Attorneys For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC: Declaration of Jonathan Mooney

1 KEITH R.
HUMMEL (admitted pro hac vice)

khummel@cravath.com
2 JUSTIN C. CLARKE (admitted pro hac vice)
jcclarke@cravath.com
3
JONATHAN MOONEY (admitted pro hac vice)
4 jmooney@cravath.com
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
5 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
6 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
7
8 JOE H. TUFFAHA (Bar No. 253723)

joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com
9 PRASHANTH CHENNAKESAVAN (Bar No. 284022)
prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
10 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
11 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3950
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3426
12 Telephone: (213) 612-8900
Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
13
Attorneys for Defendant and
14 Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC
15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
16 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
17 WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and Case No. 22STCV06081
MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California
18 limited liability company, DECLARATION OF JONATHAN
MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-
19 COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S
Plaintiffs,
20 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
vs. DISCOVERY RESPONSES RE:
21 JURISDICTION FROM CROSS-
ANGELINA JOLIE, an individual, and DEFENDANTS MARC-OLIVIER
22 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited PERRIN, SAS MIRAVAL PROVENCE
liability company, YURI SHEFLER, an AND SAS FAMILLES PERRIN
23 individual, ALEXEY OLIYNIK, an
individual, SPI GROUP HOLDING Filed concurrently with Motion to Compel,
24
LIMITED, a Cyprus private limited Request for Judicial Notice, Declaration of
25 company, and TENUTE DEL MONDO Thomas Heintz, Separate Statement, and
B.V., a Netherlands private limited Proposed Order
26 company,
Judge: Hon. Lia Martin
27 Defendants. Dept.: 16
28
DECLARATION OF JONATHAN MOONEY

1 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited Date: March 4, 2024
liability company, Time: 9:00 a.m.
2
Cross-Complainant,
Reservation No.: 134640636368
3 vs.
4 WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, Action Filed: February 17, 2022
MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California Trial Date: None set.
5 limited liability company, MARC-
OLIVIER PERRIN, an individual, SAS
6
MIRAVAL PROVENCE, a French limited
7 liability company, SAS FAMILLES
PERRIN, a French limited liability
8 company, ROLAND VENTURINI, an
individual, GARY BRADBURY, an
9 individual, WARREN GRANT, an
10 individual, SAS PETRICHOR, a French
limited liability company; VINS ET
11 DOMAINES PERRIN SC, a French
company; SAS MIRAVAL STUDIOS, a
12 French limited liability company; SASU
LE DOMAINE, a French limited liability
13 company; SAS DISTILLERIES DE LA
14 RIVIERA, a French limited liability
company, and ROES 1-10.
15
Cross-Defendants.
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1 I, Jonathan Mooney, declare as follows:
2 1. I am an attorney at the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP and counsel of
3 record for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC (“Nouvel”). I am a member in good
4 standing of the State Bar of New York, and I have been admitted pro hac vice before this Court. I
5 have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances set forth below and if called as a witness,
6 I could and would competently testify thereto.
7 2. Nouvel filed its First Amended Cross Complaint (“FACC”) on August 9, 2023.
8 Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin
9 (collectively the “Perrin Cross-Defendants”) moved to quash Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-
10 Complaint on September 20, 2023. Nouvel served its First Set of Requests for Production Re:
11 Jurisdiction on Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles
12 Perrin on September 28, 2023. The Perrin Cross Defendants served Responses and Objections to
13 Nouvel’s Requests for Production on October 30, 2023. This declaration is submitted in support
14 of Nouvel’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery re: Jurisdiction from the Perrin Cross-
15 Defendants.
16 3. In their verified Responses and Objections to Defendant and Cross-Complaining
17 Nouvel, LLC’s Second Set of Special Interrogatories, served on November 14, 2023, Plaintiffs
18 and Cross-Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC state that “Mr. Perrin raised the
19 provisional transfer” of three shares in SAS Miraval Provence from SAS Chateau Miraval to SAS
20 Familles Perrin “with Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Pitt was supportive”. They further state: “The objective
21 of the provisional transfer undertaken by Château Miraval and Familles Perrin was to insulate the
22 Miraval Provence business from, among other things, the threat of deadlock at Château Miraval as
23 a result of Angelina Jolie’s purported sale of Nouvel to Yuri Shefler and Tenute del Mondo B.V.,
24 an affiliate of the Stoli Group. Such deadlock could, in turn, cause a deadlock at Miraval
25 Provence’s level, which would undermine business operations at, necessary investments in, and
26 dividend distributions from Miraval Provence. The provisional transfer was also taken to prevent
27 the risk of a hostile takeover of the business”. Although the Responses and Objections are
28

1 designated confidential, Pitt and Mondo Bongo confirmed by email on January 19, 2023, that they
2 do not contend that the above statements are confidential.
3 4. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 2016.040, prior to filing this
4 motion, the parties engaged in telephonic meet and confer discussions and were unable to reach an
5 agreement regarding RFPs Nos. 5, 10-12, 15, 17 and 23, and whether the Perrin Cross-
6 Defendants’ objection that the French Blocking Statue prevents them from producing documents
7 unless a letter of request is served pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.
8 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Responses and
9 Objections to Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Request for
10 Production re: Personal Jurisdiction served on October 30, 2023 by the Perrin Cross-Defendants.
11 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of French Law No. 68-678
12 of July 26, 1968 on the Disclosure of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical
13 Documents and Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons and its certified English
14 translation.
15 7. Attached here to as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Convention on the
16 Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of March 18, 1970 (“The Hague
17 Evidence Convention”).
18 8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a criminal judgment of
19 the French Court of Cassation, Criminal Division captioned Cour de cassation, criminelle,
20 Chambre criminelle, 12 décembre 2007, 07-83.228 and its certified English translation.
21 9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of a judgment from the Paris
22 Court of Appeals, Division 1, Chamber 1 captioned Cour d’appel, Paris, Pôle 1, chambre 1, 9
23 Novembre 2010 – n° 10/08413 and its certified English translation.
24 10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of an order from the French
25 Judicial Court, Saint-Etienne, First Civil Division captioned Tribunal judiciaire, Saint-Étienne, 1re
26 chambre civile, 5 Octobre 2020 – n° 20/01884 and its certified English translation.
27 11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of French Code of Civil
28 Procedure, Article 745, and its certified English translation.
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1 12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of Nouvel’s First-Amended
2 Cross-Complaint.
3 13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of an email chain concerning
4 meet and confer correspondence between Counsel for Nouvel, LLC and Counsel for the Perrin
5 Cross-Defendants.
6 14. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of Nouvel’s First Set of
7 Request for Production re Jurisdiction to the Perrin Cross-Defendants.
8 15. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of the French Republic’s
9 declaration under Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention, as well as the statement made by
10 the French Republic concerning that declaration in 1987.
11 16. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of the Report on Survey of
12 Experience of U.S. Lawyers with the Hague Evidence Convention Letter of Request Procedures
13 by the International Litigation Committee Section of International Law & Practice (SILP)
14 American Bar Association dated October 9, 2003.
15 17. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of a document titled
16 “France - Central Authority (Art. 2) and practical information” from the website of the Hague
17 Conference on Private International Law.
18 18. Attached here to as Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of Decree No. 2022-207 of
19 February 18, 2022, on the Disclosure of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical
20 Documents and Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons (“Decree No. 2022-207 of
21 Feb. 18, 2022”) and its certified English translation.
22 19. Attached hereto as Exhibit 15 is a true and correct copy of the Order of October 25,
23 2023, of Judge Lia Martin Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents in
24 Response to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production to Defendant Yuri Shefler Re:
25 Personal Jurisdiction.
26 20. Attached hereto as Exhibit 16 is a true and correct copy of the subpoenas served on
27 Mondo Bongo, LLC, William B. Pitt, and Warren Grant pursuant to Nouvel’s Ex Parte
28 Application for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
-3-
1 21. Attached hereto as Exhibit 17 is a true and correct copy of correspondence between
2 Adam Goodman (counsel for Pitt, Mondo Bongo, and Grant) and Jonathan Mooney (counsel for
3 Nouvel, LLC) regarding the § 1782 production, which was made in 2022.
4 22. Attached hereto as Exhibit 18 is a true and correct copy of the Declaration of
5 Thomas Heintz dated January 22, 2024 .
7 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
8 foregoing is true and correct.
9 Executed on January 22, 2024, in New York, NY, USA.
10
11 /s/ Jonathan Mooney
12 Jonathan Mooney
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EXHIBIT 1
1 Mark T. Drooks - State Bar No. 123561
mdrooks@birdmarella.com
2 BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,
DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.
3 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-2561
4 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
5
S. Gale Dick (admitted pro hac vice)
6 Phoebe H. King (admitted pro hac vice)
Randall W. Bryer (admitted pro hac vice)
7 COHEN & GRESSER LLP
800 Third Avenue
8 New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 957-7600
9
10 Attorneys appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
11 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
SAS Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et
12 Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine, and
SAS Distilleries de la Riviera
13
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
14
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
15
16
WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and CASE NO. 22STCV06081
17 MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California
limited liability company, CROSS-DEFENDANT MARC-
18 OLIVIER PERRIN’S RESPONSES
Plaintiffs, AND OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT
19 AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT
vs. NOUVEL, LLC’S FIRST SET OF
20 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE:
ANGELINA JOLIE, et. al., PERSONAL JURISDICTION
21
Defendants. Assigned to Hon. Lia Martin
22 Dept. 16
23 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS Action Filed: February 17, 2022
24 PROPOUNDING PARTY: DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT
25 NOUVEL, LLC
26 RESPONDING PARTY: CROSS-DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN
27 SET NO.: ONE
28
CROSS-DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN’S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO NOUVEL, LLC’S

FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
1 Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2031.210, et seq., and without
2 waiver of the jurisdictional objections set forth in Specially Appearing Cross-Defendants
3 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin’s Motion to (1)
4 Quash for lack of Personal Jurisdiction; and (2) Dismiss or Stay for Forum Non
5 Conveniens, specially appearing Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin (“Perrin”), by and
6 through his attorneys, submits the following responses and objections to the First Set of
7 Requests for Production Regarding Personal Jurisdiction propounded by Defendant and
8 Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC (“Nouvel”) (together, the “Requests” and each a
9 “Request”).
10 I
11 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
12 California law requires that jurisdictional discovery be narrowly tailored “to lead to
13 the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” In re Auto. Antitrust Cases I
14 & II, 135 Cal. App. 4th 100, 127 (2005). Discovery requests based on “purely speculative
15 allegations of attenuated jurisdictional contacts” are improper. See Getz v. Boeing Co.,
16 654 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011). So are sweeping requests seeking communications with
17 California residents: such emails “d[o] not create an affiliation between [the non-resident]
18 and California.” Sec. Alarm Fin. Enterprises, L.P. v. Nebel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 976, 986
19 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Perrin will not respond to Requests that are not within the permissible
20 scope of jurisdictional discovery.
21 Article 1bis of the Loi de Blocage (“French Blocking Statute”), forbids Perrin from
22 communicating “in writing, orally or in any other form, documents or information of an
23 economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature with a view to constituting
24 evidence for or in connection with foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.” Article
25 1bis of Law No. 68-678. France enacted the French Blocking Statute in order to render
26 compliance with the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
27 Commercial Matters mandatory and prohibit foreign fishing expeditions, which the French
28 government perceives to be contrary to French public order. Art. 145 of the French Civil
2
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
1 Procedural Code. Failure to comply with the French Blocking Statute can result in
2 criminal penalties. Perrin will not produce information in contravention of the French
3 Blocking Statute. Subject to the General and Specific Objections below, Perrin will
4 produce documents in response to requests propounded through the procedures set forth by
5 the French Blocking Statute.
6 These Request responses, while based on diligent factual exploration by Perrin and
7 his counsel, reflect only Perrin’s current state of knowledge, understanding, and belief with
8 regard to the matters about which inquiry has been made. Without in any way obligating
9 himself to do so, Perrin reserves the right to modify or supplement his responses with such
10 pertinent information as he may subsequently discover.
11 Perrin is willing to meet and confer with Nouvel regarding these responses and
12 objections.
13 II
14 GENERAL OBJECTIONS
15 The General Objections (“General Objections”), unless otherwise stated, apply to
16 each Request, definition, and instruction propounded by Nouvel, and these General
17 Objections are incorporated by reference as though set forth in full in the specific
18 responses. These General Objections are neither waived nor limited by the specific
19 responses.
20 1. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they purport, or may be
21 construed, to impose on Perrin burdens and/or obligations beyond those imposed by
22 applicable provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the local rules, the case
23 law interpreting each of them, or any other pertinent orders of this Court.
24 2. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they are not likely to lead to the
25 production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction over Perrin.
26 3. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they purport to require disclosure
27 of information that is not relevant to the subject matter of Specially Appearing Cross-
28 Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin’s
3
1 Motion to (1) Quash for lack of Personal Jurisdiction; and (2) Dismiss or Stay for Forum
2 Non Conveniens or any contacts with California relating to the subject matter of Nouvel’s
3 claims.
4 4. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they seek information in violation
5 of the French Blocking Statute.
6 5. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they seek the production of
7 information that is obtainable from some other source or discovery device that is more
8 convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Perrin thus objects to each Request to the
9 extent it seeks production of documents that are (a) already within Nouvel’s possession,
10 custody, or control; (b) not reasonably accessible; (c) available from public sources; or (d)
11 obtainable from other sources, including California residents who are parties to this
12 litigation, in a more convenient, less burdensome, and/or less expensive manner than
13 seeking them through the Requests.
14 6. Perrin objects to the Requests as unduly burdensome, duplicative, and not
15 proportional to the needs of the case to the extent they call for disclosure of information
16 that Perrin has agreed to provide in response to Nouvel’s First Set of Special
17 Interrogatories to Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin Re: Personal Jurisdiction.
18 7. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they seek the production of
19 documents or communications that: (a) constitute work product; (b) were prepared in
20 anticipation of or in connection with litigation; (c) disclose the mental impressions,
21 conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of attorneys; (d) contain privileged attorney-client
22 communications; (e) are otherwise protected from disclosure under any other applicable
23 privilege, doctrine, or immunity, as set forth in the California Code of Civil Procedure,
24 common law, the Constitutions of the United States or the State of California, and/or any
25 other applicable statute or rule; or (f) are documents that Perrin is precluded by law or
26 court order from disclosing. Perrin will not intentionally produce any such documents.
27 Any disclosure of any privileged or otherwise protected information shall be deemed
28 inadvertent and shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege, doctrine, or immunity.
4
1 8. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they are vague, ambiguous,
2 overbroad, oppressive, and unduly burdensome.
3 9. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they seek information, which, if
4 disclosed, would invade the privacy rights of Perrin and/or third parties. Perrin objects to
5 the Requests to the extent they seek documents or information protected from disclosure as
6 being competitively sensitive or a trade secret, seek other confidential business or
7 proprietary information, or seek confidential and private information disclosure of which
8 would constitute improper invasion of the right to privacy under the common law, or as set
9 forth in Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. All objections on the grounds of
10 constitutional and common law privacy rights are expressly preserved.
11 10. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they purport or may be construed
12 to call for Perrin to collect, organize, or report information, or otherwise create or produce
13 information not within Perrin’s possession, custody, or control.
14 11. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they require disclosure of
15 information not within Perrin’s individual possession, custody, or control. Perrin will not
16 provide information that should properly and directly be sought from any other party.
17 12. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent they require Perrin to form a legal
18 conclusion to provide a response.
19 13. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent there is any dispute about
20 whether Perrin falls within the definition of “Designating Party” in the Stipulation and
21 Protective Order dated December 9, 2022 (“Protective Order”). To the extent that there is
22 a dispute regarding the scope of the Protective Order, Perrin will not produce documents
23 unless and until the Court enters an appropriate protective order.
24 14. Perrin objects to the Requests to the extent that they seek information that is
25 not relevant to the subject matter of this action and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
26 discovery of admissible evidence in violation of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2017.010.
27 15. The fact that Perrin has responded to a particular Request shall not be
28 interpreted as implying either that responsive documents exist or that Perrin acknowledges
5
1 the propriety of that Request. Nor should it be taken as an admission or acceptance of the
2 existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such Request, or that such responses and
3 objections constitute admissible evidence.
4 16. The production of any document shall not constitute a waiver of any
5 applicable objection.
6 III
7 OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS
8 17. Perrin objects to the “Definitions” set forth in the Requests to the extent
9 they: (a) seek to impose duties or obligations on Perrin beyond those imposed by the
10 California Rules of Civil Procedure, local rules, and any applicable orders of this Court;
11 (b) are neither authorized by, nor comply with, the California Rules of Civil Procedure,
12 Local Rules, or any applicable orders of this Court; (c) call for information or documents
13 that are not proportional to the needs of the case or that unduly burden Perrin; (d) seek
14 information neither known to Perrin nor readily obtainable by Perrin through reasonable
15 inquiry; or (e) seek information that is available to Nouvel through less burdensome means
16 of discovery.
17 18. Perrin objects to Definition No. 1 (regarding the relevant time period) as
18 overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
19 jurisdictionally relevant information to the extent it seeks documents that have been
20 created in connection with this litigation, which are overwhelmingly, if not exclusively,
21 attorney-client privileged and/or protected by the work product doctrine. For the purposes
22 of his Responses to these Requests, Perrin will construe the relevant time period to be
23 January 1, 2013 to February 17, 2022, the date on which this action commenced. Perrin
24 does not intend to log any documents created after October 5, 2021.
25 19. Perrin objects to Definition No. 2 (“Affiliate”) as overbroad, unduly
26 burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of jurisdictionally
27 relevant or admissible information to the extent it purports to define “Affiliate” to include
28 all Persons who “control”, are “controlled by”, or are “under common control with” the
6
1 referenced Person. Perrin also objects to the definition on the grounds that it is vague and
2 ambiguous; in particular, the term “control” is vague and ambiguous.
3 20. Perrin objects to Definition No. 7 (“Document(s)”) as overbroad, unduly
5 relevant or admissible information to the extent it purports to expand the definition beyond
6 that recognized by California law and to the extent it seeks to require Perrin to provide
7 information regarding documents not within his possession, custody, and control and to the
8 extent it seeks to require Perrin to translate documents in foreign languages.
9 21. Perrin objects to Definition No. 8 (“Equity Investee”) as overbroad, unduly
11 relevant or admissible information. Perrin also objects to the definition on the grounds that
12 it is vague and ambiguous; in particular, the term “similar interest” is vague and
13 ambiguous. For the purposes of his Responses to these Requests, Perrin will construe a
14 reference to Equity Investee to mean a Person with an ownership interest.
15 22. Perrin objects to Definition No. 26 (“Person” or “Persons”) as overbroad,
16 unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
17 jurisdictionally relevant or admissible information to the extent it purports to define
18 “Person” or “Persons” to include “present and former employees, agents, or
19 representatives”; “present and former attorneys, accountants, or advisors”; “any
20 professional employed or retained” by such Person; “any entity over which [such Person]
21 exercises control”; and “any other Persons acting or purporting to act on [such Person’s]
22 behalf”. For the purposes of his Responses to these Requests, Perrin will construe a
23 reference to a natural person to refer to that Person in their individual capacity. Perrin will
24 construe a reference to a business, legal, or governmental entity or association to refer to
25 that business, legal, or governmental entity or association and its employees.
26 23. Perrin objects to Definition No. 29 (“You” and “Your”) as overbroad, unduly
28 relevant or admissible information. For the purposes of his Responses to these Requests,
7
1 Perrin will construe a reference to “You” or “Your” to mean Perrin in his individual
2 capacity.
3 IV
4 OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS
5 24. Perrin objects to the “Instructions” set forth in the Requests to the extent
6 they: (a) seek to impose duties or obligations on Perrin beyond those imposed by the
7 California Rules of Civil Procedure, local rules, and any applicable orders of this Court;
8 (b) are neither authorized by, nor comply with, the California Rules of Civil Procedure,
9 Local Rules, or any applicable orders of this Court; (c) call for information or documents
10 that are not within the scope of jurisdictional discovery or that unduly burden Perrin; (d)
11 seek information neither known to Perrin nor readily obtainable by Perrin through
12 reasonable inquiry; or (e) seek information that is available to Nouvel through less
13 burdensome means of discovery.
14 25. Perrin objects to Instruction No. 3 as overbroad and unduly burdensome to
15 the extent it requires Perrin to search for and produce documents that are not reasonably
16 accessible to Perrin.
17 V
18 RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
19 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:
20 All Documents and Communications concerning any visits or trips You or any of
21 Your agents or representatives made to the State of California that in any way concerned
22 Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
23 Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de
24 Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
25 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:
26 In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Perrin objects to this Request to the
27 extent it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the production of documents that relate to
28 any contacts by Perrin with the State of California relating to the subject matter of Nouvel’s
8
1 claims. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it prematurely and improperly
2 seeks merits discovery from a specially appearing non-resident defendant who has
3 challenged jurisdiction. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
4 information in violation of the French Blocking Statute. Perrin also objects to this Request
5 as overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it seeks documents and communications
6 that are already in Nouvel’s possession or could be obtained from a more convenient and
7 less expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request as overbroad and unduly
8 burdensome because it seeks “[a]ll Documents and Communications” when a subset of such
9 materials would suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents
10 regarding the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any other party.
11 Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by any
12 privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the
13 work product doctrine.
15 All Documents and Communications concerning any visits or trips You or any of
16 Your agents or representatives made to the State of California to meet with Mr. Pitt,
17 Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their agents,
18 representatives, or Affiliates.
22 any contacts by Perrin with the State of California relating to the subject matter of
23 Nouvel’s claims. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it prematurely and
24 improperly seeks merits discovery from a specially appearing non-resident defendant who
25 has challenged jurisdiction. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
9
2 burdensome because it seeks “[a]ll Documents and Communications” when a subset of
3 such materials would suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
4 information protected by any privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the
5 attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
7 All Documents and Communications, including records of any telephone calls or
8 video calls, concerning any Communications between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et
9 Domaines Perrin, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees,
10 including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios,
11 Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any of Your or their agents or representatives,
12 on the one hand, and any Person located in the State California, on the other hand,
13 concerning Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their
14 subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval,
15 Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
26 less expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it requires Perrin to
27 speculate about another Person’s location. Perrin also objects to this Request as overbroad
28 and unduly burdensome because it seeks “[a]ll Documents and Communications” when a
10
1 subset of such materials would suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it
2 seeks documents regarding the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any
3 other party. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected
4 by any privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege
5 and the work product doctrine.
8 video calls, concerning any Communications between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et
9 Domaines Perrin, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees,
11 Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any of their agents or representatives, on the
12 one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of
13 their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the other hand.
26 such materials would suffice and insofar as it seeks, without limitation as to nexus, all
27 communications between the listed individuals. Perrin also objects to this Request to the
28 extent it seeks documents regarding the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction
11
1 over any other party. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
2 protected by any privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client
3 privilege and the work product doctrine.
5 All Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, arrangements, or
6 understandings, oral or in writing, between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin,
7 or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
8 Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or
9 Distilleries de la Rivera, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms.
10 Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their Affiliates, on the other hand.
23 such materials would suffice and insofar as it seeks, without limitation as to nexus, all
24 “contracts, arrangements, or understandings” between the listed individuals. Perrin also
25 objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents regarding the Court’s authority to
26 exercise personal jurisdiction over any other party. Perrin also objects to this Request on
27 the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous; in particular, the terms “arrangements” and
28 “understandings” are vague and ambiguous. Perrin also objects to this Request to the
12
1 extent it seeks information protected by any privilege or immunity, including, without
2 limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
4 All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel
5 of any of the acts or transactions alleged in the Second Amended Complaint or the First
6 Amended Cross-Complaint.
20 documents regarding the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any other
21 party. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by
22 any privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and
23 the work product doctrine.
25 All Documents and Communications concerning (1) any obligations, including
26 indemnification obligations, that You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or any of
27 Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence,
28 SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries
13
1 de la Rivera owe to; or (2) any rights, including indemnification rights, that You, Familles
2 Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
3 Investees, including Miraval Provence, Fleur de Miraval, SCEA Miraval, Petrichor,
4 Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera have against Mr. Pitt, Mondo
5 Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates.
18 such materials would suffice and insofar as it seeks, without limitation as to nexus,
19 information regarding “any obligations” owed and “any rights” against the listed
20 individuals. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents regarding
21 the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any other party. Perrin also
22 objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by any privilege or
23 immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the work product
24 doctrine.
26 All Documents and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance
27 to, or contribution to, any directive, order or request made from California by Mr. Pitt,
28 Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located
14
1 in the State of California to Mr. Venturini or Mr. Bradbury concerning Nouvel, Quimicum,
2 Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including
3 Miraval Provence, Fleur de Miraval, SCEA Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
4 Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
20 other party. Perrin also objects to this Request on the grounds that it is vague and
21 ambiguous; in particular, the terms “contribution”, “directive”, “order”, and “request” are
22 vague and ambiguous. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
27 to, or contribution to, any action, Communication, order, directive, or request made from
28 California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or
15
1 Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California in connection with efforts or
2 plans to control, direct, supervise, or oversee Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their
3 subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval,
4 Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or
5 any of their presidents, managers, officers, or directors.
21 other party. Perrin also objects to this Request on the grounds that it is vague and
22 ambiguous; in particular, the terms “directive”, “order”, and “request” are vague and
23 ambiguous. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected
28 to, or contribution to, any actual or contemplated efforts in the State of California by Mr.
16
1 Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person in
2 the State of California to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising,
3 overseeing, governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of
4 Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees,
6 Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
26 All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement or participation
27 by You or any of Your agents, representatives, or Affiliates in responding to any request,
28 including any request for information, made by Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning
17
1 Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees,
2 including Miraval Provence, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval,
3 Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
18 party. Perrin also objects to this Request on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous; in
19 particular, the terms “involvement”, “assistance”, and “contribution” and the phrase “any
20 request, including any request for information” are vague and ambiguous. Perrin also
21 objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by any privilege or
22 immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the work product
23 doctrine.
26 to, or contribution to any actual or contemplated actions in or Communications from the
27 State of California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or
28 of their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of
18
1 California relating to the payment, or lack thereof, of dividends from Chateau Miraval or
2 Quimicum.
23 to, or contribution to any actual or contemplated efforts in the State of California by Mr.
24 Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives,
25 or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California to renovate, to oversee or
26 supervise renovations to, to make improvements to, to oversee or supervise improvements
27 to, to make additions to, or to oversee or supervise any additions to the Chateau Miraval
28 Estate or to any buildings, constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate.
19
20 All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of
21 any actual or contemplated renovations, improvements to, or additions to the Chateau
22 Miraval Estate, or to any buildings, constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate, on
23 Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
20
12 All Document and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance to,
13 or contribution to any action, Communication, order, direction, or request made by Mr.
14 Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives,
15 or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California concerning the shareholder
16 deadlock at Quimicum, the appointment of directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of
17 directors of Chateau Miraval.
21
9 All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of the
10 shareholder deadlock at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie and Nouvel.
27 All Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements,
28 arrangements, or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et
22
1 Domaines Perrin, Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval
2 Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo
3 Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates,
4 or any Person located in the State of California, on the other hand, concerning Nouvel,
5 Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or
6 Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor,
7 Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any intellectual property
8 currently or previously owned by Chateau Miraval.
23
1 video calls, concerning any Communications between You or any of Your agents or
2 representatives and any Person located in the State of California concerning (1) the Long-
3 Term Trademark License Agreement between Chateau Miraval and Miraval Provence and
4 any amendments thereto; (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any
5 intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles Perrin charges Miraval
6 Provence for bottling; (4) the creation or registration of any entity whose legal or trade
7 name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of Chateau Miraval’s
8 assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la
9 Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their
10 subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees hold an equity interest.
24
2 All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel
3 of (1) the Long-Term Trademark License Agreement between Chateau Miraval and
4 Miraval Provence and any amendments thereto; (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or
5 registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles
6 Perrin charges Miraval Provence for bottling; (4) the creation or registration of any entity
7 whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of
8 Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine,
9 Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any
10 of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees hold an equity interest.
28
25
2 All Documents and Communications concerning the registration of any trademark
3 in the United States that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval”
4 or a similar word.
19 party. Perrin also objects to this Request on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous; in
20 particular, the phrase “or a similar word” is vague and ambiguous. Perrin also objects to
21 this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by any privilege or immunity,
22 including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
24 All Documents and Communications concerning any financial payments, transfers,
25 or transactions between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Provence,
27 de la Rivera, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, on the one
28 hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, or their
26
1 agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the other hand.
20 All Documents and Communications concerning any financial payments, transfers,
21 or transactions between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Provence,
23 de la Rivera, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, on the one
24 hand, and any Person located in the State of California, on the other hand, related to
25 Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or any of their subsidiaries,
26 Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de
28
27
20 All Documents and Communications concerning the reduction of Chateau
21 Miraval’s ownership interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by
22 the reduction in the number of shares in Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from
23 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
28
14 All Documents and Communications concerning the distribution agreement
15 between Miraval Provence and Campari Group and its effect on Nouvel.
29
6 All Documents and Communications concerning any negotiations with Ms. Jolie
7 that reflect contacts with California concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and
8 Chateau Miraval.
27 / / /
28 / / /
30
2 All drafts of agreements with Ms. Jolie concerning the sale of her interest in
3 Quimicum and Chateau Miraval.
15 burdensome because it seeks “[a]ll” Documents when a subset of such materials would
16 suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by
21 to, or contribution to any action, Communication, order, direction, or request concerning
22 shareholder loans or other financial contributions made by Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Jolie, or
23 Nouvel to Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their Affiliates, subsidiaries, or Equity
24 Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor,
25 Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
31
16 Documents sufficient to identify all businesses or any Affiliates thereof in which
17 You have an equity interest that distribute wine produced by Chateau Miraval or its
18 subsidiaries and are incorporated or headquartered in the State of California.
23 Nouvel’s claims. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information in
24 violation of the French Blocking Statute. Perrin also objects to this Request as overbroad
25 and unduly burdensome to the extent it seeks documents and communications that are
26 already in Nouvel’s possession or could be obtained from a more convenient and less
27 expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents
28 regarding the Court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any other party.
32
1 Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by any
2 privilege or immunity, including, without limitation, the attorney-client privilege and the
3 work product doctrine.
5 All Documents and Communications concerning Your business activities in
6 California.
15 expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request as overbroad and unduly burdensome
16 because it seeks “[a]ll Documents and Communications” when a subset of such materials
17 would suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
21 All Documents that You have signed that contain a forum-selection clause
22 subjecting You to the jurisdiction of a California court.
33
3 expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
7 All Documents and Communications concerning any voluntary appearance You
8 made at a court proceeding in California.
17 seeks information protected by any privilege or immunity, including, without limitation,
18 the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
20 All Documents and Communications concerning any real estate or other physical or
21 intangible assets located in California that You have or held an interest in, and/or own or
22 owned individually, or through an Equity Investee.
34
2 subset of such materials would suffice. Perrin also objects to this Request on the grounds
3 that it is vague and ambiguous; in particular, the phrase “an interest in” is vague and
4 ambiguous. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected
7 Subject to the foregoing General and Specific Objections, Perrin states that has
8 never personally owned property in California.
10 All Documents and Communications concerning any bank accounts in California in
11 which You have or had an interest and/or owned, individually, or through an Equity
12 Investee, at any time between October 2012 and the present.
15 extent it is not reasonably calculated to reasonably calculated to lead to the production of
16 documents that relate to any contacts by Perrin with the State of California relating to the
17 subject matter of Nouvel’s claims. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
19 as overbroad and unduly burdensome because it seeks “[a]ll Documents and
20 Communications” when a subset of such materials would suffice. Perrin also objects to
21 this Request on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous; in particular, the term “an
22 interest” is vague and ambiguous. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
25 Subject to the foregoing General and Specific Objections, Perrin states that he did
26 not personally own any bank accounts in California during the relevant time period, as
27 limited by Perrin’s objections in Objection 18.
28
35
2 All Documents and Communications You intend to rely upon in support of Your
3 motion to quash filed on September 20, 2023.
5 In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Perrin objects to this Request as
6 overbroad and unduly burdensome to the extent it seeks documents and communications
8 less expensive source. Perrin also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
11 Subject to the foregoing General and Specific Objections, Perrin refers Nouvel to
12 his declaration dated February 16, 2023, filed concurrently with Specially Appearing
13 Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin’s
14 Motion to (1) Quash for lack of Personal Jurisdiction; and (2) Dismiss or Stay for Forum
15 Non Conveniens.
16 DATED: October 30, 2023 Mark T. Drooks
BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT,
17 NESSIM,
18 DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.
19 S. Gale Dick (admitted pro hac vice)

Phoebe H. King (admitted pro hac vice)
20 Randall W. Bryer (admitted pro hac vice)
COHEN & GRESSER LLP
21
22
23 By: /s/ Mark T. Drooks
Mark T. Drooks
24 Attorneys appearing specially to challenge
25 jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
26 SAS Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et
27 Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine, and
SAS Distilleries de la Riviera
28
36
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 William B. Pitt, et al. v Angelina Jolie, et al.
Case No. 22STCV06081
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I
5 am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is
1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561.
6
On October 30, 2023, I served the following document(s) described as CROSS-
7 DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN’S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S FIRST SET OF
8 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION on the
interested parties in this action as follows:
9
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
10
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s)
11 to be sent from e-mail address mhicks@birdmarella.com to the persons at the e-mail
addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
12 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
13
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
15 Executed on October 30, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.
16
17
18 Michelle M. Hicks
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
1 SERVICE LIST
William B. Pitt, et al. v Angelina Jolie, et al.
2 Case No. 22STCV06081
3 Laura Brill Paul D. Murphy
Katelyn A. Kuwata Daniel N. Csillag
4 Daniel Barlava MURPHY ROSEN LLP
Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP 100 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1300
5 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Santa Monica, CA 90401
Suite 1725 Telephone: (310) 899-3300
6 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4013 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com
Telephone: (310) 556-2700 Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com
7 Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com Counsel for Defendant and Cross-
Email: KKuwata@kbkfirm.com Complainant Angelina Jolie
8 Email: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross-
9 Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo
Bongo, LLC, Cross-Defendant Warren
10 grant, and appearing specially to
challenge jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-
11 Defendants Roland Venturini and Gary
Bradbury
12
13 Jonathan M. Moses Joe Tuffaha
Jessica L. Allen Prashanth Chennakesavan
14 Adam L. Goodman LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
Remy Grosbard 300 South Grand Ave., Ste. 1400
15 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ Los Angeles, CA 90071
51 West 52nd Street Telephone: (213) 612-8900
16 New York, NY 10019 Email: joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com
Telephone: (212) 403-1000 Email:
17 Email: JMMoses@wlrk.com prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Email: JLAllen@wlrk.com Counsel for Defendant and Cross-
18 Email: ALGoodman@wlrk.com Complainant Nouvel, LLC and appearing
Email: RKGrosbard@wlrk.com specially to challenge service and
19 Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross- jurisdiction on behalf of Defendants SPI
Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo Group Holding Ltd., Tenute del Mondo
20 Bongo, LLC, Cross-Defendant Warren B.V., Yuri Shefler and Alexey Oliynik
Grant, and appearing specially to
21 challenge jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-
Defendants Roland Venturini and Gary
22 Bradbury
23
24
25
26
27
28
38
1 Keith R. Hummel John V. Berlinski
Justin C. Clarke Brandon R. Teachout
2 Jonathan Mooney Julia B. Cherlow
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP Kim A. Meyer
3 Worldwide Plaza Paula S. Yates
825 Eighth Avenue Rebecca Attarson
4 New York, NY 10019 Paralegal
Telephone: (212) 474-1000 Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim,
5 Email: khummel@cravath.com Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.
Email: jcclarke@cravath.com 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
6 Email: jmooney@cravath.com Los Angeles, CA 90067
Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Email: JBerlinski@birdmarella.com
7 Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Email: BTeachout@birdmarella.com
appearing specially to challenge service Email: jcherlow@birdmarella.com
8 and jurisdiction on behalf of Defendants Email: KMeyer@birdmarella.com
SPI Group Holding Ltd., Tenute del Email: PYates@birdmarella.com
9 Mondo B.V., Yuri Shefler and Alexey Email: RAttarson@birdmarella.com
Oliynik Counsel for Plaintiffs and Cross-
10 Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo
Bongo, LLC and Cross-Defendant
11 Warren Grant
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
39
EXHIBIT 2
1/11/24, 12:23 PM Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, on the disclosure of documents and information of an economic, commercial, i...
FRENCH
REPUBLIC
Légifrance
The public service for the dissemination of law
Liberty
Equality
Brotherhood
Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, on the disclosure of economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical documents and information to foreign natural or legal persons
🛈🛈 Last update of this text: January 1, 2002
Version effective as of January 11, 2024
Article 1 Modified by Law 80-538 1980-07-16 Art. 2 I JORF [Official

Journal of the French Republic] July 17, 1980
Subject to international treaties or agreements, it is forbidden for any natural person of French nationality or habitually resident on French
territory, and for any director, representative, agent, or official of a legal person having its registered office or place of business in France,
to disclose in writing, orally or in any other form, in any place whatsoever, to foreign public authorities, documents or information of an
economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature, the disclosure of which is likely to undermine France’s sovereignty,
security, essential economic interests or public policy, as specified by the administrative authority insofar as necessary.
Article 1 bis Introduced by Law 80-538 1980-07-16 Art. 2 II JORF

July 17, 1980
Subject to international treaties or agreements and to the laws and regulations in force, it is forbidden for any person to request, seek, or
disclose, in writing, orally, or in any other form, documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical
nature aimed at the constitution of evidence for or in connection with foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.
Article 2 Modified by Law 80-538 1980-07-16 Art. 3 JORF July 17, 1980
The people referred to in Articles 1 and 1 bis are required to promptly inform the competent minister of any request they receive
concerning such disclosures.
Article 3
Without Modified by Order no. 2000-916 of September 19, 2000 - art. 3 (V) JORF September 22, 2000, effective January 1, 2002
prejudice to any stricter penalties provided for by law, any breach of the provisions of Articles 1 and 1 bis of this law shall be punishable by
six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 18,000 euros, or by only one of these two penalties.
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000501326 1/1
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EXHIBIT 3
20. CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS1
(Concluded 18 March 1970)
The States signatory to the present Convention,

Desiring to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request and to further the
accommodation of the different methods which they use for this purpose,
Desiring to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the following provisions –
CHAPTER I – LETTERS OF REQUEST
Article 1
In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a Contracting State may, in accordance with the
provisions of the law of that State, request the competent authority of another Contracting State, by
means of a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some other judicial act.
A Letter shall not be used to obtain evidence which is not intended for use in judicial proceedings,
commenced or contemplated.
The expression "other judicial act" does not cover the service of judicial documents or the issuance of
any process by which judgments or orders are executed or enforced, or orders for provisional or
protective measures.
Article 2
A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive Letters of Request
coming from a judicial authority of another Contracting State and to transmit them to the authority
competent to execute them. Each State shall organise the Central Authority in accordance with its own
law.
Letters shall be sent to the Central Authority of the State of execution without being transmitted through
any other authority of that State.
Article 3
A Letter of Request shall specify –

a) the authority requesting its execution and the authority requested to execute it, if known to the
requesting authority;
b) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings and their representatives, if any;
c) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is required, giving all necessary information
in regard thereto;
d) the evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed.
1
This Convention, including related materials, is accessible on the website of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (www.hcch.net), under “Conventions” or under the “Evidence Section”. For the full history of the
Convention, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, Actes et documents de la Onzième session
(1968), Tome IV, Obtention des preuves (219 pp.).
Where appropriate, the Letter shall specify, inter alia –
e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined;
f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a statement of the subject-matter about
which they are to be examined;
g) the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected;
h) any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirmation, and any special form to
be used;
i) any special method or procedure to be followed under Article 9.
A Letter may also mention any information necessary for the application of Article 11.
No legalisation or other like formality may be required.
Article 4
A Letter of Request shall be in the language of the authority requested to execute it or be accompanied
by a translation into that language.
Nevertheless, a Contracting State shall accept a Letter in either English or French, or a translation into
one of these languages, unless it has made the reservation authorised by Article 33.
A Contracting State which has more than one official language and cannot, for reasons of internal law,
accept Letters in one of these languages for the whole of its territory, shall, by declaration, specify the
language in which the Letter or translation thereof shall be expressed for execution in the specified parts
of its territory. In case of failure to comply with this declaration, without justifiable excuse, the costs of
translation into the required language shall be borne by the State of origin.
A Contracting State may, by declaration, specify the language or languages other than those referred to
in the preceding paragraphs, in which a Letter may be sent to its Central Authority.
Any translation accompanying a Letter shall be certified as correct, either by a diplomatic officer or
consular agent or by a sworn translator or by any other person so authorised in either State.
Article 5
If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply with the provisions of the present
Convention, it shall promptly inform the authority of the State of origin which transmitted the Letter of
Request, specifying the objections to the Letter.
Article 6
If the authority to whom a Letter of Request has been transmitted is not competent to execute it, the
Letter shall be sent forthwith to the authority in the same State which is competent to execute it in
accordance with the provisions of its own law.
Article 7
The requesting authority shall, if it so desires, be informed of the time when, and the place where, the
proceedings will take place, in order that the parties concerned, and their representatives, if any, may
be present. This information shall be sent directly to the parties or their representatives when the
authority of the State of origin so requests.
Article 8
A Contracting State may declare that members of the judicial personnel of the requesting authority of
another Contracting State may be present at the execution of a Letter of Request. Prior authorisation by
the competent authority designated by the declaring State may be required.
Article 9
The judicial authority which executes a Letter of Request shall apply its own law as to the methods and
procedures to be followed.
However, it will follow a request of the requesting authority that a special method or procedure be
followed, unless this is incompatible with the internal law of the State of execution or is impossible of
performance by reason of its internal practice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties.
A Letter of Request shall be executed expeditiously.
Article 10
In executing a Letter of Request the requested authority shall apply the appropriate measures of
compulsion in the instances and to the same extent as are provided by its internal law for the execution
of orders issued by the authorities of its own country or of requests made by parties in internal
proceedings.
Article 11
In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as
he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence –
a) under the law of the State of execution; or
b) under the law of the State of origin, and the privilege or duty has been specified in the Letter, or,
at the instance of the requested authority, has been otherwise confirmed to that authority by the
requesting authority.
A Contracting State may declare that, in addition, it will respect privileges and duties existing under the
law of States other than the State of origin and the State of execution, to the extent specified in that
declaration.
Article 12
The execution of a Letter of Request may be refused only to the extent that –
a) in the State of execution the execution of the Letter does not fall within the functions of the
judiciary; or
b) the State addressed considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced thereby.
Execution may not be refused solely on the ground that under its internal law the State of execution
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not admit
a right of action on it.
Article 13
The documents establishing the execution of the Letter of Request shall be sent by the requested
authority to the requesting authority by the same channel which was used by the latter.
In every instance where the Letter is not executed in whole or in part, the requesting authority shall be
informed immediately through the same channel and advised of the reasons.
Article 14
The execution of the Letter of Request shall not give rise to any reimbursement of taxes or costs of any
nature.
Nevertheless, the State of execution has the right to require the State of origin to reimburse the fees
paid to experts and interpreters and the costs occasioned by the use of a special procedure requested
by the State of origin under Article 9, paragraph 2.
The requested authority whose law obliges the parties themselves to secure evidence, and which is not
able itself to execute the Letter, may, after having obtained the consent of the requesting authority,
appoint a suitable person to do so. When seeking this consent the requested authority shall indicate the
approximate costs which would result from this procedure. If the requesting authority gives its consent it
shall reimburse any costs incurred; without such consent the requesting authority shall not be liable for
the costs.
CHAPTER II – TAKING OF EVIDENCE BY DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS, CONSULAR AGENTS AND COMMISSIONERS
Article 15
In a civil or commercial matter, a diplomatic officer or consular agent of a Contracting State may, in the
territory of another Contracting State and within the area where he exercises his functions, take the
evidence without compulsion of nationals of a State which he represents in aid of proceedings
commenced in the courts of a State which he represents.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken by a diplomatic officer or consular agent
only if permission to that effect is given upon application made by him or on his behalf to the appropriate
authority designated by the declaring State.
Article 16
A diplomatic officer or consular agent of a Contracting State may, in the territory of another Contracting
State and within the area where he exercises his functions, also take the evidence, without compulsion,
of nationals of the State in which he exercises his functions or of a third State, in aid of proceedings
commenced in the courts of a State which he represents, if –
a) a competent authority designated by the State in which he exercises his functions has given its
permission either generally or in the particular case, and
b) he complies with the conditions which the competent authority has specified in the permission.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken under this Article without its prior
permission.
Article 17
In a civil or commercial matter, a person duly appointed as a commissioner for the purpose may, without
compulsion, take evidence in the territory of a Contracting State in aid of proceedings commenced in the
courts of another Contracting State if –
a) a competent authority designated by the State where the evidence is to be taken has given its
permission either generally or in the particular case; and
b) he complies with the conditions which the competent authority has specified in the permission.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken under this Article without its prior
permission.
Article 18
A Contracting State may declare that a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner authorised to
take evidence under Articles 15, 16 or 17, may apply to the competent authority designated by the
declaring State for appropriate assistance to obtain the evidence by compulsion. The declaration may
contain such conditions as the declaring State may see fit to impose.
If the authority grants the application it shall apply any measures of compulsion which are appropriate
and are prescribed by its law for use in internal proceedings.
Article 19
The competent authority, in giving the permission referred to in Articles 15, 16 or 17, or in granting the
application referred to in Article 18, may lay down such conditions as it deems fit, inter alia, as to the
time and place of the taking of the evidence. Similarly it may require that it be given reasonable advance
notice of the time, date and place of the taking of the evidence; in such a case a representative of the
authority shall be entitled to be present at the taking of the evidence.
Article 20
In the taking of evidence under any Article of this Chapter persons concerned may be legally
represented.
Article 21
Where a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner is authorised under Articles 15, 16 or 17 to
take evidence –
a) he may take all kinds of evidence which are not incompatible with the law of the State where the
evidence is taken or contrary to any permission granted pursuant to the above Articles, and shall
have power within such limits to administer an oath or take an affirmation;
b) a request to a person to appear or to give evidence shall, unless the recipient is a national of the
State where the action is pending, be drawn up in the language of the place where the evidence
is taken or be accompanied by a translation into such language;
c) the request shall inform the person that he may be legally represented and, in any State that has
not filed a declaration under Article 18, shall also inform him that he is not compelled to appear or
to give evidence;
d) the evidence may be taken in the manner provided by the law applicable to the court in which the
action is pending provided that such manner is not forbidden by the law of the State where the
evidence is taken;
e) a person requested to give evidence may invoke the privileges and duties to refuse to give the
evidence contained in Article 11.
Article 22
The fact that an attempt to take evidence under the procedure laid down in this Chapter has failed, owing
to the refusal of a person to give evidence, shall not prevent an application being subsequently made to
take the evidence in accordance with Chapter I.
CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES
Article 23
A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries.
Article 24
A Contracting State may designate other authorities in addition to the Central Authority and shall
determine the extent of their competence. However, Letters of Request may in all cases be sent to the
Central Authority.
Federal States shall be free to designate more than one Central Authority.
Article 25
A Contracting State which has more than one legal system may designate the authorities of one of such
systems, which shall have exclusive competence to execute Letters of Request pursuant to this
Convention.
Article 26
A Contracting State, if required to do so because of constitutional limitations, may request the

reimbursement by the State of origin of fees and costs, in connection with the execution of Letters of
Request, for the service of process necessary to compel the appearance of a person to give evidence,
the costs of attendance of such persons, and the cost of any transcript of the evidence.
Where a State has made a request pursuant to the above paragraph, any other Contracting State may
request from that State the reimbursement of similar fees and costs.
Article 27
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from –
a) declaring that Letters of Request may be transmitted to its judicial authorities through channels
other than those provided for in Article 2;
b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention to be performed
upon less restrictive conditions;
c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for
in this Convention.
Article 28
The present Convention shall not prevent an agreement between any two or more Contracting States to
derogate from –
a) the provisions of Article 2 with respect to methods of transmitting Letters of Request;
b) the provisions of Article 4 with respect to the languages which may be used;
c) the provisions of Article 8 with respect to the presence of judicial personnel at the execution of
Letters;
d) the provisions of Article 11 with respect to the privileges and duties of witnesses to refuse to give
evidence;
e) the provisions of Article 13 with respect to the methods of returning executed Letters to the
requesting authority;
f) the provisions of Article 14 with respect to fees and costs;
g) the provisions of Chapter II.
Article 29
Between Parties to the present Convention who are also Parties to one or both of the Conventions on
Civil Procedure signed at The Hague on the 17th of July 1905 and the 1st of March 1954, this Convention
shall replace Articles 8-16 of the earlier Conventions.
Article 30
The present Convention shall not affect the application of Article 23 of the Convention of 1905, or of
Article 24 of the Convention of 1954.
Article 31
Supplementary Agreements between Parties to the Conventions of 1905 and 1954 shall be considered
as equally applicable to the present Convention unless the Parties have otherwise agreed.
Article 32
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 29 and 31, the present Convention shall not derogate from
conventions containing provisions on the matters covered by this Convention to which the Contracting
States are, or shall become Parties.
Article 33
A State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession exclude, in whole or in part, the application
of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 and of Chapter II. No other reservation shall be permitted.
Each Contracting State may at any time withdraw a reservation it has made; the reservation shall cease
to have effect on the sixtieth day after notification of the withdrawal.
When a State has made a reservation, any other State affected thereby may apply the same rule against
the reserving State.
Article 34
A State may at any time withdraw or modify a declaration.
Article 35
A Contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a
later date, inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of the designation of authorities,
pursuant to Articles 2, 8, 24 and 25.
A Contracting State shall likewise inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of the following –
a) the designation of the authorities to whom notice must be given, whose permission may be
required, and whose assistance may be invoked in the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers
and consular agents, pursuant to Articles 15, 16 and 18 respectively;
b) the designation of the authorities whose permission may be required in the taking of evidence by
commissioners pursuant to Article 17 and of those who may grant the assistance provided for in
Article 18;
c) declarations pursuant to Articles 4, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 and 27;
d) any withdrawal or modification of the above designations and declarations;
e) the withdrawal of any reservation.
Article 36
Any difficulties which may arise between Contracting States in connection with the operation of this
Convention shall be settled through diplomatic channels.
Article 37
The present Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the Eleventh Session
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands.
Article 38
The present Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the third instrument
of ratification referred to in the second paragraph of Article 37.
The Convention shall enter into force for each signatory State which ratifies subsequently on the sixtieth
day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article 39
Any State not represented at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law which is a Member of this Conference or of the United Nations or of a specialised agency of that
Organisation, or a Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice may accede to the present
Convention after it has entered into force in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 38.
The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for a State acceding to it on the sixtieth day after the deposit of its
instrument of accession.
The accession will have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and such
Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession. Such declaration shall be
deposited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands; this Ministry shall forward, through
diplomatic channels, a certified copy to each of the Contracting States.
The Convention will enter into force as between the acceding State and the State that has declared its
acceptance of the accession on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the declaration of acceptance.
Article 40
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention
shall extend to all the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more
of them. Such a declaration shall take effect on the date of entry into force of the Convention for the
State concerned.
At any time thereafter, such extensions shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for the territories mentioned in such an extension on the sixtieth
day after the notification indicated in the preceding paragraph.
Article 41
The present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date of its entry into force in
accordance with the first paragraph of Article 38, even for States which have ratified it or acceded to it
subsequently.
If there has been no denunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five years.
Any denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands at least six months
before the end of the five year period.
It may be limited to certain of the territories to which the Convention applies.
The denunciation shall have effect only as regards the State which has notified it. The Convention shall
remain in force for the other Contracting States.
Article 42
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands shall give notice to the States referred to in Article 37,
and to the States which have acceded in accordance with Article 39, of the following –
a) the signatures and ratifications referred to in Article 37;
b) the date on which the present Convention enters into force in accordance with the first paragraph
of Article 38;
c) the accessions referred to in Article 39 and the dates on which they take effect;
d) the extensions referred to in Article 40 and the dates on which they take effect;
e) the designations, reservations and declarations referred to in Articles 33 and 35;
f) the denunciations referred to in the third paragraph of Article 41.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Convention.
Done at The Hague, on the 18th day of March, 1970, in the English and French languages, both texts
being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of
the Netherlands, and of which a certified copy shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to each of
the States represented at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
EXHIBIT 4
1/11/24, 12:25 PM Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, December 12, 2007, 07-83.228, Published in the Bulletin - Légifrance
FRENCH
REPUBLIC
Légifrance
The public service for the dissemination of law
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Brotherhood
Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, December 12, 2007, 07-83.228, Published in the Bulletin
Court of Cassation - Criminal Division Public hearing of Wednesday, December 12, 2007
Appeal no.: 07-83.228 Decision contested: Paris Court of Appeal, March 28, 2007
Published in the bulletin
Solution: Rejection
Presiding Judge Rapporteur

Mr. Cotte Ms. Nocquet
General Counsel Attorney(s)
Mr. Boccon-Gibod SCP Piwnica et Molinié
Full text
FRENCH REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE
THE COURT OF CASSATION, CRIMINAL CHAMBER, handed down the following judgment:
Ruling on the appeal lodged by:
- Christopher X,
against the decision of the PARIS Court of Appeal, 9th Chamber, dated March 28, 2007, which sentenced him to a 10,000 euro fine for seeking information
of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature aimed at the constitution of evidence for foreign proceedings;
In view of the brief produced;
On the first ground for annulment, alleging violation and misapplication of Chapter 2 of the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970 on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters and of Articles 1134 of the French Civil Code, 111-4 of the French Criminal Code, 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of July
26, 1968 as amended by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Articles 591 and 593 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, failure to state grounds and
contradiction thereof, and lack of a legal basis;
“In that the judgment under appeal found Christopher X... guilty of the offense defined in Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, amended by the Law of
July 16, 1980;
“On the grounds that it is clear from the letter sent by Jean-Claude Y to Christopher X on December 21, 2000, in response to a previous conversation, that
this lawyer asked his interlocutor to provide him with information on the way in which decisions had been taken by the MAAF Board of Directors at the
time of the Executive Life takeover, by alleging that Board members had not been properly informed, that the matter had not been debated, and that
decisions had been taken in the corridors; that, having thus told a lie in order to know the truth, Christopher X was told by Jean-Claude Y that the latter
had never taken any decisions in the corridors of any of the boards of directors meetings in which he had participated; that he thus obtained, or at least
attempted to obtain, proof that the MAAF directors had taken their decisions with full knowledge of the facts; that, contrary to what he maintains, Christopher
X did not simply approach, in a neutral manner, people whose testimony could subsequently have been requested within the framework of a procedure
conforming to the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Hague Convention, which authorizes the taking of evidence by a diplomatic agent or an independent
commissioner mandated by the foreign court, subject to the agreement of the competent authority designated by the State of execution; that he sought
information of a proven economic, commercial, or financial nature, which was intended to constitute evidence, even though he had no authorized mandate
within the meaning of this agreement, as it could justify the designation of Jean-Claude Y as a witness for the prosecution in the proceedings pending
before the Californian court, and to guide his subsequent questioning; that the infringement of Article 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended
by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, has been established;
“1) Whereas the provisions of Article 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended by the Law of July 16, 1980, are issued subject to international
treaties or agreements, including the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, which at chapter 2 provides for the taking of evidence by a diplomatic agent
or an independent commissioner appointed by the foreign court; whereas Christopher X in his pleadings, which were duly lodged and disregarded in this
respect, stated that the taking of evidence under the provisions of this chapter requires the prior agreement of any witnesses, since under the terms of
Article 17 of the Convention, the commissioner has no enforcement power to carry out investigation acts, and it was such prior agreement that he had
therefore sought from his interlocutor, Jean-Claude Y;
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000017837490/ 1/3
“2) Whereas the letter dated December 21, 2000, sent by Jean-Claude Y to Christopher X is part of the case file, and the Court of Cassation is therefore
in a position to ascertain that it does not follow from its terms that Christopher X has committed, in the words of the Court of Appeals, an abuse in the
search for evidence such as to characterize the infringement of Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, but, being in charge of the interests of the State
of California in the Executive Life case, limited himself to approaching persons whose testimony could subsequently be sought in proceedings in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Hague Convention, and that by distorting the clear terms of the letter submitted to it, the Court of
Appeals moreover reached a decision marked by a contradiction in reasoning, which must be censured;
“3) Whereas the obtaining of evidence without any request is not punishable under Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968; whereas the terms of the same
letter highlight that the information according to which Jean-Claude Y never took any decision in the corridors of all the boards of directors meetings in
which he participated does not result from a request by Christopher X but from a spontaneous declaration by his interlocutor and, as such, is not punishable;
“4) Whereas, finally, it emerges from the statements in the letter sent by Jean-Claude Y to Christopher X on December 21, 2000, that Christopher X’s
approach was based on the search for the truth, thus ruling out the possibility that Christopher X sought to influence any subsequent testimony given by
his interlocutor, unlike what stated by the Court of Appeals in its reasons, which are once again marked by contradiction”;
On the second ground for annulment, alleging violation and misapplication of Articles 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended by Law No.
80-538 of July 16, 1980, Articles 591 and 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, failure to state reasons, lack of a legal basis;
“In that the judgment under appeal found Christopher X... guilty of the offense defined in Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, amended by the Law of
July 16, 1980;
“On the grounds that it is clear from the letter sent by Jean-Claude Y to Christopher X on December 21, 2000, in response to a previous conversation, that
this lawyer asked his interlocutor to provide him with information on the way in which decisions had been taken by the MAAF Board of Directors at the
time of the Executive Life takeover, alleging that Board members had not been properly informed that the matter had not been debated and that decisions
had been taken in the corridors; that having thus told a lie in order to know the truth, Christopher X was told by Jean-Claude Y that the latter had never
taken any decisions in the corridors of any of the boards of directors meetings in which he had participated; whereas, in this way, he obtained, or at least
attempted to obtain, proof that the MAAF directors had taken their decisions with full knowledge of the facts;
“Whereas, as the first judges had rightly stated, the mere allusion to the fact that the decisions of a Board of Directors might or might not be taken in the
corridors does not constitute economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical information falling within the scope of Article 1 bis of the Law of July
26, 1968”;
On the third ground for annulment, based on the violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 1 bis of Law No. 68-
678 of July 26, 1968, amended by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Articles 591 and 593 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, failure to state
reasons, lack of a legal basis;
“In that the judgment under appeal found Christopher X guilty of the offense defined in Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, amended by the Law of
July 16, 1980;
“On the grounds that, contrary to what Christopher X maintains, this criminal charge, which aims to limit the abuses that can be committed in the search
for evidence, does not constitute a disproportionate hindrance to the rights of the defense; that the exercise of these rights is ensured by the guarantees
attached to the procedures established by the Hague Convention;
“1) Whereas the request, for economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical information, presuming it is confirmed, being in the present case
without any constraint, cannot be considered an abuse in the search for evidence;
“2) Whereas the right to a fair trial, to which States are not authorized to impose any restrictions (except with regard to the public nature of the hearing),
implies a free and unhindered search for evidence, and Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, insofar as it is interpreted as impeding the exercise of this
right, is incompatible with the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights”;
On the fourth ground for annulment, based on the violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of
July 26, 1968, amended by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Articles 591 and 593 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, failure to state reasons, lack
of a legal basis;
“In that the judgment under appeal found Christopher X guilty of the offense defined in Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, amended by the Law of
July 16, 1980;
“1) Whereas the provisions of Article 1 bis of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968 are subject to international treaties or agreements, including the European
Convention on Human Rights; Article 10 of this Convention stipulates that the right of everyone to freedom of expression includes, in particular, the freedom
to receive and disclose information without interference by any public authority and regardless of frontiers, and whereas sanctioning under criminal law
the remarks of a lawyer who, in the course of a telephone conversation with the former director of a mutual insurance company, merely mentioned that
the members of the Board of Directors (of that mutual insurance company) had not been properly informed, that the matter had not been discussed, and
that decisions had been taken in the corridors constitutes an obstacle to freedom of expression and consequently a violation of Article 10 mentioned above;
“2) whereas this obstacle to freedom of expression is not justified within the meaning of Article 10-2 of the Convention, since the general and absolute
prohibition on disclosing any information, however trivial, of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature aimed at constituting of
evidence for or in the context of foreign judicial or administrative proceedings, constitutes a measure which is not necessary and is therefore
disproportionate in a democratic society, including to protect the rights and reputations of others and to guarantee the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary”;
The grounds of appeal being gathered together;
Whereas it is clear from the judgment under appeal and from the proceedings exhibits that the Federal Court of California, seized of a dispute concerning
the conditions of the takeover of the North American life insurance company Executive Life between the Insurance Commissioner of that State and Mutuelle
d’assurance artisanale de France (MAAF), issued in April and December 2000, international civil Letters of Request seeking that the latter company
disclose documents relating to the dispute, in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970; whereas Christopher X, the French
correspondent of the insurance commissioner’s North American lawyer, at the end of 2000 contacted Jean-Claude Y, a former director of MAAF, to obtain
information on the conditions under which decisions had been taken by the company’s Board of Directors at the time of the Executive Life takeover,
alleging that “the members of the Board of Directors had not been properly informed... that the matter had not been debated and that decisions had been
taken in the corridors”; whereas at the end of a judicial investigation opened on the basis of a complaint lodged by MAAF as plaintiff, Christopher X was
brought before the court for having requested or sought information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature aimed at the
constitution of evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings, acts provided for and punishable under Articles 1 bis and 3 of the Law of July
26, 1968, as amended;
Whereas, in finding the accused guilty of this offense, the judgment states that he did not merely approach, in a neutral manner, persons whose testimony
could subsequently have been requested in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention, but obtained, or in any case attempted to obtain,
proof that the directors of MAAF had taken their decision with full knowledge of the facts; whereas the judges add that by acting in this way, Christopher
X sought information of an economic, commercial, or financial nature aimed at constituting evidence, likely to justify the designation of the person
approached as a witness for the prosecution in the proceedings before the Californian court and to guide his subsequent questioning, even though he had
no authorized mandate within the meaning of the above-mentioned Convention; whereas, finally, they note that, contrary to the defendant’s contention,
the criminal charges, which aim to limit the abuses that can be committed in the search for evidence, do not constitute a disproportionate obstacle to the
rights of the defense, the exercise of which is guaranteed by the safeguards attached to the procedures established by the Hague Convention;
Whereas in the light of these statements, from which it follows that the information sought on the circumstances in which the Board of Directors of MAAF
took its decisions on the takeover of Executive Life was of an economic, financial, or commercial nature and was aimed at constituting evidence in foreign
legal proceedings, the Court of Appeals, which responded to the peremptory arguments of the conclusions, justified its decision without disregarding the
texts of the conventions invoked;
It follows that the pleas in law must be rejected;
And whereas the judgment is in due form;
IT DISMISSES the appeal;
Thus judged and pronounced by the Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, in its public hearing, on the day, month, and year as above;
The following were present for the debates and deliberations: Mr. Cotte, Presiding Judge; Ms. Nocquet, Judge Rapporteur; Mr. Dulin, Ms. Thin, Ms.
Desgrange, Mr. Rognon, Ms. Ract-Madoux, Mr. Bayet, Chamber Side Judges; Mr. Soulard, Ms. Slove, Ms. Degorce, Ms. Labrousse, Assistant Judges;
General Counsel: Mr. Boccon-Gibod;
Chamber Clerk: Ms. Randouin;
In witness whereof this judgment has been signed by the Presiding Judge, the Rapporteur, and the Clerk of the Chamber;
Analysis
Publication: Criminal Bulletin No. 309, 2007
 Titles and abstracts
Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber - DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION OF AN ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL NATURE - Disclosure
to foreign natural or legal persons - Disclosure intended to constitute evidence for foreign proceedings - Authorization - Mandate provided
for by the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970 - Breach - Scope
The search for economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical information aimed at constituting evidence for foreign proceedings
is constituted, under Article 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968, as amended, by the steps taken by a person who is a correspondent in France
for the attorney of one of the parties to the said proceedings, in order to ascertain the circumstances in which the Board of Directors of a
French company took the decision to acquire a foreign company. Consequently, any person who takes such steps without having an
authorized mandate as provided for by the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, commits the offense punishable by Article 3 of the above-
mentioned law
1/11/24, 12:25 PM Cour de cassation, criminelle, Chambre criminelle, 12 décembre 2007, 07-83.228, Publié au bulletin - Légifrance
Cour de cassation, criminelle, Chambre criminelle, 12 décembre 2007, 07-83.228, Publié au bulletin
Cour de cassation - Chambre criminelle Audience publique du mercredi 12 décembre 2007

