Anders Lassen, Thessaloniki, October-November 1944

Thessaloniki, October–November 1944

Aft er t h e t riu mph in Athens, Jellicoe continued north, now commanding th e
im p ro vis ed Po mpforce, made up of:
- t h e 4 t h In d ependent Parachute Battalion,
- t h e SB S, a irborne engineers,
- a co n t in g en t from the RAF Regiment
a n d a b a t t ery of 75-mm guns,
t o t a llin g a p p roximately 950 men.
Po m p fo rce wa s part of Operation Noah’s Ark , which sought to impede and d ela y
t h e Germ a n withdrawal from Greece by enabling guerrillas, SOE agents an d s m a ll,
fa s t -m o vin g regular units to attack their rearguards and block their way.
An ord er fro m AFHQ in Caserta to the Balkan Air Force stated: “Our main o b j ect s
a re t o p reven t enemy from withdrawing and to kill maximum number of Germ a n s .
In rea lit y, la ck of resources to implement Operation Noah’s Ark at anythin g like
fu ll s t ren g t h meant that Pompforce was one of its few tangible outcomes.
O n 2 4 O ct o b er, Jellicoe attacked Kozani, about 200 miles north of Athens.
Des p it e va lia n t efforts, especially by the paratroopers, he was unable to t a ke t h e
t o wn . T h e Germans evacuated Kozani the following morning and continued a
s eries o f fo rced marches, mostly on foot, north-west to Florin a on the bord er
wit h Yu g o s la via.
Du rin g t h e a u tumn, the Yugoslav Communist leader Josip Broz Tito had mo ved
clo s er t o t h e USSR, and his partisans had linked up with the Red Army. Tit o h a d
exp res s ed d is pleasure with the Western Allies operating in his territory, an d
J ellico e received orders not to cross the border into Yugoslavia.
Nevert h eles s , he succeeded in launching another attack against the rear o f t h e
la s t Germ a n column to leave Florina on the evening of 1 November. As Po m p fo rce
wa s u n a b le t o pursue the Germans into Yugoslavia, Jellicoe instead sent a n SB S
p a t ro l led b y Milner-Barry into Alb ania. It made contact with David Sutherla n d
a n d h is S Det achment, which had set up its HQ in Korçë, about 20 miles wes t o f
t h e b o rd er.
W h ile Po m p fo rce advanced towards Yugoslavia and Albania, Lassen and M
Sq u a d ro n p u s hed up the east coast of Greece, through the Sporades archip ela g o ,
b o u n d fo r T h essaloniki – the second biggest city in the country, with a po p u la t io n
o f 3 2 0 – 3 5 0 , 0 0 0, significant indust ry, a major railway hub, an important po rt a n d
t wo a irfield s n ear the border with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
O n 2 3 O ct o b er, after a pleasant stay in a villa in Faliron – perhaps the ho m e o f
t h e yo u n g la d y whom Lassen may have visited on his way to Athens – M
Sq u a d ro n s a iled from Piraeus aboard the gunboat ML458.
In a d d it io n t o their usual weapons and equipment, the men of the newly d u b b ed
Scru m fo rce h ad two PIATs and were accompanied by Royal Engineers and R o ya l
Na vy p ers o n n el.
M Sq u a d ro n was the core of Scrumforce – a reconnaissance outfit under La s s en ’ s
co m m a n d . It s main aim was to prepare for the occupation of Thessaloniki, wh ich
t h e Germ a n s were getting ready to evacuate. On 25 October, the day after
Scru m fo rce s et sail, the German admiral in command of the Aegean moved h is
h ea d q u a rt ers from Thessaloniki to Vienna. All air traffic to and from the cit y
s t o p p ed t h e s ame day.
O n 2 6 O ct o b er, Army Group E HQ, which had already moved out of the cit y,
received wo rd from Thessaloniki that 30 fully loaded trains were ready to lea ve
fro m in a n d a round the city, and t hat the deadline for the evacuation, which h a d
b een s et fo r 2 8 October, could onl y be met if they left very soon.
T h e B rit is h m ay not have been aware of all of the German preparations fo r
wit h d ra wa l, b ut they had SOE and OSS spies in and around the city and
in t ercep t ed German radio traffic. [ 9 ] One particular message on 22 October
revea led t h a t the German forces in the city were not to leave until 24 hou rs a ft er
t h e h o s p it a l s hip Gradisca , due to dock on 26 October, had departed again .
La s s en a n d Scrumforce had orders to secure the Megalo Mikra airfield, 7.5 m iles
s o u t h -ea s t o f the big port, and set up a command post. The engineers were t o
rep a ir t h e a irfield after German attempts to sabotage it. Scrumforce was n o t t o
o p era t e in s id e Thessaloniki itself, except for patrols and small reconnaissa n ce
g ro u p s j u s t a head of the first wave of the occupying force Kelforce (2nd
In d ep en d en t Parachute Brigade Group, under the command of Brigadier C . H. V .
Prit ch a rd ) .
O n t h e m o rn ing of 24 October, M Squadron reached Skopelos, which the Germ a n s
h a d va ca t ed . That night, they continued to the neighbouring island of Skia t h o s .
T h e p la n wa s that Scrumforce would reach the island on D-Day -5 – in oth er
wo rd s , five d a ys before Kelforce arrived in Thessaloniki. The Germans had a ls o
a b a n d o n ed Skiathos, but Lassen encountered resistance from an unexpect ed
s o u rce. J u s t a s he was about to go ashore, he was flagged down by a patro l b o a t
ca rryin g a la n ding force from Turnbull’s Raiding Forces. They thought that
Skia t h o s wa s “their” island and that the SBS should not be there. After a s h o rt
