Week Five
" While "crimes" amount to
(Aids to Construction: General and
Legislative History)
Explain the rules involving following as
aids to construction
(a) Title
The title may indicate the legislative intent
to extend or restrict the scope of the law, and
a statute couched in a language of doubtful
import will be construed to conform to the
legislative intent as disclosed in its title. The
rule that the title may serve as a guide
carries more weight in this jurisdiction
because of the constitutional title
requirement that every bill shall have one
subject as expressed in the title thereof
(Section 26(1), Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution).
When resorting to a title is not authorized -
When the text is clear, it is improper to
resort to its title to make it obscure.
Discuss Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No.
L-33628 December 29, 1987
Issue: W/N the provisions of EO No. 264
are applicable to the respondents. – NO
Ruling: EO 264 has an exclusive application
to administrative, not criminal complaints. It
is plain from the very wording of the Order
that it has exclusive application to
administrative, not criminal complaints. The
Order itself shows why.
The very title of EO 264 speaks of
“COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES."
There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to
say, "crimes.
"irregularities," the Executive Order could
have very well referred to the more specific
term had it intended to make itself
applicable thereto.
Title Of Eo 264: "Outlining The Procedure
By Which Complainants Charging
Government Officials And Employees With
Commission Of Irregularities Should Be
Guided" Clearly, the Executive Order
simply consolidates these existing rules and
streamlines the administrative apparatus in
the matter of complaints against public
officials. It is moreover significant that the
Executive Order in question makes specific
reference to "erring officials or employees
… Removed or otherwise vindicated.” If it
were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such
technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or
"acquitted."
The petition is DISMISSED.
Relevance to the case
This case underscores the relevance of
examining the title of a legal document or
order as an aid to construction, particularly
in determining its scope and applicability. In
this case, the issue revolved around whether
Executive Order No. 264 exclusively
applied to administrative complaints or also
extended to criminal complaints.
The Supreme Court analyzed the title of
Executive Order No. 264, which was titled
"Outlining the Procedure by which
Complainants Charging Government
Officials and Employees with Commission
of Irregularities Should Be Guided." The
Court noted that the title specifically
referred to "commission of irregularities"
and did not mention criminal offenses or the
word "crimes." This absence of explicit
reference to criminal matters in the title led
the Court to interpret that the executive
order was intended to govern administrative
complaints rather than criminal ones.
The Court's interpretation was based on the
principle that the title of a legal document
provides valuable insight into its intended
scope and purpose. While titles may not
always be determinative of a document's
content, they serve as important indicators
of the legislative or executive intent behind
the enactment of the order or law. In this
case, the absence of language explicitly
referring to criminal offenses in the title
suggested that Executive Order No. 264 was
not intended to govern criminal complaints.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that its role
was not to resolve criminal complaints or
charges, as it lacked the jurisdiction and
competence to do so. Instead, the disposition
of criminal cases fell within the purview of
other agencies or bodies tasked with
adjudicating such matters.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petitions
and lifted the temporary restraining orders
issued earlier. This decision was based on
the understanding that Executive Order No.
264 did not apply to criminal complaints and
that the resolution of such complaints
belonged to the jurisdiction of other
agencies.
In summary, this case illustrates the
significance of examining the title of a legal
document as an aid to construction in
interpreting its scope and applicability.
Titles provide valuable contextual clues that
help determine the legislative or executive
intent behind the enactment of laws or
orders.
(b) Preamble
It is written immediately after the title and
states the purpose, reason, or justification for
the enactment of the law and is usually
expressed in the form of “whereas” clauses.
Though it is not, strictly speaking, a part of a
statute, it is the key to the statute for it sets
out the intention of the legislature. It may
restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad
scope of the law, or require, in the
commission of a crime, an element not
clearly expressed in its text. It may express
the legislative intent to make the law apply
retroactively, in which case the law has to be
given retroactive effect, so as to carry out
such intent (PNB v. Office of the President).
Note: It is not the body of the law.
(c) Context of whole text
Legislative intent should accordingly be
ascertained from a consideration of the
whole context of the statute and not from an
isolated part of particular provision. (Aboitiz
Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu).
