SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD VS BLR AND HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND

CONSTRUCTION CO.

FACTS: Petitioner, through its president as authorized Representative Alfie F. Alpio, filed an application
with the DOLE for registration of the name of their association. Attached in their application the list of
members, officers, and the copy of the constitution and by-laws. They had 120 total members.
Eventually, DOLE regional office in Pampanga, issued the certification of registration for the petitioner.

However, respondent filed a petition with the same regional office of DOLE for the cancellation of said
certification due to misrepresentation committed by the petitioners; respondent is claiming that the
members were not included in the types of workers enumerated in article 253. Respondent claimed that
only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite
employers can form labor’s association.

The DOLE regional director rendered its decision declaring that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim
that all members were also employees of Hajin. Hence, the certification was cancelled and grant the
petition of the petitioner.

On appeal, the Bureau of Labor relations reversed and set aside the decision of the DOLE regional
director. BLR discussed that the law is clear that the right to organize is not limited to employees but
also on workers without definite employers. It was also stated that the worker’s association is not
limited to collective bargaining. The BLR also stated that what petitioner pertains is the workplace by
using the word “at” and not the company itself by not using the word “of”. In the resolution, BLR
ordered the petitioner to remove the word “hanjin shipyard” from its name and they will still remain on
the roster of valid labor association.

Hence, samahan filed a petition in the CA which was rebutted by the respondent herein stating that the
changing of name is not tantamount in interfering with the worker’s right to self-organization.

CA rendered its decision declaring that there is indeed misrepresentation committed by the petitioner in
declaring that all of its members were employees of Hajin which in fact, only 57 out of 120 were
employees of respondent. The CA also declared that removing the phrase mentioned by the BLR will not
impair its right to self-organization. Hence, with the decision made by CA, it reinstated the decision of
the DOLE regional director on cancelling the registration and affirmed the decision of the BLR regarding
the removal of the phrase “hajin shipyard”.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion declaring that samahan cannot form a
worker’s association of employees, and reinstating the decision of the DOLE regional director.

Samahan argued that right to organize is not limited to intermittent, ambulant, or itinerant workers.
Employees with definite employer can form any association for purposes of mutual aid and protection.
Included in such right is the right to name its own organization. They claimed that hajin shipyard as their
common working place, hence, they can include such phrase in the association’s name.
HELD:

Right to self-organization includes

right to form a union, workers '
association and labor management
councils
- Article 252 provides that the right to self-organization includes the right to form, join, or assist labor
association for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives in their own choosing and
to engage in peaceful concerted activities for the purpose of their mutual aid and protection.

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the
liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.

The law even encourages employee to form an organization. A labor organization is any union or
association of employees for purposes of collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment. Hence, it encompasses the right to bargain collectively and to deal
with employers in conditions of employment.

While a union refers to any labor organization that is organized for collective bargaining and other
lawful purposes. Worker’s association is an organization formed for the mutual aid and protection of its
members or for any other purposes other than collective bargaining.

Many associations or groups of employees, or even combinations of only several persons, may qualify as
a labor organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor
organization, not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is one of organization,
composition and operation.

The court discussed the collective bargaining is only one of the means of dealing with employers. It is
not the sole end goal of employee’s representation. The aim of such is EMPLOYEE’S PARTICIPATION.

In worker’s association, what law only needs is that all workers have the same mutual interest; er-ee is
not mandatory.

Right to choose whether to form or

join a union or workers' association
belongs to workers themselves
- The court disagree with the contention of Respondent that petitioners have definite employers, hence
they should have formed a union instead of worker’s association. Article 253 together with sections 1
and 2 of DO No. 40-03 clearly explained the scope and right of workers to form workers association.
Hence, the right to form a union or worker’s association is not limited to intermittent, ambulant,
itinerant, self-employed, and rural workers. The option to join a union or association is within the
prerogative of the workers themselves.
No misrepresentation on the part
of Samahan to warrant cancellation
of registration
- The Supreme Court ruled that in order for misrepresentation to be a ground for cancellation of
certificate of registration, it must be done maliciously and deliberately. Respondent Hanjin failed to
explain how the phrase “kami ang manggagawa ng hanjin shipyard” constitute misrepresentation.

Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard"

from the association 's name, however,
does not infringe on Samahan 's right to
self-organization
- The court agreed with the BLR that the petitioner should remove the word “hanjin shipyard” and
removal of such do not infringe their right to self-organization. The court refers to the corporation code,
section 18 where no corporate name may be allowed if the proposed name is identical or confusingly
similar. Hence, the use of such would be misleading as it could give wrong impression that all members
are employed in Hanjin.

The court also cite section 9 of DO No. 40-03 where it explains that changing of name will not affect the
validity, legality, and the obligations and rights of the union or association in their old name, hence, it
will be carried out.
PAPER INDUSTRIES COROPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V LAGUESMA AND TECHNICAL STAFF
EMPLOYEES UNION, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in manufacturing paper and timber products. It has over 9,000 employees.
944 of which were supervisory and technical staff employees; 487 of these supervisory and technical
staff are signatory of the PRIVATE RESPONDENT PICOP-bislig supervisory and technical staff employees
union or the PBSTSEU.

Eventually, PBSTSEU filed a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for cba purposes.

PICOP requested for 15 day extension period, which however they failed to do. Federation of free
workers and associated labor union filed their petition for intervention. Med arbiter Gamolo set the
holding of a certification of election among PICOP’S supervisory and technical staff employees with 4
choices, which are, PBSTSEU, FFW, ALU, no union at all.

PICOP then now is arguing that med-arbiter Gamolo gravely abused its discretion in deciding the petition
without giving the petitioner the chance to file its comment and claiming that PBSTSEU did not have any
legal personality.

During the pre-election conference, PICOP questioned the inclusion of several sections heads and
supervisors. PICOP stated that due to reorganization, supervisors were already classified as managerial,
hence do not have a right to participate in organization. Under the reorganization, the company was
subdivided into 4 groups; namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest Resource
Business and Support Services Business. PICOP advanced the view that considering the alleged present
authority of these section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial
employees, and hence, ineligible to form or join any labor organization.

After the submission of position paper, Med-arbiter Pura issued an order declaring that supervisors and
sections heads were indeed managerial employees. On appeal to the DOLE, which undersecretary
Laguesma, reversed and set aside the resolution of Pura, declaring that supervisors and sections heads
were not managers but indeed under supervisory employees and are eligible to vote in the certification
election.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Undersecretary Laguesma gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the
section heads and supervisors are under supervisory employees.

HELD: The court ruled that the sections heads and supervisors in this case were under supervisory
employees as they are not actually laying down company policies. The contention of PICOP that they
have the right to hire and fire is ambiguous. The decision they are making regarding the hiring, firing,
and the decision making per se is under the confirmation and approval of their superiors. Hence, no
independent judgment is present in this case, the authority they have is only recommendatory and is
always subject to evaluation and review.
The court also noted that the belated questioning of PICOP regarding the certification election is bereft
of merit and justify their intention to circumvent the right of supervisors and technical heads. Hence, the
petition was dismissed. Finding the subject supervisors and section heads as supervisory employees
eligible to vote in the certification election are AFFIRMED.

3 types of manager: Top managers, middle managers, and first line managers or supervisors.

Top and middle- managerial; first line- supervisor

SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE V MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND
MAGKAISA-ADLO

FACTS: Respondent Magkaisa-adlo filed a petition in the DOLE regional branch in San Fernando
Pampanga for direct certification. They are claiming that they are a legitimate labor organization that is
duly registered in the Ministry of labor and employment; that almost 62 percent of the employees of
SAJELCO were members. They also stated that there have been no other bargaining unit for the past 12
months.

However, the petition filed by respondent was opposed by petitioner herein SAJELCO stating that other
members of the said organization were members-consumers of cooperative, which, cannot join, assist,
or form a labor organization, much more to participate in the certification election. Petitioner cited by-
laws to substantiate its claim that those members of cooperative are prohibited in participating.

