1 Mark T. Drooks - State Bar No.

123561
mdrooks@birdmarella.com
2 BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
3 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-2561
4 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
5
S. Gale Dick (admitted pro hac vice)
6 Phoebe H. King (admitted pro hac vice)
Randall W. Bryer (admitted pro hac vice)
7 COHEN & GRESSER LLP
800 Third Avenue
8 New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 957-7600
9
Attorneys appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction
10 on behalf of Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin,
SAS Miraval Provence, SAS Familles Perrin, SAS
11 Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le
Domaine, and SAS Distilleries de la Riviera
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
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WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and CASE NO. 22STCV06081
16 MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California limited
liability company, NOTICE OF RULING RE NOUVEL
17 LLC’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
Plaintiffs, DISCOVERY RESPONSES
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vs. Assigned to Hon. Lia Martin
19 Dept.: 3
ANGELINA JOLIE, et. al., Date: March 4, 2024
20 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Defendants.
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RESERVATION NO.: 134640636368
22 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
Action Filed: February 17, 2022
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NOTICE OF RULING RE NOUVEL LLC’S MOTION TO COMPEL

1 TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on March 4, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 3 of the
3 above-captioned court, Cross-Complainant Nouvel LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery
4 Responses From Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence and SAS
5 Familles Perrin came on for hearing before the Honorable Lia Martin. Following argument, the
6 Court adopted without modification its [Tentative] Ruling denying Nouvel’s Motion to Compel.
7 A copy of the Court’s Minute Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A and a copy of the Court’s
8 [Tentative] Ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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DATED: March 5, 2024 Mark T. Drooks
10 BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
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13 By: /s/ Mark T. Drooks
Mark T. Drooks
14 Attorneys appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants Marc-
15 Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, SAS
16 Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et Domaines
Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine, and SAS Distilleries
17 de la Riviera

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3927884.1
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NOTICE OF RULING RE NOUVEL LLC’S MOTION TO COMPEL
EXHIBIT A

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 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Civil Division
Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 3

22STCV06081 March 4, 2024

WILLIAM B. PITT, et al. vs ANGELINA JOLIE, et al. 9:00 AM

Judge: Honorable Lia Martin CSR: Ingrid J. Saracione, CSR # 11960

Judicial Assistant: A. Cisneros ERM: None
Courtroom Assistant: V. Ponce Deputy Sheriff: None

APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff(s): Adam L. Goodman (Telephonic); Brandon Ross Teachout (Telephonic)
For Defendant(s): Randall W. Bryer (Telephonic); Justin C. Clarke (Telephonic); Daniel Nathan
Csillag (Telephonic) -- See additional appearances below.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

Request for Production Re: Personal Jurisdiction from Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin,
SAS Miraval Provence and SAS Familles Perrin; Filed by Deft/Cross-Complaint Nouvel, LLC;
(CRS #6368)

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter, Ingrid J. Saracione, CSR # 11960, as Official
Reporter Pro Tempore is signed by the Court and filed this date with the original forwarded to
the e-Court Scanning Unit.

Counsel appearing via LACourtConnect are e-mailed a copy of the Court's [Tentative] Ruling on
Cross-Complainant Nouvel LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for
Production re: Personal Jurisdiction by the Court Staff this date.

Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses Request for Production Re: Personal
Jurisdiction from Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence and SAS
Familles Perrin; Filed by Deft/Cross-Complaint Nouvel, LLC; (CRS #6368) is held and argued.

The Court adopts its [Tentative] Ruling on Cross-Complainant Nouvel LLC’s Motion to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production re: Personal Jurisdiction.

Nouvel’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Jurisdictional Discover from Perrin Cross-
Defendants is DENIED as fully reflected in the Court's Ruling on Cross-Complainant Nouvel
LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production re: Personal Jurisdiction
issued by the Court, signed by the Court, and filed this date with the original forwarded to the e-
Court Scanning Unit; also available for printing through the e-Court System.