The context may circumscribe/restrict the
meaning of a statute, it may give to a word
or phrase a meaning different from its usual
or ordinary signification. In such a case, the
meaning dictated by the context prevails.
Every section, provision or clause of the
statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature. The
intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law
and every part of the act is taken into view
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX
Sales).
(d) Punctuation marks
Aids of low degree and can never control the
intelligible meaning of the written word. If it
will not set out a law's meaning, it can be
disregarded. Legislative intent bears more
significance than the written word.
Semi-colon - Indicates a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than
that expressed by a comma; and what
follows a semi-colon must have a relation to
the same matter which precedes it.
The comma and the semi-colon are both
used for the same purpose – to divide
sentences and parts of sentences, the only
difference is that the semi-colon makes the
division a little more pronounced. They are
not used to introducing a new idea
(e) Capitalization of letters
Aids of low degree
Example: In a statute which provides that “a
will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country,
which is executed in accordance with the
law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which”, in force at a
time when the PH was still a territory of the
US, the fact that the words “state and
country” are not capitalized does not mean
that the US is excluded from the phrase
“another state or country.” (In re Estate of
Johnson)
In re Estate of Johnson, G.R. No.
L-12767, 16 November 1918
The position is taken by the appellant that
this section is applicable only to wills of
aliens; and in this connection attention is
directed to the fact that the epigraph of this
section speaks only of the will made here by
an alien and to the further fact that the word
"state" in the body of the section is not
capitalized. From this it is argued that
Section 636 is not applicable to the will of a
citizen of the US residing in these Islands.
Ruling: The Court consider these
suggestions of little weight and are of the
opinion that, by the most reasonable
interpretation of the language used in the
statute, the words "another state or country"
include the US and the States of the
American Union, and that the operation of
the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It
is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation
and capitalization are aids of low degree in
interpreting the language of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible
meaning of the written words. It results that
if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his
death a citizen of the US and of the State of
Illinois, his will was provable under this
section in the courts of the Philippine
Islands, provided the instrument was so
executed as to be admissible to probate
under the laws of the State of Illinois.

The appealed order is AFFIRMED.
Relevance to the case
The relevance of the case "In Re: Estate of
Johnson G.R. No. 12767" to the question
lies in its interpretation of Section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and its application
to the probate of wills executed by aliens in
the Philippines. In this case, Emil H.
Johnson, a citizen of the United States and
resident of Manila, executed a will that did
not conform to the requirements of
Philippine law but was valid under the laws
of Illinois, his state of citizenship. The court
admitted the will to probate based on
Section 636, which allows wills made within
the Philippines by citizens of another state
or country, executed in accordance with the
laws of that state or country, to be proved
and allowed in the Philippines.
Now, let's explore the connection between
this case and the rule involving the
capitalization of letters. In legal documents,
the capitalization of certain terms or phrases
can carry significant meaning and serve as
aids to construction, which refers to the
interpretation of legal texts. For instance, in
the ruling of this case, the capitalization of
the words "another state or country" in
Section 636 is crucial. By capitalizing these
words, the legislature intended to give them
specific legal significance, indicating that
they encompass not only foreign countries
but also other states within the United
States. This interpretation expands the scope
of the provision to include citizens of other
states of the American Union, such as
Illinois in the case of Emil H. Johnson.
Furthermore, capitalization in legal
documents often serves to highlight key
terms or concepts, clarifying their
importance in the context of the law. In this
case, the capitalization of "State of Illinois"
emphasizes its role as the jurisdiction
governing the validity of Emil H. Johnson's
will. The court's recognition of Johnson's
citizenship in Illinois underscores the
significance of this jurisdiction in
determining the admissibility of the will to
probate.
Moreover, the capitalization of "United
States" reinforces the connection between
federal citizenship and state citizenship, as
recognized under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. By
acknowledging Johnson's status as a citizen
of both the United States and Illinois, the
court affirms the applicability of Illinois law
to the execution of his will, despite his
residence in the Philippines.
In summary, the capitalization of letters in
legal texts, such as statutes and court
rulings, serves as an aid to construction by
signaling the importance of certain terms
and guiding the interpretation of legal
provisions. In the case of "In Re: Estate of
Johnson," the capitalization of key terms in
Section 636 highlights the legislative intent
to include citizens of other states of the
American Union in the provision, thereby
influencing the court's decision to admit
Johnson's will to probate based on Illinois
law.
