which in this case, is what is called a zero sum game.’
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall
A game requires two distinct protagonists. To enter the

world of either is to enter the game, into a surrealistic state of a
monologue between mirror images, hence the feeling of going
round and round, repetition, exhaustion. The game is about
endless masculine power (progress), so nothing else can be done,
until exhaustion sets in. Both players spin in their own logical
96 The Battle for Pakistan
systems, which since they are very similar, eventually collapse

onto monolithic notions of morality to distinguish themselves as
‘better’, desirable, what Teichmann called the ‘rooster factor’.
The rules unchanged, the game then becomes as to who is more
moral (health/strength). Both focus on hairsplitting minutiae of
the correctness of the logic of particie physics or the distance of
the shalwar from the ankles. When persistently questioned as to
the bases of their respective beliefs/morality both shift into
enormous scales of reference: God or the masses, or to use a
favourite modern phrase “let us not lose sight of the forest for the
trees”. Meanwhile the nature of the game is unnamed or named
salvation/progress to which the common man is urged to become
participant, choose sides. The game itself however cannot be
questioned, if it is, one is either mad or bad. The former is the
label of the modem, thanks to psychology, the latter from the
religious fundamentalist and his view of religion.
One is not permitted to question the fact that the
forest/tree analogy is a perspective that puts the observer himself,
his motives, his fallibility beyond judgement since theoretically it
can go into infinite regress. As Hoodbhoy says “justice is a
concept which lies outside science” and the logic of the book
makes science synonymous with rationality. From either side --
modem or fundamentalist -- the player refuses to be questioned.
His knowledge about himself is ‘besides the point’, for to come to
a point is to come to a stop. Thus the presently de-moralized
Thinker will be analyzing - not contemplating - the nature of
power, and comforting us with Marx and Durkheim on alienation
and anomie.
One rule of the game 1s the illusion of ‘going’ somewhere,
and taking the common man along, into space and beyond; the
‘fundo’s taking the short cut via God dispatching all from
darkness towards Him, by force if necessary, the modem taking
the masses toward “progress”, up and away towards
‘enlightenment’. While the masses, as I think A. Inam would say,
keep ‘breeding like rabbits’, constantly evading the clutches of the
utilitarian saviour, by becoming, daily more in number and
possibly more inclined towards religion. Unfettered by modern
education, all that the common man ‘knows’ is his life; which
occasionally greets him and frequently humbles him as it takes

care of the vows made to himself, God and others. He understands
intuitively the message of the Crucifixion.
The game is about power and infinity. God is a manner of
existence, an attitude towards life, a set of ideas. The common
man’s perception of God is of (in)finite power, which by
definition of infinity and multiplicity at least holds the possibility
of being other than a Nazi. Man’s knowledge of himself comes
before his knowledge of his Lord, says the Hadith. To which one
can add that the capacity for seeing diversity/difference within
himself will be reflected accordingly in his conception of Divinity.
As long as there are humans, men will lie, cheat, hate, and fear.
That they may still not be condemned/damned and simultaneously
partake of joy, love, satisfaction and that strange word ‘grace’ is
possible for a great many people. One can only bear witness to
this fact, not try and ‘prove’ it empirically. The common man, in
his ‘superstitions’ and ‘backwardness’ dialogues with something,
he either cannot articulate, or does in ways eternal, such as saying
“Thy Will be done” or “strange are the ways..” But increasingly
he is invited to be “liberated” as Hoodbhoy says “by the gift of
certainty”, to join in the game and take sides between the fundos
and moderns and their driving force of the ‘will to power’.
The players are, of course, connected by their game. But
to ‘realize’ this connection, depends on the extent of doubt that
they bring to their convictions. As discussed, the overbearing
sense of certainty of modernism and fundamentalism pre-empts
the idea of doubt and therefore connection. But since it cannot be
obliterated, the pathology remains, and is reflected in the partial-
ness of the basic premise. Thus connection remains but only in the
Cartesian way, lopsided and literal: as a sort of all-pervasive
masculine homo-narcissism. The modernist claims his humanism
and psychological connection between man and man, bypassing,
God and female; the fundamentalist seeing nothing but God. Only
the starting points are different. Even when the need for
connections is recognized at an intellectual, rational level, it is
accepted only in ‘broken’ literal, i.e. meaning-less terms. Thus,
for example, the modemist pays lip service to religion but insists
4 4 Qa ,8e 2
Thinker and Hoodbhoy’s book show, the underlying mind set

remains heroic, seeing the other from the adversarial context of
battle/struggle. Since both contain the seeds of each other’s
pathology, which is the denied ‘other’ (feminine/body), finally
they coliapse onto themselves. And out of the depths of this
fusion, rises the mysterious, unbearable being which is at the
heart of A.Inam’s poignant appeal to the Khusras of Pakistan.
If one resists the temptation to play and reflect in the
mirror, one can understand better why being the mirror images
that they are, the fundos and the moderns cannot communicate
and their growing, sense of rage (especially the moderns) with
each other. The mirror displays an effect in that which is seen
from the point of view of the observer who sees. Right is reflected
as left. Mirrors are diverse in shape modifying the object seen by
the observer. None of the forms in a mirror are fofally ‘in’ the
mirror, both are ‘real’ yet different. Thus, in the disparity in
condition of both religion and rationality men mirror each other,
seeing in his brother something of himself that he could not other
wise see. By the placement of multiple mirrors, as this paper has
tried to do, one can then possibly see that metaphysical
transparency of things both distant and here. As for example, the
Salam/Weinber Nobel Prize, which Hoodbhoy sees only as a
proof of the ‘neutrality’ of science. Yet it also speaks, even at that
distance, of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, ‘cold’ and ‘dark matter’ -- and
the Unity of atheist and believer.
The Aesthetic Equation
The question becomes not one of a quest for power and

maleness and exclusive verticality, but of proportion. Exhausted
by the game, one can be contemplative. Action seeks position,
knowledge, degree.* The absolutist vocabulary of right/wrong, can
give way to a more socio-ecological one; a language reflective of
connections, doubt, balance, at /east duality if not multiplicity and
therefore a different framework of values and priorities. The word
‘proportion’ becomes central and thus, sin and evil (‘moral
health’) become a matter of homeopathic proportion and degree.
This would be a move to a more mature and challenging
vocabulary than the childish good/bad. Time magazine (10.6.91)

did a cover story on ‘Evil’ reflecting the growing preoccupation in
the west with religion. Framing the question in monolithic terms,
it posed the juvenile ‘proposition’ “God is all powerful, God is all
Good, Terrible Things Happen”. The fundos see only the first
part, the modems only the ‘result’ of what is to begin with a
childish frame. The fact is that in no religion has God said He is
only Good in the sense of being a permanent source of bliss and
guarantor of a painfree state. In Islam He has a/so mentioned
some fnghtening attributes. The common man in his experience
knows that life is not just two qualities of good/bad but multiple
experiences, which unfold and crystallize with varying intensity.
Justice then, becomes from the socio-ecological point of view,
akin to Rumi’s idea of giving each thing its proper place. [It
should be noted that the Greeks had no word for evil, the closest
was hubris (arrogance). We also tend to forget that although they
gave to us notions of democracy and family, slavery and
homosexuality were simultaneously practiced. |
This approach ‘is closer to the realm of aesthetics. Of
course from the moral highground of the religious/utilitarian hero,
who must eradicate all pain (or sin) from this world, beauty and
aesthetics have no ‘use’. But this 1s once again a superficial and
fanatical view. the last pages of Hoodbhoy’s book, apart from
being a veritable flood of slogans and an ‘inconsistency’ which
sets the book (unwittingly) on its head, states:
While science must be vigorously pursued both for development

and for enlightenment of the mind... it is not a code of morality..
it knows nothing about justice, beauty or feeling...” (p. 167).
Between being personally involved in the science of particle

physics, and urging the public not to lose sight of the forest for
the trees, Hoodbhoy himself has lost sight of the forest which is
physics. In .1983 the Indian physicist Subrahmanyan
Chandrashekhar was awarded. the Nobel Prize for physics.
Throughout his life he has been preoccupied with the role of
aesthetics in physics. A fellow physicist, writing in the award
winning journal ‘The Sciences’ under the title “The Aesthetic

Equation” describes it thus:
Chandrashekhar returned to the subject of beauty again and

again, not only in his technical work but also in speeches and
essays spanning forty years. In 1987 the latter were collected and
published under the title Truth and Beauty: Aesthetics and
Motivations in Science. The book is not a monolithic, “coherent
account”, and much of it is so technical it is difficult
for
physicists to read. Yet in the end it succeeds...
Among the qualities of mathematical beauty he singles out,
the most compelling is a sense of proportionality and relatedness,
of parts to one another... It suggests a feeling of balance, of parts
that resonate...
Thus the scientific view can be absorbed into the

language of aesthetics and a re-visioned psychology of human
consciousness. Such a perspective can assist in rethinking the
moral problems in science. If scientific ideas can be connected
with their psychological significance, the domain of objective
science and subjective ethics need no longer be adversarial. The
sort of morality to be expected by the psychological premises of a
scientific theory would belong as a corollary to the theory.”
From this perspective, ‘positive rational knowledge’
becomes realistic knowledge, in which one recognizes that gain
and loss, light and dark go hand in hand. In mythology, Venus the
goddess of love and beauty has an ongoing affair with Mars, god
of war, bloodshed and violence. Both are intertwined. Even
children’s fairly tales universally talk of the connection between
beauty and the beast. A genuinely aesthetic response is when we
gasp and this has to do more with one’s heart and soul than ‘pure’
rationality. This is partly what Hossein Nasr meant when he
referred to the heart as the seat of the Intellect, which Hoodbhoy’s
book in its quest for certainty saw as “mud”. Its fanatical, narrow
vision prevents the realization that science and rationality are
present equally in the rules of aesthetics. Literature too is based
on observation, constructs, models of behaviour and society, sets
problems and solves them. And as in science, it too has first rate
and third rate minds.
Trying to see proportion, one is led to a different view

and understanding of ourselves and society, more in accordance
with the reality which is our environment. Here the heroic burdens
of progress and morality etc., find a different sense of scale and
tone. More man-age-able, one perhaps in which A .Inam, if she so
chooses, need not regard herself and her male peers as
emasculated, impotent objects of derision, “spineless gutless
wimps”, as she says.
Instead of being tyrannized by the hypocrisy of the
“development mafia’ she can maybe occasionally, do something
for someone and simply accept what she can(not) do and
recognize her limitations. The issue is not one of ‘liberation’ but a
loosening of the bonds of A.Inam’s tormentors (‘analysis’ means
to loosen). She can rest by occasionally disengaging her gaze
from the Cyclopean vision of perpetual movement, towards
‘goals’ of light, height, speed -- all for the ‘masses’. And in
resting perhaps not be so enraged and contemptuous as much as
appreciative/contemplative of irony. Of the guts and bravery of
the (real) Khusra as he traditionally entertains us in times of
celebration, receiving, our mocking, mystified gaze with the non-
chalance of a hero. Carrying the unacknowledged pathos-(ology)
the un-dignified burden of the other (woman) sex, with humour
and grace.
Incidentally, the hermaphrodite and variations on the
theme was in ancient times considered a profoundly spiritual
symbol, prominent in various religious mystical systems to the
extent of universality. It is also the symbol and etymological
source for Hermes, the winged messenger of Zeus. His insignia is
a staff with wings and two serpents twined about it, symbolizing
moral duality. He was considered a mediator, peacemaker and
stood for conciliation, tolerance, peace. It is to the credit of
A.Inam’s essentially feminine (intuitive) imagination, that she
gave us a powerful and eternal symbol of psychological richness.
In terms of psychological potential we are all indeed Khusras.
Insofar as men and women are physically different, the image like
a true symbol, simultaneously speaks at the individual and
collective level, in both instances, suggesting balance (and
perhaps humour).
Although A.Inam remains trapped within the heroic

mode; her style and disgust with the game may yet help see her
through(herself). Here is a far more entertaining than the rhetoric
of battle/adversary, which, if she wants to retain her sense of
humour if not her sanity, she needs to continue seeing through:
Especially rhetoric such as:
...modemization of the people. The progress towards

modemity requires that mass participation -- be encouraged. To
rely on the people is an expression of respect for cultural heritage
-- At the same time, one must be cautions and bear in mind that
all traditions are not positive and do not necessarily lead towards
forward development. One can be optimistic of the triumph of
reason.. it is constant and works always in one direction... each
advance has come after a protracted struggle those who seek more
light and those who are afraid of it. The enrichment of life, the
uplift of human dignity, the liberation of the creative spirit and
the vindication of freedom -- this is the struggle ahead of us
(Hoodbhoy p. 168).
Her complaint was depression which is frequently a

harbinger of change, of going ‘down’ and deepening. The word
humility is from humus, decaying matter, and is the best natural
fertilizer for growth towards maturity. She said she had retumed
recently from abroad and one assumes she is not exactly “an
uptight middle-aged spinster”. Whether she chooses to go up or
down, one can only suggest she stay away from a modern ‘mental
health’ practitioner. In the west, Britain at least, the highest rate
of drug addiction and suicide in the medical community, is for
psychiatrists. One wishes her luck. From whatever little one
knows about psychology it is unlikely that The Thinker can
change. Paranoia is an exceedingly difficult condition to treat.
“Courage to Know”
The focus of this paper on Pakistani moderns has been

more towards the psychodynamics underlying the knowledge as
belief-system of The Thinker, Hoodbhoy’s _ book,
Herald/Newsline and to some extent A.Inam. Moderns pride
themselves on ‘open’ minds, whereas fundamentalists make no

bones about their disinclination for academic debate or ‘proving’
anything intellectually. As this paper has tried to show, the heart
and soul of both protagonists is quite similar: masculine,
misogynist, having less to do with any reality and more with a
childish and arrogant vision justified by a yearning to make this
world better, when in fact, it just becomes different. Yet there are
some differences of degree to be considered. For example, the
religious fundamentalist’s greater tendency towards violence.
One has noted elsewhere, that modems tend to regard
violence as distasteful, regarding it from a distance as one would
a snarling animal . It is a monolithic reaction designed once again
to try and retain a morally supenor, unrealistic self-image of a
sanitized psyche. [We know very little about ourselves, we even
hate to know more... the unconscious of highly educated people is
often well-nigh incredible in certain respects not to mention their
prejudices and their irresponsible ways of dealing -- or not dealing
-- with them” (Jung C.W. Vol.18, p.661)].
There 1s nevertheless, an element of rigidity and violence
in the religious fundamentalist which is hard to dilute. When one
carefully examines the psychology of religion, there seems to be
at the center of the heart of every religion an intransigent core
which will not yield to education, argument, logic and ‘common
sense’. If symbols say that which cannot be said any other way,
then the fundamentalist reflects the aspect of the unknown, which
is Absolute and Immutable. So does the hero, of course, in his
rigidity and will to power; but the scale is literal, human and in a
way, smaller. And this points to an interesting difference between
the two which has been alluded to at various places in the context
of doubt, fear, and hypocrisy. The accusation of hypocrisy 1s
more common as a verdict on fundamentalists by moderns than
vice versa. “Pious hypocrisy” is a common phrase used to label
fundamentalists. This at one level is true, yet at another is an
absolutist, narrow understanding of the varied nature of morality
and piety. The latter, according to the dictionary also simply
means a sense of duty towards people, family, friends. And one
knows many pious moderns.
Man’s own definitions of morality trap him. Preset

notions about God, religion and the scriptures prevent therefore
any realistic interpretation of the Divine view on the matter. Since
fundamentalists see moderns as ‘bad’ any way this dimension to
moderns is rarely mentioned, A.Inam’s calling her peers
hypocrites, being the exception and not the rule. As we have seen
the human, psyche can make relative every formulation by
complimenting (mirrors) it with an opposite equally valid
position. The truth remains uncertain and the only certainty which
does not reveal its truth is death. To return to the beginning then,
the question in terms of the difference between fundamentalists
and modernists can be framed in their attitude to death.
“Courage to know” is the beautiful motto of Government
College, Lahore, an institution which once provided some of the
best modern minds in Pakistan. Our history shows us that few
modems are willing to actually die for their beliefs as compared
to religious fundamentalists. For every Che Guevera there are
many more men ready to die for religion without reading half as
many books as he did. And realistically speaking there are fewer
Castros and many fundamentalist leaders today. There 1s then at
least (by moder standards of rationality) greater consistency and
integrity in the religious fanatic. In contrast, there is the image of
Salman Rushdie who is beloved of our intellectuals for his
undoubtedly accurate depictions of us, but who, when it came to
courage and principles, fell far behind the religious fanatic.
To say that this ‘proves’ that one is a fanatic while the
other is not, or that the religious fundamentalist is somehow less
intelligent since he lacks rationality -- is not only an arrogant view
but is to beg all over again those questions of the game which this
paper has addressed. More ready to kill and be killed the
fundamentalist responds primarily to the latter part of the Quran’s
call to approach with fear and hope. Modem heroes it seems are
fearless -- but up to a point -- and obviously do not need hope in
their undiluted spint of optimism and conviction of “triumph”.
(Those who feel disheartened can always read the Thinker and
Hoodbhoy’s book). ,
Religious fundamentalism thus differs from and raises
questions about modermism and its(self) destructive tendency in
terms of a reduced capacity for suffering and an abnormal fear of

death. One can only speculate that this may have something to do
with the rigid denial of the body and its realities which is a
consequence of Cartesian thought. As stated in the discussion on
humility and making room/space for the other, space is a body
related concept. The hypocrisy of that basic denial (body/woman)
eventually comes through, both in the nemesis of the ‘khusra’
image and this fear of death. Perhaps this partly explains
Maulana Edhi’s acceptance by the intelligentsia. He is most
striking for his willingness to handle dead bodies. The symbolic
ritual of prayer, especially in Islam, eloquently under-scores the
necessity of bodily commitment in any belief, religious or secular.
All else is hypocrisy.
On the other hand, the religious fundamentalist’s lack of
fear is not as absolute as he may claim. It should be evident
throughout this paper that gender attribution, like everything else,
is both literal and symbolic, the latter to be understood more in
the sense of qualitative difference. Keeping this in mind, the
fundamentalist’s seeming lack of total fear, also stems from his
conception of Divinity in a monothematic manner. The
fundamentalist too denies all those aspects of It which are
quintessentially (s)He. The Law of Evidence in Muslim Pakistan
is a desperate, literal attempt to overcome the fear inherent in the
denial of an earthly and cosmic reality.
Immutability implies sight, which in tum implies
witnessing, and is a theme close to the heart of Islam, as in the
‘Shaha’da’ which swears to the reality of the connection between
a human being and God. Behind every fanaticism, said Jung,
lurks a secret doubt. Hooked to certainty like his modern brother,
the fundamentalist’s law is a classic case of masculine arrogance,
of not wanting, the benefits of doubt. But overall it can be said,
across the globe, religious resurgence and_ religious
fundamentalism bears witness and in tum is witnessed by others,
to that which is immutable.
I am aware that none of this of course is of any practical
‘use’ in the heroic task of making Pakistan a “strong, modern
Islamic state whose ideology and territorial integrity...” etc., etc.
But it is unlikely that any paper in this conference will be of
actual use. Based on what has been said, it would be logical to

assume that since the ‘problem’ can be summarized as
‘masculine’ solutions can be found in the ‘feminine’. To some
extent this is so in the aesthetic view and its emphasis on the
diverse, ambiguous, proportional and metaphorical. But to
suggest such obviously hazy romantic notions is to be
sentimentally hijacked by the hero in his quest only for the
positive and “up-beat”. The current manifestation of such
‘feminizing’ in academia being eco-feminism and feminine
environmentalism.
The feminine, as the matrix from which all life springs, is
also the place of death, not so much as resolution but dissoiution.
To Hoodbhoy’s plea for the “acquisition of positive, rational
knowledge” one can suggest additionally the acquinng of a
“negative knowledge”, one which would be more pragmatic and
realistic. It would be for example, to at least have the courage to
recognize that the commitment to universal education is inherently
futile. If we insist, because of a sentimental sense of morality, to
focus only on the positive, one can be sure that the negative will
shadow us as it does, closely: a sense of the small, limitation,
death, humble insignificance, yielding, surrender, chaos,
disintegration. But to propose these as ‘solutions’ would be
outrageous and naive especially as the present frame is one of
reflection, not action. And in any case, this is, in fact, what the
future seems to hold for Pakistan.
Nature is self-organizing and human consciousness, male
and female, is tts great experiment. Rationality and science are
but one aspect of this consciousness, as this paper has discussed,
they too have a range of attitudes and styles. The present ‘battle’
between religion and rationality can be seen in terms of this self
organizing principle. What the ‘results’ will be one cannot tell.
But two things are evident: Firstly, that religion and rationality
are inextricably connected; secondly, that nature does not give a
damn about what we ‘think’ of it. As for the common man,
without most probably ever consciously using the words
‘rationality’ ‘religion’ and ‘science’, his common sense has
always known and practiced their essential meaning: Rationality
is from the Latin ‘ratio’ meaning proportion. Religion means to

re-connect and science simply means to know..
ENDNOTES
ie Game theory is a mathematical tool for analysis of man's

social relations; introduced by von Neumann in 1928 and
originally applied to decision-making strategies in
economic behaviour, is now extended to many sorts of
interpersonal behaviours:
(1) Zero-sum games: Situations in which the gain of

one player and the loss of his opponent always
sum to zero, 1.e., there is pure competition, since
the loss of one player is the gain of the other.
(i1) Non-zero sum games: situations in which gain

and loss are not inversely fixed and thus do not
necessarily sum to zero; they may be directly
fixed (pure collaboration) or only partly fixed
(mixed motive).
For details see: Watzlawick et al. The
Pragmatics of Human Communication. A Study
of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and
Paradoxes. N.Y. Norton 1965.
Singh, Jagjit, Great Ideas in Information
Theory, Language and Cybernetics. N.Y. Dover.
1966.
2. See Appendix.
5. "Education and Religion" by Rubina Saigol. Article in

The Frontier Post 27.5.91.
4. Schuon, Fritjof Spiritual Perspectives and Human Faets,

Faber Faber. London 1965. See also his Understanding
Islam, London, Methuen.
53 Hans Christian von Beyer “The Aesthetic Equation” in

The Sciences, New York Academy of Sciences. Jan./Feb.
1990.
6(a)Hillman, James. Re-Visioning Psychology. Harper and Row.