Minute Order Page 1 of 2

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 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Civil Division
Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 3

22STCV06081 March 4, 2024

WILLIAM B. PITT, et al. vs ANGELINA JOLIE, et al. 9:00 AM

Judge: Honorable Lia Martin CSR: Ingrid J. Saracione, CSR # 11960

Judicial Assistant: A. Cisneros ERM: None
Courtroom Assistant: V. Ponce Deputy Sheriff: None

Specially appearing Perrin Cross-Defendants are to give notice and e-file proof of notice with the
Court.

Additional appearances for Defendant(s):

Mark T. Drooks (Telephonic)
Phoebe H. King and S. Gale Dick (Telephonic)
Jonathan Mooney (Telephonic)
Joedat Hani Tuffaha (Telephonic)

Minute Order Page 2 of 2

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EXHIBIT B

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 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 3

TENTATIVE RULING

WILLIAM B. PITT, ET AL., Case No.: 22STCV06081

Plaintiff [Tentative] Ruling on Cross-

Complainant Nouvel LLC’s Motion to
vs. Compel Further Responses to Requests
for Production re: Personal Jurisdiction
ANGELINA JOLIE, ET AL.,
Defendant Hearing Date: March 4, 2024

TO CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC, CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, CROSS-DEFENDATNS MARC-OLIVIER
PERRIN, SAS MIRAVAL PROVENCE AND SAS FAMILLES PERRIN AND
CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel LLC’s (“Nouvel”) operative cross-

complaint is the First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”) filed on August 9,
2023 against Plaintiffs Pitt and Mondo Bongo, Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, SAS
Families Perrin, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warrant Grant, SAS Petrichor,
Vins et Domaines Perrin SC, SAS Miraval Studios, SAS Le Domaine and SAS
Distilleries de La Riviera.

Nouvel’s FAXC alleges (1) tortious interference with contractual relations; (2)
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (3) tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage; (5) tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage; (6) breach of the duty of good faith; (7) trespass to chattels;
(8) abuse of right; (9) in the alternative, aiding and abetting tortious interference
with contractual relations; (10) in the alternative, aiding and abetting tortious
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interference with prospective economic advantage; and (11) civil conspiracy to
tortiously interfere with prospective economic advantage.

Cross-Complainant Nouvel LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to

Requests for Production

Nouvel moves to compel further responses from Cross-Defendants Marc-Oliver

Perrin, SAS Familles Perrin and SAS Mirval Provence (“Perrin Cross-
Defendants”) to Nouvel’s Requests for Production re: Personal Jurisdiction on
Perrin Cross-Defendants.

Meet and Confer

According to Nouvel LLC, parties engaged in telephonic meet and confer

discussions and were unable to reach an agreement regarding RFP Nos. 5, 10-12,
15, 17 and 23 (“Disputed RFPs”) or whether Nouvel LLC was required to proceed
under the Hague Convention due to the French Blocking Statute. (Mooney Dec.,
¶4.)

Moving party Counsel’s declaration fails to satisfy the declaration requirement

under CCP §2016.040. Counsel’s declaration was required to “state facts showing
a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue
presented by the motion.” (CCP §2106.040.) No details are provided as to what
was discussed, the parties’ positions, the outcome of the telephonic conferences,
the number of telephonic conferences or the dates of the telephonic conferences.

Perrin Cross-Defendants’ counsel confirms that parties met and conferred

regarding the requests for production, that the parties resolved any dispute as to the
scope of RFP Nos. 1-4, 6, 14, 16, 18-22 and 34, but they could not resolve their
dispute regarding the propriety of RFP Nos. 5, 10-12, 15, 17 and 23. (Dick Dec.,
¶3.) Perrin Cross-Defendants also confirm that the parties were unable to resolve
their differences regarding whether the French Blocking Statute required Nouvel to
conduct discovery in accordance with the Hague Convention.