d eb a t e, it wa s decided that Turnbull’s men would go ashore a few minutes b efo re
La s s en a n d h is team. The double landing took place before dawn and caus ed
s o m e co n cern among the islanders until they realised that the incomers were
B rit is h , ra t h er than returning Germans. The guests were served wine and b ra n d y
b efore b rea kfast and then invited to a church service at the cathedral to
celeb ra t e t h e liberation of the island.
O n Skia t h o s , Scrumforce was reinforced by an LRDG patrol, meaning that La s s en
n o w h a d eig h t officers and 68 NCOs and men (SBS: 6/55 and LRDG: 2/13) . It a ls o
h a d a j eep wit h a trailer, which may have cheered Lassen, who was otherwis e
s o m ewh a t d is satisfied with once a gain being sent to sea while his colleagu es
Su t h erla n d a n d Patterson, who led S and L squadrons, were to fight on lan d .
La s s en h a d co mplained to Jellicoe, but his otherwise accommodating boss
t h rea t en ed t o demote him unless he did as he was told.
T h e B rit is h d id not know if the Germans had evacuated the northern Spora d es o r
wh et h er Scru mforce risked running into hostile forces. As a result, the fas t a n d
well-a rm ed b u t highly conspicuous ML458 was replaced with two more dis creet
ca iq u es fro m t he Levant Schooner Flotilla, under the command of Lieutena n t Alec
M cLeo d o f t h e Royal Navy Commandos. Unloading a jeep and trailer from a
ca iq u e wo u ld be no easy task, but Lassen ensured Kelforce HQ that it cou ld b e
d o n e, a n d t h e vehicle was loaded on board.
Scru m fo rce co ntinued heading north at a sedate pace, in bright, warm sun s h in e.
O n t h e m o rn ing of Wednesday 25 October, the caiques laid to beside a Brit is h
n a vy ves s el t h at Lassen’s Greek interpreter Jason Mavrikis described as “a h u g e
b a t t les h ip ”. W hatever kind of ship this 'monster of the seas' was, it made t h e
m en in t h e ca iques feel “like mice”. Lassen climbed on board to speak wit h t h e
ca p t a in , wh ile the British sailors b ombarded the caiques with chocolate, b is cu it s
a n d wh a t ever other food they had at hand – a welcome supplement to the u s u a l
“co m p o ” ra t io ns. Early on 26 October, the two caiques docked in the small p o rt o f
Nea Po t id a ea , about 34 miles sout h of Thessaloniki. They managed, albeit wit h
s o m e d ifficu lt y, to manoeuvre the jeep onto land. A local dignitary offered t h e
g u es t s s h elt er in his home near the harbour, where Lassen set up his com m a n d
post.
T h e s a m e a ft ernoon, Lassen, Mavrikis and two of their comrades drove no rt h in
t h e j eep o n a reconnaissance mission. As was the norm when Lassen was b eh in d
t h e wh eel, t h ey travelled at breakneck speed. At 21:00, they stopped in a fo res t
t o relieve t h emselves, and heard German voices in the dark. They crept clo s er,
s a w 3 – 4 m en chatting around an armoured car and overpowered them wit h o u t
firin g a s h o t . After destroying the engine of the armoured car, the four sco u t s
s q u eezed t wo of the prisoners on board the now packed jeep and drove to Nea
Po t id a ea wit h them.
At 0 5 :0 0 o n F riday 27 October, Scrumforce was joined by Major D.S.L. Do d s o n o f
t h e SO E. Alo n g with his interpreter, Maniotopoulos, and his radio operator,
Serg ea n t Pa rker, he had been sent to assist Kelforce. They were supposed t o
la n d o n Ep a n o mi, on the southern outskirts of Thessaloniki, but the weath er wa s
t o o p o o r t o la nd their heavy and fragile radio equipment safely, so their p a t ro l
b o a t co n t in u ed to Nea Poteidaia.
Aft er d is cu s s ing the situation, Lassen and Dodson decided that the latter s h o u ld
t ry t o g et a s close to Thessaloniki as possible – preferably all the way into t h e
cit y. La s s en g ave Dodson an escort of six LRDG men, under the command o f a
Lieu t en a n t B a rker.
At 1 5 :0 0 , Do d son and his group left Nea Poteidaia in a commandeered bus . Aft er
t a kin g a win d ing route, they arrived in the village of Mantzarides, on the s o u t h -
ea s t ern o u t s kirts of Thessaloniki, at 21:00. Mantzarides was an ELAS outp o s t ,
a n d t h e p a rt is ans were preparing to attack the military airfield at Sedes, a ro u n d
fo u r m iles s o u th of the village. Lieutenant Barker was keen to join the bat t le t h e
fo llowin g d a y, so Dodson left him and his men behind with the partisans. Do d s o n
h im s elf, a lo n g with the interpreter and the radio operator, continued to th e
villa g e o f Pa n orama, just under fo ur miles south-east of Thessaloniki.
T h e h illt o p village lived up to its name, providing an excellent view over t h e
wh o le o f t h e city and its environs. After some wrangling with the local ELAS
p eo p le, a h o u se was made availab le, where Dodson billeted his men before
d a rkn es s fell. He then went to meet the local ELAS divisional commanders fo r a
p ro gres s rep o rt, which the radio operator, Sergeant Parker, then sent to SO E HQ
in C a iro . Do d s on knew that the Communist partisans, with some justificatio n ,
co n s id ered t h e Allied liaison officers to be their enemies in the struggle fo r
p o wer in Greece. With this in mind, he said nothing about the SOE and cla im ed t o