1975.
6(b)Jenny Teichman, “Don’t be Cruel or Unreasonable”, a

review of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity by Richard
Rorty, New York Times Book Review, April 23, 1989.
he Achen, Sven T. Symbols Around Us. Van Nostrand. N.Y.

1981.
° Jung, C.G. Man and His Symbols. N.Y. Double-day

1964.
8. Cooper. J.C. An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Symbols,

1978. Thames and Hudson.
9. British Medical Association: Annual Report on the State

of the Profession 1986.
10. Ahmad, Durre S., “Ethnic Politics & Collective Violence:

Karachi in the 80’s. A Psychological Analysis”.
Monograph for UN/WIDER Conference on Systems of
Knowledge as Systems of Domination. Karachi. 1988.
De “The new breed of mullahs is in their early twenties and

highly militant”. See “A Mullah is Born” in Newsline,
April 1991. Also the interview in the same issue with a
young, leader of the Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba, quite
calmly stating his readiness to die.
The exception to both groups are found in the sufic

traditions, e.g. Hallaj, Suharwardy, who were pacifists
and considered religious heretics.
12: Weekly, Earnest, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern

English. 2 Vols. N.Y. Dover 1967.
Back to the Future
Analyzing the tensions between modemity and fundamentalism in

Saudi Arabia, the prominent Pakistani anthropologist Akbar
Ahmed has (self evidently) observed:
Unless social scientists analyze the social situation and the

leaders of the society utilize their knowledge, the consequent
tensions will be seriously disruptive (The Herald, Feb. 1987).
This paper makes no such claim. Nevertheless, if social

science is indeed scientific, and since a particular theoretical
framework has been used, if the theory is adequate, it must be
able to predict.
The theory has been of archetype and myth. In this case it
has been the myth of the hero. Myths relate basic psychological
needs to things people want to know about their religion and
society. The critic Northrop Frye has observed, that the primary
question about a myth, is “-- not is it true?.. The primary question
is something more like, do we need to know this?” That is a
question each reader must answer for him/herself. On close
reflection, our ordinary day to day life rests on a fuzzy experience
of time and space. Among other things as Frye says, myths and
archetypes like metaphors, can be considered techniques of
mediation, designed to focus our minds on a more real view of
both. The same can be said of our view of history as cause and
history as story. As a way of going forward looking in a rear view
mirror, myths and archetypes can play like Hermes, a mediative,
if not meditative role in this process.
Back to the Future lit
The process is one of rapid change and before looking to

either past or future one must dwell, as one has, on the present.
The rapidly changing geopolitical scene, especially the collapse of
communism, has left many Pakistani modems treading air. The
situation is exacerbated by modems also feeling trapped in the
current largely negative image of Islam as it is has emerged,
preceding and in the aftermath of the Gulf War and more recently
in Bosnia. Hence the attempts for the formulation of an identity
vis a vis Islam and the west, leading to the bewildering array of
combinations in nomenclature. For a range of complex reasons,
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper, some
modems have .sought out Islam, and one is witnessing some
amazing ‘flips’ towards religion, as readers may have observed if
they scan their social circles. In which perfectly rational modern
individuals quite suddenly go to the other extreme and become
insufferably religious, hairsplittingly ‘correct’ Muslims. The
game carries on. Or, in the same way that young children play
‘doctor-doctor’, one is now witnessing ‘sufi-sufi’.
To the extent that this is happening in response to the
prevailing social bankruptcy in Pakistan the ideas discussed here
and in the Appendix I point to other factors at work. Many of
them have less to do with simply science and Islam and more with
the history of the twentieth century and South Asia. The
challenging of central authority, and the attendant concepts of the
nation-state and patriotism are some examples.
Before any predictions therefore, a word of comfort.
Ultimately, the question, do we need to know this? and its answer,
may be only relevant to A.Inam. The modern Pakistani more than
his fundo brother, seems to be depressed about the future. My
guess is that the growing despair among the Pakistani
intelligentsia is greatest in those who are close to or beyond 40. It
is the first post-partition generation, at this stage caught between
a rapidly receding, if not gone, sense of security that was present
with the parental, founding fathers.
It should be kept in view that demographically the Third
World is growing, younger, while the west older. Of the nations
now buying arms internationally the majority can be considered
young, in terms of their existence as state and the average age of
bi The Battle for Pakistan
their populations. Of the 159 nations in the U.N., nearly half have
come into being within the past thirty years .The anxieties and
enthusiasms of years make them especially susceptible to the
passions of transcendence. Continue this passion with the
psychology of nationalism which encourages the feeling of being
unique and there emerges a particularly violent scenario. It seems
one must brace oneself, therefore, for the inevitable Oedipal
punishment.
However, as the Thinker and Hoodbhoy remind us, one
should not lose sight of the forest for the trees. That is to say the
situation is hopeless but not serious. Thus, the present despair (if
not disgust and shame) that some modern Pakistanis feel about
their country can be diluted if we see ourselves in a global,
international context. By accepting the mediative role of
mythology, in this case the monotheistic hero, who always insists
on asking, “what is the point?”, the answer is that Pakistan can be
seen as having: a purpose: as a country, Pakistan’s task it is to
reflect and thus be itself, a major symbol of the state of human
consciousness as it stands towards the end of the twentieth
century. It 1s a myth, but in the true, and not pejorative sense of
the word. And from this perspective it is unique.
Born almost Hermetically midway in the century, it is the
only country in the world (apart from Israel) whose basis was
religion. It is the only, real, geographic and therefore literally
earthly, embodiment of the monotheistic hero. And unlike Israel ~
who did not have a clear and definite male progenitor, Pakistan
had Jinnah.
The trajectory of his life parallels the classical myths of
the hero to an uncanny degree. Having co-opted religion, the
modem Jinnah laid the foundation of this country which from its
inception -- (like the presence of the serpent in paradise) -- was
linked to Islamic monotheism. The ideal of ‘faith’ was neatly
sandwiched between the heroic slogans of unity and discipline.
Jinnah’s own consciousness reflected modern literalized notions of
Christian morality and the grandiose absolutist vision of the hero.
Thus, the almost evangelical tone of a speech in Ahmedabad,
1916.
Back to the Future ins;
For a real new India to arise, all petty and small things must
be given up. To be redeemed, all Indians must offer to sacrifice
not only the good things, but all those evil things they cling to
blindly -- their hates and divisions, their pride in what they
should thoroughly be ashamed of, their quarrels and
misunderstandings. These are a sacrifice God would love.
This double dose of monotheistic consciousness makes

Pakistan, I believe, the land of the literal par excellence in today’s
world. Since we are collectively a symbol and yet human
individuals, we can only know and express reality through the
literal. As said so often in this paper, the literal and symbolic
reflect each other, only the proportion varies. If we feel
overwhelmed it is because firstly, modernism (the hero) is
inherently inclined to devalue the symbolic and the sacred, while
religious fundamentalism too has a very narrow literal focus.
Since the sense of the symbolic continually recedes, so does the
containing power of that which could give to the individual; a
feeling, of security-in-connection of meaning and purpose.
Symbols, whether pertaining to the hero or divinity, tell it
like it 1s, not the way we wish it to be. Insofar as eventually we
are all in and yet not in a mirror of the other, and given our
unique symbolic status, there is this dizzying sense of unreality, of
sleepwalking through something which we ‘see through’ and yet
cannot stop the dream-nightmare. Swept along by the momentum
of the hero and his paradoxical connection with God, in the
absence or waning of the sense of the sacred/symbolic, we are
literally confronted with symbols. When a person or nation’s
beliefs fall apart there is general disorder. The ideas that could
have held the ‘pathology’ (paradox) at day no longer serve as
adequate containers. Thus from the perspective of the modern
world we illustrate eternal truths. And from our own, we are
surrounded by lies and hypocrisy. Behind every symbolic
direction this country has taken the paradoxical, opposite,
lie/truth is evident. In sum everything is the opposite of what we
are told ‘officially’.
If, as Rumi said, the work of religion is bewilderment,
then one can say that the modern Pakistani is in the throes of an
intensely religious experience. Add to this Jung’s perception that

religion is frequently a defence against a religious experience and
one can perhaps make some sense of what is happening.
Born in the tremendous bloodshed of partition, the
struggle of the hero who wants to disconnect from his pathology
of God keeps getting more intense. As said earlier, everything 1s
the opposite of what is ‘real’, from the choice of name, to the
grandiose One Unit of 1955 in the same year, the first religious
riots. And then the logical culmination of the logical mind, the
hero literalized as warrior, quelling the perceived indiscipline of
the periphery from the center (“little people”) to morally (and
violently) justify Unity. The Cartesian split which was
Bangladesh taught us nothing, and that country too can be
considered a living symbol by itself, speaking of enormous
fecundity and decaying, dismembered flesh.
Zulfigar Ali Bhutto perhaps came closest to the myth of
the hero in terms of the betrayal, hubris and fall. But the
consciousness was modem. Meanwhile the fundamentalist,
rallying to Jinnah’s own call for faith became louder. Whereas
Jinnah literalized the collective aspect of Islam, Bhutto, like a
good particle physicist, went a step further and defined a Muslim.
This was followed by the first literal fusion of the heroic/martial
archetype and its monotheistic counterpart with the advent of Zia-
ul-Haq, consolidating further the violence inherent to the
masculine-religious perspective.
In more than forty years there has been no indication of a
slowing down or reversal of this momentum. One can only
speculate that we will probably continue refining, making more
narrow and literal and therefore more intense and virulent, this
archetypal fusion of the hero (rational modern/militaristic) and his
self-centered idea of God and monotheism (fundamentalism).
Meanwhile, moder journalists and intellectuals will continue to
write about myths as non-existence, lies. And perhaps one cannot
blame them since our popular hero, Imran Khan, keeps rising, so
to speak, from the ashes now simultaneously heroically fighting
the unstoppable growth (and death) which is cancer. And the
increasing sense of unacknowledged hubris (arrogance) will
Back to the Future EIS)
appear everywhere speeding up the fall with an intensity which

will be in direct proportion.
Collectively, there is no use pointing to ‘schizophrenia’
since from our theoretical view it is inevitable: that is
fragmentation. The psychodynamic fuel for this will be paranoia
and its rhetoric (which of course will be ‘real’) of sabotage and
conspiracy, violence, strife, terror and bloodshed: thanks
especially to the religious fanatic. Individually, insofar as it is
linked to the collective, the same will occur in personal lives
especially in the modern classes. Further polarization of the sexes,
ruptured relationships, and in all likelihood an increase in male
homosexuality (which social scientists will demand to have
empirically proved, once again wanting to break symbols and
secrets; and psychologists will try to “cure”). Paranoia is one of
the few genuine mental disorders; indeed, it is paradigmatic.
Unlike simply an erroneous belief, paranoid beliefs are
distinguished by their incorrigibility and intransigence in the face
of all reason. the paranoid person knows and sees all sorts of
connections which do not exist for the observer. It is a disease
about hidden connections of meaning, and has classical links to
repressed male homosexuality.
Between the two forces vying for the “little people”
modernists claim that science is not concerned with justice, and
the fundamentalist’s vision is blind anyway since its function 1s
not so much to witness man but God. One can assume then, that
there will be less and less justice in the sense of space for the
common man. Literally so, in terms of population pressures,
economic progress or the free expression of a religious instinct.
To the extent that it has been minimally so in economic terms, this
is nothing new. But what is new is the power of the media, the
nature of the game he is being invited to join, and modern life in
terms of its relationship with the sacred and the media’s power of
images. Meanwhile psychologists and psychiatrists will regularly
campaign for “mental” health awareness and the media will give
them prominent publicity.
The common man’s religious instinct is characterized by
a free-wheeling approach to religion and does not subscribe to an
unrealistic pristine idea of Islam. Nor does it subscribe to the
modemist ideal of a sanitized psyche exhibiting “moral health”.

The thousands of shrines across the country and the actrvity and
events around them -- of colour, dance, music -- point to an
essentially multiple and sensuous rather than a sterile and stem
relationship with singular doctrine. The majority are very popular
with women. But they are steadily losing the vibrancy and
rebellious spirit of the sufic traditions, primarily because of
modemist/bureaucratic and fundamentalist inroads such as the
Augaf department’. The unstoppable momentum of the two basic
forces is such. The modernist sees the ‘masses’ as backward, in
need of progress; the fundamentalist sees them as impure,
heretics, and both ideologies will continue to ‘civilize’ them
accordingly, and the intensity of anger between the modemist and
fundamentalist will escalate since the population as a whole will
become younger. This is already happening steadily in the media
and is mirrored in the new fundamentalist movements .
Speculation should be restricted to one’s life time. Thus
while we symbolize for the world the journey of the monotheistic
hero, at home, assemblies will debate whether a woman can be
head of an Islamic state and feminists will demonstrate for even
more modernization, while whoever is in power will continue to
lie and steal. The difference between the symbolic and literal
dimension is essentially one of scale, not of truth. To not see the
connection and therefore glimpse the symbolic/sacred which lies
beyond the literal, in no way diminishes the reality of that
connection nor the significance of meaning. If we cannot see the
symbols, it is because we are those symbols which both
fundamentalist and modern consciousness denigrates in its denial
of the feminine and its arrogance of purpose. The judge relies on
witnesses -- the more the better in this case -- which at the
national, literal level are the images of women being paraded
naked as in the streets of Nawabpur at gun point. While at the
ievel of macrocosm, in the larger scheme of nations, we will
continue to reflect humanity’s symbolic truth, but as usual
literally (economically) so: The Fakir. This is our meaning, and
purpose and till the time we get the message, thus shall it remain.
Back to the Future iy
ENDNOTES
Frye, Northrop. Myth and Metaphor: Selected Essays

1974 - 1988. Robert Denham (ed). University of
Virginia. 1991.
Lewis Lapham ‘Brave New World’ in Harpers. March

1991.
See myth of the Hero in detailed Theoretical Framework,

Appendix II.
This is really part of a world wide trend, people are

simply talking about it more openly. See the News and
Frontier Post (21.6.91), interview with the French Prime
Minister. Advertisements are appearing in newspapers
which confirm this: “Wanted Frends: Educated male
friends, 20-30 year old required for 30 year old male
Guy”. Box No.154. C/O The Pakistan Times Lahore. Ad
# 1216-A. The Pakistan Times, 21.1.90. This is just one
example out of many.
The News. “A Soul Destroyed”, Newsline May 1990.

Also see Anne Marie Schimmel: Mystical Dimensions of
Islam. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,
1975. Especially the appendix, “The Feminine Element in
Sufism”. Also, Ahmad, Imtiaz; Ritual and Religion
among Muslims of the Sub-continent Lahore, 1985,
Vanguard.
Newsline, April 1991, “A Mullah is Born”. Also

publication such as the monthly “Renaissance”, a
Monthly Islamic Journal. Dar-ul-Jshraq, Lahore. Almost
entirely staffed by males under 25.
The average age of reporters and feature writers at the
Frontier Post, for example, is twenty seven.
118 Maculinity, Rationality and Religion
Appendix I
The Theoretical Framework is loosely anchored in the

post-Jungian school of Archetypal Psychology which, according
to James Hillman, is “a style of thinking and a revisionist
engagement on many fronts: education, criticism, medicine,
philosophy, therapy and the material world of science. In trying to
delineate the structure of a post-modem consciousness, archetypal
theory lends its terms and viewpoints to a variety of intellectual
concems seeking to draw individuals from diverse geographic and
intellectual areas into rapport with each other for the revisioning
of their ideas and their worlds”. Actually, it is not as ‘radical’ as
it claims to be, since Hillman draws significantly from Henry
Corbin’s work on Muslim philosophy especially that of Ibn-i-
Arabi (1 1th century)
The Appendix also contains some extracts which
illustrate certain concepts about women, the body and differences
in consciousness, and related to this, an anticipatory response to
viewing, these ideas as evidence of “Essentialism”. The endnotes
to the extracts themselves are important and should be read
carefully.
Most of these notes are drawn from papers written by the
author for UNU/WIDER and the Institute of Development
Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland.(1989-1992)
Appendices 119
Appendix I.A
(From “Ethnic Violence”, paper for UN/WIDER Conference on

“Systems of Knowledge as Systems of Domination”)
The Myth of the Hero
“Isn't there a wise knight