The parties have sufficiently satisfied the meet and confer requirement. The
parties are at an impasse as to whether the French Blocking Statute should require
Nouvel LLC to proceed under the Hague Convention.

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Legal Standard on Motions to Compel Further Responses to RFPs

CCP § 2031.310
(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or
sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response
to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:
(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or
evasive.
(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.
(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following:
(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying
the discovery sought by the demand.
(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under
Section 2016.040.
(3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of
Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the
discovery request and each response in dispute.
(c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the
verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any
specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have
agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further
response to the demand.
… (h) Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party,
person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel
further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction
acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
of the sanction unjust.

Where a party is seeking to compel further responses to requests for

document production, the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to
the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (CCP §2031.310(b)(1);
Kirkland v. Supr. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (“Once good cause was shown,
the burden shifted to Kirkland to justify his objection”); Glenfed Develop. Corp. v.
Supr. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once good cause is established by
the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any
objections made to document disclosure. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42
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Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

A plaintiff is entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery in order “to develop the

facts necessary to sustain this burden” in response to a motion to quash. (Mihlon v.
Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.) A request to conduct
jurisdictional discovery may only be denied if there is no showing that discovery
would likely produce evidence of additional “contacts.” (Beckman v. Thompson
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 486–487.)

Legal Standard under Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S.

District Court for Southern District of of Iowa (“Aerospatiale”) for Application
of Hague Convention or Local Rules of Procedure

In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for Southern

District of of Iowa (“Aerospatiale”), 482 U.S. 522 (1987), the Supreme Court
clarified that the Hague Evidence Convention (“Hague Convention”) applied to a
request for information from a foreign national who was a party to federal
litigation in Iowa, that the Hague Convention was not mandatory or exclusive, that
the party seeking discovery was not required to proceed under the Hague
Convention as a first resort and that the Hague Convention was merely an
alternative to the civil procedure rules of the court where the litigation was filed.
(Aerospatiale, supra, 482 U.S. at 540, 542, 547.)

Thus, the Hague Convention and the court’s local civil procedure rules are both
options to conduct discovery on a foreign nation. (Id. at 547; American Home
Assurance Co. v Societe Commerciale Toutelectric (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 406,
426-427.) Whether the principles of international comity require application of the
Hague convention require a particularized analysis of the respective interests of the
foreign and requesting nations. Thus, to determine whether the Hague Convention
or local civil procedure rules should apply, the Court must balance several factors:
(1) the importance to the…litigation of the documents or other information
requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing
information; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
(Aerospatiale, supra, 482 U.S. at 544, fn 28.)

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In addition to the five factors specifically identified by the US Supreme Court in
Aerospatiale, the Ninth Circuit has also included two additional factors: (1) the
extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose
upon the person and (2) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the
state. (Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants (1992) 959 F.2d 1468,
1475.)

Applying Aerospatiale factors, the Hague Convention should apply

The party asserting that the Hague Convention should apply bears the burden of
persuasion on whether considerations of comity favor application of the Hague
Convention in a particular case. (American Home Assurance Co., supra, 104
Cal.App.4th 406, 427.) As such, Perrin Cross-Defendants must establish that the
factors articulated under Aerospatiale and Richmark Corp. balance in favor of
application of the Hague Convention.

(1) Importance to the…litigation of the documents or other information

requested

Nouvel is seeking jurisdictional discovery to establish the threshold issue of the

Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Perrin Cross-Defendants. For that reason
alone, the information requested is fundamental and important to the litigation.
Perrin Cross-Defendants argue that the information requested is not significant
because it does not go to the substantive issues raised by the litigation.

However, information need not go to the substantive issues raised by the litigation
in order to be “important.” Thus, in Richmark, post-judgment discovery into a
judgment debtor’s assets was deemed “crucial.” Procedural issues, like standing
and personal jurisdiction, are important precisely because they are fundamental and
litigation cannot proceed if they are absent. The outcome of this litigation therefor
“stands or falls” on the present discovery order. (Richmark Corp., supra, 959 F.2d
at 1475 (discovery relevant to execution of judgment is “crucial”).)