b e h ea d o f a British vanguard company that was in Nea Poteidaia and that h e h a d
g o n e a h ea d t o reconnoitre.
W h ile M a j o r Dodson was in Panorama, Lassen also made contact with ELAS.
Scru m fo rce was not just carrying out reconnaissance ahead of Kelforce’s a n d in g
a t T h es s a lo n iki. Lassen and his men were also charged with gathering
in t ellig en ce o n the ELAS forces in the area, and playing a role in another o n e o f
“A” F o rce’ s d ecoy operations.
F o llo win g t h e morning meeting with Dodson, Lassen had made contact wit h s o m e
lo ca l ELAS p eople. His interpreter, Jason Mavrikis, quizzed them about their
o rg a n is a t io n , strength, weapons, etc.
Aft er a q u ick lunch, Lassen, Mavrikis, McLeod and Lassen’s driver, Sam Tra ffo rd ,
d ro ve 3 0 m iles north to the ELAS HQ in the district capital, Polygyros. Arrivin g a t
1 6 :00 , t h ey m et with a large group of officers who were clearly surprised t o s ee
B rit is h s o ld iers so far north. The partisans plied their guests with water an d – in
M a vrikis ’ o p in ion – “doubtful” coffee, after which Lassen and McLeod, with t h e
h elp o f t h e in terpreter, began to question their hosts about German minefield s in
t h e a rea , b o t h at sea and on land, asking that they be marked on McLeod’ s m a p .
La s s en a n d M cLeod asked about minefields not just on the road to Thessa lo n iki,
b u t a ls o a lo n g the coast at Kavala – a town about 80 miles east of Thessa lo n iki
a n d a b o u t 3 0 miles south of the border with Bulgaria.
Du rin g a b rea k in the three-hour conversation about minefields, some of t h e ELAS
p eo p le a s ked Mavrikis why the British were so interested in the waters and
b ea ch es a t K a vala. Mavrikis “unwittingly let the information pass that a very
la rg e Allied co nvoy with a strong armada with at least 3 Army divisions wit h
a rm o u r, a rt illery, and all necessary paraphernalia was awaiting our signal t o s t a rt
a n in va s io n in that particular area”.
M a vrikis ’ “g a ffe” was, like Lassen and McLeod’s demonstrative interest in t h e
s it u a t io n in t h e Greek-Bulgarian border region, part of “A” Force’s Operation
Second Undercut . The aim was to expand the small British force in Greece b y
m a s s ively rein forcing the existing III Corps – also known as “Headquarters La n d
F o rces , Greece” – with the fictitious British 34th and 57th Infantry division s a n d
5 t h Airb o rn e Division. In contrast to “A” Force’s past performances, which h a d
b een m a in ly s taged for the benefit of the Germans, the audience for Second
Undercut wa s ELAS, and through t hem the Soviet leadership. The British d id n o t
t ru s t St a lin t o adhere to the Moscow Agreement, under which control of Greece
wo u ld b e left to the British.
R ein fo rcin g III Corps was designed to deter the Russians from supporting a n
a t t em p t ed t a keover by ELAS or moving Red Army troops from Bulgaria into
Greece. It is not known whether the message about British interest in Kava la
a ct u a lly rea ch ed Red Army Command in Bulgaria, but the Soviets did rema in
n o rt h o f t h e b order.
W h en n ig h t fell, Lassen and his companions drove back to Nea Poteidaia. T h e
n ext m o rn in g , 28 October, Scrumforce started to advance towards Thessa lo n iki.
T h a t even in g , the raiders came across German troops near the American
a g ricu lt u ra l co llege on the outskirts of the city. During the fighting, the two PIAT
ro cket la u n ch ers, which were designed to fire grenades in a straight traject o ry a t
a rm o u red veh icles or buildings, were instead used as mortars. Further skirm is h es
en s u ed o n t h e outskirts of the city. There were also verbal clashes with so m e
ELAS p a rt is a n s, who did not share Lassen’s interest in attacking the Germ a n s , b u t
p referred t o let them withdraw without a fight – presumably with a view t o fillin g
t h e p o wer va cuum that they would leave in their wake.
La s s en s et u p his command post in an American school close to the agricu lt u ra l
co lleg e a n d s pent the evening on reconnaissance. The naval officer, Martin
So lo m o n , wh o was Lassen’s liaison officer to the Royal Navy, and Lassen’s
s econ d -in -co mmand in M Squadron, Captain Henshaw, went out to find a co a s t a l
b a t t ery t h a t , according to the locals, the Germans were about to evacuate. Alo n g
t h e wa y, t h ey managed to surprise and destroy a supply truck that was hea d in g
o u t t o t h e b a t tery. This success encouraged them to try to bluff the Germ a n s in t o
s u rren d erin g . Henshaw, who spoke German, sent a letter to the German
co m m a n d er, s tating that he was surrounded by a large British force and th a t
im m ed ia t e s u rrender was the wisest course of action. While Henshaw and
So lo m o n wa it ed for their interpreter to return with a response, they were
u n exp ect ed ly joined by two Germans on their way back from the pub. In t h e
d a rkn es s , t h ey mistook the British for their own side and were taken priso n er.
T h e Germ a n b attery commander was not fooled by Henshaw's ruse and ha d
a p p a ren t ly ra ised the alarm. The sound of engine noise pierced the darknes s .
Su d d en ly, Hen shaw and Solomon were all but surrounded by a larger Germ a n
fo rce in t ru cks, accompanied by tanks and self-propelled artillery. The two