N° de pourvoi : 07-83.228 Décision attaquée : Cour d'appel de Paris, du 28 mars 2007
Publié au bulletin
Solution : Rejet
Président Rapporteur
M. Cotte Mme Nocquet
Avocat général Avocat(s)
M. Boccon-Gibod SCP Piwnica et Molinié
Texte intégral
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS
LA COUR DE CASSATION, CHAMBRE CRIMINELLE, a rendu l'arrêt suivant :
Statuant sur le pourvoi formé par :
-X... Christopher,
contre l'arrêt de la cour d'appel de PARIS, 9e chambre, en date du 28 mars 2007, qui, pour recherche de renseignements d'ordre économique, commercial,
industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves dans une procédure étrangère, l'a condamné à 10 000 euros d'amende ;
Vu le mémoire produit ;
Sur le premier moyen de cassation, pris de la violation et fausse application du chapitre 2 de la Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970 sur l'obtention des
preuves à l'étranger en matière civile ou commerciale et des articles 1134 du code civil,111-4 du code pénal,1 bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée
par la loi n° 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980,591 et 593 du code de procédure pénale, défaut et contradiction de motifs, manque de base légale ;
" en ce que l'arrêt infirmatif attaqué a déclaré Christopher X... coupable du délit défini à l'article 1 bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi du 16 juillet
1980 ;
" aux motifs qu'il résulte du courrier adressé le 21 décembre 2000 par Jean-Claude Y... à Christopher X..., en réaction à un entretien antérieur, que cet avocat a
sollicité son interlocuteur de lui fournir des indications sur la manière dont les décisions du conseil d'administration de la MAAF avaient été prises à l'époque du
rachat d'Executive Life, alléguant que les membres du conseil d'administration n'avaient pas été bien informés qu'il n'avait pas été débattu de la question et
que les décisions auraient été prises dans les couloirs » ; qu'ayant ainsi prêché le faux pour savoir le vrai », Christopher X... s'est vu répondre par Jean-Claude Y...
que celui-ci n'avait jamais pris de décision dans les couloirs dans tous les conseils d'administration auxquels il avai t participé » ; qu'il a, de cette manière,
obtenu, ou en tout cas tenté d'obtenir, la preuve que les administrateurs de la MAAF avaient pris leurs décisions en pleine connaissance de cause ; que,
contrairement à ce qu'il soutient, Christopher X... ne s'est donc pas contenté d'approcher, de manière neutre, des personnes dont le témoignage aurait pu être
ultérieurement sollicité dans le cadre d'une procédure conforme aux dispositions du chapitre 2 de la Convention de La Haye, qui autorise la recherche de
preuves par un agent diplomatique ou un commissaire indépendant mandaté par la juridiction étrangère, sous réserve de l'accord de l'autorité compétente
désignée par l'Etat de l'exécution ; qu'il a recherché, alors qu'il était dépourvu de tout mandat autorisé au sens de cette convention, des informations dont le
caractère économique, commercial ou financier est avéré, et qui tendaient à la constitution de preuves, dès lors qu'elles étaient susceptibles de justifier la
désignation de Jean-Claude Y... comme témoin à charge dans la procédure pendante devant la juridiction californienne et d'orienter son interrogatoire
ultérieur ; que l'infraction à l'article 1er bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968, modifiée par la loi n° 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 est établie ;
" 1°) alors que les dispositions de l'article 1er bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 sont édictées sous réserve des traités
ou accords internationaux parmi lesquels figure la Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970, qui prévoit, en son chapitre 2, l'obtention de preuves par un agent
diplomatique ou un commissaire indépendant mandaté par la juridiction étrangère ; que, comme le faisait Christopher X... dans ses conclusions régulièrement
déposées et de ce chef délaissées, l'obtention de preuves en application des dispositions de ce chapitre nécessite l'accord préalable des éventuels témoins dès
lors qu'aux termes de l'article 17 de la convention, le commissaire ne dispose d'aucun pouvoir de contrainte pour procéder à des actes d'instruction et que
c'est un tel accord préalable qu'il avait donc cherché à recueillir auprès de son interlocuteur, Jean-Claude Y... ;
" 2°) alors que la lettre du 21 décembre 2000 adressée par Jean-Claude Y... à Christopher X... étant au dossier de la procédure, la Cour de cassation est en
mesure de s'assurer qu'il ne résulte pas de ses termes que Christopher X... ait commis, selon l'expression de la cour d'appel, un abus dans la recherche des
preuves » susceptible de caractériser l'infraction à l'article 1er bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 mais s'est, étant chargé des intérêts de l'Etat de Californie dans le
dossier Executive Life, borné à approcher des personnes dont le témoignage pourrait être ultérieurement sollicité dans le cadre d'une procédure conforme aux
dispositions du chapitre 2 de la Convention de La Haye et qu'en dénaturant les termes clairs de la lettre qui lui était soumise, la cour d'appel a de surcroît statué
par une décision empreinte de contradiction de motifs, laquelle doit être censurée ;
" 3°) alors que l'obtention de preuves en-dehors de toute sollicitation n'est pas incriminée par l'article 1er bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 ; que les termes de la
même lettre mettent en évidence que le renseignement » selon lequel Jean-Claude Y... n'aurait jamais pris la décision dans les couloirs de tous les conseils
d'administration auxquels il a participé » ne résulte pas d'une sollicitation de Christopher X... mais d'une déclaration spontanée de son interlocuteur, en tant
que telle, non punissable ;
" 4°) alors qu'il résulte enfin des énonciations de la lettre adressée le 21 décembre 2000 par Jean-Claude Y... à Christopher X... que la démarche » de Christopher
X... était fondée sur la recherche de la vérité » excluant par conséquent que ce dernier ait cherché à orienter l'éventuel témoignage ultérieur » de son
interlocuteur comme l'a énoncé la cour d'appel dans ses motifs une fois encore empreints de contradiction " ;
Sur le deuxième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation et fausse application des articles 1 bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi n° 80-538
du 16 juillet 1980,591 et 593 du code de procédure pénale, défaut de motifs, manque de base légale ;
" en ce que l'arrêt infirmatif attaqué a déclaré Christopher X... coupable du défini à l'article 1 bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 ;
" aux motifs qu'il résulte du courrier adressé le 21 décembre 2000 par Jean-Claude Y... à Christopher X..., en réaction à un entretien antérieur, que cet avocat a
sollicité son interlocuteur de lui fournir des indications sur la manière dont les décisions du conseil d'administration de la MAAF avaient été prises à l'époque du
rachat d'Executive Life, alléguant que les membres du conseil d'administration n'avaient pas été bien informés qu'il n'avait pas été débattu de la question et
que les décisions auraient été prises dans les couloirs » ; qu'ayant ainsi prêché le faux pour avoir le vrai », Christopher X... s'est vu répondre par Jean-Claude Y...
que celui-ci n'avait jamais pris de décisions dans les couloirs dans tous les conseils d'administration auxquels il avait participé » ; qu'il a, de cette manière,
obtenu, ou en tout cas tenté d'obtenir, la preuve que les administrateurs de la MAAF avaient pris leurs décisions en pleine connaissance de cause ;
" alors que, ainsi que l'avaient pertinemment énoncé les premiers juges, la simple allusion au fait que les décisions d'un conseil d'administration seraient ou
non prises dans les couloirs » ne constitue pas un renseignement d'ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tombant sous le coup de
l'article 1 bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 " ;
Sur le troisième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation des articles 6 et 7 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme,1 bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26
juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi n° 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980,591 et 593 du code de procédure pénale, défaut de motifs, manque de base légale ;
" en ce que l'arrêt infirmatif attaqué a déclaré Christopher X... coupable du délit défini à l'article 1bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi du 16 juillet
1980 ;
" aux motifs que contrairement à ce que soutient Christopher X..., cette incrimination qui vise à limiter les abus pouvant être commis dans la recherche de la
preuve, ne constitue pas une entrave disproportionnée aux droits de la défense » ; que l'exercice de ces droits est assuré par les garanties attachées aux
procédures instaurées par la Convention de La Haye ;
" 1°) alors que ne saurait être considérée comme un abus dans la recherche des preuves », la sollicitation, à la supposer avérée, d'un renseignement d'ordre
économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique opéré comme en l'espèce sans contrainte ;
" 2°) alors que le droit au procès équitable auquel les Etats ne sont autorisés à n'apporter aucune restriction (si ce n'est en ce qui concerne la publicité de
l'audience) implique une recherche libre et sans entrave de la preuve et que l'article 1bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968, en tant qu'il est interprété comme faisant
obstacle à l'exercice de ce droit, est incompatible avec les dispositions des articles 6 et 7 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme " ;
Sur le quatrième moyen de cassation, pris de la violation des articles 10 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme,1 bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26
juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi n° 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980,591 et 593 du code de procédure pénale, défaut de motifs, manque de base légale ;
" en ce que l'arrêt infirmatif attaqué a déclaré Christopher X... coupable du délit défini à l'article 1bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968 modifiée par la loi du 16 juillet
1980 ;
" 1°) alors que les dispositions de l'article 1er bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 sont édictées sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux parmi
lesquels figure la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme ; que cette convention précise en son article 10 que le droit de toute personne à la liberté
d'expression comprend notamment la liberté de recevoir ou de communiquer des informations sans qu'il puisse y avoir ingérence d'autorités publiques et sans
considération de frontière et que sanctionner pénalement les propos d'un avocat qui s'est borné à faire état au cours d'une conversation téléphonique
adressée à l'ancien dirigeant d'une mutuelle de ce que les membres du conseil d'administration (de cette mutuelle) n'avaient pas été bien informés, qu'il
n'avait pas été débattu de la question et que les décisions auraient été prises dans les couloirs » constitue une entrave à la liberté d'expression et par
conséquent une violation de l'article 10 susvisé ;
" 2°) alors que cette entrave à la liberté d'expression n'est pas justifiée au sens de l'article 10-2 de la convention dès lors que l'interdiction générale et absolue
de communiquer tout renseignement »-si anodin soit-il d'ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de
preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères ou dans le cadre de celles-ci », constitue une mesure non nécessaire et par conséquent
disproportionnée dans une société démocratique y compris pour protéger les droits et la réputation d'autrui et pour garantir l'autorité et l'impartialité du
pouvoir judiciaire " ;
Les moyens étant réunis ;
Attendu qu'il résulte de l'arrêt attaqué et des pièces de procédure que le tribunal fédéral de Californie, saisi d'un litige portant sur les conditions de la reprise de
la société d'assurance vie nord-américaine Executive Life et opposant le commissaire aux assurances de cet Etat à la société Mutuelle d'assurance artisanale de
France (MAAF), a délivré, notamment en avril et décembre 2000, des commissions rogatoires civiles internationales tendant à la communication, par cette
dernière société, de documents se rapportant au litige, selon les modalités définies par la Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970 ; que Chritopher X..., avocat
correspondant en France de l'avocat nord-américain du commissaire aux assurances, a, à la fin de l'année 2000, contacté Jean-Claude Y..., ancien
administrateur de la MAAF, pour obtenir desrenseignements sur les conditions dans lesquelles avaient été prises les décisions du conseil d'administration de
cette société à l'époque du rachat d'Executive Life, alléguant que " les membres du conseil d'administration n'avaient pas été bien informés... qu'il n'avait pas
été débattu de la question et que les décisions auraient été prises dans les couloirs " ; qu'au terme d'une information judiciaire, ouverte sur plainte avec
constitution de partie civile de la MAAF, Christopher X... a été renvoyé devant le tribunal pour avoir demandé ou recherché des renseignements d'ordre
économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives
étrangères, faits prévus et réprimés par les articles 1 bis et 3 de la loi du 26 juillet 1968, modifiée ;
Attendu que, pour déclarer le prévenu coupable de cette infraction, l'arrêt énonce que celui-ci ne s'est pas contenté d'approcher, de manière neutre, des
personnes dont le témoignage aurait pu être ultérieurement sollicité conformément aux dispositions de la Convention de la Haye, mais a obtenu, ou, en tout
cas tenté d'obtenir, la preuve que les administrateurs de la MAAF avaient pris leur décision en pleine connaissance de cause ; que les juges ajoutent qu'en
agissant ainsi, Christopher X... a recherché, alors qu'il était dépourvu de tout mandat autorisé au sens de la convention précitée, des informations à caractère
économique, commercial ou financier tendant à la constitution de preuves, susceptibles de justifier la désignation de la personne approchée comme témoin à
charge dans la procédure suivie devant la juridiction californienne et d'orienter son interrogatoire ultérieur ; qu'ils relèvent, enfin, que, contrairement à ce que
soutient le prévenu, l'incrimination, qui vise à limiter les abus pouvant être commis dans la recherche de la preuve, ne constitue pas une entrave
disproportionnée aux droits de la défense, dont l'exercice est assuré par les garanties attachées aux procédures instaurées par la Convention de La Haye ;
Attendu qu'en l'état de ces énonciations, d'où il résulte que les renseignements recherchés sur les circonstances dans lesquelles le conseil d'administration de
la MAAF a pris ses décisions sur le rachat de la société Executive Life sont d'ordre économique, financier ou commercial et tendent à la constitution de preuves
dans une procédure judiciaire étrangère, la cour d'appel, qui a répondu aux arguments péremptoires des conclusions, a justifié sa décision, sans méconnaître
les textes conventionnels invoqués ;
D'où il suit que les moyens doivent être écartés ;
Et attendu que l'arrêt est régulier en la forme ;
REJETTE le pourvoi ;
Ainsi jugé et prononcé par la Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, en son audience publique, les jour, mois et an que dessus ;
Etaient présents aux débats et au délibéré : M. Cotte président, Mme Nocquet conseiller rapporteur, M. Dulin, Mmes Thin, Desgrange, M. Rognon, Mme Ract-
Madoux, M. Bayet conseillers de la chambre, M. Soulard, Mmes Slove, Degorce, Labrousse conseillers référendaires ;
Avocat général : M. Boccon-Gibod ;
Greffier de chambre : Mme Randouin ;
En foi de quoi le présent arrêt a été signé par le président, le rapporteur et le greffier de chambre ;
Analyse
Publication : Bulletin criminel 2007, N° 309
 Titrages et résumés
Cassation criminelle - DOCUMENTS ET RENSEIGNEMENTS D'ORDRE ECONOMIQUE OU TECHNIQUE - Communication à des personnes physiques
ou morales étrangères - Communication tendant à la constitution de preuves pour une procédure étrangère - Autorisation - Mandat prévu par la
Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970 - Défaut - Portée
Constituent, au sens de l'article 1 bis de la loi du 26 juillet 1968, modifiée, la recherche de renseignements d'ordre économique, commercial,
industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue d'une procédure étrangère, les démarches effectuées par une
personne, correspondante en France de l'avocat d'une des parties à ladite procédure, dans le but de connaître les circonstances dans lesquelles
le conseil d'administration d'une société française a pris la décision d'acquérir une société étrangère. Dès lors, commet le délit réprimé par
l'article 3 de la loi susvisée, la personne qui se livre à de telles démarches, sans disposer d'un mandat autorisé prévu par la Convention de La
Haye du 18 mars 1970
EXHIBIT 5
Paris Court of Appeals, Division 1, Chamber 1, November 9, 2010 - No. 10/08413
Court of Appeal
Paris
Division 1, Chamber 1
November 09, 2010
Docket: 10/08413
Judicial Litigation
Enforceable copies delivered FRENCH REPUBLIC
to the parties on: IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

PARIS COURT OF APPEAL
Division 1 - Chamber 1
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 2010
(no. , 6 pages)
Docket number: 10/08413
Decision referred to the Court: Order of March 22, 2010 - Tribunal de Grande Instance de PARIS [Paris District Court] – Docket No.
09/76
APPELLANTS
WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, a US fund, in the person of its legal representatives
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
represented by SCP MENARD-SCELLE-MILLET, barristers at the Court

assisted by Me Ron SOFFER, attorney at the PARIS bar, number: C 2110
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS local 269,
a US fund in the person of its legal representatives
[...]
[...]
[...]

LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, a US fund
in the person of its legal representatives

[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]

STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, a US fund
[...]
[...]
[...]

RESPONDENTS
S.A. ELECTRO BANQUE

[...]
[...]
represented by SCP PETIT LESENECHAL, barristers at the Court
assisted by Me Pierre-Yves ROSSIGNOL, pleading for SCP GRANRUT AVOCATS, number: P14
The PUBLIC PROSECUTOR acting in the person of the PROSECUTOR GENERAL at the PARIS Court of Appeal
with address for service at the Palais de Justice [...].

represented by Ms. ROUCHEREAU, attorney
COMPOSITION OF THE COURT:

The case was debated on October 12, 2010, in open court, the report heard, before the Court composed of:
Mr. MATET, Presiding Judge

Ms. GUIHAL, Side Judge
Ms. DALLERY, Side Judge

who have deliberated
Clerk during the debates: Ms. PATE

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE: represented at the hearing by Ms. ROUCHEREAU, attorney, who discussed her written
submissions orally
JUDGMENT: - ADVERSARIAL
- judgment made available at the Court registry, the parties having been previously notified in accordance with the conditions
provided for in the second paragraph of Article 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- signed by Mr. MATET, Presiding Judge, and by Ms. PATE, Clerk present at the judgment delivery.
A class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against a number of
persons, including Alstom group companies, with certain shareholders alleging that they manipulated financial results to conceal a
precarious situation.
Noting that ELECTROBANQUE was one of the four banks that assisted Alstom in providing credit to Alstom’s customer Renaissance,
and that the documents in its possession, custody, or control were central to the dispute at issue in this lawsuit, and that they were
crucial and relevant, Judge Victor Marrero of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued on May 6,
2009 a Letter of Request to the Central Authority in France for the purposes of mutual legal assistance in the following matters:
1) all documents relating to the financing of Renaissance R1, R2, R5 and R6 cruise ships, including, but not limited to, documents
relating to or in connection with credit risks, concerning credit risks, forming part of due diligence efforts, or constituting an analysis of
said credit risks;
2) all documents concerning the sale by Alstom of cruise ships to Renaissance between August 3, 1999, and August 12, 2003;
3) all documents concerning any guarantee (total or partial) granted by Alstom in connection with financing granted by the bank to
Renaissance from August 3, 1999, to August 12, 2003.
On March 22, 2010, the judge of the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance (District Court), who had been appointed to execute the Letter
of Request, issued an order in the following terms: “We find it impossible to aptly rule on the validity or otherwise of
ELECTROBANQUE’s refusal to produce various documents listed in Appendix A of the Letters of Request. Consequently, we close the
present file and order the proceedings to be referred back to the referring authority.
WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS have
appealed against the order. In their submissions of October 8, 2010, they asked the Court:
On a principal level:
- to order ELECTROBANQUE to produce the letters it sent to the beneficiaries of banking secrecy asking them to decide whether to
waive banking secrecy, under a fine of € 100 per day of delay following delivery of this decision, as well as the replies given by these
beneficiaries under the same fine,
- in any event, if the request is not granted, declare that ELECTROBANQUE does not prove a legitimate impediment to the execution
of the Letter of Request issued by the New York court, and order ELECTROBANQUE to execute it.
On a subsidiary level:
- to dismiss the ELECTROBANQUE conclusions of October 5,
- to order ELECTROBANQUE to produce the letters it sent to the beneficiaries of banking secrecy asking them to decide whether to
waive banking secrecy, under a fine of € 100 per day of delay following delivery of this decision, as well as the replies given by these
beneficiaries under the same fine,
- in any event, if the request is not granted, declare that ELECTROBANQUE does not prove a legitimate impediment to the execution
of the Letter of Request issued by the New York court, and order ELECTROBANQUE to execute it
WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS essentially
argue that banking secrecy, as the beneficiary can always waive it, does not constitute a peremptory impediment to the implementation
of a Letter of Request, and that the request for the production of documents from ELECTROBANQUE will make it possible to assess
whether or not the latter can refuse to disclose the documents which are the subject matter of the Letter of Request.
They add that ELECTROBANQUE must execute the Letter of Request because the rights of the Renaissance company, which was
based in the United States and was a beneficiary of banking secrecy, have been liquidated and it is no longer entitled to the right to
secrecy. Lastly, they state that the documents requested by the US court are listed exhaustively and have a direct and precise link with
the subject matter of the dispute, and that the relevant period is defined in the deed.
In its submissions of October 8, 2010, ELECTROBANQUE requested that the proceedings filed under Docket No. 10/7952 be struck
out, and that the request for an order to disclose documents be declared inadmissible and unfounded, declare the appeal inadmissible
and unfounded, reject the execution of the Letter of Request and order WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS to pay the sum of € 5,000 under Article 700 of the French Code of Civil
Procedure.
Its main arguments are that there is a legitimate impediment to the execution of the Letter of Request on the grounds of banking
secrecy, that the seized court does not have to assess whether the circumstances justify invoking banking secrecy, and that the Letters
of Request taking place during the pre-trial discovery period cannot be admitted as the requests are general, unrestricted, and
imprecise, thus amounting to “proof-fishing”.
Closing was declared at the request of the parties’ representatives, on the day of closing arguments.
The public prosecutor was heard in his observations.
Therefore,
Considering that ELECTROBANQUE’s request to strike out another case registered under Docket No. 10/7952 is irrelevant;
Considering that the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, signed by France and the United States on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters is intended to “facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request” with a view to “increasing
the effectiveness of mutual judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters”;
Considering that under the terms of Article 23, “a Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it
will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries”;
Considering that, in a declaration of July 30, 1974, the French Government stated that, pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention, Letters
of Request for the purpose of executing that procedure would not be executed; that this reservation was modified by the declaration of
December 24, 1989, according to which “the declaration made by the Government of the French Republic pursuant to Article 23
concerning Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery does not apply where the documents requested
are listed exhaustively in the Letters of Request and have a direct and precise link with the litigation”;
Considering that the US court states - according to the French translation - that its request is made under Chapter 1 of the Hague
Convention of March 18, 1970, on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters and specifies that the Letter of
Request “takes into account France’s reservations under the Hague Convention. This Court has deemed that the documents requested
are listed exhaustively in Appendix A of this request and that they are directly and precisely related to the subject matter of the
proceedings, in accordance with the modification of Article 23 of the Hague Convention by the declaration of the French Republic dated
January 19, 1987” and that the US court also mentions in the application for legal assistance, on page 8 of the English-language
version, that “the parties are now conducting pre-trial fact discovery”;
Considering that it is therefore established and not disputed that the execution of the request is part of the “pre-trial discovery of
documents” procedure and is subject to the conditions of the reservation over Article 23 of the Hague Convention;
Considering that, in the case at hand, the Letter of Request refers to “all documents concerning the financing of cruise ships, including
documents relating to or in connection with credit risks, concerning credit risks”... “all documents concerning the sale by Alstom of
cruise ships to Renaissance between August 3, 1999 and August 12, 2003”...”All documents concerning any guarantee whatsoever
(total or partial) granted by Alstom in connection with financing granted by the bank to Renaissance from August 3, 1999 to August 12,
2003”; considering that the content of the documents requested is not precisely defined and the requests are excessively broad, the
Letter of Request does not meet the conditions of the Convention; considering that, as there is no need to grant the appellants’ request
for the production of documents, the request for execution of the Letter of Request should be refused, setting aside the issued order;
Considering that WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF
ILLINOIS should be ordered to pay ELECTROBANQUE the sum of € 5,000 under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
FOR THESE REASONS

Sets aside the order issued,
Refuses the request for execution of the Letter of Request issued on May 6, 2009, by Judge Victor Marrero of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York;
Orders WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS to pay
ELECTROBANQUE the sum of € 5,000 under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
Rejects all other requests;
Orders WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS to pay the
costs and admits SCP PETIT LESENECHAL, barrister, to the benefit set out by Article 699 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
THE CLERK THE PRESIDING JUDGE
Previous decision
Tribunal de Grande Instance PARIS [Paris District Court] March 22, 2010, 09/76
© LexisNexis SA
Cour d'appel, Paris, Pôle 1, chambre 1, 9 Novembre 2010 – n° 10/08413
Cour d'appel
Paris
Pôle 1, chambre 1
9 Novembre 2010
Répertoire Général : 10/08413
Contentieux Judiciaire
Grosses délivrées REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
aux parties le : AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS
COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS
Pôle 1 - Chambre 1
ARRET DU 09 NOVEMBRE 2010
(n° , 6 pages)
Numéro d'inscription au répertoire général : 10/08413
Décision déférée à la Cour : Ordonnance du 22 mars 2010 -Tribunal de Grande Instance de PARIS - RG n° 09/76
APPELANTES
WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD fond de droit américain prise en la personne de ses représentants légaux
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
représentée par la SCP MENARD-SCELLE-MILLET, avoués à la Cour
assistée de Me Ron SOFFER, avocat au barreau de PARIS, toque : C 2110
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS local 269 fond de droit américain
prise en la personne de ses représentants légaux
[...]
[...]
[...]
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM fond de droit américain
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS fond de droit américain

[...]
[...]
[...]
INTIMES
S.A. ELECTRO BANQUE
[...]
[...]
représentée par la SCP PETIT LESENECHAL, avoués à la Cour
assistée de Me Pierre-Yves ROSSIGNOL, plaidant pour la SCP GRANRUT AVOCATS, toque : P14
Le MINISTÈRE PUBLIC agissant en la personne de Monsieur le PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL près la Cour d'Appel de PARIS
élisant domicile en son parquet au Palais de Justice [...]
représenté par Madame ROUCHEREAU, avocat général
COMPOSITION DE LA COUR :
L'affaire a été débattue le 12 octobre 2010, en audience publique, le rapport entendu, devant la Cour composée de :
Monsieur MATET, Président
Madame GUIHAL, Conseillère
Madame DALLERY, Conseillère
qui en ont délibéré
Greffier, lors des débats : Madame PATE
MINISTÈRE PUBLIC : représenté lors des débats par Madame ROUCHEREAU, avocat général, qui a développé oralement ses conclusions écrites
ARRET :- CONTRADICTOIRE
- par mise à disposition de l'arrêt au greffe de la Cour, les parties en ayant été préalablement avisées dans les conditions prévues au deuxième alinéa de l'article
450 du code de procédure civile.
- signé par Monsieur MATET, président et par Madame PATE, greffier présent lors du prononcé.
Une action de groupe a été engagée devant le Tribunal fédéral de Première instance du district sud de New York, contre diverses personnes notamment contre
des sociétés du groupe Alstom, certains actionnaires faisant notamment grief à celles-ci d'avoir manipulé des résultats financiers pour masquer une situation
précaire.
Relevant que la société ELECTROBANQUE était l'une des quatre banques ayant aidé Alstom à offrir du crédit au client d'Alstom, Renaissance, et que les
documents en sa possession sous sa garde ou son contrôle sont au coeur du litige faisant l'objet de l'action, qu'ils sont cruciaux et pertinents, le juge Victor
Marrero du Tribunal du district sud de l'Etat de New York a délivré, le 6 mai 2009, à l'Autorité centrale en France une commission rogatoire aux fins d'entraide
judiciaire portant sur :
'1°) tous les documents concernant le financement de navires de croisière Renaissance R1,R2,R5 et R6, y compris, mais sans limitation, les documents en
rapport ou en liaison avec les risques de crédit, concernant les risques de crédit , faisant partie d'efforts de verification préalable ou constituant une analyse des
dits risques de crédit ;
2°) Tous les documents concernant la vente par Alstom de navires de croisière à Renaissance entre le 3 août 1999 et le 12 août 2003 ;
3°) Tous les documents concernant une garantie quelconque (totale ou partielle) consentie par Alstom en liaison avec un financement accordé par la banque à
Renaissance du 3 août 1999 au 12 août 2003".
Le juge du tribunal de grande instance de Paris commis pour exécuter la commission rogatoire a rendu le 22 mars 2010 une ordonnance dans ces termes '
Constatons l'impossibilité de statuer valablement sur le bien fondé ou non du refus de la société ELECTROBANQUE de produire diverses pièces énumérées en
annexe A de la commission rogatoire. En conséquence, clôturons le présent dossier et ordonnons le renvoi de la procédure à l'autorité mandante'.
Les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS ont interjeté appel de l'ordonnance entreprise. Par
conclusions du 8 octobre 2010, elles prient la Cour :
A titre principal :
- d'ordonner à la société ELECTROBANQUE de produire les courriers adressés par elle aux bénéficiaires du secret bancaire tendant à ce que ceux-ci se
prononcent sur la renonciation au secret bancaire sous astreinte de 100€ par jour de retard suivant le prononcé de la décision à intervenir, ainsi que les réponses
apportées par ces bénéficiaires sous la même astreinte,
- en tout état de cause s'il n'est pas fait droit à la demande de production, dire que la société ELECTROBANQUE ne justifie pas d'un empêchement légitime à
l'exécution de la commission rogatoire décernée par le juge de New York, et ordonner à la société ELECTROBANQUE de l'exécuter
A titre subsidiaire :
- de rejeter des débats les conclusions de la société ELECTROBANQUE du 5 octobre ;
- d'ordonner à la société ELECTROBANQUE de produire les courriers adressés par elle aux bénéficiaires du secret bancaire tendant à ce que ceux-ci se
prononcent sur la renonciation au secret bancaire sous astreinte de 100€ par jour de retard suivant le prononcé de la décision à intervenir, ainsi que les réponses
apportées par ces bénéficiaires sous la même astreinte,
- en tout état de cause s'il n'est pas fait droit à la demande de production, dire que la société ELECTROBANQUE ne justifie pas d'un empêchement légitime à
l'exécution de la commission rogatoire décernée par le juge de New York, et ordonner à la société ELECTROBANQUE de l'exécuter
Les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS articulent essentiellement que le secret bancaire ne
constitue pas un empêchement péremptoire à la mise en oeuvre d'une commission rogatoire, le bénéficiaire pouvant toujours y renoncer, et que la demande de
production de pièces à la société ELECTROBANQUE permettra d'apprécier si cette dernière peut ou non refuser de communiquer les pièces objet de la
commission rogatoire.
Elles ajoutent que la société ELECTROBANQUE doit exécuter la commission rogatoire car les droits de la société Renaissance dont le siège se situait aux Etats-
Unis, bénéficiaire du secret bancaire, ont été liquidés et celle-ci n'est plus créancière du droit au secret. Elles disent enfin que les documents sollicités par le juge
américain sont limitativement énumérés et ont un lien direct et précis avec l'objet du litige et que la période pertinente est définie dans l'acte.
Suivant conclusions du 8 octobre 2010, la société ELECTROBANQUE sollicite de prononcer la radiation de l'instance enrôlée sous le n° RG 10/7952, demande
de déclarer irrégulière et mal fondée la demande d'injonction de communication de pièces, de déclarer irrecevable et mal fondé l'appel et de rejeter l'exécution de
la commission rogatoire et de condamner les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS au
paiement de la somme de 5 000€ au titre de l'article 700 du code de procédure civile.
Elle fait valoir principalement qu'il existe un empêchement légitime à l'exécution de la commission rogatoire pour cause de secret bancaire, que le juge requis n'a
pas à apprécier si les circonstances justifient d'opposer le secret bancaire et que la commission rogatoire se déroulant dans la période de pre-trial discovery ne
peut être admise dès lors que les demandes sont générales, non limitées et imprécises, relevant du 'proof-fishing'.
La clôture a été prononcée à la demande des représentants des parties, le jour des plaidoiries.
Le ministère public a été entendu en ses observations.
Sur quoi,
Considérant que la demande de la société ELECTROBANQUE visant à prononcer la radiation d'une autre instance enrôlée sous le n° RG 10/7952 est dépourvue
de pertinence ;
Considérant que la convention de la Haye du 18 mars 1970 signée par la France et les Etats Unis sur l'obtention de preuves à l'étranger en matière civile ou
commerciale a pour objet de 'faciliter la transmission et l'exécution des commissions rogatoires' avec le souci 'd'accroître l'efficacité de la coopération judiciaire
mutuelle en matière civile ou commerciale' ;
Qu'aux termes de son article 23 'tout Etat contractant peut, au moment de la signature, de la ratification ou de l'adhésion, déclarer qu'il n'exécute pas les
commissions rogatoires qui ont pour objet une procédure connue dans les Etats du common law sous le nom de 'pre-trial discovery of documents' ;
Que par déclaration du 30 juillet 1974 le gouvernement français a précisé que par application de l'article 23 de la convention les commissions rogatoires ayant
pour objet l'exécution de cette procédure ne seraient pas exécutées ; que cette réserve a été modifiée par la déclaration du 24 décembre 1989 selon laquelle ' la
déclaration faite par le Gouvernement de la République française conformément à l'article 23 relatif aux commissions rogatoires qui ont pour objet une procédure
connue dans les Etats de common law sous le nom de 'pre-trial discovery' ne s'applique pas lorsque les documents demandés sont limitativement énumérés
dans la commission rogatoire et ont un lien direct et précis avec le litige' ;
Considérant que le juge américain énonce -selon la traduction française- que sa requête est présentée en vertu du chapitre 1 de la convention de la Haye du 18
mars 1970 sur l'obtention de preuves à l'étranger en matière civile et commerciale et précise que la commission rogatoire 'tient compte des réserves de la France
en vertu de la convention de la Haye. Ce Tribunal a jugé que les documents demandés sont énumérés limitativement à l'Annexe A de la présente requête et qu'ils
sont directement et précisément liés à l'objet de la procédure, conformément à la modification de l'article 23 de la convention de la Haye par la déclaration de la
République Française datée du 19 janvier 1987" et que le juge américain fait encore mention dans la demande d'assistance judiciaire, page 8 de la version en
langue anglaise, de ce que 'The parties are now conducting pre-trial fact discovery' ;
Qu'il est donc établi et non discuté que l'exécution de la requête s'inscrit dans la procédure de 'pre-trial discovery of documents' et est soumise aux conditions de
la réserve de l'article 23 de la convention de la Haye ;
Qu'en l'espèce, la commission rogatoire vise 'tous documents concernant le financement de navires de croisière y compris les documents en rapport ou en liaison
avec les risques de crédit, concernant les risques de crédit'...'Tous les documents concernant la vente par Alstom de navires de croisière à Renaissance entre le
3 août 1999 et le 12 août 2003"...'Tous les documents concernant une garantie quelconque (totale ou partielle) consentie par Alstom en liaison avec un
financement accordé par la banque à Renaissance du 3 août 1999 au 12 août 2003" ; que la teneur des documents réclamés n'étant pas définie avec précision et
les demandes étant excessivement larges, la commission rogatoire ne répond pas aux conditions de la Convention ; que, sans qu'il y ait lieu de faire droit à la
demande de production de pièces formée par les appelantes, il convient, infirmant l'ordonnance entreprise, de refuser la demande d'exécution de la commission
rogatoire ;
Considérant qu'il convient de condamner les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS à payer à
la société ELECTROBANQUE la somme de 5 000€ au titre de l'article 700 du code de procédure civile ;
Par ces motifs
Infirme l'ordonnance entreprise,
Refuse la demande d'exécution de la commission rogatoire délivrée
le 6 mai 2009 par le juge Victor Marrero du Tribunal du district sud de l'Etat de New York ;
Condamne les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS à payer à la société
ELECTROBANQUE la somme de 5 000€ au titre de l'article 700 du code de procédure civile ;
Rejette toute autre demande ;
Condamne les sociétés WEST VIRGINIA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BROAD, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STATE UNIVERSITES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS aux dépens et admet la SCP PETIT
LESENECHAL, avoué, au bénéfice de l'article 699 du code de procédure civile.
LA GREFFIÈRE LE PRÉSIDENT
Décision antérieure
Tribunal de Grande Instance PARIS 22 Mars 2010 09/76
© LexisNexis SA
EXHIBIT 6
CANADA )
) ss:
Vancouver, BC )
Mark Eilers declares:
That he is employed as Translator by the firm of Lionbridge Technologies,
LLC, 1050 Winter Street, Suite 2300, Waltham, MA 02451, United States;
That he is fully conversant in the French and English languages;
That he translated or reviewed the translation of the attached document:
Ruling of the Judicial Court of Saint-Etienne, First Civil Division, dated October 5, 2020
from French into English;
and that the English translation is, to his best knowledge and belief, a true
and correct rendering of the original text in the French language.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
January 22, 2024
______________________________
Mark Eilers
B.A. in Linguistics McMaster University, 15
years of professional experience.
[[DMS:5699466v1:08/30/2021--09:57 AM]]
Judicial Court, Saint-Etienne, First Civil Division, October 5, 2020 - No. 20/01884
Relevance:
Judicial Court
Saint-Etienne
1st Civil Division
Order
October 5, 2020
General Register: 20/01884

JurisData no. 2020-021907
Summary
In the context of a dispute between the plaintiffs in a class action represented by the BURNETT Law Firm and the COLOPLAST
company, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at the request of the BURNETT Law Firm,
issued a request for international assistance under the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970 with regard to the French company
ABISS.
The President of the 1st Civil Division of the Saint-Etienne judicial court was appointed to execute the letter rogatory.
The company ABISS argues that there are no grounds for executing the letter rogatory. It contends that the letter rogatory was
transmitted in violation of the adversarial principle, arguing that neither it nor its counsel in the United States were notified of the
request that gave rise to it, and that it was therefore unable to oppose such a request. The Order points out that, pursuant to Article
743 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, the judge in charge may refuse to execute a letter rogatory if they deem it does not fall
within their remit. The judge must refuse if it is likely to prejudice the sovereignty or security of the French State. The objection
raised by the company ABISS does not fall into either of these two categories. It is not for the appointed judge to assess the
correctness of the decision taken by the U.S. judge. The French judge is only required to ensure that the letter rogatory is properly
transmitted and executed in accordance with the guiding principles of the procedure. No irregularity is alleged in this respect, given
that all parties were notified of the convening date.
ABISS also points out that on January 19, 1987, France made a reservation designed to limit the excesses of the pre-trial
discovery of documents procedure. The Order points out that France did in fact make such a reservation with regard to the
application of Article 23 of the Convention concerning the pre-trial discovery procedure, and that in its declaration of December 24,
1989, it specified that the reservation did not apply to letters rogatory relating to documents listed exhaustively and having a direct
link with the dispute. It is therefore necessary to assess whether the requests made under the letters rogatory meet these two
conditions. In this case, the requests are formulated in general and imprecise terms, relate to a large number of documents and do
not include any specific timeframes. They aim to obtain as much information as possible on all stages in the production of the
product, without establishing a clear link with the dispute. In addition, some of the requests relate to documents that have no
connection with the U.S. dispute. Consequently, and in the presence of requests which do not relate to documents listed
exhaustively and having a direct link with the dispute, it is ruled that there are no grounds for executing the letter rogatory.
Editor's note(s):
Selection criteria: well-reasoned decision
Abstract
Civil procedure, procedure before the TGI [Tribunal de Grande Instance / Regional Court], international rogatory
commission, execution by the Regional Court, Hague convention of March 18, 1970.
Private international law, source of private international law, Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, private international
law, international rogatory commission, execution by the Regional Court: violation of the adversarial principle (no), private
international law, international rogatory commission, obtaining evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters, Hague
convention of March 18, 1970, reservation to the convention formulated by France, pre-trial discovery procedure,
documents listed exhaustively and having a direct relation to the dispute, refusal to execute the international rogatory
commission.
© LexisNexis SA
Tribunal judiciaire, Saint-Étienne, 1re chambre civile, 5 Octobre 2020 - n° 20/01884
Pertinence :
Tribunal judiciaire
Saint-Étienne
1re chambre civile
Ordonnance
5 Octobre 2020
Répertoire Général : 20/01884
JurisData n° 2020-021907
Résumé
Dans le cadre d’un litige opposant les plaignantes d’une action de groupe représentées par le cabinet BURNETT Law Firm à la société COLOPLAST, la
Cour de district des États-Unis District du Sud de la Virginie Occidentale a adressé, à la requête du cabinet BURNETT, une demande d’entraide
internationale en application de la convention de la Haye du 18 mars 1970 en ce qui concerne la société française ABISS.
La présidente de la 1re chambre civile du tribunal judiciaire de Saint-Étienne a été désigné aux fins d’exécution de la commission rogatoire.
La société ABISS soutient qu'il n’y a pas lieu à exécution de la commission rogatoire. Elle fait valoir que la commission rogatoire a été transmise en violation
du principe du contradictoire, arguant du fait que la requête à l’origine de cette commission n’a été notifiée ni à elle-même, ni à son conseil aux États-Unis et
qu'elle n’a donc pu s’opposer à une telle demande. L'ordonnance relève qu'en application de l’article 743 du Code de procédure civile, le juge commis peut
refuser l’exécution d’une commission rogatoire s’il estime qu’elle ne rentre pas dans ses attributions. Il doit la refuser si elle est de nature à porter atteinte à
la souveraineté ou à la sécurité de l’État français. Le moyen soulevé par la société ABISS ne rentre pas dans l'un de ces deux cas prévus. Il n’appartient
pas au juge commis d’apprécier la régularité de la décision prise par le juge américain. Le juge français doit seulement s’assurer de la transmission
régulière de la commission rogatoire et de son exécution dans le respect des principes directeurs du procès. Il n’est pas allégué d’irrégularité à ce titre là,
étant observé que l’ensemble des parties a été avisé de la date de convocation.
La société ABISS soulève également que le 19 janvier 1987 la France a formulé une réserve destinée à limiter les excès de la procédure de “pre-trial
discovery of documents”. L'ordonnance relève qu'effectivement la France a formulé une telle réserve relativement à l'application de l'article 23 de la
convention portant sur la procédure de pre trial discover et que par déclaration du 24 décembre 1989, elle a précisé que la réserve ne s'applique pas aux
commissions rogatoires portant sur des documents limitativement énumérés et ayant un lien direct avec le litige. Il convient donc d’apprécier si les
demandes effectuées dans le cadre de la commission rogatoire répondant à ces deux conditions. En l'espèce les demandes formulées en termes généraux
et imprécis, portent sur une nombre important de documents et ne comportent aucune précision temporelle. Elles visent à obtenir le maximum de
renseignements sur toutes les étapes de la production du produit sans que le lien avec le litige soit clairement établi. En outre, certaines portent sur des
documents sans lien avec le litige américain. Il est jugé en conséquence, et en présence de demandes qui ne portent pas sur des documents limitativement
énumérés et ayant un lien direct avec le litige, qu'il n’y a pas lieu d’exécuter la commission rogatoire.
Note(s) de la rédaction :
Critère(s) de sélection : décision très motivée
Abstract
Procédure civile, procédure devant le TGI, commission rogatoire internationale, exécution par le tribunal de grande instance, convention de la
Haye du 18 mars 1970.
Droit international privé, source du droit international privé, convention de la Haye du 18 mars 1970, droit international privé, commission
rogatoire internationale, exécution par le tribunal de grande instance : violation du principe du contradictoire (non), droit international privé,
commission rogatoire internationale, obtention des preuves à l'étranger en matière civile ou commerciale, convention de la Haye du 18 mars
1970, réserve à la convention formulée par la France, procédure de pre trial discovery, documents limitativement énumérés et ayant un lien
direct avec le litige, refus d'exécution de la commission rogatoire internationale.
© LexisNexis SA
EXHIBIT 7
1/11/24, 02:07 PM Article 745 - Code of Civil Procedure - Légifrance
FRENCH
REPUBLIC
Légifrance
The public service for the dissemination of the law
Liberty
Equality
Brotherhood
Code of Civil Procedure
Article 745
Version in force since May 11, 2017
Book I: Provisions common to all jurisdictions (Articles 1 to 749)

Title XX: Letters of Request (Articles 730 to 748)
Chapter II: International Letters of Request (Articles 734 to 748)
Section II: Letters of Request from foreign States (Articles 735 to 748)
Paragraph 1: Execution of international Letters of Request by a court (Articles 735 to 747)
Article 745 Version in force since May 11, 2017
If a Letter of Request has been transmitted improperly, the court assigned to it may, of its own motion or at the
request of the public prosecutor, refuse to execute it; at the request of the public prosecutor, it may also reverse
the measures it has already taken and annul the acts stating the execution of the Letter of Request.
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000034764463 1/1
1/11/24, 2:07 PM Article 745 - Code de procédure civile - Légifrance
Code de procédure civile

Article 745
Version en vigueur depuis le 11 mai 2017
Livre Ier : Dispositions communes à toutes les juridictions (Articles 1 à 749)

Titre XX : Les commissions rogatoires. (Articles 730 à 748)
Chapitre II : Les commissions rogatoires internationales. (Articles 734 à 748)
Section II : Commissions rogatoires en provenance de l'Etat étranger (Articles 735 à 748)
Paragraphe 1 : Exécution de la commission rogatoire internationale par le tribunal judiciaire (Articles 735 à 747)
Article 745 Version en vigueur depuis le 11 mai 2017

Si la commission rogatoire a été transmise irrégulièrement, le juge commis peut d'office ou à la demande du ministère public refuser de
l'exécuter ; il peut également, à la demande du ministère public, rapporter les mesures qu'il a déjà prises et annuler les actes constatant
l'exécution de la commission rogatoire.
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000034764463 1/1
EXHIBIT 8
1 KEITH R. HUMMEL (admitted pro hac vice)
JUSTIN C. CLARKE (admitted pro hac vice)
2 JONATHAN MOONEY (admitted pro hac vice)
3 Worldwide Plaza
4 825 Eighth Avenue
Electronically Received 08/09/2023 09:22 AM
New York, NY 10019

5 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
6
JOE TUFFAHA (Bar No. 253723)
7 joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com
9 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3950
10 Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 612-8900
11 Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
12 Attorneys for Defendant and
Cross-Complainant
13 Nouvel, LLC

15
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
16
WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and Case No. 22STCV06081
17
limited liability company, DEFENDANT AND CROSS-
18
COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S
19 Plaintiffs, FIRST AMENDED CROSS-
COMPLAINT FOR:
20 vs.
1. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
21 ANGELINA JOLIE, an individual, and WITH CONTRACTUAL
NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited RELATIONS;
22 liability company, YURI SHEFLER, an
23 individual, ALEXEY OLIYNIK, an 2. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
individual, SPI GROUP HOLDING WITH PROSPECTIVE
24 LIMITED, a Cyprus private limited ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE;
company, and TENUTE DEL MONDO
25 B.V., a Netherlands private limited 3. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
company, WITH PROSPECTIVE
26
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE;
Defendants.
27
28
NOUVEL’S FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT
1 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited 4. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
liability company, WITH PROSPECTIVE
2 ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE;
Cross-Complainant,
3 vs. 5. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
4 WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, WITH PROSPECTIVE
MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE;
OLIVIER PERRIN, an individual, SAS 6. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF
6 MIRAVAL PROVENCE, a French limited GOOD FAITH;
PERRIN, a French limited liability 7. TRESPASS TO CHATTELS;
individual, GARY BRADBURY, an 8. ABUSE OF RIGHT;
individual, SAS PETRICHOR, a French 9. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AIDING
10 limited liability company; VINS ET AND ABETTING TORTIOUS
DOMAINES PERRIN SC, a French INTERFERENCE WITH
11
company; SAS MIRAVAL STUDIOS, a CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS;
LE DOMAINE, a French limited liability 10. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AIDING
13 company; SAS DISTILLERIES DE LA AND ABETTING TORTIOUS
RIVIERA, a French limited liability INTERFERENCE WITH
14 PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
ADVANTAGE; AND
15
Cross-Defendants.
16 11. CIVIL CONSPIRACY TO
TORTIOUSLY INTERFERE
17 WITH PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
18
19 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
20 Judge: Hon. Lia Martin

Dept.: 16
21
Action Filed: February 17, 2022
22 Trial Date: None set.
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
1 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited liability company, by and through its attorneys, upon
2 knowledge as to itself and its own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters,
3 alleges against Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual; and MONDO
4 BONGO, LLC, a California limited liability company; and Cross-Defendants MARC-OLIVIER
5 PERRIN, an individual; SAS MIRAVAL PROVENCE, a French limited liability company; SAS
6 FAMILLES PERRIN, a French limited liability company; ROLAND VENTURINI, an individual;
7 GARY BRADBURY, an individual; WARREN GRANT, an individual; SAS PETRICHOR, a
8 French limited liability company; VINS ET DOMAINES PERRIN SC, a French company; SAS
9 MIRAVAL STUDIOS, a French limited liability company; SASU LE DOMAINE, a French
10 limited liability company; SAS DISTILLERIES DE LA RIVIERA, a French limited liability
11 company; and ROES 1-10 as follows:
12 NATURE OF THE ACTION
13 1. Ever since his former wife, Angelina Jolie, filed for divorce from him in 2016,
14 Brad Pitt has been engaged in a vindictive campaign to dominate and loot the wine business that
15 the couple had built and owned together. Pitt, through his investment company, Mondo Bongo,
16 holds a 50% interest in a French estate and winery named Chateau Miraval, a world-famous
17 producer of rosé wine. Nouvel, Jolie’s former investment company, owns the other 50%. As a
18 co-equal owner, Pitt enjoys precisely the same rights and obligations as Nouvel—nothing more,
19 nothing less. But Pitt refuses to accept that simple reality. Instead, following a script that may
20 play in Hollywood but not in a court of law, Pitt and his co-conspirators have engaged in
21 increasingly outrageous actions to retain control over Chateau Miraval and harm Nouvel by
22 stripping Chateau Miraval of its assets. Worse yet, Pitt has caused Chateau Miraval’s assets to be
23 transferred to other Cross-Defendants, which include Pitt’s other business ventures and his friends.
24 2. Pitt masterminded a so-far-successful plan to seize de facto control of Chateau
25 Miraval, despite lacking a controlling ownership interest. He has frozen Nouvel out of Chateau
26 Miraval and treats it as his personal fiefdom. After hijacking Chateau Miraval and its highly
27 profitable wine business, Pitt wasted the company’s assets, spending millions on vanity projects,
28 including more than $1 million on swimming pool renovations, building and rebuilding a staircase
3
1 four times, and spending millions to restore a recording studio. He has attempted—in violation of
2 written contracts—to turn over half of the value of Chateau Miraval’s most valuable assets, the
3 Miraval trademarks, to his good friend and business partner Marc Perrin—for free. Pitt continues
4 to waste the company’s assets for the benefit of his other businesses—which include a recording
5 studio called Studio Miraval, a cosmetics line called Le Domaine, and a gin brand called The
6 Gardener—by funding them with Chateau Miraval’s money and/or allowing them to use Chateau
7 Miraval’s image, premises and assets for no or below-market compensation. These unlawful
8 actions have put millions of dollars in the pockets of Pitt, his businesses ventures and his friends.
9 3. Remarkably, Pitt’s misconduct escalated after Jolie sold Nouvel to Tenute del
10 Mondo, a member of the Stoli Group, a well-established and highly successful wine and spirits
11 business. Incensed that Jolie sold Nouvel to Stoli rather than him, Pitt has acted like a petulant
12 child, refusing to treat Nouvel as an equal partner in the business. He and his co-conspirators,
13 notably Perrin, categorically refuse to allow Nouvel and Tenute to participate in any aspect of
14 Chateau Miraval’s business—even though Pitt and Nouvel have the exact same ownership interest
15 in Chateau Miraval, and Perrin has none. Keeping Nouvel in the dark has allowed Pitt and his co-
16 conspirators to expand their efforts to steal Chateau Miraval’s assets, most outrageously by
17 secretly transferring majority ownership of Chateau Miraval’s wine-making subsidiary, Miraval
18 Provence, to Perrin.
19 4. In an effort to cover up his illegal self-dealing, Pitt has tried to take the offensive,
20 employing a classic “blame the victims” strategy. He maintains that Jolie, Nouvel, and Nouvel’s
21 current owners are responsible for a business dispute that he instigated and that he continues to
22 escalate. But at every turn, Pitt has been the aggressor: in addition to seizing control of Chateau
23 Miraval—and before Jolie had even sold Nouvel to Stoli—Pitt preemptively sued Nouvel in
24 Luxembourg to try to wrest control of the company from her—an effort that he doggedly
25 continues to this day against Tenute and the Stoli Group. In this, as in his other actions, Pitt
26 simply ignores the words written in contracts he freely executed years ago and under which he
27 previously benefitted. While publicly claiming that the Stoli Group is a “hostile actor” and
28 actively attempting to besmirch the reputation of its owner, Yuri Shefler—a Russian exile who is a
4
1 long-time critic of Vladimir Putin—with a xenophobic, untrue smear campaign worthy of Putin
2 himself, Pitt and his co-conspirators, particularly Perrin, have quietly acted to solidify their control
3 over Chateau Miraval and have continued to use the business as their personal cashbox. Pitt has
4 the “hostile actor” role exactly backwards. Indeed, this very lawsuit—again based on Pitt’s
5 alternative reality in which Jolie allegedly gave him veto rights over a sale of Nouvel that appear
6 nowhere in their written agreements or communications—was initiated by Pitt, not Nouvel.
7 5. Lately, Pitt has shifted his public relations campaign, claiming that Shefler and the
8 Stoli Group are trying to evict him from his “family home” and eject him from the business that he
9 “built”. Talk about fantasy. This is a fight about money and corporate control, not a fight over a
10 family home. Pitt seeks to exert total and absolute control over Chateau Miraval and its profitable
11 wine business, ignoring that, legally, he co-owns it with Tenute del Monde. The chateau is no
12 one’s “home”. Pitt is not a French citizen who keeps the chateau as his domicile. And the notion
13 that Chateau Miraval was the Pitt-Jolie family home died back in 2016 when Pitt terrorized his
14 wife and children in a drunken rage while en route from the chateau to Pitt’s true home—
15 Hollywood.
16 6. Equally ludicrous is the idea that the Stoli Group is trying to take away a business
17 that Pitt “built”. Pitt is an actor, not a winemaker. He deals in illusions, not dirt and grapes.
18 During the years that he allegedly “built” the business, he filmed and appeared in dozens of
19 movies, not to mention making countless promotional appearances, jetting-setting around the
20 world for movie premieres, and attending Hollywood parties. While he no doubt visited the
21 vineyards to admire the work of the French laborers who actually made the business successful,
22 Pitt is no vigneron.
23 7. Pitt’s distortion of his work in the fields is similar to the grandiosity with which he
24 describes the work of Perrin and Familles Perrin. While no one would question the bona fides of
25 the Perrins’ wine-making skills, their motivations here are entirely selfish. The Perrins were
26 already generously compensated for making and managing sales of Chateau Miraval’s products,
27 through contracts that paid them handsomely and through their 50% ownership of Miraval
28 Provence, which they obtained without any cash investment whatsoever. Apparently that’s not
5
1 enough for them. Despite what the contracts say, Perrin thinks he is entitled to more—far more.
2 8. But that is not how things work—when you have a contract, you have to abide by
3 it. And based on documents recently made public, it turns out that for years the Perrins have been
4 charging Miraval Provence and Chateau Miraval far more than industry standard rates for their
5 services. In other words, not only do the Perrins want more than they own, they already have been
6 taking advantage of Chateau Miraval for many years. Pitt may not know (or care) what he should
7 be paying Perrin, but Stoli does. And that provides yet another motivation for Pitt’s and Perrin’s
8 obfuscation and obstruction: they understand that if Stoli is allowed to participate in the business
9 and access its books and records, then their cozy little arrangement—which benefits Pitt and
10 Perrin, but not Stoli—will be exposed for what it is, a blatant money grab.
11 9. Nouvel files this Cross-Complaint to seek redress for the illegal and malicious
12 actions of Pitt and his co-conspirators. Those actions are designed to injure Nouvel by devaluing
13 its investments and depriving Nouvel of its proper co-equal role in the management of Chateau
14 Miraval. This amended cross-complaint lays bare the true nature of Pitt’s egregious misconduct.
15 To be clear, it is Pitt and his cronies—and not Jolie, Nouvel, Tenute, Shefler or the Stoli Group—
16 who have acted in a hostile, destructive, and illegal manner. But the Cross-Defendants have, to
17 Nouvel’s great harm.
18 The Rise of Chateau Miraval
19 10. In 2008, Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie purchased Chateau Miraval, a 1300-acre
20 country estate in the south of France, through their respective investment holding companies,
21 Mondo Bongo and Nouvel. The property consists of a manor house, vineyards, and numerous
22 other buildings.
23 11. Pitt and Jolie set out to rejuvenate Chateau Miraval’s then-modest wine business,
24 jointly investing tens of millions of dollars on improvements to the property. In 2013, Chateau
25 Miraval entered into a winemaking business venture with Familles Perrin, a well-known French
26 winemaker, to make and market Chateau Miraval’s wine. That partnership, called Miraval
27 Provence, is led by Marc Perrin, the President of Familles Perrin, but was organized to be owned
28 50% by Chateau Miraval and 50% by Familles Perrin. By agreement between them as a couple
6
1 and later as wife and husband, Jolie continued her humanitarian work, took care of their children,
2 and was entrusted with pursing the couple’s extensive philanthropic work worldwide, including
3 for the Jolie-Pitt foundation, while oversight of the couple’s investment in Chateau Miraval was
4 left in the hands of Pitt.
5 12. Supported by Pitt’s and Jolie’s celebrity and Perrin’s winemaking expertise,
6 Chateau Miraval’s wine business flourished, generating tens of millions of dollars in profits. In
7 2013, Chateau Miraval’s rosé was named the “best rosé of the year” by Wine Spectator magazine.
8 As the esteem for Chateau Miraval’s wines grew, so too did the value of the business. Its
9 trademarks, linked to leading celebrities Pitt and Jolie and to its award-winning rosé wine, became
10 its most valuable assets, worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
11 Jolie Files for Divorce
12 13. But all was not well. Pitt developed a publicly acknowledged alcohol abuse
13 problem. In 2016, after a serious and internationally publicized incident between Pitt, Jolie, and
14 the couple’s children on a plane trip from France to California, Jolie filed for divorce.
15 Pitt Retaliates By Seizing Control of Chateau Miraval
16 14. In retaliation for the divorce and custody proceedings, Pitt embarked on a multi-
17 faceted, years-long campaign to seize control of Chateau Miraval and appropriate the company’s
18 assets for his benefit and that of his own companies and friends. It did not matter to Pitt that his
19 rights as a 50% owner were co-equal to those of Jolie. Pitt credited himself for the wine’s success
20 and viewed control of Chateau Miraval as his personal entitlement. Appointing himself the
21 rightful owner of Chateau Miraval, his twin objectives were to usurp the value of Jolie’s company,
22 Nouvel, and to obtain sole control over Chateau Miraval and its profitable wine business.
23 15. To do so, Pitt conspired with his agents—Cross-Defendants Gary Bradbury,
24 Roland Venturini, and Warren Grant, each of whom owes his livelihood to Pitt—to take control of
25 Chateau Miraval’s governance and conspired with his business partners, Cross-Defendants Marc
26 Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence, to take control of Chateau Miraval’s wine business.
27 16. At first, Pitt simply continued to operate Chateau Miraval without consulting with
28 Jolie. But because much of Jolie’s personal wealth and liquidity was tied up in Chateau Miraval
7
1 through Nouvel, Jolie and Nouvel logically sought to get more information about, and to play a
2 greater role in, Chateau Miraval’s finances and operations.
3 17. Jolie’s efforts were consistently rebuffed by Pitt, who treated Chateau Miraval as
4 his personal property. That was, and remains, incorrect. Chateau Miraval is legally owned by a
5 Luxembourg entity named Quimicum, in which Nouvel and Mondo Bongo each own an equal
6 50% interest. Yet, because Pitt has installed his own loyalists in management positions at Chateau
7 Miraval, he has improperly blocked Jolie and Nouvel from obtaining information about or
8 managing the company. The directors and managers of the business run all decisions by Pitt;
9 nothing happens with respect to the company without his direct involvement and approval.
10 To Retain Control Over Chateau Miraval, Pitt Rebuffs All Efforts To Cooperate
11 18. As part of the division of labor within their relationship and later their marriage,
12 Pitt had historically managed the couple’s investment in Chateau Miraval and had full access to
13 the business records of the company, despite not holding a position as a director, officer or
14 employee. But, as an indirect owner, he has no greater legal right to the company’s business
15 records or to manage the business than Jolie herself did. A few years after the divorce, however,
16 Pitt began refusing to grant Jolie or Nouvel equal access to Chateau Miraval’s records or an equal
17 voice over management, effectively blocking Jolie and Nouvel from exercising equal oversight of
18 the company. Pitt’s consistent position is that, despite the documents that definitively establish
19 that Mondo Bongo and Nouvel are pari passu with respect to Chateau Miraval, he alone, through
20 Mondo Bongo, is entitled to control the business. That fundamental misunderstanding lies at the
21 heart of this dispute.
22 19. Faced with this untenable situation, Jolie proposed to Pitt that each of them have
23 equal representation on Quimicum’s board to reflect their equal ownership interests in Quimicum
24 and, indirectly, Chateau Miraval. Pitt rejected this reasonable proposal out of hand, and used his
25 50% interest to prevent the election of directors to Quimicum. Pitt pretends that he was amenable
26 to putting a neutral board in place, but his solution was to appoint his Hollywood business
27 manager, Warren Grant, to run the business. Pitt knew full well that Nouvel would reject this
28 “proposal”. Pitt also understood that his refusal to cooperate would render Quimicum inactive
8
1 because under Luxembourg law it cannot act without any directors. That left Pitt and Chateau
2 Miraval without supervision because a directorless Quimicum could not oversee Chateau Miraval.
3 20. Pitt’s control over Chateau Miraval was and is absolute. In 2021, when one of
4 Chateau Miraval’s three directors resigned, the other two directors—Pitt’s vassals Bradbury and
5 Venturini—appointed Grant, who has no wine business experience, as a Chateau Miraval director.
6 When that ploy failed because Grant’s appointment expired after it could not be made permanent,
7 Pitt categorically refused to permit the appointment of a neutral director, knowing that under
8 French law the company’s board could not act without three directors. And because Pitt had
9 engineered a deadlock at Quimicum, that company was powerless to rectify the situation.
10 21. Chateau Miraval’s wine business generates tens of millions of dollars in profits.
11 But Pitt ensured that Jolie and Nouvel would never see a dime of that money. Instead, Pitt,
12 Bradbury, and Venturini improperly diverted millions in dividends paid to Chateau Miraval from
13 the Miraval Provence wine business to Pitt’s personal projects that lacked any legitimate business
14 purpose, including spending over a million euros of the business’ funds on a swimming pool,
15 nearly a million euros a year constantly rebuilding stone walls using stone masons from Croatia,
16 close to three million euros on “garment work”, and more money to build and rebuild a staircase—
17 four times. Pitt also caused Chateau Miraval to expend funds, make loans or provide other in-kind
18 support to Pitt’s other investments, including Studio Miraval, Le Domaine and The Gardner Gin,
19 each of which Pitt structured so that Nouvel has no direct ownership interest. The only reason he
20 could favor his own businesses is because of his unlawful conduct to exclude Nouvel.
21 Pitt Misappropriates Chateau Miraval’s Trademarks
22 22. But there’s far more. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant have conspired with
23 Familles Perrin and Marc Perrin to misappropriate the immense value of Chateau Miraval’s
24 trademarks. Miraval Provence is contractually bound not to register Chateau Miraval’s
25 trademarks as its own. But at Pitt’s and the Perrin parties’ direction, Miraval Provence has
26 improperly registered Chateau Miraval’s trademarks all over the world, including in the United
27 States. Pitt and Perrin have offered inconsistent explanations for these registrations: Pitt’s
28 representatives stated that these transfers were undertaken in connection with a possible business
9
1 deal with a luxury goods brand, but Perrin claims that the express purpose of these improper
2 registrations was to transfer 50% of the ownership of the marks to his company, Familles Perrin,
3 because he “deserved it”. Chateau Miraval received no compensation for these registrations, and
4 Chateau Miraval’s directors, Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant, who had a duty to protect the
5 trademarks, were willing participants in this scheme to strip Chateau Miraval of its assets.
6 23. These improper trademark registrations have devastating financial consequences
7 for Nouvel. Although Nouvel holds a 50% economic interest in Chateau Miraval, it holds only a
8 25% economic interest in Miraval Provence because Miraval Provence is equally co-owned by
9 Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin. By permitting Miraval Provence to register the Chateau
10 Miraval trademarks, Pitt has sought to reduce the value of Chateau Miraval’s assets by hundreds
11 of millions of dollars, cut the value of Nouvel’s economic interest in the trademarks in half, and
12 deprive Nouvel of any proceeds that should have come to it from a legitimate sale of any marks.
13 Jolie Exits the Business
14 24. Jolie was already increasingly uncomfortable participating in an alcohol business.
15 In addition, given the events that led to her filing for divorce, neither she nor any of the children
16 felt able to return to the chateau. Combined with Pitt’s actions confirming that he had no intention
17 of sharing control of Chateau Miraval with her, Jolie decided to sell Nouvel.
18 25. Jolie was not obligated to sell Nouvel to Pitt. She nevertheless offered to sell her
19 interest to him and negotiated with him for months. Nearing a deal, Pitt’s hubris got the better of
20 him: he made an eleventh-hour demand for onerous and irrelevant conditions, including a
21 provision designed to prohibit Jolie from publicly speaking about the events that had led to the
22 breakdown of their marriage. Pitt knew that much of Jolie’s wealth and liquidity were tied up in
23 Nouvel and used that fact to try to force Jolie to agree to his unreasonable terms.
24 26. Luckily for Jolie, other companies were interested in acquiring Nouvel and its
25 interest in Chateau Miraval. In October 2021—after Pitt ignored Jolie’s final offer to sell her
26 interest in the winery on the same terms Pitt had proposed but without the hush clause—she sold
27 Nouvel to Tenute del Mondo, a subsidiary of Stoli Group, an international wine and spirits
28 company. Tenute was the proverbial white knight that solved everyone’s problems: it allowed
10
1 Jolie to liquidate her investment for the benefit of her family, freed Pitt and Jolie from having to
2 do business with their former spouses, and put in place a substantial industry player that, through
3 its capitalization, experience and networks, would increase the prestige, distribution and
4 profitability of Chateau Miraval, making Pitt a substantially richer man.
5 Stoli Seeks To Collaborate with Pitt
6 27. Stoli and Tenute immediately got to work trying to support Chateau Miraval’s wine
7 business and forge a productive business relationship with Pitt and Perrin. Stoli has vast
8 experience in making and selling alcoholic beverages, including luxury vodkas, wines, whiskeys
9 and tequilas, and an extensive global distribution network. Stoli offered to put its experience and
10 its powerful distribution capabilities to work to take Chateau Miraval to the next level.
11 28. Perrin initially appeared receptive to Stoli’s participation in Chateau Miraval’s
12 wine business. But it soon became clear that Pitt would not agree to relinquish his absolute
13 control over Chateau Miraval and that Perrin, Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant, despite
14 understanding the advantages Stoli brought to the table, would do whatever Pitt told them to do.
15 Later, it became clear that Perrin himself was a troublemaker because he desires a greater
16 ownership interest in the Chateau Miraval wine business than he legally possesses.
17 Pitt Turns His Fire on Stoli Group
18 29. Unwilling to share control, Pitt refused to work with either Stoli or Nouvel as an
19 equal partner. Stoli was shocked: It made no sense for Pitt to reject an experienced alcohol
20 company with a worldwide distribution network. It became apparent that Pitt was not acting
21 rationally, a development that Stoli had not expected. Despite Pitt’s obviously emotional
22 reaction—fueled at least in part by his animosity toward Jolie—Stoli and Nouvel made several
23 proposals to allow the parties to work together, including offering to resolve the shareholder
24 deadlock at Quimicum and to return normal governance to both Quimicum and Chateau Miraval.
25 30. Pitt rejected all of Stoli’s overtures. He sent lawyers to business meetings who read
26 messages from scripts and refused to engage in any discussion about the business. He repeatedly
27 rejected proposals for co-equal governance of Quimicum, and sent representatives to tell Stoli’s
28 executives that Pitt would not even talk to them unless Nouvel gave Pitt legal control over
11
1 Quimicum. Pitt pugnaciously refuses to cooperate with Stoli to this day, rejecting any overture by
2 the Stoli Group to be involved in the business.
3 31. In the meantime, Pitt and Perrin formed an alliance to allow each other to profit
4 financially by diverting Chateau Miraval’s value towards themselves and away from Quimicum
5 and Nouvel. With the help of Pitt’s lackeys, Bradbury, Venturini and Grant, they used Chateau
6 Miraval’s brand name to benefit their own businesses in which Nouvel has no interest. And in a
7 shocking development that came to light only in June 2023, they caused Chateau Miraval to
8 transfer three of its shares in Miraval Provence to Familles Perrin, thereby making Familles Perrin
9 the controlling shareholder in the joint venture—all without ever consulting Quimicum or Nouvel.
10 32. Also, in 2023, Pitt also orchestrated a fraudulent election of Bradbury, Venturini
11 and two others as Chateau Miraval’s directors to tighten his grip on the company.
12 33. Pitt is desperate to shift attention from his own bad behavior, including the well-
13 publicized, alcohol-fueled confrontation with Jolie and his children on a private plane flight that
14 precipitated the end of his marriage. His principal vehicle to do so has been to make assertions
15 against Stoli that are both false and inflammatory.
16 34. One of Pitt’s lies is his suggestion that Stoli Group’s owner, Shefler, is an ally of
17 Vladimir Putin. In reality, ever since Shefler rebuilt Stoli from the ashes of its Soviet predecessor
18 into a profitable business, he has been in open conflict with Putin and Russia. Stoli has been
19 locked in litigation with the Putin regime for decades over control of the Stolichnaya vodka
20 trademarks. Shefler and Stoli have repeatedly and publicly denounced the Putin regime and its
21 reprehensible invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s people once even tried to kidnap Shefler. For Pitt to
22 suggest that Shefler—who has been fighting Putin for decades—is in fact a Putin ally is truly
23 outrageous. In reality, Shefler is a highly regarded figure in the industry who is known for his
24 firm opposition to the Putin regime. Shefler and Stoli (and its affiliates) have over the years been
25 welcomed with open arms by some of the top names in the wine world such as the Italian wine
26 royalty Frescobaldi Family and Michael Mondavi, and some of the top companies in the drinks
27 world such as PepsiCo, Pernod Ricard, Allied Domecq, and Diageo.
28 35. Pitt is gaslighting, claiming that he is the victim in order to cover up the harm he
12
1 intentionally caused to his ex-wife and to Nouvel (excluding them from the business and holding
2 the most significant part of her net worth hostage) and the business (asset stripping and foolish
3 spending). But Pitt should look in the mirror because it is he, and not the Stoli Group, who carries
4 baggage, some of it recent front-page news, that is detrimental to Chateau Miraval’s business.
5 Who really has to launder his reputation?
6 36. It is time for Pitt, Mondo Bongo, and their co-conspirators to be held to account for
7 their illegal conduct. Among other relief, Nouvel seeks at least $350 million in damages to
8 compensate it for Cross-Defendants’ unlawful and oppressive conduct.
9 THE PARTIES AND OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES
10 37. SA Chateau Miraval (“Chateau Miraval”) is a French company that owns a 1300-
11 acre wine-producing estate in the south of France that has its last registered office at F-83570
12 Correns, Domaine de Miraval, France.
13 38. Quimicum S.à r.l. (“Quimicum”) is a limited liability company organized and
14 existing under the laws of Luxembourg that has its registered office at 17 boulevard F.W.
15 Raiffeisen, L-2411 Luxembourg (Cloche d’Or), Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Quimicum owns
16 the shares of Chateau Miraval.
17 39. Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC (“Nouvel”) is a limited liability
18 company organized and existing under the laws of California that has its registered office at
19 500 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600, Sacramento, California 95814. Nouvel owns a 50% interest in
20 Quimicum. Angelina Jolie was the sole member of Nouvel until October 2021, at which time
21 Jolie transferred her 100% interest in Nouvel to Defendant Tenute Del Mondo B.V. (“Tenute”).
22 40. Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant William B. Pitt is an individual residing in Los
23 Angeles, California.
24 41. Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mondo Bongo, LLC (“Mondo Bongo”) is a limited
25 liability company organized and existing under the laws of California that has its registered office
26 at 9100 Wilshire Boulevard, STE 1000W, Beverly Hills, California 90212. Mondo Bongo owns a
27 50% interest in Quimicum. Pitt is the sole member of Mondo Bongo, holding 100% of its
28 membership interest, and is also its sole manager. In practice Mondo Bongo acts exclusively
13
1 through agents other than Pitt, including its Luxembourgish counsel. Nevertheless, Pitt controls
2 and directs Mondo Bongo. He uses Mondo Bongo as his agent, including to perform acts intended
3 to harm Nouvel as described herein.
4 42. Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin (“Marc Perrin”) is an individual with a
5 business office at La Ferrière – Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
6 43. Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Provence (“Miraval Provence”) is a limited liability
7 company organized and existing under the laws of France that has its registered office at La
8 Ferrière – Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
9 44. Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin (“Familles Perrin”) is a limited liability
10 company organized and existing under the laws of France that has its registered office at La
11 Ferrière – Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
12 45. Cross-Defendant Roland Venturini is an individual residing at F-83570 Correns,
13 Domaine de Miraval, France. Venturini is a director of Chateau Miraval, resides at the estate, and
14 serves as its Chairman and CEO.
15 46. Cross-Defendant Gary Bradbury is an individual residing at South View, Roman
16 Road, Burcott, Hereford 1HR 1JL, United Kingdom. Bradbury is a director of Chateau Miraval
17 and serves as one of its employees.
18 47. Cross-Defendant Warren Grant is an individual with a business address at 9100
19 Wilshire Boulevard, STE 1000W, Beverly Hills, California 90212. Grant acts as Pitt’s agent,
20 including with respect to the Chateau Miraval business.
21 48. Cross-Defendant SAS Petrichor (“Petrichor”) is a limited liability company
22 organized and existing under the laws of France that has its registered address at 2321 Route de
23 Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
24 49. Cross-Defendants Vins et Domaines Perrin is a company organized and existing
25 under the laws of France that has its registered address at Route de Jonquières, Château du Grand
26 Prébois 84100, Orange, France.
27 50. Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Studios (“Miraval Studios”) is a limited liability
28 company organized and existing under the laws of France that has its registered address at
14
1 Domaine de Miraval, 83570 Correns, France.
2 51. Cross-Defendant SASU Le Domaine is a limited liability company organized and
3 existing under the laws of France that has its registered address at 49 Crs Mirabeau 13100, Aix-en-
4 Provence, France.
5 52. Cross-Defendant SAS Distilleries de la Riviera is a limited liability company
6 organized and existing under the laws of France that has its registered address at 2321 Route de
7 Jonquières, 84100 Orange, France.
8 53. The names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, or otherwise, of Cross-
9 Defendants named herein as Roes 1 through 10, inclusive, are unknown to Cross-Complainant.
10 Cross-Complainant therefore sues said Cross-Defendants by fictitious names. Cross-
11 Complainants will amend this Cross-Complaint to substitute the true names and capacities of such
12 Roes when they have been ascertained.
13 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
14 54. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Pitt under California Code of Civil
15 Procedure § 410.10, because he conducted business in, is a resident of, and/or committed the acts
16 alleged herein in California.
17 55. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Mondo Bongo under California Code of
18 Civil Procedure § 410.10, because Mondo Bongo is a limited liability company organized and
19 existing under the laws of California with its principal place of business in California, and/or
20 because it committed the acts alleged herein in California.
21 56. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Perrin under California Code of Civil
22 Procedure § 410.10, because he committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects in, California
23 by directing communications to California residents, Pitt and Mondo Bongo, including to discuss,
24 perpetrate and further the acts alleged herein with the intention to harm Nouvel, a California
25 resident. Perrin purposefully availed himself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise
26 out of or relate to Perrin’s forum-related contacts.
27 57. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Familles Perrin under California Code of
28 Civil Procedure § 410.10, because it committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects in,
15
1 California by directing communications to California residents, Pitt and Mondo Bongo, including
2 to discuss, perpetrate and further the acts alleged herein with the intention to harm Nouvel, a
3 California resident. Familles Perrin also supplies wine products to the United States, including
4 California. Familles Perrin purposefully availed itself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of
5 action arise out of or relate to Familles Perrin’s forum-related contacts.
6 58. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Miraval Provence under California Code
7 of Civil Procedure § 410.10, because it committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects in,
10 California resident. Miraval Provence also supplies wine products to the United States, including
11 California. Miraval Provence purposefully availed itself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of
12 action arise out of or relate to Miraval Provence’s forum-related contacts.
13 59. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Venturini under California Code of Civil
17 resident. Venturini purposefully availed himself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of action
18 arise out of or relate to Venturini’s forum-related contacts.
19 60. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Bradbury under California Code of Civil
23 resident. Bradbury purposefully availed himself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise
24 out of or relate to Bradbury’s forum-related contacts.
25 61. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Grant under California Code of Civil
26 Procedure § 410.10, because he conducted business in, is a resident of, and/or committed the acts
27 alleged herein in California.
28 62. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Petrichor under California Code of Civil
16
1 Procedure § 410.10, because it committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects in, California
4 resident. Petrichor purposefully availed itself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise
5 out of or relate to Petrichor’s forum-related contacts.
6 63. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Vins et Domaines Perrin under California
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10, because it committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects
8 in, California by directing communications to California residents, Pitt and Mondo Bongo,
9 including to discuss, perpetrate and further the acts alleged herein with the intention to harm
10 Nouvel, a California resident. Vins et Domaines Perrin purposefully availed itself of the forum,
11 and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of or relate to Vins et Domaines Perrin’s forum-related
12 contacts.
13 64. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Miraval Studios under California Code of
17 California resident. Miraval Studios purposefully availed itself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s
18 causes of action arise out of or relate to Miraval Studios’s forum-related contacts.
19 65. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Le Domaine under California Code of
23 California resident. Le Domaine purposefully availed itself of the forum, and Plaintiff’s causes of
24 action arise out of or relate to Le Domaine’s forum-related contacts.
25 66. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Distilleries de la Riviera under California
26 Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10, because it committed the acts alleged herein in, or with effects
27 in, California by directing communications to California residents, Pitt and Mondo Bongo,
28 including to discuss, perpetrate and further the acts alleged herein with the intention to harm
17
1 Nouvel, a California resident. Distilleries de la Riviera purposefully availed itself of the forum,
2 and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of or relate to Distilleries de la Riviera’s forum-related
3 contacts.
4 67. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Cross-Plaintiff asserts claims
5 under California law and the amount in controversy far exceeds this Court’s jurisdictional
6 minimum of $25,000.
7 68. Venue is proper under California Code of Civil Procedure § 395(a) because Pitt and
8 Mondo Bongo reside in the County of Los Angeles, California.
9 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
10 I. Pitt and Jolie Purchase Chateau Miraval and Revitalize Its Wine Business
11 69. In 2008, Pitt and Jolie decided to make a joint investment in a French wine-making
12 chateau as a business investment and to use as a family home. They identified a candidate:
13 Chateau Miraval, a 35-room chateau with 1300 acres of grounds and vineyards in the south of
14 France. After touring the property, the couple decided that it was a perfect choice.
15 70. They purchased the property through holding companies. Pitt’s company, which he
16 wholly owns, is named Mondo Bongo, after the song “Mondo Bongo” that was part of the
17 soundtrack for the Pitt and Jolie movie Mr. and Mrs. Smith. Jolie’s company, which she wholly
18 owned at the time, is named Nouvel.
19 71. The couple did not buy the estate directly. The property was owned by the
20 eponymous French company, Chateau Miraval, which was in turn wholly owned by the
21 Luxembourgish company Quimicum. Pitt and Jolie purchased all the shares of Quimicum for
22 €25 million, thereby also acquiring Chateau Miraval. Mondo Bongo purchased 60% of
23 Quimicum’s shares, and Nouvel purchased 40% of Quimicum’s shares, based on the funds then
24 available to Pitt and Jolie for investments.
25 72. The couple always intended that Pitt and Jolie would be equal owners. To
26 effectuate that agreement, in 2013, Pitt voluntarily caused Mondo Bongo pursuant to a valid and
27 binding contract between it and Nouvel to transfer 10% of the outstanding shares of Quimicum to
28 Nouvel. This transaction made Nouvel and Mondo Bongo equal 50-50 owners of Quimicum and
18
1 Pitt and Jolie equal indirect co-owners of Chateau Miraval. The transfer was perfectly legal and
2 proper, and the couple treated it as such for nearly eight years, until Pitt’s Luxembourgish lawyers
3 dreamed up a bogus argument, discussed below, that the transaction was void.
4 73. When Jolie and Pitt purchased Chateau Miraval, its wine business was run by a
5 hobbyist and was not generating a profit. They quickly got to work investing in the business and
6 making improvements to the property. In 2009, Jolie caused Nouvel to loan €4 million to
7 Quimicum, which provided much-needed money to Chateau Miraval to fund improvements. Pitt
8 was aware of this loan and caused Mondo Bongo to enter into a similar arrangement.
9 74. To improve the quality of its winemaking, Chateau Miraval entered into a business
10 relationship with Familles Perrin in March 2013. Familles Perrin is owned and run by one of
11 France’s most successful winemaking families, and is the maker of numerous well-known wines
12 including the famous Rhone wine, Chateau de Beaucastel. Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin
13 created a new entity, Miraval Provence, as a joint venture to operate the estate’s vineyards, and to
14 market and distribute the wine produced at Chateau Miraval. Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin
15 each held a 50% stake in Miraval Provence upon incorporation. Marc Perrin was appointed, and
16 continues to serve, as the President of both Miraval Provence and Familles Perrin.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
19
1 75. The diagram below depicts the ownership structure of these entities:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 76. Under the Miraval Provence business agreement, Chateau Miraval cultivated the
20 estate’s vineyard, harvested its grapes, and produced wine, while Familles Perrin provided
21 winemaking technical assistance and aged, bottled, and sold the wine. Pitt and Jolie loaned their
22 Hollywood star-power to support the wine’s marketing efforts.
23 77. This arrangement called for constant communication between Perrin, in France, and
24 Pitt, in California. For example, Perrin sent Pitt an email brainstorming about their options for
25 Chateau Miraval’s new wine labels and bottles. As Perrin explained to Pitt, the joint venture “had
26 an opportunity to use a ‘very new’ type of bottle that was ‘not used in [P]rovence (where 90% are
27 Bordeaux shapes like the one currently used by [Chateau Miraval S.A.])’”. Pitt responded to
28
20
1 Perrin that he thought the idea was “fantastic”.
2 78. Although Pitt was happy to lend his talent for image-management and self-
3 promotion to the marketing side of the business, he is not, and has never been, a winemaker.
4 Contrary to the image he projects in the press, to no one’s surprise, Pitt does not spend his time
5 toiling in the vineyards. Instead, while he is off making blockbuster movies, Perrin and others
6 have assumed the day-to-day responsibility of actually making Miraval’s wine. Perrin continues
7 to be heavily involved in developing Chateau Miraval’s long-term business strategy and image,
8 and regularly communicates directly with Pitt in California regarding the same, including
9 concerning marketing strategy.
10 79. The business venture between Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin was a success.
11 Wine Spectator magazine ranked the 2012 Chateau Miraval Rosé as the “best rosé in the world”.
12 The wine was also included in the magazine’s influential list of the 100 top wines, a distinction
13 that had not previously been awarded to a rosé. Reflecting the accolades the wine garnered,
14 Miraval Provence’s profits grew, from around €1 million in 2013 to around €15 million in 2022.
15 80. The value of Chateau Miraval’s brands and trademarks grew with the wine’s
16 success. These brands include “Miraval”, “Chateau Miraval”, “Miraval Côtes de Provence”, and
17 variations of these marks. Chateau Miraval’s trademarks are now among its most valuable assets,
18 estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of euros. Chateau Miraval has registered its valuable
19 trademarks in France, the United States, and other countries around the world.
20 81. In light of their immense value, Chateau Miraval took steps to protect its
21 trademarks from misuse or misappropriation by Perrin or Miraval Provence. Through an
22 agreement signed by Marc Perrin, Miraval Provence specifically acknowledged that trademarks
23 and trade names connected to Chateau Miraval’s products belong exclusively to Chateau Miraval.
24 Miraval Provence also committed not to register any of those trademarks or trade names or any
25 variation thereof that includes the term “Miraval” or any similar term. These provisions were
26 included to ensure that the value of the trademarks would remain with Chateau Miraval.
27 82. Amidst the initial success of their investment, Pitt and Jolie married at Chateau
28 Miraval on August 23, 2014, surrounded by a small group of friends and family.
21
1 83. As is the case with many families, the couple divided up responsibilities. Pitt was
2 entrusted with overseeing the couple’s investment in Chateau Miraval. Jolie assumed primary
3 responsibility for raising their six children and was entrusted with leading the couple’s
4 international philanthropic efforts, including in Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Namibia, through the
5 Jolie-Pitt Foundation, which she headed.
6 84. Pitt named two of his associates, Bradbury and Venturini, both of whom owe their
7 livelihoods to Pitt, as directors and officers of Chateau Miraval. Pitt first hired Bradbury as a
8 security guard at Chateau Miraval shortly after the 2008 acquisition, and appointed him Deputy
9 General Manager of Chateau Miraval in 2010. Pitt originally hired Venturini to manage Pitt’s
10 properties in the United States, and made him Chairman and CEO of Chateau Miraval in 2015.
11 85. Pitt’s Hollywood business manager, Grant, acted as Pitt’s main point of contact in
12 negotiations with Nouvel, and he corresponded with Chateau Miraval’s European counsel while
13 he was in California. Grant participated directly in discussions concerning Mondo Bongo’s
14 transfer of 10% of its shares in Quimicum to Nouvel throughout late 2013, and he was the person
15 who ultimately notified counsel in December 2013 that Pitt had approved the share transfer.
16 86. Grant continues to act as Pitt’s representative concerning Chateau Miraval business
17 matters, including in correspondence with Nouvel. For example, when Pitt decided to hire
18 Venturini to work at Chateau Miraval in 2015, Grant communicated to Nouvel that Pitt planned to
19 pay his salary. Grant has also been involved in both obtaining advice from and providing
20 direction to Pitt’s and Chateau Miraval’s counsel, auditors, and accountants. For example, on
21 August 18, 2016, Chateau Miraval’s accountant emailed Chateau Miraval’s cash flow report at the
22 end of July 2016 to Grant and others. Grant himself emailed the accountant on November 16,
23 2017, to inform him that “Brad has approved a salary of 2,000 Euros per month from Miraval to
24 Roland similar to what we did for Gary [to] qualify Roland for social/medical services in France”.
25 Grant also received correspondence in May 2019 concerning Chateau Miraval’s accounting firm.
26 II. After Jolie Files for Divorce, Pitt Wrongfully Seizes Absolute Control of
27 Chateau Miraval and Moves To Financially Harm Nouvel and Jolie.
28 87. Despite the success of their wine business, Pitt and Jolie’s personal relationship
22
1 was suffering. Over the years, Pitt developed an addiction to alcohol, which resulted in
2 increasingly destructive behavior towards Jolie and the rest of their family.
3 88. Things came to a head on a private plane trip from France to the United States on
4 September 14, 2016. As has been widely reported and documented in recently released FBI
5 records and confirmed by Jolie in these proceedings, during the flight, Pitt, who reportedly
6 consumed multiple alcoholic beverages, took Jolie to the bathroom. As they argued, Pitt grabbed
7 Jolie by the head, shaking her, and pushed her into the bathroom wall. Pitt also punched the
8 ceiling of the plane four times and told her, “You’re fucking up this family”. As noted in the FBI
9 investigative report, when their children asked, “Are you OK, Mommy?”, Pitt replied “No, she’s
10 not OK. She’s ruining this family. She’s crazy”. And when one of their children confronted Pitt,
11 Pitt lunged at the child. Jolie held Pitt back, but in the process suffered injuries to her back and
12 elbows. Over the remainder of the flight, Pitt continued to rant, and poured beer on Jolie and the
13 children as they tried to sleep. When the flight landed and Jolie told Pitt that she was taking the
14 kids to a hotel to rest, Pitt refused to let the family leave the plane for 20 minutes, yelled “You’re
15 not taking my fucking kids”, and pushed Jolie.
16 89. Five days later, Jolie filed for divorce.
17 A. Pitt Blocks Jolie and Nouvel from Participation in Chateau Miraval
18 90. In the aftermath of Jolie’s divorce filing, Pitt began excluding her from the joint
19 investment entirely. He stopped consulting with Jolie on any aspect of Chateau Miraval and
20 withheld important information about the business and its investment decisions from her. This
21 gave him absolute de facto control of the property, and he took full advantage of it.
22 91. As the divorce proceedings progressed, however, Jolie began to turn more of her
23 attention to the business aspects of Chateau Miraval, as she was no longer comfortable leaving the
24 management and supervision of her largest investment primarily in the hands of Pitt. Moreover,
25 Chateau Miraval had never distributed any of the business’ profits to its shareholders and was
26 expending large sums of money on projects that did not appear to have a legitimate business
27 purpose. Jolie began to insist on receiving information about Chateau Miraval’s finances and
28 began exercising a greater degree of supervision over its business.