In opposition, Perrin Cross-Defendants point out that neither Aerospatiale nor any
other US Supreme Court or California Supreme Court case has determined that the
analysis of Aerospatiale applied to jurisdictional discovery. Aerospatiale involved
substantive discovery on foreign defendants who had already answered and
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submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. (Aerospatiale, supra, 482 U.S. at 522.)

While no United States Supreme Court case or California Supreme Court case has
applied Aerospatiale to jurisdictional discovery, the United States Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has done so. “We agree with the majority of trial courts'
decisions that there should be no exception to the Aerospatiale holding for
jurisdictional discovery.” (In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation,
358 F.3d 288, 302 (2004).)

As explained in Automotive, Aerospatiale’s holding was not based on the type of

discovery at issue and there is no basis to exempt jurisdictional discovery from its
scope. “[T]he distinction drawn by the appellants between “merits” discovery and
“jurisdictional” discovery, predicated on a false dichotomy of having and not
having jurisdiction, amounts to no real difference because the court has jurisdiction
for either type of discovery. The undisputed presence of personal jurisdiction in
Aerospatiale is, therefore, tangential to its holding and irrelevant to the issue of
whether Aerospatiale applies also to jurisdictional discovery.” (Id. at 303.) In
addition, the nature of jurisdictional discovery weighs in favor of applying
Aerospatiale to jurisdictional discovery. (Id. (narrow scope of jurisdictional
discovery would support rejection of “first resort” rule as to Hague Convention).)

This factor weighs against application of the Hague Convention and in favor
of disclosure under the CCP.

(2) Specificity of the Request.

“A second consideration in evaluating a discovery request is how burdensome it

will be to respond to that request. Generalized searches for information, the
disclosure of which is prohibited under foreign law, are discouraged.” (Richmark
Corp., supra, 959 F.2d at 1475.)

Theoretically, jurisdictional discovery should inherently be limited and specific but

like any discovery, it is subject to abuse. According to Perrin Cross-Defendants,
Nouvel’s jurisdictional discovery is overbroad, spanning six years and reaching far
beyond issues relevant to specific jurisdiction.

“The relevant time period for measuring the nature and quality of a nonresident
defendant's contacts with the forum for purposes of specific jurisdiction is at the
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time the plaintiff's cause of action arose.” (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair
& Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 226.) According to the allegations of
the FAXC, Pitt and Perrin Cross-Defendants conspired to take control of Miraval’s
wine business and interfere with Nouvel’s and Miraval’s interests after Jolie filed
for divorce in 2016. As such, the relevant time period of jurisdictional discovery
arguably extends back to 2016, eight years ago. The six-year time span is
therefore reasonable.

The jurisdictional discovery propounded by Nouvel is extremely broad and it is not

narrowly tailored. The issue is not whether the requests are “relevant” under CCP
§2017.010 but whether they are “specific” or “generalized” and the burden that
responding will be imposed on Perrin Cross-Defendants. Here, the jurisdictional
discovery is broad and generalized, and on that basis, responding fully to the
discovery would impose a significant burden.

This factor weighs in favor of applying the Hague Convention.

(3) Whether the information originated in the United States/Location of

information sought

“The fact that all the information to be disclosed (and the people who will be
deposed or who will produce the documents) are located in a foreign country
weighs against disclosure, since those people and documents are subject to the law
of that country in the ordinary course of business.” (Richmark Corp., supra, 959
F.2d at 1475.)

Perrin Cross-Defendants are undisputedly French residents and claim their

responsive documents are located in France. Nouvel’s only response is that some
of the responsive documents must have “originated in the United States.”
However, based on Richmark Corp., the relevant question is where the information
sought is located, as opposed to where it “originated.”