Upon a shining steed
Late at night I twist and I turn
As I think of what I need
I need a hero...”
Rock Song/Bonny Tyler.
A super individual, a demigod from whom the power of

law derives, is just one of the many archetypes or metaphors
projected from the collective human imagination. The dominance
of the heroic as an archetype is at the root of so many external
tyrannies exacerbating violence that it 1 almost imperative that we
capture its working and lay bare its frequently undetected
influences. Despite its innumerable guises, the heroic man is
clearly a factor if not a key determinant of modem human
behaviour. I propose therefore to briefly assess the old yet ever
present myth of the hero as a means of understanding ‘who’
rather than ‘what’ impels us to act contrary to ourselves in a
manner that is perhaps best defined as a form of violence.
The story of the hero is a universal one”’. It can be found
in legends myths and histories the world over and its myriad:
variations notwithstanding, certain themes remain common.
Typically, it is a story describing the birth of a boy in unusual
circumstances where he is for example, missing a parent, or is the
long awaited child of a royal couple, or perhaps bom in a very

humble situation. The child is raised under conditions of ever
present danger and frequently exhibits early proof of superhuman
powers. There follows a difficult journey or quest for treasure, or
perhaps a special mission which brings him to a position of
prominence. This stage involves a series of confrontations with a
range of frightening forces and culminates in the hero’s eventual
victory and his being acknowledged as a ruler, unifier, redeemer,
and giver of laws. For some time after this all is well until his
final fall when death comes about either through loss of favour
with gods or men, his fallibility to the sin of pride (hubris), from a
betrayal, or from a heroic self-sacrifice. Some better known
examples of this hero figure are those of Perseus, Hercules,
Oedipus, King Arthur, Ulysses, Mithras, Siegfried, Samson,
Achilles, Prometheus, Superman and Rambo. (It is perhaps
reflective of the age that some modern figures like the last two
refuse to undergo any final decline and fall.)
The archetypal story of the hero has been interpreted as
an account of the development of consciousness, especially in the
earlier stages of adulthood. The initiation rituals ard rites of
passage in ‘primitive’ cultures can be seen as preparatory
enactments of this attitude which is required for the process of
separation from familial protection and of a symbolic death
leading to a re-birth as member of the adult community". The
myth of the hero can also be understood as the emergence of the
faculties of will and reason. Tales of the heroes emphasize these
two qualities required for victory. Frequently it is a violent
experience during which he must undergo enormous tests of
physical endurance. Similarly, he must plan complicated
campaigns and carefully calculate his route to survival and
eventual triumph. Tortuous initiation rites which test the initiate’s
capacity to survive under difficult circumstances reflect this
psychic process of the development of the powers of will and
reason reinforcing the sense of the hero as a_ progressively
improved and elevated human being.
In depth psychology, as Hillman pints out, “the hero
archetype (or imaginative pattern) appears not so much as _aa list
of contents as it does in maintaining a heroic attitude towards all
Appendices 121
events”. The heroic at a collective level, resounds with grandeur is

such a way, that the rule, rank and privilege it implies grips the
masses so that they identify with it and serve it unquestioningly.
Thus the German and Russian people thought of themselves as
part of a heroic ideal even while they were being dispatched
toward death in great numbers by their increasingly cynical
political leaders. Archetypal heroes of various kinds function in
our societies today in a normative role. Whether in the form of
film stars or cricketers, they provide a compensatory focus, ‘and
this 1s especially so with political figures and the responses they
evoke from those who lack the skills to gain much in the way of
long term economic benefit.
In the case of Pakistan, figures like Jinnah and Bhutto
approximate the heroic archetype perfectly, offering the
possibility of a better future. Yet, both these figures were
intrinsically linked with the enormous violence, one with partition,
the other with the breakaway of Bangladesh.
The story of the hero is just one among numerous
archetypes and is instrumental in bringing into consciousness the
interplay between individual achievement, human limitation, and
the need to belong to a social group. It is symbolic of social
process of separation from individual and familial unity towards
inclusion in a larger collective unity. Our acknowledgement of it
is very important but it 1s also important to remember that it is
essentially an adolescent archetype. Taken to the exclusion of
other archetypes - and its principles encourage exclusion -- it can
prevent the unfolding and maturing of consciousness. For this
reason it is frequently referred to as the myth of the child-hero.
Monotheism and the Heroic
All -isms that promise a “better” world are to be

distrusted on principle, for this world only becomes
different but not better.
- Jung.
The hero archetype occupies a central place in the

monotheistic religions, namely Judaism, Islam and Christianity.
LZ Maculinity, Rationality and Religion
Many aspects of the lives of the central figures in these religions

are clearly reflective of the myth. Note the miraculous and
obscure birth of Christ, the story of David as a humble shepherd
boy, or Moses. There are the miracles of healing and teaching, the
separation from one’s origins, the dangers from powerful enemies,
difficult ordeals and victorious returns. Among the monotheistic
religions perhaps the story of Christ most closely approximates
the heroic archetype”.
The monotheistic archetype is also based on and moves
towards the principle of unity but its concern is individual
morality, perfection and transcendence toward an_ ideal
transpersonal future. The fusion of the two archetypes is evident
in their many parallels, but the later stages of the story of the hero
and his limitation through hubris, decline and fall, have a
tendency to be overwhelmed by theological elements. Rather than
letting the heroic ego of social consciousness come down to earth,
monotheism offers the all too willing adolescent ego an ever
upward trajectory’*. This fusion of the two archetypes, dominated
as they have to be by monotheistic principles, keep the hero
permanently in a state of emotional and social separation, battle
and rulership.
Monotheism itself is not some simple objective entity
which functions in an invariable manner. What I am attempting to
describe here is more the psychology of monotheism, its
interiorization in the life of a nation, a consensus of the faithful,
where this large Greek word denoting belief in one god has
become a complex of images, feelings, metaphors, expressing the
beliefs and the everyday feelings, of millions of ordinary people.
When referring to the term, “monotheistic”, it is important to bear
in mind the difference between a religion and a psychology. The
fist is a belief, the second an attitude, and one can exist without
the other. Judaism, for example, seems more monotheistic in its
religion than in its psychology of an undefined god and the myriad
faces of the Torah, one for each Jew in exile. Similarly in Islam,
the meandering recursive form of the Quran and the numerous
attributes of Allah indicate an inherent psychological attitude of
variety and multiplicity. Nevertheless, both religions remain
monotheistic. Psychological monotheism then refers to a /iteral"
Appendices 123
attitude towards psychological that is symbolic events, in which

one vision may overwhelm all others, swallowing them in an
attempt to extend itself and create ‘unity’. This insistence on
singularity is a kind of implicit ideology supplying images and
appropriate feelings about them, creating a fantasy about what it
means to be a people. And this major archetype, of the one ‘god’,
brings with it its compatible and fellow archetypes. For instance,
One Lord is accompanied by One Faith (orthodoxy), One Law
and also One State, served by One Body of the faithful - a
beautiful evocation of the ideal totalitarian society.
This ideal of unity requires for its earthly realization an
ideal man, the Hero, who can receive the divine commands and,
as we have described, overcome in his own person and at large the
obstacles which stand in the way. These obstacles must also have
a mythic dimension. Whether the story is retold in an Islamic,
Christian, or Marxist setting, some dragon of dangerous strength
must have its head chopped off, traitors within the city itself must
be sought out and eliminated. The Marxists, therefore, require
their Capitalists, the Western Powers their Communist Threat and
the Muslims, Satan and their heretics.
The hero archetype and the urge toward monotheistic
consciousness both refine mental focus and require inner
resources to function strongly in the service of a singular vision,
an ideal external goal. In the West, this emphasis on will and
reason culminated in the Eighteenth Century with the nse of
Science and then Industry. The period produced single-minded
individuals prepared to go out and make the world safe for their
particular colonial ‘raj’ as similar recruits do now for their
transnational corporations.
In sum, the heroic requires Problems and by implication,
Final Solutions. Similarly, psychological monotheism tends to
regard difference and diversity as irreconcilable opposites and
reduces all psychic life to moral issues. This kind of moral
reductionism and the fusion of the two archetypes, provide the
justification for all types of ‘social’ action, including as I have
indicated, violence against whatever seems ‘outside’ a prescribed
idea of ‘unity’.
The weight we give to the ideal of unity and perfection is

most clearly recognized when an individual feels himself failing in
the struggle to attain these ideals and instead resorts to what is
colloquially known as a “nervous breakdown”. Turning from the
collective, it is at this individual level that violence is most
conducive to psychological analysis.
Psychopathology, Ego Consciousness and Violence
“You know the tragicomic thing is that they are all

convinced of their normality as much as the doctor
himself of his own mental balance”.
- Jung
Violence, veiled or overt, is frequently part of the context

of experience of those individuals who, from the standpoint of
modern psychology, have been diagnosed as mentally/emotionally
disturbed’*. Whether in an outer-directed form, or passive
aggression, or the inwardness of suicide and masochism, to be
vehement about something is to be lacking or out of one’s mind
(mentis). In a sense, psychological illness can be considered an
adamant, vehement ‘stand against the normative triumvirate of
will, reason and morality. Put another way, the psychologist is
frequently confronted with individuals who cannot manage to
modify their idiosyncrasies or alleviate their anguish through
rationality or religious dogma - or secular humanism’. The
following section will discuss some key ideas underlying
psychopathology and violence and their place in modem
individual consciousness.
Ego Consciousness
The lay person speaks of “I”. The professional

psychologist translates “I” into “ego” and/or “consciousness”.
“Ego” and “consciousness” are often used synonymously, though
in fact, they are distinct; the ego being only one aspect of the more
Appendices 125
comprehensive matrix of consciousness. The breakdown of

distinction between these concepts and its connections with
psychopathology are a result of the convergence of a number of
historical forces. These ideas need to be examined before one can
diagnose violence -- ethnic or otherwise -- as pathological. In
other words a brief case history of psychiatry/psychology is called
for’’.
Wester monotheistic thinking found its fulfillment in
Germany with Protestant Christianity and its heroic Ethic. The
scientific enterprise with its methods of empirical investigation
emerged from within that particular milieu: Both these
perspectives colluded in outlawing much of the material inherent
in the dense, complex notion of “psyche” which originally meant
“soul”. (And I emphasize here that in the language of archetypal
psychology soul is not a pseudo-religious substance but rather “a
perspective - a viewpoint towards things rather than a thing
itself’).
This perspective perforce must include the subjective
(experience) as well as the objective (measurement). Thus what
was once a logos of the psyche -- psychology -- started becoming
a science of the “mind” and further concretized into “brain”.
Brain physiology is a valid branch of science but as a psychology,
has no room for life as we know it in the direct immediacy of
sense experience. Neither does it allow for the inherent ambiguity
of interpretation of those experiences.
Psychiatry emerged as a teachable specialty by the
beginning, of the Nineteenth Century and partly due to Gutenberg,
the German rhetoric became the principal vehicle of psychological
expression. Significantly, the foundations of this youngest of the
medical sciences were to an extraordinary extent also the
inventions of young males, mostly under the age of thirty”.
The cultural locus of this ascension of a heroic and
monotheistic co: sciousness over a fundamentally multiple and
diverse sense of personality can said to be a movement from south
to north. As Hillman has observed, ‘south’ is both an ethnic,
cultural, geographical place and also a symbolic one. It is the
Mediterranean culture with its images and textual sources, its
sensuality and myths, its tragic and picaresque genres, and its
stress on the feminine and cyclical nature of life. But the relentless
upward march of the hero gradually overshadowed this fecundity,
moving increasingly towards the style of Northem Epic heroism”.
Stated simply, what was originally a diverse, feminine as much as
masculine pantheon, was gradually overshadowed by male, heroic
gods, till for example Zeus - who was just one of the Olympians -
finally merged into the monotheistic ideal associated with light,
height and Law.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, consciousness had
been defined and fixed against the negative unknown of the
‘unconscious’ within a linear scheme of movement from below to
above (progress)”. All unfamiliar phenomena, that is, those not
explainable to the ego of will and reason, were seen as belonging
“down there” in the realm of the unconscious and potentially
“pathological”. As Jung said, the gods had become diseases.
If tendencies towards dissociation were not inherent in the human

psyche, fragmentary psychic systems would never have been split
off; in other words neither spirit nor gods would have ever come
into existence... we pursue the cult of consciousness to the
exclusion of all else.. Our true religion is a monotheism of
consciousness, or possession by it, coupled with a fanatical denial
of the existence of fragmentary autonomous systems”.
The history of psychiatry/psychology can be considered a

sort of grand finale to the total enthronement of a masculine,
heroic, monotheistic view of ‘ego’ and ‘consciousness’ to the
extent that they can be considered synonymous. Its formulation
was that “I” = mind = consciousness = brain which in tum was
essentially Aryan, Apollonic, Germanic,positivistic, rational and
Cartesian, in sum, heroic/monotheistic in which there is no space
for anything feminine, “intermediate, ambiguous, metaphorical”.
Two of the earliest “pathologies” to be detected and which most
gripped the popular imagination were “hysteria” and “multiple
personality” or “schizophrenia”. The former was and still is
considered an exclusively female condition. The latter today has
myriad variations and concomitant drugs for its treatment.
Appendices 127
The Freudian Ego
The heroic model of the psyche found its penultimate .

expression in the writings of Freud. While claiming scientific
objectivity, Freud inadvertently infact also bore valuable witness
to the mythic basis of inner life*. Indeed he received not the
Nobel Prize for medicine, but the Goethe Award for literature.
Although Freud himself stated* that he was not a scientist by
choice, his writings were read in the light of the prevailing
mechanistic and literalistic ethos of Nineteenth Century Science.
And, although today classical psychoanalysis is a besieged and
crumbling fortress, psychiatry and psychology remain enthralled
by Freud’s heroic vision, especially his ideal of the supremacy
and centrality of the rational ego. This idea needs to be examined
further if one is to understand how ethnic conflict has come to be
considered “pathological”.
For the Freudian, what is unconscious is generally
regarded as a hotbed of dark, repressed, demonic forces. They
were mainly concerned with labelling and controlling that
unconscious world from the standpoint of the ego. The principal
attitude is one of suspicion towards the unseen darkness of their
patients. Even in the more than 300 schools* of contemporary
psychotherapy (mostly in the US), many of them with languages
and methods different from classical psychoanalysis, underlying
the vast majority are ego-oriented principles. The task of most
ego-therapies is still to unveil, expose or ‘integrate’ these forces
but always in a way that the ego remains supreme. Certainly in
psychiatry and the medical approach to mental illness, Freudian
notions of personality continue to form the foundations of training
and practice.
Finally, Freud’s ideas are inseparable from his historical
context and it is interesting to note their connections with parallel
developments. The concept of the ego and consciousness is a
Nineteenth Century Model based on the (now) primitive
Darwinian idea of dominant over recessive. Similarly, the
approach to the unconscious is fundamentally impenalistic,
regarding the id as something to be tamed, taken over, colonized”
His classic description is as follows: “To strengthen the ego, to
make it independent of the super-ego, to widen the field of

perception and enlarge its organisation so that it can appropriate
fresh portions of the id, where id was there ego shall be. It is a
work of culture””’.
In the light of what has been considered the scientific
approach to psychology then, our images and thought processes,
all emotional and affective phenomena, which are not subjected to
the ego’s control, are seen as anti-social, anti-cultural. Thus the
modern understanding of psychopathology, including violence is
seen from the perspective of the Freudian ego which is a direct
outgrowth of mainly the two masculine archetypes I have
mentioned: the Child-Hero ard the One Deity. Contemporary
manifestations of this ego inciude an overwhelming emphasis on
organization, unity, central control, perfection, singularity of
meaning and the power of re 1son and will. The wider contents of
an inherently diverse and mutli-valent psyche have thus been
reduced and literalized to such an extent that they are only
referred to in the language of pathology. Relegated to the status of
what Jung called “the little people” of the psyche, when they insist
on_ revealing their presence and protest against the heroic
dominance of the ego they are regarded as “symptoms”, violent
elements of hysteria, complexes, and other neurotic or psychotic
characteristics of a dis-eased or dis-ordered mind. Through the
self-reflexive logic which belongs to every archetype, the ego’s
principles demand to be unified, perfected, strengthened. Even
regression however undesirable, must be “in the service of the
ego”. Neurosis is the sign of a weak ego and “the common
denominator of all neurotic phenomena is an insufficiency of the
normal control apparatus”.
The Medical Model
Medical science itself indicates that human consciousness

is an embodied phenomenon and not necessarily confined to the
brain. All psychosomatic. diseases and phenomena such as
phantom pain give the lie to the conversion hypothesis of a
separation between “mind” and “body”.
Appendices 129
From its inception Freudian psychology has emphasized.

its medical base to give itself scientific credibility. In so doing the
“normal control apparatus” methods in contemporary clinical
practice are directly or indirectly related to the medical model of
pathology which is again, reflective of the attitudes of the child-
hero. For example, the increasing reliance on laboratory tests, and
the genetic effort to isolate complex phenomenon by going
backwards into their origins is, in psychological terms, to give
precedence to childhood (embryonic) over maturity. The
enormous emphasis on childhood and mother in many schools of
therapy has become a modern obsession, especially in the U.S,
with youth”. Similarly, the medical bias is more concemed with
the length of life rather than quality, with statistical facts rather
than individual meaning, in short, with the literal rather than the
symbolic. Finally, the medical attitude does not distinguish
between physical and psychological pain; The latter can better be
described as suffering and is frequently a harbinger of change in
the individual. In short, the medical approach to psychopathology
-- the pathos of the psyche -- attempts to keep us in a permanently
juvenile state of consciousness. By focusing exclusively on a
psychologically pain-free state, this approach prevents a
qualitative refinement in consciousness, crippling the human
capacity for enduring the depth and tragedy of our condition.
Thus modern psychotherapy -- once, the care of the soul -
- from the point of view of the entire psyche, has methods of
“adjustment” which are not only violently respective, but
frequently also violently coercive. Techniques such as Cognitive
Therapy, Stimulus Desensitization, Behavioral or Rational
Emotive Therapy, can be considered managed forms of torture.
Similarly, the massive psychopharmacological®” industry and
certain standard techniques of “therapy” in “organic” psychiatry
are often literally violent in methods, as for example, Electro-
Convulsive Therapy, Insulin Shock and various surgical
procedures. The goveming principles of what constitutes
psychopathology then are themselves violent and therefore
inappropriate for an application towards understanding ethnic
violence.
Psychopathology Re-Envisaged
What follows the Age of Reason -- the present Age of

Matter -- as it has been called, can be seen as a struggle between
a dominant monotheistic perspective and re-assertion of a
polytheistic psyche. Almost as if the psyche was protesting at
being caged and categorized into a variety of diseases,
‘schizophrenia’ or ‘multiple personality’ was diagnosed as a
‘disease’ just before the eruption of the First World War. By the
Second World War a corresponding, unfettering of consciousness
into its natural flow or streams was evident in literature, most
vividly in the writings of James Joyce. A similar relativization of
the ego position was evident in music (the twelve tone scale),
painting (cubism), and the natural sciences (physics). But
psychiatry and psychology continue to sustain an image of
ourselves central to which is the idea of the heroic ego. Even
though the course of our own lives tells us we are otherwise:
There is nothing heroic in our moods of sullen depression,
perennially doing/saying things we never intended -- from eating
too much, to desire and betrayals -- of love, vengeance, sexual
obsession, vulnerability and being tom apart by conflicting
versions of these feelings.
The victims of the monotheistic ego, Jung’s “little people”
of the psyche, are all those sides to us which do not subscribe to
the ego’s principles. Basing his views primarily on work with
schizophrenics, Jung gave a picture of the psyche as it naturally
exists apart from scientific and moralistic notions of how it
“should be”*”. It was an image of multiplicity. And although Jung
too fell victim to the monotheistic dominant and its attendant
archetypes of “wholeness” and “integration”, his radical vision
forms the basis for regarding the psyche, that is consciousness, as
a polycentric, polyvalent phenomenon in which:
“..dissociation - breaking away, splitting off,

personification, multiplication, ambivalence -- will always
seem an illness to the ego as it has come to be defined...
But if we take the context of the psychic field as a whole,
these fragmenting phenomena may be understood as
Appendices 131
reassertions against central authority by the individuality

of the parts”.*>
Despite his enormous output which is a meticulously researched

opus in accordance with classic principles of science, Jung never
gave a specific etiology of neurosis. For him it was simply one
sidedness in the presence of many.
As discussed earlier, the principles of the hero and
monotheism literally epitomise this idea of neurotic one sidedness
leading to a vision of psychopathology which is inherently violent.
As an axiom of depth psychology asserts, what is not admitted
into awareness erupts in ungainly, obsessive, literalistic ways,
affecting consciousness with precisely the qualities it strives to
exclude. It is this insistence on exclusion which is truly
pathological when what we call “ego” that is:
Number One will not recognize the existence of

independent partial personalities and through this denial
places them outside in the world where they become
paranoid fears of invasion by enemies. On the one hand
we have individual insanity, on the other, insane
collective projections upon other people, whole races and
nations”.
The Ego as Analogue of the State

The Question of the Centre
So far I have spent a good deal of time attempting to

establish the widespread presence of this ideal of a controlling,
heroic - child - ego within the human community, in our
imaginations, our religious practices, our medical science and
ideas of psychological disease and cure. It is only a short step
further to seeing how the rise of the modern state and the
formation of central government provide an effective, perhaps the
most effective means, by which the heroic ego and monotheistic
consciousness seek confirmation of their power in the process of
human development. In most societies this insistence on central
control is implicit, if not explicitly and brutally parading its
power. But centralized power has rarely, if at all, gone

unchallenged. History, indeed the contemporary world, is replete
with instances of resistance against the intrusions of the
centralized state apparatus®. Today, we are witnessing the
emergence of a ‘post modern’ world, a fragmentation of large
political entities into different autonomous parts. Frequently, there
is large scale violence. The point is not to condone or applaud this
fragmentation but to simply point out the untenability of the
Freudian-Marxist political ideal and to gain a more realistic
perspective of various human endeavours, as they exist in theory
versus historical and psychological reality.
The point is that instead of remaining one of the many
facets of consciousness, the heroic ego has assumed the role of
consciousness to produce a particularly intolerant and exclusivist
attitude towards difference and diversity. In the preceding
descriptions there are obvious parallels between the role of the
ego in denying and controlling the little people of the psyche, and
the role of the concept of the nation-state and national culture in
disenfranchising and controlling the little people of the country;
the imperialistic attitude of the civilised (and civilising) secular
elites of a country with regard to the uncivilised populations, and
the similar role of the ego over the unconscious; between ethnic
diversity and psychic diversity; and the notion of dissociation or
multiplication as pathology in psychology as well as in political
science.
Even in the United States with its apparently ‘reasonable’
attempt to distribute power through a Federal system of checks
and balances and semi-autonomous state governments, there is an
unstoppable momentum of control and dominance springing from
the alliance of the military, industry, and the bureaucracy. This
dominates the shape of the Federal budget, it has vastiy reduced
Research and Development funds in other scientific (non military)
fields, and despite rather feeble campaign rhetoric to the contrary,
looks now to have become, as the center of real power, a kind of
privileged state-within-the-state. This expanding military-
industrial center cuts across all features of the national landscape,
flattening or co-opting through the media, in the service of its
projected future, the ‘yuppies’ or rising professional class,
Appendices 133
thereby, creating its own elite citizenry as a norm against which

all other life styles are measured.
From its cult of the youthful to its obsession with the
‘Great American Dream’, the United States is in many ways an
embodiment of heroic and monotheistic consciousness. One
wonders in passing, what would have been our ideas on ego
consciousness, pathology etc., if there had no been the mass
intellectual migration - especially in psychiatry and psychology -
from Germany to the U.S., strengthening the already entrenched
Northem European weltenschauung. The U.S. in many ways
serves as a point of reference for the ruling elites in most
developing countries and as I mentioned earlier, the heroic
archetype tends to evoke such an identification. The same is the
case with violence and its place in America and it has been
repeatedly pointed out that the heroic ego is blind to its own
internal forms of violence.
ENDNOTES
10. J.Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces,