23
1 92. When Pitt quashed these efforts, Jolie retained Christophe Salin as an advisor.
2 Salin had worked in the wine business for over 30 years, and was the former Chairman and CEO
3 of Domaines Barons de Rothschild (Lafite), a maker of world class wines including the Bordeaux
4 first-growth Lafite Rothschild. Jolie introduced Salin to Perrin and explained that she was
5 bringing him in to allow her to be more involved in and informed about the business of which she
6 was a 50% owner. On September 30, 2019, Nouvel requested a shareholder meeting to appoint
7 Salin to Quimicum’s board. But Mondo Bongo stonewalled, refusing to hold a meeting.
8 Ultimately, no vote took place on Nouvel’s proposal.
9 93. Despite repeated requests, Pitt also refused to provide Nouvel with equal access to
10 the company’s records. But Pitt had no right to block Nouvel from reviewing Chateau Miraval’s
11 records. He was in the same position as Jolie—both were indirect owners, through Mondo Bongo
12 and Nouvel, respectively, of half the company (Quimicum) that owned Chateau Miraval—and
13 therefore both had the same right to access the company’s books and records. But Pitt stubbornly
14 refused to provide Nouvel with the same level of access to information that he himself enjoys. In
15 what would become a consistent course of conduct, Pitt deprived Nouvel of information about
16 Chateau Miraval’s operations and finances to hide his waste and looting of the company’s assets.
17 94. As of September 2020, the board of Quimicum consisted of a single director who
18 had been supplied by Ocorian, a management, administrative, and fiduciary services agency.
19 Concerned about Pitt’s behavior with respect to Chateau Miraval, representatives of Nouvel spoke
20 to Quimicum’s director on September 2, 2020. What they learned was deeply troubling. For
21 years, Quimicum’s director had not taken any steps to exercise oversight over Chateau Miraval.
22 95. Getting nowhere with Pitt, Jolie and Nouvel challenged Mondo Bongo and Pitt’s de
23 facto control of Chateau Miraval, and exclusion of them from its management, at a Quimicum
24 general shareholders meeting held on September 8, 2020. Nouvel stated that it was “highly
25 concerned that Mondo Bongo LLC, does, without a mandate and without concertation [French for
26 consultation] with Nouvel LLC, de facto run the Company and its subsidiaries and ignores any
27 rights of its co-shareholder in this respect”. Nouvel noted that it was “opposed to the fact that no
28 profits are ever distributed” to shareholders despite the fact that Chateau Miraval should be highly
24
1 profitable. Nouvel requested that Quimicum analyze and submit proposals regarding distributing
2 profits or reimbursing existing shareholder loans.
3 96. Faced with the strife between its owners, Quimicum’s sole director, from Ocorian,
4 attempted to resign. In order to have a functioning board—one that would actually exercise
5 oversight over Chateau Miraval—Quimicum’s shareholders, Nouvel and Mondo Bongo, would
6 need to appoint new directors. Nouvel insisted that “equal representation of both shareholders
7 must be implemented both at the level of the Company and Château Miraval”. Nouvel again put
8 forward Salin as its candidate to serve as a Quimicum director and encouraged Mondo Bongo to
9 also put forward a candidate. But rather than engaging constructively with Nouvel on its proposal
10 for equal representation on Quimicum’s board, Pitt caused Mondo Bongo to block Salin’s
11 appointment and to refuse to put forward any candidate of its own. Instead, Pitt and Mondo
12 Bongo imposed a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum beginning at the September 8, 2020 meeting.
13 That deadlock continues to this day, with Pitt rejecting all efforts to appoint a balanced board.
14 97. Pitt did this for a reason. He, Grant, and his lawyers knew that Quimicum’s bylaws
15 provide that the company acts through its directors. Under Luxembourg law, Quimicum is unable
16 to act if it had no directors. So Pitt’s refusal to allow Mondo Bongo to work with Nouvel on the
17 election of new directors renders Quimicum unable to act. That, in turn, renders Nouvel unable to
18 supervise Chateau Miraval, cementing Pitt’s de facto control of the company. Pitt and Grant know
19 that as long as the deadlock at Quimicum exists, no one can place checks on Pitt’s actions at
20 Chateau Miraval. That suits Pitt, who is otherwise able to run Chateau Miraval at his whim.
21 98. Pitt did not devise the plan for the deadlock alone. In fact, Ocorian communicated
22 principally with Grant about all matters concerning Quimicum. Grant has acted as Pitt’s agent to
23 help render Quimicum unable to act and supervise Chateau Miraval, and has provided advice and
24 guidance to Pitt about beginning and continuing the deadlock at Quimicum. And Pitt’s business
25 partner and “brother” Perrin, who is intimately aware of the ownership, corporate structure and
26 operations of Nouvel, Quimicum and Chateau Miraval, fully understands that a deadlock at
27 Quimicum allows him and Pitt to exercise complete and unsupervised control over Chateau
28 Miraval and Miraval Provence.

25
1 99. On September 22, 2020, Nouvel again expressed concern to Quimicum’s director
2 about Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s behavior, observing that “although Quimicum is a 50/50 joint
3 venture between Nouvel LLC and Mondo Bongo LLC, corporate decisions generally are taken
4 based solely on the instructions of a single shareholder, Mondo Bongo LLC”. Nouvel complained
5 that it was not being given adequate information “with respect to the continued heavy investment
6 to renovate Chateau Miraval” and questioned whether “the continued investment of substantial
7 borrowed funds to renovate Chateau Miraval is in the best interest of [Quimicum] and its
8 shareholders”. In response to this inquiry, Quimicum refused to provide any explanation about the
9 decisions made at Chateau Miraval or take steps to supervise its subsidiary.
10 100. Recognizing that Nouvel now was taking steps to supervise Chateau Miraval more
11 actively—which threatened his absolute control of the business and risked exposing his waste of
12 corporate assets—Pitt concocted a new scheme to block Nouvel from gaining equal participation
13 in the activities of Chateau Miraval. In September 2021, and before Jolie sold Nouvel to Tenute
14 but clearly in anticipation of a sale, Pitt had Mondo Bongo sue Nouvel in Luxembourg to attempt
15 to void the 2013 transaction in which Mondo Bongo had transferred 10% of the shares of
16 Quimicum to Nouvel, making Pitt and Jolie equal co-owners. Pitt’s goal is clear: to take de jure
17 control over Quimicum to legitimize his usurpation of corporate authority, improper assumption of
18 control over Chateau Miraval, and looting of its assets by seeking to undo a valid transaction that
19 he willingly caused Mondo Bongo to execute eight years ago.
20 101. Pitt’s desperate Luxembourg gambit has no merit. Pitt and Mondo Bongo entered
21 into the 2013 share transfer freely. Indeed, Pitt was advised by highly competent counsel,
22 including the current managing partner of Hogan Lovells’s Paris office, when he caused Mondo
23 Bongo to enter into the arrangement. For eight years afterwards, Pitt willingly shared 50-50
24 control over Quimicum with Jolie and obtained significant tax advantages because of that
25 ownership structure. It was only after Jolie and Nouvel began exercising their rights as
26 shareholders of Quimicum, and, as discussed below, Pitt learned that Jolie would not sell Nouvel
27 to him, that Pitt and his lawyers searched for a way to undo the contract and the transfer. In a now
28 familiar theme, Pitt only adheres to his contracts when he deems it convenient for him to do so.
26
1 102. At the same time that Pitt was taking steps to render Quimicum powerless, he also
2 worked to ensure that Chateau Miraval’s board was fully stocked with his vassals—people who
3 would take direction from him and whom he could trust to execute his plans. The two existing
4 directors, Bradbury and Venturini, were already entirely beholden to Pitt—he hired both of them
5 to work at Chateau Miraval; they both depend on him for their continued employment; they both
6 have longstanding relationships with him, including as his subordinates at Chateau Miraval; and
7 they both lack independence from him. Venturini is even paid by Pitt directly. Pitt’s control over
8 these individuals further enabled his de facto control of the company.
9 103. In June 2021, Chateau Miraval’s third director resigned. Under French law, the
10 company’s board cannot take official action unless it has a minimum of three directors.
11 Accordingly, Pitt needed to fill the third seat with someone who could be trusted to do his bidding.
12 104. On August 23, 2021, a general meeting of the shareholders of Chateau Miraval was
13 held to fill the third board seat. Quimicum was prevented from attending this meeting or casting a
14 vote at it because Pitt and Mondo Bongo had cemented the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum that
15 left Quimicum without any directors and therefore legally unable to act.
16 105. But that did not stop Pitt. His men, Venturini and Bradbury, each held a single
17 share of Chateau Miraval (out of 10,500 total shares) that had been loaned to them from
18 Quimicum when they first took office as Chateau Miraval directors. They were required to each
19 hold a share in Chateau Miraval because the company’s bylaws require its directors to hold an
20 ownership interest in it. Because Quimcum holds all the shares of Chateau Miraval, the only way
21 for a director to obtain a share is for Quimicum to loan it to the director. Using their “ownership”
22 interest—of two of Chateau Miraval’s over ten thousand shares (or .02%)—Venturini and
23 Bradbury, acting at Pitt’s direction and without obtaining consent from Jolie, Nouvel, or
24 Quimicum, purported to elect yet another Pitt acolyte—Pitt’s Hollywood business manager,
25 Grant—to the Chateau Miraval board to fill the vacant seat.
26 106. Grant had no prior experience in the wine industry and no credentials that would
27 qualify him to serve as a director of a French wine business. He was appointed solely because,
28 like Venturini and Bradbury, he is absolutely beholden to Pitt. Grant earns a substantial portion of
27
1 his income from Pitt and his continued livelihood depends on doing what Pitt tells him to do.
2 107. Grant’s appointment could not become permanent unless Grant also held a share in
3 Chateau Miraval. Accordingly, Venturini attempted, at Pitt’s direction, to arrange for one of
4 Quimicum’s shares in Chateau Miraval to be illegally transferred to Grant instead of returned to
5 Quimicum as required under the share loan contract. This scheme was stopped only when Nouvel
6 explained to Venturini and the others involved that the transfer would flagrantly violate French
7 law and open them up to civil liability. Grant was not given a share of Chateau Miraval, and as a
8 result, his appointment to the Chateau Miraval board expired on November 23, 2021. That left
9 Chateau Miraval once again without a functioning board, but that was fine with Pitt because it left
10 a power vacuum that Pitt continues to exploit to his own benefit to this day by exercising
11 complete, illegal control over the company.
12 108. Nouvel was powerless to stop Pitt from engineering this state of affairs. Prior to
13 Grant’s “election”, Nouvel had suggested resolving the deadlock at Quimicum so that Quimicum
14 could vote in the election. Pitt and Mondo Bongo refused to cooperate, and Pitt had the election
15 proceed over Nouvel’s objections.
16 B. Pitt Strips Chateau Miraval of Its Assets.
17 109. At the same time as they were solidifying their grip over Chateau Miraval and
18 blocking Jolie from participating in the business, Pitt and his co-conspirators stepped up their
19 efforts to misappropriate the business’s assets for their own personal benefit. As Pitt knew, Jolie
20 had committed a substantial amount of her net worth to Chateau Miraval, both through its
21 purchase and through loans made to Quimicum to fund Chateau Miraval. With the assistance of
22 his co-conspirators Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, and Grant, Pitt set out to devalue Jolie’s interest
23 in the company by removing assets from it, including Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks.
24 110. Pitt’s scheme was made possible by the absolute control he exercised over Chateau
25 Miraval. Pitt had already installed his associates, Bradbury and Venturini, as Chateau Miraval
26 directors. Both men, dependent upon Pitt for their employment, ran the business under Pitt’s
27 direction. Pitt also had both a business and a personal relationship with Perrin, the President of
28 both Familles Perrin and of Miraval Provence; Pitt has referred to Perrin as his “brother”. Pitt,
28
1 therefore, had effective control over Chateau Miraval before the divorce filing. After the divorce,
2 he was no longer notionally acting for the benefit of his family; he was freed to pursue his own
3 selfish and vindictive aims. Among the illegal acts the conspirators pursed are the following:
4 i. Diversion of Corporate Profits to Pitt Vanity Projects
5 111. With the complicity of Venturini, Bradbury and Grant, Pitt first ensured that
6 Nouvel would never see any of the profits from Chateau Miraval’s incredibly successful wine
7 business. Pitt set out to divert those profits to a series of wasteful vanity projects.
8 112. Chateau Miraval owes tens of millions of dollars to both Nouvel and Mondo Bongo
9 through Quimicum as a result of loans that both Pitt and Jolie made (at least in part) to get the
10 enterprise on its feet. In addition to the €4 million from 2009, Nouvel loaned significantly more
11 money to Quimicum over the next several years to fund improvements to Chateau Miraval.
12 Nouvel’s total contributions to Quimicum now stand at approximately $40 million.
13 113. The wine business has been enormously profitable. As a result, Miraval
14 Provence’s profits have risen from around €1 million in 2013 to around €15 million in 2022.
15 Because of this success, Miraval Provence has been able to pay substantial annual dividends to
16 Chateau Miraval. In total, between 2013 and 2022, Miraval Provence has paid about €45 million
17 in dividends to Chateau Miraval and an equal amount in dividends to Familles Perrin.
18 114. Despite the overwhelming success of the wine business, however, Chateau
19 Miraval’s finances are not nearly as rosy. Chateau Miraval barely broke even in 2020, despite
20 receiving over €5 million in dividends from Miraval Provence. Not a penny of the tens of millions
21 of euros that Chateau Miraval has earned over the years has ever been used to repay its loans from
22 Quimicum or otherwise been distributed to Quimicum or its shareholders. Year after year,
23 Chateau Miraval’s board, at Pitt’s direction, has refused to pay dividends to Quimicum. Instead,
24 Pitt uses the company’s funds as his own personal pocket money to indulge his wasteful spending
25 and to benefit his business ventures.
26 115. Pitt and Chateau Miraval’s directors have squandered tens of millions of dollars of
27 Chateau Miraval’s money on vanity projects that have little, if any, business justification. For
28 example, Chateau Miraval’s accounts indicate that in 2020 alone, Chateau Miraval spent
29
1 €4,034,980 on construction at a nearby house that is owned by Chateau Miraval, €1,106,658 on a
2 swimming pool, and €2,963,207 on “garment works”. At Pitt’s direction, Chateau Miraval also
3 commissioned a single staircase at the chateau to be built and rebuilt a total of four times after he
4 was unhappy with the first three attempts. Pitt also caused Chateau Miraval to spend nearly
5 €1 million per year for years on end reconstructing stone walls using stone masons from Croatia.
6 116. Numerous expenses in the years following the divorce were incurred either over
7 Nouvel’s objection or without its knowledge. At Pitt’s direction, Chateau Miraval approved
8 budgets without seeking Nouvel’s input or approval and only told Jolie and Nouvel about many
9 renovations after they had been started or completed.
10 117. Alarmed by this spending and concealment of information, Jolie and Nouvel sought
11 to become more involved in Chateau Miraval’s finances and operations. From California, Nouvel
12 engaged in back-and-forth email exchanges with Bradbury, Venturini and Perrin about the
13 business. Venturini and Perrin even traveled to California to meet with Nouvel’s representatives
14 to discuss Chateau Miraval’s business. But Pitt remained firmly in control and refused to allow
15 Bradbury, Venturini and Perrin to take direction from anyone but him.
16 118. In August 2020, Jolie’s representatives had a lengthy call with Venturini to
17 challenge his authorization of wasteful spending at Pitt’s direction. During this call, Venturini—
18 whom Pitt insisted on paying directly and not through Chateau Miraval—repeatedly responded in
19 substance, “What am I to do? He’s my boss.” Following this call, Venturini made no effort to put
20 a stop to Chateau Miraval’s wasteful spending.
21 ii. Pitt and Perrin Begin to Strip Chateau Miraval of Its Trademarks
22 119. Pitt also looted Chateau Miraval’s extraordinarily valuable intellectual property.
23 Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant allowed Perrin, Pitt’s close friend and self-declared “brother”,
24 to register certain Chateau Miraval trademarks in the name of Miraval Provence. These
25 registrations, which have continued over the years, have caused millions of dollars in damage to
26 Nouvel.
27 120. Miraval Provence was organized to be owned 50-50 by Chateau Miraval and
28 Familles Perrin. That means that Nouvel has a 50% economic interest in Chateau Miraval
30
1 (through its 50% ownership in Quimicum, the 100% owner of Chateau Miraval) but only a 25%
2 economic interest in Miraval Provence (through Chateau Miraval’s 50% interest in Miraval
3 Provence). Thus, any registration of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks by Miraval Provence that
4 purports to effect a change in ownership away from Chateau Miraval has the harmful effect of
5 reducing Nouvel’s economic interest in these valuable trademarks by half. In order to prevent that
6 from happening, the agreement between Chateau Miraval and Miraval Provence expressly
7 prohibited Miraval Provence from registering the Miraval trademarks. But, as repeatedly
8 observed in their behavior, Pitt and Perrin do not believe they are bound by contractual
9 commitments that they no longer view as convenient to their interests.
10 121. By registering the Miraval trademarks in the name of Miraval Provence, Pitt and
11 Perrin caused Miraval Provence to interfere with Nouvel’s economic interest in Chateau Miraval.
12 Pitt and Perrin could do so because of Pitt’s de facto control of Chateau Miraval and Perrin’s
13 direct control, as President, of Miraval Provence. These actions, in direct breach of the agreement
14 between Chateau Miraval and Miraval Provence, threaten to divert hundreds of millions of dollars
15 in value to Perrin and from Chateau Miraval, and by extension from Quimicum and Nouvel.
16 122. Miraval Provence began its misappropriation of the Miraval marks shortly after
17 Jolie filed for divorce. Chateau Miraval owns, and had registered, the trademark “Miraval Côtes
18 de Provence”—which is worth at least €24,500,000 alone. On June 27, 2017, Miraval Provence
19 applied to register the trademark under its own name in the United States. Miraval Provence also
20 applied in Europe to register the trademarks “MIRAVAL The Art of Rose” on April 13, 2017;
21 “MIRAVAL COTEAUX VAROIS EN PROVENCE” and “MIRAVAL COTES DE
22 PROVENCE” on June 21, 2017; and “STUDIO BY MIRAVAL” on April 11, 2018.
23 123. The pace of misappropriation has recently accelerated. Since the start of 2020,
24 Miraval Provence applied to register 13 trademarks in 10 different jurisdictions that were
25 originally registered by Chateau Miraval. On November 30, 2020, Miraval Provence applied to
26 register the word mark “Miraval”, also previously registered to Chateau Miraval, in the United
27 States. Miraval Provence applied to register the same word mark—“Miraval”—in Canada, China,
28 the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, the European Union, and India despite
31
1 Chateau Miraval’s prior registration of the mark in each of those jurisdictions. On December 17,
2 2020, Miraval Provence applied in the United States to register the Word and Design mark
3 “Miraval Cotes de Provence Miraval Millisime 2012”, which is registered to Chateau Miraval.
4 124. Miraval Provence has also applied to register new trademarks containing the word
5 “Miraval” or a confusingly similar word. For example, Miraval Provence applied to register the
6 word mark “Mrvl” in the United States on January 18, 2021, and applied to register the logo mark
7 “Fleur de Miraval Exclusivement Rosé” in the United States on March 9, 2021.
8 125. Miraval Provence was actively prosecuting multiple trademarks using the Miraval
9 name during the period that Grant served as a Chateau Miraval director. For example, on
10 November 22, 2021, Miraval Provence submitted a Response to Office Action to the U.S. Patent
11 and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) as part of its prosecution of the word mark “Miraval”. The
12 trademark Examiner had refused to allow the mark because “all of the cited marks, U.S.
13 Registration Nos. 3657042, 4853676, 4948904, 4962245, and 5158319, are all owned by Chateau
14 Miraval S.A.”, and so the “Miraval” mark posed a likelihood of confusion. In response, Miraval
15 Provence wrote that it “respectfully confirms that Applicant and Chateau Miraval S.A. are related
16 companies. . . . Accordingly, . . . an appreciable number of consumers will not likely be confused
17 between the source of origin of Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Marks.”
18 126. Grant, Venturini and Bradbury, as directors of Chateau Miraval, each had a duty to
19 protect the company’s assets, including its trademarks. Yet they allowed Miraval Provence to loot
20 these assets by registering and maintaining the registrations of these trademarks as its own, for no
21 apparent compensation, and in violation of a written contract.
22 127. Nouvel never consented to the transfer of Chateau Miraval’s incredibly valuable
23 trademarks to Miraval Provence. Indeed, Pitt and Perrin concealed their true intentions from
24 Nouvel. They told Nouvel that Miraval Provence had undertaken certain limited trademark
25 registrations on a temporary basis because of a potential transaction with luxury goods
26 manufacturer LVMH. In 2018, counsel for Quimicum and Chateau Miraval confirmed that Perrin
27 and Miraval Provence had registered the trademarks exclusively for the purpose of pursuing a
28 potential joint venture with LVMH. Counsel informed Nouvel that Chateau Miraval could seek
32
1 the return of the trademarks at any time. Nouvel was never informed that these registrations were
2 intended to be permanent, and never consented to Miraval Provence indefinitely, let alone
3 permanently, owning the trademarks. As it turns out, the purported transaction with LVMH never
4 materialized. But Miraval Provence did not return the trademarks to Chateau Miraval. Nouvel
5 learned for the first time at the end of 2021 that Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence now
6 claim that they own Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks and refuse to cancel the registrations
7 even though the supposed reason for their temporary transfer never came to pass. As of today,
8 Miraval Provence has not canceled any of these registrations, it maintains its ownership, and it
9 continues to register more and more of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks. And again, Miraval
10 Provence paid nothing for these trademarks it now claims to own.
11 128. Nouvel has tried to put a to stop Miraval Provence’s improper seizure and
12 registration of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks. On October 11, 2022, Nouvel filed a notice of
13 opposition against Miraval Provence’s U.S. registrations of the marks “Miraval” and “Miraval
14 Cotes de Provence Miraval Millesime”. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has observed that
15 “the determination in the civil action [this action] may have a bearing on the issues in this
16 opposition proceeding” and suspended the opposition proceedings “pending final disposition of
17 the civil action”.
18 129. In short, Perrin, his companies, and Chateau Miraval’s directors conspired with Pitt
19 to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s extremely valuable trademarks to Miraval Provence to harm
20 Nouvel.
21 iii. Pitt and Perrin Scheme To Divert Chateau Miraval’s Resources To
22 Their Own Side Projects
23 130. Pitt and Perrin have also fleeced Chateau Miraval of its assets in favor of their
24 personal business endeavors. In an obvious case of self-dealing, Pitt and Perrin have set up side
25 businesses that exploit the name, image, premises and financial resources of Chateau Miraval—all
26 without sharing any returns with Nouvel, Chateau Miraval’s 50% owner. Pitt has also allowed
27 Perrin to siphon profits away from Chateau Miraval by charging Miraval Provence significantly
28 above-market bottling rates.

33
1 131. Miraval Studios. Chateau Miraval’s funds are being spent on renovations meant to
2 benefit a Pitt vanity project: a recording company located at the chateau named Miraval Studios.
3 In December 2021, Architectural Digest reported that “Pitt’s latest project is a thoughtful
4 restoration of a recording studio at Château Miraval”, a project in which he is apparently
5 collaborating with French producer Damien Quintard. The project reportedly includes “a console
6 designed by Pitt and Quintard with hybrid analog/digital capacities”, “a Dolby Atmos system”,
7 “technology to power pre-mixing for film and television projects”, “[r]ecording booths”, “a room
8 dedicated to housing vintage synthesizers”, “workstations to edit sound and video”, preservation
9 of a “drum room, which embodies the ‘heritage of the quirky sound’”, and the addition of “a
10 3,445-square-foot live room and a 1,000-square-foot meter-control”.
11 132. Based on public filings, Miraval Studios is 40% owned by Pitt through Mondo
12 Bongo, 50% by DQ Holdings (Damien Quintard’s company) and only 10% by Chateau Miraval.
13 Venturini, Pitt’s handpicked director and CEO of Chateau Miraval, is the Managing Director of
14 Miraval Studios. The ubiquitous Grant, Pitt’s Hollywood business manager and unsuccessful pick
15 to serve as a Chateau Miraval director, is the studio’s Supplementary President.
16 133. While Mondo Bongo is a 40% owner of Miraval Studios, Nouvel has no direct
17 ownership interest in the venture. It is relegated to a 5% indirect ownership, though Chateau
18 Miraval’s 10% interest. Thus, any money generated from Nouvel and Mondo Bongo’s joint
19 investment in Chateau Miraval that is used to benefit Miraval Studios is a straight-up diversion of
20 cash profits that should properly be split evenly between Nouvel and Mondo Bongo.
21 134. Worse yet, Chateau Miraval’s recently published financial accounts show that
22 Chateau Miraval made a loan of over 750,000 euros to Miraval Studios. Chateau Miraval’s funds
23 have thus been loaned to an entity in which Pitt and Mondo Bongo hold an outsize equity interest
24 and stand to benefit disproportionally from Chateau Miraval. Such a loan is a clear misuse of
25 Chateau Miraval’s funds.
26 135. Fleur de Miraval. Miraval Provence’s 2022 financial accounts show that Miraval
27 Provence has loaned 1,377,464 euros to SAS Fleur de Miraval. Fleur de Miraval is advertised as a
28 collaboration between the Pitt, (Rodolphe) Peters (through SAS Champagne Pierre Peters) and
34
1 Perrin families. Miraval Provence’s capital is therefore being used to support a partly owned
2 subsidiary in a way that disproportionally benefits a 20% shareholder that has no connection to
3 Nouvel.
4 136. Le Domaine and Distilleries de la Rivieria. Pitt has recently gone even further,
5 again with Perrin, in using Chateau Miraval’s resources and brand to prop up businesses in which
6 Chateau Miraval—and by extension, Nouvel—has no interest. On August 6, 2021, Mondo Bongo
7 and Vins et Domaines Perrin, a corporation controlled by the Perrin family, established a
8 corporation called Petrichor, of which they each own 50%. The same day, Pitt and Perrin
9 established the corporation Le Domaine, a cosmetics company, and Distilleries de la Riviera, a gin
10 maker. Distilleries de la Rivieria is wholly owned by Petrichor, Le Domain is 95% owned by
11 Petrichor, and both are managed by Perrin. Neither Chateau Miraval, nor Quimicum, nor Nouvel
12 have any ownership interest in Petrichor, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Riviera.
13 137. Pitt and Perrin launched Le Domaine’s first products in late 2022. Chateau Miraval
14 appears to play a crucial role in Le Domaine’s business: the skincare products are reportedly
15 made with grapes grown on the property’s vineyard. Pitt and Perrin have also exploited the
16 Chateau Miraval name extensively in their efforts to market Le Domaine, apparently for no
17 compensation. Pitt and Perrin feature the Miraval name prominently throughout Le Domaine’s
18 website, which includes pictures of Pitt and Perrin walking through the estate’s vineyards and
19 descriptions of how the two men “began exploring the treasures of the vineyard, and saw its
20 potential beyond wine-making”.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
35
1 138. Pitt and Perrin’s other business, Distilleries de la Rivieria, which distributes The
2 Gardener Gin, also makes use of the Miraval name to promote its business. Indeed, the business
3 uses “MRVL” as its registered trade name. Pitt and Matthieu Perrin, Marc Perrin’s cousin,
4 launched Distilleries de la Rivieria’s first product, The Gardener Gin, at the 2023 Cannes Film
5 Festival. As with Le Domaine, Pitt relies heavily upon the Chateau Miraval name and brand to
6 market The Gardener Gin. Indeed, the label on the bottle is presented in the same style as
7 Miraval’s distinctive label: a small round label of two concentric circles, with the brand name
8 displayed within the outer circle and a design set within the inner one. The Wine Spectator linked
9 the two explicitly: “Meet The Gardener, a French Riviera–inspired spirit from the partners behind
10 luxury Provence rosé brand Miraval.”
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 139. Pitt and Perrin are brazenly using Chateau Miraval’s name to sell Le Domaine
22 products and The Gardener Gin while ensuring that Nouvel will not benefit from these enterprises
23 at all. These businesses apparently provide no or below-market compensation to Chateau Miraval
24 for the use of its assets. Nouvel is unable to determine which because Pitt, while having complete
25 access to Miraval’s books and records, has repeatedly denied Nouvel’s requests for equal access.
26
27
28
36
1 140. The ownership structure of these other Pitt investments—which he and his co-
2 conspirators are using to siphon value away from Chateau Miraval and Nouvel—is this:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 141. Pitt and Perrin—together with at least Bradbury, Venturini and Grant—have
15 conspired to undertake these actions with the intention to harm Nouvel. Bradbury, Venturini, and
16 Grant, who were under a duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval, ignored that duty and
17 participated in this scheme for the same purpose, resulting in the waste and diversion of its assets.
18 142. Miraval Studios, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Le Domaine, and
19 Distilleries de la Riviera are co-conspirators in Pitt’s scheme to use Chateau Miraval for his own
20 personal enrichment. These entities all have conspired with Pitt, Perrin, and Familles Perrin to
21 divert Chateau Miraval’s assets away from Nouvel and Quimicum, and into the pockets of Pitt,
22 Perrin and others close to Pitt. These entities have acted with the intent to harm Nouvel.
23 143. Perrin benefits from this scheme in more ways than one. Beyond his unauthorized
24 appropriation of 50% of the value of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks and his use of Chateau
25 Miraval’s assets to subsidize other businesses in which he owns an equity interest, he has been
26 charging Miraval Provence exorbitant rates for the bottling services provided by Familles Perrin.
27 Under the contract that established Miraval Provence, Chateau Miraval is responsible for
28
37
1 cultivating its vineyard, harvesting its grapes, and producing wine up through the vinification
2 stage. Familles Perrin is responsible for bottling and selling the wine produced by Chateau
3 Miraval. But Perrin has been charging Miraval Provence supra-market rates for bottling at
4 Familles Perrin, often at rates over three times the industry standard. Whether Pitt is complicit in
5 or ignorant of Perrin’s price-gouging is unknown to Nouvel, which is kept in the dark by Pitt.
6 144. What is clear is that Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Familles Perrin, and Perrin have conspired
7 to ensure that they alone profit from Chateau Miraval, and are working together to divert Chateau
8 Miraval’s assets to their own entities so that neither Quimicum nor Nouvel profit from those
9 businesses’ successes.
10 iv. Pitt Gives Control of Miraval Provence to Familles Perrin
11 145. Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin created Miraval Provence as a joint venture in
12 which the two companies were meant to have equal ownership. But as part of their broader
13 conspiracy to loot Chateau Miraval, Pitt now appears to have handed over control of Miraval
14 Provence to Perrin altogether.
15 146. Each year, Chateau Miraval must publish its accounts. For year after year, those
16 accounts showed that Chateau Miraval owned 5,000 shares of Miraval Provence’s 10,000 shares.
17 This 50% ownership interest, for example, is clear from Chateau Miraval’s public 2020 accounts:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 147. In Summer 2021, after it became clear that Jolie would not sell Nouvel to Pitt,
25 Miraval Provence was converted from an SNC (société en nom collectif) to a SAS (société par
26 actions simplifiée). Under French law, the first one is a form of partnership, a highly transparent
27 form of business organization in France, whereas the second company form is closer to a limited
28
38
1 company, a highly opaque form. This change in organization, therefore, allowed Pitt and Perrin to
2 shield even more of their unlawful conduct from Nouvel.
3 148. On May 15, 2023, Chateau Miraval published its 2021 accounts, showing for the
4 first time that Chateau Miraval now owns only 4,997 of Miraval Provence’s 10,000 shares, or a
5 49.97% ownership interest:
6
7
8
9
10
11 149. By contrast, Miraval Provence’s and Familles Perrin’s 2022 public financial
12 statements reveal that Familles Perrin now owns 50.01% of Miraval Provence:
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 150. In an instant, Familles Perrin became the majority owner of Miraval Provence, and
22 Chateau Miraval was relegated to minority status.
23 151. Nouvel was never consulted about a potential transfer of any of Chateau Miraval’s
24 interest in Miraval Provence or any increase in Miraval Provence’s share capital. Indeed, it
25 appears that Nouvel was intentionally kept in the dark. Until reviewing the 2021 accounts, Nouvel
26 understood that Chateau Miraval remained a 50% owner of Miraval Provence. Despite Nouvel’s
27 demand for and explanation, Pitt and Mondo Bongo had remained silent.
28 152. Chateau Miraval appears to have in effect given away control—which is highly
39
1 valuable and usually requires the payment of a control premium—over Miraval Provence to
2 Familles Perrin. Indeed, the timing of this transfer is telling, as it occurred sometime in 2021 and
3 was obviously targeted at one of two things: (a) Jolie’s announced intent to sell her share of the
4 winery to third parties; or (b) Jolie’s sale to Tenute. Either way, the transfer of control to Perrin
5 was done secretly and for the clear purpose of wresting control from Jolie or anyone she sold it to.
6 Such conduct amounts to corporate theft and is a blatant breach of directors’ duties.
7 153. Pitt and Perrin arranged for Familles Perrin to become the controlling shareholder
8 of Miraval Provence with the intent of harming Nouvel, and intentionally concealed from Nouvel
9 the fact that Familles Perrin is now the controlling shareholder of Miraval Provence.
10 III. Unable To Reach an Agreement with Pitt, Jolie Sells Her Interest in Nouvel.
11 154. Frozen out of participating as an equal partner in the governance of Quimicum and
12 Chateau Miraval, Jolie informed Pitt and Familles Perrin that she wished to sell her interest in
13 Quimicum and, indirectly, Chateau Miraval, on fair terms. Jolie explained that she could not
14 continue to be involved in a business centered on alcohol given the role it had played in the events
15 leading to her and Pitt’s divorce, and that neither she nor any of the children felt able to return to
16 the chateau. Also, much of Jolie’s savings and financial independence were tied up in her
17 investment in Chateau Miraval, and the sale would enable her to achieve liquidity.
18 155. Despite Pitt’s protestation, there were no contractual or legal restrictions on Jolie’s
19 ability to sell Nouvel to any willing buyer. Nevertheless, Jolie first sought to reach a deal with Pitt
20 directly, and negotiated with Pitt and Perrin in good faith for months about a possible buyout of
21 her interest. By February 25, 2021, the parties had apparently reached agreement on all key terms
22 for Jolie to sell her interest to Pitt and Familles Perrin. Perrin had even secured a loan for the
23 purchase. But just a few weeks later, on or around March 18, 2021, Pitt and Perrin reneged on the
24 agreement, informing Jolie’s representatives that they were walking away from the deal
25 indefinitely. They specifically tied this decision to media reports indicating that Jolie had filed
26 proof of Pitt’s domestic abuse under seal in the divorce proceedings.
27 156. Pitt and Familles Perrin later returned to the table, this time seeking to impose a
28 new and unacceptable condition on the sale—one that had no relevance whatsoever to the wine
40
1 business. Pitt and Perrin refused to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau Miraval unless she agreed
2 to a broad nondisclosure provision that would prevent her from speaking truthfully about any of
3 the issues that had led her to file for divorce from Pitt. In layperson’s terms, Pitt and Perrin sought
4 to use Chateau Miraval as leverage to coerce Jolie into keeping quiet about Pitt’s behavior. This
5 new demand essentially imposed a poison pill, all but ensuring that no deal could ever be reached.
6 157. Jolie gave Pitt one last opportunity to accept the deal with a toned-down
7 nondisclosure provision, but Pitt and Perrin ignored it. Left with no other option, Jolie notified
8 Pitt and Perrin that she would try and sell to someone else.
9 158. Aware of Chateau Miraval’s reputation and popularity, the Stoli Group was
10 interested in a deal with Jolie. Stoli had made previous inquiries about acquiring Chateau Miraval,
11 but Pitt had politely declined to sell. After representatives of the Stoli Group contacted Jolie in
12 2021, she eventually agreed to explore a potential deal with Stoli.
13 159. Jolie and the Stoli Group reached an agreement for the sale of Nouvel, which
14 closed in October 2021. The purchase was made through Stoli Group’s wine affiliate, Tenute del
15 Mondo, which owns and operates several family-run wine businesses, including Achaval Ferrer
16 and Arinzano.
17 IV. Tenute Seeks To Employ the Stoli Group’s Marketing Expertise and
18 Distribution Might To Take Chateau Miraval to the Next Level.
19 160. The Stoli Group was an ideal acquiror of Nouvel and its interest in Chateau
20 Miraval. Stoli Group is an international beverage company that produces and distributes a global
21 wine and spirits portfolio. Stoli Group has a presence across a network of more than 176 markets
22 and works with a team of 200 distributors around the world. Its major brands include Stoli Vodka,
23 elit Vodka, Bayou Rum, Kentucky Owl Bourbon, Villa One and Cenote Tequila, Tulchan Gin, and
24 Se Busca Mezcal. Stoli’s wine division, Tenute del Mondo, owns the highly rated Argentine
25 wines, Achaval Ferrer, and Arínzano, a Spanish vineyard dating back to 1055. It is also in a joint
26 venture with Italian wine royalty, the Frescobaldi Family, in a partnership that includes the top
27 Super-Tuscan wines Luce, Ornellaia, and Masseto. Bayou Rum, which the Stoli Group acquired
28 in 2016, is the most awarded domestic rum in the United States.