This factor weighs in favor of application of the Hague Convention.

(4) Availability of alternative means of securing information

“If the information sought can easily be obtained elsewhere, there is little or no
reason to require a party to violate foreign law. In this circuit [Third Circuit], the
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alternative means must be ‘substantially equivalent’ to the requested discovery.”
(Richmark Corp., supra, 959 F.2d at 1475.)

The Perrin Cross-Defendants argue Nouvel can obtain substantially the same
information through the Hague Convention as it may under the CCP. However,
based on the declaration of Quentin De Margerie, the information obtainable
through the Hague Convention or under French law would be far more limited than
that which is available under the CCP. (De Margerie Dec., ¶¶27-35.)

For example, De Margerie concedes that “general investigation measures that are
tantamount to ‘fishing expeditions’ are not allowed under French law. (Id. at ¶33.)
However, under California law, “fishing expeditions” are expressly authorized by
statute—i.e., the Discovery Act provides for discovery of matters “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP § 2017.010;
Gonzalez v. Sup.Ct. (City of San Fernando) (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

However, Nouvel need not go on a fishing expedition for jurisdictional discovery.

Nouvel is seeking discovery on the very limited issue of personal jurisdiction.
Based on De Margerie’s testimony regarding what is available, Nouvel will be able
to obtain document discovery on jurisdictional issues on a more limited scale than
under the CCP. (De Margerie Dec., ¶¶27-35.) Nouvel should be able to obtain
what is necessary to oppose the motion to quash or substantially the same evidence
under the Hague Convention.

This factor weighs in favor of the Hague Convention.

(5) The extent to which noncompliance with the request would

undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with
the request would undermine important interests of the state where the
information is located/Balancing of national interests

According to Richmark Corp., “[t]his is the most important factor. We must assess
the interests of each nation in requiring or prohibiting disclosure, and determine
whether disclosure would affect important substantive policies or interests” of
either the United States or France. (Richmark Corp., supra, 959 F.2d at 1476.)

Perrin Cross-Defendants rely heavily on the French Blocking Statute to establish

that this factor weighs in favor of applying the Hague Convention. The text of the
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Blocking Statute is as follows: “Subject to international treaties or agreements and
to the laws and regulations in force, it is forbidden for any person to request, seek,
or disclose, in writing, orally, or in any other form, documents or information of an
economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature aimed at the
constitution of evidence for or in connection with foreign judicial or administrative
proceedings.” (Mooney Dec., Ex. 2.)

The United States Supreme Court considered this same Blocking Statute in
Aerospatiale, as did the California Court of Appeals in American Home Assurance
Co. v. Societe Commerciale Toutelectric. As explained American Home Assurance
Co., the French Blocking Statute purportedly criminalizes discovery outside of the
Hague Convention. (American Home Assurance Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at
426.)

In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court found the Blocking Statute did not justify a
blanket requirement that the Hague Convention be the exclusive means to obtain
discovery from the foreign defendant or that it be the discovery procedure of first
resort. (Aerospatiale, supra, 482 U.S. at 544, fn 29.) “The blocking statute thus is
relevant to the court's particularized comity analysis only to the extent that its
terms and its enforcement identify the nature of the sovereign interests in
nondisclosure of specific kinds of material.” (Id.)

“When a state has jurisdiction to prescribe and its courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate, adjudication should (subject to generally applicable rules of evidence)
take place on the basis of the best information available. Blocking statutes that
frustrate this goal need not be given the same deference by courts of the United
States as substantive rules of law at variance with the law of the United States…On
the other hand, the degree of friction created by discovery requests and the
differing perceptions of the acceptability of American-style discovery under
national and international law, suggest some efforts to moderate the application
abroad of U.S. procedural techniques, consistent with the overall principle of
reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction.” (Id. (quoting Restatement, §437,
Reporter’s Note 5, pp. 41-42).)