Princeton/Bollingen 1972, The Mythic Image,
Princeton/Bollingen 1975.
Lk A.Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage Chicago: U.of
Chicago Press, 1960. Also, M. Eliade. Myth and Reality
N.Y., Harper & Row, 1963.
12. See Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, ibid.
LS. There is an important difference between the heroic

archetype and its religious variant. The latter emphasizes
the idea of rebirth, not into the adult human community,
but after death into another spiritual realm. The archetype
of spiritual meaning here comes from an impersonal
force, a recognized diety (theos) and is concerned with
consciousness in the context of morality, literal death and
a transpersonal system. This is different from the heroic
myth whose concern is ego-consciousness in the context

of human society through the symbolic death of the child-
ego. The word “transcendence” offers a key to the
mingling of the heroic and monotheistic: to climb over, to
overstep, to go beyond the limits of, to exceed, to surpass,
to be superior. Websters.
14. Literalism is a tendency to lose sight of the symbolic and

its accompanying spectrum of meaning. Process is frozen
into product, that is, the concrete. Norman O.Brown:
“The thing to be abolished is literalism -- truth is always
in poetic form; not literal but symbolic”. Hillman:
“Literalism is the natural concomitant of monotheistic
consciousness -- whether in theology or in science --
which demands singleness of meaning -- it narrows the
multiple ambiguity of meaning into one definition”. Re-
Visioning Psychology, p.149.
I am not referring to what are called “psychotics”, 1.e. in-
sanity. Nobody really knows enough about it. What is
more relevant is the vast majority of us and the disease(s)
of ‘normalcy’, those ‘neurotics’ whose misery Freud
strived to tum into common unhappiness.
Humanistic psychology also collapses into morality, not
to mention making a god of feeling, a blindness to the
insufficiency of love and its own transcendent system e.g.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. See Hillman, “A Critique
of Modern Humanism’s Psychology” in Re-Visioning
Psychology. Ibid. pp.38-42 and p.180.
For a nichly detailed account of this case history see
Hillman, “On Psychological Language” in the Myth of
Analysis, N.Y., Harper & Row, 1972.
This is a central concept of archetypal theory and is
essentially synonymous with “psyche”. Difficult to
define, Hillman amplifies “soul”: “Soul is not a scientific
term, and it appears rarely in psychology today, and then
usually with inverted comas, as if to keep it from
Appendices 135
infecting its scientifically sterile surround.... There are

many words of this sort which carry meaning, yet which
find no place in today’s science. It does not mean that the
references of these words are not real because scientific
method leaves them out... Its meaning is best given by its
context ... The root metaphor of the analyst’s point of
view is that human behaviour is understandable because
it has inside meaning. The inside meaning is suffered and
experienced... Other words long associated with “soul”
amplify it further - mind, spirit, heart, life, warmth,
humanness, personality, essence, innermost, purpose,
courage, virtue, morality, wisdom, death, God
“Primitive” language have often elaborate concepts about
animated principles which ethnologists have translated by
“soul”. For these peoples, soul is a highly differentiated
idea referring to a reality of great impact. The soul has
been imaged as the inner man, and as the inner sister or
spouse, the place or voice of God within, as a cosmic
force in which all living things participate, as having been
given by God, as conscience, as a multiplicity.... One can
search one’s soul, and one’s soul can be on trial. There
are parables describing possession of the soul by and sale
of the soul to the Devil... of development of the soul ... of
joumeys of the soul... while the search for the soul leads
always into “depths”.... This exploration of the word
shows that we are dealing not with a concept, but a
symbol. Symbols, as we know, are not completely within
our control, so that we are not able to use the word in an
unambiguous way, even though we take it to refer to that
unknown human factor which makes meaning possible,
which tums events into experiences, which is
communicated in love and which has a religious concer.
The soul is a deliberately ambiguous concept.. in the
same manner as all ultimate symbols which provide the
root metaphors for the systems of human thought.
“Matter” and “nature” and “energy” have ultimately the
same ambiguity; so too have “life,” “health.”
19; Hillman has accumulated incontrovertible evidence. See

Part-II of the Myth of Analysis (pp.128-140) for a long
list of names, dates and ages of various “discoveries” and
publications. “The French Revolution and the Napoleonic
era had brought young men into positions of authority --
Young, authors became new authorities about the psyche
and its states -- wrote in journals, published the books
and texts which established the new terms and thus
indoctrinated the generations unto our day” (p.140).
20. Ibid.
Paes “Irrational and unconscious, like insane, are negative
signs, begrudgingly affixed by reason to what it does not
comprehend. One might have called Uranus or Neptune
“non-Satum”, Australia ‘un-Asia” -- the term
“unconsciousness” is suitable for describing states where
consciousness is not present -- coma for instance; but to
use the word for the imaginal region, for morally inferior
or culturally ignorant behaviour is an erosion of
categories”. Hillman, The Myth of Analysis, p.174, Ibid.
pap Jung, C.W. Vo.13 #.51.
23, G. Toumey “Freud and the Greeks: A Study of the
Influence of Classical Greek Mythology and Philosophy
upon the Development of Freudian Thought”. In Journal
of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 1 # 1 (1965).
Wittgenstein “What he has done is to propound a new
myth” in Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics,
Psychology and Religious Belief, p.51. A.SSammuels “the
Klienian approach is essentially a mythological one” in
Jung and the Post-Jungians, p.262. Finally, Hillman on
Freud: “His translation of personified images into
conceptual processes and functions does not truly
separate us from the mythic roots of psychoanalysis. The
concepts are myths in other terms. Castration Anxiety,
Penis Envy, the Repetition Compulsion -- all these work
upon us as once did invisible diamones. We fall into their
‘Appendices Ly
power and are held in their grip”. (Re-Visioning

Psychology p.20).
24. “---I am really by nature an artist -- and of this there lies
irrefutable proof which is that in all countries into which
psycho-analysis has penetrated it has been better
understood and applied by writers and artists than by
doctors. My books, in fact, more resemble works of
imagination than treatises on pathology--”. G Papini “A
Visit to Freud” reprinted in Review of Existential
Psychology and Psychiatry, 9, n 2 (1969) pp.130-34.
23: Sociology, history, etc., and the more than 300-schools of
psychology among which we cannot decide “who is right”
are different archetypal perspectives, ways in which the
psyche comments on itself.
26. See Note # 49.
2m S.Frued. “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-

Analysis” trans. W.J.H.Sprott. (London: Hogarth, 1933)
p.106.
28. Freud’s eminent follower O.Fenichel, The
Psycholanalytic Theory of Neurosis, N.Y., Norton,
1945, p.19. Hillman: “Our ego represents the literal view
it takes itself and its view for real, the other characters on
the stage are merely projections of mine. Only I am
literally real. Our symptoms, however, can save us from
this literalism -- symptoms tell us that we can never take
back into our ownership the events caused by the little
people of the psyche -- they are autonomous -- and refuse
to submit to the ego’s point of view”. Re-Visioning
Psychology, p.49. Ibid.
29 The necessary return to origins exemplified in genetics

has been literalized by psychology which has somehow
got stuck, possibly because of the enormous attraction of
childhood and the eden-like world it trails with it --
especially in terms of the mother -child within the
powerful grip of the romantic ideal of innocence, physical
perfection, utter dependence and not being responsible

for/to oneself.
30. Some facts about drugs, women and mental illness (in the
U.S.):; At every age over 15, more women than men
receive treatment for mental health problems. Women are
prescribed more than twice, the amount of drugs than
men for the same psychological symptoms. Although no
data are available it is most probable that the situation in
Pakistan vis a vis women and psychiatric illness, 1s
worse. For detailed information and on the role of drug
companies and mental illness see M.Nellis. The Female
Fix, N.Y. Penguin, 1981.
alt Two points: Firstly all these procedures are commonly

practiced in Pakistan and the approach whether to
neurosis or insanity is heavily reliant on such treatment
and drugs. Secondly, note again that all these 3 violent
procedures -- insulin shock, electro - convulsive therapy
and lobotomy -- were invented in Durope by young men
during the 1930’s and the height of the Fascist era (See
Note # 19).
3m Moralism plagues psychology, as it must if we remember

(its) ongins (and) the ethical culture of Germany --
Whether in the fantasy of Watson, Skinner, Mowrer,
Freud, Laing, and Jung, psychology wants to show in the
same demonstration both how we are and how we
“should be” -- “Every student of psychology is forced
into moralistic positions and every patient caught in
moral judgements about the soul”. Hillman, Re-Visioning
Psychology, p. 178
Ibid. p. 48.
34. Ibid. p. 33.
35; Hillman has also commented on our modern historical
fantasy about the decline of the Roman Empire and ideas
of a strong central ego. The disintegration and
paganization of society is seen as describing what
Appendices 139
happens when consciousness is released from its Roman

identification (virtus, dignitas) and the centered rule of
will and reason. Setting these as counterpositions is to do
a “disservice to the psyche”. Both historical conditions,
whether of Roman virtue or Pagan decline, are stereo-
typical and need to be revisioned as different styles of
consciousness within a diverse polytheistic psyche, with
Rome no more “conscious” than the barbaric hinterlands.
Ibid. p.26. And here are the views of a (U.S. based)
Pakistani academic: “The cerebral Pakistani professor
held out a rather sombre picture for people in general.
The picture is that of the last dying days of Roman
Empire with 30 to 40 princes fighting out amongst
themselves with daggers and swords. The royal guards
too were involved in the carnage. Yes, we might soon
enough have the same scenario in the country,” he added.
The Nation, Lahore, 24-01-87.
APPENDIX [I.b
(From paper done for Institute of Development Studies,
University of Heisinki, Seminar on “Woman/Body/Knowledge”
1992.)
Adam and Eve
..As Hillman has observed, the perception of female

inferiority and its by now well documented manifestation in
western civilization may be seen as a series of footnotes to the
Judaeo Christian version of Genesis as “First Adam then Eve.”
Relevant to our purpose is that the entire structure of the
metaphor on which the Adam and Eve hierarchy is based is
physical, that is, it reflects the male body and its images in
anatomy, physiology, reproduction and embryogeny. For example
in Genesis II], Adam was fashioned in God’s image and Eve made
from him. Whatever divinity she has is second hand. The male is
prior in time, superior since he is the direct image. He is superior
in consciousness, since Eve was extracted from his deep sleep,
that 1s his unconsciousness:
The existence, essence and material substance of Eve depend on

Adam. he is her formal cause, because she is performed in him,
he is her material cause, since she is made of his rib, and he is her
final cause, since her end and purpose is help for him. The male is
the pre-condition of the female and the ground of its possibility.”
The medical historian Ludwing Edelstein has observed,

that the theory of the human body is always part of philosophy.
Medical science is not merely physiological investigation but
always part of a particular philosophy and weltanschauung. As
Edelstein has shown whether in Hellenistic science or ‘modern
medicine, cited facts are embedded in a particular philosophy.
Appendices 141
Bringing together a vast body of research ranging from

anatomy to chemical embryology, Hillman has discussed how the
idea of Eve, as the Christian “abysmal side of bodily man”, dark
and unconscious, remained a leitmotif in medical science. It is an
amazing tour de force in which we see the male heroic/Appollonic
archetype at work. Beginning with Anstotle, 37% of whose
writings were on biology/physiology, through the centuries, one
sees a either a denial of the feminine body or its representation in
grossly unbalanced and pejorative terms. As late as the 18th
century with the assistance of microscopes, eminent medical
scientists “saw” complete forms of creatures in the sperm of
various species. If it was horse sperm, minute horses were seen, if
sperm from a human male, an entire person in miniature was
documented. William Harvey, of the heart/circulation fame came
to the conclusion that semen could not enter the uterus and
therefore was not necessary for conception. The female ovum was
discovered in 1827 but its discoverer Von Baer, did not envision
the conjunction of egg and sperm as necessary for conception.
This was not discovered till well over 70 years later. As a logos of
beginnings, embryology remained influenced by the Eve myth and
male superiority. "ay
We encounter a long and incredible history of theoretical

misadventures and observational errors in male science regarding
the physiology of reproduction. These fantastic theories and
fantastic observations are not mere misapprehensions the usual
and necessary mistakes on the road scientific progress, they are
recurrent depredations of the feminine phrased in the un-
impeachable, objective language of the science of the period. The
mythic factor returns disguised in the sophisticated new evidence
of each age.*
The preceding examples illustrate the untenability of

absolute objectivity even in “pure” science, leave alone the
domain of social/behavioural science. As theorizing is always
prone to pre-conception, there is a vicious circle in which
preconceptions become a part of what is being observed and in
turn are reinforced by the results of the observation.
Earlier one had referred to consciousness as an analogue

to vision and as the preceding examples from science regarding
male and female indicate, seeing is believing but believing is
seeing. Like visual perception itself, a certain optimum distance is
required for clarity of an image. The same can be said for our
consciousness about consciousness, that is our view of ourselves.
This is why one has chosen to adopt the long, circular but
historical view, since to have begun closer to the present, would
have been to get trapped into precisely those modes of thought
which are currently considered modern, scientific and somehow
unimpeachable.
Keeping in view, in terms of psychology and received
ideas of consciousness/personality -- that is, where women are so
to speak coming from (Eve); as one moves closer to the present, it
seems that ironically, the feminist view of human consciousness
remains largely confined, physically and emotionally, within a
masculine worldview. It should be noted in passing that the
negative picture of Eve as seductress responsible for the fall, is
not present in Hindu mythology which has a totally different
attitude towards women the female body. And although Islam
today is categorized as part of the monotheistic group of religions,
unlike its Judaeo-Chnistian counterpart, the actual name of Eve is
not mentioned in the Quran at all.. There are references to
Adam’s spouse or wife, and although Eve has an Arabic name
and is revered as such by Muslims, in the Quran she is neither
named nor created from Adam in the Biblical way. More
significantly, in the story of the fall, it is Adam who is seduced by
Satan, while the expulsion applies to both of them. There is in
fact a complete silence about Eve.
One has detailed the ascendance of the hero upto the time
of Freud and the 20th century. Although many feminists would
like to believe that since Freud, the historical biases have been
redressed, what has been happening in fact is an interesting game
of hide and seek. In this game, masculine consciousness continues
to trap the feminine psyche but now from a different field of
focus: the body. One has come full circle. Insofar as
consciousness/personality is not separate from this, the picture
remains the same but with further ironical twists.
Appendices 143
Masculine Consciousness and Female Sexuality
Compared to the male body, scientific understanding of

female functioning is very recent. For example, the cyclical nature
of menstruation and its relation to ovulation occurred only at the
tur of this century. The scientific understanding of female
sexuality in the 20th century provides a good example of a
masculine consciousness which has coopted the feminine at the
most basic physical level.
As numerous writers have discussed, western models for
male and female sexuality have been heavily influenced by
Puritan Chnistianity*. In fact, it can be said that the view of Islam
as a framework for debauchery, given the way in which its
Prophet’s marriages have been interpreted, not to mention the
sensuous nature of the Quranic depiction of paradise, is a view
embedded in the religious ethos of Puntan Chnistianity and its
ideas of sexuality. Similarly, the human body, especially the
female in all its sensuous aspects, is a major element of Hinduism.
And while both Hinduism and Islam have an ascetic dimensions
they do not have institutionalized asceticism, as characterized for
example in medieval Catholicism. The idea of Eve as seductress
and responsible for the fall permeated European/Chnistian and
subsequently American puritanism. The purity and holiness for
both men and women was in celibacy. A good (moral) woman
does not desire, leave alone enjoy, sexual expression.
One major reason why Freud had such an impact was
because for the first time, following the Victorian era, sex became
an open subject, sanctioned thus by “science.” In the same way
that the current mushrooming of numerous schools of
psychotherapy claim to be ‘new’ but essentially continue to
uphold the values of the Freudian ego, similarly many feminists
believe that theirs is a stance which restores respect to the female
body. Thus, for example a feminist text book on women and sex
roles states that the sexual attitude implicit in his (Freud’s)
writings have in many cases supported and strengthened the
sexual attitudes found in Judaeo-Christian writings.’ Yet, the
same authors, do not discern the oppression implicit in
contemporary scientific literature. An example pertaining to the

female orgasm will illustrate this point.
More of the Same
Few moder psychologists realize that Freud’s theory of

female sexuality and its central concept of “penis envy” is without
foundation in any data. He postulated this counterpart to the
concept of male castration anxiety without the benefit of ever
having “analysed” even one little girl. Ostensibly revolutionary in
its freeing the subject of female sexual response from its Victorian
prison, Freudian psychology in fact forced it farther into a
different and defensive posture.
According to Freud, female orgasm was of two sorts:
“immature” (clitoral) and “mature” (vaginal). Obviously, the
more desirable/mature type is also more in accordance with
masculine sexual expression. As the impact and fame of
psychoanalysis and psychiatry spread during the forties and
fifties, generations of women thought they were “inadequate”,
“frigid” or in the words of medical psychiatry “dys-functional.” In
the United States, the Kinsey reports on male and female
sexuality received wide spread publicity, further strengthening
Freudian perspectives on the matter.” :
The connection between the frustrating labels of
immature/mature female sexuality and the nse of the women’s
movement has been well documented by western feminists. The
energy of the movement strongly related to a sense of rage and led
to many studies which debunked not only the vaginal/clitoral
category, but had repercussions in other areas as well. During the
sixties and seventies an increasing number of women, including
professional scientists, provided documentary evidence contrary
to prevailing attitudes about sex roles, gender and sexuality.* Two
,
points need to be kept in mind. Firstly, insofar as the feminist
concem was essentially on outward legal and economic issues, the
focus was equality as defined by no difference. Related to this,
secondly, the rhetoric and vocabulary was a quantitative one,
since qualitative issues are relevant only in the context of
difference. Legal and -economic issues by definition are
Appendices 145
quantitative and are in turn part of the overarching masculine

world view/preoccupation with power. It was in this context of
power as quantity, that the last major studies on male/female
sexuality were conducted, their conclusions considered valid till
today. These were conducted by a man and a woman -- William
Johnson and Virginia Masters.
Like the Kinsey reports the Masters and Johnson studies?
received wide publicity in the media and are considered
authoritative and definitive in their subject of human sexual
response and human sexual inadequacy. They are significant for
two reasons: firstly in the approach to the concept of sex, and
secondly, that the studies are accepted by feminist scholars since
they are “scientific.” A commentary by six women authors of the
book on women and sex roles, can illustrate the point:
Coming from a medical background (Master’s and Johnson), their

work was the first comprehensive scientific study of what actually
happened during sexual arousal and orgasm. By bringing couples
into the laboratory, they were able to measure precise bodily
changes during sexual activity."
The most sensational disclosure of the Masters and

Johnson studies was the assertion that women could experience
multiple orgasm. The statistical graph given in the book on sex
roles, indicates the difference in frequency between single and
multiple female orgasms as almost negligible. The authors do not
question this extreme swing within twenty years, indeed they
highlight it in the context of the debunking of Freud’s ideas about
female orgasm. What they do not do, 1s question the assumptions
and context of such female orgasm. This has been done for
example in The Hite Report." which is significant firstly, for its
refreshing non-academic approach to female sexuality and
secondly, for highlighting the meaning of intercourse for women.
It clearly shows that for women, orgasm through intercourse is
not the norm, but it is exceedingly important for its emotional
aspects. However, it is not the Hite report but the Masters and
Johnson studies which constitute the present curriculum on this
subject in medical schools across the world.
With the announcement of multiple orgasms for women,

and its unquestioning acceptance by feminist scholars, there is the
present closing of the circle. Within a religious and Puntan
context, pre-twentieth century woman did not/could not enjoy sex
and in a sense it was a non issue. With Freud, the issue was
postulated as possible but in an impossible manner and its criteria
for validity, “maturity”, remained anchored in the masculine and
preferred male context of intercourse. Ostensibly granting women
their due, the Master’s and Johnson model simply keeps up the
pressure, through the (heroic) notion of unlimited orgasm.
Although many women have never experienced multiple orgasms,

Masters and Johnson feel that they are possible for any woman
given appropriate stimulation. Masters and Johnson also
demonstrated that failure to reach orgasm has biological
consequences for women”...
Insofar as the feminist commentary does not question the

notion of orgasm through intercourse, the Freudian model in fact
persists, as frustratingly if not more so, than the earlier models of
either no orgasm or an “immature” one. Overtly “superior” in its
quantitative aspect, the possibility of multiple orgasm for women
continues to convey an impression of functioning below a
desirable threshold. It is, like much of modern thought, a
reflection of institutionalized frustration which constantly beckons
the individual towards more of what is frequently, the same. Thus
for example, the same authors suggest:
In spite of their greater capacity for orgasm, women also appear

less sexually responsive than men. Although moder marriage
manuals suggest that a woman’s potential level of sexual desire is
equal to that of a man, they also point out that women tend to
become aroused less quickly than men and that prolonged sexual
foreplay is needed for most women to achieve orgasm on a regular
basis (p.277).
Once again women are left feeling “inadequate.” Given

the entire construction of female sexuality, as a disembodied penis
(en)vying with another as to who can have more orgasms, such
Appendices 147
‘science’ reinforces feminist ideas of self and body in male terms.