41
1 161. The Stoli Group has experience in marketing celebrity beverages. In partnership
2 with Nick Jonas and Jon Varvatos it makes and markets the luxury Tequila, Villa One.
3 162. Tenute purchased Nouvel hoping to work as an equal partner with Pitt and Mondo
4 Bongo, and to expand production of the high-quality rosé that had made Chateau Miraval famous.
5 Tenute sought to leverage the Stoli Group’s resources, marketing experience, and global
6 distribution network to bring Chateau Miraval’s business to the next level. At the time, the
7 estate’s wines had strong distribution in only five to seven countries, but Tenute wanted to bring
8 effective distribution to many more.
9 163. Eager to get to work on the Chateau Miraval wine business after the acquisition,
10 Tenute’s executives spoke with a representative of Mondo Bongo, who put them in touch with
11 Perrin. Perrin soon began discussing future plans for the business with top executives from
12 Tenute and the Stoli Group in a series of calls and at an in-person meeting in London on
13 October 22, 2021. Perrin seemed eager to work with Stoli, particularly on improving Chateau
14 Miraval’s global distribution network, and asked Stoli for a list of its distributors in each country.
15 Stoli provided that information and began work on a proposal to provide Chateau Miraval the
16 operational support and sophisticated distributor network it needed. The parties had begun what
17 appeared to be fruitful commercial discussions.
18 164. Stoli continued its dialogue with Perrin in the following months and offered to
19 support Chateau Miraval’s expansion into new markets. Again, Perrin appeared receptive and told
20 Stoli that he believed that by working together, “we can further develop Miraval and make it the
21 leading luxury rose company”. In his continuing dialogue with Tenute and Stoli executives,
22 Perrin noted that he was eager “to start a discussion about where it could make sense for the brand
23 to transition distribution to Stoli/TdM network”.
24 165. To support Chateau Miraval, Tenute and Stoli invested significant time and
25 resources in developing a detailed global business plan for Chateau Miraval. In January 2022,
26 Tenute and Stoli executives presented Perrin with that plan. They explained that although Chateau
27 Miraval had achieved commercial success in North America and Western Europe, it had yet to
28 break through in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the rest of Europe. Tenute and Stoli had a plan
42
1 to change that and had devised country-specific marketing plans, projected sales targets, and lists
2 of preferred local distributors to help Chateau Miraval become the world’s leading premium rosé
3 brand by 2030. Perrin was thankful for the “great presentation and conversation” and exclaimed
4 that the plans were “really exciting!”
5 V. Pitt Attempts To Drive Tenute Out
6 166. Despite Perrin’s apparent excitement, these discussions foundered because Pitt
7 vehemently opposed any such cooperation. Pitt and Mondo Bongo refused to do anything to
8 facilitate the relationship. Pitt has pugnaciously caused Mondo Bongo to resist all reasonable
9 efforts to resolve the deadlock at Quimicum, and has blocked Tenute and Nouvel from
10 participating in their equally owned business, Chateau Miraval. On its face, Pitt’s consistent
11 message has been crystal clear—he considers Chateau Miraval as his personal property and
12 refuses to share it with anyone. In reality, however, it is now apparent that he is desperate to stop
13 Tenute (or any other new partner, for that matter) from uncovering the systematic malfeasance and
14 asset-stripping he has orchestrated. Pitt instructed Perrin to stop speaking to Nouvel, Tenute, and
15 the Stoli Group; made sure Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant did not assist them; and began a
16 campaign to obstruct Tenute and Nouvel from participating in the business or obtaining access to
17 Chateau Miraval’s records. His goal has been to drive Tenute and Stoli Group, who have the
18 ability to increase the prestige and success of Chateau Miraval, out of the business. To meet that
19 goal, he has constructed a fantasy in which the Stoli Group is a competitor who is bent on a hostile
20 takeover of Chateau Miraval. His behavior is emotional, irrational and ultimately illegal.
21 167. It has also become clear that Perrin does not want Stoli to participate in the
22 business, despite his apparent enthusiasm after Tenute purchased Nouvel. This change of heart
23 has come about because Perrin now realizes that Stoli seeks to impose proper corporate
24 governance and oversight; does not wish to allow Perrin and his companies to exercise unfettered
25 control of the business; and will not sit idly by while Pitt and Perrin siphon off Chateau Miraval’s
26 assets for their own benefit.
27 A. Pitt and Mondo Bongo Refuse To Resolve the Deadlock at Quimicum.
28 168. By June 2021, Quimicum’s remaining director had resigned, leaving Quimicum
43
1 directorless. Under Luxembourg law, as discussed above, that means that Quimicum cannot take
2 any action. That situation was, and remains, untenable, and threatens the continued existence of
3 Quimicum because it has been unable to perform basic corporate actions.
4 169. Nouvel understood that the absence of a functioning board at Quimicum would
5 impede Quimicum’s subsidiary, Chateau Miraval, from operating properly, including because a
6 directorless Quimicum could not appoint directors at Chateau Miraval. So, after its purchase by
7 Tenute, Nouvel again attempted in good faith to resolve the deadlock at Quimicum.
8 170. Over the course of the next few months, Tenute and Nouvel repeatedly sought to
9 engage with Pitt and Mondo Bongo in an effort to break the stalemate. Nouvel convened several
10 general meetings of the Quimicum shareholders in an effort to resolve the deadlock. At these
11 meetings, Nouvel was represented by its manager, Alexey Oliynik, who was fully empowered to
12 act on behalf of Nouvel to negotiate a resolution. In contrast, rather than send representatives who
13 were actually responsible for running the business or empowered to resolve the deadlock, Mondo
14 Bongo sent its outside Luxembourgish lawyers. Instead of engaging with Nouvel, these outside
15 lawyers read pre-written statements and refused to engage in constructive discussion.
16 171. Nouvel made several proposals to structure Quimicum’s board with equal
17 representation on both sides. On October 21, 2021, Nouvel first proposed that Quimicum’s board
18 consist of an equal number of members appointed by Nouvel and Mondo Bongo, and one
19 independent director appointed by Ocorian, an administrative and fiduciary services agency that
20 had previously managed Quimicum.
21 172. Mondo Bongo responded on October 27, 2021. Mondo Bongo asserted through its
22 Luxembourgish lawyers, without justification or any legal basis, that because it disputed Nouvel’s
23 ownership of 10% of Quimicum’s shares, those shares would “be recorded as abstaining” during
24 the upcoming general meeting of Quimicum. Mondo Bongo then proposed appointing Pitt’s
25 Hollywood business manager, Grant, as a Quimicum director, incredibly claiming that he was “the
26 ideal candidate for a directorship of Quimicum” despite his lack of experience in the alcoholic
27 beverages industry and his close ties to Pitt.
28 173. The next day, Nouvel proposed a board of two Nouvel directors, two Mondo
44
1 Bongo directors, and a director chosen “among reputed Luxembourg independent directors”.
2 Nouvel also identified its two director candidates, both of whom had extensive experience in the
3 wine and spirits industry, to Mondo Bongo.
4 174. At the Quimicum board meeting the following day, Mondo Bongo, through its
5 lawyers, rejected Nouvel’s proposal out of hand. Mondo Bongo’s lawyers instead proposed that
6 Grant—who they incredibly claimed was a “neutral person”—serve as Quimicum’s sole director.
7 Nouvel, reasonably, rejected this undisguised effort by Pitt and Mondo Bongo to assume complete
8 control of Quimicum. During this meeting, Mondo Bongo’s lawyers simply read from a script.
9 When Oliynik asked whether Mondo Bongo was convinced that it was fair to deny Nouvel the
10 right to have a representative on Quimicum’s board given that Nouvel and Mondo Bongo each
11 held 50% of Quimicum’s shares, Mondo Bongo’s lawyer could only emptily refer to her previous
12 scripted statements.
13 175. Mondo Bongo also voted against the appointment of Nouvel’s proposed directors
14 to Quimicum’s board. Mondo Bongo stated that it had voted against them because it believed that
15 as employees of Nouvel’s shareholder, they purportedly would act solely in that shareholder’s
16 interests. This justification was entirely self-serving. Mondo Bongo’s proposed director
17 candidate, Grant, whom Mondo Bongo described as a “neutral person”, was himself in the service
18 of Mondo Bongo’s sole shareholder, Pitt, but unlike Nouvel’s candidates had no relevant
19 experience.
20 176. Apparently tired of rejecting Nouvel’s reasonable proposals, Pitt caused Mondo
21 Bongo to finally acknowledge his true plan. On November 18, 2021, Mondo Bongo’s
22 Luxembourgish lawyers informed Nouvel that Mondo Bongo would not discuss resolving the
23 deadlock at Quimicum unless Nouvel agreed to unwind the 2013 transfer of 10% of the stock of
24 Quimicum from Mondo Bongo to Nouvel that had made Nouvel an equal owner of Quimicum. In
25 other words, Mondo Bongo demanded that Nouvel surrender control of Quimicum—and
26 essentially capitulate to Mondo Bongo’s demands in his Luxembourg legal case—as a
27 precondition to resolving the deadlock. But Nouvel and Tenute would simply not roll over and
28 cede Pitt de jure control over Quimicum and ultimately Chateau Miraval.
45
1 177. Despite Pitt’s aggressive posturing, Nouvel continued (and continues to this day) to
2 try to find a solution to the deadlock.
3 178. On November 19, 2021, Nouvel proposed a six-person board with three directors
4 appointed from each side. At the Quimicum shareholders’ meeting the following day, Mondo
5 Bongo, through its lawyers, again rejected Nouvel’s reasonable proposal out of hand. Mondo
6 Bongo then informed Nouvel that it had sued Nouvel for a second time in Luxembourg, seeking to
7 place the disputed 10% of shares in Quimicum in escrow pending resolution of the parties’
8 dispute, so it made no sense, in their mind, to hold a shareholders’ meeting.
9 179. In February 2022, Nouvel proposed a four-person board with two members
10 appointed by each side for a limited duration of six months to see if the parties could work
11 together. In April 2022—two months later—Mondo Bongo rejected this proposal for provisional
12 management of Quimicum apparently on the basis that Nouvel had taken legal action in France to
13 preserve evidence concerning Chateau Miraval—forgetting that Mondo Bongo had initiated legal
14 action by suing Nouvel twice in Luxembourg. Not recognizing the irony of their words, Mondo
15 Bongo’s lawyers lectured Nouvel that Mongo Bongo “must reject all of your proposals as they
16 require a minimum of mutual trust and good will”. In short, Mondo Bongo has systematically
17 opposed all resolutions put forward by Nouvel and has acted in a purely negative capacity.
18 180. Nouvel has had to seek judicial intervention in Luxembourg as a result of Mondo
19 Bongo’s intransigence. On June 28, 2022, Nouvel initiated an action before the Luxembourg
20 District Court seeking an order to appoint an ad hoc representative to vote Mondo Bongo’s shares
21 at Quimicum meetings. Those proceedings were temporarily put on hold.
22 181. Nouvel then initiated extraordinary summary proceedings to appoint a provisional
23 administrator to manage Quimicum on February 14, 2023. On March 2, 2023, the parties agreed
24 to appoint a provisional administrator for a period of three months with a limited mandate: to hire
25 a domiciliary agent, to update Quimicum’s registered office, to prepare financial statements, and
26 to convene a general meeting to approve financial statements. The provisional administrator took
27 office on March 15, 2023. But the provisional administrator did not accomplish any of these tasks
28 before his mandate expired on June 15, 2023, so his term to act was extended by the Luxembourg
46
1 court for an additional three months. Mondo Bongo’s systematic actions in voting to perpetuate
2 the shareholder deadlock have continued to disable Quimicum.
3 182. Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s refusal to consider any of Nouvel’s reasonable proposals
4 to resolve the Quimicum deadlock, their ridiculous assertion that Pitt’s Hollywood business
5 manager was a “neutral person”, and their “take it or leave it” demand for control of Quimicum
6 shows that Pitt and Mondo Bongo were not and are not acting in good faith and have no intention
7 of resolving the shareholder deadlock. Pitt has repeatedly used his 50% ownership in Quimicum
8 to veto every attempt to break the deadlock. In Pitt’s world, that makes perfect sense because the
9 absence of proper management at Quimicum allows him to keep control of Chateau Miraval.
10 183. Eager to resolve the conflict, a member of the Stoli Group at one point solicited
11 Perrin’s advice, explaining that Tenute planned to suggest to Pitt that Pitt appoint Perrin as one of
12 Mondo Bongo’s Quimicum directors. Perrin demurred, telling Stoli that he did not want to be
13 involved. Perrin explained that he had “been very careful (for the last 9 years) not to be involved
14 [at the Quimicum level] and honestly I much prefer to stay that way. Experience shows that it was
15 a good decision”.
16 184. Pitt and Mondo Bongo’s back of the hand rejections of Nouvel’s reasonable
17 proposals to resolve the deadlock at Quimicum and to restore proper governance to the company
18 has had and is having real negative consequences for Nouvel. Without a functioning board,
19 Quimicum cannot appoint a third director (not beholden to Pitt) to Chateau Miraval’s board or
20 replace Bradbury and Venturini. That suits Pitt, and indeed is his objective, because no one is
21 around to check his wasteful spending and misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks, or
22 to question his cozy relationship with Perrin and Familles Perrin.
23 185. Pitt and his co-conspirators have caused Mondo Bongo to vote in a way that
24 prevents Quimicum from fulfilling its essential activities. Mondo Bongo’s votes against Nouvel’s
25 reasonable proposals to appoint directors have left Quimicum with no director since August 24,
26 2021. As a consequence, Quimicum has had no registered office since Ocorian terminated its
27 agreement with Quimicum on June 28, 2022. Mondo Bongo’s systematic voting against Nouvel’s
28 proposals also has prevented Quimicum from publishing its annual financial statements since
47
1 2018. Due to Mondo Bongo’s negative votes, Quimicum is at risk of judicial liquidation, which
2 would have dramatic consequences because Quimicum owns Chateau Miraval, which in turn owns
3 the Chateau Miraval estate in France. Mondo Bongo’s votes against Nouvel’s proposals are not
4 mere disputes about how to run the business; they threaten the very existence of Quimicum.
5 186. Mondo Bongo has voted against Nouvel’s proposals to appoint a functional board
6 of directors at Quimicum because it is in Mondo Bongo’s own interest to render Quimicum
7 inactive. As long as Quimicum cannot properly supervise Chateau Miraval, Mondo Bongo can
8 continue to create and to profit from companies in which it holds an interest (but in which Nouvel
9 holds little or no interest) that misuse the Miraval name and appropriate Chateau Miraval’s assets
10 without proper compensation, thereby draining Quimicum’s only asset of value. Mondo Bongo
11 has voted against Nouvel’s proposals to appoint a functional board at Quimicum to further its own
12 personal interest at the expense of the interest of Quimicum as a whole. Mondo Bongo has
13 refused to cooperate with Nouvel and has completely disregarded Nouvel’s legitimate interests
14 and the parties’ shared interest in Quimicum functioning properly by repeatedly voting to
15 perpetuate the shareholder deadlock. Mondo Bongo has consciously disregarded Nouvel’s rights
16 and has subjected Nouvel to cruel and unjust hardship by voting to render Quimicum incapable of
17 supervising Chateau Miraval, Nouvel’s sole investment.
18 187. Pitt has flatly rejected Nouvel’s good-faith efforts to work together and has
19 continued his obstructionist campaign to prevent any oversight over his conduct at Chateau
20 Miraval. Nouvel will remain unable to participate in all business decisions, and will continue to
21 be harmed, for as long as Mondo Bongo refuses even to discuss any of Nouvel’s proposals.
22 188. Pitt and Perrin are trying to transform the Chateau Miraval business to make it
23 conform to their preferred structure: Nouvel as a minority shareholder and Pitt and Perrin as
24 majority owners. But the reality is that Nouvel and Mondo Bongo are equal co-owners in
25 Quimicum, and by extension equal co-owners in Chateau Miraval. Pitt fundamentally, and
26 willfully, misunderstands his rights in the business. And Perrin, seeking to capitalize on Jolie’s
27 and Pitt’s fame, has steadily been trying to increase his position in the business above what he is
28 legally owed, including by improperly registering Chateau Miraval’s trademarks, and now
48
1 apparently convincing Pitt to give him control of Miraval Provence. Jolie’s and Pitt’s
2 endorsement is what made the Miraval brand successful—more successful than Familles Perrin’s
3 competing rosés. Pitt and Perrin do not want to face the business reality that Jolie owned half of
4 the Chateau Miraval business and sold it for just compensation, so they seek to rewrite history.
5 B. Pitt and Perrin Cannot Defend Their Misappropriation of Chateau
6 Miraval’s Trademarks
7 189. In October 2021, Nouvel asked Chateau Miraval for information concerning
8 Miraval Provence’s continued registration of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks. Chateau Miraval
9 provided no information or explanation about those registrations.
10 190. In December 2021, in the face of inaction by the Pitt-controlled Chateau Miraval,
11 Nouvel reached out to Perrin directly, requesting in a letter that Miraval Provence stop registering
12 new Chateau Miraval trademarks and transfer existing ones back to Chateau Miraval.
13 191. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence refused. For the first time at the end
14 of 2021, they took the position that they now own Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks and
15 refused to cancel the registrations. Perrin, and later Pitt’s representatives, claimed that the 2013
16 License Agreement had been amended in 2017 to permit the registrations. When challenged on
17 the existence of such an amendment, neither Perrin nor Pitt has been able to produce any such
18 purported amendment. Instead, Perrin told Nouvel’s manager, Oliynik, a different story: that
19 because he had invested so much time and effort into the business and had provided cashflow
20 support, he simply “deserved” to become the 50% owner of trademarks worth hundreds of
21 millions of euros for no consideration, effectively acknowledging his own asset-grab.
22 192. Perrin’s position is meritless. Nothing in the agreement between Chateau Miraval
23 and Miraval Provence authorizes Miraval Provence to have ownership of Miraval’s trademarks—
24 it says just the opposite. Perrin and his company Familles Perrin have been handsomely
25 compensated for their contributions to the success of Chateau Miraval. They have received a full
26 50% of the profits from the business, through dividends paid to them by Miraval Provence. Perrin
27 struck a deal in 2013 with Pitt and Jolie. He may now want an even better deal, but the 2013 deal
28 binds him.
49
1 193. Miraval Provence has continued registering Chateau Miraval’s trademarks. In
2 November 2021, it even formed a new entity bearing the Miraval name, SCEA Miraval.
3 194. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, and Chateau Miraval’s directors all continue to facilitate the
4 Perrin Parties’ trademark registration scheme, each in distinct but important ways. Pitt has
5 encouraged Perrin to maintain and to continue the registrations as part of his continuing scheme to
6 harm Nouvel financially. Chateau Miraval’s directors, following Pitt’s direction, took no steps to
7 stop the registrations or in any way defend Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property. And, realizing
8 that Quimicum could put a stop to this theft if it were able to properly supervise Chateau Miraval,
9 each of Pitt, Chateau Miraval’s directors, and the Perrin Parties have worked together with Mondo
10 Bongo to prolong the shareholder deadlock.
11 C. Pitt Purports to Improperly Install New Chateau Miraval Directors
12 195. The French Commercial Code and Chateau Miraval’s Articles of Association
13 require Chateau Miraval to have a board comprised of at least three directors. But Chateau
14 Miraval has had fewer than three directors since November 24, 2021. Thus, all its actions,
15 directed by Pitt, that have been taken since that time have been taken without authority.
16 196. Pitt grew increasingly concerned that his ultra vires conduct could cause the
17 Luxembourg court to step in. On January 9, 2023, he caused Bradbury and Venturini to convene
18 an emergency general meeting of the Chateau Miraval shareholders to purport to elect new
19 members of the board. At the time, Chateau Miraval was under scrutiny from the Luxembourg
20 court that was determining whether to appoint a provisional administrator to govern Quimicum.
21 Despite the fact that Quimicum holds 99.98% of Chateau Miraval’s shares, Quimicum could not
22 be notified (because it lacks a registered office, which Bradbury and Venturini knew) and did not
23 participate in this general meeting. Only Venturini was present. Venturini presumably voted on
24 behalf of Bradbury, as the meeting minutes read that “the Shareholders present or represented
25 [own] two shares, or 0.02% of the shares with voting rights”. Venturini, acting alone, then
26 purported to appoint four directors: himself; Bradbury; the company Noyomagus, represented by
27 Christophe Salin; and Dominique Bernard. (The fact that Pitt purported to put Salin on the board
28 of Chateau Miraval demonstrates that his earlier refusal to put Salin on the Quimicum board was
50
1 in bad faith.) Venturini and Bradbury, who own only 0.2% of Chateau Miraval’s shares, convened
2 a sham general meeting to hold a sham election in the absence of the only shareholder whose votes
3 mattered: Quimicum.
4 197. On January 26, 2023, these “directors” then purported to appoint Venturini as
5 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Bradbury as Deputy Chief Executive Officer. Only
6 then did Pitt and Chateau Miraval deign to notify Nouvel, which owns half of the shares of
7 Quimicum, about the purported election of Chateau Miraval directors.
8 198. As it turns out, Pitt was too late. Neither Bradbury nor Venturini were even
9 directors of Chateau Miraval as of January 9, 2023, and so they could not call a meeting of the
10 company’s shareholders. The facts are as follows: During a general meeting of Chateau Miraval
11 on August 23, 2021, Venturini’s and Bradley’s mandates as directors were renewed, but only for a
12 period of one year or “until the end of the General Assembly (. . .) called to decide, in 2022, on the
13 accounts of the last financial year closed”. Because their directorships were never renewed in
14 2022, Bradbury and Venturini were no longer directors on January 9, 2023, and so did not have
15 the power to convene the January 9 meeting. Accordingly, the January 9 meeting, and all actions
16 taken at the meeting and at the subsequent January 26, 2023 board meeting, were null and void
17 under French law, and the purported election of new Chateau Miraval directors and the
18 appointment of new officers was invalid and fraudulent. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Bradbury, and
19 Venturini intentionally organized these fraudulent elections to harm Nouvel by perpetuating Pitt’s
20 control over Chateau Miraval to allow him to drain value from the company, and intentionally
21 concealed this fraudulent election from Nouvel.
22 VI. Seeking To Divert Attention from His Actions, Pitt Presents a Sensational and
23 False Narrative.
24 199. In an effort to further distract from his own misconduct concerning the operation of
25 Quimicum and Chateau Miraval, Pitt has taken aim at the reputation of the Stoli Group and its
26 founder, Yuri Shefler, in Quimicum meetings, emails to Nouvel, Luxembourg court filings and in
27 the press. This is a desperate effort to deflect attention from Pitt’s toxic media coverage—ranging
28 from his construction of unlivable homes for Hurricane Katrina victims, to his close association
51
1 with the notorious predator Harvey Weinstein, to the recent disturbing revelations of alcohol-
2 fueled abusive behavior towards his family. Pitt is also wrong. It is not Stoli Group or Shefler
3 whose reputation poses commercial risk to Chateau Miraval—it is his own.
4 200. Pitt’s suggestion that Stoli Group and its founder and owner, Yuri Shefler, are
5 somehow tied to Vladimir Putin is categorically false. In reality, Stoli and Shefler have been
6 fighting a well-publicized and well-documented battle against Putin for decades. The fight
7 between Shefler and Putin is so well-known that it must be that Pitt simply decided to
8 intentionally misrepresent the facts.
9 201. Stoli Group has its roots in a Soviet company that originally registered the famous
10 Stolichnaya vodka trademarks. That company was transformed, as the Soviet Union fell, into a
11 private company as part of the government’s attempt to transition to a market-based economy.
12 After the Soviet Union dissolved, the private company was left to fend for itself, and operated
13 much like its Soviet predecessor, making a small commission on exports of products, including
14 vodka, produced by third parties. As a result of mismanagement, inefficient corporate
15 organization, and its failure to ensure that only high-quality vodka was sold under the Stolichnaya
16 brand, the company was close to insolvency by the mid-1990s. Seeing untapped potential, Shefler
17 assembled a group of investors to purchase and reform the company. Shefler acquired control of
18 the company in 1997, later founding Stoli Group S.à r.l. (formerly known as SPI Group S.à r.l.),
19 which through affiliates now owns and markets the Stoli brands. Shefler’s entrepreneurship,
20 investments in production, and marketing acumen transformed a company on the brink of collapse
21 into the global drinks conglomerate it is today. Stoli Group now operates in over 170 markets and
22 oversees the production, management and distribution of more than 50 wine and liquor brands.
23 202. Shefler’s transformation of the Stolichnaya brand and Stoli Group’s subsequent
24 commercial success attracted the attention of Vladimir Putin and his associates, many of whom are
25 sanctioned individuals. Shortly after Putin came to power in January 2000, Putin and Russian
26 officials close to him launched a campaign to appropriate the Stolichnaya trademarks. As part of
27 this campaign, the Russian Federation has employed against Shefler and Stoli Group tactics that it
28 has used time and time again to acquire valuable but privately held Russian assets—“black press”,
52
1 trumped-up criminal charges, harassment, vague and shifting allegations of legal improprieties,
2 and almost two decades of pretextual litigation across the globe challenging Stoli Group’s
3 ownership of its trademarks. This tactic is so commonly employed that it has a name in Russia,
4 reiderstvo, which roughly translates to “asset grabbing”.
5 203. The Russian Federation initiated meritless criminal proceedings against Shefler,
6 forcing him to flee into exile in June 2002. In an effort to get his hands on Shefler, Putin has
7 repeatedly sought to extradite him to Russia. In 2010, a court in the U.K. ruled that Russia’s
8 prosecution of and attempt to extradite Shefler was “not brought in good faith”, was “politically
9 motivated”, and that extradition “would be incompatible with the defendant’s convention rights
10 within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998”. In 2011, Switzerland also rejected a Russian
11 request to extradite Shefler, granted asylum to Shefler, and provided him with travel documents.
12 Putin has been undeterred: he had Russia improperly put out an Interpol “red notice” (now lifted)
13 on Shefler, and Putin’s people even tried to kidnap Shefler when he was en route to Kyrgyzstan,
14 an attempt Shefler narrowly escaped.
15 204. From exile, Shefler has repeatedly stood up to Putin and his regime. Shefler has
16 been described as “a vocal critic of President Vladimir Putin”. Immediately following Russia’s
17 invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both Shefler and Stoli Group voiced their unequivocal
18 support for Ukraine and condemned the Putin regime’s war. The Stoli Group, at Shefler’s
19 direction, issued a public statement that it “unequivocally condemns the military action in Ukraine
20 and stands ready to support the Ukrainian people”. Stoli was also one of the first companies to act
21 to support the Ukrainian people through a financial commitment to the World Central Kitchen,
22 which provides meals both to people in Ukraine and people fleeing the country.
23 205. The truth is that any apparently negative perceptions about Stoli in the public eye
24 are based on misconceptions. The short-lived and misguided boycotts of Stoli vodka in the wake
25 of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were based on misunderstandings about where Stoli vodka is
26 made and have since ceased. The Stoli Group moved production of Stoli vodka to Latvia (a
27 European Union country and member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) over 20
28 years ago. Although Stoli used to be made from raw materials from Russia, that is no longer true:
53
1 with Shefler’s full support and guidance, after the Ukraine invasion, Stoli Group ceased buying
2 from Russia, and now sources all its raw materials from other countries, including Ukraine.
3 206. And contrary to Pitt’s recent bizarre allegations in his Second Amended Complaint,
4 Stoli and Shefler have also been longstanding, vocal opponents of Russian’s anti-LGBTQ
5 legislation. After Russia passed legislation in 2013 banning LGBTQ “propaganda”, Stoli’s then
6 CEO, Val Mendeleev, published an open letter to the LGBTQ community. Mendeleev stressed
7 that “Stoli firmly opposes” the “recent dreadful actions taken by the Russian Government limiting
8 the rights of the LGBT community”, and that Stoli “fully support[ed] and endorse[d] [the LGBTQ
9 community’s] objectives to fight against prejudice in Russia”.
10 207. Because it is convenient to do so, Pitt wholly ignores these facts about the Stoli
11 Group and Shefler, and, instead, invents his own false narrative about them. It is much the same
12 as his willingness to ignore the words of the contracts he has freely signed, and to invent fictional
13 agreements that do not exist and even were expressly rejected.
14 208. Nouvel also has done nothing to disrupt business operations at Quimicum or
15 Chateau Miraval, contrary to what Mondo Bongo has asserted at Quimicum meetings. Nouvel did
16 not advocate a corporate restructuring of Miraval Provence to appropriate assets; instead, Nouvel
17 suggested that the parties consider whether Chateau Miraval’s stake in Miraval Provence could be
18 transferred to Quimicum to enhance communication and support for the wine business and to
19 facilitate faster decision-making. Nouvel never advocated a risky tax strategy concerning
20 intellectual property, but simply sought to discuss the optimal corporate structure for holding
21 Miraval-related intellectual property, something about which the Stoli Group, with its vast
22 intellectual property portfolio, has much experience. In short, Nouvel has sought to access
23 Chateau Miraval’s information precisely because it wants to protect and properly supervise its
24 substantial investment as a 50% indirect owner of Chateau Miraval.
25 209. Nor did the Stoli Group attempt a hostile takeover of Chateau Miraval as Pitt, who
26 ironically is improperly exercising total control over Chateau Miraval, claims. Although
27 employees of Stoli spoke with certain customers of Miraval Provence in the early days after the
28 transaction was announced, when Perrin asked Stoli to hold off on such contacts, Stoli
54
1 immediately obliged. With Perrin’s knowledge and blessing, Stoli had limited contact with certain
2 distributors of Miraval products as part of its preparation of a business plan for presentation to
3 Miraval Provence. Stoli undertook these efforts to assist, not to harm, Chateau Miraval. What
4 Stoli wants is to enjoy the benefits of its 50% ownership of Chateau Miraval to the same extent as
5 its other 50% owner—Pitt. But Pitt has done everything possible to prevent that.
6 210. Stoli also never put “undue pressure” on Pitt, Perrin, or the leadership of Chateau
7 Miraval and Miraval Provence as Pitt also claims. Rather, when those parties refused to provide
8 adequate justification for the wasteful spending at Chateau Miraval and the misappropriation of its
9 valuable trademarks, Stoli notified them that it would pursue all legal remedies available to it and
10 Nouvel to protect its investment. And Nouvel has. Most recently, it filed a criminal complaint in
11 France against Bradbury and Venturini for, in bad faith, putting Chateau Miraval’s assets to a use
12 that they know is against the interest of the corporation. Pitt’s bullying tactics started with Jolie.
13 She would not be bullied by them, and neither will Nouvel. Instead, Nouvel will pursue all
14 remedies it has against anyone, including Pitt and his co-conspirators, who should be subjected to
15 civil and criminal liability for their actions.
16 211. Nevertheless, at all stages and to this day, Stoli has sought an amicable resolution
17 of the conflict over the management of Quimicum and Chateau Miraval. Communications
18 between Shefler and Pitt evince an attempt by Shefler to find common ground with Pitt in an effort
19 to reach a negotiated resolution of their dispute that would avoid the unnecessary cost of litigation:
20 Dear Brad
21 I am writing to you in these anxious and baffling times when the

22 designs of a wicked, aggressive man dissolve the frame of civilised
society and the atrocities of war destroys the countries.
23
24 I have been born in the USSR and when the time came, I was doing
my best in order to build a new democratic Russia, being an ally to
25
political opposition democratic leader Boris Nemtsov, who has been
26 viciously and ruthlessly killed by the “bloody regime” back in 2015.
27
28
55
1 After several attempts organised by FSB secret service to poison me
in Moscow, I have made a decision to leave Russia and not been
2
able to return over the last 20 years.
3
Anyone can see with his eyes open that my path has been long and
4
difficult, but I did stand for freedom and democracy, despite
5 numerous attempts of the regime to stop me, detain me (2005 –
6 special FSB operation organised to arrest me in Kyrgyzstan when
the military transport plane and special elite FSB unit has been
7
waiting for me upon arrival in order to detain and transport back to
8 Moscow: thanks to my on the ground friend, I have been warned
9 whilst being en-route and had a chance to U-turn the plane), even
poison me over the course of the last 20 years.
10
11 When all those attempts of the regime to detain me have failed,
Russian authorities have filed a request to Interpol to detain me on
12
international level.
13
A new round of persecution has been initiated with a number of
14
criminal cases being raised against me without any grounds and I
15 had to fight for my rights and life endlessly over those years.
16 Westminster Magistrate Court has declined Russia’s extradition
request in June 2010, based on a conclusion that “the case has been
17
politically motivated”, with Swiss government granting me a
18 political asylum in June 2011.
19
The reason to outline my life path over the last 20 years is very
20 simple – I have been at war and I am fully aware of all the burdens
21 and hardship of it. War in any shape is destructive. The last thing I
want is to start a legal war, which will clearly be very costly, time
22
and efforts consuming.
23
There is nothing personal in the situation we both find ourselves in
24
and anyone could have been in my place, purchasing the shares from
25 your ex-partner. I have a definite and practical proposal to make for
26 action, i.e. find a compromise to current situation in regards to
Miraval. Let us establish a working group, which will include
27
trusted business manager and trusted legal adviser from each side,
28 the group which will be working on a proper shareholders
56
1 agreement, outlining responsibilities of each party, entry/exit ways,
etc.
2
3 Courts and hearings may be set up but we are both better off to sit
down and try to find an amicable way forward, becoming business
4
partners. I am always open for a discussion and I ask you to consider
5 cooperative partnership and work.
6
Yours truly,
7
Yuri SCHEFLER
8
9 212. The reality is that Stoli’s involvement with Chateau Miraval introduces no
10 commercial risk. To the contrary, Stoli and Shefler are highly regarded in the international
11 beverage industry and have worked with numerous prominent companies and celebrities. For
12 example, for years they have been partners with Italian wine royalty, the Frescobaldi Family,
13 which alone gives them credibility among the top echelon of the wine world. Another example is
14 Stoli’s Villa One Tequila, which is a collaboration with pop musician Nick Jonas and fashion
15 designer John Varvatos. And over the years, Stoli affiliates have also done business with the likes
16 of global beverage giant PepsiCo, as well as Pernod Ricard, the former British liquor and wines
17 company Allied Domecq, Michael Mondavi through his minority ownership of Frescobaldi, and
18 Diageo.
19 213. It is Pitt’s reputation, not that of Shefler or Stoli Group, that poses a risk to Chateau
20 Miraval. In recent years, Pitt has experienced a steady drumbeat of negative media coverage. For
21 example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Pitt founded the “Make It Right Foundation”, an
22 effort to provide victims with homes. But that initiative devolved into lawsuits and recriminations
23 when it was revealed that the homes Pitt’s foundation built used faulty designs and materials, and
24 now have major issues with water infiltration, mold, structural damage, and gas leaks. Only six of
25 the 109 homes built are in reasonably good condition.
26 214. Pitt also worked with disgraced predator and rapist Harvey Weinstein, even though
27 the press has reported that Jolie disclosed to Pitt that Weinstein had assaulted her in the late 1990s
28 and had urged him not to associate with Weinstein. Pitt has also publicly acknowledged being
57
1 aware of Weinstein’s sexual misconduct toward Pitt’s ex-girlfriend, Gwyneth Paltrow. But Pitt
2 ignored these warnings. He starred in a film co-produced by Weinstein in 2009 and even asked
3 Weinstein to produce his own movie in 2012, which Weinstein later distributed. Pitt’s close
4 association with Weinstein added to his media woes.
5 215. And now come the revelations of Pitt’s alleged shocking, drunken, and abusive
6 behavior on the September 2016 flight that precipitated Jolie’s filing for divorce.
7 VII. Pitt and His Co-Conspirators’ Illegal Conduct Has Harmed Nouvel
8 216. Pitt and his co-conspirators’ conduct has significantly harmed Nouvel.
9 217. Nouvel has been harmed by its inability to participate in the management of
10 Quimicum and Chateau Miraval. As a 50-50 owner of Quimicum and, by extension, Chateau
11 Miraval, Nouvel’s governance rights are being thwarted on an ongoing basis by the conduct of
12 Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Venturini, Bradbury, Miraval Provence, Perrin and the Familles Perrin.
13 Nouvel has been prevented from exercising oversight over the business that it owns and realizing
14 the benefits of its investment. By contrast, Mondo Bongo, but not Nouvel, has access to
15 information about the business and investment decisions of Chateau Miraval, which Mondo
16 Bongo refuses to share with Nouvel. In addition, Chateau Miraval’s directors allow the
17 company’s assets to benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in
18 which Nouvel holds little or no interest). Accordingly, Mondo Bongo is benefitting from the
19 shareholder deadlock at Quimicum at Nouvel’s expense, and Nouvel is uniquely harmed by the
20 deadlock.
21 218. As a result of Pitt’s and his co-conspirators’ conduct, Nouvel has been harmed by
22 the misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks. These actions have reduced Nouvel’s
23 economic interest in this incredibly valuable intellectual property by 50%.
24 219. Nouvel is also harmed by the ongoing mismanagement of Chateau Miraval’s funds
25 and assets. As set forth above, Pitt and his co-conspirators are responsible for squandering
26 millions of dollars of Chateau Miraval funds on a host of vanity projects and other investments
27 designed to benefit Pitt and Mondo Bongo at the expense of Chateau Miraval and Nouvel.
28 220. Nouvel is also being harmed by its inability to participate economically in Chateau
58
1 Miraval’s ongoing financial success. Miraval Provence’s profits have steadily increased year after
2 year, and between 2013 and 2022, Miraval Provence distributed approximately 90 million euros in
3 dividends to its shareholders, of which approximately 45 million euros were provided to Chateau
4 Miraval. None of this money has been distributed to Quimicum’s shareholders, which means
5 Nouvel has never received a penny of these profits. Nor has Nouvel received a penny of
6 repayment for the millions of dollars in loans that Quimicum owes Nouvel as a result of Nouvel’s
7 investment into the chateau and wine business. This problem has become more pronounced since
8 Tenute acquired Nouvel, as Miraval Provence enjoyed its most profitable year yet in 2021.
9 Nouvel reasonably expected the millions of dollars it loaned to Chateau Miraval through
10 Quimicum to be repaid after Chateau Miraval’s wine business became profitable. Instead, Pitt and
11 his co-conspirators have diverted all of the wine business’ profits to their own purposes, including
12 companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little
13 or no interest), thereby benefiting Mondo Bongo at Nouvel’s expense. Pitt and his co-conspirators
14 are directly and intentionally harming Nouvel by rendering a substantial portion of Nouvel’s assets
15 in the form of its outstanding shareholder loans illiquid.
16 221. Pitt and Mondo Bongo’s imposition of a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum that
17 has left Quimicum without any directors capable of supervising Chateau Miraval is a direct cause
18 of all the above harms to Nouvel. Quimicum can act only through its directors, yet Mondo
19 Bongo’s conduct has left Quimicum with no director since 2021, rendering Quimicum unable to
20 act to supervise Chateau Miraval. Under Luxembourg law, directors have an obligation to manage
21 a company’s affairs. Any reasonable director made aware of the conduct of Pitt, Perrin, and their
22 co-conspirators to drain value from Quimicum’s sole asset, Chateau Miraval, would have taken
23 steps to protect that asset. In particular, under Chateau Miraval’s bylaws, Chateau Miraval’s
24 directors can be removed by its shareholders. Because Quimicum is the controlling shareholder of
25 Chateau Miraval, any reasonable director of Quimicum would have removed Chateau Miraval’s
26 directors in thrall to Pitt who allowed the misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets and
27 replaced them with directors who would defend and protect Chateau Miraval’s assets.
28 222. It is time for Pitt and his co-conspirators to be held responsible for their illegal
59
1 conduct. This First Amended Cross-Complaint represents Nouvel’s next step in accomplishing
2 exactly that.
3 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
4 Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
5 (By Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendants William B. Pitt, Marc Perrin,
6 Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, and
7 Roes 1-10)
8 223. Cross-Complainant Nouvel realleges and incorporates by reference each of
9 Paragraphs 1 through 222 as though fully set forth herein.
10 224. The Quimicum Articles constitute a valid and binding agreement among Nouvel,
11 Mondo Bongo and Quimicum.
12 225. The Quimicum Articles set forth certain powers, rights and duties, providing,
13 among other things:
14 a. “The Company is managed by one or several directors (gérants).”
15 (§ 6.1.1.)
16 b. “All powers not expressly reserved by Law or the present Articles to
17 the general meeting of shareholders fall within the competence of
18 the sole director (gérant), or in case of plurality of directors
19 (gérants), of the board of directors (conseil de gérance).” (§ 6.2.1.)
20 c. “In dealing with third parties as well as in judicial proceedings, the
21 sole director (gérant), or in case of plurality of directors (gérants),
22 the board of directors (conseil de gérance) will have all powers to
23 act in the name of the Company in all circumstances and to carry out
24 and approve all acts and operations consistent with the Company’s
25 objects.” (§ 6.3.1.)
26 d. “In case of plurality of shareholders, each shareholder may take part
27 in collective decisions irrespectively of the number of shares (parts
28 sociales) he owns. Each shareholder has a number of votes equal to

60
1 the number of shares (parts sociales) held by him.” (§ 7.2.)
2 e. “Collective decisions are only validly taken insofar as shareholders
3 owning more than half of the share capital adopt them provided that
4 in case such majority is not met, the shareholders may be
5 reconvened or consulted again in writing by registered letter and the
6 decisions will be validly taken by the majority of the votes cast
7 irrespective of the portion of share capital represented.” (§ 7.3.)
8 f. “Except where otherwise provided for in these Articles, each share
9 (part sociale) entitles [the holder] to a fraction of the corporate
10 assets and profits of the Company in direct proportion to the number
11 of shares (parts sociales) in existence.” (§ 11.3.)
12 226. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Grant
13 were all aware of the Quimicum Articles.
15 worked together to divert Chateau Miraval’s funds to projects that lacked a legitimate business
16 purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets to benefit
18 or no interest). They also caused Miraval Provence to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable
19 assets. They knew this conduct was harmful to Nouvel.
21 knew that Quimicum would put a stop to their plan to strip Chateau Miraval of assets if a
22 reasonable Quimicum director were elected. So they developed a plan to disrupt the contractual
23 relationship among Nouvel, Mondo Bongo and Quimicum, as set forth in the Quimicum Articles,
24 and the normal operation of those articles, which would allow Quimicum to supervise Chateau
25 Miraval, including the provisions set forth above.
26 229. Because Nouvel and Mondo Bongo each own 50% of Quimicum, Quimicum could
27 be effectively disabled and prevented from supervising Chateau Miraval if Mondo Bongo
28 prevented the appointment of directors who could act on behalf of Quimicum.

61
2 encouraged and worked with Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum to
3 prevent Quimicum from functioning properly. They did so intentionally and in bad faith with the
4 express purpose to intentionally disrupt the contractual relationship among Nouvel, Mondo Bongo
5 and Quimicum, as set forth in the Quimicum Articles, and the normal performance of those
6 articles. Among other things, they intentionally and in bad faith:
7 a. Encouraged and assisted Mondo Bongo to prevent the election of
8 Quimicum directors empowered to manage the Company and to
9 exercise the powers delegated to them pursuant to Article VI of the
10 Quimicum Articles, including the power to supervise Quimicum’s
11 subsidiary, Chateau Miraval;
12 b. Encouraged and assisted Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder
13 deadlock to prevent Nouvel from effectively taking part in collective
14 decisions of Quimicum and effectively exercising voting rights in
15 proportion to its share ownership, including by rejecting all of
16 Nouvel’s reasonable proposals for equal representation on the
17 Quimicum board and for the appointment of a balanced board plus
18 one independent director; and
19 c. Prevented Nouvel from enjoying the repayment of its shareholder
20 loans to Chateau Miraval through Quimicum by misusing and
21 misappropriating Chateau Miraval’s assets, including to benefit
22 companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but
23 in which Nouvel holds little or no interest), thereby benefiting
24 Mondo Bongo at Nouvel’s expense, and by causing Chateau
25 Miraval to refuse to pay dividends to Quimicum.
26 231. Cross-Defendants’ actions did in fact disrupt the performance of the Quimicum
27 Articles and Nouvel’s contractual relationship with Mondo Bongo and Quimicum. In particular:
28 a. After Quimicum’s sole director resigned in 2020, Cross-Defendants

62
1 worked with Mondo Bongo to prevent Quimicum from having a
2 valid board. Since that time, Quimicum has had no agents who can
3 manage the company and exercise the powers delegated to them
4 pursuant to Article VI of the Quimicum Articles, including the
5 power to supervise Quimicum’s subsidiary, Chateau Miraval.
6 Accordingly, Quimicum has been unable to participate in
7 shareholder meetings of Chateau Miraval or to elect new directors to
8 Chateau Miraval’s board, despite owning all of Chateau Miraval’s
9 share capital;
10 b. Because of Cross-Defendants’ work with Mondo Bongo to impose a
11 shareholder deadlock, Nouvel has been prevented from effectively
12 taking part in collective decisions of Quimicum and effectively
13 exercising voting rights in proportion to its share ownership, in
14 breach of, among other provisions, Quimicum Article 7.2, which
15 provides that “each shareholder may take part in collective decisions
16 irrespectively of the number of shares (parts sociales) he owns”; and
17 c. Cross-Defendants have caused Chateau Miraval’s funds and assets
18 to be misappropriated, including to benefit companies in which
19 Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel
20 holds little or no interest), thereby disrupting Nouvel’s right to the
21 repayment of its shareholder loans and benefiting Mondo Bongo at
22 Nouvel’s expense.
23 232. Pitt, Perrin, and their co-conspirators intervened in the normal functioning of the
24 Quimicum shareholder franchise by causing Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder deadlock at
25 Quimicum. That deadlock has left Quimicum without any directors capable of supervising
26 Chateau Miraval, which is the direct cause of all the above harms to Nouvel. Quimicum can act
27 only through its directors, yet Mondo Bongo’s conduct has left Quimicum with no director since
28 2021, rendering Quimicum unable to act to supervise Chateau Miraval. Under Luxembourg law,
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1 directors have an obligation to manage a company’s affairs. Any reasonable director made aware
2 of the conduct of Pitt, Perrin, and their co-conspirators to drain value from Quimicum’s sole asset,
3 Chateau Miraval, would have taken steps to protect that asset and to ensure that Nouvel receives
4 information concerning Quimicum on a co-equal basis with its other 50% co-owner, Mondo
5 Bongo. Under Chateau Miraval’s bylaws, Chateau Miraval’s directors can be removed by its
6 shareholders. Because Quimicum is the controlling shareholder of Chateau Miraval, any
7 reasonable director of Quimicum would have removed Chateau Miraval’s directors in thrall to Pitt
8 who allowed the misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets and replaced them with directors
9 who would defend and protect Chateau Miraval’s assets.
10 233. As a direct and proximate result of Cross-Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Nouvel
11 has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated to be not less than $350
12 million because, among other things, as a result of Quimicum’s inability to act, Nouvel is being
13 blocked from receiving information about, and participating in the governance of, Quimicum on a
14 co-equal basis; Chateau Miraval has not paid Quimicum any dividends; the assets of Chateau
15 Miraval have been diverted from it, including to benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds
16 an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and Nouvel’s shareholder
17 loans have not been repaid.
18 234. Cross-Defendants engaged in their wrongful conduct with malice, oppression, or
19 fraud. Accordingly, Nouvel requests that punitive damages be awarded.
20 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
21 Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
22 (By Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendants William B. Pitt, Mondo Bongo,
23 Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, Miraval Studios, and Roes 1-10)
26 236. Nouvel has had and continues to have economic relations with Chateau Miraval
27 that are likely to yield future and continued benefits to Nouvel.
28 237. In 2009, Nouvel loaned money to Chateau Miraval through Quimicum to invest in
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1 Chateau Miraval’s business. Nouvel had an expectation of profit from this loan to Chateau
2 Miraval. Specifically, Nouvel expected that Chateau Miraval would undertake investments that
3 would increase Chateau Miraval’s profits and enhance the value of its business. Nouvel
4 reasonably expected the millions of dollars it loaned to Chateau Miraval through Quimicum to be
5 repaid after Chateau Miraval’s wine business became profitable. Instead, Pitt and his co-
6 conspirators have diverted the wine business’ profits to their own purposes. Pitt and his co-
7 conspirators are directly and intentionally harming Nouvel by rendering a substantial portion of
8 Nouvel’s assets in the form of its outstanding shareholder loans illiquid.
9 238. Nouvel has an expectation of profit based on its indirect 50% equity interest in
10 Chateau Miraval. Specifically, Nouvel acquired and maintains a 50% equity interest in Quimicum
11 in order to benefit from Quimicum’s 100% ownership of Chateau Miraval and the success it has
12 enjoyed within the wine industry.
13 239. Cross-Defendants knew of these economic relations and the likelihood of continued
14 benefits to Nouvel. Pitt caused Mondo Bongo to enter into a similar financial arrangement with
15 Quimicum at the same time as Nouvel. Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant knew or were charged
16 with knowledge of such economic relations by virtue of their status as directors of Chateau
17 Miraval. All parties knew that Nouvel held a 50% indirect economic interest in Chateau Miraval
18 through its ownership of 50% of Quimicum.
19 240. Cross-Defendants intentionally engaged in actions designed to disrupt Nouvel’s
20 continued economic relations with Chateau Miraval.
21 241. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Mondo Bongo, and Miraval Studios worked
22 together to divert Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business
23 purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and renovations to benefit a company in which Mondo
24 Bongo holds a 40% ownership interest but Nouvel holds no direct interest. The misappropriation
25 of Chateau Miraval’s assets was independently wrongful because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant
26 each breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its assets and
27 because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of
28 French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action
65
1 causing harm to another.
2 242. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Mondo Bongo, and Miraval Studios worked
3 together to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable intellectual property assets. The
4 misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property was independently wrongful because
5 Cross-Defendants’ registration of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property amounts to theft or
6 conversion of Chateau Miraval’s assets, because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached
7 their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its intellectual property, and
11 243. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Mondo Bongo, and Miraval Studios prevented
12 Chateau Miraval from paying dividends to Quimicum that could be used to repay Nouvel’s
13 shareholder loans by diverting Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate
14 business purpose. This conduct was independently wrongful because Bradbury, Venturini, and
15 Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its assets
16 and because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation
17 of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action
19 244. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Mondo Bongo, and Miraval Studios knew this
20 conduct was harmful to Nouvel.
21 245. Cross-Defendants did in fact disrupt the economic relationship between Nouvel and
22 Chateau Miraval because the economic benefits that accrued to Chateau Miraval from investments
23 funded by Nouvel’s loan to it have not benefitted Nouvel but instead have been diverted away
24 from Nouvel and used for other purposes.
25 246. Cross-Defendants’ conduct is the direct cause of these harms to Nouvel. Between
26 2013 and 2022, Miraval Provence has paid €45 million in dividends to Chateau Miraval. At the
27 same time, its trademarks increased in value with the success of Chateau Miraval’s wines. Had
28 Cross-Defendants not misappropriated Chateau Miraval’s assets, Chateau Miraval would have
66
1 retained control of its trademarks and would have paid dividends to Quimicum, which then would
2 have repaid Nouvel’s shareholder loans and paid dividends to Nouvel. In addition, had Chateau
3 Miraval sold the misappropriated trademarks at fair market value, Chateau Miraval would have
4 had cash to pay dividends to Quimicum, which in turn would have repaid Nouvel’s shareholder
5 loans and paid Nouvel dividends.
8 million because, among other things, Chateau Miraval has not paid Quimicum any dividends, the
9 assets of Chateau Miraval have been diverted from it, including to benefit companies in which
10 Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest);
11 Nouvel’s economic interest in Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks has been reduced; and
12 Nouvel’s shareholder loans have not been repaid.
15 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
17 (By Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendants Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin,
18 Miraval Provence)
28 repaid after Chateau Miraval’s wine business became profitable. Instead, Perrin Familles Perrin,
67
1 and Miraval Provence have diverted the wine business’ profits to their own purposes. Perrin,
2 Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence are directly and intentionally harming Nouvel by rendering
3 a substantial portion of Nouvel’s assets in the form of its outstanding shareholder loans illiquid.
8 253. Nouvel’s indirect 50% equity interest in Chateau Miraval also gave Nouvel an
9 expectation of profit from an appropriate control premium payable upon any sale or transfer of
10 control in Miraval Provence.
12 benefits to Nouvel. Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Familles Perrin knew from their involvement in
13 the Chateau Miraval business that Nouvel had loaned Chateau Miraval millions of dollars through
14 Quimicum. All parties knew that Nouvel held a 50% indirect economic interest in Chateau
15 Miraval through its ownership of 50% of Quimicum.
18 256. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence worked together to divert Chateau
19 Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business purpose, including companies in
20 which Nouvel holds no interest. The misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets was
21 independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to
22 Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause
23 of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
24 257. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence worked together to misappropriate
25 Chateau Miraval’s valuable intellectual property assets. The misappropriation of Chateau
26 Miraval’s intellectual property was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants’
27 registration of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property amounts to theft or conversion of Chateau
28 Miraval’s assets and because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to
68
3 258. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence prevented Chateau Miraval from
4 paying dividends to Quimicum that could be used to repay Nouvel’s shareholder loans by
5 diverting Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business purpose. This
6 conduct was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty manner and
7 caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a
8 broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
9 259. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence worked together to misappropriate
10 control over Miraval Provence while precluding Nouvel from receiving the 50% share in any
11 control premium to which Nouvel, as an indirect 50% owner of Chateau Miraval, is entitled. This
12 conduct was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty manner and
13 caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a
14 broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
15 260. Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence knew this conduct was harmful to
16 Nouvel.
69
4 million because, among other things, Chateau Miraval has not paid Quimicum any dividends; the
7 Nouvel’s economic interest in Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks has been reduced; control
8 over Miraval Provence has been transferred without the payment of a control premium in which
9 Nouvel has a 50% interest; and Nouvel’s shareholder loans have not been repaid.
12 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
14 (By Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendants Petrichor, Vins et Domaines
15 Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera)
25 repaid after Chateau Miraval’s wine business became profitable. Instead, Cross-Defendants have
26 diverted the wine business’ profits to their own purposes. Cross-Defendants are directly and
27 intentionally harming Nouvel by rendering a substantial portion of Nouvel’s assets in the form of
28 its outstanding shareholder loans illiquid.

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6 benefits to Nouvel. Vins et Domaines Perrin knew of such economic relations because it was
7 formed by Perrin, and so charged with his knowledge. Petrichor, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de
8 la Riviera knew of such economic relations because they were formed, either directly or indirectly,
9 by Pitt and/or Mondo Bongo, and so are charged with his or its knowledge. All parties knew that
10 Nouvel held a 50% indirect economic interest in Chateau Miraval through its ownership of 50% of
11 Quimicum.
14 271. Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera
15 worked together to divert Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business
16 purpose, including companies in which Nouvel holds no interest. The misappropriation of
17 Chateau Miraval’s assets was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty
18 manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240,
19 which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
20 272. Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, and Distilleries de la Riviera worked together
21 to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable intellectual property assets. The misappropriation
22 of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property was independently wrongful because the Cross-
23 Defendants’ registration of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property amounts to theft or conversion
24 of Chateau Miraval’s assets and because Cross-Defendants acted in a faulty manner and caused
25 harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad
26 tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
27 273. Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, and Distilleries de la Riviera prevented
28 Chateau Miraval from paying dividends to Quimicum that could be used to repay Nouvel’s
71
1 shareholder loans by diverting Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate
2 business purpose. This conduct was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants acted in a
3 faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article
4 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
5 274. Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, and Distilleries de la Riviera knew this conduct
6 was harmful to Nouvel.
24 Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and
28
72
1 FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
4 Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, Miraval Studios, Marc Perrin, Familles
5 Perrin, Miraval Provence, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries
6 de la Riviera, and Roes 1-10)
24 Miraval. Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Familles Perrin knew from their involvement in the
25 Chateau Miraval business that Nouvel had loaned Chateau Miraval millions of dollars through
26 Quimicum. Vins et Domaines Perrin knew of such economic relations because it was formed by
27 Perrin, and so charged with his knowledge. Miraval Studios, Petrichor, Le Domaine, and
28 Distilleries de la Riviera knew of such economic relations because they were formed, either
73
1 directly or indirectly, by Pitt and/or Mondo Bongo, and so are charged with his or its knowledge.
4 284. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Mondo Bongo, Miraval Studios, Perrin, Familles
5 Perrin, Miraval Provence, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la
6 Riviera worked together to divert Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate
7 business purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt, renovations to benefit a company in which
8 Mondo Bongo holds a 40% ownership interest but Nouvel holds no direct interest, and companies
9 in which Nouvel holds no interest. The misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets was
10 independently wrongful because the Cross-Defendants’ registration of Chateau Miraval’s
11 intellectual property amounts to theft or conversion of Chateau Miraval’s assets and because
12 Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau
13 Miraval to protect its assets and because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to
18 Riviera prevented Chateau Miraval from paying dividends to Quimicum that could be used to
19 repay Nouvel’s shareholder loans by diverting Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked
20 a legitimate business purpose. This conduct was independently wrongful because Bradbury,
21 Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to
22 protect its assets and because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau
23 Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action
24 for any faulty action causing harm to another.
27 Riviera knew this conduct was harmful to Nouvel.
74
5 2013 and 2022, Miraval Provence has paid €45 million in dividends to Chateau Miraval. Had
7 paid dividends to Quimicum, which then would have repaid Nouvel’s shareholder loans and paid
8 dividends to Nouvel. In addition, had Chateau Miraval sold the misappropriated trademarks at fair
9 market value, Chateau Miraval would have had cash to pay dividends to Quimicum, which in turn
10 would have repaid Nouvel’s shareholder loans and paid Nouvel dividends.
15 Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and
19 SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
20 Breach of Duty of Good Faith in Luxembourg Law
21 (By Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendant Mondo Bongo)
24 292. Quimicum is incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg.
25 293. Mondo Bongo and Nouvel are parties to the Quimicum Articles.

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1 (§ 6.1.1.)
11 objects.” (§ 6.3.1.)
26 295. Nouvel has performed, and continues to perform, all conditions, covenants, and
27 promises required to be performed under the Quimicum Articles.
28 296. Under Luxembourg law, Mondo Bongo is required to perform the Quimicum
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1 Articles in good faith. As part of this obligation of good faith, Mondo Bongo has a duty of loyalty
2 toward Nouvel, which requires it to provide Nouvel with accurate information, to cooperate in the
3 performance of the Quimicum Articles, and to refrain from behavior that would deprive Nouvel of
4 the normal benefits of the Quimicum Articles.
5 297. Mondo Bongo breached this duty by refusing, in the face of repeated requests by
6 Nouvel, to provide Nouvel with information about business and investment decisions made at
7 Quimicum’s subsidiary, Chateau Miraval. Quimicum’s sole asset is Chateau Miraval, and
8 Quimicum’s appointed directors have the power to supervise Chateau Miraval, including by
9 removing Chateau Miraval’s directors. As an indirect shareholder of Chateau Miraval, Mondo
10 Bongo has no greater right of access to information about Chateau Miraval than Nouvel. Yet
11 Mondo Bongo, but not Nouvel, has access to information about the business and investment
12 decisions of Chateau Miraval. Because Mondo Bongo and Nouvel have the same right of access
13 to information about Chateau Miraval, Mondo Bongo must provide that information to Nouvel to
14 maintain parity of information. By denying Nouvel access to information about business and
15 investment decisions at Chateau Miraval, Mondo Bongo has denied Nouvel access to information
16 relevant to the performance of the Quimicum Articles and to Nouvel’s decisions concerning how
17 to vote at shareholder meetings.
18 298. Mondo Bongo also breached this duty by refusing to cooperate in the performance
19 of the Quimicum Articles. Among other things, Mondo Bongo imposed a shareholder deadlock at
20 Quimicum to prevent Quimicum from functioning properly and rejected all of Nouvel’s
21 reasonable proposals for equal representation on the Quimicum board and for the appointment of a
22 balanced board plus one independent director. Mondo Bongo has refused to cooperate with
23 Nouvel and has completely disregarded Nouvel’s legitimate interests and the parties’ shared
24 interest in Quimicum functioning properly by repeatedly voting to perpetuate the shareholder
25 deadlock. Mondo Bongo has consciously disregarded Nouvel’s rights and has subjected Nouvel
26 to cruel and unjust hardship by voting to render Quimicum incapable of supervising Chateau
27 Miraval, Nouvel’s sole investment.
28 299. Mondo Bongo also breached this duty by engaging in behavior that deprives
77
1 Nouvel of the normal benefits of the Quimicum Articles. In particular:
2 a. After Quimicum’s sole director resigned in 2020, Mondo Bongo has
3 prevented Quimicum from having a valid board. Since that time,
4 Quimicum has had no agents who can manage the company and
5 exercise the powers delegated to them pursuant to Article VI of the
6 Quimicum Articles, including the power to supervise Quimicum’s
7 subsidiary, Chateau Miraval. Accordingly, Quimicum has been
8 unable to participate in shareholder meetings of Chateau Miraval or
9 to elect new directors to Chateau Miraval’s board, despite owning
10 all of Chateau Miraval’s share capital;
11 b. Because of Mondo Bongo’s actions in imposing a shareholder
12 deadlock, Nouvel has been prevented from effectively taking part in
13 collective decisions of Quimicum and effectively exercising voting
14 rights in proportion to its share ownership; and
15 c. While exercising de facto control over Chateau Miraval, Mondo
16 Bongo has caused Chateau Miraval’s funds and assets to be
17 misappropriated, including to benefit companies in which Mondo
18 Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little
19 or no interest), thereby benefiting Mondo Bongo at Nouvel’s
20 expense, disrupting Nouvel’s right to a proportionate share of the
21 assets and profits of the company, and preventing the repayment of
22 Nouvel’s shareholder loan to Chateau Miraval through Quimicum.
23 300. Mondo Bongo’s imposition of a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum that has left
24 Quimicum without any directors capable of supervising Chateau Miraval is the direct cause of
25 these harms to Nouvel. Quimicum can act only through its directors, yet Mondo Bongo’s conduct
26 has left Quimicum with no director since 2021, rendering Quimicum unable to act to supervise
27 Chateau Miraval. Under Luxembourg law, directors have an obligation to manage a company’s
28 affairs. Any reasonable director made aware of the conduct of Pitt, Perrin, and their co-
78
1 conspirators to drain value from Quimicum’s sole asset, Chateau Miraval, would have taken steps
2 to protect that asset and to ensure that Nouvel receives information concerning Quimicum on a co-
3 equal basis with its other 50% co-owner, Mondo Bongo. Under Chateau Miraval’s bylaws,
4 Chateau Miraval’s directors can be removed by its shareholders. Because Quimicum is the
5 controlling shareholder of Chateau Miraval, any reasonable director of Quimicum would have
6 removed Chateau Miraval’s directors in thrall to Pitt who allowed the misappropriation of Chateau
7 Miraval’s assets and replaced them with directors who would defend and protect Chateau
8 Miraval’s assets.
9 301. Mondo Bongo undertook these actions recklessly, wantonly or with the express
10 intent to injure Nouvel. That Mondo Bongo acted recklessly, wantonly or with the express intent
11 to injure Nouvel is demonstrated by its rejection of all of Nouvel’s reasonable proposals for equal
12 representation on the Quimicum board and for the appointment of a balanced board plus one
13 independent director. It is also demonstrated by Mondo Bongo’s willingness to deprive
14 Quimicum of agents who can manage the company and exercise the powers delegated to them
15 pursuant to Article VI of the Quimicum Articles, including the power to supervise Quimicum’s
16 subsidiary, Chateau Miraval.
17 302. As a direct and proximate result of Mondo Bongo’s wrongful conduct, Nouvel has
18 suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated to be not less than $350 million
19 because as a result of Quimicum’s inability to act, among other things, Nouvel is being blocked
20 from receiving information about, and participating in the governance of, Quimicum on a co-equal
21 basis; Chateau Miraval has not paid Quimicum any dividends; the assets of Chateau Miraval have
22 been diverted from it, including to benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership
23 interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and Nouvel’s shareholder loans have not
24 been repaid.
25 SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
26 Trespass to Chattels
28 Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury,
79
1 Warren Grant, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine,
2 Distilleries de la Riviera and Roes 1-10)
5 304. Nouvel owns shares in Quimicum.
6 305. Cross-Defendants’ actions devalued Nouvel’s shares and intermeddled with the
7 quality of those shares by interfering with Nouvel’s rights as a shareholder of Quimicum and
8 stripping Quimicum of the economic benefits of its investments.
9 306. Cross-Defendants intermeddled with the quality or value of Nouvel’s Quimicum
10 shares by preventing Nouvel from effectively exercising its shareholder rights because they
11 encouraged and worked with Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum to
12 prevent Quimicum from functioning properly. Because of the shareholder deadlock, Nouvel has
13 been prevented from effectively taking part in collective decisions of Quimicum and effectively
14 exercising voting rights in proportion to its share ownership in breach of, among other provisions,
15 Quimicum Article 7.2, which provides that “each shareholder may take part in collective decisions
16 irrespectively of the number of shares (parts sociales) he owns”. Cross-Defendants have caused a
17 functional disruption to Nouvel’s Quimicum shares by systematically opposing all resolutions put
18 forward by Nouvel, thereby nullifying the utility of the franchise right inherent in Nouvel’s
19 Quimicum shares.
20 307. Cross-Defendants’ actions also intermeddled with the quality or value of Nouvel’s
21 Quimicum shares by diverting Chateau Miraval’s funds to projects that lacked a legitimate
22 business purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets to
23 benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds
24 little or no interest), and causing Miraval Provence to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable
25 assets. That stripping of assets and wasting of funds has intermeddled with the value of Nouvel’s
26 Quimicum shares because it has reduced the value of Quimicum’s sole asset, Chateau Miraval,
27 and because the profits that Quimicum is entitled to receive from it, thereby disrupting Nouvel’s
28 right to a proportionate share of the assets and profits of the company.

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1 308. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, and their co-conspirators intervened in the normal functioning
2 of the Quimicum shareholder franchise by causing Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder
3 deadlock at Quimicum. That deadlock has left Quimicum without any directors capable of
4 supervising Chateau Miraval, which is the direct cause of these harms to Nouvel. Quimicum can
5 act only through its directors, yet Mondo Bongo’s conduct has left Quimicum with no director
6 since 2021, rendering Quimicum unable to act to supervise Chateau Miraval. Under Luxembourg
7 law, directors have an obligation to manage a company’s affairs. Any reasonable director made
8 aware of the conduct of Pitt, Perrin, and their co-conspirators to drain value from Quimicum’s sole
9 asset, Chateau Miraval, would have taken steps to protect that asset and to ensure that Nouvel
10 receives information concerning Quimicum on a co-equal basis with its other 50% co-owner.
11 Under Chateau Miraval’s bylaws, Chateau Miraval’s directors can be removed by its shareholders.
12 Because Quimicum is the controlling shareholder of Chateau Miraval, any reasonable director of
13 Quimicum would have removed Chateau Miraval’s directors in thrall to Pitt who allowed the
14 misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets and replaced them with directors who would defend
15 and protect Chateau Miraval’s assets.
18 million because as a result of Quimicum’s inability to act, among other things, Nouvel is being
22 an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and Nouvel’s economic
23 interest in Chateau Miraval’s valuable trademarks has been reduced.
26 EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
27 Abuse of Right Under Article 6-1 of the Luxembourg Civil Code

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1 Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury,
2 Warren Grant, and Roes 1-10)
5 312. Quimicum is incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg.
6 313. Article 6-1 of the Luxembourg Civil Code provides, “Any act or fact which
7 manifestly exceeds, by the intention of its author, by its object or by the circumstances in which it
8 occurred, the normal exercise of a right, is not protected by law. It engages the responsibility of
9 its author and may give rise to an action for an injunction to prevent the continuation of the
10 abuse.”
11 314. Mondo Bongo has manifestly exceeded the normal exercise of its shareholder
12 rights by imposing a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum to prevent Quimicum from functioning
13 properly and by rejecting all of Nouvel’s reasonable proposals for equal representation on the
14 Quimicum board and for the appointment of a balanced board plus one independent director.
15 315. Mondo Bongo has manufactured the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum
16 intentionally and in bad faith so that Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval
17 Provence, and Grant could divert Chateau Miraval’s funds to projects that lacked a legitimate
18 business purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets to
19 benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds
20 little or no interest), and to enable Miraval Provence to appropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable
21 assets.
22 316. Pitt and his co-conspirators have caused Mondo Bongo to vote in a way that
23 prevents Quimicum from fulling its essential activities. Mondo Bongo’s votes against Nouvel’s
24 reasonable proposals to appoint directors have left Quimicum with no director since August 24,
25 2021. As a consequence, Quimicum has had no registered office since Ocorian terminated its
26 agreement with Quimicum on June 28, 2022. Mondo Bongo’s systematic voting against Nouvel’s
27 proposals also has prevented Quimicum from publishing its annual financial statements since
28 2018. Due to Mondo Bongo’s negative votes, Quimicum is at risk of judicial liquidation or
82
1 administrative dissolution without liquidation, which would have dramatic consequences because
2 Quimicum owns Chateau Miraval, which in turn owns the Chateau Miraval estate in France.
3 Mondo Bongo’s votes against Nouvel’s proposals are not mere disputes about how to run the
4 business; they threaten the very existence of Quimicum.
5 317. Mondo Bongo has voted against Nouvel’s proposals to appoint a functional board
6 of directors at Quimicum because it is in Mondo Bongo’s own interest to render Quimicum
7 inactive. As long as Quimicum cannot properly supervise Chateau Miraval, Mondo Bongo can
8 continue to create and to profit from companies in which it holds an interest (but in which Nouvel
9 holds little or no interest) that use the Miraval name and appropriate Chateau Miraval’s assets
10 without proper compensation, thereby draining Quimicum’s only asset of value. Mondo Bongo
11 has voted against Nouvel’s proposals to appoint a functional board at Quimicum to further its own
12 personal interest at the expense of the interest of Quimicum as a whole.
13 318. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, and their co-conspirators intervened in the normal functioning
14 of the Quimicum shareholder franchise by causing Mondo Bongo to impose a shareholder
15 deadlock at Quimicum. That deadlock has left Quimicum without any directors capable of
16 supervising Chateau Miraval, which is the direct cause of these harms to Nouvel. Quimicum can
17 act only through its directors, yet Mondo Bongo’s conduct has left Quimicum with no director
18 since 2021, rendering Quimicum unable to act to supervise Chateau Miraval. Under Luxembourg
19 law, directors have an obligation to manage a company’s affairs. Any reasonable director made
20 aware of the conduct of Pitt, Perrin, and their co-conspirators to drain value from Quimicum’s sole
21 asset, Chateau Miraval, would have taken steps to protect that asset and to ensure that Nouvel
22 receives information concerning Quimicum on a co-equal basis with its other 50% co-owner.
23 Under Chateau Miraval’s bylaws, Chateau Miraval’s directors can be removed by its shareholders.
24 Because Quimicum is the controlling shareholder of Chateau Miraval, any reasonable director of
25 Quimicum would have removed Chateau Miraval’s directors in thrall to Pitt who allowed the
26 misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets, including to benefit companies in which Mondo
27 Bongo holds an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest), and replaced
28 them with directors who would defend and protect Chateau Miraval’s assets.
83
1 319. Mondo Bongo exercised its shareholder rights outside the limits of their normal
2 exercise by a prudent and diligent person.
3 320. Mondo Bongo exercised its shareholder rights either recklessly, with wanton
4 disregard, or with the aim of causing harm to Nouvel because maintaining the shareholder
5 deadlock has allowed Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, and
6 Grant to strip Chateau Miraval of valuable assets and to ensure that it never paid dividends to
7 Quimicum, devaluing Nouvel’s investment.
8 321. As a direct and proximate result of Mondo Bongo’s wrongful conduct, Nouvel has
9 suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated to be no less than $350 million
10 because as a result of Quimicum’s inability to act, among other things, Nouvel is being blocked
11 from receiving information about, and participating in the governance of, Quimicum on a co-equal
12 basis; Chateau Miraval has not paid Quimicum any dividends, the assets of Chateau Miraval have
13 been diverted from it, including to benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership
14 interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and Nouvel’s shareholder loans have not
15 been repaid.
16 NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
17 In the Alternative, Aiding and Abetting Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
19 Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, and Roes 1-10)
22 323. The Quimicum Articles constitute a valid and binding agreement among Nouvel,
23 Mondo Bongo and Quimicum.
27 (§ 6.1.1.)

84
9 objects.” (§ 6.3.1.)
24 325. Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Grant were all
25 aware of the Quimicum Articles.
26 326. Pitt tortiously interfered with these provisions of the Quimicum Articles as set forth
27 in paragraphs 223 through 234 above.
28 327. Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Grant gave
85
1 substantial assistance to Pitt’s actions to impose a shareholder deadlock at Quimicum to prevent
2 Quimicum from functioning properly. Among other things, they intentionally and in bad faith:
3 a. Substantially assisted Pitt to prevent the election of Quimicum
4 directors empowered to manage the Company and to exercise the
5 powers delegated to them pursuant to Article VI of the Quimicum
6 Articles, including the power to supervise Quimicum’s subsidiary,
7 Chateau Miraval;
8 b. Substantially assisted Pitt to impose a shareholder deadlock to
9 prevent Nouvel from effectively taking part in collective decisions
10 of Quimicum and effectively exercising voting rights in proportion
11 to its share ownership, including by rejecting all of Nouvel’s
12 reasonable proposals for equal representation on the Quimicum
13 board and for the appointment of a balanced board plus one
14 independent director, all in breach of, among other provisions,
15 Quimicum Article 7.2, which provides that “each shareholder may
16 take part in collective decisions irrespectively of the number of
17 shares (parts sociales) he owns”; and
18 c. Substantially assisted Pitt in preventing Nouvel from enjoying the
19 repayment of its shareholder loans to Quimicum by misusing and
20 misappropriating assets belonging indirectly to Quimicum through
21 its subsidiary, Chateau Miraval, and by causing Chateau Miraval to
22 refuse to pay dividends to Quimicum.
23 328. Cross-Defendants made a conscious decision to participate in Pitt’s wrongful
24 conduct and had actual knowledge of Pitt’s disruption of the contractual relationship among
25 Nouvel, Mondo Bongo and Quimicum, as set forth in the Quimicum Articles, and the normal
26 performance of those articles.
86
1 million because, among other things, as a result of Quimicum’s inability to act, Nouvel is being
5 an ownership interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest); and Nouvel’s shareholder
6 loans have not been repaid.
9 TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
10 In the Alternative, Aiding and Abetting Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic
11 Advantage
13 Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, Petrichor, Vins et
14 Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Riviera, and Roes 1-10)
87
5 benefits to Nouvel. Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant knew or were charged with knowledge of
6 such economic relations by virtue of their status as directors of Chateau Miraval. Perrin, Miraval
7 Provence, and Familles Perrin knew from their involvement in the Chateau Miraval business that
8 Nouvel had loaned Chateau Miraval millions of dollars through Quimicum. All parties knew that
9 Nouvel held a 50% indirect economic interest in Chateau Miraval through its ownership of 50% of
10 Quimicum.
11 336. Pitt and Mondo Bongo tortiously interfered with Nouvel’s economic relationship
12 with Chateau Miraval as set forth in paragraphs 235 through 248 above.
13 337. Cross-Defendants gave substantial assistance to Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s actions
14 to disrupt Nouvel’s continued economic relations with Chateau Miraval.
15 338. Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Grant, Petrichor,
16 Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera gave
17 substantial assistance to Pitt’s and Mongo Bongo’s scheme to divert Chateau Miraval’s resources
18 to projects that lacked a legitimate business purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and the use
19 of Chateau Miraval’s assets to benefit companies in which Mondo Bongo holds an ownership
20 interest (but in which Nouvel holds little or no interest). The misappropriation of Chateau
21 Miraval’s assets was independently wrongful because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each
22 breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its assets and because
23 all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French
24 Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing
25 harm to another.
26 339. Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Grant, Petrichor,
27 Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera gave
28 substantial assistance to Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s scheme to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s
88
1 valuable intellectual property assets. The misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual
2 property was independently wrongful because Cross-Defendants’ registration of Chateau
3 Miraval’s intellectual property amounts to theft or conversion of Chateau Miraval’s assets,
4 because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of
5 Chateau Miraval to protect its intellectual property and because all parties acted in a faulty manner
6 and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates
7 a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
8 340. Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Miraval Studios, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval
9 Provence, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera gave
10 substantial assistance to Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s scheme to prevent Miraval from paying
11 dividends to Quimicum that could be used to repay Nouvel’s shareholder loans by diverting
12 Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business purpose. This conduct
13 was independently wrongful because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to
14 act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its assets and because all parties acted in a
15 faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article
16 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
17 341. They knew this conduct was harmful to Nouvel.
22 343. Cross-Defendants made a conscious decision to participate in Pitt’s and Mondo
23 Bongo’s wrongful conduct and had actual knowledge of Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s disruption of
24 the economic relationship between Nouvel and Chateau Miraval.
89
15 ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
16 Civil Conspiracy To Tortiously Interfere with Prospective Economic Advantage
17 (Cross-Complainant Nouvel Against Cross-Defendants Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin,
18 Miraval Provence, Roland Venturini, Gary Bradbury, Warren Grant, Petrichor, Vins et
19 Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Riviera, and Roes 1-10)
90
13 Miraval. Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Familles Perrin knew from their involvement in the
14 Chateau Miraval business that Nouvel had loaned Chateau Miraval millions of dollars through
15 Quimicum. Vins et Domaines Perrin knew of such economic relations because it was formed by
16 Perrin, and so charged with his knowledge. Miraval Studios, Petrichor, Le Domaine, and
17 Distilleries de la Riviera knew of such economic relations because they were formed, either
18 directly or indirectly, by Pitt and/or Mondo Bongo, and so are charged with his or its knowledge.
19 All parties knew that Nouvel held a 50% indirect economic interest in Chateau Miraval through its
20 ownership of 50% of Quimicum.
21 352. Cross Defendants formed and operated a conspiracy to disrupt Nouvel’s continued
22 economic relations with Chateau Miraval.
23 353. Cross-Defendants intentionally engaged in actions in furtherance of the conspiracy
24 to disrupt Nouvel’s continued economic relations with Chateau Miraval.
25 354. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Grant,
26 Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera
27 worked together to divert Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a legitimate business
28 purpose, including vanity projects for Pitt and the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets to benefit
91
2 or no interest). The misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s assets was independently wrongful
3 because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of
4 Chateau Miraval to protect its assets and because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused
5 harm to Chateau Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad
6 tort cause of action for any faulty action causing harm to another.
7 355. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, Grant,
8 Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera
9 worked together to misappropriate Chateau Miraval’s valuable intellectual property assets. The
10 misappropriation of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property was independently wrongful because
11 Cross-Defendants’ registration of Chateau Miraval’s intellectual property amounts to theft or
12 conversion of Chateau Miraval’s assets, because Bradbury, Venturini, and Grant each breached
13 their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to protect its intellectual property and
17 356. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Miraval Studios, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval
18 Provence, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera
19 prevented Chateau Miraval from paying dividends to Quimicum that could be used to repay
20 Nouvel’s shareholder loans by diverting Chateau Miraval’s resources to projects that lacked a
21 legitimate business purpose. This conduct was independently wrongful because Bradbury,
22 Venturini, and Grant each breached their duty to act in the best interest of Chateau Miraval to
23 protect its assets and because all parties acted in a faulty manner and caused harm to Chateau
24 Miraval in violation of French Civil Code Article 1240, which creates a broad tort cause of action
25 for any faulty action causing harm to another.
26 357. Pitt, Bradbury, Venturini, Grant, Miraval Studios, Perrin, Familles Perrin, Miraval
27 Provence, Petrichor, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Le Domaine, and Distilleries de la Riviera knew
28 this conduct was harmful to Nouvel.