In two letters from the Strategic Information and Economic Security Service
(“SSIE”), the SSIE informed Perrin that responding to the subject jurisdictional
discovery outside of the Hague Convention would violate the French Blocking
Statute, a penal law that carries with it a potential prison sentence of six months
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and a fine of $18,000 euros. (Dick Dec., Exs. 1 and 3.) The discovery in question
could trigger criminal prosecution of the Perrin Cross-Defendants. Although it
seems highly unlikely given that Cross-Defendants could only identify two such
instances, it is a consideration that weighs in favor of the Hague Convention. (De
Margerie Dec., ¶¶13-16.)

This is a significant factual distinction from the circumstances in both American

Home Assurance Co. and Aerospatiale. While defense counsel informed witnesses
in American Home Assurance Co. that they would be in violation of the Blocking
Statute if they testified, it does not appear from the opinion that they were ever
warned directly by the French government that doing so would violate the statute.
(American Home Assurance Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at 421.) Likewise, there
was no such direct warning from the French government in Aerospatiale.
(Aerospatiale, supra, 482 U.S. at 528, fn. 10.)

In addition, California’s interest in this dispute as to Perrin Cross-Defendants is

much more limited than the interest raised in Aerospatiale or American Home
Assurance. Aerospatiale involved a plane crash that occurred in Iowa and
accusations that the foreign defendants had manufactured and sold a defective
plane that caused personal injury. American Home Assurance involved a dispute
over performance bonds issued by an American company to a Florida corporation
wholly owned by a French corporation. The bond was issued for construction in
California.

Here, Nouvel is allegedly no longer owned by a California resident but remains a

California LLC. Nouvel is allegedly now a holding company for European assets.
(Dick Dec., Ex. 4, p. 11.) There are no public safety issues involved in this action
as there were in Aerospatiale. The dispute is also focused entirely on the
ownership, sale and management of Miraval, which is located in France. The
matter is a civil matter, not a criminal matter.

In addition, the discovery in question is jurisdictional discovery. The Court

jurisdiction over the Perrin Cross-Defendants has not been established or
conceded. This is another significant fact that distinguishes this case from
Aerospatiale and American Home Assurance. The Court’s interest in allowing all-
out discovery in the context of personal jurisdictional discovery is less than its
interest in cases where personal jurisdiction, a threshold issue, is conceded and the
discovery pertains to substantive issues or post-judgment issues.
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This factor weighs in favor of applying the Hague Convention.

(6) Extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent

enforcement would impose upon the person

If Perrin Cross-Defendants were likely to face criminal prosecution in France for

complying with this Court’s order, this would weigh against disclosure under the
CCP. (Richmark Corp., supra, 959 F.2d at 1477.) Perrin Cross-Defendants would
be exposed to potential criminal prosecution. Even if the likelihood is low, the
SSIE has expressly warned Perrin Cross-Defendants that responding to the
discovery outside of the Hague Convention would be a violation of the Blocking
Statute and that it is “essential to use…the Hague Convention.” (Dick Dec., Exs. 1
and 3.) Certainly, disclosure would not be entirely without any potential
consequence.

This factor weighs in favor of applying the Hague Convention.

(7) Likelihood of compliance/Extent to which enforcement by action of

either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by the state

“If a discovery order is likely to be unenforceable, and therefore to have no

practical effect, that factor counsels against requiring compliance with the order.”
(Richmark Corp., supra, 959 F.2d at 1478.) Here, there is no indication that Perrin
Cross-Defendants would refuse to comply with a discovery order under the CCP,
or that the order would be unenforceable for any other reason. Thus far, Perrin
Cross-Defendants have participated in the meet and confer attempts in good faith
and reached agreement with Nouvel on the Agreed Requests.

This factor weighs does not weigh in favor of application of the Hague
Convention.