The med-arbiter rendered its decision by granting the petition for direct certification of election. It
declared that even some members were members of cooperatives, it cannot deny the fact that they are
also employees of SAJELCO. Hence, they should enjoy the right to self-organization.

On appeal, the BLR sustained the decision rendered by the med-arbiter.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

The solicitor general is of the opinion that med-arbiter’s and BLR’s decision should be set aside. It is
undisputed that there were members that is also a member of cooperative, hence, a fusion of
personality; it will be inconsistent as the OSG stated to bargain within themselves as they are one of the
same person. The right to self-organize is not applicable to employers and his co-owners.

The only issue presented for resolution in this petition is whether or not the employees-members of
an electric cooperative can organize themselves for purposes of collective bargaining.

Held: The Supreme court, citing jurisprudence, declared that members of cooperatives which is not rank
and file, cannot exercise right to self-organization because as co-owners, they cannot bargain to
themselves.

The court explained what cooperative is; where in cooperative, the members are the ones who operates
the business while the other are its employees. They are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon
the affair of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interests, They enjoy special privileges as —
exemption from income tax and sales taxes, preferential right to supply their products to State agencies
and even exemption from minimum wage laws.
The petition is granted, the SC held that only rank-and-file employees and not its members-consumers
can exercise right to self-organization. Thus, the direct certification was set aside and the DOLE regional
is directed to determine the number of rank and file employees, to rule if whether or not there is
compliance made by the SAMAHAN and if there is, to conduct a direct certification.
UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION V LAGUESMA AND PEPSI-COLA PRODUCT PHIL

FACTS: Petitioners is a union for supervisory employees of pepsi-cola product phil. Petitioners filed a
petition for certification election on behalf of its route managers. However, it was denied by the med-
arbiter and by the secretary of labor and employment, declaring that route managers are MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES and hence is ineligible to participate for union membership according to article 255 of the
labor code.

Petitioner on this present petition, claimed that article 255 contravenes article 3 section 8 of the
constitution which encompasses the right of the people including in private or public sectors to form
unions and the like.

ISSUES: (1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial
employees and (2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming,
joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.

HELD: DISCUSSION:

The supreme Court discussed the types of Manager which are the first line manager, middle manager,
and top manager. First line manager is bound to ensure that such policies are carried out by rank-and-
file employee while top and middle manager have the authority to devise, implement, and control
strategic and operating policies.

The Supreme Court, citing jurisprudence and applying res judicata, ruled that it is well settled in the 2
previous cases involving the same that route managers were indeed a managerial employees which
functions are define under article 212 of the labor code; prerogative to hire, fire, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign, or even discipline employees.

The Supreme court also ruled that the said findings of DOLE regional director, that route managers are
managerial employees, was substantiated with evidence on records. It was shown in the position
description that the phrase “management of your job and the management of your people” indicates
that they are responsible in managing their sales team.

Supreme court also stated that route managers, in line with the definition of article 212 which compares
managerial and supervisory employees which the latter merely recommends. In this case, route
managers perform operational, human resource, financial, and marketing functions which is beyond
merely recommending as it involves laying down of operating policies for their teams. Hence, it is
unusual a supervisor to be given a task of protecting and expanding of the company’s business.

The claim that they do not hire or fire is bereft of merit because such function is being exercise by the
human resource or personnel department in line with the delineation of functions and responsibilities.
SECOND QUESTION REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 255 AS THE PETITIONER
CONTENDS THAT IT VIOLATES ARTICLE 3 SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES The right
of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Under the old industrial peace act, managers are only sub-category of supervisory which both did not
have the right to self-organization.

The court stated that article 3 section 8 of the constitution provides that it should be contrary to law and
article 255 of the labor code has its rational basis in prohibiting managerial employees in joining,
assisting, and forming a union. Like confidential employees, by the nature of their position, they have
the capacity and right to access confidential matters.