92
5 359. Cross-Defendants’ actions done in furtherance of the conspiracy damaged Nouvel
6 because the economic benefits that accrued to Chateau Miraval from investments funded by
7 Nouvel’s loan to it have not benefitted Nouvel but instead have been diverted away from Nouvel
8 and used for other purposes.
27
28
93
1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2 WHEREFORE, Cross-Complainant respectfully requests judgment and relief against
3 Cross-Defendants as follows:
4 A. For judgment in favor of Cross-Complainant and against Cross-Defendants;
5 B. For compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated to be at
6 least $350 million;
7 C. For moral damages;
8 D. For punitive and exemplary damages;
9 E. For a declaration of Cross-Defendants’ violations;
10 F. For an order that Mondo Bongo specifically perform its obligations under the
11 Quimicum articles;
12 G. For an order that Miraval Provence transfer its registrations of any of Chateau
13 Miraval’s trademarks to Chateau Miraval;
14 H. For an order enjoining Miraval Provence from registering any of Chateau Miraval’s
15 trademarks;
16 I. For an order enjoining Cross-Defendants and any of their agents or representatives from
17 causing or aiding Miraval Provence to register any of Chateau Miraval’s trademarks;
18 J. For attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided by law;
19 K. For pre- and post-judgment interest; and
20 L. For any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
21
22
23
24
25
26
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94
1 Dated: July 10, 2023
2 Respectfully submitted,
3 By: /s/ Prashanth Chennakesavan
4 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP

Keith R. Hummel (admitted pro hac vice)
5 (N.Y. Bar No. 2430668)
6 Justin C. Clarke (admitted pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 5076096)
7 Jonathan Mooney (admitted pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 5648191)
8 Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
10 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
11
LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
12
14 PRASHANTH CHENNAKESAVAN
(Bar No. 284022)
15 prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
Los Angeles, CA 90071
17 Telephone: (213) 612-8900
18 Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
19 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant

NOUVEL, LLC
20
21
22
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25
26
27
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95
1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
2 Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable.
3 Dated: July 10, 2023
4 Respectfully submitted,
5 By: /s/ Prashanth Chennakesavan

Keith R. Hummel (admitted pro hac vice)
7 (N.Y. Bar No. 2430668)
8 Justin C. Clarke (admitted pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 5076096)
9 Jonathan Mooney (admitted pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 5648191)
10 Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
12 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
13
LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
14
16 PRASHANTH CHENNAKESAVAN
(Bar No. 284022)
17 prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
19 Telephone: (213) 612-8900
20 Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
21 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant

NOUVEL, LLC
22
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24
25
26
27
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96
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
3
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles State of California. I am over the age of 18,
4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 300 South Grand Ave., Suite 3950, Los
Angeles, CA 90071.
5
On July 10, 2023, I served the foregoing document(s) described as:
6 DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S FIRST AMENDED
CROSS-COMPLAINT on the interested parties in this action.
7
Laura W. Brill Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
8 Katelyn A. Kuwata William B. Pitt and
9 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP Mondo Bongo, LLC
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
10 Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 556-2700
11 Facsimile: (310) 556-2705
Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com
12 Email: kkuwata@kbkfirm.com
13
William Savitt Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
14 Jonathan M. Moses William B. Pitt and
Sarah K. Eddy Mondo Bongo, LLC
15 Adam L. Goodman
Jessica L. Allen
16
Remy Grosbard
17 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
51 West 52nd Street
Telephone: (212) 403-1000
19 Facsimile: (212) 403-2000
20 Email: WDSavitt@wlrk.com
Email: JMMoses@wlrk.com
21 Email: SKEddy@wlrk.com
Email: ALGoodman@wlrk.com
22 Email: JLAllen@wlrk.com
Email: RKGrosbard@wlrk.com
23
24 Paul D. Murphy Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-
Daniel N. Csillag Complainant
25 MURPHY ROSEN LLP Angelina Jolie
100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1300
26 Santa Monica, CA 90401
Tel.: (310) 899-3300
27 Fax: (310) 399-7201
28
97
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com
Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com
2
3 Mark T. Drooks Appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction
BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, on behalf of Cross-Defendants
4 NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG & Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
RHOW, P.C. and Familles Perrin.
5 1875 Century Park East, Suite 2300
6 Email: mdrooks@birdmarella.com
7
S. Gale Dick
8 COHEN & GRESSER
800 Third Ave.
Email: sgdick@cohengresser.com
10
11
[X ] BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE I caused the above-document(s) to be served via the Los
12 Angeles Superior Court’s electronic service provider One Legal.
13 Executed on July 10, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.

14 [X] (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
15 above is true and correct.
16
17 Lynette W. Suksnguan
Print Name Signature
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98
PROOF OF SERVICE
EXHIBIT 9
Subject: FW: ELECTRONIC SERVICE: William B. Pitt, et al. v. Angelina Jolie, et al.; LASC Case No.
22STCV06081
From: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>

Sent: Monday, January 22, 2024 11:48 AM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>
Cc: Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick <SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Keith Hummel
<KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com;
prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com; Chibunkem Ezenekwe <cezenekwe@cravath.com>
Subject: RE: ELECTRONIC SERVICE: William B. Pitt, et al. v. Angelina Jolie, et al.; LASC Case No. 22STCV06081
Couns el, As we have made clear, if res pons ive mate rial is within th e pos s es s ion, cus tody or cont rol of Mr. Pe rrin o r of Familles Pe rrin o r Mi raval Provence, we a re no t planning t o withhol d it s imply o
External (rbryer@cohengresser.com)
Report This Email FAQ
Counsel,
As we have made clear, if responsive material is within the possession, custody or control of Mr. Perrin or of Familles
Perrin or Miraval Provence, we are not planning to withhold it simply on the basis that it is stored in the files of a
“controlled subsidiary.” Without prejudice to our views on whether documents in the possession, custody, and control
of controlled subsidiaries would, as a matter of law, be discoverable from the corporate parent, if we become aware of
the existence of responsive documents in the possession, custody, or control of Mr. Perrin, Familles Perrin, or Miraval
Provence, we will produce them to you even if they happen to be housed in the files of a “controlled subsidiary.” To the
extent that the French Cross-Defendants are not aware, and do not become aware, of the existence of any such
documents, we are not required to search the files of any “controlled subsidiaries.” Please let us know if this resolves
point 1 of your email.
Our proposal on this front relates solely to the location of documents and appropriate custodians, not to the scope of
responsiveness. Thus, as to Point 2 of your email, Nouvel is not entitled to discovery – in the form of a representation
or otherwise – concerning the California contacts of entities other than the French Cross-Defendants, and we cannot
agree to a definition of “You” that would grant you such discovery. Please let us know if we have misunderstood your
position or if you have support for it.
On January 20 we said: “Your pleading contains no allegations that Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin, or Miraval Provence
could be subject to jurisdiction in California under an agency or alter ego theory. And we have informed you that we are
not aware of any such facts. See R&Os to Rog 8 (stating that no persons performed acts in California on our clients’
behalf relating to the allegations of tortious conduct in the First Amended Cross-Complaint that could form a basis for
personal jurisdiction in California).” We did not make representations regarding our knowledge of the files of entities
other than the French Cross-Defendants, and their hypothetical possession of documents responsive to “Nouvel’s RFPs
(as proposed or as agreed to between the parties, as applicable”, whatever that means.
Randall Bryer
1
800 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518
rbryer@cohengresser.com | view bio
www.cohengresser.com
New York | Paris | Washington DC | London
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From: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>

Sent: Sunday, January 21, 2024 8:09 PM
To: Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>
Couns el, It appea rs that we a re at an im pas s e concerning RFP N os . 10–12, 15, and 2 3. W ith res pect to the definiti on of “You”, me may be clos e to an agree ment. N o uvel prop os es that: To t he exten t tha t the Pe rrin C ros s -De fendan ts are aware o r du ring the cou rs e of a s earch of reas on
Counsel,
It appears that we are at an impasse concerning RFP Nos. 10–12, 15, and 23.
With respect to the definition of “You”, me may be close to an agreement. Nouvel proposes that:
1. To the extent that the Perrin Cross-Defendants are aware or during the course of a search of reasonable scope
become aware of the existence of responsive documents in the possession, custody, or control of a controlled
subsidiary, they would search for and produce those documents. To the extent that the Perrin Cross-Defendants
are not aware and do not become aware of the existence of any such documents, they would not be required to
search the files of any controlled subsidiaries.
2. The Perrin Cross-Defendants represent, as you suggested in your January 20 email, that they are not aware of
the existence of any documents that would be responsive to Nouvel’s RFPs (as proposed or as agreed to
between the parties, as applicable) only if the words “You” and “Your” are defined to include controlled
subsidiaries (i.e., the Perrin Cross-Defendants represent that they are not aware of any documents responsive to
Nouvel’s RFPs concerning contacts exclusively between their controlled subsidiaries and California). For clarity,
Nouvel does not consider documents and communications concerning ordinary course distribution to be
responsive to its RFPs.
Please let us know if you agree.
Jonathan Mooney
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
825 Eighth Avenue | New York, NY 10019
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
2
From: Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 21, 2024 7:04 PM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>
Counsel,
We have been flexible with the deadline for your motion to compel. We agreed to several extensions to accommodate
our negotiations. We also expressed willingness to discuss a lengthier schedule if you noticed your hearing for a date in
April instead of March. You declined that option.
We cannot agree to your proposals on RFP Nos. 10–12, 15, and 23.
Your counterproposal on the definition of “You” may reflect movement, but we must admit that we do not fully
understand it or how it differs from the proposal set forth in our email of January 15. Under that proposal, we would
not agree or be required to search and produce responsive documents from custodial files of a controlled subsidiary, but
we would produce (while reserving all rights on the legal merits of this dispute, and subject to approval by the SISSE) any
such documents (i.e., responsive documents held in the custodial files of a controlled subsidiary) we become aware of in
the course of a reasonable search of custodial files of Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence. Please let us
know how your counterproposal differs from this.

Sent: Saturday, January 20, 2024 6:36 PM
Couns el, W e dis agree with th e characte riz ations in your e mail. Amo ng othe r thi ngs , we note tha t the deadline fo r N ouvel to file its motio n to com pel is controlled entir ely by the Pe rrin C ros s -Def endan ts . N evertheles s , we remain in teres te d in reaching a global res olutio n concernin
Counsel,
We disagree with the characterizations in your email. Among other things, we note that the deadline for Nouvel to file
its motion to compel is controlled entirely by the Perrin Cross-Defendants.
Nevertheless, we remain interested in reaching a global resolution concerning the scope of discovery. To that end,
please let us know if the Perrin Cross-Defendants agree to the following:
1. The Perrin Cross-Defendants are not required to search for, collect, and produce documents that would be
responsive only if the words “You” and “Your” are defined to include controlled subsidiaries, provided that the
Perrin Cross-Defendants represent that no such documents exist. For the sake of clarity, here Nouvel does not
consider any other Cross-Defendant to be a controlled subsidiary of the Perrin Cross-Defendants.
2. As part of a search of reasonable scope, the Perrin Cross-Defendants will produce documents that are located in
the files of a controlled subsidiary, to the extent that any such documents exist.
3. As proposed in my prior email, Nouvel accepts the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ counterproposals on RFP Nos. 5 and
17 while the Perrin Cross-Defendants accept Nouvel’s proposals concerning RFP Nos. 10-12, 15, and 23 and
3
agree to produce documents responsive to Nouvel’s RFP No. 5 in merits discovery if their motion to quash is
denied.
If we do not hear from you, we will understand that you disagree with this proposal and do not wish to continue
negotiating.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Counsel,
Both parties have always maintained that our proposals were in service of a global resolution. And yet we find
ourselves, on the eve of your filing, without one. Your response—a single business day before your motion is due—
leaves us no time to continue negotiating. We are disappointed by this result.
Our proposals reflect many hours of good faith efforts to work collaboratively to redraft your vastly overbroad and often
incomprehensible discovery requests. They reflect significant concessions by us and are well beyond what you are
entitled to by law.
Nevertheless, we will not force you to move to compel on all of your discovery requests. We will agree to extend you
the benefit of our proposals if your motion to compel is limited to: (1) our dispute over French law and the appropriate
procedure for discovery; (2) RFP Nos. 5, 10–12, 15, 17, and 23; and (3) the definition of “You.”
On the last item, as we have made clear, your expansive definition of the term “You” is vague, unduly burdensome, and
legally unsupportable. Marc Perrin, Familles Perrin, and Miraval Provence are the only entities on whom you have
served, or are entitled to serve, jurisdictional discovery requests. Jurisdictional discovery must be limited to documents
relevant to jurisdiction over these cross-defendants. Your pleading contains no allegations that Marc Perrin, Familles
Perrin, or Miraval Provence could be subject to jurisdiction in California under an agency or alter ego theory. And we
have informed you that we are not aware of any such facts. See R&Os to Rog 8 (stating that no persons performed acts
in California on our clients’ behalf relating to the allegations of tortious conduct in the First Amended Cross-Complaint
that could form a basis for personal jurisdiction in California). Thus, we can only conclude your proposed definition of
“You” is intended to inflict unnecessary burden on non-parties to this litigation and to engage in an expansive and
improper fishing expedition for information regarding entities that are unrelated to the business or alleged conduct at
the heart of this dispute.
We await your brief.

Sent: Friday, January 19, 2024 12:39 AM
4
Couns el, The par ties are in agree ment conce rning t he deadline to file th e moti on to co mpel and t he oppos itio n and re ply briefs , t he relevan t perio d for documen t pr oduction, a nd RFPs 21-22 an d 34. W ith res pec t to t he defini tion of “YOU ”, the pa rties appear to be at a n impas s e. To
Counsel,
The parties are in agreement concerning the deadline to file the motion to compel and the opposition and reply briefs,
the relevant period for document production, and RFPs 21-22 and 34.
With respect to the definition of “YOU”, the parties appear to be at an impasse. To be clear, Nouvel considers that:
1. The Perrin-Cross-Defendants must produce files from any wholly controlled subsidiary that are responsive, even
for non-custodial sources of information
2. To the extent that the Perrin Cross-Defendants have structured their communications, contractual relations, or
financial payments with California such that their ties to, for example Mr. Pitt, are channeled through a
controlled subsidiary, that conduct is relevant to jurisdiction.
With respect to the remaining RFPs, in the interest of compromise, Nouvel would be willing to accept the Perrin Cross-
Defendants’ counterproposals on RFP Nos. 5 and 17 if (1) the Perrin Cross-Defendants accept Nouvel’s proposals
concerning RFP Nos. 10-12, 15, and 23; and (2) the Perrin Cross-Defendants agree to produce documents responsive to
Nouvel’s RFP No. 5 in merits discovery if their motion to quash is denied. Please let us know if you agree.
Finally, given the substantial progress that the parties have made, Nouvel intends to move to compel further discovery
responses only with respect to the definition of “YOU” and those RFPs on which the parties have not reached agreement
and to represent to the court that, subject to the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ objection concerning the French Blocking
Statute, the parties were able to agree on the proper scope of discovery with respect to the remaining RFPs. Please let
us know if you disagree.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Monday, January 15, 2024 11:07 PM
Counsel,
Our response to your Saturday, January 13 proposal is below. It is subject to, and without waiver of, the conditions and
objections we outlined on January 12. Please let us know if we have agreement.
5
Deadline to File
We agree to grant you another extension to file your motion to compel to January 22, 2024, provided that our
opposition brief would be due on February 20, which we understand to be consistent with the Code. We cannot file our
opposition any earlier than February 20 for the reasons we have explained.
Relevant Period
As a compromise, we would agree to log responsive documents through October 5, 2021 and produce responsive
documents through September 6, 2022, the date Nouvel filed the Cross-Complaint naming our clients as cross-
defendants. This is in line with the position you have taken that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised upon contacts
“that did not exist at the time they filed suit.” Shefler Opp. at 9. In exchange, for all RFPs, the relevant period should be
adjusted to begin starting September 1, 2016, the date on which the FACC alleges tortious conduct principally begun.
You
We will not accept Nouvel’s proposed definition of the term “You.” To be clear, if responsive material is within the
possession, custody or control of Mr. Perrin or any employee or officer of Familles Perrin or Miraval Provence, we are
not planning to withhold it simply because it is stored in the files of a “controlled subsidiary” (a term you have not
defined). But we cannot agree that by naming a foreign parent entity as a defendant, and serving jurisdictional
discovery solely on that foreign parent, a plaintiff is entitled to discovery regarding the possible extent of California
contacts by every “controlled subsidiary” within the corporate structure or to force upon foreign defendants the burden
of searching and producing documents from the files of their non-party subsidiaries. Your attempted expansion of the
term “You” is vague, unduly burdensome, and beyond what the law allows.
RFP Nos. 21–22

Please let us know if the addition of the below text, in underline, resolves the open issue regarding RFP Nos. 21–22.
• All executed contracts pursuant to which any payments were made between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird;
• A representation that the only payments made between You and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms.
Jolie, or Ms. Bird were made pursuant to the produced contracts; and
• Documents and Communications, if any, indicating that contractual payments described in subsection (2) were
made for a purpose or in an amount other than obligations pursuant to the contracts provided in subsection (1).
RFP No. 5
Our proposal offered you contracts between our clients and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel or Ms.
Bird, even though those contracts do not form the basis of your claims. We also offered to provide you with
communications, if any, with those individuals and entities concerning the conduct alleged in the First-Amended Cross-
Complaint to be tortious.
The terms “arrangement or understandings” remain vague, and discovery relating to those terms would be unduly
burdensome. In addition, including these terms would likely sweep in routine business decisions and understandings,
rather than California contacts or even tortious conduct, to which you are not entitled, particularly as part of
jurisdictional discovery.
RFP Nos. 10–12 15, 17, 23

We cannot agree to expand the scope of our counterproposals to RFP Nos. 10–12, 15, 17, and 23. We offered to make
substantial concessions on these RFPs as part of a proposed global agreement, but have not seen proportional reciprocal
movement on your part.
RFP No. 34
We direct you to our responses and objections dated October 30, 2023. To the extent additional documents exist,
subject to the objections and conditions articulated in our January 12 email, we agree to your proposal.
6
From: Phoebe King
Counsel,
We agree to grant you another extension to file your motion to compel to January 22, 2024, provided that our
opposition brief would be due on February 20, which we understand to be consistent with the Code. We cannot file our
opposition any earlier than February 20 for the reasons we have explained.
We will respond on the substantive issues later this evening or tomorrow morning.

Couns el, The par ties are clos e to an agre emen t on the s cope o f pro duction in res pons e to RFP N os . 21 and 22. Pleas e let us know if you ag ree to thebold ed modi fication below : All executed con tracts pu rs uant t o which any paymen ts were made between Yo u, on t he one han d, and M r. Pit t
Counsel,
The parties are close to an agreement on the scope of production in response to RFP Nos. 21 and 22. Please let us know
if you agree to the bolded modification below:
1. All executed contracts pursuant to which any payments were made between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
2. A representation that the only payments made between You and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms.
Jolie, or Ms. Bird were made pursuant to the produced contracts;
3. Documents and Communications, if any, indicating that contractual payments in described in subsection (2)
were made for a purpose other than obligations pursuant to the contracts provided in subsection (1); and
4. Documents and Communications, if any, indicating the amounts of the contractual payments if those amounts
are not apparent on the face of the contracts.
As part of a global agreement concerning the scope of discovery, and without prejudice to Nouvel’s right to seek
discovery responsive to the full scope of its requests if the parties cannot reach agreement, please let us know if you
agree to the following proposal:
Nouvel will accept the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ counterproposals on RFP Nos. 3-4, 14, 16, 18-20 and will agree not
move to compel further discovery responses to RFP Nos. 7 and 24-26.
In return, the Perrin Cross-Defendants, subject to resolution of their objection based on the French Blocking Statute, will
accept Nouvel’s proposals on RFP Nos. 5 (excluding documents responsive to RFP No. 25), 10-12, 15, 17, and 23, as well
as Nouvel’s proposal concerning the definition of the word “YOU”; will produce documents responsive to Nouvel’s RFP
7
No. 34 to the extent that any such documents exist; will log responsive documents through October 5, 2021; and will
produce responsive documents through the present.
Please let us know by the end of the day on Monday, January 15, 2024, if the Perrin Cross-Defendants agree to the
above proposal.
Furthermore, in light of the timing, the holiday, and the upcoming hearing on Pitt’s demurrer to Nouvel’s First Amended
Cross-Complaint, Nouvel requests an extension of the deadline to file its motion to compel further discovery responses
until Monday, January 22, 2024. If the parties are able to reach agreement, Nouvel agrees that the deadlines for filing
opposition and reply briefs would be per Code.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Friday, January 12, 2024 2:39 PM
To: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>
Counsel,
We write in further response to your January 8 email.
As we have made clear, the French Blocking Statute and the directive Miraval Provence, Familles Perrin, and Marc Perrin
(the “French Cross-Defendants” or “our clients”) received from the Service de I'information Stratégique et de la Sécurité
Économiques (“SISSE”) forbid us from providing any discovery outside the procedures set forth by the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”). Your refusal to seek discovery
via Hague Convention procedures necessitates the Court’s intervention.
Notwithstanding our dispute over the proper procedures for jurisdictional discovery, we have endeavored in good
faith—over many hours of meet and confers—to reach agreement with you regarding the scope of jurisdictional
discovery. We have done so without prejudice to our position that jurisdictional discovery from our clients is
unwarranted in this case, is unnecessary to oppose our clients’ motion to quash, and will not establish personal
jurisdiction over the French Cross-Defendants, whose alleged conduct occurred in France and related to European
entities.
We remain hopeful that we can reach an agreement as to the scope of jurisdictional discovery. In the event that the
Court were to order production outside Hague Convention procedures the French Cross-Defendants would agree not to
oppose discovery, subject to approval by the SISSE, of non-privileged Documents and Communications in their
possession, custody, or control that are responsive to the below counterproposals and located upon a reasonable search
of custodial files.
Except to the extent specified below, we maintain our general objections and objections to the instructions, definitions,
and specific requests as set forth in the French Cross-Defendants’ responses and objections to cross-complainant Nouvel
LLC’s first sets of requests for production regarding personal jurisdiction. To the extent the below counterproposals
8
reference “all” documents and communications, “all” is subject to a reasonable search, privilege review, and standard
ESI practices such as deduplication and threading. The fact that the French Cross-Defendants have responded should
not be interpreted as implying that responsive documents exist. Nor should it be taken as an admission or acceptance of
the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by the request.
To be clear, we view our below counterproposals as well beyond what your client is entitled to under California
law. They reflect our good faith efforts to compromise and progress made during our extensive negotiations.
Please let us know if we have an agreement.
In light of the timing, we are willing to grant you two additional days to file a motion to compel, i.e., until January 18. If
you would like to discuss a lengthier briefing schedule, we are available.
Definition of You
Your proposal: The Perrin Cross-Defendants agree with Nouvel’s definition of “YOU” to include any controlled
subsidiaries and will produce documents and communications from any controlled subsidiaries.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants will construe a reference to “You” or “Your” to mean Familles Perrin and its
officers or employees, Miraval Provence and its officers or employees, and Marc Perrin in his individual capacity. The
French Cross-Defendants agree to produce documents within their possession custody or control responsive to the
counterproposals.
Note: Although documents maintained by controlled subsidiaries may sometimes fall within the parent entity’s
possession, custody, and control, your proposed expansion of the term “You” is not appropriate in the context of
jurisdictional discovery. Nouvel has served jurisdictional discovery on Familles Perrin, Miraval Provence, and Marc
Perrin. California law requires that jurisdictional discovery be narrowly tailored to lead to the production of evidence of
facts establishing jurisdiction over those cross-defendants. Use of jurisdictional discovery to seek production of
documents or information regarding other entities or defendants, and their hypothetical contacts with California, is
improper. You have taken this very position before the Court: “California law does not allow Plaintiffs to obtain
discovery from [one cross-defendant] for the purpose of attempting to carry their burden of proof with respect to other
motions to quash filed by other defendants.” Shefler Opp. at 9 (quoting 1880 Corp. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 840, 843
(1962) (a foreign defendant who has challenged personal jurisdiction “cannot be required to answer any question which
is not relevant to the subject matter of the motion [to quash]”)). Service of jurisdictional discovery requests on our
corporate clients in this litigation does not entitle you to discovery regarding the possibility of separate contacts by other
entities within the corporate structure. We do not agree that you may use the definition of “You” to ignore the
corporate form, investigate other entities’ or defendants’ California contacts, and/or inflict undue burden.
RFP Nos. 1-2
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications discussing any meetings held during visits or trips You or any of Your
agents or representatives made to the State of California that relate to the conduct alleged in the First Amended Cross-
Complaint to be tortious.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants agree to this proposal.
RFP Nos. 3-4
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird,
Jon Liebman, Raynault LecanuFayet, or any other Person in California concerning the conduct alleged in the First-
Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
9
Our proposal: All Documents and Communications with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird,
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning the conduct alleged in the First-
RFP No. 5
Your proposal: All executed contracts, arrangements, or understandings and all Documents and Communications
memorializing or referencing executed contracts, arrangements, or understandings, in each case between You, on the
one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or their Affiliates, on the other hand, and
all Documents and Communications concerning any unexecuted contracts, arrangements, or understandings between
You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their Affiliates, on the
other hand, concerning Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence, or Miraval Studios.
Our proposal: All executed contracts between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie,
Nouvel or Ms. Bird, on the other hand, concerning Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence.
In addition, all Documents and Communications with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, Jon
Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning the conduct alleged in the First-
Note: Nouvel is not entitled, in the context of jurisdictional discovery, to documents and communications merely
“referencing” contracts that do not form the basis of Nouvel’s claims. Nouvel also is not entitled to jurisdictional
discovery concerning “unexecuted” contracts or “arrangements or understandings” (terms which are vague and overly
broad) that are not specified or alleged to exist in the First Amended Cross-Complaint, let alone alleged to form the basis
of Nouvel’s claims or support personal jurisdiction over our clients. California law does not permit such a fishing
expedition. See, e.g., Burdick v. Superior Ct., 233 Cal. App. 4th 8, 30, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 17 (2015) (“Any discovery must
be limited to the issue of specific personal jurisdiction based on the required minimum contacts. . . .”).
RFP No. 6
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of the conduct alleged in
the First Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants agree to this proposal.
RFP No. 7
Your proposal: A representation that no non-contractual rights or obligations exist between You, on the one hand, and
Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates, on the other hand.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants do not agree to produce Documents and Communications or offer any
representations regarding non-contractual rights or obligations, if any, with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie,
Nouvel, or Ms. Bird.
Note: Nouvel is not entitled, in the context of jurisdictional discovery, to documents and communications concerning
the existence of “non-contractual rights and obligations” (terms which are vague and overly broad) that are not
specified or alleged to exist in the First Amended Cross-Complaint, let alone alleged to form the basis of Nouvel’s claims
or support personal jurisdiction over our clients. California law does not permit such a fishing expedition.
RFP No. 10
10
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning Your knowledge of, involvement in, assistance to, or
contribution to, any actual or contemplated actions to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising,
overseeing, governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any
of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval,
Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning Your involvement in, assistance
to, or contribution to, any actions to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising, overseeing,
governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence,
or their direct subsidiaries.
In addition, all Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of any actions to block or
prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising, overseeing, governing, obtaining information about, or
participating in the affairs of Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence, or their direct subsidiaries.
RFP No. 11
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement or participation by You or any of Your
agents, representatives, or Affiliates in responding to any request, including any request for information, made by
Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
Investees, including Miraval Provence, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval
Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning Your involvement or
participation in responding to any request, including any request for information, made by Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird,
concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence, or any of their direct subsidiaries.
In addition, all Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of Your involvement in
responding to any request, including any request for information, made by Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning
Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence or any of their direct subsidiaries.
RFP No. 12
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance to, or contribution to
any actual or contemplated actions relating to the payment, or lack thereof, of dividends from Chateau Miraval or
Quimicum.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, relating to Your involvement in, assistance
to, or contribution to the payment, or lack thereof, of dividends from Chateau Miraval or Quimicum.
In addition, all Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of the payment, or lack
thereof, of dividends from Chateau Miraval or Quimicum.
RFP No. 14
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of any actual or
contemplated renovations, improvements to, or additions to the Chateau Miraval Estate, or to any buildings,
constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate, on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
11
Our proposal: All Documents and Communications discussing the expected or actual effect of renovations,
improvements to, or additions to the Chateau Miraval Estate, or to any buildings, constructions, or attachments on or
near the Estate, on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
RFP No. 15
Your proposal: All Document and Communications concerning Your knowledge of, involvement in, assistance to, or
contribution to any action concerning the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the appointment of directors of
Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning Your involvement in, assistance
to, or contribution to the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the appointment of directors of Quimicum, or the
appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
In addition, all Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of the shareholder deadlock
at Quimicum, the appointment of directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
RFP No. 16
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of the shareholder
deadlock at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
Our proposal: All Documents and Communications discussing the expected or actual effect of the shareholder deadlock
at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
RFP No. 17
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements, arrangements, or
understandings, oral or in writing, between You, on the one hand, and any Person located in the State of California, on
the other hand, that relate to the conduct alleged in the First-Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
Our proposal: All executed contracts, if any, between You, on the one hand, and any known California resident that
relate to the conduct alleged in the First-Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
RFP No. 18
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications, including records of any telephone calls or video calls, concerning
any Communications between You or any of Your agents or representatives and any Person located in the State of
California concerning (1) amendments to the Long Term License Agreement or deviations from performing the
obligations in the Long Term License Agreement; (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual
property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the creation or registration of any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word
“Miraval” or a similar word; or (4) the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their subsidiaries,
Affiliates, or Equity Investees hold an equity interest; and Documents sufficient to show the rates that Familles Perrin
charges Miraval Provence for bottling and how those rates were calculated.
Our proposal: Documents and Communications with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, Jon
Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident concerning (1) amendments to the Long Term
License Agreement or deviations from performing the obligations in the Long Term License Agreement; (2) Miraval
Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the creation or registration of
12
any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (4) the use of Chateau Miraval’s
assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
RFP No. 19
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of (1) amendments to
the Long Term License Agreement or deviations from the obligations in the Long Term License Agreement; (2) Miraval
Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles Perrin
charges Miraval Provence for bottling and how those rates were calculated; (4) the creation or registration of any entity
whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by
Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo
Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees hold an equity interest.
Our proposal: All Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of (1) amendments to the
Long Term License Agreement or deviations from the obligations in the Long Term License Agreement; (2) Miraval
Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the creation or registration of
any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (4) the use of Chateau Miraval’s
assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera.
RFP No. 20
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning the registration of any trademark in the United States
that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar word.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning the conduct alleged in the First-
Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious, including Documents and Communications regarding the registration of a
trademark in the United States that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval”.
Note: The French Cross-Defendants will not produce all Documents and Communications concerning the registration of
any trademark in the United States that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar
word. Such a production is overly broad and is not reasonably tailored to lead to the production of evidence of facts
that would give rise to jurisdiction. The registration of a trademark in the United States is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction in California.
RFP Nos. 21–22
Your proposal: All contracts, agreements, arrangements, or understandings pursuant to which any financial payments,
transfers, or transactions were made between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel,
Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, or their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the other hand, all Document and
Communications showing that the purpose of any such payment, transfer, or transaction is not consistent with the
purpose described in the relevant contract, a representation concerning the number and amount of all such payments,
transfers, or transactions, in each case on a contract-by-contract basis, and a representation that all such payments
were made pursuant to a contract.
Our proposal:
(1) All executed contracts pursuant to which any payments were made between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
(2) A representation that the only payments made between You and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms.
Jolie, or Ms. Bird were made pursuant to the produced contracts; and
(3) Documents and Communications, if any, indicating that contractual payments in described in subsection (2)
were made for a purpose other than obligations pursuant to the contracts provided in subsection (1).
13
RFP No. 23
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning the reduction of Chateau Miraval’s ownership interest in
Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of shares in Miraval Provence held
by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
Jon Liebman, Reynald LecanuFayet, or any other known California resident, concerning the reduction of Chateau
Miraval’s ownership interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of
shares in Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
In addition, all Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of the reduction of Chateau
Miraval’s ownership interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of
shares in Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
RFP No. 24
Your proposal: The distribution agreement between Miraval Provence and Campari Group and all Documents and
Communications concerning the purpose of entering into the distribution agreement or the effect on Nouvel or the Stoli
Group of entering into the distribution agreement.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants do not agree to produce the distribution agreement between Miraval
Provence and Campari Group or documents and communications concerning that agreement. There are no allegations
in the First Amended Cross-Complaint discussing the Campari Group or any distribution agreements between Miraval
Provence and the Campari Group. In addition, efforts to obtain this document are straightforward attempts to misuse
jurisdictional discovery to obtain information about the operation of European businesses.
RFP Nos. 25–26
Your proposal: All Documents and Communications concerning any negotiations with Ms. Jolie that reflect contacts with
California concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and Chateau Miraval, including all drafts of agreements with
Ms. Jolie concerning the sale.
Our proposal: The French Cross-Defendants do not agree to produce Documents and Communications concerning failed
negotiations regarding the sale of shares in European entities.

Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2024 8:34 PM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>
Cc: Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
<SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>;
joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com; prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com; Chibunkem Ezenekwe
<cezenekwe@cravath.com>
Jonathan,
14
We hope to provide a substantive response to your proposals tomorrow, but we wanted to get back to you on your
scheduling proposals in the meantime.
As we conveyed on our last meet and confer, the March 4 motion to compel date, which necessitates a mid-February
deadline for our response, is incredibly challenging for our team. Two of our team members will be traveling
internationally during the week you proposed for our opposition and the third is preparing for a trial the following
week. As a result, we need more time to brief the motion to compel than your schedule permits. Since January 15 is a
court holiday, we would consent to extending your deadline to file your motion to compel until January 16 and then
going to code for the response and reply. We note that it appears you have 10 hearing dates reserved for motions to
compel, including 3 in April.
The motion to quash schedule is acceptable to us.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518

To: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>
Cc: Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
<SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>;
Couns el, I write conce rning th e par ties ’ January 4, 20 24 meet a nd confe r concerning N ouvel’s re ques ts for j uris dictional dis covery f rom the Pe rrin C ros s -Defe ndants . B riefing Schedule for Moti on To Co mpel and Motio n to Quas h G iven that the pa rties have engaged in ext ens ive negotia
Counsel,
I write concerning the parties’ January 4, 2024 meet and confer concerning Nouvel’s requests for jurisdictional discovery
from the Perrin Cross-Defendants.
Briefing Schedule for Motion To Compel and Motion to Quash

15
Given that the parties have engaged in extensive negotiations concerning the scope of discovery, Nouvel plans to file its
motion to compel this month. Following up on our discussion during the January 4 meet and confer concerning the
briefing schedule for the motion to compel, Nouvel proposes the following deadlines:
• Motion to Compel: January 22, 2024

• Opposition to Motion to Compel: February 13, 2024
• Reply in Support of Motion to Compel: February 23, 2024
• Hearing on Motion to Compel: March 4, 2024
We propose the following schedule for the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash:
• Opposition to Motion to Quash: April 12, 2024

• Reply in Support of Motion to Quash: April 26, 2024
• Hearing on Motion to Quash: May 3, 2024
Please let us know if you agree to these briefing schedules for the two motions.
Scope of Discovery
In an effort to resolve any remaining disputes as to the scope of your clients’ production, Nouvel proposes that, subject
to the court’s resolution of your clients’ objection based on the French Blocking Statute and your clients’ position that
discovery should proceed through the Hague Evidence Convention, the Perrin Cross-Defendants agree to the following
scope of jurisdictional discovery. Nouvel makes this proposal as a global resolution of the parties’ dispute concerning
the scope of jurisdictional discovery. Please provide written confirmation of your agreement to this scope of discovery.
• RFPs No. 1-2: All Documents and Communications discussing any meetings held during visits or trips You or
any of Your agents or representatives made to the State of California that relate to the conduct alleged in
the First Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
• RFPs No. 3-4: All Documents and Communications with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie,
Nouvel, Ms. Bird, Jon Liebman, Raynault LecanuFayet, or any other Person in California concerning the
conduct alleged in the First-Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
• RFP No. 5: All executed contracts, arrangements, or understandings and all Documents and
Communications memorializing or referencing executed contracts, arrangements, or understandings, in
each case between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms.
Bird, or their Affiliates, on the other hand, and all Documents and Communications concerning any
unexecuted contracts, arrangements, or understandings between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their Affiliates, on the other hand, concerning
Chateau Miraval, Miraval Provence, or Miraval Studios.
• RFP No. 6: All Documents and Communications discussing the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of the conduct
alleged in the First Amended Cross-Complaint to be tortious.
• RFP No. 7: A representation that no non-contractual rights or obligations exist between You, on the one
hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates, on the
other hand.
• RFP No. 10: All Documents and Communications concerning Your knowledge of, involvement in, assistance
to, or contribution to, any actual or contemplated actions to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird
from supervising, overseeing, governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of
16
Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la
Rivera.
• RFP No. 11: All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement or participation by You or any
of Your agents, representatives, or Affiliates in responding to any request, including any request for
information, made by Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their
subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA
Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
• RFP No. 12: All Documents and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance to, or
contribution to any actual or contemplated actions relating to the payment, or lack thereof, of dividends
from Chateau Miraval or Quimicum.
• RFP No. 14: All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of any actual or
contemplated renovations, improvements to, or additions to the Chateau Miraval Estate, or to any
buildings, constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate, on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
• RFP No. 15: All Document and Communications concerning Your knowledge of, involvement in, assistance
to, or contribution to any action concerning the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the appointment of
directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
• RFP No. 16: All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of the
shareholder deadlock at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
• RFP No. 17: All Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements, arrangements, or
understandings, oral or in writing, between You, on the one hand, and any Person located in the State of
California, on the other hand, that relate to the conduct alleged in the First-Amended Cross-Complaint to be
tortious.
• RFP No. 18: All Documents and Communications, including records of any telephone calls or video calls,
concerning any Communications between You or any of Your agents or representatives and any Person
located in the State of California concerning (1) amendments to the Long Term License Agreement or
deviations from performing the obligations in the Long Term License Agreement; (2) Miraval Provence’s
rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the creation or registration of
any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (4) the use of
Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la
Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or
Equity Investees hold an equity interest; and Documents sufficient to show the rates that Familles Perrin
charges Miraval Provence for bottling and how those rates were calculated.
• RFP No. 19: All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of (1)
amendments to the Long Term License Agreement or deviations from the obligations in the Long Term
License Agreement; (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau
Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles Perrin charges Miraval Provence for bottling and how those rates were
calculated; (4) the creation or registration of any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word
“Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor,
Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr.
Grant, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees hold an equity interest.
• RFP No. 20: All Documents and Communications concerning the registration of any trademark in the United
States that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar word.
17
• RFPs No. 21-22: All contracts, agreements, arrangements, or understandings pursuant to which any
financial payments, transfers, or transactions were made between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, or their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on
the other hand, all Document and Communications showing that the purpose of any such payment,
transfer, or transaction is not consistent with the purpose described in the relevant contract, a
representation concerning the number and amount of all such payments, transfers, or transactions, in each
case on a contract-by-contract basis, and a representation that all such payments were made pursuant to a
contract.
• RFP No. 23: All Documents and Communications concerning the reduction of Chateau Miraval’s ownership
interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of shares in
Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
• RFP No. 24: The distribution agreement between Miraval Provence and Campari Group and all Documents
and Communications concerning the purpose of entering into the distribution agreement or the effect on
Nouvel or the Stoli Group of entering into the distribution agreement.
• RFP Nos. 25-26: All Documents and Communications concerning any negotiations with Ms. Jolie that reflect
contacts with California concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and Chateau Miraval, including all
drafts of agreements with Ms. Jolie concerning the sale.
• The Perrin Cross-Defendants agree with Nouvel’s definition of “YOU” to include any controlled subsidiaries
and will produce documents and communications from any controlled subsidiaries.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 3:48 PM
To: Randall Bryer <rbryer@cohengresser.com>
Cc: Phoebe King <pking@cohengresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
<SGDick@cohengresser.com>; Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>;
Subject: Re: ELECTRONIC SERVICE: William B. Pitt, et al. v. Angelina Jolie, et al.; LASC Case No. 22STCV06081
Thanks, Randall. These edits are fine with us. We’ll get this on file.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
On Jan 3, 2024, at 11:21 AM, Randall Bryer <rbryer@cohengresser.com> wrote:
18
Hi Jonathan,
Thanks. We proposed a few edits to the attached. If these are acceptable to you, you have our consent to file. Please
let us know if you have any concerns with or comments on our edits.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518

To: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks
<mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick <SGDick@CohenGresser.com>
Cc: Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com;
Randall, Thank you. We hope you als o had a res tfu l holiday as well and wis h you a happy new year . We are available at 4:30 PM ET on Thu rs day. I will ci rculate an invitatio n. In addi tion, we would l ike to fi le the attached s tipulation re flecting the pa rties ’ agreement to ex tend th
Randall,
Thank you. We hope you also had a restful holiday as well and wish you a happy new year. We are available at 4:30 PM
ET on Thursday. I will circulate an invitation.
In addition, we would like to file the attached stipulation reflecting the parties’ agreement to extend the briefing
schedule for the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash. We are cognizant that the court has asked the parties to be
economical about filing stipulations and to that end have provided that the parties may further adjust the relevant
briefing deadlines amongst themselves provided they comply with CCP § 1005(b). However, because the court
previously so-ordered a stipulation requiring Nouvel to oppose the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash tomorrow,
we think it is necessary to file this stipulation to extend the deadline. Please let us know if you have any edits and if we
have you consent to file the stipulation.
19
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks
Hi Jonathan,
We hope you all had a happy and restful holiday/new year. To circle back on our discussion regarding the next meet and
confer, we are available on Thursday (1/4) from 3PM onward. Please let us know when works for you.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518
From: Randall Bryer

Sent: Saturday, December 23, 2023 10:56 AM
20
Jonathan,
We are not sure what about our December 21 email surprises you. Your prior position was that you were leaning
toward proceeding through the CCP and not the Hague Convention. But during our December 15 meet and confer, you
took a more definitive position that “unless something extraordinary happens” you planned to move the court to
compel us to go through the CCP, notwithstanding your understanding that doing so could require our client to violate
the SISSE’s directive and risk criminal sanctions. Against that backdrop, it should be unsurprising that we need a few
additional days (during the holidays) to think through and discuss with our client the ramifications of any potential
agreement regarding the scope of discovery.
We also vigorously dispute your assertion that we have engaged in a “consistent pattern of delay.” To the contrary, we
have met and conferred with you on a near-weekly basis. And, having reviewed the correspondence in connection with
the motions to compel filed by Mr. Pitt and Mondo Bongo against your foreign clients, we note that it appears it often
took you significantly longer to respond to those parties and schedule meet and confers than it has taken us.
In response to your comment about my December 15 email, we again disagree that your renditions of our meet and
confers have been fully accurate or complete. To reiterate, you have, at times, failed to include the full range of our
objections or positions, which distorts the record.
In response to your request for an example of any such omissions, on our last meet and confer, we referenced your
December 15 summary of our objection to RFP 6 on the parties’ December 7 meet and confer as inaccurate. Your email
summarized the discussion about why you believed that our proposal to produce effects test documents that mentioned
the forum was unduly narrow as follows: “You stated that you wanted to make document production a manageable
exercise.” While we did raise that objection, we also stated that we felt our proposal was substantively appropriate
because any production set should be “limited to contacts that impact the forum not just someone who lives
there.” While you may disagree with our interpretation of the case law, that response was omitted from your
summary. And it is only one such example. It is entirely appropriate for us to reserve our rights to object to efforts to
trivialize, diminish, or omit our objections to your discovery requests.
Finally, we agree to your request for an extension to January 15. We hope you have a happy holiday season.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518
21

Sent: Friday, December 22, 2023 4:34 PM
Randall, Nouvel is s urpris ed that the Per rin Cros s -Defendants des cribe Nouvel ’s plan to s eek dis covery fro m them under the Californ ia Code of Civil Procedure rather than th rough the Hague Conventi on as “changed circums tances ”. In my December 6 email, I w rote that du ring the pa rti
Randall,
Nouvel is surprised that the Perrin Cross-Defendants describe Nouvel’s plan to seek discovery from them under the
California Code of Civil Procedure rather than through the Hague Convention as “changed circumstances”.
In my December 6 email, I wrote that during the parties’ December 1 meet and confer I had “explained that Nouvel
believes that it would be appropriate to proceed under the California Code of Civil Procedure” because “the California
Code of Civil Procedure would allow a broader scope of discovery, would provide certainty about the scope of the
discovery requests actually served on the Perrin Cross-Defendants, and would take less time than proceeding through
the Hague Convention”. I then provided several California authorities supporting these point. I also clearly stated on
several meet and confers that Nouvel intends to seek discovery from your clients under the California Code of Civil
Procedure rather than through the Hague Evidence Convention.
In sum, there are no “changed circumstances”. The Perrin Cross-Defendants’ contention that they are unable to meet
and confer for two weeks due to purportedly “changed circumstances” is not credible, but instead appears to be part of
a consistent pattern of delay that is prejudicing Nouvel’s right to obtain jurisdictional discovery.
I also wish to respond to a statement in your December 19 email. There, you wrote that my December 15 email “does
not fully reflect the positions and objections we raised as to the specific RFPs discussed during the December 7 meet and
confer”. We disagree. Our rendition of the parties’ discussion during the December 7 meet and confer is accurate, and
you have not specified any statement that you contend is inaccurate.
We are available to meet and confer on January 4.
With respect to Nouvel’s deadlines to oppose the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash and to move to compel
further responses to its RFPs and special interrogatories, we respectfully request a courtesy extension to January 15 so
that we do not need to work on these briefs over the holidays and to provide the parties adequate time to work out a
mutually acceptable briefing schedule given that we will not be meeting and conferring until January 4.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2023 4:16 PM
22
Jonathan,
You have now confirmed that you are not planning to utilize Hague Convention Procedures notwithstanding the explicit
direction from the SISSE and threat of criminal sanctions against our clients. Given these changed circumstances, which
require further internal deliberation, as well as the upcoming holidays, we are unable to meet and confer this week on
the substantive issues. We propose a call on January 4.
In the interim, we are willing to extend your provisional deadline for a Motion to Compel until January 8.
We are also willing to work with you to stipulate to a revised briefing schedule for our motion to quash.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518

Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2023 5:41 PM
Couns el, I write concerning ou r December 15, 20 23 meet and confe r concerning the Perrin C ros s -Defendants ’ res pons es and objections to Nouvel’s jur is dictional dis covery reques ts . Nouvel’s M otion to Compel Fu rther Dis covery Res pons es I explained that Nouvel ’s deadline to move to co
Counsel,
23
I write concerning our December 15, 2023 meet and confer concerning the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ responses and
objections to Nouvel’s jurisdictional discovery requests.
Nouvel’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses
I explained that Nouvel’s deadline to move to compel further discovery responses from the Perrin Cross-Defendants is
Monday, December 18 with respect to Nouvel’s jurisdictional RFPs and Wednesday, December 20 with respect to
Nouvel’s jurisdictional interrogatories. Given that the parties have made considerable progress negotiating the scope of
the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ responses to Nouvel’s discovery requests, I explained that it would be premature to move
to compel because the parties are not yet at an impasse. I asked that the Perrin Cross-Defendants agree to extend the
deadline to move compel further discovery responses. You stated that you would get back to us, and have tentatively
extended the deadline for Nouvel to move to compel further discovery responses to December 27, 2023.
You asked in your email of December 15, 2023 for the dates of Nouvel’s hearing reservations for motions to compel
further discovery responses. As relevant here, Nouvel has reserved hearings for motions to compel further discovery
responses on March 4, 2024, and April 3, 2024.
So that we may continue to make progress, please provide times later this week when you are available to continue the
meet and confer process.
Nouvel’s Opposition to the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ Motion to Quash
I explained that because Nouvel has a right to take jurisdictional discovery before opposing a motion to quash, because
Judge Martin had moved the hearing for the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash from January 30, 2024, to May 3,
2024, and because it would be unreasonable to require Nouvel to oppose the motion to quash without having obtained
jurisdictional discovery, the parties should agree to push back Nouvel’s deadline to oppose the Perrin Cross-Defendants’
motion to quash. You asked what Nouvel’s position is with respect to proceeding under the California Code of Civil
Procedure or the Hague Evidence Convention, and I responded that we plan to ask the court to order discovery through
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which will allow your clients to raise the Aérospatiale factors and obtain a ruling
on whether discovery should proceed through the Hague Evidence Convention. My colleague Joe Tuffaha added that the
California judges appreciate when parties agree to move deadlines because they prefer not to get involved in discovery
disputes where unnecessary. You agreed to consider moving the date.
RFP Responses
RFPs Nos. 1 and 2
I stated that Nouvel wants to ensure that any correspondence covered by these RFPs that addresses the subject matter
of the trips but may not fall into the categories of “summaries” or “agendas” is produced. You responded that you
hadn’t had much time to digest Nouvel’s December 15 email but explained that it was helpful to understand what
Nouvel is seeking with regard to this RFP. You also explained that Nouvel should “wordsmith” its request further. I
explained that Nouvel is seeking information regarding a very limited number of trips. You agreed to come back to us
with your position.
RFPs Nos. 3 and 4
I explained that the parties are close to an agreement on these RFPs provided we can reach agreement on RFPs Nos. 1
and 2 and the contractual RFPs. I reiterated Nouvel’s position that this RFP should encompass correspondence with Jon
Liebman, Reynault LecanuFayet and anyone else with whom your clients corresponded in California, as limited by the
qualifier “relating to allegations of tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint”. You responded that
agreement to this RFP is conditional on reaching agreement on other RFPs and that you want to understand what falls
24
into Nouvel’s definition of “tortious conduct.” You asked if it is Nouvel’s position that any communication about Le
Domaine concerns tortious conduct. I explained that not every document about Le Domaine would fall within the scope
of this RFP as limited. I explained that the establishment of Le Domaine, decisions about why entities like Le Domaine
were created, decisions about how to allocate the equity of entities like Le Domaine among their shareholders, and
these entities’ use of the Miraval name and resources falls into the category of tortious conduct. You disagreed that any
email regarding Le Domaine’s establishment concerns tortious conduct. I reiterated that Nouvel seeks documents
concerning the purpose, goal, or objective of incorporating Le Domaine, but Nouvel does not seek documents
concerning, for example, the general administration of the entity. I stated that the scope of Nouvel’s request is limited
and that Nouvel has made specific allegations that entitle it to these documents. You responded that you view the
relevant jurisdictional hook as an effect in California, and that the parties differ about the issue of effects.
RFP No. 5
I explained that Nouvel seeks contracts between your clients and Persons in California. I explained that Nouvel is not
aware of any contracts between your clients and, for example, Mr. Pitt, that do not relate to the allegations in Nouvel’s
First Amended Cross-Compliant.
You stated that Nouvel’s definition of “YOU” including controlled subsidiaries is overbroad, and asked for Nouvel’s
support for this RFP concerning jurisdictional discovery. I agreed to get back to you. See United States v. Int'l Union of
Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A corporation must produce documents
possessed by a subsidiary that the parent corporation owns or wholly controls.”); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Super. Ct.,
18 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480 (1971) (noting that “it may be argued that a parent controls a subsidiary corporation and its
employees for discovery purposes”).
You stated that you proposed producing written contracts only, and do not want to produce informal contracts and
understandings. You added that this dispute does not arise out of breach of those agreements. I responded that Nouvel
seeks documents concerning substantive rights and obligations between your clients and certain parties in California. As
part of a broader agreement, Nouvel is willing to consider narrowing the scope of this request to executed contracts,
arrangements, or understandings, documents memorializing or referencing executed contracts, arrangements, or
understandings but excluding the drafting history thereof, and the drafting history of any unexecuted executed
contracts, arrangements, or understandings.
RFP No. 6
I stated that Nouvel tried to narrow its request to documents concerning the effects of your clients’ tortious conduct
alleged in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. I stated that Nouvel had added qualifiers to address purposeful
direction and had appropriately tailored this request to address your burden-related concerns. You stated that your
objection to this request was not exclusively burden-related and that the parties disagree about the effects test, which
you stated concerns conduct aimed at California, not just aimed at a resident there. You added that you proposed
producing communications explicitly discussing the effect of tortious conduct on Angelina Jolie or Nouvel, and asked
how far Nouvel’s request is from that.
I stated that Nouvel disagrees with the proposed limitation that a document must expressly reference California and
added that there is no authority to limit jurisdictional discovery to documents that explicitly mention the forum state. I
noted that this RFP will require a judgment call in a responsiveness review. I added that Nouvel is seeking documents
and communications concerning potential harm to Nouvel or Jolie, not every document that arguably concerns any
indirect effect on Nouvel or Jolie.
You mentioned that the Foreign Defendants (Tenute del Mondo, B.V., SPI Group Holding Limited, Alexey Oliynik, and
Yuri Shefler) had included a California-related limitation in their jurisdictional document production. I explained that in
the context of producing documents concerning purported purposeful availment through contracts, the Foreign
Defendants had agreed to produce all final and draft versions of contracts with Jolie, all correspondence with California
25
parties about such contracts, and all other correspondence about such contracts that discussed or referenced indirect
contacts with California. I explained that the context in which the Foreign Defendants had agreed to this scope of
production did not concern the “effects test”, for which Judge Martin had ordered a broader production, and that the
Foreign Defendants’ production related more closely to RFP No. 5 than RFP No. 6. You agreed that the context was
different.
RFP No. 10
I stated that Nouvel seeks documents about the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ blocking Jolie and Nouvel from participating in
the governance of Quimicum and Chateau Miraval. I explained that this conduct is relevant under the effects test,
because Nouvel’s key allegations are that it has been frozen out participating in governance by the Perrin Cross-
Defendants’ deliberate actions.
You responded that you had hoped that reaching agreement on other RFPs would resolve this RFP but that you
understood it may not. You stated that you are prepared to keep thinking through this RFP. I explained that this RFP
may not overlap completely with RFP No. 6 depending on the parties’ interpretation of RFP No. 6. You stated that the
difference between RFP No. 10 and RFP No. 6 shows the parties’ disagreement. You stated that any document that
discusses blocking access to Quimicum and Chateau Miraval but does not reference effects on Nouvel is merits
discovery. I responded that any document about blocking Nouvel from participating in governance necessarily shows an
effect on Nouvel. You responded that you saw our point.
RFP No. 15
I stated that Nouvel seeks any documents concerning your clients’ contribution or assistance to the shareholder
deadlock at Quimicum. You responded that this RFP is informed by conversations regarding RFP Nos. 6 and 10. I
responded that this RFP is properly tailored because Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Compliant alleges that the
shareholder deadlock directly targeted Nouvel with the goal of harming it, even if the term “Nouvel” is not explicitly
mentioned in this RFP. You responded that you understand, but that this RFP imposes a burden on your clients. You
asked Nouvel to consider what it wants from this RFP and whether Nouvel would get what it needs in response to RFP
Nos. 3 and 4. I responded that documents responsive to this RFP are not covered by RFP Nos. 3 and 4 because those
RFPs do not address internal communications among your clients about the shareholder deadlock or communications
with, for example, Roland Venturini about the deadlock. I explained that if your clients were involved in the deadlock,
documents about that involvement are relevant to jurisdictional discovery.
RFP No. 16
We agreed that our prior discussion covers this RFP.
RFP No. 17
I stated that Nouvel is entitled to your clients’ contracts concerning the allegations in the First Amended Cross-
Compliant and that this RFP covers Persons not included in earlier RFPs. I added that Nouvel is not seeking every
contract with a distributor in California, only contracts related to the allegations in the First Amended Cross-
Compliant. You asked whether Nouvel is seeking documents and communications concerning contracts. As part of a
broader agreement, Nouvel is willing to consider narrowing the scope of this request to executed contracts,
arrangements, or understandings, documents memorializing or referencing executed contracts, arrangements, or
understandings but excluding the drafting history thereof, and the drafting history of any unexecuted executed
contracts, arrangements, or understandings.
RFP Nos. 18-20
26
I stated that these RFPs go to the scope of what encompasses effects and tortious conduct. I explained that a common
understanding of RFP 6 might help the parties come to an agreement on scope with respect to these RFPs, and that the
categories of documents sought by RFP No. 18 concern harm to Nouvel. You responded that you would consider your
position on these requests further.
RFPs Nos. 21 and 22
I stated that if there are emails between Brad Pitt and your clients concerning the purpose or objective of financial
transfers, those communications are highly relevant. I explained that Nouvel should obtain such documents rather than
a representation, and that documents concerning the amount, date, and subject matter of transfers would be sufficient.
You responded that Nouvel is seeking a far broader set of documents than you had hoped. You asked, in the event all
payments were made pursuant to contracts, what beyond the contracts Nouvel seeks. I responded that Nouvel would
want the contracts and any documents or communications showing that the purpose of the transaction as described in
the contract is misleading or contradictory so that Nouvel understands the full context of any transaction.
Other RFPs
RFPs Nos. 28-33
I stated that these RFPs go to general jurisdiction as well as the fairness and substantial justice prong of the specific
jurisdictional analysis. You responded that you are continuing to think about these RFPs but that you did not find
Nouvel’s caselaw persuasive. You added that you do not think Nouvel needs more than what is in your clients’
declarations, and that this RFP is not closely tied to any allegation of specific jurisdiction. We agreed that the parties
would revisit these RFPs in the context of a broader agreement about the scope of production.
RFP No. 7
I stated that Nouvel seeks documents concerning any right or obligation between your clients and certain Persons in
California, which includes rights and obligations that tie your clients to California imposed by law or created by the
commission of tort. You asked how such documents are related to Nouvel’s claims. I responded that paragraph 31 of
Nouvel’s FACC alleges that your clients formed an alliance with Mr. Pitt to divert money away from Nouvel, so we are
entitled to the documents concerning your clients’ ties to Mr. Pitt. You suggested that Pitt funneling money to Perrin
has no effects in California but that money moving in the other direction would be more relevant to discovery.
RFP No. 8
I stated that Pitt’s directives to Venturini and Bradbury are relevant under the effects test. You stated that your clients’
position is informed by earlier RFPs, including RFP Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 15. I explained that not all documents responsive to
this RFP would be covered by RFP Nos. 3 and 4.
RFP Nos. 9, 11, and 12
We agreed that the considerations previously discussed apply to RFP Nos. 9, 11, and 12.
RFP Nos. 13 and 14
We agreed that the considerations previously discussed apply to RFP Nos. 13 and 14. You suggested that the parties
focus on the scope of RFP No. 6 to address these RFPs.
RFPs Nos. 23 and 24
27
I explained that Nouvel seeks documents and communications concerning decisions that were intended to harm
Nouvel. With respect to RFP No. 23, I explained that Nouvel made specific allegations regarding the share transfer and
that Pitt’s and Mondo Bongo’s interrogatory response confirms Mr. Perrin’s involvement in the transfer. I explained that
the “effects” aspect of this RFP should be construed broadly given that the share transfer was undertaken in response to
a change in control over Nouvel and was designed to exclude Nouvel from governance. Because the purpose of the
share transfer was to affect Nouvel, Nouvel is entitled to all documents about it, not just those that on their face
concern effects on Nouvel.
RFPs Nos. 25-26
I explained that Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint alleges that after Jolie and Nouvel were excluded from
participating in the governance of Quimicum and Chateau Miraval and were denied access to information about the
business, they entered into negotiations about a sale of their interest in Chateau Miraval to Pitt and Perrin. I explained
that Nouvel’s claims therefore relate to the contract negotiations about that proposed sale. I added that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants’ willingness to execute a contract with a California party with effects in California is relevant to
purposeful availment.
You disagreed that the contract negotiations are relevant because the contract was not executed but agreed to consider
your position on these RFPs as part of a broader deal on the scope of discovery.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2023 12:04 PM
Jonathan,
We write in response to your December 15 email, below. Your email does not fully reflect the positions and objections
we raised as to the specific RFPs discussed during the December 7 meet and confer. For the avoidance of doubt, we
reserve our rights as to each objection.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518
28

Sent: Friday, December 15, 2023 10:04 AM
To: Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks
Couns el, I write concerning t he parties ’ December 7, 20 23 meet and confe r and your December 8, 2023 email. December 8, 2023 Email You s tated in yo ur December 8, 20 23 email you dis agreed that you had preju diced Nouvel’s ability to res pond to t he Perr in Cros s -Defendants ’ mot ion to
Counsel,
I write concerning the parties’ December 7, 2023 meet and confer and your December 8, 2023 email.
December 8, 2023 Email
You stated in your December 8, 2023 email you disagreed that you had prejudiced Nouvel’s ability to respond to the
Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motion to quash because Nouvel has known your clients’ position on the French Blocking
Statute since the Perrin Cross-Defendants served responses and objections to Nouvel’s RFPs six weeks ago.
We disagree. In the first place, because the Perrin Cross-Defendants did not submit Nouvel’s RFPs to the SISSE until
several weeks after serving responses and objections, Nouvel did not know of the position of the SISSE until November
20, 2023, after your clients first learned of it. You also appear to suggest that Nouvel is responsible for delays because it
has “not initiated” the process of seeking discovery through the Hague Convention. Not so. As you acknowledged
during a recent meet and confer, Nouvel must complete the meet and confer process with the Perrin Cross-Defendants
before either moving to compel under the California Code of Civil Procedure or moving for a letter of request under the
Hague Convention. And the Perrin Cross-Defendants have delayed that process by twice joining meet and confers
unprepared to negotiate the scope of their responses to Nouvel’s RFPs.
December 7, 2023 Meet and Confer
You stated that you disagreed that the Perrin Cross-Defendants had prejudiced Nouvel’s ability to oppose their motion
to quash. You added that you are willing to work collaboratively to identify a range of materials for a letter of request
through the Hague Evidence Convention.
I disagreed that Nouvel is in a position to oppose your clients’ motion to quash because Nouvel will not obtain any
documents concerning jurisdiction until after the deadline to oppose the motion to quash has passed.
29
The parties then had a discussion concerning the appropriate scope of document production subject to the Perrin Cross-
Defendants’ objections based on the French Blocking Statute.
RFP Nos. 1-2
You stated that you had provided the dates of Mr. Perrin’s trips to California in an interrogatory response and that if the
Court were to order jurisdictional discovery, you would be willing to produce summaries and agendas of meetings in
California related to the allegations of tortious conduct in the First Amended Cross-Complaint. You added that your
proposal omits the newly-added Cross-Defendants.
I responded that this proposal is narrower than what the parties had agreed to on previous meet and confers. I added
that if your clients travelled to California in connection with the newly-added Cross-Defendants, that travel is relevant to
jurisdiction because Nouvel alleges that the purpose of those entities is to harm Nouvel. You suggested that the parties
discuss your offer with respect to RFPs Nos. 3-4. I stated that I would take back the scope that you offered, and you
asked me to better explain the scope of what Nouvel is seeking.
Nouvel proposes that your clients produce all Documents and Communications concerning the subject matter of any
visits or trips You or any of Your agents or representatives made to the State of California that relate to the allegations of
tortious conduct in the First Amended Cross-Complaint.
RFP Nos. 3-4
You offered to produce communications between your client and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel,
and Ms. Bird concerning the allegations of tortious conduct made against your clients in the First-Amended Cross-
Complaint.
I noted that Nouvel alleges that setting up the some of the entities listed in the request, including Le Domaine, and
allowing them to drain Chateau Miraval’s resources was tortious conduct. I asked if you would produce documents
concerning Nouvel’s allegations that setting up these entities was meant to harm Nouvel. You agreed with this proposal
subject to further evaluating a concern about such documents turning your production into a direction you cannot
anticipate, and added that you would not produce documents about entities that do not concern Chateau Miraval. I
pointed out that the condition “relating to allegations of tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint”
would provide a limiting principle and that Judge Martin’s ruling makes clear that your clients should produce responsive
documents. You stated that your clients are willing to produce a lot but not all documents about these entities.
I noted that I want to be sure the parties share the same understanding of the phrase “relating to allegations of tortious
conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint”. I asked whether, in response to RFP No. 3, your clients would
produce communications with other parties in California, subject to the same conditions as discussed for RFP No. 4. You
said that you would not. I asked about correspondence with Jon Liebman and Reynald LecanuFayet and asked whether
you would identify any other Person in California with whom your clients corresponded concerning the allegations of
tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. You agreed to produce correspondences with
Mr. Liebman and Mr. LecanuFayet and to identify any other persons in California with whom your clients corresponded
concerning the allegations of tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. I stated that if you confirm
this, we may have an agreement, though I added that this agreement does not mean we have reached agreement on
RFPs Nos. 1-2 and that any agreement is conditional on reaching a broader agreement on Nouvel’s RFPs concerning
contracts. I added that Nouvel is interested in all documents concerning subject matter of the trips in RFP Nos. 1-2. You
stated that the document would need to reference a specific trip or meeting.
RFP No. 5
30
You proposed producing your clients’ Miraval-related written contracts with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms.
Jolie, Nouvel, and Ms. Bird. You added that if the parties reach agreement on RFPs Nos. 3-4, you would produce
documents concerning informal agreements as well.
I asked you to clarify what “Miraval related” meant, and you asked what Nouvel would seek other than documents
related to Chateau Miraval. I stated that Nouvel is entitled to documents regarding other entities formed by Pitt and
Perrin. You responded that entering into a contract does not give rise to jurisdiction even if the contract may have an
effect on a California resident. I responded that entering into a contract with a California party concerning tortious
conduct is relevant to jurisdiction if your clients are parties to the contract. You stated that you would get back me. You
noted that to reach agreement on RFP No. 5 will depend on reaching agreement on RFP No. 3.
Nouvel proposes that your clients produce all Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, arrangements,
or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie,
Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their Affiliates, on the other hand.
Nouvel notes that it previously proposed defining “You” to include Your employees and controlled subsidiaries and
expects that definition to apply here.
RFP No. 6
You stated that you want to understand why Nouvel is entitled to documents concerning the effects of conduct, and
asked if I agree that mere foreseeability of harm is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. I stated that there is caselaw
supporting that point, but added that if your clients took deliberate action that transferred wealth from Jolie or Nouvel
to Pitt or Mondo Bongo, that conduct had a financial impact in California. You stated that your clients would be willing
to produce documents concerning the effect of tortious conduct on Nouvel and Jolie that mentions California.
I asked what in the effects test is your basis to require that the forum is mentioned in a document and stated that your
position is unduly narrow. You stated that you wanted to make document production a manageable exercise.
I stated that I would come back to you on this RFP.
Nouvel maintains that your clients should produce all documents and communications concerning the effect on Nouvel
and Jolie of your clients’ tortious conduct alleged in the First Amended Cross-Complaint.
RFP No. 10
You proposed producing documents between your clients and the listed individuals (Mr. Pitt and Mr. Grant). I asked
about communications with other persons, such as Roland Venturini. You stated that you do not think communications
with California residents are proper but agreed, and that your clients do not agree to produce communications between
European individuals about European entities.
I stated that I would consider your position and get back to you.
Nouvel proposes that your clients produce all documents and communications concerning their involvement in,
assistance to, or contribution to, any actual or contemplated efforts to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird
from supervising, overseeing, governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of Quimicum,
Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries.
RFP No. 15
You contended that RFP No. 15 seeks documents concerning contacts in Europe, and added that agreement on RFP Nos.
3-4 and RFP No. 6 would encompass what Nouvel seeks for RFP No. 15. I noted that there are responsive documents to
31
this RFP that do not fall within the scope of RFPs Nos. 3-4, and 6, such as communications with Roland Venturini, which
would not be covered. You stated that this RFP concerns only directives given by Pitt.
With respect to RFP No. 15, Nouvel proposes that your clients produce all documents and communications concerning
their involvement in, assistance to, or contribution to the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the appointment of
directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
RFP No. 16
I explained that the documents sought by RFP No. 16 are relevant to jurisdiction under the effects test. You proposed
producing communications concerning the expected or actual effect of the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum on
Nouvel or Ms. Jolie that reference California. I responded that I would get back to you.
Nouvel maintains that your clients should produce all Documents and Communications concerning the expected or
actual effect of the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie and Nouvel.
RFP No. 17
You proposed producing Miraval-related contracts with the listed parties and communications about tortious conduct.
I noted that Nouvel seeks documents concerning communications concerning contracts with “any other Person” in
California concerning the subject matter of this request. You stated that you understood my position and but that your
clients have agreed to produce a large volume of documents.
Nouvel proposes that your clients produce all Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements,
arrangements, or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr.
Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the other hand, as well as all Documents
and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements, arrangements, or understandings, oral or in writing,
between You, on the one hand, or any Person located in the State of California, on the other hand, concerning Nouvel,
Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, any of their subsidiaries, or the allegations of tortious conduct in the First
Amended Cross-Complaint.
RFP Nos. 18-20
You stated that your clients’ response to these RFPs are all informed by prior discussions.
I explained that the five categories of conduct in RFP Nos. 18-19 are examples of tortious conduct alleged in Nouvel’s
First Amended Cross-Complaint, and that the same was true of the subject matter of RFP No. 12.
Nouvel maintains that your clients should produce all Documents responsive to these requests.
RFP No. 21
You stated that a document hypothetically responsive to this RFP would not necessarily confer jurisdiction. I responded
that Nouvel alleges an alliance between Pitt and Perrin concerning tortious conduct. You proposed providing a
representation concerning the extent and nature of payments in lieu of a document production.
I responded that I would get back to you.
As part of a broader agreement Nouvel would be willing to accept all Documents and Communications concerning the
subject matter, amount, and date of all financial payments, transfers, or transactions between the Perrin Cross
32
Defendants or any of their controlled subsidiaries or Affiliates, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant,
Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, or their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the other hand.
RFP No. 22
You distinguished this RFP from RFP No. 22 and stated that you view this RFP as beyond the scope of jurisdictional
discovery. I explained that financial payments to anyone in California concerning tortious conduct falls within the scope
of jurisdictional discovery. Both parties agreed that they would consider the adding qualifier of “related to tortious
conduct in Nouvel’s FACC” to reach a deal. I added that Nouvel is not seeking every transaction between your clients
and any business entity in California.
Without waiving its right to pursue further discovery if warranted by the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ response and
document production, as part of a broader agreement Nouvel would be willing to accept all Documents and
Communications concerning the subject matter, amount, and date of all financial payments, transfers, or transactions
between the Perrin Cross Defendants or any of their controlled subsidiaries or Affiliates, on the one hand, and any
Person in California, on the other hand, concerning the allegations of tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-
Complaint.
RFP No. 34
I noted that this RFP may be premature, but Nouvel does not want to be ambushed. You confirmed that as of present,
there were no documents responsive to this request. I added that if your clients plan submit a reply brief in support of
their motion to quash, we want the documents in your clients intend to use in support of that brief.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Friday, December 8, 2023 2:45 PM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks
Jonathan,
As we stated on yesterday’s call, we strongly disagree that we have prejudiced your ability to oppose the French Cross-
Defendants’ motion to quash. You have known our position on the French Blocking Statute and our objections to your
requests since we served our R&Os almost six weeks ago. In addition, as you know, the French government has
explicitly directed that the discovery you seek must go through the Hague Convention – a process you have not
initiated. In any event, it is your obligation to serve requests that respect the limits of jurisdictional discovery and we
are entitled to stand on our objections.
Nevertheless, we have been and remain willing to work with you to determine if there is a path forward to narrow the
scope of your requests and potentially avoid motion practice. We are doing so without prejudice to our objections to
your requests and our position that jurisdictional discovery is unwarranted and unnecessary to oppose our clients’
motion to quash.
33
We believe our conversation yesterday was constructive. We propose that our next meet and confer take place on
Tuesday between 3:30pm and 5:30pm or on Wednesday between 3:30pm and 6:30pm ET. Please let us know if you
have availability in those windows.
We do not think it is constructive to respond to the remainder of your email point-by-point, but we reserve all rights.
We look forward to speaking with you next week.