Conclusion

Balancing the Aerospatiale factors, Nouvel should proceed with jurisdictional

discovery under the Hague Convention. While the requested jurisdictional
discovery is important to this litigation, all other factors weigh in favor of applying
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the Hague Convention.

Accordingly, Nouvel’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Jurisdictional

Discover from Perrin Cross-Defendants is DENIED.

Specially appearing Perrin Cross-Defendants are to give notice.

[It is so ordered.]

Dated: March 4, 2024

______________________
Hon. Lia Martin
Judge of the Superior Court

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 1 PROOF OF SERVICE

2 William B. Pitt, et al. v Angelina Jolie, et al.

Case No. 22STCV06081
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1875 Century
Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561.
6
On March 5, 2024, I served the following document(s) described as NOTICE OF
7 RULING RE NOUVEL LLC’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY
RESPONSES on the interested parties in this action as follows:
8
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
9
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be
10 sent from e-mail address dthrockmorton@birdmarella.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses
listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any
11 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
12 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
13
Executed on March 5, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.
14
15
16 /s/ Debra Lynn Throckmorton
Debra Lynn Throckmorton
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3927884.1
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PROOF OF SERVICE
1 SERVICE LIST
William B. Pitt, et al. v Angelina Jolie, et al.
2 Case No. 22STCV06081

3 Laura Brill Jonathan M. Moses

Katelyn A. Kuwata Adam L. Goodman
4 Daniel Barlava Remy Grosbard
KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP Jessica L. Allen
5 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
Suite 1725 51 West 52nd Street
6 Los Angeles, CA 90067 New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (310) 556-2700 Telephone: (212) 403-1000
7 Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com Email: JMMoses@wlrk.com
Email: kkuwata@kbkfirm.com Email: ALGoodman@wlrk.com
8 Email: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com Email: JLAllen@wlrk.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross- Email: RKGrosbard@wlrk.com
9 Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross- Defendants
Bongo, LLC, Cross-Defendant Warren William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC, Cross-
10 Grant, and appearing specially to Defendant Warren Grant, and appearing
challenge jurisdiction on behalf of Cross- specially to challenge jurisdiction on behalf of
11 Defendants Roland Venturini and Gary Cross-Defendants Roland Venturini and Gary
Bradbury Bradbury
12
Paul D. Murphy Joe Tuffaha
13 Daniel N. Csillag Prashanth Chennakesavan
MURPHY ROSEN LLP LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
14 100 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1300 300 South Grand Ave., Ste. 1400
Santa Monica, CA 90401 Los Angeles, CA 90071
15 Telephone: (310) 899-3300 Telephone: (213) 612-8900
Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com Email: joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com
16 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com Email: prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Counsel for Defendant and Cross-Complainant
17 Complainant Angelina Jolie Nouvel, LLC and appearing specially to
challenge service and jurisdiction on behalf of
18 Defendants SPI Group Holding Ltd., Tenute del
Mondo B.V., Yuri Shefler, and Alexey Oliynik
19
Keith R. Hummel John V. Berlinski
20 Justin C. Clarke BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT,
Jonathan Mooney NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG &
21 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP RHOW, P.C.
Worldwide Plaza 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
22 825 Eighth Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90067
New York, NY 10019 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
23 Telephone: (212) 474-1000 Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
Email: khummel@cravath.com Email: jberlinski@birdmarella.com
24 Email: jcclarke@cravath.com Email: BTeachout@birdmarella.com
Email: jmooney@cravath.com Email: jcherlow@birdmarella.com
25 Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Email: Kmeyer@birdmarella.com
Complainant Nouvel, LLC and appearing Email: Pyates@birdmarella.com
26 specially to challenge service and Email: RAttarson@birdmarella.com
jurisdiction on behalf of Defendants SPI Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
27 Group Holding Ltd., Tenute del Mondo William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC and
B.V., Yuri Shefler, and Alexey Oliynik Cross-Defendant Warren Grant
28

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PROOF OF SERVICE