Citing jurisprudence, the Court explained that if the managerial employees will be allowed to join, form,
or assist a union, then conflict of interest will arise; such that it will be detrimental to the employer as
well as to the employee. For the employer, loyalty cannot be assured; and for the employee, the union
may be dominated by the company as managers are also a member of it.
METROLAB INDUSTRIES INC V ROLDAN-CONFESOR, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS

FACTS: Respondent Metro drug corp employees association- federation of free workers is a labor
organization who represents the rank-and-file employee of metrolab industries inc.

Year 1990, the CBA between petitioner and respondent had expired. The negotiation for the new cba,
turns out in deadlock.

Hence, the respondent filed a notice of strike as they failed to settle the dispute in the national
conciliation and mediation board.

Secretary of labor and employment, torres, pursuant to the labor code, assumed the jurisdiction to
settle the dispute. Torres prohibited any strike or lockout that will worsen the situation.

Labor secretary torres ordered the parties to have a new CBA. Which the union filed a motion for
reconsideration; during the pendency of the said motion, 94 of rank and files employees were laid off by
Metrolab. Hence, the union filed a motion to desist such act of metrolab as it will excarbate the
situation. However, metrolab claimed that it is just a temporary lay-off and a valid exercise of
management prerogative; to avoid losses and due to automation of the production of eskinol,
employees should be reduced.

Acting secretary Confesor, rendered a decision, declaring that metrolab committed illegal dismissal and
ordered the company to reinstate the laid-off employees and to pay full backwages. The decision was
justify that the act of metrolab violates the prohibition made by the secretary of labor and employment
to avoid acts that will exacerbate the situation and the dismissal violates the 30-day notice rule.

Labor Secretary Confesor also ruled that executive secretaries are excluded from the closed-shop
provision of the CBA, not from the bargaining unit.

Hence, the union filed a motion for execution which was opposed by metrolab. Hence the present
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the labor secretary gravely abused its discretion in declaring that illegal dismissal
has been committed and whether or not it gravely abused its discretion in including executive
secretaries as part of the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.

HELD: In the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the claim of metrolab is bereft of merit.
Management prerogative is not boundless, it has limitation that can be imposed by law, cba, and the
principle of fair play and justice. The order made by the labor secretary is valid as it assumes jurisdiction
pursuant to article 263 of the labor code. Hence, his order to both parties to avoid doing acts that will
exacerbate the situation as the case is of national interest, is a valid order.

It is not disputed that metrolab is one of the leading manufacturer of medical and pharmaceutical
product. Its management prerogative, as its right, still has limitation considering the case and
circumstance in this case.

The court explained that act of exacerbation need not be in violence and should not be based on
speculative reactions; hence, acts that will give rise to further contentious issues may be considered as
an of exacerbation.

It is to be noted that the lay-off was committed during the pendency of the case; hence, it causes drastic
delay and it diverted the attention of parties to settle the additional issues caused by the said lay-off.

SECOND ISSUE: whether or not it gravely abused its discretion in including executive secretaries as part
of the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.

The Supreme Court affirmed the position of metrolab that executive secretaries should not be excluded
in the closed shop provision but also from the membership of the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees as they are considered as confidential employees who have access to vital labor information.

The court ruled that article 255 has been extended to confidential employees, citing jurisprudence. The
court explained that like managerial employees, confidential employees should act in the interest of the
employer as it holds confidential information that would be detrimental to employers if it will be
disclosed to the union if they are allowed to join or form such.

The petitioner failed to explain how the inclusion will avoid conflict of interest. Hence, even if they are
not members of the union, but on the bargaining unit, will still be the same.

The petition is partially granted. The first issue was resolved in favor of the union, the second issue was
in favor of the company.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND DUBRIN IN
HER CAPACITY AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

FACTS: Petitioner SCBEU-NUBE and respondent Standard chartered bank started negotiating for a new
CBA as the old cba already expired. Due to deadlock on the negotiation, it prompted petitioner to file a
notice of strike; hence, the secretary of labor and employment assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

The secretary ordered to them to execute new CBA and to incorporate the dispositions and the
agreements they reached through their negotiation and conciliation. The charge of unfair labor practice
was dismissed.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner assailed the decision of the secretary.