Sent: Wednesday, December 6, 2023 1:10 PM
Couns el, I write concerning yo ur Novembe r 28 email and ou r December 1 meet and con fer. Nouvel is dis appointed that, as you acknowledged durin g our meet and con fer, the Perrin C ros s -Defendants once again were not prepared to negotiate the s cope of thei r res pons es to Nouvel’s
Counsel,
I write concerning your November 28 email and our December 1 meet and confer. Nouvel is disappointed that, as you
acknowledged during our meet and confer, the Perrin Cross-Defendants once again were not prepared to negotiate the
scope of their responses to Nouvel’s discovery requests. I note that this is second time in two weeks that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants have not been prepared to negotiate the scope of their responses during a scheduled meet and
confer. The Perrin Cross-Defendants’ significant unilateral delays are seriously prejudicing Nouvel’s ability to oppose the
Perrin Cross-Defendants’ motions to quash.
November 28 Email
We disagree that the cases we cited do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited. We also disagree with
your attempt to distinguish MGI Digital Tech. S.A. v. Duplo U.S.A., No. 822-cv-00979, 2023 WL 6814579 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
24, 2023). In that case, the Defendant specifically requested that discovery of two individuals who were not parties to
the dispute, but former employees of the plaintiff, proceed through the Hague Convention. MGI Digital, 2023 WL
6814579, at *1-*3. The court granted that request. Id. at *6. In contrast, the court ordered discovery to proceed under
the Federal Rules with respect to current employees of the plaintiff. Id.
We also disagree that our email contains “omissions”. For example, with respect to RFP Nos. 1-4, the proposed
compromise was meant to address all objections other than your clients’ objection based on the French Blocking
Statute.
December 1 Meet and Confer
On our meet and confer you reiterated your position that because the SISSE had determined that all of Nouvel’s
discovery requests to the Perrin Cross-Defendants are subject to the French Blocking Statute, Nouvel must proceed
through the Hague Evidence Convention. You also again stated that you believe the § 1782 production obviates
Nouvel’s need for jurisdictional discovery. You also stated your intention nonetheless to work with Nouvel to find
mutually agreeable parameters for the jurisdictional discovery, but added that you were still “thinking through” the RFPs
that the parties had previously discussed and needed more time to “dot the i’s and cross the t’s”.
34
I reiterated that the Perrin Cross-Defendants were not recipients of the § 1782 subpoenas, and the scope of discovery
available from the individuals who were recipients of Nouvel’s § 1782 subpoenas is not coextensive with the discovery
available from Perrin Cross-Defendants.
RFP Nos. 28-33
You asked why the documents responsive to these RFPs would support jurisdiction. I explained that Nouvel is not aware
of all the connections the Perrin Cross-Defendants have to California, so the goal of certain of these RFPs is to assess
whether there is a basis to assert general jurisdiction over the Perrin Cross-Defendants. You responded that the general
jurisdiction standard in California is the “at home” test and that you contend that Mr. Perrin’s declaration made clear
that your clients are not at home in California. I stated that Nouvel is entitled to explore your client’s ties to California as
part of jurisdictional discovery, and that your client could provide verified responses to certain of Nouvel’s RFPs stating
that they possess no responsive documents, which would resolve the dispute. I also agreed to get back to you with
additional details on this matter.
In the first place, I note that Mr. Perrin’s declaration only partially addresses the documents called for by RFP Nos. 32-33
with respect to the Perrin Cross-Defendants and only partially addresses the documents called for by RFP No. 29 with
respect to SAS Miraval Provence and SAS Familles Perrin. Accordingly, the declaration does not fully address Nouvel’s
requests concerning the extent of the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ presence in California, and the Perrin Cross-Defendants
should supplement their responses, even if just to represent that they have no responsive documents, as the SISSE
states is permitted under the French Blocking Statute. See Yocum v. CBS Corp., No. CV-17-1061, 2019 WL 8220720, at *7
(C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019) (noting that discovery requests concerning general jurisdiction “will provide further information
on the extent and magnitude of Westinghouse’s presence in California, and will aid the Court in determining whether
Westinghouse can be considered essentially at home in the state”). The Perrin Cross-Defendants’ business activities in
California are also relevant to the “fair play and substantial justice” prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Daimler
Trucks N. Am. LLC v. Superior Ct., 80 Cal. App. 5th 946, 959 (2022). I also note that RFP No. 28 is also relevant to specific
jurisdiction in light of Nouvel’s allegation that Pitt and Perrin worked to prevent Nouvel and Stoli from working with
Chateau Miraval’s distributors. (FACC ¶¶ 162-67.)
Remaining RFPs
You stated that you wished to continue thinking about your position on the remaining RFPs before discussing them
further. You also reiterated your position that the § 1782 production obviates the need for further jurisdictional
discovery. I responded that we understand your position regarding the French Blocking Statute. I also asked why you
needed more time to think about the remaining RFPs before conferring about them. You responded that you needed
more time to discuss internally and understand the scope of the RFPs.
You also explained that you would like to understand our position concerning how Nouvel intends to proceed with
taking discovery. I explained that Nouvel believes that it would be appropriate to proceed under the California Code of
Civil Procedure and to move to compel further discovery from the Perrin Cross-Defendants if needed, although Nouvel
has not reached a final decision. You asked me to explain the basis for Nouvel’s position, and I stated that proceeding
through the California Code of Civil Procedure would allow a broader scope of discovery, would provide certainty about
the scope of the discovery requests actually served on the Perrin Cross-Defendants, and would take less time than
proceeding through the Hague Convention. You also asked why Nouvel believed proceeding through the Hague
Evidence Convention would lead to a narrower scope of discovery than proceeding under the California Code of Civil
Procedure. I explained that France does not permit American style pretrial discovery through the Hague Convention and
that proceeding through the Hague Convention introduces the risk that the SISSE or the French judiciary will reject or
narrow Nouvel’s discovery requests months after a letter of request is issued. I added that on our last meet and confer,
you had explained that the French judiciary and the SISSE may apply filters on the back end of Nouvel’s Hague requests.
To provide some further detail on this topic, Nouvel notes that France has declared a reservation in accordance with
Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention stating that “[l]etters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-
35
trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries will not be executed”. (Hague Conference on Private
International Law (Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé), Declaration/Reservation/Notification,
www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/notifications/?csid=501&disp=resdn.) France has qualified this
reservation, stating that it will not apply “when the requested documents are enumerated limitatively in the Letter of
Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure”. (Id.)
With respect to the Hague Evidence Convention, California courts have held that “Letter of Request procedure
authorized by the Convention would be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce
needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules”, Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Societe Commerciale Toutelectric,
104 Cal. App. 4th 406, 423 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Soc. Nat. Ind. Aero. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 542
(1987)), and that requiring a litigant to proceed through the Hague Convention would limit the litigant to “the
cumbersome procedures and narrow range authorized by the Convention”, MGI Digital Tech. S.A. v. Duplo U.S.A., No.
8:22-CV-00979, 2023 WL 6814579, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023) (emphasis added). In particular, in light of France’s
reservation under Article 23, even as qualified, “the standard for discovery in France under the Hague Convention is
narrower than that under the FRCP”. Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, No. CV-16-02368, 2017 WL
3433542, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (emphasis added).
I proposed that we briefly go through the remaining RFPs and outstanding issues so that Nouvel could present its
positions even if the Perrin Cross-Defendants were not prepared to negotiate, and you agreed.
Outstanding Issues from November 28 Email
I explained that in response to your email concerning the scope of the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ production in response
to RFP Nos. 1-4, Nouvel would be willing to agree to add the further qualifier “relating to tortious conduct” so that the
full condition reads “allegations related to tortious conduct in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint”, but only if the
parties reach agreement that the Perrin Cross-Defendants will produce documents concerning their contractual or
potential contractual ties to California sought by Nouvel’s other RFPs, including but not limited to RFP Nos. 5, 7, 17, 25
and 26. I emphasized that Nouvel alleges that Pitt and Perrin were denying Nouvel access to information about Chateau
Miraval, which is one of the reasons Ms. Jolie and Nouvel entered into negotiations concerning a potential sale of
Nouvel’s interest in Quimicum to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Perrin (FACC ¶¶ 93, 98, 154), so Nouvel’s claims relate the
negotiations concerning that sale. You stated that you would get back to us on this proposal.
I also reiterated that partial overlap between the scope of Nouvel’s requests is not a basis for the Perrin Cross-
Defendants to refuse to produce responsive documents.
Interrogatories
You also stated that many of Nouvel’s interrogatories ask to the Perrin Cross-Defendants “describe” documents and
communications within documents. You proposed that it may be more efficient for your clients to simply produce the
relevant documents as opposed to supplying a written narrative as well. I responded that Nouvel would consider
allowing the Perrin Cross-Defendants to simply identify the relevant documents in response to Nouvel’s interrogatories
as part of a broader agreement.
With regards to special interrogatory Nos. 9, 21, and 23, you stated that you would get back to us on whether
interrogatory No. 9 falls within the scope of the French Blocking Statute. Regarding interrogatory Nos. 21 and 23, you
responded that you believe they fall squarely within the French Blocking Statute. I explained that the fact that an
individual or entity was involved in a communication is not material of a commercial or technical nature. I asked which
provision of the French Blocking Statute you contend interrogatory Nos. 21 and 23 fall under. You responded that the
SISSE considers these requests to fall under the French Blocking Statute.
I asked you to confirm that you were not prepared to the negotiate the scope of the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ discovery
response on our meet and confer. You maintained that you did not wish to negotiate your clients’ responses to specific
36
RFPs. I explained that Nouvel’s opposition to your clients’ motion to quash is due in a month, and that these delays are
severely prejudicing Nouvel. I asked for you to propose your availability to meet and confer further. You responded
that you understood the position Nouvel was in and would follow up with times to meet and confer.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2023 8:38 PM
Jonathan,
Thank you for your email. At the outset, we reiterate that pursuant to the guidance provided by the SISSE (attached)
and the express threat of criminal sanctions, we are unable to produce any documents at this time. As previously
stated, the SISSE has made clear that any jurisdictional discovery must proceed through the Hague
Convention. Nevertheless, if you insist on pursuing jurisdictional discovery, we remain willing to work with you to
identify an appropriate scope of discovery that would comply with the Hague Convention framework and avoid
unnecessary motion practice. We do so without prejudice to our position that jurisdictional discovery is unwarranted,
unnecessary to oppose our clients’ motion to quash, and will not establish personal jurisdiction over our French clients
whose alleged conduct occurred in France and related to European entities.
On the subject of the French Blocking Statute, we reviewed the cases you provided, which do not alter our position or
obviate our legal obligations. Among other things, these cases do not stand for the definitive propositions for which
they are cited in your email and all of them are distinguishable. Only one of the decisions you cited postdates the 2022
amendments to the French Blocking Statute, and that case ordered discovery to proceed through Hague Convention
procedures for two French individuals.
Next, your email does not fully reflect the objections we raised on last Wednesday’s meet and confer. For example:
1. On RFPs 1-5, in addition to what you noted in your email, we also reiterated our objections to your definitions
and instructions and objected to the requests on the basis that they are overbroad and seek documents that are
irrelevant for purposes of jurisdictional discovery. Thus, we did not agree to blanketly produce documents to
the extent they relate to “allegations in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint,” to the extent such
“allegations” do not relate to the causes of action asserted against our clients. Read broadly, the word
“allegation” could encompass a huge swath of documents that pertain to the day-to-day running of the business
and have nothing to do with the tortious conduct at issue in this dispute.
2. On RFP 10, in addition to our belief that much of this request overlaps with RFP 3, we also stated that the
request was improper because (1) we do not think our clients would have had any knowledge as to the specific
whereabouts of the individuals listed in this request and (2) we do not believe that the mere fact that an
individual resides in California necessarily connects the alleged conduct to California.
3. On RFPs 21-22, we also noted that we did not believe these requests were appropriate for jurisdictional
discovery.
37
These are only examples; we will not correct all of the omissions in your email and do not plan to engage in lengthy
email exchanges of this sort going forward. To the extent you find it helpful to continue to send such summaries, please
either include the entirety of both sides’ positions or explicitly state that you are not purporting to do so.
Lastly, although we are continuing to think through the issues we discussed on our last meet and confer, we wanted to
get back to you regarding RFPs 28-33, which you characterized as requests designed to “test whether the Perrin Cross-
Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in California.” As discussed during the meet and confer, the declaration of
Marc Perrin is sufficient to resolve any question regarding general jurisdiction. We do not believe there is any colorable
basis to assert general jurisdiction over our French clients for the reasons stated during Wednesday’s meet and confer
and in our Motion to Quash and R&Os. If you believe that these RFPs would result in the production of evidence
supporting jurisdiction, please share your support for that position.
We are available on Friday between 2 to 4 for an additional meet and confer to discuss any open questions regarding
the RFPs as well as the Special Interrogatories.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518

Sent: Saturday, November 25, 2023 2:06 PM
Counsel,
On our meet and confer last Wednesday, you stated that you had heard back from SISSE, which informed you that all of
Nouvel’s RFPs to the Perrin Cross-Defendants are subject to the French Blocking Statute and would need to proceed
through the Hague Evidence Convention. You noted that the French government would apply a filter for “economically
38
sensitive information” to Nouvel’s requests after receiving them through the convention and that the French judiciary
may also scrutinize the requests and potentially further narrow them.
You stated that you had a standing objection to any RFP that seeks information about the newly added Cross-
Defendants, but would not exclude from your production materials in which a newly added Cross-Defendant happens to
be a party to a responsive communication.
With regard to RFP Nos. 1-4, you confirmed that, subject to your objections based on the French Blocking Statute, you
would produce responsive documents to the extent they relate to the allegations in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-
Complaint. You added that you would limit your production to materials from the Perrin Cross-Defendants. You
confirmed that you would produce responsive documents from the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ employees, and you stated
you would get back to us concerning the production of documents from the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ controlled
subsidiaries.
RFP No. 5
We explained that, to the extent that there are any agreements, arrangements, or understandings from the relevant
period between the Perrin Cross-Defendants and, for example, Mr. Pitt, those ties are relevant to jurisdiction given
Nouvel’s allegations about an alliance between Pitt and Perrin to harm Nouvel, as alleged, for example, in paragraph 31
of Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint.
You stated that the term “arrangement” was vague and suggested the Perrin Cross-Defendants would produce only
formal, written contracts. We explained that the memorialization of oral agreements or communications referencing
informal understandings were also appropriately within the scope of jurisdictional discovery.
You stated that documents responsive to Nouvel’s RFPs may be duplicative of the § 1782 production. We explained that
the § 1782 production would not cover all of what we seek from the Perrin Cross-Defendants, such as internal
communications and or records kept by the Perrin Cross-Defendants but not by the Respondents to the § 1782
subpoenas.
You agreed to consider the points we raised on the meet and confer and to come back to us with your position on RFP
No. 5.
RFP No. 6
You stated that the mere foreseeability of in-forum effects is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. We explained that
intentional tortious conduct expressly aimed at California is relevant to personal jurisdiction under the effects test and
Judge Martin’s approach to jurisdictional discovery. You stated that because Mr. Perrin built the Miraval Provence
business, he possesses many documents concerning effects in California that are not relevant to personal
jurisdiction. We explained that, at a minimum, Nouvel is entitled to documents referencing or describing the effects in
California of conduct related to the allegations in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. You agreed to come back to
us with your position on RFP No. 6.
RFP No. 10
You asked us to clarify the scope of Nouvel’s request. We explained that Nouvel seeks, among other things, your clients’
contributions to Pitt’s efforts in California to block Nouvel or Jolie from fully participating in Quimicum, Chateau Miraval,
or Miraval Provence. You stated that this request may overlap with RFP No. 3. We disagree. There may be internal
communications among the Perrin Cross-Defendants or between the Perrin Cross-Defendants and third parties
concerning efforts to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising, overseeing, governing, obtaining
information about, or participating in the affairs of Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or
Equity Investees.
39
RFP No. 15
We asked whether, with respect to RFP No. 3, you would consider documents related to the categories of conduct
addressed in allegations of the First Amended Cross-Complaint—as opposed to just documents related to specific
allegations therein—responsive. You stated that you would consider documents related to those categories of conduct
responsive. You stated that documents responsive to this request are likely covered by RFP No. 3. We disagree. There
may be internal communications among the Perrin Cross-Defendants or between the Perrin Cross-Defendants and third
parties concerning an order, direction, or request made concerning the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the
appointment of directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
RFP No. 16
You asked us to consider your position that reaching an agreement on RFP No. 6 would resolve disputes about this
request. Based on your representations during our discussion of RFP No. 15 concerning how you will assess
responsiveness with respect to whether a document relates to allegations in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint,
we believe that an agreement on RFP No. 6 would resolve disputes about this request. We believe that overlap in
requests is not a reason to decline to produce documents in response to a request, so we ask that you confirm that,
subject to your objections, you will produce documents responsive to RFP No. 16.
RFP No. 17
We noted that this request includes contracts with “any other Person in California”. You stated that you would get back
to us regarding your position on this request. You noted that your corporate clients have many contracts with parties in
California related to the distribution of wine that are unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation. We explained that
Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint includes allegations about Stoli’s efforts to assist with distribution and Pitt and
Perrin’s efforts to freeze Stoli out. You agreed to get back to us with your position on this request.
RFP Nos. 18-19
We stated that at least items four and five of this request were not covered by prior RFPs. You stated that you believed
that these RFPs were seeking merits discovery and that there may be responsive documents that are not appropriate for
jurisdictional discovery. You agreed to come back to us with your position on these RFPs.
RFP Nos. 21-22
You stated that your concern with this request was that it covers people other than Perrin and Miraval Provence. We
explained that payments between, for example, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Perrin may be relevant to jurisdiction, especially if close
in time to the tortious conduct alleged in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint. You stated that you would discuss
this RFP internally and get back to us.
RFP Nos. 34
We explained that, to the extent that Mr. Perrin plans to rely on documents showing an absence of jurisdiction in
support of his motion to quash, Nouvel is entitled to them. You agreed to consider your position and get back to us.
Jurisdictional Interrogatories
Regarding Nouvel’s Special Interrogatories Regarding Jurisdiction, you stated the SISSE had said that it would permit you
to respond, as long as the response denies that there is any personal jurisdiction. You also stated you need more time to
consider what the SISSE had communicated to you.
40
We noted that at least Interrogatory Nos. 9, 21, and 23, which ask the Perrin Cross-Defendants to identify persons, likely
fall outside the scope of the French Blocking Statute. You agreed to consider your position and get back to us.
Remaining RFPs
With respect to RFP No. 7, we explained that any rights or obligations that are not contractual in nature may be relevant
to jurisdiction in the same manner as contracts are for RFP No 5. You agreed to consider your position and get back to
us.
With respect to RFP No. 8, we explained that responsive documents are relevant to jurisdiction under the effects
test. You agreed to get back to us with your position on this request.
You suggested that RFP Nos. 9 and 11 would be resolved based on the parties’ prior discussions about other RFPs. We
disagree. There may be internal communications among the Perrin Cross-Defendants or between the Perrin Cross-
Defendants and third parties concerning the subject matter of these requests.
We explained that RFP No. 12 was relevant to jurisdiction because Nouvel alleges that dividends were not paid for the
purpose of harming Nouvel, so responsive documents are relevant under the effects test. You agreed to consider your
position and get back to us.
We explained that RFP Nos. 13-14 seeks relevant documents under the effects test. You suggested that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants’ response on RFP No. 6 may resolve the parties’ dispute concerning these requests. Based on your
representations during our discussion of RFP No. 15 concerning how you will assess responsiveness with respect to
whether a document relates to allegations in Nouvel’s First Amended Cross-Complaint, we believe that an agreement on
RFP No. 6 would resolve disputes about RFP No. 14. We believe that overlap in requests is not a reason to decline to
produce documents in response to a request, so we ask that you confirm that, subject to your objections, you will
produce documents responsive to RFP No. 14. With respect to RFP No. 13, we disagree. There may be internal
communications among the Perrin Cross-Defendants or between the Perrin Cross-Defendants and third parties
concerning the subject matter of this request.
We explained that RFP No. 20 seeks relevant documents under the effects test. You agreed to consider your position
and get back to us.
We explained that RFP Nos. 23-24 seeks relevant documents under the effects test. You suggested that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants would only produce documents that expressly reference effects on Nouvel. We explained that Pitt
and Mondo Bongo’s interrogatory response indicated that Mr. Perrin had suggested the share transfer for the purpose
of affecting Nouvel, so Nouvel is entitled to all relevant documents to have a full understanding of the transfer. We
added that these documents are relevant under Judge Martin’s approach to jurisdictional discovery.
We explained that RFP Nos. 25-26 seeks relevant documents because the negotiations with Ms. Jolie were prompted by
tortious conduct, because the negotiations demonstrated a willingness by your clients to subject themselves to
jurisdiction in California, and because your clients’ contract negotiations with a California party with expected effects in
California were extensive. You suggested that these RFPs may be covered by prior requests but agreed to consider your
position and get back to us.
We explained that RFP No. 27 seeks relevant documents under the effects test. You agreed to consider your position
and get back to us.
With respect to RFP No. 28-33, we explained that we were entitled to test whether the Perrin Cross-Defendants are
subject to general jurisdiction in California. We suggested that your clients may consider amending their responses to
state that they possess no documents responsive to these requests. You agreed to consider your position and get back
to us.
41
We asked you which custodians you would collect documents from, which devices you would search, whether you
would search non-custodial sources, and whether you planned to run search terms. You agreed to get back to us about
these issues.
You stated your clients’ positions will be affected by whether Nouvel proceeds under the Hague Convention. You asked
us to provide you with the cases that support our contention that California courts have required parties that object to
discovery based on the French Blocking Statute to produce documents under U.S. rules of civil procedure. You asked us
to advise you whether Nouvel intended to file a motion to compel.
Regarding your request to share cases that support our position, the caselaw in California has consistently rejected the
French Blocking Statute as a valid objection to making discovery. See MGI Digital Tech. S.A. v. Duplo U.S.A., No. 822-cv-
00979, 2023 WL 6814579, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023) (rejecting objection based on French Blocking Statute and
ordering discovery to proceed under the Federal Rules rather than the Hague Convention); Proofpoint, Inc. v. Vade
Secure, Inc., No. 19-cv-04238, 2020 WL 1911195, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020) (same); Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp.
Sols. Assurance, No. cv-1602368, 2017 WL 3433542, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (same); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC, 2014 WL 5462496, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014) (same).
We note that one California state appellate court has held that California state trial courts should apply the multifactor
test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa 482 U.S. 522 (1987) in deciding whether to order discovery to proceed under the Hague
Convention or U.S. discovery rules. See Home Assurance Co. v. Societe Commerciale Toutelectric, 104 Cal. App. 4th 406,
426 (2002).
We explained that the scope of discovery is broader under the California Code of Civil Procedure than under the Hague
Convention and that proceeding under the Hague Convention would take, at minimum, two to six months. We agreed
to get back to you concerning Nouvel’s plan for proceeding to obtain jurisdictional discovery from your clients.
We asked for another meet and confer to address outstanding issues. You stated that you would email us about your
availability next week.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
From: Jonathan Mooney

To: 'Phoebe King' <PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks
Cc: Keith Hummel <khummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com;
Counsel,
On our meet and confer yesterday, you stated that the SISSE had tentatively determined that all of Nouvel’s RFPs to the
Perrin Cross-Defendants are covered by the French Blocking Statute. You stated that you would receive a full answer
from the SISSE later this week.
42
With respect to the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ overbreadth objections, I explained that the Perrin Cross-Defendants had
served boilerplate objections that did not explain for each RFP why the request was overbroad. I stated that Nouvel was
prepared to discuss the scope of its requests but would need to understand in detail the basis for the Perrin Cross-
Defendants’ objections. You stated you were prepared to discuss what you considered to be the appropriate scope of
Nouvel’s requests with the caveat that the Perrin Cross-Defendants were not committing to make a production of
documents.
You stated that, subject to resolution of the objection based on the French Blocking Statute, the Perrin Cross-Defendants
were prepared to produce communications with California residents related to tortious acts alleged by Nouvel.
You requested an explanation of Nouvel’s basis for asserting that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Perrin Cross-Defendants. I stated that Nouvel was entitled to test whether the Perrin Cross-Defendants are subject to
general jurisdiction in California and added that, without waiving any rights, Nouvel expects to argue that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants are subject to specific personal jurisdiction because they expressly aimed their intentional tortious
conduct at California and knew that their conduct was likely to have effects in California.
We then discussed Nouvel’s RFP Nos. 1-4 to the Perrin Cross-Defendants. I asked whether, in light of your explanation
about what the Perrin Cross-Defendants consider to be the appropriate scope of Nouvel’s requests and subject to
resolution of the objection based on the French Blocking Statute, the Perrin Cross-Defendants would agree to produce
documents responsive to these requests with the addition of the qualifier “that relate to the allegations of Nouvel’s the
First Amended Cross-Complaint”. You stated that the Perrin Cross-Defendants would do so.
After we had finished conferring about Nouvel’s RFP No. 4, you asked to pause the meet and confer to allow for an
internal discussion among the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ counsel. After dropping from the call for several minutes, you
returned and stated that you “need to go through a little more on our end with the exercise”, to think about your
answers concerning the appropriate scope of Nouvel’s RFPs, and to receive a full answer from SISSE before continuing
the meet and confer process.
I responded that Nouvel completely disagreed that there was any need to stop the meet and confer process. I explained
that the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ objections to Nouvel’s RFPs based on California law concerning the proper scope of
jurisdictional discovery were independent of any determination by the SISSE. I asked whether the Perrin Cross-
Defendants were declining to continue the meet and confer process concerning the scope of jurisdictional discovery
under California law for Nouvel’s remaining RFPs. You stated that the Perrin Cross-Defendants were declining to
continue the meet and confer process for those RFPs. I explained that Nouvel’s opposition to Perrin Cross-Defendants’
motion to quash was due in a little over a month and that the Perrin Cross-Defendants’ delays in engaging with Nouvel
about jurisdictional discovery were creating a serious risk of prejudice to Nouvel.
You asked me to provide a list of RFPs that Nouvel would like to prioritize. I stated that, without waiving any rights, for
the purpose of making the meet and confer process more efficient, Nouvel would like to prioritize discussing the Perrin
Cross-Defendants’ responses and objections to RFP Nos. 1-6, 10, 15-19, 21-22, and 34.
Nouvel is disappointed that eight weeks after being served with Nouvel’s RFPs, the Perrin Cross-Defendants still are not
prepared to meet and confer about them.
We are available to continue the meet and confer process tomorrow at 12 PM ET. I will circulate an invitation.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
43
Sent: Monday, November 20, 2023 7:23 PM
Jonathan,
Are you available on Wednesday 9:30am–11am ET or 12pm–4pm ET for our follow-up call?

Sent: Friday, November 17, 2023 11:37 AM
Phoebe,
Thank you for the update concerning SISSE’s response to Nouvel’s discovery requests. We are available to meet and
confer on Monday at 2:30 PM ET. I will send around a revised calendar invitation.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2023 7:03 PM
Jonathan,
We write to alert you to developments related to the French Blocking Statute and to address issues regarding our next
meet and confer.
As we stated in our last email, we contacted the SISSE regarding the extent to which Nouvel’s discovery requests
implicate the Blocking Statute. The SISSE responded that they are liaising with other French agencies and working to
promptly evaluate these issues. We expect to have preliminary information from them on Monday, and we think it
44
would be more efficient to meet with you after that takes place. Please let us you if you are available on Monday
afternoon between 2:00pm and 5:00pm. If you have conflicts during that window, we can propose additional times.
It is our hope that we can also use the call to discuss narrowing Nouvel’s requests so that they fall within the permitted
scope of jurisdictional discovery in California. However, we disagree that we are required to rewrite your requests for
you. If you want jurisdictional discovery, it is your obligation to serve requests that respect the limits of jurisdictional
discovery in California. You may not serve overbroad requests and then expect us to figure out how you should have
phrased them.
To date, you have not articulated the basis on which you are claiming personal jurisdiction over our clients. We see no
plausible basis for you to assert general jurisdiction, yet your discovery requests seek information that has nothing to do
with specific jurisdiction – i.e., acts taken by each cross-defendant we represent in connection with the material
allegations against these cross-defendants that have a jurisdictionally relevant connection with California.
That said, we would like to avoid unnecessary and wasteful motion practice, and will therefore be prepared to discuss
possible categories of information that might be appropriate for jurisdictional discovery. (To be clear, we cannot
commit to providing any documents or information that the SISSE determines, pursuant to the process that is currently
underway, are implicated by the Blocking Statute.) For the discussion to be at all productive, we trust you will do the
same, or at least be prepared to explain the basis on which you are asserting personal jurisdiction over our clients and
how each of your discovery requests is appropriate. If we cannot work these issues out, we will be entitled to stand on
our objections and require you demonstrate why each of your requests is appropriate.

Counsel,
I will not address all the mischaracterizations in your email below, but will just note that to the extent that the Perrin
Cross-Defendants believed that Nouvel’s RPFs exceeded the scope of jurisdictional discovery, they should have made
proposals to narrow the requests in their responses and objections.
We are available to meet and confer on Friday at 4 PM ET. To make the meet and confer productive, please provide the
Perrin Cross-Defendants’ proposals to narrow the scope of Nouvel’s RFPs by this Thursday at 5 PM ET.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

45
Counsel,
Your email mischaracterizes our Wednesday, November 8 meet and confer.
As we explained to you when we spoke, we hoped our meet and confer would clarify and narrow the issues relevant to
the Service de l'information Stratégique et de la Sécurité Économiques (“SISSE”). We disagree that we were obliged to
contact the SISSE prior to understanding your position on the French Blocking Staute or discussing the possibility of
narrowing the requests. Regardless, in light of the position you took during our call, we have now contacted the SISSE
and are awaiting guidance.
We disagree that our clients’ objections to Nouvel’s RFPs were boilerplate or inappropriate. We stand by the objections
and again request a meet and confer to discuss (a) narrowing requests that exceed the scope of jurisdictional discovery
under California law and (b) identifying the categories of material you view as having the highest priority. As you
acknowledged during our call, Nouvel’s requests are broad and, as formulated, call for the production of information of
an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature.
It is precisely because we take our discovery obligations seriously that we request a meet and confer to better
understand the scope of the information you are seeking, and why you believe you are entitled to it, so that we can
accurately assess the applicability of the French Blocking Statute and the possibility of production.
We are available to discuss on Friday, November 17 or Monday, November 20 between 2:00pm and 5:00pm EST on both
days.

To: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
<SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Phoebe King <PKing@CohenGresser.com>
Counsel,
I write to follow up on last Thursday’s meet and confer concerning the responses and objections of Cross-Defendants
Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin (the “Perrin Cross-Defendants”) to Cross-
Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for Production Regarding Personal Jurisdiction.
You stated during the meet and confer that, despite having been served with Nouvel’s Requests for Production on
September 26, 2023—over six weeks ago—the Perrin Cross-Defendants still have not submitted Nouvel’s requests to the
French service de l'information stratégique et de la sécurité économiques (“SISSE”). That is so even though French
Decree No. 2022-207 of February 18, 2022, requires a party subject to the French Blocking Statute to send any request
for documents to SISSE “without delay”. The Perrin Cross-Defendants should have submitted Nouvel’s requests to SISSE
as soon as they received them, and they should rectify their failure to do so by submitting them immediately.
46
You stated during the meet and confer that the Perrin Cross-Defendants believe that certain documents responsive to
Nouvel’s RFPs do not fall within the scope of the French Blocking Statute. If that is so, the Perrin Cross-Defendants
should have agreed to produce those documents rather objecting to all RFPs based on the French Blocking and declining
to produce a single document. You suggested during our meet and confer that Nouvel consider whether at least some
documents responsive to certain RFPs may not be covered by the French Blocking Statute. We believe the Perrin Cross-
Defendants have it the wrong way around. To the extent the Perrin Cross-Defendants believe documents called for by
Nouvel’s requests are not covered by the French Blocking Statute, then they should immediately produce them.
You also suggested during the meet and confer that, separate and apart from the French Blocking Statute, Nouvel
consider narrowing its RFPs or identifying certain RFPs as higher priority. The Perrin Cross-Defendants made boilerplate
relevance, overbreadth, and burden objections to nearly all Nouvel’s RFPs and are now attempting to shift the burden to
Nouvel to determine which of those objections the Perrin Cross-Defendants intend to stand on. That is improper. To
the extent you have suggestions for how to narrow Nouvel’s RFPs, please propose them; indeed, you should have
already done so.
Nouvel has serious concerns that the Perrin Cross-Defendants are wasting time and are not taking their discovery
obligations seriously. Please (1) confirm by tomorrow that the Perrin Cross-Defendants have submitted Nouvel’s RFPs to
SISSE; (2) identify by November 17 the RFPs for which the Perrin Cross-Defendants will produce responsive documents
they consider not to be covered by the French Blocking Statute; and (3) provide by November 17 the Perrin Cross-
Defendants’ proposals to narrow Nouvel’s RFPs to a scope they consider appropriate. If you do you agree to do any of
the foregoing, please provide times later this week when you are available to meet and confer.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 9:17 AM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
Jonathan,
That works for us, thanks.
Best,
Randall

Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 9:02 AM
To: Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
47
Randall,
We are available to meet and confer at 4 PM PT / 7 PM ET on Wednesday. If that time works for you, I will circulate an
invitation.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Sunday, November 5, 2023 9:25 AM
To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick
Jonathan,
We agree that it makes sense to meet and confer, but unfortunately are not available tomorrow. Let us know if there
are times that would work for you on Wednesday.
As set forth in our R&Os, we believe the French Blocking Statute (which covers “information of an economic,
commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature”) applies to these Requests and that the proper vehicle for seeking
this discovery will thus be the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. If
you have a different view of the extent to which the French Blocking Statute is implicated, we would like to discuss
during our meet and confer so that we have the benefit of your position and can take it into account.
Best,
Randall
Randall Bryer
800 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
+1 212 324 3518
48

Sent: Friday, November 3, 2023 7:13 PM
To: Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S. Gale Dick <SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Phoebe King
<PKing@CohenGresser.com>; Randall Bryer <RBryer@CohenGresser.com>
Counsel,
We have not heard back from you on the inquiry below. We request a meet and confer concerning the
responses and objections of Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles
Perrin to Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for Production Regarding Personal
Jurisdiction.
We are available on Monday from 4:30 PM – 6 PM ET.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
From: Jonathan Mooney

Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2023 7:45 PM
To: Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S Gale Dick (SGDick@CohenGresser.com)
<SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Phoebe H King (pking@cohengresser.com) <pking@cohengresser.com>;
Randall W Bryer (rbryer@cohengresser.com) <rbryer@cohengresser.com>
Cc: Keith Hummel <khummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>;
49
Subject: RE: ELECTRONIC SERVICE: William B. Pitt, et al. v. Angelina Jolie, et al.; LASC Case No.
22STCV06081
Counsel,
Please confirm that Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin
will not produce any documents responsive to Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for
Production Regarding Personal Jurisdiction on the basis of the French Blocking Statute.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
From: Michelle M. Hicks <MHicks@birdmarella.com>

Sent: Monday, October 30, 2023 11:09 PM
To: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com; lbrill@kbkfirm.com; prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com; Justin C. Clarke
<jcclarke@cravath.com>; dcsillag@murphyrosen.com; ALGoodman@wlrk.com; RKGrosbard@wlrk.com;
Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Katelyn Kuwata <KKuwata@kbkfirm.com>; Jonathan Mooney
<jmooney@cravath.com>; pmurphy@murphyrosen.com; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com; JLAllen@wlrk.com;
Jonathan Moses <JMMoses@wlrk.com>; John V. Berlinski <JBerlinski@birdmarella.com>; Brandon R.
Teachout <BTeachout@birdmarella.com>; Julia B. Cherlow <jcherlow@birdmarella.com>; Kimberly A.
Meyer <KMeyer@birdmarella.com>; Paula S. Yates <PYates@birdmarella.com>; Rebecca Attarson
<RAttarson@birdmarella.com>; Debbie L. Throckmorton <dthrockmorton@birdmarella.com>
Cc: Mark T. Drooks <mdrooks@birdmarella.com>; S Gale Dick (SGDick@CohenGresser.com)
<SGDick@CohenGresser.com>; Phoebe H King (pking@cohengresser.com) <pking@cohengresser.com>;
Randall W Bryer (rbryer@cohengresser.com) <rbryer@cohengresser.com>; Debbie L. Throckmorton
<dthrockmorton@birdmarella.com>
Subject: ELECTRONIC SERVICE: William B. Pitt, et al. v. Angelina Jolie, et al.; LASC Case No.
22STCV06081
Dear Counsel,
Attached please find a service copy of the discovery responses listed below in the above-referenced matter.
50
1. Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin’s Responses and Objections to Defendant and Cross-Complainant
Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for Production Re: Personal Jurisdiction
2. Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Provence’s Responses and Objections to Defendant and Cross-
Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for Production Re: Personal Jurisdiction
3. Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin’s Responses and Objections to Defendant and Cross-Complainant
Nouvel, LLC’s First Set of Requests for Production Re: Personal Jurisdiction
Verifications will follow.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
______________
Michelle Hicks
Assistant to Vincent Marella, Joel Boxer, Mark Drooks, Kate Shin, Nick Purcell and Cameron R. Partovi
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.
1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90067-2561
www.birdmarella.com | 310.201.2100| LinkedIn | mhicks@birdmarella.com
This e-mail is confidential and may be privileged. Use or disclosure of it by anyone other than a designated
addressee is unauthorized. If you are not an intended recipient, please delete this e-mail from the computer on
which you received it.
51
This e-mail is confidential and may be privileged. Use or disclosure of it by anyone other than a designated addressee is
unauthorized. If you are not an intended recipient, please delete this e-mail from the computer on which you received
it.
it.
it.
it.
it.
52
EXHIBIT 10
khummel@cravath.com
3
5 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
6 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
7 Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
8 JOE H. TUFFAHA (State Bar No. 253723)

9 PRASHANTH CHENNAKESAVAN (State Bar No. 284022)
11 300 S. Grand Avenue

Suite 3950
12 Los Angeles, California 90071-3426
Telephone: (213) 612-8900
13

16 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Plaintiffs, FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
20 PRODUCTION TO CROSS-
vs. DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER
21 PERRIN RE: PERSONAL
ANGELINA JOLIE, an individual, and JURISDICTION
22 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited
liability company, YURI SHEFLER, an Judge: Hon. Lia Martin
23
individual, ALEXEY OLIYNIK, an Dept.: 16
24 individual, SPI GROUP HOLDING
LIMITED, a Cyprus private limited Action Filed: February 17, 2022
25 company, and TENUTE DEL MONDO Trial Date: None set.
B.V., a Netherlands private limited
26 company,
27 Defendants.
28
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR

PRODUCTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
liability company,
2
Cross-Complainant,
3 vs.
4 WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual,
6
limited liability company, VINS ET
company, SAS MIRAVAL STUDIOS, a
12 French limited liability company, SASU
13 company, SAS DISTILLERIES DE LA
15
Cross-Defendants.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Propounding Party: Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC

27 Responding Party: Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin
28 Set No.: One

1 Pursuant to Sections 2031.010, et seq., of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
2 Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC demands that Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier
3 Perrin produce and permit Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC to inspect and to copy
4 the documents described in the following requests for production (each, a “Request,” and
5 collectively, the “Requests”) on or before October 30, 2023, at the offices of LTL Attorneys LLP,
6 300 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 3950, Los Angeles, California 90071.
7 DEFINITIONS
8 1. Unless otherwise specified, the relevant time period for these requests is January 1,
9 2013, through the present.

10 2. “Affiliate”, in relation to a given Person, shall refer to any Person that controls, is
11 controlled by, or is under common control with, such Person.
12 3. “Campari Group” shall refer to Davide Campari-Milano N.V., a Dutch public

13 company with a corporate office at Via F. Sacchetti, 20 – 20099 Sesto San Giovanni, Milan, Italy.
14 4. “Chateau Miraval” shall refer to SA Chateau Miraval, a company established and

15 having its registered office in F-83570 Correns, Domaine de Miraval, France.
16 5. “Chateau Miraval Estate” or “Estate” shall refer to the 1300-acre country estate in
17 the south of France consisting of a manor house, vineyards, and numerous other buildings that is
18 owned by Chateau Miraval.
19 6. “Communications” means any act or instance of transferring, transmitting, passing,

20 delivering, or giving information by oral, written, or electronic means, including, but not limited
21 to, by notes, letter, telegram, facsimile, electronic mail, electronic message (including text
22 message), or voicemail.
23 7. “Document(s)” means the full and broadest scope of documents and things
24 discoverable under California law and includes, without limitation, all writings (as defined in
25 Section 250 of the California Evidence Code) and any written material, whether typed,
26 handwritten, printed or otherwise, and whether in draft or final form, of any kind or nature, or any
27 photograph, photostat, microfilm or other reproduction thereof, including, without limitation, each
28 note, memorandum, letter, telegram, telex, circular, release, article, report, prospectus,

1 memorandum of any telephone or in-person conversation, any financial statement, analysis,
2 drawing, graph, chart, account, book, notebook, draft, summary, diary, transcript, computer data
3 base, computer printout or other computer generated matter, and other data compilations, and any
4 other documents or electronically stored information in any medium from which information can
5 be obtained, whether directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form.
6 Electronic mail, instant messages, text messages, voice mail and any pictures, video, or sound
7 recorded by any means are included within the definition of the terms “Document” or
8 “Documents.” A draft or non-identical copy, including a copy with handwritten notes, is a
9 separate Document within the meaning of the term.

10 8. “Equity Investee” shall refer to any other Person in which a Person or any of its
11 subsidiaries or Affiliates has an equity or similar interest or investment.
12 9. “Familles Perrin” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin, a French

13 company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de Jonquières, 84100 Orange, France and
14 SAS Famille Perrin, a French company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de
16 10. “SAS Petrichor” or “Petrichor” shall refer to SAS Petrichor, a French limited
17 liability company that has its registered address at 2321 Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange,
18 France.
19 11. “Vins et Domaines Perrin” shall refer to Vins et Domaines Perrin SC, a French
20 company that has its registered address at 2321 Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
21 12. “Distilleries de la Riviera” shall refer to SAS Distilleries de la Riviera, a French

22 limited liability company that has its registered address at 2321 Route de Jonquières 84100,
23 Orange, France.
24 13. “Fleur de Miraval” shall refer to SAS Fleur de Miraval, a French company whose
25 registered office is at 26-28 Rue des Lombards 51190 Le Mesnil-sur-Oger, France.
26 14. “Le Domaine” shall refer to Le Domaine Skincare, a French limited liability
27 company with its registered office at 2321 Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France.
28
-2-
1 15. “Miraval Provence” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Provence, a joint
2 venture between Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin headquartered at La Ferrière, Route de
4 16. “Miraval Studios” shall refer to SAS Miraval Studios, a French company whose
5 registered office is at F-83570 Correns, Domaine de Miraval, France.
6 17. “Mondo Bongo” shall refer to Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mondo Bongo, LLC,
7 a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of California, having its registered office
8 at 9100 Wilshire Boulevard, STE 1000W, Beverly Hills, California 90212.
9 18. “Mr. Bradbury” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Gary Bradbury.

10 19. “Mr. Grant” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Warren Grant.
11 20. “Mr. Pitt” shall refer to Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant William B. Pitt.
12 21. “Mr. Venturini” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Roland Venturini.
13 22. “Ms. Bird” shall refer to Terry Bird.
14 23. “Ms. Jolie” shall refer to Defendant Angelina Jolie.
15 24. “Mr. Oliynik” shall refer to Defendant Alexey Oliynik.
16 25. “Nouvel” shall refer to Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff Nouvel, LLC, a limited
17 liability company under the laws of California, established and having its registered office at 500
18 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600, Sacramento, California, 95814.
19 26. “Person” or “Persons” shall mean any natural person or any legal person, including
20 but not limited to any business, legal, or governmental entity or association and includes that
21 Person and, as applicable, each and all of (a) his or her present and former employees, agents, or
22 representatives; (b) his or her present and former attorneys, accountants, or advisors; (c) any
23 professional employed or retained by him or her; (d) any entity over which he or she exercises
24 control; and (e) any other Persons acting or purporting to act on his or her behalf.
25 27. “Quimicum” shall refer to Quimicum S.à r.l, a limited liability company (société à
26 responsabilité limitée), established and having its registered office at L-5365 Munsbach, 6C, rue
27 Gabriel Lippmann, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
28
-3-
1 28. “SCEA Miraval” shall refer to SCEA Miraval, a French company whose registered
2 office is at 83143 Le Val, 4515 Route de Barjols, Domaine de Miraval, France.
3 29. The terms “You” and “Your” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin
4 and any of your current or former agents, attorneys, accountants, employees, partners or other
5 persons occupying similar positions or performing similar functions, acting either individually or
6 collectively; and all persons either acting or purporting to act on behalf of the above.
7 INSTRUCTIONS
8 1. CCP §§ 2017.010–2017.020, 2031.010–2031.320 are hereby incorporated by
9 reference and apply to each of the following instructions,

10 2. The following rules of construction apply to all Requests:
11 a. The terms “any,” “all,” “each,” and “every” should be understood in either
12 their most or least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of a
13 Request all Documents or Communications that might otherwise be construed to be
14 outside of its scope.
15 b. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed either disjunctively or
16 conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of a Request all Documents or
17 Communications that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.
18 c. The terms “concern,” “concerning,” “relate,” and “relating to” shall be
19 construed as broadly as possible and shall mean and include, without limitation,
20 constituting, comprising, setting forth, summarizing, reflecting, stating, supporting,
21 weakening, describing, recording, noting, embodying, mentioning, studying,
22 analyzing, discussing, or evaluating, directly or indirectly.
23 d. The term “including” shall be construed as broadly as possible and shall
24 mean “including without limitation.”
25 e. The use of a verb in any tense, mood, or voice shall be construed as the use
26 of the verb in all tenses, moods, or voices, as necessary to bring within the scope of
27 a Request all Documents or Communications that might otherwise be construed to
28 be outside of its scope.
-4-
1 f. The use of the singular form of any word shall be taken to mean the plural
2 as well as the singular, and the use of the plural form of any word shall be taken to
3 mean the singular as well as the plural.
4 g. The use of the masculine gender shall include the feminine, neuter, and any
5 other genders.
6 3. Produce all Documents described below which are in Your possession, custody, or
7 control, including those Documents in the possession, custody, or control of Your present or
8 former attorneys or counsel, advisors, investigators, accountants, employees or other agents, as
9 well as any other Persons or entities acting on Your behalf, wherever located and in whatever form
10 they may exist.
11 4. Produce all Documents in their entirety, without deletion or excision, and along
12 with any attachments, regardless of whether You consider the entirety of any such Documents or
13 attachments to be responsive to any Request.
14 5. In objecting to any Request, identify the specific grounds for the objection and the
15 part of the Request objected to, and state with specificity which Documents will be withheld and
16 which Documents will be produced notwithstanding such objection.
17 6. If any Document responsive to these Requests is withheld or redacted by You

18 under a claim of privilege, provide a privilege log describing the basis for the claim of privilege
19 and all information necessary for Nouvel and the Court to assess the claim of privilege.
20 7. If You are unable to answer or respond fully to any Request, answer or respond to
21 the extent possible and specify the reason(s) for Your inability to answer or respond in full. If
22 You have no Documents responsive to a particular Request, so state.
23 8. You must comply with your obligations under CCP § 2031.230 in all respects,
24 including your obligation to set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization
25 known or believed to have possession, custody, or control of any Documents that have been
26 destroyed, lost, misplaced, stolen, or which are not in Your possession, custody, or control.
27 9. Subject to any protocol governing the production and use of ESI that may be
28 agreed to by You and Nouvel or ordered by the Court, all Documents shall be Bates labeled and
-5-
1 shall be produced electronically in single page Group IV TIF format (except that Microsoft Excel,
2 PowerPoint, and structured data files shall be produced in native format), with load files
3 containing, for each Document, extracted searchable text and all available metadata for at least the
4 following fields: BEGBATES; ENDBATES; BEGBATESATT; ENDBATESATT; All
5 Custodians; File Name; Email Importance; File Type; File Size; Page Count; Author; Subject;
6 From; To; CC; BCC; Sent Date; Received Date; Date Appointment Start; Date Appointment End;
7 Time Zone Processed; MD5 Hash; and Redaction.
8 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
9 Request for Production No. 1:

10 All Documents and Communications concerning any visits or trips You or any of Your
11 agents or representatives made to the State of California that in any way concerned Nouvel,
12 Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity
13 Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval
14 Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
17 agents or representatives made to the State of California to meet with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo,
18 Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their agents, representatives, or Affiliates.
20 All Documents and Communications, including records of any telephone calls or video
21 calls, concerning any Communications between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or
22 any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence,
23 SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la
24 Rivera, or any of Your or their agents or representatives, on the one hand, and any Person located
25 in the State California, on the other hand, concerning Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau
26 Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence,
28 Rivera.
-6-
3 calls, concerning any Communications between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or
4 any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence,
6 Rivera, or any of their agents or representatives, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr.
7 Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, on the
8 other hand.

11 understandings, oral or in writing, between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or any
12 of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA
13 Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, on
14 the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their
15 Affiliates, on the other hand.
17 All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of any
18 of the acts or transactions alleged in the Second Amended Complaint or the First Amended Cross-
19 Complaint.
22 indemnification obligations, that You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, or any of Your or
23 their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval,
24 Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera owe to; or
25 (2) any rights, including indemnification rights, that You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines
26 Perrin, or any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
27 Provence, Fleur de Miraval, SCEA Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or
28
-7-
1 Distilleries de la Rivera have against Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel,
2 Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates.
4 All Documents and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance to, or
5 contribution to, any directive, order or request made from California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo,
6 Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of
7 California to Mr. Venturini or Mr. Bradbury concerning Nouvel, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or
8 any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, Fleur de
9 Miraval, SCEA Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.

12 contribution to, any action, Communication, order, directive, or request made from California by
13 Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person
14 located in the State of California in connection with efforts or plans to control, direct, supervise, or
15 oversee Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees,
16 including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
17 Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any of their presidents, managers, officers, or directors.
20 contribution to, any actual or contemplated efforts in the State of California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo
21 Bongo, Mr. Grant, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person in the State of
22 California to block or prevent Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird from supervising, overseeing,
23 governing, obtaining information about, or participating in the affairs of Quimicum, Chateau
24 Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence,
26 Rivera.
27
28
-8-
2 All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement or participation by You
3 or any of Your agents, representatives, or Affiliates in responding to any request, including any
4 request for information, made by Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning Quimicum, Chateau
6 Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
10 contribution to any actual or contemplated actions in or Communications from the State of
11 California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or of their agents,
12 representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California relating to the
13 payment, or lack thereof, of dividends from Chateau Miraval or Quimicum.
16 contribution to any actual or contemplated efforts in the State of California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo
17 Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any
18 Person located in the State of California to renovate, to oversee or supervise renovations to, to
19 make improvements to, to oversee or supervise improvements to, to make additions to, or to
20 oversee or supervise any additions to the Chateau Miraval Estate or to any buildings,
21 constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate.
23 All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of any actual
24 or contemplated renovations, improvements to, or additions to the Chateau Miraval Estate, or to
25 any buildings, constructions, or attachments on or near the Estate, on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel.
27 All Document and Communications concerning Your involvement in, assistance to, or
28 contribution to any action, Communication, order, direction, or request made by Mr. Pitt, Mondo
-9-
2 Person located in the State of California concerning the shareholder deadlock at Quimicum, the
3 appointment of directors of Quimicum, or the appointment of directors of Chateau Miraval.
5 All Documents and Communications concerning the expected or actual effect of the
6 shareholder deadlock at Quimicum on Ms. Jolie and Nouvel.
8 All Documents and Communications concerning any contracts, agreements, arrangements,
9 or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin,
10 Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or
11 Distilleries de la Rivera, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie,
12 Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of
13 California, on the other hand, concerning Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or
14 any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA
15 Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or
16 any intellectual property currently or previously owned by Chateau Miraval.
19 calls, concerning any Communications between You or any of Your agents or representatives and
20 any Person located in the State of California concerning (1) the Long-Term Trademark License
21 Agreement between Chateau Miraval and Miraval Provence and any amendments thereto; (2)
22 Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3)
23 the rates that Familles Perrin charges Miraval Provence for bottling; (4) the creation or registration
24 of any entity whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the
25 use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine,
26 Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their
28
-10-
2 All Documents and Communications concerning the effect on Ms. Jolie or Nouvel of
3 (1) the Long-Term Trademark License Agreement between Chateau Miraval and Miraval
4 Provence and any amendments thereto; (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any
5 intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles Perrin charges Miraval
6 Provence for bottling; (4) the creation or registration of any entity whose legal or trade name
7 contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur
8 de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in
9 which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or Equity
10 Investees hold an equity interest.
12 All Documents and Communications concerning the registration of any trademark in the
13 United States that is registered by Chateau Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar
14 word.
16 All Documents and Communications concerning any financial payments, transfers, or
17 transactions between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Provence, SCEA
19 any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,
20 Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Nouvel, Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, or their agents, representatives, or
24 transactions between You, Familles Perrin, Vins et Domaines Perrin, Miraval Provence, SCEA
26 any of Your or their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, on the one hand, and any Person
27 located in the State of California, on the other hand, related to Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, Vins
28 et Domaines Perrin, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
-11-
2 Distilleries de la Rivera.
4 All Documents and Communications concerning the reduction of Chateau Miraval’s
5 ownership interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the
6 number of shares in Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
8 All Documents and Communications concerning the distribution agreement between
9 Miraval Provence and Campari Group and its effect on Nouvel.

11 All Documents and Communications concerning any negotiations with Ms. Jolie that
12 reflect contacts with California concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and Chateau
13 Miraval.
15 All drafts of agreements with Ms. Jolie concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum
16 and Chateau Miraval.
19 contribution to any action, Communication, order, direction, or request concerning shareholder
20 loans or other financial contributions made by Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Jolie, or Nouvel to Quimicum,
21 Chateau Miraval, or any of their Affiliates, subsidiaries, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
25 Documents sufficient to identify all businesses or any Affiliates thereof in which You have
26 an equity interest that distribute wine produced by Chateau Miraval or its subsidiaries and are
27 incorporated or headquartered in the State of California.
28
-12-
2 All Documents and Communications concerning Your business activities in California.
4 All Documents that You have signed that contain a forum-selection clause subjecting You
5 to the jurisdiction of a California court.
7 All Documents and Communications concerning any voluntary appearance You made at a
8 court proceeding in California.

11 intangible assets located in California that You have or held an interest in, and/or own or owned
12 individually, or through an Equity Investee.
14 All Documents and Communications concerning any bank accounts in California in which
15 You have or had an interest and/or owned, individually, or through an Equity Investee, at any time
16 between October 2012 and the present.
18 All Documents and Communications You intend to rely upon in support of Your motion to
19 quash filed on September 20, 2023.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-13-
1 DATED: September 26, 2023 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
Keith R. Hummel
2 Justin C. Clarke
Jonathan Mooney
3
4 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP

Joe H. Tuffaha
5 Prashanth Chennakesavan
6
7 By: /s/ Jonathan Mooney

8 JONATHAN MOONEY
Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant
9 NOUVEL, LLC
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-14-
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
employed in the County of New York, New York. My business address is 825 Eighth Avenue,
4 New York, NY 10019.
5 On September 26, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
6 DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOUVEL, LLC’S FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE: JURISDICTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT
7 MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN on the interested parties in this action as follows:
8 John V. Berlinski William Savitt (admitted pro hac vice)

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
9 WOLPERT, NESSIM, Sarah K. Eddy (admitted pro hac vice)
DROOKS, LINCENBERG & Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
10 RHOW, P.C. Jessica L. Allen (admitted pro hac vice)
1875 Century Park East, Suite 2300 Remy Grosbard (admitted pro hac vice)
11 Los Angeles, CA 90067 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
Tel: (310) 201-2100 51 West 52nd Street
12 Email: jberlinski@birdmarella.com New York, NY 10019
Tel: (212) 403-1000
13 Fax: (212) 403-2000
Email: wdsavitt@wlrk.com, jmmoses@wlrk.com,
14 skeddy@wlrk.com, algoodman@wlrk.com,
jlallen@wlrk.com, rkgrosbard@wlrk.com
15
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC and Cross-
16
Defendant Warren Grant
17
Laura Brill (SB No. 195889) William Savitt (admitted pro hac vice)
18 Katelyn Kuwata (SB No. 319370) Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP Sarah K. Eddy (admitted pro hac vice)
19 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725 Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
Jessica L. Allen (admitted pro hac vice)
Los Angeles, CA 90067 Remy Grosbard (admitted pro hac vice)
20 Tel: (310) 556-2700 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
21 Fax: (310) 556-2705 51 West 52nd Street
Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com New York, NY 10019
22 Email: kkuwata@kbkfirm.com Tel: (212) 403-1000
Fax: (212) 403-2000
23 Email: wdsavitt@wlrk.com, jmmoses@wlrk.com,
skeddy@wlrk.com, algoodman@wlrk.com,
24 jlallen@wlrk.com, rkgrosbard@wlrk.com
25 Attorneys appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants Roland
Venturini and Gary Bradbury
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
Paul D. Murphy (SB No. 159556) Mark T. Drooks (SB No. 123561)
2 Daniel N. Csillag (SB No. 266773) BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,
MURPHY ROSEN LLP DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.
3 100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1300 1875 Century Park East, Suite 2300
Santa Monica, CA 90401 Los Angeles, CA 90067
4 Tel: (310) 899-3300 Tel: (310) 201-2100
Fax: (310) 399-7201 Email: mdrooks@birdmarella.com
5 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com,
dcsillag@murphyrosen.com S. Gale Dick (admitted pro hac vice)
Attorneys for Defendant and Cross- Phoebe H. King (admitted pro hac vice)
7 Complainant Angelina Jolie COHEN & GRESSER LLP
800 Third Avenue
Tel: (212) 957-7600
9 Email: sgdick@cohengresser.com,
rbryer@cohengresser.com, pking@cohengresser.com
10
11 Attorneys appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction

on behalf of Cross-Defendants Marc-Olivier Perrin,
12 SAS Miraval Provence, and SAS Familles Perrin
13 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be

sent to each interested party at the email addresses listed above or on the attached service list. I did
14 not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other
indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
15
16
foregoing is true and correct.
17
18
Executed on September 26, 2023, in New York, New York.
19
/s/ Jonathan Mooney
20 JONATHAN MOONEY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-2-
PROOF OF SERVICE
khummel@cravath.com
3
5 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
6 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
7 Facsimile: (212) 474-3700


Suite 3950
Telephone: (213) 612-8900
13

vs. DEFENDANT SAS MIRAVAL
21 PROVENCE RE: PERSONAL
23
26 company,
27 Defendants.
28

PRODUCTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT SAS MIRAVAL PROVENCE RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
liability company,
2
Cross-Complainant,
3 vs.
6
15
Cross-Defendants.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

27 Responding Party: Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Provence
28 Set No.: One

2 Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC demands that Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval
3 Provence produce and permit Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC to inspect and to
4 copy the documents described in the following requests for production (each, a “Request,” and
7 DEFINITIONS






12 9. “Familles Perrin” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin, a French

13 company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de Jonquières, 84100 Orange, France and
14 SAS Famille Perrin, a French company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de
18 France.

23 Orange, France.
28
-2-
8 19. "Mr. Perrin” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin.
28
-3-
1 29. The terms “You” and “Your” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval
2 Provence, a joint venture between Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin headquartered at La
3 Ferrière, Route de Jonquières 84100, Orange, France, and any of its current or former agents,
4 attorneys, accountants, employees, partners or other persons occupying similar positions or
5 performing similar functions, acting either individually or collectively; and all persons either
6 acting or purporting to act on behalf of the above.
7 INSTRUCTIONS

-4-
5 other genders.
10 they may exist.

-5-

11 directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives made to the State of California that in any
12 way concerned Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
13 Affiliates or Equity Investees, including You, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval
14 Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
17 directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives made to the State of California to meet
18 with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their agents,
22 calls, concerning any Communications between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or
23 Equity Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives,
24 on the one hand, and any Person located in the State California, on the other hand, concerning
25 Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or
26 Equity Investees, including You, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
28
-6-
3 calls, concerning any Communications between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates or
5 on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of
9 understandings, oral or in writing, between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
10 Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives, on the
11 one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their
16 Complaint.
19 indemnification obligations, that You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, or
20 any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives owe to, or (2) any
21 rights, including indemnification rights, that You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
22 Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives have
23 against Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates.
-7-
1 any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including You, Fleur de Miraval, SCEA
9 including You, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or
10 Distilleries de la Rivera, or any of their presidents, managers, officers, or directors.
17 Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including You, SCEA
18 Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
20 All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement, assistance, or
21 contribution in responding to any request, including any request for information, made by Nouvel,
22 Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
23 Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including You, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de
24 Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera by You, any of Your
25 subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees,
26 agents or representatives.
27
28
-8-
4 California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their
5 agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California relating to the
27 or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
-9-
1 one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents,
2 representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California, on the other hand,
3 concerning Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
4 Affiliates or Equity Investees, including You, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval
5 Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any intellectual property currently or
6 previously owned by Chateau Miraval.
10 Equity Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives
11 and any Person located in the State of California concerning (1) the Long-Term Trademark
12 License Agreement between You and Chateau Miraval and any amendments thereto; (2) Your
13 rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval; (3) the rates that Familles
14 Perrin charges You for bottling; (4) the creation or registration of any entity whose legal or trade
15 name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of Chateau Miraval’s assets by
16 Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity
17 in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
18 Investees hold an equity interest.
20 All Documents and Communications concerning the registration by any Person other than
21 Chateau Miraval of any trademark in the United States that is already registered by Chateau
22 Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar word.
25 transactions between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, or any of Your
26 or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,

-10-
4 or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives, on the one hand, and any Person
6 et Domaines Perrin, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including You,
8 Rivera.