o fficers b ea t a swift retreat, taking their prisoners with them, but leaving b eh in d
La s s en ’ s b elo ved jeep. Once they were out of immediate danger, the full g ra vit y
o f t h eir s elf-in flicted predicament dawned on them. The thought of return in g t o
La s s en wit h o u t his beloved jeep was too horrible to contemplate. Henshaw a n d
So lo m o n s p en t a restless night in the woods with their prisoners. Shortly b efo re
d a wn , Hen s h a w sneaked back to the spot where they had left the jeep. Lu ckily, it
wa s s t ill t h ere. When the Germans began blowing up their gun emplacemen t s ,
Hen s h a w d ro ve off, using the nois e as cover. When they arrived back at t h e
co m m a n d p o s t , they told Lassen what had happened. “You have done well, ” h e
s a id , “b u t h a d you not brought ze jeep back, I would have slit your throat s . ”
“I rea lly t h in k that he would have done it,” Solomon wrote later. Whether o r n o t
So lo m o n rea lly believed this of Lassen, it is certainly significant that his s t o ry
a b o u t t h e ep is ode – like Hancock’s story about the fiasco on Paros – was a s m u ch
a b o u t t h e fea r of Lassen’s fiery temperament and brutality as it was about t h e
en co u n t er wit h the enemy.
O n Sa t u rd a y 2 8 October, Dodson and his companions saw columns of smoke
ris in g a b o ve t he city from the mountains between Panorama and Thessalo n iki.
W h ile h e co u ld not see what was going on, he did not doubt that the Germ a n s
wo u ld wit h d ra w very soon. Massive destruction preceded the departure – Germ a n
en g in eers s p ent days rendering th e port useless. Forty-four scuppered ship s
b lo cked t h e a pproach, the shipyard had been razed to the ground, holes h a d
b een b lo wn in the outer pier, and the Germans were preparing to blow up o t h er
p la n t a n d in s t allations.
T h e n ext m o rning, Dodson secured his interpreter a pass from the local ELAS
p eo p le a n d s ent him down into Thessaloniki to find a house where the ma j o r
co u ld wa it fo r the Germans to leave the city. However, around noon, ELAS
s t a rt ed t o d es cend Panorama mountain, heading into Thessaloniki. When Do d s o n
a s ked t h e lo cal ELAS commander to accompany him into the city that same
even in g , it p roved more difficult to obtain a pass this time. The ELAS man
referred Do d s on to divisional HQ for the pass. Later that evening, the maj o r m et
a Greek wh o worked for the International Red Cross and was due to enter
T h es s a lo n iki t he following morning. He agreed to accompany Dodson into t h e
cit y. T h ey s et off early on Monday 30 October, before the local ELAS comm a n d er
co u ld s t o p t h em. He reached Thessaloniki about 08:00. He stopped a car a n d
p ers u a d ed t h e reluctant driver to take him to Queen Olga Avenue in the cit y
cen t re. Do d s o n noted that there were still German patrols around and tha t ELAS
d id n o t s eem minded to take them on.
Aft er s eizin g control of Thessaloniki on 29 October, ELAS now aggressively
p a t ro lled t h e streets in search of people that the Communists regarded as
en em ies o f t h e new order: collabo rators, anti-Communist resistance fighters , a n d
s o o n . All a ro und the city, official and more or less spontaneous demonstra t io n s ,
p ro ces s io n s a nd festivities were held in honour of ELAS .
W h ile in T h es saloniki, Dodson hea rd that Lassen and his men were on their wa y
t o wa rd t h e cit y and had engaged a German unit that was cut off to the so u t h o f
it . He h u rried back to Panorama and sent a message to Lassen that the ro a d wa s
clea r fu rt h er north. [ 2 2 ]
La s s en wa s in deed on his way to Thessaloniki with Scrumforce. ELAS had t o ld h im
t h a t o n ly a few Germans remained in the city, so he decided to move in. [ 2 3 ] His
m o t ives a re u nclear. Perhaps he presumed Kelforce’s arrival was imminent ( in
fa ct , t h ey were delayed by sea mines and would not arrive until 8 Novemb er) ,
a n d t h a t it wo uld be in line with his orders to march into the city now. Or
p erh a p s h e h a d decided that to prevent the Germans from destroying more o f t h e
cit y' s in fra s t ructure, or to establish a British military presence before ELAS t o o k
co n t ro l, h e h a d to act immediately – Kelforce or no Kelforce. Or maybe he j u s t
co u ld n o t res ist the prospect of marching into the liberated city at the hea d o f
h is m en .
Ea rly o n M o n d ay, 30 October, Lassen led Scrumforce into Thessaloniki. It s t a rt ed
o u t a s a p a rt triumphal procession, part circus parade: Lassen’s driver Sam
T ra ffo rd wa s at the front, on a horse that had been chewing grass by the
ro a ds id e wh en the raiders arrived. Then came Lassen’s jeep and four fire t ru cks
wit h rin g in g b ells that Lassen’s men had picked up along the way. Bringing u p
t h e rea r wa s a contingent of ELAS partisans with bandoliers across their ch es t s .
T h e s t ra n g e p rocession attracted a growing number of jubilant Greeks wh o t h rew
flo wers a n d p elted the British with gifts of food and wine, while the pretties t
lo ca l g irls were invited to climb aboard the fire engines.
J o h n O . Ia t rid es, who lived with his parents in a side street off Queen Olg a
Aven u e, ( p erh aps) saw Lassen’s entry:

T h e parade I saw marched on Queen Olga Avenue (eastern end o f

t h e city) heading west, toward the center. The avenue, its side-
wa lks and side-streets were crowded and noisy as the marchers
m a de their way through the excited spectators. We were stand in g
o n the second-floor balcony of the house we occupied, on
K ryezotou Street, looking left toward Queen Olga Avenue, abou t
6 0 -80 ft away. (The building across from us had been evacuated
b y a German unit the day before). We could see the parade
( fo rmations of marching ELAS, [the communist youth organisat io n ]
EPON, other groups of civilians) on Queen Olga Avenue, in the
s p ace between the buildings astride Kryezou clearly but only fo r a
few moments as the marchers came into view and quickly wen t b y
t o our left. We did not see the start (head) of the parade but la t er
h eard there were ELAS men on horseback. For a few moments we
wa tched a single jeep go by, carrying four or five (?) men in kh a ki
B ritish field uniforms, officers' caps (two?) and round khaki
b erets. It was surrounded by cheering pedestrians and we cou ld
n o t see the occupants' faces clearly. Could that have been
La ssen's jeep? Impossible to say! (We later heard stories that
B ritish troops had landed from a submarine somewhere along t h e
C h alkidiki coast and I remember wondering how they got the j eep
o ff the submarine ...).
R eg a rd in g t h e British journalist Henry Maule’s [ 2 4 ] account of people in
T h es s a lo n iki h anging Union Jacks from their windows in the days following t h e
lib era t io n , Ia t rides recalls:

M y family had to take down its homemade British flag when

t h reatened with violence by the local EAM. [ 2 5 ]