To the best of my knowledge, no commentary, feminist . or
otherwise, has critiqued the Masters and Johnson studies which
today constitute standard texts on the subject in modern medicine.
In the same way that today there is the “scientific” study of
religion, the idea of “scientifically” studying an activity (sex)
which humans almost universally engage in utmost privacy, in a
frequently emotional context of an amorphous idea of love, is
considered irrelevant; as is the fact that in its natural context, it is
rarely if ever, done with sundry electrodes, wires, meters,
connected to various parts of ones body -- nor is it usually
‘monitored’ thus by observers behind one-way mirrors or in the
next room. The vast majority of women who participated in the
section of the research on male impotence were euphemistically
labelled “surrogate” (“experienced”) partners. Similarly, they
were the major participants of the research in other areas such as
male impotence. All these variables, which if reflected on
seriously, can make such “science” seem alternatively ridiculous
or tragic. Nevertheless, behavioural, psychological, and physical
generalizations are made and held up to be the valid norm as
“proved” by science.
The Master’s and Johnson studies provide a perfect
symbol for the present state of many modern women as they
remain trapped in a masculine consciousness. As we have seen,
theories of the female body are preponderantly based on the
observations and fantasies of men. They are statements of
masculine consciousness confronted with its sexual opposite.
Insofar as one investigator of the above mentioned research was
female, it clarifies the question of consciousness as not
necessarily being only one of man or woman .but what type of
consciousness is at work and whether or not it gives adequate
place for the feminine. The “freedom” of women is modeled on a
male idea of consciousness which sees all issues in terms of
power and quantity and a moral reductionism related to these
terms. By making a technology of the orgasm, along with the
steady refining, of other technologies such as contraception and
abortion, women can more closely approximate male sexual
patterns in the prototype of a ‘free’ and ‘healthy’ male sexuality.

Thus, though Freud has been ‘debunked’, penis envy lives on.
ENDNOTES
Ne Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures. Hogarth.

London. 1957.
a James Hillman. The Myth of Analysis. Harper & Row
N.Y. 1972. p.218.
3" Ludwig, Edelstein. Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of
Ludwig Edelstein. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins
U Press 1967. p.260-265 cited in Hillman. ibid.
4. Hillman, Mytrh of Analysis. p.224.
6. Irene Fieze, Jacquelynne Parsons, Paula Johnson, Diane
Ruble, Gail Zellman: Women and Sex Roles: A
Social Psychological Perspective, New York,
Norton. 1978.
fe Kinsey Pomerey, Martin and Gebhard, Sexual Behaviour
in the Human Male, 1948. And, Sexual
Behaviour in the Human Female. 1953.
Philadelphia W.B. Saunders.
8. Marielouise Jurriet: Sexism: The Male Monopoly on
History and Thought. N.Y. Farrar, Strass,
Giroux 1982. Also Jidith Bardwick; The
Psychology of Women (see Part I)
- Mariette Nowak. Eve ’s Rib. St. Martin’s Press.
N.Y.1980.
9. Virginia Masters and William Johnson: Human Sexual
Response and Human Sexual Inadequacy. 1966
and 1970 respectively, Boston. Little Brown.
10. Fieze etal. op.cit. p.218.
i Shere Hite The Hite Report. N.Y. MacMillan 1977.
Dell.1978.
i, Fieze etal,. op.cit. p.219.
13 As a student at Columbia I had the “required reading”
text, but in all seriousness, on The Scientific
Study of Religion. by Milton Yinger, MacMillan
Appendices 149
1970. | remember the book for its considerable

price.
14. Walter Ong. Contest, Sexuality and Consciousness, p.90
and 98.
15. The most recent attack on Freud comes from Gloria Steinem’s
hilarious and ironically conceived reversal of Freud as a woman.
But Steinem provides sobering evidence as to how his ideas live
on firmly in the universities and medical schools of the nineties.
(Ms Vol.IV No.5, 1994.)
Appendix I.c
(From the paper “The Cultural Politics of Paranoia” IDS,

University of Helsinki. Seminar on Woman/Body/Knowledge)
“Word Power”
_. Regarding the intellectual sin of “essentialism” in the context of

deconstructive postmodemism, the reader is referred to Charlene
Spretnak’s excellent, and appropriately scholarly, response”. Our
own is a little more basic and two fold: Firstly, while we find such
semantic hairsplitting quite boring, it seems necessary insofar as
modem consciousness seems to have lost all sense of the
importance of language. It is seen as a vehicle for accumulating
facts rather than for holding or conveying meaning.
Language is the one thing that sets us apart from the rest
of creation. There can be no consciousness without language, and
in this sense, indeed “In the beginning was the Word.” To us,
social science’s relationship with the word is virtually empty of
all meaning, whereas, in ancient scholarship words had a
sacred/archetypal function. Words were considered to be
repositories of sacred power and hence to be used carefully.
“Sanity” in Latin, onginally meant the rational use of words.
Today, the ‘evolution’ of language has reduced words to
nominalisms. The word ‘rational’ itself being made into a
nominalism, no longer reflecting its organic connections and
meaning in the idea of ‘ratio’, (proportion). To us, the logic
behind structural linguistics, of seeing no inherent meaning in
words and reducing them into quasi-mathematical units is a sort
of suicide/murder. Because, as one knows, outside of the
Orwellian “Newspeak” of the university, words -- in any language
-- do have power ... to move us to tears, laughter and much more.
The Rushdie affair should be an instructive lesson for the
Appendices 151
western(ized) intellectual, illustrating the deep rooted connections

of the symbolic, the sacred and the word. Secondly, and related to
this murder of meaning in academic discourse, our response to the
sin of ‘essentialism’ can be considered, depending on one’s
culture, quite crude: As the “essentialist” label implies, there is a
skepticism regarding the idea of “essence” which in philosophy
means “that which constitutes the inward nature of anything” We
prefer to approach the idea through the more commonplace
notions of “essence perfume”: notions, which are perhaps more a
part of a woman’s world than a man’s. Considering the nature of
perfume, regardless of the essence remains as a_ unique,
identifying characteristic.
The skepticism about ‘essentialism’ may have to do with
a severance/denial of the body, especially as it 1s exemplified in
westem civilization’s notions of hygiene and
manifestations/reactions to bodily odour. The pejorative ‘odour’
rather than ‘essence’/’perfume’ is itself indicative of the culture’s
attitude (and knowledge) of the body. Each of us has a distinctive
body essence, which for most animals forms a key part of the
process of identification. Today, various pseudo-medical
industries urge and assist in obliterating (de-odenizing) and
artificially replacing this aspect of the body, to the extent that
now it is considered almost compulsory not to know one’s own
essence. Perhaps the anti-essentialist view has to do with this
virtual absence of the physical aspect to the meaning of essence in
modem times. Not only literally, but also in the symbolic
understanding of essence-as-irreducible-difference.
ENDNOTES
14. Charlene Spretnak; States of Grace: The Recovery of

Meaning in the Postmodern Age. San Francisco: Harper.
1991.
15) Walker Percy; “The Divided Creature” Wilson
Quarterly. Summer 1989. Although approaching the
subject from a different perspective, Percy also laments
the loss of meaning in academic language.
Appendix Il.a
The Savonarola Syndrome
In fifteenth century Italy, Florence had been a democracy

of sorts. No one today would have recognised it as such because
democracy had been reduced to an oligarchy and even this was
little more than a facade behind which the Medici family had
established authoritarian rule. Political dispensations of this kind
are vulnerable to such ills as corruption, increasing disparities of
income and, ultimately, tyranny. All this came to pass. The
Dominican friar and demagogue, Savonarola, made his bid for
power on the basis of a campaign to return the city to democracy,
eliminate corruption and restore moral health. He ended up by
becoming a tyrant as bad, if not worse, than those he had
overthrown. He achieved power in 1494 and was killed four years
later, not without connivance of the Church establishment. During
the period of his rule, all he did was vent and rave against
immortality. He did not address the underlying problems nor,
perhaps, did he ever understand them. He carried out no
institutional reforms. It is scarcely surprising then, that he did not
succeed in making the city any better than it had been. The
Medicis returned after he had been overthrown. Fanatics may
cause a great deal of misery but never achieve the goals they set
for themselves. They are incapable of understanding reality which
is complex, and they can never tackle the different problems that
they are inevitably confronted with.
Savonarola was a cleric, belonging to a religion that had
institutionalized priesthood, in an age when the Church enjoyed
great temporal power. But there is a clerical mentality that is
common to priests of all the different religions. And, it seems,
Appendices 153
neither the changes wrought by time nor the lessons of history

make any difference to it. Being of simple mind, they confuse the
symptoms with the disease and feel that treating one is the same
thing as curing the other. Their basic prescription is to promote
hypocrisy. Superficial piety is taken for moral health. The
insidious disease is then free to eat away at the body politic from
within.
Who would have thought that the close of the twentieth
century would witness yet another oversimplification being taken
seriously, the affairs of the state and the problems of the citizenry
being ignored so that an attempt can be made to create a pious
society? And yet, five hundred years later, exactly that is being
attempted. Savonarola, though he was probably quite genuinely
convinced that he had found the ultimate solution to society's ills,
has been forgotten by posterity because his answer to the
problems of his times was false. Those who attempt to imitate
him will fare no better. But how much misery would they have
caused in the meantime!
God's laws do not change because they are eternal
verities, principles of a general nature. They are immediately
comprehensible to all men, requiring little, if any, interpretation
by the wise and none at all by those whose profession implies a
cloistered existence. These principles grasped, no learning in
divinity is required to translate them into laws applicable and
enforceable in any given society. What is needed is awareness of
(and, more importantly, sensitivity to) the needs of the people.
That is why the only people entrusted with the task of making the
laws are those chosen by the people. Questions regarding God's
sovereignty and the supreme law are false questions because
God's sovereignty is not dependent upon its recognition by his
creatures, and the source of all law is already embedded in the
hearts of the believers.
Laws, therefore, have to be debated and made by men if
they are not to become rigid and unenforceable. Further, the
interpretation of these man-made laws can be entrusted only to
those trained for this particular job and not to anyone whose claim
rests on no more than knowledge of religious doctrine. That
knowledge must be combined with learning of a host of matters
that have a direct connection with the existing state of society.

This kind of a mind is simply not available amongst the priestly
class, whether the class be recognised, as in the religion to which
Savonarola adhered, or be no more than an usurper class with no
religious legitimacy, as in Muslim countries. The priest can never
see the wood for the trees. His interpretation of every divine
injunction is literal and his knowledge of the real state of the
world is no more than hazy. He does not, after all, live as other
people do. He does not earn his living by economically productive
Sa
Ss work. In fact, he is never anything more than a social parasite.
That is also why he is rarely elected by the people to represent
a
them. And when he pretends to a leadership role, he almost never
has anything concrete to say about their problems, like
Savonarola he goes about attacking the morals of the people or
imposing doctoral purity on society like Savonarola, his methods
are tyrannical. Like Savonarola, he is forgotten but not before he
is eliminated by forces that he never comprehends, even when
they are represented by those of his own parasitic profession. --
The Friday Times, May 16, 1994.
Appendices 155
Appendix II.b
Is knowledge a dangerous thing?

(Science Survey, Feb.16, 1991. The Economist)
Despite spreading its tentacles into every crevice of

modern life, science remains a peripheral part of human culture.
In 400 years of assaulting ignorance, it has had almost no effect
on superstition, despite insisting that superstition is a form of
ignorance. Religious faith has not declined much, if at all, since
science began answering some of its questions; and where it has
declined, new superstitions -- Freudian, Gaian or homeopathic --
have quickly filled the vacuum.
Opinion polls still put scientists high in public esteem and
reveal widespread, uncynical support for what they try to achieve.
In 1957, 88% of Americans told a pollster the world would be
better off because of science; two years ago, 88% still thought the
same. Even so, something has changed since, say, the 1960s.
Where there was once uncritical support, now there is more
ambivalence.
This stems partly from the debacles represented by DDT,
thalidomide, Chernobyl and Challenger, but partly also from the
growing alienation of science from people. A century ago, a
reasonably educated person could open any issue of Nature, the
dominant journal of scientific record, and peruse it with interest.
Today, a distinguished professor of geology cannot understand
more than one word in two of an article on molecular biology --
and vice versa. The layman would be baffled by both. Only 22%
of Americans and 13% of Britons know what DNA is. A head of
government with Jefferson’s knowledge of science (hard to
imagine in any case) would still be ill-equipped to judge the
promise of, say, star-wars technologies.
Where once science seemed to be friendly, now it seems
intimidating and remote. Publishers rush to print books accusing,
it of heartless reductionism and praising soulful holism. Dr.
Frankenstein and Dr. Strangelove have replaced the benevolent
eccentricity of Professor Brainstawm and Dr. Who. Dr. Wolpert

believes the credulity with which people greet telepathic, spoon-
bending or crop-circling charlatans reveals their need to heal the
wound caused by not understanding true science.
The resulting ambivalence affects technology more than
science. John Gibbons, head of the American Congress’s Office
of Technology Assessment, puts it this way: the public supports
science, but it reserves for itself the right to apply the brakes to its
application. It wants its elected representatives, not scientists, to
have an off-switch. Literally in some cases: in Frankfort,
Kentucky, where chemical weapons are to be destroyed, the
mayor will have monitoring equipment in his office.
“Genetic engineering”, says one scientist who has worked
in government, “stands at the top of the slippery slope down
which nuclear power slid.” Nuclear power committed three
cardinal sins -- besides being related to weapons of mass
destruction. First, it over-promised: in the 1960s it was going to
produce power too cheap to be worth metering. By the 1970s, it
was Clearly producing the most expensive power of all. Second, it
condescended: the public was wrong to worry about radiation
leaks because they would not happen and (sigh of exasperation)
the risks from them were smaller than those of riding a bicycle.
But, as Sir Richard Southwood, now vice-chancellor of Oxford
University, spotted, it turned out that the public minded more
about involuntary, invisible msks, however small, than about
clearly visible risks that people bring upon themselves, such as
riding a bicycle. Third, it was secretive: the nuclear industry lied
again and again about leaks and minor accidents, was caught, and
was deeply distrusted. Only now, belatedly, has it realised that the
way to reassure the public is to deluge it with tedious details of
insignificant incidents.
Genetic engineering has certainly over-promised. In the
early 1980s it was forecasting new drugs, new crops, new
pollution-eating bugs and more. Few of these have materialised. It
has also condescended, by dismissing the fears of its enemies as
sq much science fiction. The fate of the word “cloning” illustrates
the gap between the public and the scientists. To a scientist,
cloning means the isolation of a gene from one creature so that it
Appendices ay
can be copied into another. To the man in the street, it means

making 431 identical versions of Hitler somewhere in Brazil. But
genetic engineering has not committed the third of nuclear
power’s mistakes. It has mostly leamt from that example to be as
open as possible about its plans. In Britain, for example, the
Institute of Virology has taken great care to tell local and national
audiences why it is about to release viruses that kill caterpillars.
The eugenic taboo
Nonetheless, public concern about genetic engineering

remains strong. It stems from two taboos that the subject touches
on: that against playing god (or behaving like a Nazi -- the two
metaphors are oddly interchangeable), and that against tampering
with the integrity of nature. Genetic engineers have certainly
played into the hands of the environmentalists by making, as the
first genetically engineered crop to be released into the wild, a
tobacco (cough) plant made resistant to herbicides and therefore
able to be more heavily sprayed (ugh) against weeds.
People are quite used to the idea that technology is used
to non out the vagaries of life, yet they are repelled by the idea
that other people should be able to determine in advance the sex
of their child, which is a classic case of ironing out life’s vagaries.
When in 1990, a group of scientists at a London hospital
announced that they could determine the sex of a very early
embryo and abort it if it were male, they were careful to dress this
up as a method of avoiding sex-linked genetic disease, not as a
method of determining sex.
Similar ethical questions will grow in importance. How
will society and commerce manage the discovery that people with
gene A are more likely to become alcoholics, or those with gene B
are more likely to get breast cancer, or, God forbid, that people
with gene C are poor at mathematics? The almost obsessive gene-
hunting, that characterises much epidemiological research at
present is leading that way. Breast cancer is only the latest disease
to have the discovery of “its gene” announced on the front page of
the New York Times.
158 ; Maculinity, Rationality and Religion
This survey has argued that science is always on the

move. Its preference is to find a question that nobody knew
needed answering, answer it and then move on, leaving
technologists to turn the answer into a machine, a drug or a
computer program. Yet, for the first time, man is voluntarily
retreating from scientific and technical breakthroughs that he has
made. For more than 18 years, nobody has been to the moon.
America decided in the 1960s not to build a supersonic airliner;
Concorde is an older craft than a Boeing 767. Several American
states have banned bovine growth hormone because it would
boost milk yields and hence increase the cost of subsidies. Not
everybody who could benefit will be able to afford a bone-marrow
transplant.
Those retreats are commercial. Others might be technical:
Professor Edwards of the Cavendish points out that not since the
discovery of the neutron led to the atom bomb has a new
elementary particle led to feasible new technology (though the
muon may yet). Still other retreats will be ethical: objections to
vivisection have already slowed the progress of some research and
may yet retard medicine; in Germany, for obvious reasons, taboos
against research that uses fetal tissue remain strong, in America
taboos against sex determination may well ensure tts prohibition.
Others will be environmental. It is one of the curious
things about the recent fascination with global warming that so
little interest or faith has been shown in technology’s ability to
solve the problem. If a similar concern had swept the world in the
heyday of science in the 1950s and 1960s, the newspapers would
have been full of claims that nuclear power, or giant satellite
shades, or some such Dan Dare wizardry was the answer. Today,
instead, people assume that such technical “fixes” will only create
their own secondary problems For example, some scientists
recently calculated that the growth of plankton in the Antarctic
ocean was limited by the supply of iron. Since plankton gobble
carbon, why not fertilise them with cheap iron filings and thus
reduce global warming? Greenpeace was horrified. A technical
fix! What might it do to the sensitive ecology of the Antarctic? It
might upset the natural balance. Yet, who knows, it might be a lot
e
Appendices 159
cheaper and more politically manageable than reducing, fossil-fuel

use.
Mankind at the approach of the third millennium is more
addicted to the drug of progress than ever, yet more eager to get
rid of that addiction more distrustful of those who would make
better and better versions of that drug, yet more ready to pay
them; more aware of the infinity of improvements in the drug that
are still possible, yet more convinced that the drug is not the
answer to its problems. Ignorance has shrunk vecause of science
but it has also grown: every discovery reveals how much 1s not
known.
Appendix Tif
The gulf that divides Islam from the West