ISSUE: I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR REVISING THE SCOPE
OF EXCLUSIONS FROM THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT UNDER THE CBA.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT A ONE-MONTH OR LESS TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF A
POSITION (ACTING CAPACITY) DOES NOT MERIT ADJUSTMENT IN REMUNERATION.

The resolution has been overtaken by the CBA conducted in the year 2003-2005; nevertheless, the court
ruled that while the case is moot and academic, they still need to decide and to render decision to evade
repetition as this would be most likely happen again the further CBA.

The adjustment that the petitioner is assailing is the exclusion of other members-employees in the
bargaining unit and the adjustment regarding the remuneration of employees in acting capacity for one
month. They sought that the exclusion should only be managerial employees and confidential
employees.

In the cast at bar, the question need to be answered is whether the bank chief cashiers, assistance
cashiers, personnel of the telex program are confidential employees, hence, should be excluded.

Citing jurisprudence, the court ruled that bank cashiers and assistant cashiers are confidential
employees that should be excluded as they have access to confidential labor relation matter.
The court also ruled by citing jurisprudence, that personnel staff in which human resource can be
qualified, is also a confidential employee who holds confidential matter and has the capacity to access
such.

However, while the contention of petitioners in excluding such managerial and confidential employees,
it failed to show that employees were actually a managerial and confidential employee.
The court also ruled that the adjustment in the remuneration of the acting employees for more than one
month did not violate the equal pay equal work principle. It is natural for them to be entitled in such
salary as they should not be place for temporary employees for more than one month without the
corresponding fair and just salary.

Hence, the petition is denied. The court ruled that under rule 45, petition for certiorari, it shall only raise
questions of law absent any evidence that will show that the lower court gravely abused its discretion.
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL V STO. TOMAS IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF DEPT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT AND PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG ANAKPAWIS—HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNIONS

FACTS: A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Union. They alleged that
PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization that represents HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
EMPLOYEES LABOR UNIONS. It was also stated that respondent union comprises of 120 teachers and
was duly registered. Respondent union mentioned that HCCS do not have any sole and exclusive
bargaining agent. The documents presented by respondent union includes the certificate of affiliation
with Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis Kristiyanong Alyansa ng Makabayang Obrero (PIGLAS-
KAMAO) and the certificate of registration issued by the DOLE, declaring respondent union as a
legitimate labor organization.

However, petitioner claim that respondent union do not have personality to file a petition for
certification. It lacks mutuality of interest as the members included is a mixture of managerial,
supervisor, and rank and file employees; among the members are teaching personnel, non-teaching
academic employees, and non-teaching and non-academic workers. Petitioner also stated that there are
members who are principals, supervisors, department head, which is a direct violation of article 255 of
the labor code.

This was rebutted by respondent union stating that mixture of employees is not one of the grounds for
dismissal of legitimate organization as mentioned in DOLE dept order.

Med arbiter denied the petition for certification election as she held that the unit was inappropriate due
to improper composition of the bargaining unit and the validity of majority representation claims.

It was also discussed that from the members of the bargaining unit, there exist a distinction between the
teaching and non-teaching staff. Hence, wanting of mutuality of interest which is the test in determining
the constituency of the bargaining unit. It is because the acceptability of a unit is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will assure the exercise of collective bargaining rights.

Hence, private respondent appealed in the secretary of labor and employment regarding the dismissal
due to inappropriateness by the med-arbiter.

SOLE ruled that there is an existing differences between the teaching and non-teaching staff between its
nature, hours and conditions of work, and salary determination. However, SOLE is of the opinion that
this inappropriateness of such bargaining unit is not one of the ground for the dismissal of the said
petition for certification.

Hence, SOLE reversed the decision of the med-arbiter. SOLE citing jurisprudence, that inappropriateness
of the bargaining unit will not dismiss the certification election and will not invalidate the labor
organization. However, they were ordered by SOLE to have a separate certification of election for a
bargaining unit among teaching personnel and non-teaching personnel.