11 ownership interest in You from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of
12 shares in You held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
14 All Documents and Communications concerning the distribution agreement between You
15 and Campari Group and its effect on Nouvel.
17 All Documents and Communications that reflect contacts with California concerning any
18 negotiations with Ms. Jolie concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and Chateau Miraval.
26 Chateau Miraval, or any of their Affiliates, subsidiaries, or Equity Investees, including You,
28 Rivera.
-11-
2 Documents sufficient to identify all of Your Equity Investees or any Affiliates thereof that
3 distribute wine produced by Chateau Miraval or its subsidiaries and are incorporated or
4 headquartered in the State of California.
8 All agreements that You have signed that contain a forum-selection clause subjecting You

16 individually or through an Equity Investee.
19 You have or had an interest and/or owned, individually or through an Equity Investee.
23
24
25
26
27
28
-12-
Keith R. Hummel
2 Justin C. Clarke
Jonathan Mooney
3
4 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP

Joe H. Tuffaha
6

8 JONATHAN MOONEY
9 NOUVEL, LLC
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-13-
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE: JURISDICTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT SAS
7 MIRAVAL PROVENCE on the interested parties in this action as follows:

Tel: (212) 403-1000
13 Fax: (212) 403-2000
15
16
17
Fax: (212) 403-2000
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
4 Tel: (310) 899-3300 Tel: (310) 201-2100
800 Third Avenue
Tel: (212) 957-7600
10


15
16
17
18
19
/s/ Jonathan Mooney
20 JONATHAN MOONEY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-2-
PROOF OF SERVICE
khummel@cravath.com
3
5 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
6 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
7 Facsimile: (212) 474-3700


Suite 3950
Telephone: (213) 612-8900
13

vs. DEFENDANT SAS FAMILLES
21 PERRIN RE: PERSONAL
23
26 company,
27 Defendants.
28

PRODUCTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT SAS FAMILLES PERRIN RE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
liability company,
2
Cross-Complainant,
3 vs.
6
15
Cross-Defendants.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

27 Responding Party: Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin
28 Set No.: One

2 Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC demands that Cross-Defendant SAS Familles
3 Perrin produce and permit Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel, LLC to inspect and to copy
4 the documents described in the following requests for production (each, a “Request,” and
7 DEFINITIONS







14 France.

19 Orange, France.
24 14. “Miraval Provence” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Miraval Provence, a joint
25 venture between Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin headquartered at La Ferrière, Route de
-2-
6 19. "Mr. Perrin” shall refer to Cross-Defendant Marc-Olivier Perrin.

26 29. The terms “You” and “Your” shall refer to Cross-Defendant SAS Familles Perrin, a
27 French company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de Jonquières, 84100 Orange,
28 France and SAS Famille Perrin, a French company whose registered office is at La Ferrière, Route
-3-
1 de Jonquières, 84100 Orange, France, and any of its current or former agents, attorneys,
2 accountants, employees, partners or other persons occupying similar positions or performing
3 similar functions, acting either individually or collectively; and all persons either acting or
4 purporting to act on behalf of the above.
5 INSTRUCTIONS
27
28
-4-
5 other genders.
10 they may exist.

-5-

11 directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives made to the State of California that in any
12 way concerned Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
13 Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval,
14 Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
17 directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives made to the State of California to meet
18 with Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their agents,
24 on the one hand, and any Person located in the State California, on the other hand, concerning
25 Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates or
26 Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor,
27 Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
28
-6-
3 calls, concerning any Communications between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates or
5 on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of
9 understandings, oral or in writing, between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
11 one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their
16 Complaint.
19 indemnification obligations, that You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, or
20 any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives owe to, or (2) any
21 rights, including indemnification rights, that You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
22 Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives have
23 against Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their Affiliates.
-7-
1 any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, Fleur de
2 Miraval, SCEA Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera.
9 including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le
10 Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any of their presidents, managers, officers, or directors.
19 Rivera.
21 All Documents and Communications concerning any involvement, assistance, or
22 contribution in responding to any request, including any request for information, made by Nouvel,
23 Ms. Jolie, or Ms. Bird, concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
24 Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, Vins et Domaines Perrin, SCEA
25 Miraval, Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera by
26 You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, or any of Your or their directors,
27 officers, employees, agents or representatives.
28
-8-
4 California by Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, or any of their
5 agents, representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California relating to the
27 or understandings, oral or in writing, between You, any of Your subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity
-9-
1 one hand, and Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Ms. Jolie, Nouvel, Ms. Bird, their agents,
2 representatives, or Affiliates, or any Person located in the State of California, on the other hand,
3 concerning Nouvel, Mondo Bongo, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or any of their subsidiaries,
4 Affiliates or Equity Investees, including Miraval Provence, SCEA Miraval, Fleur de Miraval,
5 Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine, or Distilleries de la Rivera, or any intellectual property
6 currently or previously owned by Chateau Miraval.
10 Equity Investees, or any of Your or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives
11 and any Person located in the State of California concerning (1) the Long-Term Trademark
12 License Agreement between Chateau Miraval and Miraval Provence and any amendments thereto;
13 (2) Miraval Provence’s rights in or registrations of any intellectual property of Chateau Miraval;
14 (3) the rates that You charge Miraval Provence for bottling; (4) the creation or registration of any
15 entity whose legal or trade name contains the word “Miraval” or a similar word; or (5) the use of
16 Chateau Miraval’s assets by Fleur de Miraval, Petrichor, Miraval Studios, Le Domaine,
17 Distilleries de la Rivera, or any entity in which Mr. Pitt, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, or any of their
20 All Documents and Communications concerning the registration by any Person other than
21 Chateau Miraval of any trademark in the United States that is already registered by Chateau
22 Miraval or that uses the name “Miraval” or a similar word.
26 or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives, on the one hand, and Mr. Pitt,

-10-
4 or their directors, officers, employees, agents or representatives, on the one hand, and any Person
6 et Domaines Perrin, or any of their subsidiaries, Affiliates, or Equity Investees, including Miraval

11 ownership interest in Miraval Provence from 50% to 49.97%, as evidenced by the reduction in the
12 number of shares in Miraval Provence held by Chateau Miraval from 5,000 to 4,997 in 2021.
14 All Documents and Communications concerning the distribution agreement between
15 Miraval Provence and Campari Group and its effect on Nouvel.
17 All Documents and Communications that reflect contacts with California concerning any
18 negotiations with Ms. Jolie concerning the sale of her interest in Quimicum and Chateau Miraval.
26 Chateau Miraval, or any of their Affiliates, subsidiaries, or Equity Investees, including Miraval
-11-
2 Documents sufficient to identify all of Your Equity Investees or any Affiliates thereof that
3 distribute wine produced by Chateau Miraval or its subsidiaries and are incorporated or
4 headquartered in the State of California.
8 All agreements that You have signed that contain a forum-selection clause subjecting You

16 individually or through an Equity Investee.
19 You have or had an interest and/or owned, individually or through an Equity Investee.
23
24
25
26
27
28
-12-
Keith R. Hummel
2 Justin C. Clarke
Jonathan Mooney
3
4 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP

Joe H. Tuffaha
6

8 JONATHAN MOONEY
9 NOUVEL, LLC
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-13-
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION RE: JURISDICTION TO CROSS-DEFENDANT SAS
7 FAMILLES PERRIN on the interested parties in this action as follows:

Tel: (212) 403-1000
13 Fax: (212) 403-2000
15
16
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Fax: (212) 403-2000
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PROOF OF SERVICE
EXHIBIT 11
1/22/24, 2:26 PM HCCH | Declaration/reservation/notification
DECLARATION/RESERVATION/NOTIFICATION
Declarations
Reservations
Articles: 4,16,17,23
(Translation)
In accordance with the provisions of Article 33, the French Government declares:
– that in pursuance of Article 4, para. 2, it will execute Letters of Request only if they are in French or if they are
accompanied by a translation into French;
– that, in pursuance of Article 23, Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries will not be executed;
(...)
In accordance with the provisions of Article 16, the Service Civil de l'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale, Ministère de la
Justice [click here for current contact details], has been designated as the authority competent to authorize diplomatic
officers or consular agents of a Contracting State to take the evidence without compulsion of persons other than
nationals of that State in aid of proceedings commenced in the courts of a State which they represent.
This authorization which will be given for each particular case accompanied by particular conditions if need be, shall
be subject to the following general conditions:
1. the evidence must only be taken within the precincts of the Embassies;
2. the Service Civil de L'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale must be given due notice of the date and time at which the
evidence is to be taken so that it can make representatives available if necessary;
3. the evidence must be taken in a room to which the public has access;
4. the persons who are to give evidence must receive due notice in the form of an official summons drawn up in
French or accompanied by a translation into French, and stating:
(a) that the taking of evidence for which the person concerned is summoned is based on the provisions of the Hague
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters, and is part of the
judicial proceedings taken in a court designated by a Contracting State by name;
(b) that appearance for the giving of evidence is voluntary and that non-appearance cannot lead to prosecution in the
requesting State;
(c) that the parties to any action consent to it or, if they do not, their reasons for this;
(d) that the person who is to give evidence is entitled to legal advice;
(e) that the person who is to give evidence can claim dispensation or prohibition from doing so.
A copy of the summonses will be sent to the Ministère de la Justice.
5. The Service Civil de l'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale will be kept informed of any difficulties.
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/notifications/?csid=501&disp=resdn 1/2
1/22/24, 2:26 PM HCCH | Declaration/reservation/notification
In accordance with the provisions of Article 17, the Service Civil de l'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale, Ministère de la
Justice [click here for current contact details], has been designated as the authority competent to authorize persons
duly appointed as commissioners to take evidence without compulsion in aid of proceedings commenced in the
courts of a Contracting State.
This authorization, which will be given for each particular case, accompanied if need be by particular conditions, shall
be subject to the following general conditions:
1. the evidence must only be taken within the precincts of the Embassies;
2. the Service Civil de l'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale must be given due notice of the date and time at which the
evidence is to be taken so that it can make representatives available if necessary;
3. the evidence must be taken in a room to which the public has access;
4. the persons who are to give evidence must receive due notice in the form of an official summons drawn up in
French or accompanied by a translation into French, and stating:
(a) that the taking of evidence for which the person concerned is summoned is based on the provisions of the Hague
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, and is part of the
judicial proceedings taken in a court designated by a Contracting State by name;
(b) that appearance for the giving of evidence is voluntary and that non-appearance cannot lead to prosecution in the
requesting State;
(c) that the parties to any action consent to it or, if they do not, their reasons for this;
(d) that the person who is to give evidence is entitled to legal advice;
(e) that the person who is to give evidence can claim dispensation or prohibition from doing so.
A copy of the summonses will be sent to the Ministère de la Justice.
5. The Service Civil de l'Entraide Judiciaire Internationale will be kept informed of any difficulties.
The application for authorization, which will be addressed to the Ministère de la Justice by the requesting authority,
should specify:
1) the reasons why this method of investigation was chosen in preference to that of Letters of Request, bearing in
mind the judiciary expenses involved.
2) the criteria for designating the commissioners when the person designated does not reside in France.
The French Government declares that, in pursuance of the provisions of Article 8, members of the judicial personnel
of the requesting authority of a Contracting State may be present at the execution of a Letter of Request.
Modification dated 19 January 1987 of the declaration relating to Article 23:
(Translation)
The declaration made by the French Republic in accordance with Article 23 relating to Letters of Request issued for
the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents does not apply when the requested documents are
enumerated limitatively in the Letter of Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure.
N.B.: The instrument of ratification of France (a copy of which can be downloaded here) clearly indicates that the
Convention applies to the entire territory of the French Republic. Consequently, besides Metropolitan France and the
Overseas Departments (French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Reunion, Martinique), the Convention applies to all of the other
French overseas territories. (Translation by the Permanent Bureau)
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/notifications/?csid=501&disp=resdn 2/2
EXHIBIT 12
REPORT ON SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE OF U.S. LAWYERS WITH
THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
LETTER OF REQUEST PROCEDURES
International Litigation Committee

Section of International Law & Practice
(SILP)
American Bar Association
Submitted to:
Office of Legal Adviser
for Private International Law
United States Department of State
October 9, 2003
INTRODUCTION
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (“Hague

Conference”) has convened a Special Commission to review the practical
operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention” or “Convention”).1 The
Special Commission will meet from October 28, 2003 to November 4, 2003 in The
Hague.2 The last such Special Commission to review the operation of the Hague
Evidence Convention was convened in 1989.3
The Office of Legal Adviser for Private International Law of the U.S. State
Department requested input from practicing litigators for the purpose of
identifying issues that should be raised at the Special Commission meeting.
Accordingly, the International Litigation Committee (“ILC”) of the Section of
1 Hague Evidence Convention, 3 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744, 28 U.S.C. § 1781. The Special
Commission is also reviewing the practical operation of the Hague Convention on Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Hague
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents.
2 For more on the Special Commission, see http://www.hcch-net/e/workpgro/lse_intro.html.
3 See Report on the Work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the
Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 28 I NT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1556 (1989)
(hereinafter “1989 Special Commission Report”).
1662006v1
International Law and Practice (“SILP”) of the American Bar Association (“ABA”)4
initiated a survey to elicit feedback from American lawyers concerning their
experience with the letter of request procedures under the Hague Evidence
Convention. A copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A.5
This report summarizes the results of the survey and, on the basis of the
survey data and other feedback received by the ILC, presents
recommendations to the Office of Legal Adviser concerning issues that might
be raised at the meeting of the Special Commission.
4 ABA members represent approximately half of all lawyers in the United States. The Section of
International Law and Practice of the ABA includes over 13,000 members and serves as one of
the primary links between the American legal profession and its counterparts around the world.
The ABA International Section’s mission is to “promote interest, activity and research in
international and comparative law and related areas; to further its development; to diffuse
knowledge thereof among members of the legal profession and others; to formulate
professional opinion thereon; to promote professional relationships with lawyers similarly
engaged in foreign countries; and to implement Goal VIII of the [American Bar] Association, ‘to
advance the rule of law in the world.’”
5 The survey form was developed by Glenn P. Hendrix (Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, Atlanta),
with substantial input by Robert F. Brodegaard (Thacher Profit & Wood, New York). The following
attorneys and ABA staff members also provided invaluable feedback: Donald J. Hayden (Baker
& McKenzie, Miami), Barton Legum (Office of Legal Adviser), Rachel Pittman (SILP staff), Thomas
B. McNamara (Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Denver), and several attorneys at Arnall Golden
Gregory, LLP who “pre-tested” the questionnaire.
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1662006v1
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Hague Evidence Convention
The Hague Evidence Convention allows U.S. litigants to obtain evidence in

“civil or commercial matters” from 37 other jurisdictions.6 The Convention sets
forth two basic methods of gathering evidence. Chapter I outlines the
procedure for “letters of request,” which are requests from a “judicial authority”
for the purpose of “obtain[ing] evidence which is … intended for use in judicial
proceedings, commenced or contemplated.” Each signatory designates a
“central authority” to receive letters of request and oversee their execution. The
court submits the letter of request directly to the foreign central authority, which
in turn forwards it to the appropriate foreign judicial authority to obtain the
requested evidence. The evidence is then returned via the same route. The
requesting court may be informed of the time when, and the place where, the
witness examination will take place, in order that the parties and their
representatives may attend. If so indicated in the letter of request, this
information is sent directly to the parties or their counsel. Under article 10 of the
Convention, compulsory process is available against recalcitrant witnesses “in
the instances and to the same extent as are provided by [the foreign state’s]
internal law” for domestic proceedings. Chapter II of the Convention provides
for the taking of evidence from voluntary witnesses by diplomatic officers or
commissioners. The ILC survey focused solely upon the Chapter I letter of
request procedures.
B. Distribution of the Survey Form
The questionnaire was posted on the websites of SILP and the Litigation
Section of the ABA. The chairs of the International Litigation Committees of SILP
and the Litigation Section7 sent emails to members of their committees soliciting
responses to the survey. Emails soliciting responses were also sent to SILP’s
International Commercial Dispute Resolution Committee and U.S.-based
members of the International Litigation Committee of the International Bar
Association.
6 A complete list of member nations, together with their declarations and reservations and
sample forms, is available on the Hague Conference website at
http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat20e/html.
7 SILP is grateful for the assistance of Donald J. Hayden, Co-Chair of the International Litigation
Committee of the Litigation Section.
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1662006v1
The SILP International Litigation Committee also compiled a compendium
of 116 reported cases decided after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Societe National Industrielle v. United States District Court8 that cite the Hague
Evidence Convention.9 A list of 203 attorneys who participated in those cases
and their email addresses was compiled from the compendium,10 and emails
were sent to each of them requesting that they participate in the survey.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY RESULTS
There were 72 responses to the survey, including 42 from attorneys who

had used the Convention letter of request procedures.11
The respondents who indicated having used the Convention procedures

seem to represent a fairly broad cross-section of the legal community. Many of
the larger multi-national firms are represented, together with several regional
firms, and numerous small firm lawyers. Sixteen states and the District of
Columbia are represented among the respondents who identified themselves
on the form.12
The ILC also received helpful feedback in the form of a detailed narrative
from Legal Language Services, Inc. (“LLS”), which provides international litigation
support services to law firms.
?? Hague Evidence Convention Contracting States Represented in the Survey

Responses
?? The United Kingdom (“UK”) is the most common destination for

letters of request from the United States – 21 of 40 respondents who
answered this question indicated that they had used the
Convention procedures in that country. The UK was followed by
France (18); Germany (17); Switzerland (8); Hong Kong (7); Italy (4);
Argentina, Mexico, the Netherlands and Spain (3 each); Denmark,
Israel, Singapore, and South Africa (2 each); and Australia,
Barbados, China, Kuwait, Turkey, and Venezuela (1 each).
8 428 U.S. 522 (1987).

9 The compendium is posted on the SILP website at
http://www.abanet.org/interlaw/divisions/business/intl-lit/compendium-hague.pdf. The
compendium was prepared by Thomas B. McNamara, Glenn P. Hendrix and Martha Charepoo.
10 A SILP intern, Arsineh Arakel, performed this task.
11 Many respondents did not answer each and every question, however, and thus, there are
fewer than 42 responses to most of the questions.
12 A list of the respondents who identified themselves is attached as Appendix B.
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1662006v1
?? After asking respondents to indicate the countries with which they
had Convention experience, the questionnaire included the
following instruction: “[I]f you have participated in Convention
discovery of evidence from more than one country, we ask that you
choose only one such country and answer the following questions
as to only that country. Please select the country with respect to
which you believe your experience would be most helpful to the
Hague Conference. Obviously, we would be delighted if you would
complete separate questionnaires as to each country for which you
have Convention experience, and we encourage you to do so.”
The purpose of this instruction was to ensure that the responses
could be related back to experience in a particular country.
?? 24 of 40 respondents (62%) had experience with more than one

country, as reflected in the following breakdown:
Number of Countries in
Which Respondent Used
Convention Procedures Number of Respondents
6 3
5 3
4 5
3 4
2 9
1 16
Despite being requested to fill out additional forms for each country
with which they had Convention experience, virtually all of the
respondents completed only one form for only one country.13
?? The countries “selected” by the respondents, and with respect to

which they completed the questionnaire, included: France (11
responses), the UK (10 ), Switzerland (7), Germany (5), Australia (2),
Hong Kong (2), Italy (2), the Netherlands (2), Argentina (1),
Barbados (1), Singapore (1), and Venezuela (1).
13 The single exception was an attorney who completed questionnaires as to 4 countries in

which he had used the Convention procedures.
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1662006v1
?? Overall Assessments of the Effectiveness of the Hague Evidence
Convention Letters of Request Procedure
?? As noted, most of the respondents had Convention experience in

two or more countries, but filled out a survey form as to only one
country. Assuming that they followed the instruction to complete
the form as to the country with respect to which their “experience
would be most helpful to the Hague Conference,” this may have
introduced an element of bias into the results. Most respondents
would presumably tend to select a country with which they had
encountered problems.
?? Even so, many respondents were positive about their experience

with the Convention. Eleven of 28 respondents indicated that their
experience was “more satisfactory” than they had anticipated.
They were responding as to their experiences in the UK (4
respondents), Germany (3), Switzerland (2), Hong Kong, and the
Netherlands.
?? The 17 respondents who indicated that their experience with the

Convention was “less satisfactory” than they had anticipated were
responding as to France (6 respondents), the UK (4), Switzerland (2),
Barbados, Germany, the Netherlands, and Venezuela.
?? Although 60% of respondents stated that their experience was “less

satisfactory” than expected, 24 of 33 (73%) respondents indicated
that they were “glad” they had used the Convention and would
again initiate the Convention procedures under the same
circumstances. They were responding as to their experiences in the
UK (5 respondents), France (4), Germany (3), Switzerland (3), Italy
(2), the Netherlands (2), Argentina (1), Barbados (1), and Singapore
(1). The 9 respondents who indicated that they were not “glad”
that they had used the Convention and would not initiate the
Convention procedures again under similar circumstances were
answering as to their experiences in the UK and France
(3 respondents each), Switzerland (2), and Germany. Three other
respondents answered, “I don’t know”.
?? 18 of 30 respondents indicated that testimony obtained through the

Convention had an impact on the ultimate disposition or settlement
posture of the case. (5 respondents indicated that it had no
impact; 7 indicated that they did not know).
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?? Effectiveness of Measures of Compulsion
?? 12 of 33 respondents had experienced a situation in which the

foreign judicial authority required the attendance of the witness
through measures of compulsion (e.g., subpoena, etc.), but such
measures did not result in the appearance of the witness.
?? One respondent commented: “use [the Convention] in France if

you have to, but don’t expect them to do anything if the witness
refuses to show or produce docs.” Another respondent
complained of the same problem in France, claiming that “the
result appeared protective of major French company.”
?? Methods and Procedures for Taking Oral Testimony
American parties seem to have generally been afforded leeway in

witness examinations:
?? 20 of 24 respondents who directly examined the witness indicated

that they were permitted to conduct an American-style cross-
examination. The exceptions were in Switzerland (2 respondents)
and France (also 2 respondents).
?? With regard to respondents who did not directly conduct the

witness examination,
?? questioning was conducted exclusively by the judge in 3

instances, (in Switzerland, France, and Germany);
?? one respondent, commenting as to his experience in

Switzerland, indicated that the examination was conducted
by “foreign judicial authority [with] follow up by me as long as
on topic of written question;”
?? another respondent, commenting as to his experience in

Germany, indicated that the examination was conducted in
accordance with “each of the first three choices above [i.e.,
by American counsel, foreign counsel, and the foreign
judicial authority], but primarily [by] the foreign judge.”
?? Although most respondents were satisfied with the examination

procedure, 9 of 27 respondents indicated that the means by which
the testimony was taken before the foreign judicial authority
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diminished the utility or effectiveness of the procedure. Their
comments were as follows:
“No ability to compel videotaped deposition for use at trial.”

(France)
“No follow up questions.” (France)
“No effective cross-examination.” (Switzerland)
“The answers were incomplete or evasive. Answers could not

be followed up.” (Switzerland)
“The judicial authority started by the written questions

attached to our letter request. Once that process was
completed, counsel were allowed to ask follow up questions
but only to the extent they fell under the scope of the written
questions.” (Switzerland)
“Unable to cross-examine and critical questions suggested to

the Court to ask the witness were rejected without
explanation.” (Germany)
“The court insisted on the witness and all lawyers speaking in

French, although the witness and both sides’ lawyers were
native English speakers. Thus, all questions had to be
translated from English to French, and then all answers from
French to English.” (France)
“Lack of clarity in answers.” (Switzerland)
?? 6 respondents reported instances in which the foreign judicial

authority upheld an evidentiary privilege that would not likely have
been upheld by the American court issuing the letter of request (in
Barbados, France, Germany, the UK, Venezuela, and Switzerland).14
?? 23 of 30 respondents indicated that a verbatim transcript was

taken. In every instance in which no verbatim transcript was taken,
the record of the testimony was deemed by the survey respondent
to be substantially accurate. One of the respondents, while
indicating that the summary was substantially accurate, did
14
Of course, the assertion of an evidentiary privilege recognized in the state of execution and
not the state of origin is permitted pursuant to article 11 of the Convention.
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complain that the lack of a verbatim transcript “diminish[ed] its
value in an American court.”
?? Only 3 respondents indicated having an evidentiary objection

upheld in the United States with regard to testimony obtained
through the Convention. (The respondents’ answers pertained to
France, Germany and Venezuela).
?? Requests for Documents
?? 14 of 30 respondents indicated that they received all of the

documents sought in a letter of request. The countries from which
the documents were obtained were the UK (4 respondents), France
(3) Switzerland (2), Italy (2), the Netherlands, and Argentina. 15
?? In the remaining 16 instances, the foreign judicial authority did not

compel production of the documents. The countries at issue were
France (5 respondents), the UK (4), Switzerland (2), the Netherlands,
Germany, and Venezuela. In 4 of these instances, however, the
foreign judicial authority “blue penciled” the request and
compelled production of some of the documents requested (in
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Venezuela).
?? The reasons given for the denial of document requests were as

follows:
Respons
e
Total
the foreign country deemed the request as one for 8
“pretrial discovery” (the UK – 4 respondents ;
Switzerland – 2; Germany – 1; the Netherlands – 1)
the documents were not identified with sufficient 4
specificity (Hong Kong, Italy, the UK, Venezuela)
a claim of privilege (Germany, Switzerland) 2
Other:
“no real compulsion, witness and docs never 1
appeared” (France)
15 One respondent did not indicate the country from which documents were obtained.
Another respondent, who had utilized the Convention procedures more than ten times in
France, indicated that he had obtained the requested documents in certain instances, but not
in others.
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1662006v1
Respons
e
Total
“Names of plaintiffs were not revealed; Court 1
insisted that true names of plaintiffs be provided”
(France)
“The local court deemed the request improper and 1
questioned the jurisdiction of the US court”
(Switzerland)
“Fishing expedition” (the Netherlands) 1
“blocking statute” (France) 1
“simply declined without particular explanation” 1
(France)
?? Timeframes for Execution of Letters of Request
?? With regard to oral testimony, the average length of time from

issuance of a letter of request until the parties’ receipt of the
evidence or a final determination was as follows:
Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
1 month or less 0% 0
1-2 months 12.5% 4
2-4 months 53.1% 17
4-6 months 18.8% 6
6-9 months 6.2% 2
9-12 months 0% 0
12-18 months 16 6.2% 2
more than 18 months 0% 0
N/A (never received the evidence or a final 3.1% 1
determination)
?? With respect to documents, the execution periods were as follows:
Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
1 month or less 0% 0
16 The answers of 12-18 months pertained to a letter of request directed to Switzerland and
France.
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1-2 months 11.1.% 3
2-4 months 37% 10
4-6 months 33.3% 9
6-9 months 3.7% 1
9-12 months 0% 0
12-18 months17 3.7% 1
more than 18 months 0% 0
N/A (never received the evidence or a final 11.1% 3
determination)
?? These periods are consistent with the report of a 1985 Special

Commission of the Hague Conference that the average length of
time to execute a letter of request is between one and six months.18
?? A slight majority of respondents (19 of 37) indicated that use of the

Convention letter of request procedure did not delay case
management or trial of the domestic litigation.
?? Reasons for Non-use of the Convention
?? Asked whether they had ever considered using the Convention

letter of request procedures, but elected not to, respondents with
experience using the Convention indicated the following reasons:
Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
Insufficient familiarity with the Convention 3.4% 1
procedure (either generally or with respect to
a particular country)
Concerns over delays 51.7% 15
Concerns regarding the assertion of foreign 27.6% 8
evidentiary privileges
Inability to conduct an American-style witness 37.9% 1
examination 1
Inability to identify the documents sought with 34.5% 10
the specificity required by the foreign country
Expense to the client 31% 9
17 The answer of 12-18 months pertained to France.

18 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Report of the Special Commission on the
Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, reprinted in 24 I NT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1668, 1674 (1985) (hereinafter “1985 Special
Commission Report”).
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Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
Other: 24.1%
“The UK will not allow ‘discovery’ under the
Rule 26 because it is considered a ‘fishing
expedition’ under their laws. We went to
enormous effort and expense and 1
obtained no discovery.”
“Voluntary arrangement for witnesses 1
giving deposition evidence”
“Took a voluntary deposition” 1
“Bar of pretrial discovery” 1
“Animosity of Swiss courts to American
courts and litigants” 1
“Concern it would be deemed pre-trial” 1
“Arbitrary judicial bias favoring nation’s 1
witness”
N/A 20.7% 6
?? In responding to the same question, respondents with no

experience using the Convention gave the following reasons:
Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
Insufficient familiarity with the Convention 28.6% 4
procedure (either generally or with respect to
a particular country)
Concerns over delays 64.3% 9
Concerns regarding the assertion of foreign 21.4% 3
evidentiary privileges
Inability to conduct an American-style witness 42.9% 6
examination
Inability to identify the documents sought with 0% 0
the specificity required by the foreign country
Expense to the client 50% 7
Other:
“Proceeded with a voluntary deposition” 21.4% 1
“Court ordered discovery under Federal 1
Rules of Civil Procedure”
“Stipulations regarding discovery” 1
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Respons Respons
e e
Percent Total
N/A 14.3% 2
It is perhaps significant that respondents with no Convention

experience were more concerned over possible delays than those
who had Convention experience.
?? One of the questions asked:
“Have you ever been involved in a case in which a party

agreed not to file a motion to require resort to the
Convention letter of request procedure with respect to a
foreign witness in exchange for an agreement that the
discovery proceed on stipulated terms (e.g., that the
deposition occur in the witness’ country of residence, etc)?”
Of the 50 respondents who answered this question, 32

responded “yes.”
III. ISSUES FOR THE SPECIAL COMMISSION MEETING
A. Denial of Requests for Oral Testimony That Are Deemed to Constitute

“Pretrial Discovery”
The Hague Evidence Convention provides for the obtaining of “evidence”

that is “intended for use in judicial proceedings.”19 A few contracting states,
most notably, the United Kingdom, draw a distinction between letters of request
for the purpose of obtaining “evidence”, on the one hand, and for the purpose
of obtaining “pretrial discovery”, on the other. The Convention itself makes that
distinction only with respect to the pretrial discovery of documents. Specifically,
article 23 of the Convention provides that:
A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or

accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued
for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as
known in Common Law countries.
There is no counterpart provision in the Convention with respect to oral

depositions. Nevertheless, requests for oral depositions which an English court
19 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
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deems are being sought for “discovery” purposes, rather than as “evidence”,
may be denied. This issue is addressed in further detail below.
1. Survey Responses Concerning the UK
Prior to detailing the concerns of certain respondents regarding their

experience in the UK, it should be emphasized that most respondents seemed
satisfied with the disposition of their requests by the English courts. For instance,
although 21 respondents indicated having utilized the letter of request
procedure in the UK, only 10 selected that country for their focused response,20
which might imply that the other 11 did not encounter significant problems.
Furthermore, 8 of the 10 who focused their responses on the UK had no
Convention experience with any other country, and the UK was thus the only
country as to which they could respond.
Of the 10 respondents who focused on the UK, only 4 indicated that their
experience was “less satisfactory” than they had anticipated prior to first using it;
4 responded that it was “more satisfactory”; and 2 responded, “I don’t know”.
Five of 8 indicated that they were “glad” they had utilized the procedure in the
UK and would initiate it again under the same circumstances.21 Indications of
effective use of the letter of request procedures by American litigants in the UK
can be found in the case law.22
Nevertheless, the few respondents who indicated a negative experience

expressed very strong sentiments. For instance, one respondent stated:
“Concerning my experience in attempting to obtain American discovery in the
UK, if told I must resort to the Hague Convention to obtain necessary discovery in
the UK – I will run from the room screaming.”23 Another respondent indicated
that:
20 As previously indicated, after asking respondents to indicate the countries with which they
had Convention experience, the questionnaire included the following instruction: “[I]f you have
participated in Convention discovery of evidence from more than one country, we ask that you
choose only one such country and answer the following questions as to only that country.
Please select the country with respect to which you believe your experience would be most
helpful to the Hague Conference. Obviously, we would be delighted if you would complete
separate questionnaires as to each country for which you have Convention experience, and we
encourage you to do so.” (Emphasis in original).
21 Two of the respondents who answered as to the UK did not respond to this question.
22 See e.g., LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 514 (D. Del.
1999) (letter of request issued from US court on September 8, and English court issued deposition
summons seven days later, on September 15).
23 She explained further that: “We won at the trial court in the UK. Defendants then appeared
and we lost at the intermediate court after being forced to hire a ‘silk’ and a second barrister.
The reported decision makes clear that because we were seeking ‘discovery’ under Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 26 and ‘discovery’ is not allowed under English law because ‘discovery’ amounts to a fishing
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We faced severe hostility to our request because of the “fishing
expedition” reputation that has been given to US discovery
practice. We obtained a letter request in a case in the federal
court in New York to question several witnesses residing in England,
and started a proceeding in London, UK, to enforce it, including
getting an “Examiner” appointed by the court in London. However,
the court in London later decided the request was not enforceable.
The questioning was opposed by an English entity (that was not a
party to the action in New York), but which was fearful that the
witnesses (employees and former employees) might give answers
which could create liability problems. To protect them, the court
ruled that the letter request lacked sufficient detail the [sic] on the
subjects for the questioning and issued a decision that cited the
witness protection attitudes in case law and the provisions of English
statutory enactments on the subject. . . . We were told that to pass
muster in England the letter request from the US court needed to
give specific reasons why the questioning was relevant and
necessary for the evidence at trial and should have included a list
of the questions to be asked. Essentially the petition submitted to
get the US court to issue the letter request needed to anticipate
and answer the opposition we faced in England. Our efforts to
provide these details to the London court, as a response to the local
opposition, were rejected on the basis that they had not been
considered by the US court. Our effort to get documents was also
rejected.
At least one U.S. court has also noted difficulties with letters of request to the UK.
In First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, the court observed that: “A
letter of request served by First American in the same underlying lawsuit has
been the subject of enforcement proceedings in Britain. The letter of request
sought the testimony and documents of specific PW-UK partners. The English
court refused to enforce the letter of request, because First American was
seeking pretrial discovery not provided for under the Hague Convention or British
law.”24
expedition – we were not going to get the information we sought – at all! I have no confidence
that any American litigant will ever receive discovery they seek from a UK court under the
Hauge [sic] convention. The ‘silk’ I hired told me we would never win as long as Rule 26
contained the word ‘discovery’. My experience convinced me that despite the fact the UK is a
signator of the Hauge [sic] Convention, it will never respect American discovery requests.
Further. American litigants will bear the expense of a losing attempt in the UK courts where the
loser pays.”
24 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998).
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To some extent, such dissatisfaction arises from the UK’s long-standing
refusal to honor requests for documents that are not identified with a high
degree of particularity (i.e., date of letter, sender, recipient, subject matter,
etc.). Indeed, all 4 respondents who indicated that their experience with the UK
was “less satisfactory” than they had anticipated had requested documents
and did not obtain them.25 As a practical matter, this issue will continue to be
problematic in view of the UK’s article 23 reservation.
Nevertheless, the survey responses also raise what may be a more

fundamental concern regarding oral depositions. As discussed in the following
section of this Report, several recent reported English cases have applied
restrictive standards to letters of request from the U.S. for oral depositions, and
not merely to requests for document discovery.
2. Reported English Cases Involving Letters of Request from the

United States
The UK “Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975” (the

“Evidence Act”) prohibits courts from making an order requiring “any particular
steps to be taken unless they are steps which can be required to be taken by
way of obtaining evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings” in the English
court. In accordance with that provision, the English rules distinguish between
(i) evidence in the nature of proof to be used for the purposes of the trial and
(ii) evidence in the nature of pre-trial discovery to be used for purposes of a train
of enquiry which might produce evidence for trial.
In a 1978 decision, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,26 Lord
Diplock stated that the Evidence Act:
prohibits the making of an order for the examination of a witness

not a party to the action for the purpose of seeking information
which, though inadmissible at the trial, appears to be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This is
permitted by rule 26 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Yet, Lord Diplock also indicated that he “would not be inclined to place any
narrow interpretation on the phrase ‘evidence’ to be obtained for the purposes
of civil proceedings.” He stated further that the court should generally “be
prepared to accept the statement by the requesting court” as to the purpose of
25 It should be noted, however, that 4 other respondents did obtain the documents requested,
and a fifth received some of the documents through a “blue pencil” exercise by the court.
26 [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.), 1977 WL 58879.
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the examination and should not refuse a letter of request unless it is “satisfied
that the application would be regarded as falling within the description of
frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court.”
Likewise, in the same case, Lord Keith opined:
In the face of a statement in letters rogatory that a certain person is

a necessary witness for the applicant, I am of opinion that the court
of request should not be astute to examine the issues in the action
and the circumstances of the case with excessive particularity for
the purposes of determining in advance whether the evidence of
that person will be relevant and admissible. That is essentially a
matter for the requesting court.
Thus, while strictly scrutinizing the document requests, Westinghouse applied a

relatively liberal standard regarding requests for oral testimony that was highly
deferential to the requesting court.
Similarly, in a 1985 case, In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,27 the

House of Lords upheld a challenge to a document request, but allowed oral
depositions to proceed, observing that:
Each of these three appellants admits that he is in a position to give

some evidence that is relevant to the co-ordination proceedings. It
may be that they will be asked for evidence about matters which
are outwith their experience, and which they are not qualified to
deal with. If so, they can say so. It would be quite inappropriate,
even if it were possible, for this House or any English court to
determine in advance the matters relevant to the issues before the
Californian courts on which each of these witnesses is in a position
to give evidence.
Based on such rulings, most commentators have noted the difficulties of

obtaining documents from the UK, but have concluded that “[r]equests for oral
testimony will generally be granted where the letter of request states that a
person is a necessary witness.”28
27 [1985] E.C.C. 531, 1985 WL 311458.

28 Darrell Prescott & Edwin Alley, Effective Evidence-Taking Under The Hague Evidence
Convention, 22 I NT’L LAW. 939, 972 (1988); see also, Robert C. O’Brien, Compelling the Production
of Evidence by Non-Parties in England Under the Hague Convention, 24 SYRACUSE J. I NT’L L. &
COMM. 77 (1998) (“United States courts have apparently adequately demonstrated that
requested evidence is intended for use at trial merely by making the recital and noting the date
of the pending trial and, where appropriate, that the discovery cut-off date in the underlying
case has passed.”); Edward L. Kling, United Kingdom, in ANTITRUST TRIAL PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES
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That no longer appears to be the case. In an influential 1986 article,
Sir Lawrence Collins challenged the “myth” that had “developed that the
power of reservation under Article 23 for pre-trial discovery of the documents
means that the contracting states are bound to execute letters rogatory from
the United States . . . seeking oral depositions for discovery purposes.”29 Collins
maintained that requests for oral depositions for “pretrial discovery” purposes
are no less objectionable than pretrial discovery requests for documents.30 With
regard to the fact that article 23 applies on its face only to pretrial discovery of
documents, Collins allowed that this article was “perhaps only partially
successful in drafting terms.”31 Regardless of the actual wording of the
Convention, however, Collins maintained that “the representatives of the United
Kingdom could not have intended ‘evidence’ to include discovery, since it was
well established in the English case law that ‘evidence’ or ‘testimony’ is material
in the nature of proof for the trial.”32 Collins seems to acknowledge that
“between 1976 and 1985 the prevailing orthodoxy in the discussions at the
Hague Conference” was contrary to his position.33 Nevertheless, according to
one commentator, Collins’ “view is now widely accepted in England.”34
That view is certainly reflected in the recent case law.35 Indeed, in one
recent decision, the Court of Appeals appears to cite article 23 as applying to
all “pretrial discovery” from non-parties, including oral depositions:
Once again time and money is being spent in the English courts
over Letters Rogatory requesting the English court to order the
production of documents and oral depositions from third parties to
litigation in the United States of America. That time and money
would be unnecessary, if those seeking the request from the United
VOLUME 1: OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD at 27 (John F. McClatchey et al. eds. 1990) (“The
potentially extraordinary hurdle that needs to be overcome in relation to documents is not the
same in the case of oral testimony.”); Charles Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil
Cases in the United States, 16 I NT’L LAW. 757 (1982) (“In our experience [in the UK], the deposition
request which obtained only a general description of the subject matter of the examination,
was approved in the first instance, but the document request was closely scrutinized.”).
29 Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious
Misunderstanding?, 37 I NT’L COMP. L. Q. 765, 780 (1986).
30 Id. (“There is no difference in principle between documentary and oral discovery in this
respect.”).
31 Id. at 783.
32 Id. at 777.
33
Id. at 782.
34 Campbell McLachlan, Obtaining Evidence in England in Aid of a US Proceeding, 77
PLI/Comm 181, 184 (1998).
35 See e.g., State of Minn. & Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, [1998] I.L. Pr. 170, 1997 WL
1105492 (citing Collins’ article with approval).
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States Court appreciated the differences between the attitude of
the United States Courts to the making of “discovery” orders against
non-parties, and the attitude of the English court to the making of
such orders. The United Kingdom, when becoming parties to the
Hague convention concluded in 1970, registered a reservation
pursuant to Article 23 which became enshrined in the Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdiction) Act 1975 making it clear that
discovery against non-parties was something the English court
would not provide because it simply was not part of its procedure.36
In several recent cases, requests for oral depositions have been deemed
to constitute “fishing” and have been disallowed.37 The English courts have
reached that result notwithstanding recitals in the letter of request in which the
U.S. court indicated that the deposition was sought for use at trial. In at least
one such case, the English court’s decision seemed to turn primarily on the fact
that the moving papers to the U.S. court in connection with the deposition
made passing references to the word “discovery.”38
The foregoing discussion should be tempered with a few observations.

First, as previously noted, the overall experience of American lawyers with the UK
seems to be positive. According to the ILC survey, the UK is the leading
destination of letters of request from the United States, and the ILC is grateful for
the assistance provided by English courts under the Convention.
Furthermore, in some of the reported cases, problems might have been

avoided had the proponent of the request involved English counsel earlier in the
process. Indeed, American lawyers would be well-advised to retain English
counsel even prior to submitting the application for a letter of request to the U.S.
court.
Finally, some of the recent English decisions might be explained in part by

the nature of the cases. For instance, Philip Morris was a tobacco case, which
may have been viewed with disfavor by the English court. In other cases,
concerns regarding the breadth of the request might have been legitimate. In
one of the reported cases, for instance, the proponent of the request sought
testimony from 26 witnesses.
36 Genira Trade & Finance, Inc., et al. v. Refco Capital Markets Ltd., [2001] C.P. Rep. 15, 2001
WL 1347093 (emphasis added).
37 See e.g., id.; Philip Morris, [1998] I.L. Pr. 170, 1997 WL 1105492; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping et
al. v. Hyundai MIP Dockyard, [2001] High Court QBD, 2001 WL 1422850; APA Excelsior v. Premiere
Technologies, Inc., [2002] EWHC 2005, 2002 WL 31523279.
38 See e.g., APA Excelsior, 2002 WL 31523279.
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3. Problems with the Discovery/Evidence Distinction in the
Context of Oral Testimony
Regardless of these explanations, however, the seeming erosion in the

case law of the distinction between the standards for evaluating requests for
oral and documentary evidence is a matter of concern that should be
broached at the Special Commission meeting.
The Convention, on its face, restricts only “pretrial discovery of

documents,” and makes no reference to restrictions on requests for oral
testimony.39 Different treatment of document discovery and depositions might
make some sense. As noted by Professor Hazard, “[a]lthough discovery
depositions are more numerous and more lengthy [in the United States] than
abroad, they are similar to examinations at trial in other common-law systems
and examinations at hearings in civil-law systems. But document discovery
American style is something unto itself.”40 Document discovery is “something
unto itself” under the terms of the Convention as well, and article 23 reservations
cannot be extended to cover requests for oral depositions.
In addition, the distinction between “discovery” and “evidence”

depositions is not tenable. Often, an attorney will know that a witness has
knowledge of matters at issue in the case and is in a position to give evidence
relevant to those issues, but does not know in advance what answers to the
questions the witness will give.41 This does not turn the deposition into a “fishing
expedition.” If the testimony from a foreign deposition proves useful, it may be
used at trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32. If not, it will
likely be used by the other side. Either way, the deposition is taken for use as
“evidence.”
Furthermore, the focus on evidence “in the nature of proof for the trial”
does not take into account the extensive use of deposition testimony in the
United States as evidence in support of motions for summary judgment. Article 1
of the Convention provides for obtaining evidence that is intended for use in
39 Id. at 781.
40 Geoffery C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1676 (1998).
41 One recent English decision seems to acknowledge this point. First Am. Corp. v. Sheik Zayed
bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, [1997] I.L. Pr. 179, 1998 WL 1042425. In First American, Justice Scott
observed that: “In framing questions to ask a witness from whom no proof has been taken, the
questioner can be expected to ask a number of preliminary questions in order to feel his way in.
This is not fishing. It is a normal technique of examination. A topic for legitimate questioning may
have merely background significance. I repeat that, in my opinion, if there is sufficient ground
for believing that an intended witness may have relevant evidence to give on topics which are
relevant to the issues in the action, a Letter of Request seeking an order for the oral examination
of the witness on those topics cannot be denied on the ground of fishing.” Id. Nevertheless, the
court rejected the requests as overly broad and “oppressive.” Id.
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any “judicial proceedings.” Thus, deposition testimony cited in a dispositive
motion is no less “evidence” than testimony presented at trial. Following a
trilogy of landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in 1986,42 summary
judgment procedure has emerged in the United States as “the new fulcrum of
civil dispute resolution”.43 The percentage of civil cases proceeding to trial in
the federal courts dropped from 8.5% of all pending cases in 1973 to just 1.8% in
2002.44 The percentage of cases terminated by summary judgment, on the
other hand, more than doubled between 1975 and 2000, from 3.7% to 7.7%.45
(Of course, the vast majority of cases are resolved by settlements between the
parties).
Finally, the English decisions do not seem to take into account changes in
American civil procedure and discovery practices over the past twenty-five
years. For instance, in describing discovery in the United States, cases continue
to quote Lord Diplock from the 1978 Westinghouse decision – “The approach to
discovery in jurisdictions such as the United States is sometimes categorized
unattractively, and perhaps inappropriately, as ‘fishing’”. 46 The changes in
discovery rules since that time are succinctly summarized by Professor Arthur R.
Miller, one of the United States’ foremost scholars on domestic civil procedure:
Rule 26, the centerpiece of the discovery process, has undergone

dramatic revisions as a result of amendments in 1983, 1993, and
2000 that provide for greater judicial control over the discovery
process and set limitations on the availability of discovery. The initial
– somewhat tentative – step in 1983 directed the district court to set
limits on “redundant” or “disproportionate” discovery and imposed
a good-faith and reasonable-inquiry standard on attorneys for all
motions, requests, and responses . . .
The 1993 amendments were much more dramatic, mandating . . . a

meeting of counsel to formulate and submit a discovery plan to the
court, including an identification of the issues and a timetable, and
a heightened duty to supplement information provided in the
discovery process. In addition, the Rules now set presumptive limits
42 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
43 Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141 (2000).
44 Id.; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2002 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Table C-4A.
45 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion”, “Liability Crisis”,
and Efficiency Cliché’s Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV.
982, 1049 (2003).
46 Philip Morris, 1997 WL 1105492, quoting Westinghouse (Diplock, L.J.), 1977 WL 58879.
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on the number of depositions and interrogatories each party is
allowed, requiring court approval to exceed these numbers. . . .
Work continued on the discovery rules and in 2000 . . . additional

limitations on discovery emerged. Perhaps most significant is the
modification of the language of the scope-of-discovery provision,
which since 1938 had embraced anything “relevant to the subject
matter of the action” but now reads anything “relevant to a claim
or defense in the action.” The advisory committee note indicates
that the change “signals” to judges their “authority to confine
discovery.” . . .
Especially in conjunction with Rule 16,47 the amended discovery

rules give the judge substantially greater control over the process.48
Thus, although the right to “discovery” is undoubtedly broader in the

United States than in other countries, the stereotype of discovery constituting a
“fishing expedition” run amok, without judicial supervision or oversight,49 does
not take into account recent developments. 50
47 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 addresses case management by the court and was
amended in 1993. Professor Miller notes that the effect of the 1993 amendment, “in conjunction
with other contemporary changes in practice, has been to transform the presiding judge’s role
from that of neutral arbiter to case supervisor.” Miller, supra n. 45, at 1012.
48 Id. at 1013-14. See also Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts? 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301 (2002) (“The rapid pace of amendments to the federal discovery rules has
brought expanded case management, discovery conferences, pretrial conferences, required
attorney consultations, more stringent certification, numeric discovery limits, the concept of
proportionality, mandatory disclosure, [and] a redefinition of ‘scope’”); Richard L. Marcus,
Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New Work Order 7 TUL. J.
I NT’L & COMP. L. 153, 183 (1999) “([T]he cumulative effect of the changes that have been made
[to the discovery rules] already move beyond mere tinkering. . . . [I]t could be said that America
is finally eliminating the ‘extravagant’ features of discovery, opening the way to
accommodation with the practice of the rest of the world”); Alba Conte & Herberg B. Newberg,
3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9.10 (4th ed. 2003) (“Revisions to Rule 26 governing discovery
generally have been specifically designed to control both discovery excesses and
avoidance.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing
Odyssey of Discovery ‘Reform’” 64 SUM LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 197 (2001).
49 Hazard, supra n. 40, at 1676. (“Put bluntly, the impression of American discovery in most
foreign countries is that of an alien legal regime conducting a warrantless search in someone
else’s domestic territory.”).
50 Of course, as with most stereotypes, this one was always grossly exaggerated. A 1997 study
of the Federal Judicial Center (a governmental entity) reported that “empirical research about
discovery in civil litigation has yielded results that differ from the conventional wisdom, which
claims that discovery is abusive, time-consuming, unproductive, and too costly. In contrast to
this picture of discovery, empirical research over the last three decades has shown consistently
that voluminous discovery tends to be related to case characteristics such as complexity and
case type, that the typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that are
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The ILC respects the right and obligation of English courts to protect
witnesses from vexatious or oppressive letters of requests emanating from foreign
courts, but believes that greater deference should be afforded to statements by
U.S. courts in letters of request that the testimony sought is, indeed, intended for
use as “evidence” in the proceeding.
B. “No Show” Witnesses
As indicated in the overview section of this letter, 12 of 33 survey

respondents indicated having problems with “no show” witnesses.51 The
Convention offers a mechanism for compelling discovery from recalcitrant
witnesses. Specifically, article 10 provides that the requested state “shall apply
the appropriate measures of compulsion in the instances and to the same
extent as are provided by its internal law” for internal proceedings.
Unfortunately, the internal law of certain countries may provide for only
minimal penalties if a witness fails to appear or, indeed, may not provide for any
measures of compulsion at all with respect to certain classes of witnesses. For
instance, in many civil law countries, the parties to an action cannot be
compelled to testify. This will not generally present a problem for an American
litigant because a party to a U.S. lawsuit will be subject to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, certain civil law jurisdictions also treat certain
individuals as being equivalent to a party and therefore not subject to
compulsion. This might include, for example, the members of the board of
directors of a stock corporation, the managing director(s) of a company with
limited liability, the general partner(s) of a limited partnership, and all partners in
a general partnership. Thus, a situation may arise in which a foreign corporate
entity is subject to jurisdiction in the United States, but various individuals
affiliated with the corporation, who may be critical witnesses, are not. In that
event, the American litigant may not be able to compel the individual to testify
proportionate to the stakes of the litigation, and that discovery generally – with notable
exceptions – yields information that aids in the just disposition of cases.” Thomas E. Willging et al.
An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C.L. REV . 525, 527 (1998). See also Subrin, supra n. 48, at 308 (“What neither
foreign commentators on American discovery nor homegrown conservative critics tend to
mention is the extensive empirical research in our country demonstrating that in many American
civil cases, often approaching fifty percent, there is no discovery, and in most of the remainder
of the cases there is remarkably little”).
51 See also Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 246 F.Supp.2d 285,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (in determining whether to issue letters of request to France, court noted that
one party had already spent “nearly two years … attempting to take the testimony of the
French Witnesses through coercive means”).
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under U.S. law, and since that individual is treated as a “party” under the foreign
law, he or she is not subject to compulsion in the foreign jurisdiction either.
It may be that little can be done about this issue because, again,
contracting states are required to apply measures of compulsion only to the
extent required by their internal laws.52 Nevertheless, this is a problem in certain
cases for U.S. litigants and should perhaps be noted to the Special Commission.
A more fundamental issue relating to the non-appearance of witnesses

was noted by Legal Language Services, Inc. (“LLS”), which provides international
litigation support to law firms:
LLS . . . is often surprised by the willingness of foreign judges to honor

last minute requests by the witness’s counsel which delay the
hearing date. LLS is generally able to secure a place on the foreign
docket within 4 to 6 weeks of filing a Request and obtain a hearing
date within 2 to 3 months. However, decisions to reschedule a
hearing date within 5-7 days of that date are not uncommon,
especially in France, Spain and the Netherlands. It is also not
uncommon for such a hearing to be rescheduled in this way 3 to 4
times, stretching overall turnaround time to 5-6 months.
Foreign hearings are expensive – LLS typically bills $3,000-$5,000 day

for interpreters, interpreting equipment and court reporters (which
must sometimes be brought in from neighboring countries)
excluding the cost of hotels and transportation and the billable time
of the attorneys themselves. As a result, delays and rescheduling
are enormously expensive to US counsel. In some instances, the
witness’ counsel has managed by such tactics to frustrate US
counsel to the point of abandoning the Request altogether.
Foreign judicial authorities might be encouraged to take this issue into

account when considering requests for continuances.
52 In the Explanatory Report to the Convention, Philip Amram observed that: “The requesting
authority cannot ask the executing authority to grant compulsion in the execution of the Letter
to any extent greater than the compulsion which would be applied, under the same
circumstances, in a domestic proceeding in the State of execution.” Philip Amram, Explanatory
Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, S.
Exec. Doc. A, p.11, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted in 12 I NT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327 (1973).
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C. Methods And Procedures For Examining Witnesses
As indicated in the overview, most survey respondents seemed satisfied

with the means by which testimony was taken before the foreign judicial
authority. This is a remarkable testament to the Convention, as the methods
and procedures for examining witnesses in civil law countries, in particular, differ
significantly from those in the United States. In many countries, for instance, the
witness, who is not sworn, initially gives an uninterrupted narrative of his version of
the facts; thereafter the judge acts as examiner-in-chief, with counsel asking
only follow-up questions, subject to leave of the court, and without using leading
questions. In fact, in certain countries, the attorney does not pose his follow-up
questions directly to the witness, but rather provides them to the court, which
then presents them to the witness. In lieu of a verbatim transcript, the judge
pauses from time to time to dictate a summary of the testimony for the file. The
summary is read back to the parties and the witness for their approval and
suggestions on how the wording might be improved.
The differences between legal systems are smoothed out to some extent
by article 9 of the Convention, which provides that a judicial authority that
executes a letter of request shall apply its own law as to the methods and
procedures to be followed, but “will follow a request of the requesting authority
that a special method or procedure be followed, unless this is incompatible with
the internal law of the State of execution or is impossible of performance by
reason of its internal practice and procedures or by reason of practical
difficulties.” Several countries have taken significant measures to implement
article 9. For instance, France incorporated article 9 into its Civil Procedure
Code (Noveau Code de Procédure Civile).53
Nevertheless, a few respondents to the SILP survey indicated that the

method by which witnesses were examined diminished the utility or
effectiveness of the procedure. Their comments were as follows:
“No follow up questions.” (France)

“No effective cross-examination.” (Switzerland)
“The answers were incomplete or evasive. Answers could not be
followed up.” (Switzerland)
“The judicial authority started by the written questions attached to
our letter request. Once that process was completed, counsel were
allowed to ask follow up questions but only to the extent they fell
under the scope of the written questions.” (Switzerland)
53 Art. 739, N.C.P.C.
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“Unable to cross-examine and critical questions suggested to the
Court to ask the witness were rejected without explanation.”
(Germany)
“Translation process slow and burdensome.” (France)54
These responses are consistent with the observations of legal commentators.55
On the other hand, as to each of the three countries referenced in these

comments – France, Switzerland and Germany – several respondents indicated
being quite satisfied with the examination procedures, which bears out an
observation by Legal Language Services, Inc. that “the personality and
experience of the presiding judge is an important factor in determining the
degree to which US counsel will be accommodated.”56
Philip Amram, the rapporteur at the proceedings that resulted in the

Convention, described the intent of article 9 as follows:
To be "incompatible" with the internal law of the State of execution

does not mean "different" from the internal law. It means that there
must be some constitutional inhibition or some absolute statutory
prohibition. No Civil Law delegation suggested that his country had
constitutional or statutory provisions which would prevent the
examination of witnesses and the preparation of the transcript of the
testimony "Common Law style". …
54 Under the French procedure, the attorney’s questions and the answers of the witness must
be translated into French, even if the witness is a native English speaker. See Art. 740, N.C.P.C.
55 For instance, one French lawyer observes that although “in theory the door is open to a cross
examination before the French court, . . . there is little chance of the court agreeing to this,
especially as its inexperience of this system will hardly encourage the lawyers acting for the
parties to insist on this being done in accordance with common law practice.” Jean-Louis
Delvolvé, France in OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN BUSINESS DISPUTES at 86 (Charles
Platto & Michael Lee eds. 2d ed. 1993). See also Judith L. Holdsworth, et al., Germany, in
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION – A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE GER-56 (Richard H. Kreindler et al. eds. 1997) (“The
extent to which a German judge will permit deviation from German procedures in executing a
Letter of Request for testimony from a German national depends on the directives he has
received from the Central Authority, the individual judge’s preferences, and the facts and
circumstances of the case.”); In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25070 (D.D.C.
Sept. 10, 2001) (special master’s report) (citing French legal expert for the proposition that
“[w]hile depositions where counsel may ask questions can be taken, cross-examination is up to
the French judge”).
56 See also 1989 Special Commission Report (“Cross-examination was not felt to raise any legal
problems . . . Practical problems were foreseen, however, owing to the inexperience of lawyers
in civil law countries in such matters”); 1985 Special Commission Report (“it appeared that the
courts in civil law countries generally will allow for depositions to be taken ‘common law’ style if
so requested, even though they may sometimes have difficulties conducting a cross-
examination”).
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There is a clear difference between "impracticable" and "impossible
of performance". The latter is a much heavier burden to assume. This
was deliberate. The basic intent is to maximize international
cooperation and to minimize the possibilities of refusal to cooperate.
It is not sufficient for the foreign practice to be "difficult" to administer
or "inconvenient"; compliance must be truly "impossible".57
Although most courts and judges seem to be applying article 9 in an

appropriate manner, this does not appear to be occurring consistently. The ILC
believes that foreign central authorities should promote more consistent
application of American procedures in witness examinations conducted
pursuant to U.S. letters of request.
D. Video Depositions
Three respondents complained of the inability to conduct videotaped

depositions in France. One of them stated:
One French judge refused to allow videotaping even though

French procedure now allows for videotaping (as our local counsel
pointed out to the court), but the court ruled that French “practice”
was opposed to videotaping. The US should request that the
French Ministry of Justice instruct judges not to oppose reasonable
discovery requests for purely subjective reasons.
We have also been provided with a copy of a decision by a Paris court, dated
March 4, 2003, denying a request for a video deposition.
The Report of the 1989 Special Commission included the following

reference to video depositions:
Particular methods or procedures for taking evidence which had

been requested included video evidence, and the opportunity for
cross-examination of witnesses. Most delegations did not envisage
problems with requests for video recordings, but the representatives
of Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden considered that there would
be difficulties with such requests under their laws.
A video deposition is a useful device in arriving at the truth. Unlike a

deposition recorded by stenographic means, a video deposition affords the
57 Philip Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, S. Exec. Doc. A, p.12, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), 12 I NT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 327 (1973).
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fact-finder, be it a judge or jury, the opportunity to evaluate the credibility and
demeanor of the witness. Videotaping can also help resolve or avoid disputes
among interpreters. The ILC believes that video depositions should be
accommodated under article 9 of the Convention.
E. Logistical Issues
LLS noted various logistical problems in arranging for depositions under the
Convention letter of request procedure. In particular, foreign judges or law
clerks often reject requests to:
?? Extend the allotted time for the hearing from 1-2 hours to at
least 7 hours per witness (as provided by US federal rules)
?? Bring in court reporters even though a dictated summary will

be provided by the foreign court (LLS’ experience is that a
hearing may result in 300-400 pages of verbatim transcript but
at the same time only 10 pages of court summary)
?? Have audio tape backup as a quality control for court

reporters (often denied)
?? Bring in videographers (virtually always denied, even though

very helpful for cases going to trial where witness testimony
will be presented to a jury, and as a quality control for
interpreters)58
?? Force the witness into the courtroom when the witness says
he/she has extended business trips or vacation time and
cannot honor the hearing date 59
?? Arrange for long-distance participation by opposing counsel

by telephone
?? Have a room large enough to accommodate attorneys,

witnesses and support staff (formal hearings sometimes held
in judge’s chambers, where space is cramped)
?? Allow counsel to object to answers or ask for clarification
58 See supra Section III.D.

59 See supra Section III.B.
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?? Bring in large quantities of documents to the hearing for
presentation to the witness
These issues might be brought to the attention of the Special Commission.
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F. The Nature Of “Pretrial” Discovery
Although not raised as an issue in the survey, the United States delegation
to the Special Commission should perhaps emphasize that “pretrial” does not
mean prior to the filing of the action. The issue was previously raised at the 1978
and 1985 Special Commission. As stated in the 1989 Special Commission Report:
The United States Experts emphasized as they had done in 1978 that
the expression “pre-trial” does not literally mean: “before the
commencement of the proceedings.” The fact-finding process can
only be engaged after institution of civil proceedings, i.e. after a
complaint has been filed with the court and summons been served
on the defendant.
Although contracting states with long-term experience under the Hague

Evidence Convention seem to understand this point, some of the newer
contracting states may not.
For instance, in an otherwise excellent commentary on the Hague

Evidence Convention, a staff attorney for the Russian High Commercial Court
stated, in connection with a discussion of article 23, that pretrial discovery
enables a party to “obtain, even before the institution of legal proceedings,
access to documents at the disposal of the opposing party for preparation of
the complaint and for future legal proceedings.”60
Confusion on this point arises because civil law systems do not typically
recognize distinct “pretrial” and “trial” phases in civil litigation. Since cases are
decided by a judge, rather than a jury, civil proceedings tend not to culminate
in a “trial” in the sense of a single, concentrated event in which jurors from the
community gather to hear testimony, consider evidence, and render a verdict.
Rather, the typical civil proceeding in a civil law country consists of a series of
meetings and written communications between attorneys and the judge, with
evidence, testimony, motions, and rulings presented in installments. Pretrial
discovery, whereby each side is afforded a preview of the other’s proof in order
60 V.V. Starzhenetskii, Kommentarii k Gaagskoi Konventsii 1970 goda o poluchenii za granitsei

dokazatel’stv po grazhdanskim ili torgovym delam [Commentary on the Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of 1970], in GRAZHDANIN I PREDPRINIMATEL’
V ROSSIISKOM I ZARUBEZHNOM SUDE: PRAVOVAYA POMOSHCH [THE CITIZEN AND ENTREPRENEUR IN RUSSIAN AND
FOREIGN COURT: JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE] 100-01 (2002). In the original Russian, this sentence reads in
context as follows: “? ??????? ?????? ?????????, ???? ? ? ?????? ? ???????? ???????? ? ?? ?? ???????
?? ? ?? ?????? ????? ? ??????? ???????????? ?????? ? ????? ????? , ??????? ?? ?? ? ???????? ???? ?????????
??????? , ??? ?????????? ? ??????? ?????????, ??? ?????????? ? ????? ?? ? ???????? ? ? ???????????.” In
referring to “pretrial discovery”, the text uses the term “?????????? ?????? ???”, which literally
means “pre-judicial discovery”.
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to prepare for trial, is less essential to a system of trial by installment than it is to
the common law system in which the “trial” constitutes a culminating event.
The United States should perhaps ensure that there is no misunderstanding

at the Special Commission regarding the nature of “pretrial” discovery.
G. Benefits to Foreign Litigants of the Aerospatiale Decision
In Societe National Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,

the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Hague Evidence
Convention preempts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to
obtaining evidence from abroad.61 In deciding this issue, the Court essentially
had four options: (1) rule that the Convention was the exclusive means of
obtaining discovery from parties located in Convention countries; (2) rule that
the Convention had no application to discovery of foreign persons over whom
the American court had personal jurisdiction; (3); rule that resort should first be
had to the Convention procedures; or (4) rule that the issue should be decided
case-by-case using a comity analysis.62 The Court unanimously rejected options
(1) and (2), and by a 5 to 4 margin elected the fourth option -- case-by-case
analysis of whether the Convention procedures should be used.63
In view of Aerospatiale, any request for accommodation of American

letters of request might be greeted to some extent with a response of “what
have you done for us?”
One obvious response is that U.S. courts are perhaps the most
accommodating in the world with regard to rendering assistance to foreign
courts seeking evidence.64 Such assistance is in no way contingent on
reciprocity.
Second, in a number of recent cases, state courts have applied the

Aerospatiale comity analysis to require first resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention.65
61 428 U.S. 522 (1987).