(Review of Dr. Hoodbhoy’s book in the New Scientist by
Roderick Grierson, April 4, 1992, London.)
The appalling consequences of the military technology

deployed in the Gulf War 12 months ago provide a tragic symbol
of the encounter between East and West during the past five
centuries: superior military technology has allowed Western
nations to impose their will across the globe, inducing a prolonged
crisis of culture among the losers. Nowhere has this crisis been
more intense than in the Islamic world, where military success
had often been regarded as an outward and visible sign of divine
favour after the Arab armies began to overwhelm their
complacent neighbours in the seventh century.
As a physicist whose career is divided between
universities in Pakistan and the US, Pervez Hoodbhoy’s personal
experiences have given him a unique insight into a number of
urgent questions at the very heart of this crisis. Although he
insists that he lacks any professional competence to address the
issues he raises in the book, he maintains that force of
circumstance has compelled him to write. The appendix confirms
that he has found himself engaged in a controversy with
proponents of a so-called “Islamic science” which he regards as
similar to Christian “Creationism”. His book is an attempt to
explain how a hybrid of science and religious fundamentalism
could have received the patronage of President Zia of Pakistan,
and to suggest a course for the future which might prevent his
fellow Muslims consigning themselves to a scientific ghetto.
The cover of the book displays an enthusiastic note from
Edward Said, who claims that “any reader, Muslim or non-
Appendices 161
Muslim, is bound to be affected by Dr. Hoodbhoy’s clear and

persuasive arguments”, but the circumstances described above
will almost certainly reduce the impact the book might have had.
Although the title seems to promise a general study of Islam and
science, when Hoodbhoy discusses contemporary issues he rarely
moves beyond Pakistan. Given the varied circumstances of life
throughout the Islamic world, even readers with a special interest
in Pakistan are likely to find such a narrow focus frustrating.
At the same time, his hopes of providing answers to
historical questions lead him into precisely the sort of areas he
admits are outside his training. The account of the ways in which
the medieval Christian church attempted to suppress early
scientists, which Abdus Salam in his preface regards as
particularly impressive, consists of little more than a list of ten
examples drawn from A History of the Warfare of Science with
Theology published almost a century ago. Additional comments
made by the author himself indicate virtually no knowledge of the
structure of medieval European society, or of the relationship
between sacred and secular learning, and include a condemnation
which even readers who are not anxious to return to the Middle
Ages may regard as rather extreme: “the suppression of scientific
thought by the medieval Church represents one of the blackest
periods of human history”.
This description is in marked contrast with Hoodbhoy’s
account of the French Revolution as “a landmark victory for the
intellectual and physical liberation of the French people”.
Throughout the book, one encounters simplistic dichotomies
between what the author regards as reason and superstition, and
these raise serious questions about the sort of reader he has in
mind. Hoodbhoy is evidently a “modernist” of the old school, and
his account of the nature of science and the scientific method
might almost have be taken from a textbook for elementary
schools 40 years ago.
While he will have been very provoked by “Islamic
scientists” who seem to believe that celestial beings mentioned in
the Quran can be used to solve Pakistan’s energy problem, his
frustration has led him to adopt a stance which will seem
anachronistic or reactionary to general readers who are now
familiar with books attempting to lead them through the strange

worlds of chaos theory or artificial intelligence.
Given Hoodbhoy’s own modesty, it may seem unfair to
press the point, but if the general reader will not be convinced by
his arguments, who will be? Specialists in the history of Islamic
science will learn nothing from his chapters on the subject. He
does not seem to be familiar with research which might have
strengthened his own arguments, and of all the publications by
dozens of specialist historians, only a single article by A.I. Sabra
is cited, and then only in support of the obvious point that
Nestorian Christians played a major role in translating Greek
texts into Arabic.
Conservative Muslims who might be attracted to the
“Islamic science” which so worries Hoodbhoy are also unlikely to
be convinced, since he finds it difficult to answer the basic
questions at the centre of the dispute. At times he seems to regard
science as morally neutral, but at other times as normally positive
because its very neutrality means that it is part of the process of
enlightenment.
He also maintains that Western science is more than
simply Wester, because it is universal, but this is precisely the
claim which conservatives have made a point of rejecting: they do
not see a tradition so obviously tied to the history of the West as a
system of objective;, neutral or universal truth. Indeed, even if the
claims for neutrality were justified, the lack of moral commitment
this neutrality implies would itself be seen as contrary to Islam.
No account of the glories of early Chinese, Indian or
Islamic science is likely to remove conservative anxiety, and in
the end the question would not seem to be about the kind of
science which is compatible with Islam, but rather about the kind
of Islam which is compatible with science. The Islam in which
Hoodbhoy maintains that science can flourish is almost certainly
not the kind of Islam his opponents would like to see.
This means that the argument is likely to be decided
according to the rules of theology rather than the history of
science, and Hoodbhoy may have had more justification than he
realised when he claimed that the debate lay outside his
competence. Nevertheless, his modesty and sincerity make his
Appendices 163
courage in addressing issues avoided by many specialists

all the
more admirable. Even if his arguments might have been refined,
there is much in the book that needed to be said, and much that
can be read with profit, especially about science education in
Pakistan. I hope he will return to the subject.
It is with this in mind that Hoodbhoy provides a useful
critique of attempts by other authors to discuss Islamic science as
if the realities of modern life simply did not exist, and Muslims
could wish themselves back to the numinous realms of the
medieval alchemists. This is a very serious question for anyone
attempting to revive the glories of earlier centuries, and although
Hoodbhoy may rnsk making the same mistake himself when he
recruits Ibn Sina or al-Razi to prove that “the seeds of
modernism” can be detected among famous Muslim scientists a
thousand years ago, it is an area in which conservative Muslims,
Christians, Hindus or anyone else ought to take great care.
In addition, his arguments are often confusing to support
‘claims for the “oneness” of mankind, he provides a brief account
of the linguist Noam Chomsky’s theories of a “language
acquisition device”, although even if this could be demonstrated to
exist, it is difficult to see why it would prove that “human thought
and behaviour are entirely universal” and that the development of
science in Europe was therefore “utterly accidental”:
Furthermore, while Hoodbhoy seems to think the point is essential
to his hopes of encouraging contemporary Muslims to study
science, his lengthy accounts of why the scientific and
technological revolution occurred in Europe rather than the
Islamic world suggest that he does not really believe it anyway.
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PART IV
COMMENTARIES
Some comments on Durre S.Ahmed’s
Masculinity, Rationality and Religion:
by Akbar Zaidi
This paper is a masterpiece, a work of genius. It is

superbly argued, very incisive, and exceedingly well written.
There are dozens of quotable one-liners which capture the essence
of an extraordinanily alive and fertile mind. The paper is also very
funny and witty. This is really a brilliant, brilliant, piece.
Unfortunately, I agree with the thesis presented in this
monograph, that the moder and the religious fundamentalist are
brothers. Both are equally bigoted, prejudiced, and closed to an
acceptance and understanding of the larger reality as it exists. The
modernist and the fundamentalist may appear to react very
differently to the same situation, but their reactions and views are,
in generic and epistemological terms, very similar. My own
observation is that, in some ways, the poor modernist is a
bechaara, because he does not have the solid and immutable
belief system the religious fundamentalist does. Our modernists
think they are rooted and located in a sense of ideology and some
sense of morality, but scratch them and you find them groping at
strings. They lack believable belief systems. Their own credibility
ought to be, if it is not already, suspect to themselves.
Although I agree with the general theme and thesis in the
paper, there are a number of places where further clarification
and comment is required, essentially to strengthen the arguments.
My comments need to be seen in this context and are meant to be
discursive in the tradition of Ahmed’s paper. The comments
presented below are differentiated into major, overall, comments
about more conceptual issues in the paper, followed by quibbles

regarding, statements in the text.
is While there is probably a religious fundamentalist in

Pakistan, I do not think there is a modernist in this
country. All modernists, no matter how modern, or how
“secular” or atheistic, are always Pakistani Muslims. By
denying, being a Muslim, one still can’t get away from
being a Muslim. Islam is too cultural, societal, prevalent,
existent, everywhere. It cannot be ignored. Any person
born in this country is condemned by its history, culture,
etc. No matter how modern one is, we are trained by this
burden of history. Unlike the west where there is
ll
a
le
Ene
something called secularism, and a concept called

modernism, in Pakistan we have no equivalent.
Furthermore, there is a continuum of modems
rather than the clear-cut category/ies which the paper
discusses. There is a “purer” modem, 1.e., one who is
more secular, more western, etc., compared to the
moder who is more, if you like cultural or even
religious. The Pakistani psyche is schizophrenic. It
cannot be moder or western without being religious. The
irony is obvious. And I am not talking, of symbols alone;
jeans and majlis; or booze and sex and saying one’s
prayers, and so on. I feel that there is a deeper conflicting
belief system of some variety, of some degree, of some
combination - which persists in its existence within all
Pakistanis. There is no either/or: one is not a modem or a
religious person. One can easily be both whether in
Ramzan, Muharram, ox any other day. I think there are
degrees of modernism along a continuum which links the
chain to the degrees of religious fundamentalist along
another, albeit a connected, continuum. Islam is part of
the base as well as the superstructure of our society, and
is too ingrained to be disassociated from any form of “the
modem” in Pakistan.
I think this is a matter of scale, rather than an
either/or. Maybe because modems are so morally close to
Commentaries 17
religious fundamentalists, we could be talking of an

incomplete circle, like an open bracelet, where both come
very close to each other, but are not identical. Degrees of
both run through the continuum and bracelet.
The case-study method is guilty of
methodological individualism, where observations are
often irrelevant and not appropriate. I think Ahmed’s
generalizations presented in the text, of Hoodbhoy, Inam
and the Thinker, cannot be generalized and are bad
caricatures of the modem or of the many modems that
exist in Pakistan. I think Ahmed offers a superb critique
of these three different moderns but to extend that to a
more general, macro level, does not seem to be nght in
my opinion. One may find a few people like all the three
named, just a few. Different modems would react to the
same issues very differently - even ideologically, morally
and differently in a modem sense. The book on science
would be so much better wntten by a modemist
philosopher, social scientist, or even physicist other than
Hoodbhoy. Ahmed could not have found a worse
representative of this category called “modern.” The three
moderns she chose are all individuals, and thus cnticism
of their work is legitimate, as individuals, but not as
symbols or representatives of the one or many moderns.
From her work, I feel that Ahmed thinks that post-

modemism is closer to something, called - let’s call it -
“Sufism.” But to get to that stage in the post-modern
world i.e., the west, one has to travel centuries along the
modem path. There can be no post-modernism without
modemism, and hence no retum to the “true” path.
Modernism ought to, and does, destroy “sufism” (and
everything else one can put in it, including homeopathy,
etc.), because it is supposed to. Modernism is aggressive
and dominating and cannot contextualize the terrain with
other philosophies. Only in its more mature phase is
modermism more tolerant, democratic and softer. In its
youth, it destroys so as to assert itself.
But Ahmed castigates the Pakistani modern for

not being post-modern, or spiritual or for not using
homeopathic medicine. This seems to be historical. It is
not his/her “fault” to be as they are. They are not free of
the process of history of which they form such an integral
part. To say that “why are they like this, and don’t they
see, and can’t they be like that” does not seem to be
contextual. It can only be wishful thinking, ignoring the
process underway. One cannot expect people to be what
they cannot be at that particular time in their history.
Some specific comments on the text
Ahmed talks of the “two aspects of the state of

contemporary Pakistan”, but I think it seems that she is looking at
development versus the religious scholar. This seems odd. Is
development modernization?
“The subject of the paper is the modem Pakistani, his
understanding of himself and religion.” But is “she” any different
from her fundamentalist sister, or from her modern brother? I
agree with the critique of Pakistani feminism wherever Ahmed
mentions it in this paper, and also, as she says, men and women
think and react differently, based on.gender factors. But she does
not mention the differences and similarities associated with
modemism based on gender. I know this is not a tract on
Pakistani feminism as Ahmed also says, but I am curious about
gender differences.
Ahmed talks about different professions being, part of the
Pakistani intelligentsia and intellectual arena, which form “the
notion of ‘modern’ in her paper. There seems to be this belief
amongst English speaking intellectuals, that intellectuals are all
English speaking, usually westernised/modem men and women.
Ahmed’s use of these terms endorses that belief, and she seems to
subscribe to that view. A profession does not determine ideology,
for we do have religious fundamentalists who are journalists,
generals, etc. These fundamentalists exist in non-religious, i.e.
modern environments. Also, the definition of “an intellectual”, (by
an agricultural-intellectual), which Ahmed quotes on many -
Commentaries 179
occasions, seems rather odd. The author defines them as people

“who have a mental tendency [rather than ability?] to think
beyond their own immediate interests.” Almost every one can
think beyond their own immediate interests. And, I would argue
that like other humans, intellectuals very often do only think of
their own interest. And fair enough, I think this is a bad definition,
as definitions usually are, since they are too limiting.
The use of Ahmed’s word “modem” here, her definition,
includes just too much, and almost everything. It seems by her use
of the word, that Islamicists are non-developmental, non progress-
oriented, etc. While modernists may keep Islam at bay, and prefer
“secular” ideas, you can have modern developments and religious
developments. Ahmed talks of development separated from Isiam.
Why?
By looking at only the “English media”, she restricts her
category of the modern or the intellectual, and this source for her
material and critique limits and biases her analysis substantially.
There is also a very different category of the Urdu-medium
modems, something that Ahmed ignores. Their “psychology” 1s
very, very different.
Ahmed argues that the modernists and the fundamentalist
saviours have taken away the world of the common man by the
saviours’ ideas of life and development, but what exactly is “the
common sense of the common man”? Is it something outside of
society, untouched by science, rationality, religion, or
development? In today’s world how can common sense be
considered other than what it is? The common man lives in a
world where numerous conflicting and conciliatory ideas and
stimuli form “common sense.” But, more importantly, is there a
common man?
The author seems somewhat surprised that the TFT has
carried articles on black magic and happens to be “for tradition.”
She is surprised, possibly, because of her use of very strict
categories - of the modem and fundamentalist. There is overlap
and these strange things are increasingly part of the modern’s
portfolio.
Ahmed talks about a “sophisticated modem.” Again, one
needs a continuum: what about unsophisticated moderns? Her
“sophisticated modern” is a terribly crude columnist. Most

sophisticated moderns would probably not say that “mullahs... are
incapable of understanding reality which is complex”, or that they
“are of simple minds.” Only an “unsophisticated modern” would
say all this nonsense. Based on Ahmed’s quotes, the sophisticated
modern is the one who does not have a wider knowledge about the
existing state of society. His ideology, approach, and
interpretation is very unsophisticated. So what makes him
“sophisticated”? He does not realise that mullahs in our society
are very worldly wise, and do have an extensive knowledge of
their own relevant spaces and societies. They may not be aware of
the modemists’ world, but they are very aware of their own
world, which incidentally, is very modem. It is Ahmed’s
“sophisticated” modem who 1s quite crude and unsophisticated.
The “lens of a western consciousness” through which the
modems “have swallowed whole, and unquestioned” ideas from
psychology, is not an immutable/absolute/fixed concept. Different
people - class, gender, culture - see different things through the
same lens. There is no single view, just as there is no single
ideology/psychology of people. Also, Ahmed argues that moderns
accept what psychologists do, and they think that “since
psychology is a science, its ‘discoveries’, pronouncements,
practitioners are beyond question.” This is odd, for her original
definition and. assumptions about “modern” seems to contradict
this way of being. If modems are educated in a certain way and
are able to think (her chosen definition for the intellectual), then
they must question everything rather than just swallow it whole,
without critique or comment. However, some moderns are like
this, just as some fundamentalists are creative “intellectuals”, as
she uses the term.
Ahmed talks of “the true spirit of science” as being
something, which can only be post-modern. So why complain
where it is not, for it cannot be unless those people/regions
become post-modem too.
Ahmed writes that Hoodbhoy’s book “is an example of
the modem view of science, rationality and religion prevailing in
the Pakistani intelligentsia.” She has a very narrow view of the
Pakistani intelligentsia. More importantly, here Ahmed is giving
Commentaries 181
the Pakistani intellectual too much credit for having a view. There
is no single view about anything in this world amongst this
intelligentsia. There is no thought-out view about anything. I
would argue that the Pakistani intellectual does not think in a way
Ahmed gives him credit for. His views happen to him through
numerous stimuli. She seems to give too much credit to the
modern western, liberal Pakistani intellectuals for having a
crystallised view, which I do not think they have.
This book, which Ahmed has critiqued and on which she
builds her entire arguments is not representative enough of a
view, or of the Pakistani intelligentsia. I think Hoodbhoy and his
book are bad and/or incomplete symbols which she attacks. Not
only are they unrepresentative, his arguments are. weakly argued
and poorly developed. Another modern would write the same
book differently. While some moderns would agree with some of
the things he says, others would interpret the ideological and
philosophical question quite differently. Ahmed quotes Hoodbhoy
as saying “wisdom is not accumulated but exists from the outset”,
which just proves my point that he is a poor scientist, philosopher
and ideologue.
S.Akbar Zaidi
Senior Research Economist/Associate Professor
Applied Economics Research Centre,
University of Karachi
P.O. Box 8403
Karachi 75270
Pakistan
May 15, 1994

A commentary on Durre S. Ahmed’s
by Rubina Saigol
Durre Ahmed’s paper is an incisive critique of modernist

rationality, that is, of modern Pakistanis who have an unwavering
faith in modern science and uncritically believe in its premises,
assumptions and methods. Their blind belief in the tenets of
science is not unlike the absolute faith of the religious believer
who accepts all religious norms and injunctions without question .
Yet, modernist thinkers mock religious believers and laugh at
their blindness and their so-called inability to see ‘facts’ and
‘proven truth’. This reflects an ignorance of the extent te which
the believer in modem science is himself trapped in particular
forms of thinking that have roots and origins within religion.
The author quite correctly criticises the modem
Pakistani’s arrogant view of himself as someone who is
enlightened and rational and has somehow broken away from the
unverified premises of religion and ideology and has entered the
world of science where truth is verified, quantified, proved, tested
and established as final. This ‘truth’ when divorced form its
historicity, the conditions of its production and distribution , and
from the context of its construction, appears to be transcendent.
What gets obliterated is that it is produced by historical,
interested agents and its underlying ideologies and assumptions
become hidden behind a facade of objectivity, detachment,
experimentation, quantification, measurement, exactness,
replicability, verifiability and a host of other scientific ideologies.
These assumptions provide this knowledge with a legitimacy that
Commentaries 183
emanates from its assumed neutrality and value-freedom. The

constructs of objectivity, neutrality and value-freedom, in short,
all the dominant ideologies of science, have been subjected to
scathing criticism in the West which originally posited science as
the antidote to religion and purveyed this ideology all over the
world. The West has now come full circle back to a realization of
the importance of the subjective, the unknowable, the unseen,
intuitive knowledge, the relationship between subject and object
that this ideology had severed, the connection between thought
and feeling and the sense of the transcendent, the good, the true
and the beautiful.
To the extent to which the author critiques the
unquestioning, belief in the postulates of science as the new
religion she is correct in her criticism. However, there are
problems in terms of her definition of the modern Pakistani. In
this broad, rather loosely defined category, she lumps together
several categories of people who may, in fact, have no agreement
with one another and, in some cases, may even be equally critical
of modernist rationality. It is very important to distinguish
between these groups of people as subtle and even minute
differences can be of significant import. In the introduction she
writes, “... this paper will treat as synonymous progress,
modemism, modernity, modem, liberal, secular, progressive,
feminist, western, rational.’ Treating these concepts as
synonymous is a major problem and is the source of the confusion
that results. For example in Pakistan many modern or liberal
people are not secular in orientation, many feminists are not-
secular and many secular people are not feminists. Similarly,
many traditional or fundamentalist people are extremely modern
in their style of life and use all the modern techniques,
methodology and technology of science. In this sense they can be
considered completely westernized. Modernism and moderity
need to be distinguished from each other as many people think
that modernism refers to a way of thinking about the world while
modemity refers to technology such as VCRs, the dish antenna,
cars, computers etc. which extremely religious and traditional
people also use generously.
It is therefore difficult to make hard and fast distinctions

between the two categories of the modernist and fundamentalist
whose worlds of meaning overlap.
Durre appears to lump together all feminists even though
the critique applies mainly to liberal feminists. Perhaps, it is
important to consider the rich diversity in feminist thought. The
spectrum ranges from those located within religion to those who
prefer to work outside the religious discourse. In between lie
several shades and hues of feminism, for example, Marxist
feminists who see the unequal class structure as the basis of
inequality and injustice in society; the socialist feminists who see
not only social class but patnarchy with its various manifestations
as related to the oppression of women. A number of socialist
feminists are as critical of masculine knowledge systems as Durre
herself. Postmodern feminists are also obviously in agreement
with a large part of Durre’s critique of modernist rationality. The
debates among feminists are lively and contentious and it may be
important for feminists to think about these issues keeping in view
the exciting diversity of thought.
Although in her appendix Ic Durre comments on the
intellectual sin of essentialism and I do agree that essence is
related to the body, nevertheless I feel that sweeping
generalizations such as ‘a western consciousness’, “‘the
psychology of human characters, ‘westem civilization’, ‘typical
human experiences’ and absolutist assertions such as ‘humans are
essentially the same and human nature as such is really no
different from the beginning of recorded history’ need to be used a
little carefully. They have a tendency to universalise and
obliterate difference and diversity. Such notions run the risk of
denying the vast complexity and variation within what we call
eastern civilization as well as ‘Western civilisation’. Moreover,
they can also become a denial of history and human agency by
positing some sort of a fundamental, transcendent human nature
that has remained untouched by history. Feminists need to be
wary of universalist ideas which have traditionally been used to
oppress women by positing them as one monolithic group versus
men, another monolithic group. Perhaps feminists need to
question these monoliths by positing diversity and difference but
Commentaries 185
without, at the same time, denying the commonalities and