On the petition for certioarari filed by HCCS, it declared that there is no commingling of employees
despite its mixture as it failed to show that the principals, dept head, coordinators are indeed a
managerial employee or a supervisor.

ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONFLICTING RULING ALLOWING THE
CONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY UPHOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT UNION REPRESENTED A
BARGAINING UNIT DESPITE ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THERE IS NO MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN
THE MEMBERS OF RESPONDENT UNION APPLYING THE TEST LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FERRER-CALLEJA

HELD:
The court ruled that the invalidity of one of the members does not make the union illegal where the
requisites needed by law for the organization are satisfied and met.
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO V ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER’S UNION AND ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY INC.

FACTS: Petitioner Victoriano is a member of INC and who is employed in Elizalde rope Factory Inc. Under
the former CBA, it contains a closed shop agreement where the membership in the union is a condition
of employment to retain such employment.

Prior the amendment made by RA. No. 3350, RA No. 875 employer was not precluded in making
arrangement with a labor organization to require a condition of membership in the union for
permanency of employment. However, as the mentioned amendment, it stated that such agreement is
not applicable to members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation in any labor organization.

Victoriano then now presented his resignation to the union. Hence, the union wrote a letter addressed
to the company to separate Victoriano in the said union. However, the company stated that unless
petitioner and the union could have arrangement, and if not, company will terminate his service. Thus,
prompted the petitioner to file a petition and to file an injunction.

Court of first instance of MNL declared its decision in favor of petitioner and ordering respondent to pay
attorney’s fee.

Hence, the union together with the company assailed the constitutionality of RA. No. 3350 and
questioning the decision of the lower court regarding the attorneys fee.

Union stated that ra no 3350 violates the right of all workers to form, join, or assist labor organization as
provided in the constitution and the labor code. The union also contends that it violates the obligation
of contracts in such a way that employees who are member of religious sect will be relieve in
reciprocating by way of cooperation and participation. The union also stated that ra no. 3350 is
discriminatory and impairs the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right.

It also contends that ra no 3350 violates the equal protection of laws granted in the constitution as it
granted undue advantages to the “INC members” without any adjustment in the obligations incurred.

Union also asserted that a closed shop provision cannot be considered as a violation to religious
freedom, hence, the amendment made by ra no 3350 is not necessary and should be declared
unconstitutional as it would affect trade unionism—where the employer will now favor those religious
sect members to avoid labor organizations.

Petitioner then now rebutted that ra no 3350 does not violate the right to form an organization; right to
self-organization also includes the right not to join. Petitioner contends that ra no 3350 is not a violation
of the separation of state and church as the constitutional right to exercise one’s religion has primacy
over union security measures which are only contractual. Ra No. 3350 only accommodated the religious
needs of workers whose religion prohibits its members in joining any labor organization; it also does not
violate the equal protection because there is a valid distinction, the law is germane to the purpose of
the law, and it is applied to all members of the same class.

ISSUE: whether or not ra no 3350 is unconstitutional; whether or not ra no 3350 violates the right to
form an organization

HELD: The court ruled that the right to self-organization is a right given to workers or employees on his
choice, meaning, it includes right to form and join association without any restraint and the prerogative
whether to join or not.

The Supreme Court also held that ra no 3350 does not violate the right to self-organization and the
constitutional guarantee regarding the freedom of association. It does not prohibit workers or
employees to join a union or association, regardless of being a member of a religious sect; if the
employee chooses to join, he may do so; however, if he chooses not to join, despite having closed shop
agreement, due to religious belief, he may do so without violating the closed shop agreement. Hence,
what ra no 3350 produce is not a prohibition but a protection to those religious sect members.

The Supreme Court also held that the contention of the union that it impairs contract obligation as it
affect the union security clause is bereft of merit. Legislations or laws can impair obligations of contracts
when it is enacted for the promotion of public good and welfare and the means it is employed is lawful
and constitutional. Hence, the end and means adopted should be legitimate.

The end that ra no 3350 secures is the freedom of belief and religion without affecting his employment.
As it will be prejudicial to employee who possesses all the qualification for that certain job, but cannot
be employed because of his religious belief not to join any labor organization.