T h e t riu m p h a l procession moved into the centre of town and passed a squ a re
wh ere s o m e lo cal Communist resistance leaders were waiting to receive th e
B rit is h a n d t h e ELAS partisans – or perhaps, just holding one of probably s evera l
p u b lic m eet in gs that day. Lassen ignored whatever was going on in the sq u a re
a n d co n t in u ed towards the harbour.
Ag a in , h is m o t ives are unclear. Did he not understand what was going on a n d
t h a t it wo u ld have been polite and diplomatically opportune to stop and greet t h e
lo ca l d ig n it a ries? Did he miss an opportunity to portray the British as libera t o rs
a n d s t ea l s o m e of the limelight from ELAS? Or did he want to show that it wa s
n o t ELAS b u t t he Greek Royal Government and its British allies who were m a s t ers
o f T h es s a lo n iki and that the Communist partisans did not have the status t o b id
Scru m fo rce welcome?
As t h e p ro ces sion approached the docks, the celebrating crowds started to
d is p ers e q u iet ly. Suddenly, Germa n snipers opened fire on the raiders. Th ey
m is s ed , b u t t he raiders and partisans found themselves in a prolonged firefig h t
wit h a g ro u p of Germans who were preparing to blow up a fuel depot. The
ra id ers , wh o h ad split into two attack groups under Lassen and Henshaw, t o o k
wh a t lit t le co ver there was and returned fire until they began to run out o f
a m m u n it io n . Some of the Germans managed to escape, but 22 were killed. O n e
ra id er t o o k a bullet to the shoulder. The fuel depot was saved. [ 2 6 ]
*
T h e n ext d a y, Tuesday 31 October, the last Germans left Thessaloniki. Las s en
t eleg ra p h ed C airo: “I have the honour to report that I am in Salonika.” Jellico e
rep lied , “Give your estimated time of arrival Athens.” [ 2 7 ]
Alm o s t t wo weeks would pass before Lassen could comply with Jellicoe’s req u es t
t o ret u rn t o t he capital. Kelforce did not arrive until 8 November, and its
rein fo rcem en t and replacement, Glisforce (7th Indian Infantry Brigade), wo u ld
n o t b e rea d y t o take over until 11 November. [ 2 8 ] Until then, and until tran s p o rt
b a ck t o At h en s could be procured, Scrumforce would have to stay in Thes s a lo n iki.
Like Do d s o n , Lassen received all s orts of practical help from the Greek ma j o r
Geo rg e Dia m a ntopoulos, who was head of SOE’s mission “Jeanne”, which h a d
b een o p era t in g since the summer of 1944 in northern Greece, and since
Sep t em b er in Thessaloniki. In September, Diamantopoulos held negotiatio n s wit h
a rep res en t a t ive of the Germans in Thessaloniki. They had expressed their
willin g n es s t o surrender if conditions could be agreed, but negotiations
even t u a lly b ro ke down, as they did in several other parts of the country. T h e
en t erp ris in g Diamantopoulos was now acting as a procurer of transport an d
a ccom m o d a t io n, as well as an interpreter and liaison to ELAS, for Lassen, Do d s o n
a n d la t er fo r t he first of the British officers who arrived with Kelforce. [ 2 9 ]
W id es p rea d violence had broken out across Thessaloniki in the final weeks b efo re
lib era t io n , a n d continued for the first few days afterwards, especially in th e
o u t lyin g d is t ricts. EAM/ELAS quickly rounded up its most prominent oppon en t s
a n d b eg a n m o nitoring all political activity and the press. The city was also
ru n n in g o u t o f food, a situation exacerbated by EAM’s arbitrary confiscatio n s .
[30]
In At h en s , from 5 December to early January, the British forces waged o p en
wa rfa re o n ELAS, using every mea ns at their disposal (including Spitfires,
Sh erm a n t a n ks and naval artillery). Thessaloniki, however, was essentially
co n t ro lled b y EAM, with the British and Indian occupation forces remaining in t h e
b a ckg ro u n d . EAM and KKE/ELAS had the military might to seize power in
T h es s a lo n iki a nd the surrounding area, but were too ambivalent, confused a n d
d ivid ed t o t a ke advantage of ELAS’ superior strength in Greek Macedonia t o s eize
a n d h o ld t h e city. On 17 January 1945, representatives of the government in
At h en s a s s u m ed control of it. [ 3 1 ]
*
M a rt in So lo m o n described his and Lassen’s role in the first week as a sort o f s elf-
a p p o in t ed m ilitary governors:

I s hall never again have as much power or enjoy anything so

m uch. Dictators for a week … Andy and I prevent riots and
m urder, we pass laws, we pardon and pass sentences. If we ha d
n o t come, much blood would have been spilt. [ 3 2 ]