62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The legislative history for this provision, enacted in 1964, stated that
“[e]nactment of the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to the
forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing
equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in
litigation with international aspects.” S. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3793-94.
65 See, e.g., Umana v. SCM SpA, 291 A.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (in action against Italian
manufacturer, court upheld lower court’s decision “requiring the plaintiff to follow the
Convention procedures in the first instance”); Husa v. Laboratories Services S.A., 740 A.2d 1092
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Finally, the Aerospatiale decision extended special protection to foreign
litigants, stating:
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise

special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in
a disadvantageous position. . . . Objections to ‘abusive’ discovery
that foreign litigants advance should therefore receive the most
careful consideration.66
Thus, although U.S. courts do not typically mandate first resort to the Convention,
they will often intervene to limit discovery in ways that would not have been
likely in purely domestic litigation.67 In effect, the Aerospatiale opinion raises
foreign litigants to the status of a protected class for whom the judge will
exercise special vigilance to protect them against potentially abusive discovery
tactics.68
Based upon Aerospatiale, foreign parties are often in a position to extract

discovery concessions from the other side based on a threat to file a motion
seeking resort to the Convention procedures (which, even if unsuccessful, will
delay the case).69 That point is reflected in the survey results. One of the
questions asked:
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (requiring use of the Convention, New Jersey court observed “we
are more generous in our use of the Convention’s procedures than the [federal] courts”); Geo-
Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv. Mgmt., 936 P.2d 1063 (Ore. App. 1997).
66 428 U.S. at 547.
67 See, e.g., DBMS Consultants, Ltd. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 367, 370 (D. Mass.
1990) (foreign deposition of former employee of defendant ordered taken in writing rather than
orally when “it would be unjust and inappropriate to request a full-blown oral examination, with
the attendant time, travel and money constraints for all involved, when a simpler procedure
may yield the desired information”); Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 349 (D.
Conn. 1997) (approving Federal Rules discovery, but only on the condition that the discovery
requests be narrowed); In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); Oxford
Indus. Inc. v. Luminco, Inc., 1990 WL 181488, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1990).
68 Indeed, foreign parties fare well in American courts generally. In the U.S. federal courts, for
instance, foreign plaintiffs win 80% of their cases, as compared to a plaintiff win rate of only 64%
in wholly domestic cases. When domestic plaintiffs sue foreign defendants, the plaintiff win rate
drops to 50%. “Thus, domestic plaintiffs fare worse than foreign plaintiffs, and furthermore,
domestic defendants fare worse than foreign defendants.” Kevin Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV . 1120 (1996).
69 Cf., Boss Mfg. Co. v. Hugh Boss AG, 1999 WL 20828 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (current managing agent
and former employee of German defendant agreed to waive applicability of Hague Evidence
subject to deposition being conducted in Germany); Triple Crown America, Inc. v. Biosynth AG,
1998 WL 227886 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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Have you ever been involved in a case in which a party agreed not
to file a motion to require resort to the Convention letter of request
procedure with respect to a foreign witness in exchange for an
agreement that the discovery proceed on stipulated terms (e.g.,
that the deposition occur in the witness’ country of residence,
etc).?
Of the 50 respondents who answered this question, 32 responded “yes.”
CONCLUSION
The Hague Evidence Convention has been remarkably successful in

bridging differences between the common law and civil law approaches to
obtaining evidence and has significantly streamlined the procedures for
compulsion of evidence from abroad. Members of the ILC are grateful for the
assistance available from foreign judicial authorities. We hope the comments in
this report will be accepted in the spirit in which they are offered – as a
constructive effort to further enhance the effectiveness of this remarkable
system for judicial cooperation between nations.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this report.
Glenn P. Hendrix
Co-Chair, International Litigation
Committee,
Section of International Law and Practice
Robert F. Brodegaard
Vice-Chair, International Litigation
Committee,
Section of International Law and Practice
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire on Experience Under

the Hague Evidence Convention
The International Litigation Committees of the International and Litigation

sections of the ABA are conducting this survey as part of a study of the
effectiveness of the “letter of request” procedure under the Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
(the “Convention”).
The results of the study will be used by the Office of Legal Adviser of the
U.S. State Department at a Hague Conference review meeting regarding
the operation of the Convention. The Hague meeting is scheduled for
October 28 – November 5, 2003. In order to conduct a meaningful
analysis of the data prior to that meeting, we need your response as soon
as possible.
The survey questionnaire was designed to make your entries as effortless

as possible. Most of the questions require only checking “yes” or “no”
boxes. We estimate that it will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.
1. Have you ever participated in discovery of evidence from abroad

(either as counsel for the requesting or responding party) through the
Convention letter of request procedure?
? Yes
? No
If no, please proceed directly to Part VI.
2. If yes, how many times have you participated in the Convention letter
of request procedure?
? Once
? 2-5 times
? 6-10 times
? More than 10 times
3. If you have participated in discovery of evidence from abroad through

the Convention letter of request procedure, please indicate which country
or countries were involved:
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? Argentina ? Australia
? Barbados ? Belarus
? Bulgaria ? China
? Cyprus ? Czech Republic
? Denmark ? Estonia
? Finland ? France
? Germany ? Hong Kong
? Israel ? Italy
? Kuwait ? Latvia
? Luxembourg ? Mexico
? Monaco ? Netherlands
? Norway ? Poland
? Portugal ? Russia
? Singapore ? Slovenia
? South Africa ? Spain
? Sri Lanka ? Sweden
? Switzerland ? Turkey
? United Kingdom ? Ukraine
? Venezuela
2. Part II
With regard to the following questions, if you have participated in

Convention discovery of evidence from more than one country, we ask
that you choose only one such country and answer the following
questions as to only that country. Please select the country with respect to
which you believe your experience would be most helpful to the Hague
Conference. Obviously, we would be delighted if you would complete
separate questionnaires as to each country for which you have
Convention experience, and we encourage you to do so.
4. Consistent with the immediately preceding instructions, please indicate

the country with respect to which you will be completing the following
questions of this questionnaire. Please select one country:
? Argentina ? Australia
? Barbados ? Belarus
? Bulgaria ? China
? Cyprus ? Czech Republic
? Denmark ? Estonia
? Finland ? France
? Germany ? Hong Kong
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? Israel ? Italy
? Kuwait ? Latvia
? Luxembourg ? Mexico
? Monaco ? Netherlands
? Norway ? Poland
? Portugal ? Russia
? Singapore ? Slovenia
? South Africa ? Spain
? Sri Lanka ? Sweden
? Switzerland ? Turkey
? United Kingdom ? Ukraine
? Venezuela
5. If you have participated in Convention discovery in that country on

more than one occasion, please state how many times:
? 2-5 times
? 6-10 times
? More than 10 times
The next section relates to oral examinations or depositions. If your

discovery experience related only to document requests, please proceed
directly to Part IV.
3. Part III (Depositions)
NOTE: If you have obtained evidence from that country in multiple

instances, please respond to the following questions as to your typical
experience with that country. If your experience with that country has
varied, you will have an opportunity to supplement your “yes” or “no”
responses in space provided at the end of the questionnaire.
6. Did you experience a situation in which the foreign judicial authority

required the attendance of the witness through measures of compulsion
(e.g., subpoena, etc.), but such measures did not result in the appearance
of the witness?
? Yes
? No
7. Did you attend the oral examination/deposition?
? Yes
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? No
8. If yes, please indicate who questioned the witness:
? me or other American counsel

? foreign counsel
? the foreign judicial authority
? N/A
? Other (please specify) _________________________
9. If the parties’ counsel examined the witness, were they able to conduct
an American-style cross-examination?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
10. Did the foreign judicial authority uphold the assertion of any
evidentiary privileges that would not likely have been recognized by the
U.S. court issuing the letter of request?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
11. Was a verbatim transcript taken of the testimony?
? Yes
? No
12. If no verbatim transcript was taken, was the summary of the testimony
substantially accurate?
? Yes
? No
? I don’t know
? N/A
13. Did the means by which the testimony was taken before the foreign
judicial authority diminish the utility or effectiveness of the procedure?
? Yes
? No
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? I don’t know
14. If yes, please indicate how the utility or effectiveness of the procedure
was diminished:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________
15. Was the testimony used in any proceeding before the U.S. court (e.g.,
at trial, in support of a motion, etc.)?
? Yes
? No
16. If yes, were any objections upheld as to the admissibility of the

Convention evidence that was obtained?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
17. Did the evidence obtained through the Convention procedure have
any impact on the ultimate disposition or settlement posture of the case?
? Yes
? No
? I don’t know
18. What was the length of time (or average length of time, if you used the
Convention procedure in multiple instances) from the issuance of the
letter of request until the parties’ receipt of the evidence (or other final
determination concerning the disposition of the letter of request)? If you
are not able to determine the precise length of time, please respond to
the best of your recollection (we are not asking you to retrieve your files
from archives). Please check one:
? 1-2 months
? 2-4 months
? 4-6 months
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? 6-9 months
? 9-12 months
? 12-18 months
? N/A (e.g., never received the evidence or a final determination)
19. If you used the Convention procedure in multiple instances, please

comment as to any letters of request that were executed far outside the
above-referenced average length of time for execution of such requests:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________
NOTE: If the discovery was a request for documents, continue on to the

next section. If not, go to Part V.
4. Part IV (Request for Documents)
NOTE: If you have obtained evidence from a particular country in multiple

instances, please respond to the following questions as to your typical
experience with that country. If your experience with that country has
varied, you will have an opportunity to supplement your “yes” or “no”
responses in space provided at the end of the questionnaire.
20. Did the foreign judicial authority compel production of all of the
documents requested?
? Yes
? No
21. If no, please indicate the reason (check all that apply):
? the foreign country deemed the request as one for “pretrial

discovery”
? the documents were not identified with sufficient specificity
? a claim of privilege
? N/A
? Other (please specify) ____________________
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22. If you did not obtain all of the documents requested, did the foreign
judicial authority limit or “blue pencil” the request and compel production
of some of the documents requested?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
23. Were documents obtained through the Convention procedure used in

any proceeding before the U.S. court (e.g., at trial, in support of a motion,
etc.)?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
24. If yes, were any objections upheld as to the admissibility of the

documents?
? Yes
? No
? N/A
25. Did the documents obtained through the Convention procedure have
any impact on the ultimate disposition or settlement posture of the case?
? Yes
? No
? I don’t know
? N/A
26. What was the length of time (or average length of time, if you have
used the Convention procedure in multiple instances) from the issuance of
the letter of request until the parties’ receipt of the evidence (or other final
determination concerning the disposition of the letter of request)? If you
are not able to determine the precise length of time, please respond to
the best of your recollection (we are not asking you to retrieve your files
from archives). Please check one:
? 1 month or less
? 1-2 months
? 2-4 months
? 4-6 months
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? 6-9 months
? 9-12 months
? 12-18 months
? more than 18 months
? N/A (i.e., never received the evidence or a final determination)
7. If you used the Convention procedure in multiple instances, please

comment as to any letters of request that were executed far outside the
above-referenced average length of time for execution of such requests:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________
5. Part V (Effectiveness of the Process)
If you represented the party that initiated the use of the Convention letter
of request procedure, please respond to the following questions:
28. Did you associate foreign counsel to assist in processing the letter of
request through the foreign central authority?
? Yes
? No
29. If yes, do you believe that this significantly expedited the process?
? Yes
? No
? I don’t know
? N/A
30. Viewing the question with the benefit of hindsight, would you again
initiate the use of the Convention letter of request procedure under the
same circumstances? (i.e., are you glad you did it?)
? Yes
? No
? I don’t know
31. Was your experience with the Convention more or less satisfactory
than you had anticipated prior to first using it?
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? more satisfactory
? less satisfactory
? I don’t know
32. Did use of the Convention letter of request procedure delay case
management or trial of the domestic litigation?
? Yes
? No
6. Part VI (Reasons for not Using the Convention)
33. Please indicate whether you have ever considered using the
Convention letter of request procedures, but elected not to, as a result of
(check all that apply):
? insufficient familiarity with the Convention procedure (either

generally or with respect to a particular country)
? concerns over delays
? concerns regarding the assertion of foreign evidentiary privileges
? inability to conduct an American-style witness examination
? inability to identify the documents sought with the specificity
required by the foreign country
? expense to the client
? N/A
? Other (please specify) _________________
34. Have you ever been involved in a case in which a party agreed not to
file a motion to require resort to the Convention procedure with respect to
a foreign witness in exchange for an agreement that the discovery
proceed on stipulated terms (e.g., that the deposition occur in the witness’
country of residence, etc.)?
? Yes
? No
7. Part VII (Additional Information)
35. Please use this space if any of your preceding answers require further
elaboration or explanation:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
36. Please provide any other comments or proposals that might be

pertinent to an assessment of the Convention’s letter of request procedure:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
37. Would you like to receive an electronic copy of the final study report
and be listed in the appendix as one of the survey respondents?
? Yes
? No
38. If yes, please provide us with your name, firm, address, phone
number, and email:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________
8. Thank You
Thank you for completing the questionnaire on experience under the

Hague Evidence Convention.
If you have participated in Convention discovery in more than one

country, please complete a separate questionnaire, with respect to each
country. Please return the questionnaire to: Glenn P. Hendrix, Arnall
Golden Gregory LLP, 1201 W. Peachtree Street, Suite 2800, Atlanta,
Georgia 30309-3450.
If you have any questions regarding the questionnaire or this project,

please contact:
Glenn P. Hendrix
Co-Chair, International Litigation Committee
ABA Section of International Law & Practice
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Arnall Golden Gregory LLP
1201 W. Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3450
Ph: (404) 873-8692
Fax: (404) 873-8693
Email: glenn.hendrix@agg.com
Robert F. Brodegaard
Vice-Chair, International Litigation Committee
ABA Section of International Law & Practice
Thacher Proffitt & Wood
Two World Financial Center
New York, New York 10281
Ph: (212) 912-7681
Fax: (212) 912-7751
Email: rbrodegaard@tpwlaw.com
Donald J. Hayden
Vice-Chair, International Litigation Committee
ABA Litigation Section
Baker & McKenzie
Mellon Financial Center
1111 Brickell Avenue
Suite 1700
Miami, Florida 33131
Ph: (305) 789-8966
Fax: (305) 789-8953
E-mail: donald.j.hayden@bakernet.com
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APPENDIX B
Respondents to Hague Evidence Convention Survey
Anonymous (28 Respondents)

Craig M. J. Allely, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, CO
Brigitte M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, Three Forks, MT
Randall K. Anderson, Keogh, Caisley, Tunbridge, Wells, United Kingdom
Harry L. Arkin, Arkin and Associates, P.C., Denver, CO
William M. Barron, Alston & Bird, New York, NY
Robert Brodegaard, Thacher Profit & Wood, New York, NY
Peter I. Broeman, Ullman Furhman Broeman & Platt, P.C., Morristown, NJ
Theresa L. Busch, Freeman, Freeman & Salzman, P.C., Chicago, IL
Bernardo M. Cremades, B. Cremades & Asociados, Madrid, Spain
James Martin Dickstein, Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, LLP, Washington DC
Christopher H. Dillon, Burke & Parsons, New York NY
Grant J. Esposito, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, New York, NY
Adam Freedman, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, New York, NY
Gregory F. Hauser, Alston & Bird LLP, New York, NY
Donald J. Hayden, Baker & McKenzie, Miami, FL
Eckhard R. Hellbeck, White & Case, Washington, DC
Glenn P. Hendrix, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, Atlanta, GA
Thomas B. Kenworthy, Morgan Lewis & Bockins LLP, Philadelphia, PA
David J. Levy, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, TX
Dana C. MacGrath, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York, NY
Harold Maier, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville, TN
Orual Marlow II, Morris, Lendais, Houston, TX
Clifford R. Michel, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., New York, NY
Michael L. Morkin, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, IL
Michael L. Novicoff, Reuben & Novicoff, Los Angeles, CA
John B. Pinney, Graydon Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, OH
Daniel M. Press, Chung & Press, P.C., McLean, VA
Mitch Purcell, Theler Reid & Priest, San Francisco, CA
Evgeny Reyzman, Baker & McKenzie, Moscow, Russia
Alice C. Richey, Kennedy Covington Lobdell & Hickman, Charlotte, NC
Steven Richman, Duane Morris, Princeton, NJ
Gerald Ross, Fryer & Ross LLP, New York, NY
Joe Samarias, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Tysons Corner, VA
Judith Sapp, Komondorok LLC, Portland, ME
Howard J. Schwartz, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, Morristown, NJ
Philip Schwartz, Fairfax, VA
Margaret D. Stock, Stock & Donnelley LLC, Anchorage, AK
-1-
1662006v1
Robert A. Swift, Kohn Swift & Graf PC, Philadelphia, PA
A. Katherine Toomey, Baach Robinson & Lewis, Washington, DC
William R. Towns, Attorney-Mediator, San Antonio, TX
Martha K. Wivell, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN
Mark E. Wojcik, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL
-2-
1662006v1
EXHIBIT 13
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
France - Central Authority (Art. 2) and practical information

Central Authority(ies):
Ministry of Justice
Contact details:
Address: Ministère de la Justice

Direction des Affaires Civiles et du Sceau
Département de l’entraide, du droit international privé et européen
(DEDIPE)
13, Place Vendôme
75042 Paris Cedex 01
Telephone: +33 (1) 44 77 61 05
Fax: +33 (1) 44 77 61 22
E-mail: entraide-civile-internationale@justice.gouv.fr
General website: www.justice.gouv.fr

www.entraide-civile-internationale.justice.gouv.fr
Contact person: Mrs. Tania Jewczuk, Head of Department:

tania.jewczuk@justice.gouv.fr
Mrs. Catherine Rumeau, Deputy Head of Department:
catherine.rumeau@justice.gouv.fr
Languages spoken by staff: French, English
Practical Information
https://www.hcch.net/index.cfm?oldlang=en&act=authorities.details&aid=500 1/7
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Blocking statutes: Yes, there are two European instruments of this nature:
- Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the
extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon
or resulting therefrom (see, Article 5(1)).
- Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (See, Art. 25(1)).
In addition, two Articles of the law n°68-678 of July 26, 1968 (Articles 1 and 1 bis) - introduced by
a law of 16 July 1980 - prevent "savage" requests for the purpose of obtaining evidence outside
of mutual legal assistance framework.
The provisions of Article 1 of this law aim to prohibit, "subject to international treaties or
agreements", the communication to foreign public authorities of documents or information of
an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature, the disclosure of which may
affect the sovereignty, security, essential economic interests of France or public order, specified
by the administrative authority as necessary.
Under Article 1 of the French Blocking Statute, "subject to international treaties or agreements
and to the laws and regulations in force, it is prohibited for any person to request, seek or
communicate, in writing, orally or in any other form, documents or information of an economic,
commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature for the purpose of gathering evidence in or
in connection with foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.”
The resulting prohibition is particularly broad. It applies :
- even if the communication of the document or information does not affect the sovereignty,
security, public order or essential economic interests of France,
- even if this search is not acted upon,
- and even if the prosecuted person is neither French nor a French resident.
In a decision dated 28 March 2007, the Paris Court of Appeals (9th Chamber B), reversing a
judgment of acquittal rendered by the Paris Criminal Court on 1 June 2006, convicted a lawyer
of the offense of communicating economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical
information aimed at obtaining evidence for foreign proceedings without complying with the
requirements of the Hague Convention, and ordered him to pay a fine of 10,000 euros. The
Court of Cassation upheld this ruling: in a decision dated 12 December 2007, the Court of
Cassation (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeal filed against the decision of the Paris Court
of Appeal.
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Chapter I
(Letters of Requests)
Transmission of Letters of Requests: Letters of Request are sent directly from a judicial authority in the requesting State to the
Central Authority of the requested State.
Authority responsible for informing of the time and place of Judicial authority competent to execute the request.
the execution of Letter of Request
(Art. 7):
Presence of judicial personnel at the execution of the Letter of Declaration of applicability.

Request (Art. 8):
The French Code of Civil Procedure expressly permits the possibility for the requesting foreign
judge to be present during the execution of the Letter of Request (article 741), without the need
to obtain authorisation from anyone.
Privileges and duties existing under the law of States other No declaration of applicability.
than the State of origin and the State of execution
(Art. 11):
Translation requirements The French Government will execute only those Letters of Request which are in French or
Arts 4(2) and 33): accompanied by a translation into French.
Costs relating to execution of the Letters of Request No.

(Arts 14(2)(3) and 26):
Time for execution: Between 2 and 6 months, approximately.
Pre-trial discovery of documents Letter of Request may be executed subject to certain conditions (qualified exclusion).
Art. 23):
Information about domestic rules on the taking of evidence: - European Judicial Network in Civil or Commercial Matters - France.
- Articles 132 à 322 of the French Code of Civil Procedure - Legifrance.
Witness examination under Chapter I
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Should Letters of Request include specific questions to be French national law has no requirements in this respect.
used during witness examination or only a list of matters to be
addressed?
Is it a public or private hearing? Public hearing.
Do the judicial authorities "blue-pencil" Letters of Requests (i.e. Yes.

rephrase, restructure and / or strike out objectionable
questions or offensive wording so that a Letter of Request may
be executed under the laws of the requested State)?
Is the witness provided in advance with a copy of the The judge is not obliged to provide the witness with a list of the questions/matters to be
questions / matters to be addressed as contained in the Letter addressed as contained in the Letter of Request, but there is no prohibition against doing so.
of Request? However, according to article 212 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, "witnesses may not
read any draft".
Are documents produced by the witness authenticated by the No.

court?
Is an oath generally administered to the witness? Yes.
Can the witness be made subject to further examination and Yes, but a second Letter of Request is necessary.
recall?
Are there sanctions for non-appearance of witness? Under Article 207 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, “Defaulting witnesses and those who,
without legitimate reason, refuse to testify or take an oath may be sentenced to a civil fine of up
to 3,000 euros.”
Must interpreters who assist with the witness examination be No. The oath is only to be taken by judicial experts when they are entered on the list
court-certified? established by the Court of Appeals.
How is the testimony transcribed? In accordance with Article 219 et seq. of the French Code of Civil Procedure, witness testimonies
are recorded in a transcript ("procès-verbal"), dated and signed by the requested judge and by
the clerk who prepared it.
Chapter II
(Taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners)
Article 15 Applicable.
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Article 16 Applicable. See conditions and competent authority.
Article 17 Applicable. See conditions and competent authority.
Article 18 No declaration of applicability (i.e., a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner may
not apply for appropriate assistance to obtain evidence by compulsion).
Taking of evidence by video-links

(under either chapter)
Chapter I
Are there legal obstacles to the use of video links? No.
Conducting hearings directly, by videoconference: Under Chapter I of the Convention, pursuant to Article 27 (b) and (c) of the Convention and
articles 747-1 and 747-2 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, France permits a foreign judicial
authority to conduct a hearing directly on French territory, including via videoconference,
without compulsion or sanction, provided that the French Central Authority has given its prior
permission. The hearing may be conducted on the premises of a French Court, but this is not
mandatory.
Technology used: Pursuant to Article R. 111-7, paragraph 2 of the Code of Judicial Organization :
“The technical specifications of the audiovisual telecommunication means used must guarantee
a reliable, loyal and confidential transmission with respect to third parties.
They are determined by order of the Minister of Justice.”
The transport network currently used by the Ministry of Justice is the RNIS network (Integrated
Services Digital Network / ISDN), belonging to the commutated telephone network. The
required speed is 256 kbps.
Level of interpretation required: France makes use of the services of accredited professional interpreters, but also relies on the
parties and their legal counsel.
Simultaneous or in sequence interpretation: No preference.
Interpretation required in which jurisdiction? No information available.
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Who pays for the interpretation? Pursuant to Article 748 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which applies to incoming Letters
of Request, the costs incurred by interpreters are to be borne by the foreign (requesting)
authority.
How would a request for evidence be handled if witness not Should a witness refuse to attend a videoconference hearing conducted by the judicial
willing? authority, it remains for the judicial authority to determine the consequences. While Article 207
of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Defaulting witnesses and those who,
without legitimate reason, refuse to testify or take an oath may be sentenced to a civil fine of up
to 3,000 euros", French national law provides that in civil matters, the use of videoconference is
subject to the consent of all parties.
Chapter II
Are there legal obstacles to the use of video links? No.
Technology used: No information available.
Level of interpretation required: No information available.
Simultaneous or in sequence interpretation: No information available.
Interpretation required in which jurisdiction? No information available.
Who pays for the interpretation? No information available.
Other Information
1/21/24, 10:31 PM HCCH |
Bilateral or multilateral agreements - Supplementary agreements to the Hague Convention of 1 March 1954 were concluded with:
Austria (1979), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1969), Croatia (1969), Germany (1961), Poland (1967),
Serbia (1969), Slovenia (1969), The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1969).
- Bilateral conventions on judicial co-operation: Algeria (1962), Australia (1922), Bahamas (1922),
Belgium (1956), Benin (1975), Brazil (1996), Bulgaria (1989), Burkina Faso (1961), Cameroon
(1974), Canada (1922 and Agreement with Quebec of 9 September 1977), Central African
Republic (1965), Chad (1976), China (1987), Congo, Côte D'Ivoire (1961), Czech Republic (1984),
Djibouti (1986), Egypt (1982), Gabon (1963), Hungary, Italy (1955), Lao People's Democratic
Republic (1956), Lithuania (1928), Luxembourg (1870), Madagascar (1973), Mali (1962), Morocco
(1957), Mauritania (1961), Monaco (1949), Mongolia (1994), Niger (1977), New Zealand (1922),
Romania (1974), Russian Federation (1936), San Marino (1967), Senegal (1974), Slovakia (1984),
Switzerland (1913), Togo (1976), Tunisia (1972), United Arab Emirates (1991), United Republic of
Tanzania (1922), Uruguay (1991), Vietnam (1999).
- Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of
the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.
Useful links: http://www.entraide-civile-internationale.justice.gouv.fr/
Competent authorities (Art. 17) Ministère de la Justice

Direction des Affaires Civiles et du Sceau
Département de l’entraide, du droit international privé et européen (DEDIPE)
13, Place Vendôme
75042 Paris Cedex 01
Phone : + 33 (1) 44 77 61 05 - fax : + 33 (1) 44 77 61 22
E-mail : entraide-civile-internationale@justice.gouv.fr
General website : www.justice.gouv.fr
www.entraide-civile-internationale.justice.gouv.fr
Additional authorities (Art. 24) Not applicable.
This page was last updated on: 27 February 2023
Conventions (incl. Protocols and Principles)
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters [20]
EXHIBIT 14
1/11/24, 12:24 PM Decree No. 2022-207 of February 18, 2022, on the disclosure of documents and information of an economic, commercial...
FRENCH
REPUBLIC
Légifrance
The public service for the dissemination of the law
Liberty
Equality
Brotherhood
Decree No. 2022-207 of February 18, 2022, on the disclosure of economic, commercial, industrial, financial,
or technical documents and information to foreign natural or legal persons
NOR: ECOI2135492D
ELI: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2022/2/18/ECOI2135492D/jo/texte
ALIAS: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2022/2/18/2022-207/jo/texte
JORF [Official Journal of the French Republic] No. 0043 of February 20, 2022
Text No. 14
First version
Persons concerned: natural and legal persons, including their service providers or any person acting in their name or on their behalf, receiving a
request for disclosure of documents and information likely to fall within the scope of Article 1 or Article 1 bis of Law No 68-678 of July 26, 1968.
Subject matter: clarification of the procedure for notifying the authority responsible for implementing economic security policy in France of any
request for disclosure, issued by a foreign public authority or aimed at the constitution of evidence for foreign judicial or administrative
proceedings; submission of opinions by the authority responsible for implementing economic security policy in France relating to the applicability
or inapplicability of Articles 1 and 1 bis of Law No 68-678 of July 26, 1968.
Entry into force: the text enters into force on April 1, 2022.
Notice: requests from foreign public authorities for disclosure of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information,
the disclosure of which is likely to undermine France’s sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public policy, or aimed at the
constitution of evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings, are subject to a ban on disclosure under the terms of Articles 1 and 1 bis
of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980. This decree makes it possible: i) regarding the application of
Article 2 of the Law of July 26, 1968, to implement information procedures to the Service de l’Information Stratégique et de la Sécurité Économique
(Strategic Information and Economic Security Department - SISSE), the authority responsible for implementing economic security policy in France,
about any request for disclosure that may relate to such documents and information; ii) to enable the SISSE to issue an opinion on the applicability
of Articles 1 and 1 bis of the Law of July 26, 1968.
References: the decree can be consulted on the Légifrance website (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
The Prime Minister,

On a report by the Minister of the Economy, Finance, and Recovery,
Having regard to Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, as amended, relating to the disclosure of economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical
documents and information to foreign natural or legal persons;
Having regard to Decree No. 2019-206 of March 20, 2019, as amended, relating to the governance of economic security policy; after the opinion of
the Conseil d’Etat [Council of State] (finance section),
Decrees:
Article 1
The competent minister within the meaning of Article 2 of the aforementioned law of July 26, 1968, is the minister responsible for the economy.
He/she immediately informs the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice and, where applicable, the minister responsible for the activities
of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 1 bis of the aforementioned law.
Article 2
For the application of Article 2 of the aforementioned law of July 26, 1968, persons subject to the prohibition on disclosing documents and
information provided for by Articles 1 and 1 bis of that same law, inform the national department responsible for implementing economic security
policy in France, mentioned in Article 3 of the aforementioned decree of March 20, 2019, of any request for such disclosure issued by a foreign
public authority or by any person acting on its behalf or with a view to responding to its request.
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000045190519 1/2
1/11/24, 12:24 PM Decree No. 2022-207 of February 18, 2022, on the disclosure of documents and information of an economic, commercial...
Article 3
Persons subject to the information obligation set out in Article 2 shall implement the following procedures:
1st They shall forward requests for disclosure without delay to the national department referred to in Article 2;
2nd They shall submit, as soon as possible, to that department a file, the contents of which are set by order of the Minister for the Economy.
Article 4
As soon as the complete file has been submitted, the national department shall send an acknowledgment of receipt to the person designated by
the company in the file mentioned in Article 3.
It shall then investigate the file in conjunction with the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries or authorities.
Within one month of submission of the complete file, it shall send the person designated by the company an opinion on the applicability of Articles
1 and 1 bis of the aforementioned law of July 26, 1968.
Article 5
Decree No. 81-550 of May 12, 1981, implementing Article 2 of the aforementioned law of July 26, 1968, is repealed.
Article 6
The provisions of this decree come into force on April 1, 2022.
Article 7
The Minister of the Economy, Finance and Recovery is responsible for implementing this decree, which will be published in the Official Journal of
the French Republic.
Done on February 18, 2022.
Jean Castex
For the Prime Minister:
The Minister of the Economy, Finance and Recovery,

Bruno Le Maire
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000045190519 2/2
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EXHIBIT 15
EXHIBIT 16
Case 2:22-mc-00004 Document 2 Filed 01/07/22 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:32
1
KEITH R. HUMMEL (Pro Hac Vice Application Forrhcoming)
a
Worldwid e Plaza
J 825 Eighth Avenue
Telephone: (212) 47 4-1rA00
5 Facsimile : (212) 47 4-37 00
6
JAMES LEE (Bar No. 192301)
7 ENOCH LIANG (Bar No. 212324)
8
LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
9 300 South Grand Ave, Suite 1400
Los Angeles, Califo mia 9a07 1
10
Telephone : (213) 6 12-8900
11 Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
t2
Attorneys for Applicant
l3 NOUVEL, LLC
t4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COT'RT
15 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
t6
T7 In re Ex Parte Application of Miscellaneous Action No
NOUVEL,LLC
18 DECLARATION OF ENOCH H. LIANG
19
Applicant, IN SUPPORT OF NOWEL'S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER
20 For an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. $ 1782
1782 Granting Leave to Obtain Discovery GRANTING LEAVE TO OBTAIN
2t from Mondo Bongo,LLC, William DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN
22 Bradley Pitt, and Warren Grant for Use in PROCEEDII{GS AND SUPPORTING
Foreign Proceedings. MEMORANDUM
ZJ
^t
24
25
26
27
28
DECLARATION OF ENOCH H. LIANG

1 I, Enoch H. Liang, declare as follows:

2 1. I am a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Californiaand am
J a partner at LTL Attorneys LLP, attorneys for Nouvel, LLC ("Nouvel").
4 2. I respectfully submit this declaration in support of Nouvel's Ex Parte

5 Application for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. g 1782 Granting Leave to Obtain
6 Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings.
7 3. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to
8 do so, I could and would testifu competently thereto.
9 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is atrue and correct copy of the proposed form
10 of subpoena to be served on Mondo Bongo, LLC ("Mondo Bongo") to produce
11 documents and things for use in Mondo Bongo's actions against Nouvel in Luxembourg
T2 and Nouvel's contemplated action against the directors and officers of SA Chateau
13 Miraval ("Chateau Miraval") as well as SAS Miraval Provence ("Miraval Provence") and
14 its president and officers in France.
15 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and corect copy of the proposed form
16 of subpoena to be served on Wiliiarn Bradley Pitt to produce documents and things for
I7 use in Mondo Bongo's actions against Nouvel in Luxembourg and Nouvel's
18 contemplated action against the directors and officers of Chateau Miraval as well as
19 Miraval Provence its president and officers in France.
20 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the proposed form
21 of subpoena to be served on Warren Grant to produce documents and things for use in
22 Mondo Bongo's actions against Nouvel in Luxembourg and Nouvel's contemplated
ZJ action against the directors and officers of Chateau Miraval as well as Miraval Provence
1A
25
26
27
28
-l-
1
and its president and officers in France.
2
7. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that
J
the foregoing is true and correct.
4
6
Executed on January 7,2022, in Vancouver, Canada.
7
9 H. Liang
l0
11
t2
I3
l4
15
T6
17
18
t9
2A
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a

Case 2:22-mc-00004 Document 2-1 Filed 01/07/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:35
Exhibit 2
AO 88B (Rev. 02/14) Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects or to Permit Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
Central District
__________ of of
District California
__________
Nouvel, LLC
)
Plaintiff )
v. ) Civil Action No.
)
N/A )
Defendant )
SUBPOENA TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS, INFORMATION, OR OBJECTS

OR TO PERMIT INSPECTION OF PREMISES IN A CIVIL ACTION
Mondo Bongo, LLC
To:
(Name of person to whom this subpoena is directed)
✔
’ Production: YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce at the time, date, and place set forth below the following
documents, electronically stored information, or objects, and to permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the
material: See Schedule A
Place: LTL Attorneys LLP Date and Time:

300 South Grand Ave., 14th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071
’ Inspection of Premises: YOU ARE COMMANDED to permit entry onto the designated premises, land, or
other property possessed or controlled by you at the time, date, and location set forth below, so that the requesting party
may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.
Place: Date and Time:
The following provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 are attached – Rule 45(c), relating to the place of compliance;
Rule 45(d), relating to your protection as a person subject to a subpoena; and Rule 45(e) and (g), relating to your duty to
respond to this subpoena and the potential consequences of not doing so.
Date:
CLERK OF COURT
OR
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk Attorney’s signature
The name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the attorney representing (name of party) Nouvel, LLC
, who issues or requests this subpoena, are:
Keith R. Hummel, 825 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY 10019, khummel@cravath.com, (212) 474-1772
Notice to the person who issues or requests this subpoena

If this subpoena commands the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the
inspection of premises before trial, a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party in this case before
it is served on the person to whom it is directed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).
AO 88B (Rev. 02/14) Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects or to Permit Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.)
I received this subpoena for (name of individual and title, if any)

on (date) .
’ I served the subpoena by delivering a copy to the named person as follows:
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the subpoena unexecuted because:

.
Unless the subpoena was issued on behalf of the United States, or one of its officers or agents, I have also
tendered to the witness the fees for one day’s attendance, and the mileage allowed by law, in the amount of
$ .
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc.:

AO 88B (Rev. 02/14) Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects or to Permit Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action(Page 3)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (c), (d), (e), and (g) (Effective 12/1/13)
(c) Place of Compliance. (ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that does
not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert’s
(1) For a Trial, Hearing, or Deposition. A subpoena may command a study that was not requested by a party.
person to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only as follows: (C) Specifying Conditions as an Alternative. In the circumstances
(A) within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or described in Rule 45(d)(3)(B), the court may, instead of quashing or
regularly transacts business in person; or modifying a subpoena, order appearance or production under specified
(B) within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly conditions if the serving party:
transacts business in person, if the person (i) shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be
(i) is a party or a party’s officer; or otherwise met without undue hardship; and
(ii) is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial (ii) ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated.
expense.
(e) Duties in Responding to a Subpoena.
(2) For Other Discovery. A subpoena may command:
(A) production of documents, electronically stored information, or (1) Producing Documents or Electronically Stored Information. These
tangible things at a place within 100 miles of where the person resides, is procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored
employed, or regularly transacts business in person; and information:
(B) inspection of premises at the premises to be inspected. (A) Documents. A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents
must produce them as they are kept in the ordinary course of business or
(d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement. must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the demand.
(B) Form for Producing Electronically Stored Information Not Specified.
(1) Avoiding Undue Burden or Expense; Sanctions. A party or attorney If a subpoena does not specify a form for producing electronically stored
responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps information, the person responding must produce it in a form or forms in
to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms.
subpoena. The court for the district where compliance is required must (C) Electronically Stored Information Produced in Only One Form. The
enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction—which may include person responding need not produce the same electronically stored
lost earnings and reasonable attorney’s fees—on a party or attorney who information in more than one form.
fails to comply. (D) Inaccessible Electronically Stored Information. The person
responding need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
(2) Command to Produce Materials or Permit Inspection. from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because
(A) Appearance Not Required. A person commanded to produce of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective
documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things, or to order, the person responding must show that the information is not
permit the inspection of premises, need not appear in person at the place of reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
production or inspection unless also commanded to appear for a deposition, made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
hearing, or trial. requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
(B) Objections. A person commanded to produce documents or tangible 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
things or to permit inspection may serve on the party or attorney designated
in the subpoena a written objection to inspecting, copying, testing, or (2) Claiming Privilege or Protection.
sampling any or all of the materials or to inspecting the premises—or to (A) Information Withheld. A person withholding subpoenaed information
producing electronically stored information in the form or forms requested. under a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation
The objection must be served before the earlier of the time specified for material must:
compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served. If an objection is made, (i) expressly make the claim; and
the following rules apply: (ii) describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or
(i) At any time, on notice to the commanded person, the serving party tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself
may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.
order compelling production or inspection. (B) Information Produced. If information produced in response to a
(ii) These acts may be required only as directed in the order, and the subpoena is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as
order must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer from trial-preparation material, the person making the claim may notify any party
significant expense resulting from compliance. that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena. information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information
(A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district where until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the
compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that: information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly
(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; present the information under seal to the court for the district where
(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits compliance is required for a determination of the claim. The person who
specified in Rule 45(c); produced the information must preserve the information until the claim is
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no resolved.
exception or waiver applies; or
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. (g) Contempt.
(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a The court for the district where compliance is required—and also, after a
subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion is transferred, the issuing court—may hold in contempt a person
motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires: who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the
(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, subpoena or an order related to it.
development, or commercial information; or
For access to subpoena materials, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a) Committee Note (2013).
SCHEDULE A
DEFINITIONS
1. Unless otherwise specified, the relevant time period for these requests is January 1,
2013, through the present.
2. The terms “You” and “Your” shall mean Mondo Bongo, LLC and any of its
predecessors, successors, parents, partially or wholly owned subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions,
departments, operating units, and any other subdivisions; their present and former officers,
directors, agents, attorneys, accountants, employees, partners or other persons occupying similar
positions or performing similar functions; and all persons either acting or purporting to act on
behalf of the above.
3. “Document(s)” shall carry its broadest meaning consistent with Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and includes, without limitation, any written material, whether
typed, handwritten, printed or otherwise, and whether in draft or final form, of any kind or nature,
or any photograph, photostat, microfilm or other reproduction thereof, including, without
limitation, each note, memorandum, letter, telegram, telex, circular, release, article, report,
prospectus, memorandum of any telephone or in-person conversation, any financial statement,
analysis, drawing, graph, chart, account, book, notebook, draft, summary, diary, transcript,
computer data base, computer printout or other computer generated matter, and other data
compilations, and any other documents or electronically stored information in any medium from
which information can be obtained, whether directly or, if necessary, after translation into a
reasonably usable form. Electronic mail, instant messages, text messages, voice mail and any
pictures, video, or sound recorded by any means are included within the definition of the terms
1
“Document” or “Documents.” A draft or non-identical copy, including a copy with handwritten
notes, is a separate Document within the meaning of the term.
4. “Person” or “persons” shall mean any natural person or any legal person, including
but not limited to any business, legal, or governmental entity or association.
5. “Nouvel” shall refer to Nouvel, LLC, a limited liability company under the laws of
California, established and having its registered office at 500 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600,
Sacramento, California, 95814.
6. “Quimicum” shall refer to Quimicum S.à r.l, a limited liability company (société à
responsabilité limitée), established and having its registered office at L-5365 Munsbach, 6C, rue
Gabriel Lippmann, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
7. “Mondo Bongo” shall refer to Mondo Bongo, LLC, a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of California, having its registered office at 9100 Wilshire Boulevard,
STE 1000W, Beverly Hills, California 90212.
8. “Mr. Pitt” shall refer to William Bradley Pitt, the sole shareholder of Mondo Bongo.
9. “Mr. Grant” shall refer to Warren Grant, Mr. Pitt’s agent.
10. “Chateau Miraval” shall refer to SA Chateau Miraval, a company established and
having its registered office in F-83570 Correns, Domaine de Miraval, France.
11. “Familles Perrin” shall refer to SAS Familles Perrin, a French company whose
registered office is at La Ferrière, Route de Jonquières, 84100 Orange, France.
12. “Miraval Provence” shall refer to SAS Miraval Provence, a joint venture between
Chateau Miraval and Familles Perrin headquartered at La Ferrière, Route de Jonquières 84100,
Orange, France.
2
13. “Mr. Perrin” shall refer to Marc-Olivier Perrin, the President of Miraval Provence
and an officer of Familles Perrin.
14. The “2013 Quimicum 10% Share Transfer” shall refer to Mondo Bongo’s
December 19, 2013 sale of 10% of Quimicum’s shares to Nouvel.
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34 are hereby incorporated by reference
and apply to each of the following instructions:
2. The following rules of construction apply to all Requests:
a. The terms “any,” “all,” “each,” and “every” should be understood in either
their most or least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of a Request for all
Documents or that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.
b. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed either disjunctively or
conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of a Request for all Documents or
Communications that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.
c. The terms “concern,” “concerning,” “relate,” and “relating to” shall be
construed as broadly as possible and shall mean and include, without limitation, constituting,
comprising, setting forth, summarizing, reflecting, stating, supporting, weakening, describing,
recording, noting, embodying, mentioning, studying, analyzing, discussing, or evaluating, directly
or indirectly.
d. The term “including” shall be construed as broadly as possible and shall
mean “including without limitation.”
3
e. The use of a verb in any tense, mood, or voice shall be construed as the use
of the verb in all tenses, moods, or voices, as necessary to bring within the scope of a Request all
Documents or Communications that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.
f. The use of the singular form of any word shall be taken to mean the plural
as well as the singular, and the use of the plural form of any word shall be taken to mean the
singular as well as the plural.
g. The use of the masculine gender shall include the feminine, neuter, and any
other genders.
3. Produce all Documents described below which are in Your possession, custody, or
control, including those Documents in the possession, custody, or control of Your present or
former attorneys or counsel, advisors, investigators, accountants, employees or other agents, as
well as any other Persons or entities acting on Your behalf, wherever located and in whatever form
they may exist.
4. Produce all Documents in their entirety, without deletion or excision, and along
with any attachments, regardless of whether You consider the entirety of any such Documents or
attachments to be responsive to any Request.
5. In objecting to any Request, identify the specific grounds for the objection and the
part of the Request objected to, and state with specificity which Documents will be withheld and
which Documents will be produced notwithstanding such objection.
6. If any Document responsive to these Requests is withheld or redacted by You under
a claim of privilege, provide a privilege log describing the basis for the claim of privilege and all
information necessary for the Debtors and the Court to assess the claim of privilege.
4
7. If You are unable to answer or respond fully to any Request, answer or respond to
the extent possible and specify the reason(s) for Your inability to answer or respond in full. If You
have no Documents responsive to a particular Request, so state.
5
DOCUMENT REQUESTS: LUXEMBOURG ACTIONS
1. All documents concerning any reason for or the objective of the 2013 Quimicum
10% Share Transfer.
2. All documents concerning any tax, financial, or other benefit that any Person could
receive, be expected to receive, or did receive as a result of the 2013 Quimicum 10% Share
Transfer.
DOCUMENT REQUESTS: FRENCH ACTION
3. All documents concerning the intellectual property rights of Chateau Miraval or
Miraval Provence.
4. All correspondence or other communications involving Miraval Provence, Familles
Perrin, or Mr. Perrin concerning the intellectual property rights of Chateau Miraval or Miraval
Provence.
5. All documents concerning the appointment of Mr. Grant as a director of Chateau
Miraval.
6. All correspondence or other communications between or among You, Mr. Pitt, Mr.
Grant, Chateau Miraval or its directors or officers, Quimicum or its managers or officers, Miraval
Provence or its president or officers, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, concerning the finances,
operations, assets (including intellectual property rights), governance, supervision, or control of
Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence, property renovations involving Chateau Miraval or Miraval
Provence (including any business purpose for, decisions approving, tenders issued and proposals
obtained regarding such renovations), or any planned, contemplated, potential, or future sale of
either Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence.
6
7. All documents and things, including quarterly, annual, or other reports to the board
of directors or management, all convening notices, agendas, and minutes of all board meetings,
and quarterly and annual or other periodic financial statements such as income statements, balance
sheets, and statements of cash flows, concerning the finances, assets (including intellectual
property rights), governance, supervision, or control of Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence,
property renovations involving Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence (including any business
purpose for, decisions approving, tenders issued, and proposals obtained regarding such
renovations), or any planned, contemplated, potential, or future sale of either Chateau Miraval or
Miraval Provence.
8. All documents and things, including documents concerning or memorializing oral
agreements and understandings, concerning contracts, transactions, or arrangements between
Chateau Miraval, on the one hand, and You, Mr. Pitt, or Mr. Grant on the other hand.
Miraval Provence, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, on the one hand, and Chateau Miraval, You, Mr.
Pitt, or Mr. Grant, on the other hand.
10. Documents sufficient to show use of any of the residential properties of the Chateau
Miraval estate by any Person, including any payments by any Person for use of the residential
properties.
11. All documents concerning Your, Mr. Pitt’s, Mr. Grant’s, Quimicum’s, Chateau
Miraval’s, or Miraval Provence’s responses to, or actions taken by You, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Grant,
Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence in response to, any request for information
made by Nouvel regarding Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence, including all
7
communications between or among You, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Grant, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or
Miraval Provence and any other Person regarding any requests or proposals made by Nouvel
concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence, or their respective assets (including
intellectual property rights).
8
Exhibit 3

for the
Central District
__________ of of
District California
__________
Nouvel, LLC
)
Plaintiff )
)
N/A )
Defendant )

William Bradley Pitt
To:
✔

Date:
CLERK OF COURT
OR

Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE

on (date) .
on (date) ; or

.
$ .
Date:
Server’s address

expense.
SCHEDULE A
DEFINITIONS
2. The terms “You” and “Your” shall mean you, William Bradley Pitt, personally and
any entities you control, including any predecessors, successors, parents, partially or wholly owned
subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, operating units, and any other subdivisions of your
entities; Your and Your entities’ present and former officers, directors, agents, attorneys,
accountants, employees, partners or other persons occupying similar positions or performing
similar functions; and all persons either acting or purporting to act on behalf of the above.
1
8. “Mr. Grant” shall refer to Warren Grant, Mr. Pitt’s agent.
Orange, France.
2
INSTRUCTIONS
or indirectly.
3
g. The use of the masculine gender shall include the feminine, neuter, and any
other genders.
they may exist.
4
10% Share Transfer.
Transfer.
Miraval Provence.
Provence.
5. All documents concerning the appointment of Mr. Grant as a director of Chateau
Miraval.
6. All correspondence or other communications between or among You, Mondo
Bongo, Mr. Grant, Chateau Miraval or its directors or officers, Quimicum or its managers or
officers, Miraval Provence or its president or officers, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, concerning
the finances, operations, assets (including intellectual property rights), governance, supervision,
or control of Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence, property renovations involving Chateau
Miraval or Miraval Provence (including any business purpose for, decisions approving, tenders
issued and proposals obtained regarding such renovations), or any planned, contemplated,
potential, or future sale of either Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence.
5
Miraval Provence.
Chateau Miraval, on the one hand, and You, Mondo Bongo, or Mr. Grant on the other hand.
Miraval Provence, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, on the one hand, and Chateau Miraval, You
Mondo Bongo or Mr. Grant, on the other hand.
properties.
11. All documents concerning Your, Mondo Bongo’s, Mr. Grant’s, Quimicum’s,
Chateau Miraval’s, or Miraval Provence’s responses to, or actions taken by You, Mondo Bongo,
Mr. Grant, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence in response to, any request for
information made by Nouvel regarding Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence,
6
including all communications between or among You, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Grant, Quimicum,
Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence and any other Person regarding any requests or proposals
made by Nouvel concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence, or their respective
assets (including intellectual property rights).
7
Exhibit 4

for the
Central District
__________ of of
District California
__________
Nouvel, LLC
)
Plaintiff )
)
1$ )
Defendant )

Warren Grant
To:
✔

Date:
CLERK OF COURT
OR

Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE

on (date) .
on (date) ; or

.
$ .
Date:
Server’s address

expense.
SCHEDULE A
DEFINITIONS
2. The terms “You” and “Your” shall mean you, Warren Grant, personally and any
entities you control, including any predecessors, successors, parents, partially or wholly owned
subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, operating units, and any other subdivisions of your
entities; Your and Your entities’ present and former officers, directors, agents, attorneys,
accountants, employees, partners or other persons occupying similar positions or performing
similar functions; and all persons either acting or purporting to act on behalf of the above.
1
8. “Mr. Pitt” shall refer to William Bradley Pitt, the sole shareholder of Mondo Bongo.
Orange, France.
2
INSTRUCTIONS
or indirectly.
3
g. The use of the masculine gender shall include the feminine, neuter and any
other genders.
they may exist.
4
10% Share Transfer.
Transfer.
Miraval Provence.
Provence.
5. All documents concerning Your appointment as a director of Chateau Miraval
6. All correspondence or other communications between or among You, Mondo
Bongo, Mr. Pitt, Chateau Miraval or its directors or officers, Quimicum or its managers or officers,
Miraval Provence or its president or officers, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, concerning the
finances, operations, assets (including intellectual property rights), governance, supervision, or
control of Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence, property renovations involving Chateau Miraval
or Miraval Provence (including any business purpose for, decisions approving, tenders issued and
proposals obtained regarding such renovations), or any planned, contemplated, potential, or future
sale of either Chateau Miraval or Miraval Provence.
5
Miraval Provence.
Chateau Miraval, on the one hand, and You, Mondo Bongo, or Mr. Pitt, on the other hand.
Miraval Provence, Familles Perrin, or Mr. Perrin, on the one hand, and Chateau Miraval, You,
Mondo Bongo, or Mr. Pitt, on the other hand.
properties.
11. All documents concerning Your, Mondo Bongo’s, Mr. Pitt’s, Quimicum’s, Chateau
Miraval’s, or Miraval Provence’s responses to, or actions taken by You, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Pitt,
Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence in response to, any request for information
made by Nouvel regarding Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence, including all
6
communications between or among You, Mondo Bongo, Mr. Pitt, Quimicum, Chateau Miraval,
or Miraval Provence and any other Person regarding any requests or proposals made by Nouvel
concerning Quimicum, Chateau Miraval, or Miraval Provence, or their respective assets (including
intellectual property rights).
7
EXHIBIT 17
Subject: William B. Pitt et al. v. Angelina Jolie et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV06081
From: Goodman, Adam L. <ALGoodman@wlrk.com>

To: Jonathan Mooney <jmooney@cravath.com>; Drivas, Ioannis D. <IDDrivas@wlrk.com>; Keith Hummel
<KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Chibunkem Ezenekwe
<cezenekwe@cravath.com>; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com; prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Cc: Moses, Jonathan M. <JMMoses@WLRK.com>; Grosbard, Remy K. <RKGrosbard@wlrk.com>; Allen, Jessica L.
<JLAllen@wlrk.com>; Abboud, Alexis J. <AJAbboud@wlrk.com>; Berlinski, John V. (Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert,
Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <jberlinski@birdmarella.com>; Julia B. Cherlow <jcherlow@birdmarella.com>;
Fanxi Wang <fwang@birdmarella.com>; Teachout, Brandon R. (Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks,
Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <bteachout@birdmarella.com>
Subject: RE: William B. Pitt et al. v. Angelina Jolie et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV06081
Jonathan , Thanks for con firming . W e are planning to pr oduce the Secti on 1782 d ocuments t his week. As reflected in our N ovem ber 13 e mail, we unde rs tand N ouvel has agreed that i t will likewis e produce d
External (algoodman@wlrk.com)
Report This Email FAQ
Jonathan,
Thanks for confirming. We are planning to produce the Section 1782 documents this week. As reflected in our
November 13 email, we understand Nouvel has agreed that it will likewise produce documents that are subject to a joint
privilege to the joint privilege holders. If our understanding is incorrect, please let us know promptly and by no later
than Friday at 12:00 pm EST, so that we do not produce the Section 1782 documents based on a misapprehension of
Nouvel’s position and commitments.
Adam L. Goodman
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
51 West 52nd Street | New York, NY 10019
+1 (212) 403-1179 (Direct) | +1 (212) 403-2179 (Fax)
ALGoodman@wlrk.com | www.wlrk.com

Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2024 9:35 PM
To: Goodman, Adam L. <ALGoodman@wlrk.com>; Drivas, Ioannis D. <IDDrivas@wlrk.com>; Hummel, Keith R. (Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP) <khummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Chibunkem Ezenekwe
**External Email-Use Caution**

Adam,
1
Nouvel agrees that the production of jointly privileged documents does not effect a waiver, and that each of the parties
retains clawback rights as to one another with respect to jointly privileged documents that are produced (without
prejudice to any other joint privilege holder’s rights with respect to any privilege determination and the use of any
document subject to a joint privilege).
Please let us know if you now will proceed with the production of the Section 1782 documents.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

Sent: Thursday, December 7, 2023 8:25 PM
<KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Chibunkem Ezenekwe
Jonathan,
Thanks. Paul has advised us that Ms. Jolie has “no objection to the production of privileged documents to Nouvel, as
long as [] all parties
agree that the production is not a waiver, and that everyone retains claw-back rights.” Can you confirm that you agree
to this, including that each of the parties retains clawback rights as to one another with respect to jointly privileged
documents that are produced (without prejudice to any other joint privilege holder’s rights with respect to any privilege
determination and the use of any document subject to a joint privilege)?
We have also asked Paul to confirm, as you now have on behalf of Nouvel, that Ms. Jolie will produce responsive
documents that are subject to a joint privilege to the joint privilege holders. Once we have these confirmations, we can
proceed with the production of the Section 1782 documents.
Adam L. Goodman
+1 (212) 403-1179 (Direct) | +1 (212) 403-2179 (Fax)

Sent: Wednesday, November 15, 2023 4:04 PM
To: Goodman, Adam L. <ALGoodman@wlrk.com>; Drivas, Ioannis D. <IDDrivas@wlrk.com>; Hummel, Keith R. (Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP) <khummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Chibunkem Ezenekwe
Cc: Moses, Jonathan M. <JMMoses@wlrk.com>; Grosbard, Remy K. <RKGrosbard@wlrk.com>; Allen, Jessica L.
2

Adam,
Nouvel does not object to Plaintiffs producing the 1782 documents to Ms. Jolie simultaneously and will not assert waiver
when Plaintiffs produce documents subject to the joint privilege to the joint privilege holders.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com

<KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Benjamin Ahn <bahn@cravath.com>;
joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com; prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Jonathan,
As you know, we were seeking to meet and confer on the Tenute R&Os sooner, but we will accommodate your request
in light of your email. We are available to meet and confer this Friday at 2:30 pm ET. We are amenable to covering
Plaintiffs’ R&Os to Nouvel’s RFPs as well on Friday, after completing our meet and confer on the Tenute R&Os. If we do
not have enough time to get to that portion on Friday, we will need to reschedule, and we will of course make ourselves
available.
With respect to the joint privilege issue, it is surprising how difficult Nouvel has been to pin down on this, though we
appreciate that you have finally confirmed that Nouvel will produce documents that are subject to a joint privilege to
the joint privilege holders. To be clear, we are not “withholding the production” of responsive documents. At this point,
consistent with our email of October 18 (to which you did not respond), we are simply asking you to confirm that Nouvel
does not object to our producing the 1782 documents to Ms. Jolie simultaneously and will not assert waiver. In other
words, we are attempting to protect the privilege for both parties. You know what is in the 1782 production. If you
object to our producing any of those documents to Ms. Jolie simultaneously for whatever reason, please let us know; for
our part, we do not feel we need a stipulation to do so. If we do not hear from you on this by Friday, we will assume you
have no objection and will not assert waiver. We have likewise asked Paul to confirm that Ms. Jolie has no objection to
our producing jointly privileged documents to Nouvel simultaneously in this action.
If either of you do have an objection, we will need to work out a stipulation to govern the process.
Regards,
Adam
3
Adam L. Goodman
+1 (212) 403-1179 (Direct) | +1 (212) 403-2179 (Fax)

Sent: Thursday, November 9, 2023 6:59 PM
To: Drivas, Ioannis D. <IDDrivas@wlrk.com>; Hummel, Keith R. (Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP)
<khummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Benjamin Ahn <bahn@cravath.com>;
joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com; prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Cc: Moses, Jonathan M. <JMMoses@WLRK.com>; Goodman, Adam L. <ALGoodman@wlrk.com>; Grosbard, Remy K.
<RKGrosbard@wlrk.com>; Allen, Jessica L. <JLAllen@wlrk.com>; Abboud, Alexis J. <AJAbboud@wlrk.com>; Berlinski,
John V. (Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <jberlinski@birdmarella.com>; Julia B.
Cherlow <jcherlow@birdmarella.com>; Fanxi Wang <fwang@birdmarella.com>; Teachout, Brandon R. (Bird, Marella,
Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <bteachout@birdmarella.com>

Counsel,
Thank you for the letter we received last night addressing a number of outstanding issues with Nouvel’s and Plaintiffs’
document productions. We think it makes sense for us to meet and confer about Tenute’s responses to Plaintiffs’
document requests after we have had time to consider the points you raise and discuss them with our clients. To give us
time to do that and due to other commitments next week, we suggest that we meet and confer next Friday. We have
pretty good availability after 11 a.m. ET. In addition to Tenute’s responses, we will want to talk about the issues raised
in your letter and Plaintiffs’ responses and objections to Nouvel’s RFPs.
With respect to the joint privilege issues you raise, you write in your letter that “[t]he ball is in your and Ms. Jolie’s
court”. We disagree. It is Plaintiffs who are withholding the production of responsive documents on the basis of the
joint privilege. If you believe that a stipulation is necessary, please propose one that outlines the conditions under
which documents subject to a joint privilege will be produced. We prepared to agree that Nouvel will produce
documents that are subject to a joint privilege to the joint privilege holders and that any such production on by any
party does not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Jonathan Mooney
T: 212-474-1460
jmooney@cravath.com
From: Drivas, Ioannis D. <IDDrivas@wlrk.com>

Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 7:22 PM
To: Keith Hummel <KHummel@cravath.com>; Justin C. Clarke <jcclarke@cravath.com>; Jonathan Mooney
<jmooney@cravath.com>; Benjamin Ahn <bahn@cravath.com>; joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com;
Cc: Moses, Jonathan M. <JMMoses@WLRK.com>; Goodman, Adam L. <ALGoodman@wlrk.com>; Grosbard, Remy K.
<RKGrosbard@wlrk.com>; Allen, Jessica L. <JLAllen@wlrk.com>; Abboud, Alexis J. <AJAbboud@wlrk.com>; Berlinski,
John V. (Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <jberlinski@birdmarella.com>; Julia B.
Cherlow <jcherlow@birdmarella.com>; Fanxi Wang <fwang@birdmarella.com>; Teachout, Brandon R. (Bird, Marella,
Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) <bteachout@birdmarella.com>
Subject: William B. Pitt et al. v. Angelina Jolie et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV06081
4
Counsel,
Please see the attached correspondence on behalf of Adam Goodman.
Best regards,
Ioannis
Ioannis D. Drivas
+1 (212) 403-1374 (Direct) | +1 (212) 403-2000 (Fax)
IDDrivas@wlrk.com | www.wlrk.com
=================================================
Please be advised that this transmittal may be a confidential attorney-client communication or may otherwise be
privileged or confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please do not read, copy or re-transmit this
communication. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us by e-mail (helpdesk@wlrk.com) or by
telephone (call us collect at 212-403-4357) and delete this message and any attachments.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation and assistance.

=================================================
5
EXHIBIT 18
khummel@cravath.com
3
5 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
6 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
7
8 JOE H. TUFFAHA (Bar No. 253723)

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3426
12 Telephone: (213) 612-8900
Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
13
16 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
18 limited liability company, DECLARATION OF THOMAS
HEINTZ IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-
Plaintiffs,
20 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
vs. DISCOVERY RE: JURISDICTION
21 FROM CROSS-DEFENDANTS MARC-
ANGELINA JOLIE, an individual, and OLIVIER PERRIN, SAS MIRAVAL
22 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited PROVENCE, AND SAS FAMILLES
liability company, YURI SHEFLER, an PERRIN
23 individual, ALEXEY OLIYNIK, an
individual, SPI GROUP HOLDING Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion
24
LIMITED, a Cyprus private limited and Motion to Compel, Declaration of
25 company, and TENUTE DEL MONDO Jonathan Mooney, Request for Judicial
B.V., a Netherlands private limited Notice, Separate Statement, and Proposed
26 company, Order
27 Defendants. Judge: Hon. Lia Martin
28
DECLARATION OF THOMAS HEINTZ

1 NOUVEL, LLC, a California limited Dept.: 16
liability company, Date: March 4, 2024
2 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Cross-Complainant,
3 vs. Reservation No.: 134640636368
MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California Action Filed: February 17, 2022
5 limited liability company, MARC- Trial Date: None set.
6
limited liability company; VINS ET
company; SAS MIRAVAL STUDIOS, a
13 company; SAS DISTILLERIES DE LA
15
Cross-Defendants.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 I, Thomas Heintz, declare as follows:
2 1. I am an attorney with Bosco Avocats, counsel to Nouvel, LLC (“Nouvel”). I am admitted
3 to the French bar and am established in Paris, France. I have personal knowledge of the
4 facts and circumstances set forth below and if called as a witness, I could and would
5 competently testify thereto.
6 2. I have read the responses and objections to Defendant and Cross-Complainant Nouvel,
7 LLC’s First Set of Request for Production re: Personal Jurisdiction (the “Responses and
8 Objections”) served by Cross-Defendant Marc-Oliver Perrin, SAS Familles Perrin, and
9 SAS Miraval Provence (collectively the “Perrin Cross-Defendants”). (Ex. 1.)1
10 3. In the Responses and Objections, the Perrin Cross Defendants contend that Article 1bis of
11 Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1986 (Ex. 2, the “French Blocking Statute”) forbids them from
12 producing documents responsive to Nouvel’s Requests for Production except in response
13 to a letter of request made under the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of
14 Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Ex. 3, the “Hague Evidence
15 Convention”).
16 4. The Perrin Cross-Defendants state that “[f]ailure to comply with the French Blocking
17 Statute can result in criminal penalties”. (Responses and Objections at 3.) I examined the
18 caselaw in France concerning enforcement of the French Blocking Statute. The French
19 Blocking Statute has been enforced only once in France since it was first enacted in 1968.
20 Cour de cassation, criminelle, Chambre criminelle, 12 décembre 2007, pourvoi n°07-
21 83.228 (Ex. 4). In that case, a French lawyer was fined under the French Blocking Statute
22 for making false statements to a party in France and for obtaining information from the
23 party that rendered him a potential witness in a U.S. litigation under false pretenses. The
24 criminal proceedings were also initiated by the French legal entity whose documents had
25 been disclosed abroad. Based on my review of the French caselaw, no French target of
26
27 1
All exhibit references are to the Declaration of Jonathan Mooney in support of Cross-
Complainant Nouvel, LLC’s Motion To Compel Further Discovery Responses re: Jurisdiction
28 from Cross-Defendants Marc-Oliver Perrin, SAS Familles Perrin, and SAS Miraval Provence.

1 discovery requests has ever been prosecuted under the French Blocking Statute for
2 complying with those requests. In addition, although decrees related to the French
3 Blocking Statute were issued on February 18, 2022, and March 7, 2022, their sole purpose
4 is to clarify the role of the Service de l’information stratégique et de la sécurité
5 économiques (“SISSE”), a French government entity created in 2016, with regard to
6 Article 2 of the French Blocking Statute (“The persons referred to in Articles 1 and 1 bis
7 are required to inform the competent minister without delay when they receive any request
8 concerning such communications”), and thus to clarify the procedure for referrals to the
9 French authorities by companies faced with requests for the transmission of information to
10 foreign authorities.
11 5. I also examined the French caselaw concerning letters of request for documents under the
12 Hague Evidence Convention. Based on my review of the French caselaw, French judges
13 reject the United States-style discovery requests seeking categories of documents. For
14 example, in 2010 the Court of Appeal of Paris held that requests made under the Hague
15 Convention for, among other things, “[a]ll documents concerning the sale by Alstom of
16 cruise ships to Renaissance between August 3, 1999, and August 12, 2003” and “[a]ll
17 documents concerning any guarantee (total or partial) granted by Alstom in connection
18 with financing granted by the bank to Renaissance from August 3, 1999 to August 12,
19 2003” were “not precisely defined” and were “excessively broad”. (Ex. 5 at 2, 4.) The
20 court then rejected the requests in light of France’s reservation under Article 23 of the
21 Hague Evidence Convention. (Id.) Similarly, in 2020, the Judicial Tribunal of Saint-
22 Étienne invoked France’s reservation under Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention
23 to reject requests for document on the basis that they were “formulated in general and
24 imprecise terms, concerned a significant number of documents, and included no temporal
25 limitation”. (Ex. 6.)
26 6. Under the French Code of Civil Procedure, judges possess the authority to reject stipulated
27 discovery requests even if the involved parties mutually agree on the scope of discovery.
28 A French judge may, ex officio, reject a request that is likely to prejudice the sovereignty or
-2-
1 security of the French state. See Code of Civil Procedure, Article 745 (Ex. 7); Hague
2 Evidence Convention, Article 12 (Ex. 3). The judge may also reject a request that is likely
3 to infringe business secrecy.
4 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
7 Executed on January 22nd, 2024, in Paris, France.
10
11
12
13
14 Thomas Heintz
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-3-

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1 KEITH R.

HUMMEL (admitted pro hac vice)

8 JOE H. TUFFAHA (Bar No. 253723)

DECLARATION OF JONATHAN MOONEY

6 I could and would competently testify thereto.

16 3. In their verified Responses and Objections to Defendant and Cross-Complaining

DECLARATION OF JONATHAN MOONEY

2 do not contend that the above statements are confidential.

3 4. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 2016.040, prior to filing this

7 unless a letter of request is served pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.

18 8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a criminal judgment of

23 Novembre 2010 – n° 10/08413 and its certified English translation.

28 Procedure, Article 745, and its certified English translation.

7 Request for Production re Jurisdiction to the Perrin Cross-Defendants.

10 the French Republic concerning that declaration in 1987.

14 American Bar Association dated October 9, 2003.

17 Conference on Private International Law.

21 Feb. 18, 2022”) and its certified English translation.

28 Application for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.

5 Thomas Heintz dated January 22, 2024 .

8 foregoing is true and correct.

9 Executed on January 22, 2024, in New York, NY, USA.

11 /s/ Jonathan Mooney

CROSS-DEFENDANT MARC-OLIVIER PERRIN’S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO NOUVEL, LLC’S

19 S. Gale Dick (admitted pro hac vice)

🛈🛈 Last update of this text: January 1, 2002

Version effective as of January 11, 2024

Article 1 Modified by Law 80-538 1980-07-16 Art. 2 I JORF [Official

Article 1 bis Introduced by Law 80-538 1980-07-16 Art. 2 II JORF

&'611((()!* )! )*111+,-./01/22222232072 010

(Concluded 18 March 1970)

The States signatory to the present Convention,

CHAPTER I – LETTERS OF REQUEST

A Letter of Request shall specify –

CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES

A Contracting State, if required to do so because of constitutional limitations, may request the

A State may at any time withdraw or modify a declaration.

Presiding Judge Rapporteur

In view of the brief produced;

The grounds of appeal being gathered together;

It follows that the pleas in law must be rejected;

And whereas the judgment is in due form;

IT DISMISSES the appeal;

General Counsel: Mr. Boccon-Gibod;

Chamber Clerk: Ms. Randouin;

Publication: Criminal Bulletin No. 309, 2007

 Titles and abstracts

Cour de cassation - Chambre criminelle Audience publique du mercredi 12 décembre 2007

Les moyens étant réunis ;

D'où il suit que les moyens doivent être écartés ;

Et attendu que l'arrêt est régulier en la forme ;

Avocat général : M. Boccon-Gibod ;

Greffier de chambre : Mme Randouin ;

to the parties on: IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

represented by SCP MENARD-SCELLE-MILLET, barristers at the Court

assisted by Me Ron SOFFER, attorney at the PARIS bar, number: C 2110

in the person of its legal representatives

assisted by Me Ron SOFFER, attorney at the PARIS bar, number: C 2110

represented by SCP MENARD-SCELLE-MILLET, barristers at the Court

in the person of its legal representatives

with address for service at the Palais de Justice [...].

COMPOSITION OF THE COURT:

Mr. MATET, Presiding Judge

&'611((()! )! )111+,-./01/22222232072 010