Hence, the means used by the legislative, by exempting those members from the coverage of union
security agreements is reasonable and lawful. It is to be noted that the constitutional right of religious
freedom is superior than contract rights.

The court, citing jurisprudence, also explained that ra no 3350 does not violate the non-establishment
clause provided in the constitution. Ra no 3350 main purpose is secular in manner, and the effect
regarding religion is only incidental. Hence, as jurisprudence, provide, is allowed.

The act main purpose is for the protection of their tenure against the aggregate force of CBA, and
relieving them of a burden regarding their religious belief. Hence, the effect of favoring one’s religion is
only incidental to what the act really pursue. The court stated that there is no compelling state interest
to withhold the exemption.
The Supreme court also ruled that ra no 3350 does not violate the equal protection clause. What the
constitution guarantee is equality, not identity of rights. It does not limit nor forbid discrimination as to
things that are different.

Valid classification should be present to have a valid discrimination.

requisites:
1. It should be based on substantial distinction
2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions
4. It must apply to all members of the same class

The court also ruled that the necessity is beyond their concern, the threat to unionism, as it is not
existent at the time of the enactment of said act is not within the scope of the court’s judgment.

2nd issue: TINAMAD NA KO, ETO RULING. REGARDING SA ATTYS FEE LANG NAMAN

Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article provides
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's
dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according
to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing
party.

Petition dismissed.
SLORD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V BERNARDO NOYA

FACTS: Bernardo Noya was employed as a welder in petitioner slord development corp which is engaged
in manufacturing and processing of sardines and other canned goods product. Its employment was
covered by a CBA between the company and NLM-katipunan, the sole and exclusive bargaining unit for
all the REGULAR AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEE. In their CBA, a closed shop agreement under the
union security clause is provided.

Slord development stated that respondent asked several employees to sign a blank sheet of paper for
purposes of creating a new union. Hence, it was because of his act that he was removed from NLM-
katipunan due to disloyalty; and as there exist a closed shop agreement between them, he is terminated
from his employment.

Respondent then now file a complaint for illegal dismissal, ULP, and illegal deduction. He claimed that he
validly organized the said union in the freedom period.

LA RULING: Dismissed the petition. There exist a valid union security clause, hence, due to his own act,
he was validly terminated.

NLRC RULING- Affirmed the decision of the LA but with modification. NLRC granted nominal damages
because petitioner failed to observe due process. (10,000.00 PESOS NOMINAL DAMAGES)

CA RULING- Reversed and set aside the decision of the la and nlrc. Declared that respondent was
illegally dismissed. The act made by respondent by soliciting signature in a blank paper did not
constitute disloyalty, hence, not a violation in the union security clause.

Hence, the present petition.

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in reversing and setting aside nlrc and la decision.

HELD: The Supreme court discussed what union security is. It is a term which comprehends closed shop
where maintenance of membership or any form of agreement imposes upon employees to retain their
employment.

A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the
employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain
agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the
agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the
employees in interest are a part.

The law allows closed shop agreement because it promotes the exercise of one’s right to organization.
Instead of individually bargain with the employer, the employee is encourage to join labor union for the
protection of their rights and it is much more persuasive if they will act collectively.
3 requisites for valid termination through the enforcement of union security clause:
a. The union security clause is applicable
b. The union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provisions in the cba
c. There is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union

The court mentioned that it is undisputed that there exist a union security clause, a closed shop
agreement wherein employees must join in the NLM-katipunan and remain a good standing in the said
union. Otherwise, they will be terminated and as the court consistently ruled the validity of dismissal
due to violation of such closed shop agreement.

Corroborated statement and affidavits were present substantiating the act of Respondent disloyalty.

Hence, the nlrc did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that there exist a valid cause for termination
due to violation of the union security clause in their CBA. However, petitioner failed to afford due
process to the petitioner, hence, nominal damages should of course be awarded.

Hence, the petition is granted but the nominal damages awarded was adjusted from 10,000.00 pesos to
30,000.00 pesos