Given t h e s ize of Thessaloniki, the complexity of the situation in the city a n d , in

p a rt icu la r, t h e fact that ELAS had a firm and very aggressive grip on power b y
t h e t im e La s s en and Solomon and their force of approximately 75 men arrived in
t h e cit y, it is hard to imagine that the two young officers really made the h u g e
d ifferen ce t h a t Solomon described. However, by keeping on the move con s t a n t ly
a n d m a in t a in ing an active presence, they might have been able to give th e
im p res s io n o f a much larger and more powerful force – although ELAS was
p ro ba b ly rela t ively well informed about the real numbers. Scrumforce may h a ve
b een a b le t o exert some control over a single neighbourhood, perhaps on t h e
o u t s kirt s o f t o wn toward the Megalo Mikra airbase, which they and
Dia m a n t o p o u los’ “Jeanne” mission were responsible for securing. To pave t h e
wa y fo r t h e rest of Kelforce and Glisforce, Lassen and Solomon organised civilia n
wo rk b a t t a lio ns from the areas around the port and the airbase to clear ru b b le
a n d rep a ir s a b otage damage to runways.
O cca s io n a lly, local people approached the two British officers in the hope t h a t
t h ey co u ld s o lve various everyday problems. Among them were black market eers
wh o m o re o r less openly asked for help in smuggling their ill-gotten fortun es o u t
o f t o wn , p ro b ably fearing confiscation by ELAS. Lassen took their money a n d
p ret en d ed t o arrange for it to be sent securely to Athens – but in fact he d o led it
o u t a m o n g h is own men. By the time the black-marketeers found out, Lass en a n d
So lo m o n were long gone, and the victims of their scam had nowhere to tu rn t o
co m p la in . [ 3 3 ]
M Sq u a d ro n d id not fly to Athens on leave until 10 November, when space s t a rt ed
t o b e a va ila b le again on flights. [ 3 4 ]

At h en s wa s t h e scene of a couple of weeks of parties, booze, women and t h e kin d

o f p ira t ica l a p proach to the miltary’s resources and money that was typica l o f
La s s en a n d m any of his comrades in the SBS. Lassen was usually to be fou n d in
Ed d ie’ s B a r, which acted as an unofficial HQ for the SBS, and in the sumpt u o u s
Ho t el Gra n d e Bretagne. It was in the hotel that he blocked a lift when he t ried t o
t a ke a n Am erican jeep he had stolen – to replace his own, which had been s t o len
s h o rt ly b efo re – up to his floor to stop it being stolen again. It was also h ere
t h a t , a ft er s wapping rooms with his fellow officer Charlie Clynes, he avoid ed a n
en co u n t er wit h a very angry Greek husband armed with a pistol.
No n e o f t h e a ccounts confirm whether the change of rooms, which earned C lyn es
a b u llet in t h e leg, was down to chance or yet another example of Lassen’ s
leg en d a ry a b ility to obtain intelligence.
O n T h u rs d a y 30 November, the commander of the SBS’ HQ Squadron, Walt er
M iln er-B a rry, noted in his diary:

B reakfast with Andy Lassen at a black market restaurant for ab o u t

1 5 /. Andy tells me he [is] able to keep himself nearly by sellin g
Diesel fuel!! Amoral but a modern Robin Hood.
He solemnly offered to give me a part of the proceeds, and wa s
q u ite surprised when I declined! [ 3 5 ]

[1] WO 201/1598 (quoted from Bærentzen 1987, p.258).