overlaps between men and women and also without valorizing the
feminine side of the difference. It serves no purpose to destroy one
dichotomy only to set up another, kill one god only to create
another.
Similarly, positing one unified West against a unified and
monolithic East can be equally problematic. The West is divided
by many factors such as Catholicism versus Protestantism as well
as by the level of capitalist development in the different Western
countries. The East is also rich with religious, ethnic and
linguistic diversity. I think such complexities are important,
particularly if feminists want to break the established ways of
thinking about the world which have arisen within Western
knowledge systems. The historical exchange of ideas and goods
between the East and West through conquest and trade belies any
notion of purely indigenous ideas or goods. Even though the
Western countries have tried to appropriate the ideas of
secularism and democracy, these ideas have a history in non-
western countries also. At the same time, religion has not waned
in Western countries and the ordinary people are mostly believers.
It seems a little difficult to believe that there is such a
thing, as “ human nature’ which has remained stable throughout
human existence. Human concerns appear to vary from age to
age, decade to decade, across cultures, across societies and across
time. Even within the same society, there is variation from one
social class to another, between geographical regions and, most
importantly, between genders. The question that comes to mind is:
do human beings live in a socio-historical vacuum? They need to
interact with their environment; they articulate and reflect their
social conditions. It seems far fetched to believe that a sixteenth
century English lord is no different from a twentieth century
Pakistani peasant woman. They are separated by historical time,
geographical space, class and gender. I would agree with Durre
that some of the concerns that human beings have had, have been
similar across centuries, for example, most human beings love,
hate, live, die, feel happy or sad, cry or laugh and feel desire or
sorrow. But can we assume that these experiences have been the
same for them across time and space? The perceptions people
have of their experiences, and the meaning, they give to their

experiences, differ greatly. A poor, destitute peasant woman who
is pregnant may not look forward to the birth of her offspring
with the love, eager anticipation, boundless hope and inner joy
which seems to characterize a middle or upper class, well-off
woman who is not struggling to support a family. Yet , both are
experiences of reproduction. Can we say that they are the same
experience?
I wonder if it is useful to write a critique of western
modernist rationality using western styles of didactic thinking,
references to western scholars and western forms of discourse.
While a great deal may be wrong with modemity and _ its
postulates of enlightenment, reason and progress, postmodernity
has its own problems. Like modemity, postmodernity 1s also a
historical phenomenon and one which does not appear to be aware
of its own historicity. Postmodernity is located 1n a post-industrial
world where any sense of universal moral absolutes, which
enabled a person to be anchored in a moral position, seems to
have disappeared. This has, at times, led to a kind of degenerate
moral and cultural relativism, which is equivalent to a total free
market of ideas where all ideas seem to have equal validity.
This brings me to an exploration of the feminist
appropriation of postmodermity in a rather uncritical way.
Feminist methodology, which is a very understandable reaction to
the hegemonic and alienating mainstream social science
methodology, has perhaps gone too far with an emphasis on
subjectivity. The danger here, I fear, is that a tendency to
universalize the subjective may develop, leading to an inability to
form an understanding of the social world, let alone acting, upon it
to change it. If the commonalities and similarities across
structures and systems connot be perceived because only the inner
subjective is true, then I wonder if there can be a feminist politics.
A blanket rejection of the ‘masculinist’ notions of retionality,
objectivity and neutrality may be as dangerous as a complete
submersion in them. For example, in judicial discourse, the value
of neutrality would be paramount if fairness and justice were to
be achieved. If the only reality is that which is subjective, the
Pakistani state can claim its measures against women to be
Commentaries 187
perfectly valid. One area that feminists might want to explore,

then, pertains to the ideologies of postmodemism which has
become the new hegemonic discourse in Western universities.
Feminists need to be critical of feminist methodologies as much as
of any other methodologies. Durre does point this out in her paper
when she writes that we need to look at what is good and useful in
masculine ways of thinking and being. I agree with her that
setting up newer binary oppositions would subvert the purpose of
the feminist movement.
What one may need to explore is the process of the
production and distribution of ideas whether they are labelled
Easter or Wester or other. Ideas have a history and context of
emergence and need to be rejected or accepted on the basis of
their validity and applicability rather than on the basis of where
they originated. Ideas are being contested even within the contexts
in which they developed, for example, secularism and democracy
have become problematic in most modern nation-states including
those based exculsively on these concepts. Virulent and rampant
local nationalisms have landed democracy in a severe crisis, while
religious and ethnic movements have strained secularism severely.
Everyone interested in social change, but particularly feminists,
need to confront these nationalisms, the violence they generate,
the war and defence ideology that these masculinist, patriarchal
enterprises give rise to.
Perhaps more fruitful than an Us versus Them debate is
to look at the rise of nationalistic, warlike and ethnic sentiment
globally. If we fall into an Us (East) versus them (West) debate,
would we not reproduce the distinctions and dichotomies first
produced by Western orientalist scholars supplying colonial
expansion with morally acceptable motives? The boundaries
created in this discourse would then get not so much dissolved as
inverted. Identity would then be created in a binary opposition, as
the exact opposite of the West, resulting in a blanket rejection of
all ideas — even those that might be relevant and resonate with
experience. If one of the aims of feminist movements is to dissolve
false boundaries and re-connect broken wholes, would it perhaps
not be futile to set up new boundaries?
The resurrection of ancient myths, symbols, icons and

images in order to rediscover their emancipatory value is an
exciting enterprise. Yet, a word of caution is needed because
many of the ancient symbols, myths and gods may have had an
oppressive impact even in ancient times and may come to
represent that even today. Nationalism itself uses ancient myths,
symbols, legends and images in the process of its construction.
Nationalism, a positive and vibrant force against imperialism, has
become destructive ever since the purpose of overthrowing
colonial rule has been achieved. As nationalism draws upon
ancient traditions to create itself, it can become very oppressive
for women who are considred the repositories of culture and
tradition. Many traditions are counter-productive and unjust
though one may agree that not all traditions are oppressive.
It is not very clear in Durre’s paper how myths and
symbols arise. How do these ‘structures of consciousness’ take
shape in the psyche? What are the processes of their production?
Instead of being assumed, they need to be dealt with critically and
analytically. Once again my question is whether human beings,
through time and = space, have identical structures of
consciousness? If they exist, how do they arise in individual
and/or collective consciousness? Durre describes myths, symbols
and archetypes as ‘principles governing individual and collective
human existence’. This is a structuralist assumption and the
question 1s: if Marxist structuralism 1s wrong and has given way
to post-structuralism, how is religious or mythical structuralism
more acceptable?
As regards Durre’s comments on the emergence of
symbols, I would agree that there is a certain unknowable quality
about them and that they have the capacity to say that ‘which
cannot be said any other way.’ She gives the examples of Saddam
Hussain, the Kaaba, the Swastika, Imran Khan and the like.
However, I think it is important to locate symbols in a context and
to examine the context of their production. Symbols, like all
knowledge, myths, beliefs and icons, are products of human
beings collectively or individually. The media, for example, has
played no small role in ‘producing’ and ‘distributing’ Imran
Khan, Madonna, Michael Jackson or Saddam Hussain. The
Commentaries 189
thousands of newspapers and magazine interviews, stories,

articles, television coverage, photographs, pictures and posters
have played a central role in commodifying these ‘superstars’. I
think that print-capitalism is strongly involved in the production
and dissemination of symnols, myths, legends and_ icons.
Advanced semiotic capitalism is largely engaged in the production
of signs, symbols and information. The focus of this form of
capitalism has shifted from the production of goods to the
production of services, information and the image. Production
processes in society are related to social, ideological and political
power which, to an extent, determines who gets manufactured and
how, who gets commodified and packaged and sold to an audience
and in what way. The fastest growing, technology in the world, the
communications technology, is integral to the production of
symbols and images. In tum, of course, these symbols produce
their own power which gives rise to further commercialisation.
Imran Khan and even Saddam Hussain are products of the
commercialisation of desire - the hamessing of desire to capital
gains. I think these aspects of image and symbol production are
important even though I think that Durre is nght that they seem to
take on a mysterious power of their own.
Durre Ahmed’s critique of the role that psychology has
played in the costruction of the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is
excellent. One could add to this critique by exploring the
processes which relate to the development of the expert, that 1s,
the modern doctor and psychologist, as the purveyor of a pseudo-
science. This development, I think, has roots in the power struggle
between social groups. In order to gain social legitimacy and the
financial advantages of that legitimacy, these experts present their
dubious and uncertain knowledge as high status knowledge and
truth. I suppose feminists really need to look at the social and
historical context in which a phenomenon emerges. Psychologists
medicalized their subject in order to give it the respect and
authority of the so-called exact sciences and medicine. They were
at that time trying to establish their relatively recent discipline in
the academy. In agreement with Durre, I would argue that they
mystified more than they explained, distorted more than they
understood and expounded more than they grasped. Feminists
need to take Durre’s critique of medical knowledge very seriously,

since this is an area in which women are often used as guinea
pigs. Local and traditional medical techniques, usually used by
women such as Daais, have been wrested from them by the
medical establishment, thus disempowering women. A great deal
of medical knowledge is contested and ideological but is presented
as the truth and Durre’s demystification of this highly respected
area is incisive and critical. Psychology has done a great deal of
harm in creating ever new categories of “mental illness’ and then
devising intervention strategies to “cure “ these illnesses and in the
process, it has capitalized on the knowledge created by
psychologists.
These processes are social, political and ideological and
the struggle of psychologists to become and remain a socially
influential group cannot be divorced from the way they practise
their discipline.
As regards the reading of Freud, I do have some
disagreements with Durre as I think that an alternative reading of
Freud can be very useful from a feminist perspective. I do, of
course, agree that one can take issue with a great deal of what
Freud argued and I disagree with several of his contentions. I
think it is difficult to completely agree or disagree with a theorist
who wrote a great deal, especially a great deal that was new at the
time it came out and was not received well because it challenged
the very basis of some of the most dearly held values of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I also think that it is
important to look at a theorist in the context of his time. Some of
Freud’s assertions not only shocked his contemporaries, they were
outraged and indignant.
The problem with an American view of Freud is that it
ignores the highly interesting observations of Freud on religion,
myth, symbol, the sacred and profane, the development of
thinking through human history and the hidden symbolic world of
meaning and desire. The mainstream view looks at Freud the
clinician, and not at Freud the soctologist/philosopher. I agree that
when it comes to therapy, Freud is at his weakest. It is when one
looks at his works on civilization, progress, religion and myth that
one comes across an intriguing, penetrating mind. I am not
Commentaries 191.
arguing that he is hundred percent right. I think his work is

thought-provoking and stimulating. Despite the very valid critique
of the concept of the unconscious in Durre’s appendix, I still think
that there are deeper layers of existence - suppressed, repressed
and subjugated layers of knowledge denied through history. I also
suspect that these deeper, hidden layers comprise the repressed
feminine. Perhaps, one reason that Freud was rebuked and reviled
by his contemporaries was that he was delving into forbidden
areas. He was speaking about the dark, musterious, hidden lands
which had been conquered and subjugated by patriarchy. These
lands comprised elements of the feminine and sexuality. When I
was at the university, Freud was forbidden knowledge. For one
thing, he talked about sexuality which was a taboo topic in our
society. Secondly, his postulates were considered too subjective
and not amenable to testing, verification, quantification and proof.
All the idologies of modern science were used to dismiss Freud. I
was taught learning theory and behaviourism because, as we were
then told, these theories easily lent themselves to testing,
experimentation and control.
I think feminists need to grapple with some of the issues
raised by Freud, especially because they have long been involved
in the nature versus nurture debate and have frequently tried to
avoid the intellectual sin of biological determinism. Denial of sex
differences seems to serve no purpose because differences are
obviously there. Freud’s thought can be helpful here because he
showed a way out of this dichotomous debate by commenting on
the ways in which bodily phenomena translate into psychic
experiences. In a sense, denial of Freud is a denial of the body, the
sensuous and the physical, in a world which privileges the mind
over body and separates the two. It appears to me that Freud did
not posit this Cartesian dualism. My reading is that he tried to
show the dialectical links between the mind and body through the
symbolic system. His focus seems to have been on trying to
understand how bodily instincts, desires and needs get translated
into psychic ‘structures’ or experiences of inferiority/superiority,
competence/incompetence, self/other. In these processes, the
structures of collective and individual meaning seem to play a
vital role. Freud offers a bridge between the body and mental life
and, as 2 medical practitioner, argues that psychic experiences do

arise in the body. Symbolic systems and knowledge (of the self
and the other) grow out of a knowledge of the body as the child
first begins to explore himself to try to understand his body and
its strange stirrings. Freud’s comments on how biological instincts
can be mutilated, articulated, destroyed, used, abused,
suppressed, repressed, sublimated and expressed in society are
intriguing and for feminists, they have the potential to help
understand how men came to be perceived as superior or how
women historically came to be regarded as inferior.
Another very important issue raised by Freud is, in my
opinion, important for feminists to deal with. This is the area of
gender identity. The subjective appropriation of identity must
have processes that should be very interesting for feminists to
study. Freud tried to understand these processes albeit with
limitations which he expressed in his very candid admission that
he found women hard to understand. Nevertheless, he argued that
there is no such thing as pure femininity and pure masculinity,
that these are theoretical constructions of uncertain content. He
was among the first to point out that these boundaries are
arbitrary and that no person completely fits the stereotype of the
masculine and the feminine. He was severely rebuked also for
observing that perhaps, all human beings are bisexual and have
all kinds of stirrings. The libido (basic sexual energy) is not
gendered even if, in the process of gender identity formation, it
becomes masculine and feminine. In this process, the external
world and one’s interaction with it are involved. I think it may be
a bit hasty to reject all his ideas and dismiss him without really
grappling with these issues.
Another dichotomy that Freud dissolved was the one
between ‘normal’ (read good) and ‘abnormal’ (read bad). He
regarded these as social constructions. The dissolution of strict,
either-or categories at a time when this form of thinking was
rampant, 1s remarkable especially because feminists criticise the
patriarchal world for being trapped in such hard and fast
distinctions.
Freud’s work on religion seems to be significant from a
feminist point of view. Freud understood religion as a masculiae,
°
Commentaries 193
_patriarchal, oedipal construction based on the abstract, distanced

and alienated male way of creating omnipotent, omniscient, all-
knowing, all-embracing, yet unknowable and unseen entities. For
him, monotheism derives its strength from the early infantile
helplessness, fear, insecurity and dependance on an absolute, all-
powerful father who was a provider even though he was also
punitive. The child projects his fantasies on to an abstract plane in
his adult life and recreates the image of the father in the form of
the heavenly father whose attributes are usually those that one
expects in the earthly father. The ideas of one God, one ruler, one
head of the family, appear to have a consistency which seems to
have gone from the particular to the universal, from the concrete
to the abstract. It is a masculine imperialist enterprise because the
male’s alienated relationship to nature, women and others is
universalized. This is an example of the universalization of
subjective experience, which can be dangerous when the
patriarchal state imposes this experience on everyone. As the state
takes on the attributes of a universal God, the citizens become
infantilized, immobilized, passive and feminized.
A very interesting analogy that Freud mentions is the one
between obsessional neurosis and religious mtuals. Obsessive
neurosis is based on the endless repetition of certain mechanical
acts which are performed for no apparent reason. They resemble
repetitive rituals in many ways. Once again, the sense of
helplessness and fear is overcome by means of magical, repetitive
acts designed to achieve goals that the person feels unable to
attain otherwise through the power of action. A sociological and
social understanding of the symbolic and meaning systems of
religion as a powerful human invention provides an understanding
of its historical roots and origin in human needs. Superstitions
also arise in human needs and desire and are, at least to an extent,
related to helplessness and powerlessness. When one has no
control or power. of decision over one’s life and_ being,
superstitions and magical acts can have a very comforting effect
by creating the illusion of control.
Religion is also an illusion that promises immortality in
the hereafter. In this sense, again I think, it represents the
masculine need to endlessly strive and go towards the goal of a
never-ending continuity (the myth of the hero as described by

Durre). Death is the only certainty and the human species is the
only one aware of its own ending. However, religion has
prevented men from coming to terms with death by promising a
paradise which contains very little that could attract women. As
one of the most powerful of human inventions, religion must be
studied and understood. But there should be a difference between
teaching religion as a subject, especially as comparative religion,
and preaching it as the truth. In schools and colleges, it is taught
as the one and only truth and I think that is a problem.
As I understand Freud, the Ego, the center of ‘rational’
activity, is an illusion, a secondary outgrowth of the basic
storehouse of libidinal energy. It derives its strength from the id as
it attempts to reconcile the demands of outer reality and the basic
instincts and desires that we are all born with. Both the Ego and
the Superego are secondary constructions and develop as a result
of the interaction of the human organism with its environment. As
the so-called Reality principle impinges on the organism’s deep
needs forcing it to realize that its instincts cannot get immediate
gratification, the Ego and the Superego develop to deal with the
conflict. However, the basic inner self, the id, is composed of all
the instincts, desires, needs and basic strivings. This is where
ambivalence comes from. The id operates on the pleasure
principle (associated with the feminine) while the ego operates on
the Reality principle which comes from the male dominated outer
environment. In a sense what this means is that the basic human
needs and strivings are feminine in nature which a masculine
consciousness has subjugated by imposing an illusion of
rationality on them. Freud was very sceptical of rationality and
believed that beneath the first layer of rationality lurks
irrationality and negative desire. He was equally sceptical of
modernity, progress and civilization and argued that the savage
exists in all of us.
I think that these observations of Freud are highly
significant for feminists because the id, which comprises
fundamental human instincts and needs, is neither masculine nor
rational. It is multiple, contradictory, ambivalent and multi-
layered. Feminists are arguing that reality is multiple,
Commentaries 195
contradictory and complex. The Freudian concept of the id can be

very useful in arguing that the world as we see it, is based on
masculine illusions of power and domination, rationality,
exactness, precision, technology, control and a unilinear vision.
The innermost layers of human consciousness are feminine.
Feminists should at least take a serious look at the possibilities
offered by Freud in his incisive reading of society, culture and
human beings. This does not mean that one should accept each
and every one of his ideas as absolute truth. I think Freud
deserves at least a serious reading, or rather re-reading to grapple
with the most intriguing of his notions.
The Freudian id is all the more interesting because it
contains contradictions, ironies, complexity, ambivalence and
forbidden desire. It is multi-sexual, diverse and contains conflict,
multiplicity, mixtures and overlaps. In this part, all dichotomies
are dissolved and no fixed categories exist. This layer of human
consciousness can be a rich source of feminist critique because it
represents a dark and mysterious world prior to the takeover by
patnarchy. In this concept, Freud dissolved some of the most
prevalent assumptions of nineteenth century epistemology such as
rationality, masculinity, individualism, the quest for certainty,
strict gender categories, absolute truth, either-or distinctions and
other myths. The idea that human beings have multiplicity and
complexity and are not either this or that has tremendous potential
for a feminist critique of mainstremam thought.
Another reason that I think Freud was heavily rebuked
lies in the fact that he attributed sexuality to children who had
hitherto been considered as innocent as angels. Furthermore, he
challenged the moral convictions of his time by questioning
whether human beings are fundamentally good. The idea that
good flows out of deep-lying ego-centric desires rather than
abstract altruistic motives was new when he outlined it. I think
Freud’s importance lies not so much in whether he was wrong, or
right because that is debatable. It lies in the fact that he
challenged many of the established notions and assumptions of his
time thereby forcing people to think. He stimulated debate.
Durre has shifted in her monograph between a
universalist rhetorical strategy such as ‘human nature has
remained essentially the same throughout history’ and the rhetoric