[2] WO 204/8512, LRDG Operation Report No 155B; Woodhouse: Report on Final Phase of Allied
Military Mission in Greece. Geoffrey Chandler, an SOE officer in western Macedonia, described
Jellicoe’s arrival at Kozai, the fighting, and the political situation before and after the German
withdrawal and the British passing through the town in The Divided Land – An Anglo-Greek
Tragedy (1959). In this, beautifully written, book Chandler who went on to have a career as
director of the Shell oil company,
director-general of the National Economic Development Office, a pioneering
campaigner for ethical business practices, was highly critical of the British failure to support more
moderate Greek elements and help avert the bloody civil war which followed the German
defeat. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/finance-obituaries/8478562/Sir-Geoffrey-
Chandler.html (retr. 20 August 2018).
[3] Woodhouse: Report on Final Phase of Allied Military Mission in Greece; Milner-Barry, MS, 2
November 1944; Sutherland 1999, pp. 157–162.
[4] The population figures are from WO 204/9102 Progress Reports 3 District, reports of 21–25
and 26 November 1944. They recorded a population of 350,000 (of whom 130,000 were refugees
from the Bulgarian-occupied parts of Greece) within a 9.5-mile radius of the city and 320,000 (of
whom 108,000 were refugees) in the city itself. Thessaloniki’s 50,000 Jews had been deported
during the German occupation.
[5] Mavrikis 2000.
[6] WO 204/8828, Naval Message from CS 15.
[7] Lodwick 1947/1990, p. 188.
[8] RH 19-7/27; RM 35-III/96.
[9] HW 1/3294. Helias Doundoulakis, who afer the war had a distinguished carreer in aerospace
engineering had der efter krigen blev en fremtrædende luft- og rumfartsingeniør, desvcribed his
work as an OSS agent in i.a. Thessaloniki in the very entertaining memoirs I was trained to ba a
Spy I-II (Xlibris Corporation, 2008 og 2012/2014).
[10] HW 1/3294.
[11] WO 204/8828, orders from III Corps to Kelforce, 31 October 1944; orders from Kelforce to
Scrumforce/Sea Patrol; WO 204/8830.
[12] WO 204/8828, Outline Plan for Operation “Kelso”, 27 October 1944.
[13] WO 204/8830, “Occupation of Salonika”, sign. Brig. Pritchard, 22 October 1944.
[14] Lodwick 1947/1990, p.188.
[15] WO 204/8828, signal from Kelforce to Skiathos Sea Patrol.
[16] HS 5/785: Final Report on Third Visit to Greece by Major D.S.L. Dodson.
[17] Mavrikis 2000; Holt 2004, pp. 622, 625 and Appendix III. In autumn 1944, Allied newspapers
(e.g. The Times on 11 and 29 September 1944 and the Sydney Morning Herald on 18 September
1944) and the German news agency (quoted in The Times on 14 September 1944) carried reports
that Soviet troops had crossed the Bulgarian/Greek border. It is not clear whether there actually
were Soviet troops in Greece, or Bulgarian forces with Soviet officers, or the size of these alleged
forces, or how long and for what purpose they stayed in Greece. The newspaper articles may
have been misinformation circulated by the British or by the Germans – or by both, each for their
own purposes.
The German military authorities and the German Foreign Ministry also announced several times
during September and October that the Soviet military had entered northern Greece (RM
35-III/92; RM 35-III/95, KTB, 2 October 1944).
It is well documented that a Soviet military mission arrived in Greece in July 1944 and held
meetings with the EAM/ELAS leadership. The mission advised the Greek Communists not to
attempt a takeover and advised them to cooperate with the British (Moscow did not want to
imperil the beginnings of an understanding with Britain that would give the USSR control of the
rest of the Balkans).
The above is a highly simplified representation of the complicated relationship between the KKE
and the USSR, and the role of the Soviet military mission. Interested readers should refer to
Bærentzen (1986 and 2011) and Macrakis (1988).
British speculation about the point of the Russian mission: WO 202/175.
[18] Capell 1945, p.72.
[19] HS 5/785: Final Report on Third Visit to Greece by Major D.S.L. Dodson.
[20] Capell 1945, p. 70-71.
[21] HS 5/785: Final Report on Third Visit to Greece by Major D.S.L. Dodson.
[22] HS 5/785: Final Report on Third Visit to Greece by Major D.S.L. Dodson; thanks to John O.
Iatrides for the description of conditions in Thessaloniki.
[23] Langley 1988/2016, pp. 225-229; Mavrikis 2000; HS 5/785: Final Report on Third Visit to
Greece by Major D.S.L. Dodson.
[24] In the book Scobie, Hero of Greece: The British Campaign, 1944–5. Arthur Barker, 1975.
[25] Iatrides, e-mail of 10 October 2017.
[26]Langley 1988/2016, pp. 225-229; Lodwick 193; Capell 72-73. The information about German
casualties varies considerably. Suzanne Lassen says both 22 and 60 were killed, and mentions
that Henshaw personally killed 12 and Lassen eight (Lassen 179). Lodwick says 60 dead Germans,
of whom Henshaw was responsible for 11 and Lassen for eight (Lodwick, p. 193). Prof. Iatrides
confirms that the Greek sources also mentioned the incident, but present it as a clash between
ELAS and the Germans, without British involvement. Iatrides, e-mail of 10 October 2017.
[27] Lodwick, p. 194.
[28] WO 204/9102, HG 3 District, M.L. (Greece), Progress Report No. 1: (Covering period up to 25
Nov ’44); WO 204/8692.
[29] HS 5/785, Report by Major Diamantopoulos (Arty), Leader of “Jeanne” mission at
Thessaloniki. About the German/British negotiations in general, see Bærentzen 2011.
[30] Thanks to Professor Ioannis D. Stefanidis for this summary of the situation in Thessaloniki,
Stefanidis, e-mail, 11 October 2017.
[31] Another possible explanation for why ELAS did not seize control of Thessaloniki is that once
the fighting in the Athens area had started in earnest (following demonstration of Dec 3) the
communist party (KKE) leadership ordered the main ELAS units in northern Greece to attack the
anti-communist colonel Napoleon Zervas' weaker EDES forces in Epirus which had to be rescued
by British troops and ships that transferred them to Corfu. Some weeks later ELAS's commander
in the Thessaloniki area was ordered by the KKE to take Thessaloniki but he refused, claiming that
his forces were now inadequate for the task. (Thanks to professor Iatrides for this observation.)
On the British perception of EAM/ELAS’ rule in Thessaloniki: Alexander 1980.
[32] Quoted from Langley 1988/2016, p.229.
[33] Lassen 1949/1965, p.181.
[34] WO 204/8828: Signal from Kelforce to III Corps, 10 November 1944.
[35] Milner-Barry, MS 30 and TS p. 328.

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