.of diversity and diference. Although one may argue that ‘diversity
can exist within a fundamental sameness, nevertheless it becomes
hard to take a position when someone alternates between the two.
If all humans are basically alike then why should the same
medicine not work for them? If human beings are essentially the
same how is women’s morality different from men’s? Carol
Gilligan’s book stimulated an interesting debate about whether or
not morality can be divided by sex. Is morality divisible? If so
how can we make a universalist argument that all human beings
are essentially alike? The judicial systems of the Pakistani state
have been based upon a divisible morality where different laws
are being, framed for men and women. Can this not lead to even
more oppression? Morality is based on the ideas of right and
wrong and it is a little problematic to believe that nght and wrong
are divisible on the basis of sex. Men and women are obviously
different but psychological differences can easily become
confused with biological differences and the conflation of morality
with biology can lead to racist notions such as ‘national
character’.
When cultural diversity and relativism are upheld ,
perhaps universal moral absolutes become problematic. When
universal absolutes are emphasized cultural and moral relativism
and diversity arguments valorizing the indigenous can lead to
many wrongs. The human nghts movement has recently gone
through this debate and feminsts have been arguing for some
basic moral , indivisible absolutes so that individual states or
communities may not use the diversity argument to oppress their
women. This is a difficult issue and one which cannot be resolved
easily. It needs a great deal of thinking as extreme moral
relativism can be very degenerate and can make it impossible to
have a politics or a position . The vacillation between the
thetorical strategies of universalism and diversity is problematic
and I feel has not been dealt with adequately. Perhaps this is an
area which feminists need to explore further.
If human beings never change and have been the same
since time immemorial all social movements are redundant.
Durre, of course, has a right to believe that we all live in an
Commentaries 197
Orwellian Animal Farm where nothing changes but for me as a

feminist there is a need for a politics of change and movement. If
one accepts a Dostyevskian despair and hopelessness that all
endeavour is futile, then there is no tendency toward life, JOY,
being and creativity. For Durre I understand that contemplation
and knowledge are equal to action. I think that this is true as the
difference would be between individual action and collective
action. Contemplation and meditation are individualized, personal
action for change. It is easy for the powerful elite classes to tell
the ordinary person that nothing is going to change because it
suits us to let things stay as they are. This rhetorical strategy in
itself reinforces the dominant conditions and as feminists we need
to explore this area more deeply.
Religion serves the important social function of
reconciling people to pain, loss and suffering. While this is the
positive side, the dark side is that it also tends to accommodate
people to the injustices of others which are the result of human
acts.It can take away the desire for action to change one’s social
conditions because everything appears to be pre-ordained and
unchangeable. For a feminist, or any social movement, this is
something to think about. This does not, of course, deny the fact
that religion has also throughout history acted as the basis of
resistance movements. On account of its contradictory aspects it
can be liberating as well as oppressive. Its liberating moments
cannot be denied. This is the reason that some feminists are
looking, to religion itself to find a source of opposition to male
hegamonic norms. While this may have its efficacy, I think it
would also mean treading on very dangerous ground. Since
everything, depends upon interpretation every interpretation can
lead to a counter interpretation an interpretation that is oppressive
and unjust.This, however, is true of all social movements,
_ religious or secular.
Durre’s argument that a religious argument should be
refuted by a more knowledgeable religious argument and not by a
secular or scientific one has some problems. While this may be a
valid notion the problem comes when one has to decide which
argument and whose argument can be considered to be the ‘more
knowledgeable’ one and the state imposes the one that it finds
most suitable for its own purposes. This is again where the danger
of exclusively valorising subjectivity comes in. If all
interpretations are indeed subjective then one could become ~
locked in endless battles of interpretation. What would then
constitute the criterion of acceptance of a particular interpretation
over another? Would it simply be the one that carries guns and
tanks behind it?
I would like to make a few comments in answer to
Durre’s preface. She asks why, if knowledge is power, the
modem intellectual feels so powerless in front of the religious
fundamentalist? In the mid-seventies and eighties the intellectuals
and citizens were not confronting the religious fanatic but raw
state power backed by the ideology of the fanatic. Guns and tanks
and the muscle of the nation-state are hard to fight even though
confronting them is necessary. The fanatic’s view was being
imposed from above by the powerful elite. It was not simply a
matter of the intellectual confronting the religious ideologue. One
cannot rule out the fact that state power was being used in the
service of the official interpretation of religion.
On the question of beauty, aesthetics and justice [ would
completely agree with Durre that the concerns of science cannot
be separated from those of art, aesthetics, beauty and
morality.Science must be responsible, accountable and resonate
with the morally uplifting power of beauty.
Finally I would like to make some comments on the
differences between the fundamentalist and the modemist that
Durre talks about. It seems very difficult to decide who is a
fundamentalist and who is a modern. Both categories are products
of the colonial encounter, each representing a different reaction to
colonial rule; the fundamentalist representing a complete rejection
of it in favour of a return to the early purity of Islam, the
modernist representing a compromise albeit an uncomfortable
one. The west has had a great deal to do with the creation of the
fundamentalist in the same way that it created the modem. Many
modems are very traditional and use indigenous remedies and
hikmat while there are fundamentalists who would trust no one
except the most modem medical practitioner. The alliance
between Pakistani fundamentalism and the Americans was
Commentaries 199
glaringly obvious during the Zia years when the west was
certainly not the enemy. Durre, of course, correctly points out that
both share the tendency towards fanaticism and a narrow world
view and that both are masculine responses. | think Durre is by
and large right that the fundamentalist is more ready to kill and
die for his beliefs, however I know many a Marxist modern who
equally believes in dying for or killing if the need arises. They do,
at some level, share a world of meaning. A hard and fast
distinction between the two appears to me to be very problematic.
Perhaps , precisely because reality is multiple and many layered
that several different categories of people exist and there is also
tremendous overlap. For example, most fundamentalists have a
very modern lifestyle and no hesitation in employing the most
modern western technology in furthering their aims. Many a
modern tums out to be a fundamentalist if one scratches the first
layer. The dichotomy does not seem to stand up to closer scrutiny.
In sum then I think this paper is extremely stimulating
and a must for all Pakistanis involved in movements and the
making of knowledge. It is especially important for male Pakistani
intellectuals but I think that many feminists also have a great deal
to gain from reading Durre’s thought-provoking paper. The issues
regarding universality versus cultural or moral diversity, a
problematic relativism versus universal moral absolutes, the
differentiation between the different strands of feminists and
moderns, the tendency towards the west versus the rest thinking
and an alternative reading of Freud, all need to be addressed by
feminists. I think Durre has started a very interesting debate. My
hope is that feminists will pick up on the debate and further it so
that this important effort can bear frutt.
A review of Durre S. Ahmed’s
by Tariq Banuri
A friend says that even when the rest of the world comes
to an end Pakistan will survive because “we are fifty years behind
everyone else.” For reasons that do not seem clear, Pakistam
social thought is stuck in a time warp from the 1030s. Virtually
the entire intellectual space is occupied by two supposedly
antithetical groups, the liberals and the fundamentalists. The
former borrow their ideas and categories uncritically from the
West, ideas that are becoming increasingly irrelevant in their
home environment, leave alone their resonance with Pakistani
realities. The latter are involved in the rather odd enterprise of
“Islamising” the same concerns and categories.
Along comes a brilliant monograph by Durre Ahmed,
which shows, inter alia, that contrary to their self-perception,
liberals and fundamentalists are fellow travelers sharing a
common project de societe, modemity; that this shared
perspective is being challenged and discarded even in the West
because of its reductionism, literalism, hyper-masculinism, and
propensity to structural violence; and that the roots of what is
being called the “post-modern” critique of modermity can be
traced to Jungian psychology, as well as recent writings of
Southem scholars. In passing, one could add that the monograph
' also shows that as long as Pakistan can produce ideas of this
quality, it is not dead intellectually.
Commentaries 201
Modernism and post-modernism
A civilization that cannot distinguish between reality and

illusion is said to be at the end of its existence. Modem society is
characterized precisely by such a disjuncture from reality. The
age of Reason that began in Westem Europe in the 17th century
in opposition to religious intolerance and governmental tyranny
has now created extreme forms of intolerance and oppression. But
Reason itself prevents us from recognizing this change.
Knowledge, which was to be the antidote to power, has become
enslaved to power. The ability to think freely, for which the
philosophers of the Enlightenment fought fiercely, has become
subject to control by real or imagined organizations, publishing
houses, media conglomerates, academic disciplines, and others.
Today, people do not “think”, experts do; and they do so
through the mediation of other experts. The production of thought
needs institutions that facilitate such mediation. Third World
societies, which often have difficulties in creating and sustaining
large organizations, find it difficult therefore to produce
“thought.” Memory, which is the only resistance against
oppression, has become expropriated by those who control the
production and dissemination of thought.
These observations are not orginal. A number of writers
-- Michel Foucault, Ivan Illich, Ashis Nandy, Paul Feyerabend,
Jit Uberoi, Frederique Apffel Margin, Stephen Marglin, Stephen
Toulmin, John Ralston Saul -- have identified the violence and
oppression inherent in the age of Reason. In Pakistan, besides
Durre Ahmed, Sara Suleri, Charles Amyad-Ali, Sohail
Inayatullah, Arshad Zaman and a few others have contributed to
this tradition. Critics and admirers have started referring to this
tradition as ‘post-modemism’, although some of the writers
contest the title being, applied to them.
A key insight in this literature is that the age of Reason
was founded, to use the words of John Ralston Saul, “upon an
essential misunderstanding -- that Reason constituted a moral
weapon, when in fact it was nothing more than a disinterested
administrative method.” Saul goes on to note that this method, or
structure, is “most easily controlled by those who feel themselves
to be free of the cumbersome weight of common sense and

humanism. Structure suits best those whose talents lie in
manipulation and who have a taste for power in its purer forms.”
Increasingly the world focuses not on understanding but on
solutions, even when the solutions produce greater problems than
what they try to solve. The search for solutions, however futile,
privileges the technocrat and the expert, unmoored from ethical or
social considerations, and disenfranchises the citizen.
Post-modemists focus on how people think, on the
production process of what passes for “thought”, on the
structures and institutions that validate, condition and constrain
the expression of ideas, and ultimately on the relationship between
knowledge and power in society. These writers come from diverse
academic backgrounds, including philosophy, history,
psychology, anthropology, theology, literature, economics,
political science, and even some natural sciences, but they tend to
take an inter-disciplinary approach towards the issues. What
unites them is not a single academic discipline or concern, but the
domination of a single system of knowledge over all others, and
the linkages of this system of knowledge with the overt systems of
manipulation and control.
Post-modernism is rebellion at the fringes of modemity. It
has brought such ideas into the discussion as symbolism, systems
(and hierarchies) of knowledge, knowledge production, the role of
commonsense, hermeneutics versus rationality. It is the
philosophical analog of relativity, which accepts the idea that
there is no universal truth, that truth is local and context-specific,
that reality is fragmented, that the other dimensions of humanity
(spirit, appetite, religiosity, passions, emotions) have as much of a
role as Reason, that the opposite of Reason is not Unreason but
reason with a small r. Post-modernism celebrates the blurring of
boundaries between disciplines, cultures, and nations. It includes
popular wniting that attempts to stimulate popular consciousness
and popular participation in the intellectual project, but also
writing that is highly esoteric and theoretical.
Post-modernism is a major philosophical movement in the
' world today, but there is little consciousness of the dynamics of
modernism or post-modernism in Pakistan. And even though it
Commentaries 203
may not be realised, the overt thinking of most people is

dominated by modernist assumptions of progress. Yet, the social
and political situation in Pakistan is most susceptible to post-
modernist explanations. Pakistan is a classic example of a society
that has lost the distinction between illusion and reality, but this
would not be obvious at all if one looked only at the social and
philosophical wntings in Pakistan. Within this context, a small
and unlikely alliance of post-modemist thinkers has evolved, of
whom Durre Ahmed 1s a significant contributor.
Perhaps the main reason for the paucity of post-modernist
writings in Pakistan 1s the awe with which a less industrialized
society views the success of industrialized, hence “rational”
societies. Another important reason is what can only be called a
silly debate between so-called liberals and fundamentalists. The
awe of the industrial world obscures from us not only the crisis of
that world, but also the roots of our own civilizational crisis. The
side debate provides an easy scapegoat for our crisis.
Liberals and fundamentalists
In this desolate intellectual milieu, along comes Durre

Ahmed’s monograph to carry us beyond frivolous arguments
between liberals and fundamentalists. Ahmed identifies the
underlying, assumptions of modernism, which function both as an
organizational framework and a theory of salvation. This exercise
reveals the underlying unity among modernists of different stripes,
today’s liberal or. fundamentalist, yesterday’s capitalist or
socialist. All are engaged in a quest for power devoid of
considerations of common sense and humanism, and are agreed
on the usurpation for an elite meritocracy the basic human right
of thinking, of judging, and of freedom.
In order to map the prevailing ‘modern sensibility’,
Ahmed has focussed on samples of three kinds of popular
writings: a book on Islam and modemity by Pervez Hoodhboy, a
regular column in the weekly The Friday Times, and a series of
articles in the monthly Herald. The selection represents particular
ways of modern thinking and the specific jargon that embodies’
such thought. The analysis, however, is not meant to refer to these
writers alone, but to a broad cross-section of intellectuals in

Pakistan of which these writers are able representatives. The goal
of the criticism is to challenge the assumptions that underlie the
construction of an objective, secular, exclusive knowledge system,
and the identities that are brought into play as a result.
Ahmed takes great pains to say that the aim of the book is
not to dispute Hoodbhoy’s views about science per se, but to
bring out the tendency to gloss over sticky areas and to present
material in such a way that only the positive side is highlighted.
Secondly, while science prides itself on its calm rationality, and
deplores the passionate and hysterical tone of religious “zealots”,
such calmness is thrown to the winds when the question of
religion comes in, or when the quasi-religious claims of science
(i.e., science as the liberator of humankind) are to be presented
and defended. This hysterical tone is quite evident in the
Hoodbhoy book.
In a similar vein, Ashis Nandy (Traditions, Tyrannies,
and Utopias, Delhi: OUP 1987: pp. 108-9) cites an essay by Paul
Feyerabend (The Strange Case of Astrology, in Science in a Free
Society, London: NLB 1978), in which the latter examines a joint
statement by 186 modem scientists, 18 of them Nobel laureates,
against astrology. Feyerabend, no lover of astrology himself,
shows that none of the 186 had studied astrology before attacking
it, and some, when contacted by journalists, were unashamed that
they knew nothing about it. That of course did not stop them from
passing judgement. Not only were they unwilling to apply their
scientific method to judge the claims of a competing system, they
did not stop to ask why they needed 186 signatures and not one
(as is the case in scientific writing) if the arguments were so good
and so conclusive. Nandy goes on to suggest that the 186
signatures were needed precisely to deny the principle of
reciprocity -- that if science claims the right to criticise other
systems, it should, at least, grant the same night to its own victims
to criticise science on the basis of the totality of human
experience. The 186 scientists were acting not as scientists but as
the high priests of a religious order.
In this sense, to focus on the supposed conflict between
religion and science is misleading and even farcical. All organized
Commentaries 205
faiths today seek their endorsement from science. Like modernity

itself, organized faiths have become devoid of morality, and share
the aim with the high priests of modernity of capturing state
power, and of manipulating and controlling the system. The style
of writing and argument of Pervez Hoodbhoy or the Thinker is
echoed only in the posturing of the so-called fundamentalist
thinkers. The only thing that is in retreat before the onslaught of
modern science is basic humanism, and the simple faith of
ordinary people. The struggle is not between science and religion,
but between intolerance and bigotry on one end, espoused by the
liberals and the fundamentalists alike, and between humility,
civility, and tolerance. What is in retreat before the onslaught of
modem science is not organised religion, but basic humanism and
the simple faith of ordinary people. Durre Ahmed’s monograph
does well to bring out these dimensions of modern thinking.
Similarly, on the other side, Ahmed differentiates between
Science with a capital S, which claims to be objective as well as
the means of salvation, and ordinary science, namely practice
based on commonsense. She proposes that by bringing knowledge
into the purview of ‘common’ individuals, they will be able to
then participate in knowledge-formation themselves as opposed to
being mere recipients of a legislating project. The mythologization
of science, and its alienation from any ethical foundation
endangers this small science as much as it endangers the everyday
religion of ordinary folks.
Ahmed uses the (‘post-Jungjan’) psychoanalytic model to
examine the underpinnings of ‘modemist rationality’ and
‘religious fundamentalism’ in Pakistan. However, this does lay
her open to the charge of internal inconsistency by relying on an
alternative approach that is itself steeped in the certainty of an
exclusivist and purist discipline, protestations of humility
notwithstanding. This enables the wniter to simulate authority for
herself by positing, psychoanalysis as some kind of superior and at
once more humble intervention, which is not entirely
distinguishable from the ‘monoliths’ that she criticises. The
danger is that many readers will see in this book yet another
theory of salvation.
While any selection would be subjective and therefore

open to criticism, I could not help feeling that Durre Ahmed’s
selection suffers from the same failing as Pervez Hoodbhoy’s in
the book analysed by the former. Pervez Hoodbhoy rejects a
relation between science and religion by analyzing a number of
rather poor specimens of writing that seek to demonstrate such a
connection. The writings selected by him, with one exception, can
be characterized neither as good science nor as good social or
religious philosophy. Many readers will question the choice of the
Hoodbhoy book, as well as the other pieces on the same grounds.
These can certainly not be taken as examples of the best that the
modernist mind, even the Pakistani modernist mind, can produce.
Finally, a question that comes through very clearly is how
a morally pluralistic society can also be truly and equitably
possible. But perhaps this should be the subject of the next book
by Durre Ahmed. j
By way of a summary
While the argument of this book will appeal to a broad

range of scholars and thinkers, it will have particular resonance
with those who have some familiarity with the current debate
between modemists and their critics, and some exposure to post-
Jungian thought. The monograph is addressed to those scientists
whose ‘modernist’ undertaking might perpetuate a
disenfranchising system of knowledge. There is a danger,
however, that scientists would focus not on the substance of the
message, but on methodological issues common to anti-
psychologistic natural sciences, namely sample selection,
definitional issues, and the like. This would be unfortunate, since
it would leave only people with a particular kind of educational
background, which may be a relatively closed circuit.
Many readers, steeped as they are in modernist thinking,
will find this to be a highly disturbing book. It is, in a way, an
attempt to strip away the only remaining source of certainty that
remains in the lives of the modernising elites in this country. If
Reason cannot be trusted either, then what is left? Some might be
able to take refuge in side arguments in order to miss the point in
Commentaries 207
the book. Knowing this particular audience, one would expect a

heated debate on why this particular sample was selected for
analysis; why such an esoteric style was adopted if the aim is to
restore common sense; what is meant by commonsense anyway
when there is not one but many commonsenses; who has given her
the authority to speak; who 1s she speaking for; is this monograph
an attempt to prevent others from enjoying the privileges available
to the author and her readers -- others who are not yet tainted by
modemity and must therefore remain in some arrested pastoral
space. These may be valid questions, but it would be unfortunate
if the debate were to focus on these rather than the central
message of the book, namely that modernity lacks the ability to be
self-critical, and indeed that its criticism of virtually any other
system is equally applicable to itself.
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Masculinity, Rationality, and Religion - A Feminist - Ahmed, Durre S - 1994 - Lahore, Pakistan - ASR Publications - 9789698217198 - Anna's Archive

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Masculinity, Rationality, and Religion - A Feminist - Ahmed, Durre S - 1994 - Lahore, Pakistan - ASR Publications - 9789698217198 - Anna's Archive

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CENTRAL CIRCULATION BOOKSTACK

When renewing by phone, write new due date below

First Published in 1994 by

This is Volume III of a six-volume Women’s Studies Journal Series.

All Copyrights with ASR Publications

ASR is grateful to Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) for

ISBN 969 8217 193

Cover by Durre Ahmed: “One and a Half” sculpture in terra cotta.

Printed by The Hoshruba Group, 141 V Defence Phase II, Lahore,

‘me ~~ —_— - ‘a ini c ;

Vi a (fe er New Ap Pemy

Dr. Durre Ahmed wrote the paper Masculinity, Rationality and

simple answer, then fundamentalism is certainly much more

challenge notions of objectivity and personal distance. “The

Nighat Said Khan

PART |] THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Case History 13

Theoretical Framework pip

PART II MODERNISM IN PAKISTAN

The Scientist as Saviour 49

PART IJ THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN

The Battle for Pakistan 95

Back To The Future 110

Commentary by Akbar Zaidi 175

Commentary by Rubina Saigol 182

Commentary by Tariq Banuri 200

Many of the ideas in this monograph were first presented at an

What I am not apologetic about however, is that while I

Chest beating is good for a personal catharsis perhaps,

intellectual impotence. The exercise does not pretend to offer

History may well be ending for Francis Fukuyama and other

apprehension if not fear. It will certainly not propose/analyze any

Unlike development, religious fundamentalism is a

Pakistani Muslim, etc. Nevertheless, the title demands some

That this is a partial definition, framed through the lens

fundamentalism as fanaticism. and to the extent that the English

As stated earlier, the paper will focus not so much on

Social Sciences in Pakistan

Before one gets sucked into the other debate of whether

Thus, concepts such as ‘western’, ‘fundamentalist’, will

As newspapers and magazine articles show, they include

...as being used here to include everyone who (1) has a

‘Modern’ will also include those who champion the idea

scientific analysis of the epistemology of modernism. This critique

METHODS AND SOURCES:

In the discipline of clinical psychology (or even

preferences, concerns. Even formulations such as E=mc?, tell us

The paper is divided into three parts. Part I sketches

I. “Our best hope in American strength and will .. to lead a

Z, David Landes, “Rethinking Development”, The New

3, Ahmed, Durre-Sameen; “Ethnic Politics and Collective

4. Banuri, Tariq; “Modernization and its Discontents” in

5) Vanguard Books, Lahore 1991.

6. Gumperz, J; Hymes, D. Directions in Socio-linguistics:

e Miller, George, Language and Communication,

Hall, Edward. Beyond Culture, N.Y. Anchor Books,

Sapir, Edward. Culture, Language and Personality. :

Giglioli, Pier Paolo, Language and Social Context,

Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth and Logic N.Y. Dover.

Bacich, John. A Little About Language Winnthrop.

Boulding, Kenneth, The Image, University of

Lacquer, T. Making Sex Body & Gender from the