(f) Headnotes or epigraphs
Convenient indexes to the contents of its
provisions. However they are not entitled to
too much weight, and inferences drawn
therefrom are of little value. They can never
control the plain terms of the enacting
clause, for they are not part of the law.
Prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute
for ready reference or classification.
Secondary aids, such as headnotes or
epigraphs, may be consulted to remove, but
not to create nor to limit or control the plain
language of the law.
Being nothing more than a convenient index
to the contents of the provision, these cannot
have the effect of limiting the operative
words contained in the body of the text (In
re Estate of Johnson).
Discuss People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 39085,
27 September 1933
Inasmuch as the appellant was serving
sentence for the crime of homicide, the
appellant contends the court below erred in
applying article 160 in the present case
which was a prosecution for murder
(involving homicide).
The appellant places much stress upon the
word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of Article 160
and would have the Court accept his
deduction that it is applicable only when the
new crime which is committed by a person
already serving sentence is different from
the crime for which he is serving sentence.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in applying
Article 160. – NO
Ruling: It is clear that no such deduction
could be drawn from the caption There is no
warrant whatsoever for such a deduction
(and we do not understand the appellant to
assert it) from the text itself of Article 160.
The language is plain and unambiguous.
There is not the slightest intimation in the
text that said article applies only in cases
where the new offense is different in
character from the former offense for which
the defendant is serving the penalty.
When the text itself of a statute or a treaty is
clear and unambiguous, there is neither
necessary nor propriety in resorting to the
preamble/headings/paragraphs of a section
of interpretation of the text, especially where
such epigraphs/headings of sections are
mere catchwords/reference aids indicating
the general nature of the text that follows. A
mere glance at the titles to the articles of the
RPC will reveal that they were not intended
by the Legislature to be used as anything
more than catchwords conveniently
suggesting in a general way the subject
matter of each article.
The appealed Order is AFFIRMED
Relevance to the case
The case you provided underscores the
principle that when the text of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, there is no need to
resort to the preamble, headings, or
epigraphs of a section for interpretation.
This principle ensures that the law is applied
based on its plain meaning rather than
extraneous aids, promoting consistency and
predictability in legal interpretation.
In the case, the appellant argued that the
heading of Article 160, which uses the word
"another," should restrict its application only
to cases where the new crime committed by
a person already serving sentence is
different from the crime for which they are
serving sentence. However, the court
rejected this argument, emphasizing that the
language of Article 160 itself is clear and
unambiguous.
This highlights the importance of
interpreting statutes based on the text itself
rather than relying on headings or epigraphs,
which may serve as mere catchwords or
reference aids. While headings or epigraphs
may provide some context or indication of
the general nature of the text that follows,
they should not override the plain language
of the statute.
The connection between this case and the
rule involving headnotes or epigraphs lies in
the acknowledgment that these elements
should not be used as primary sources for
interpretation when the text of the statute is
clear and unambiguous. Instead, the focus
should be on the language of the statute
itself to ensure accurate interpretation and
application of the law.
In summary, the case underscores the
importance of interpreting statutes based on
their plain and unambiguous language,
without undue reliance on headings or
epigraphs for interpretation. This principle
promotes consistency, predictability, and
accuracy in legal interpretation, ensuring
that the law is applied in accordance with its
intended meaning.
(g) Lingual Text
Philippine laws are officially promulgated
either in English, Spanish or Filipino, or
either in 2 such languages. The rule is that,
unless otherwise provided, where a statute is
officially promulgated in English and
Spanish, the English text shall govern, but to
explain the English text.
Discuss Baking v. Director of Prisons,
G.R. No. L-30364, 28 July 1969
[Petitioners] lay heavy stress on the phrase
"any prisoner" in the English text of Article
97. In asking that the provision be made to
apply to them when they were still detention
prisoners, they say that the law does not
distinguish between a prisoner who is
serving sentence and decision prisoner.
Issue: W/N Article 97 of the Revised Penal
Code applies to detention prisoners. – NO
Ruling: Inasmuch as the RPC was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs. The term "any
prisoner" in the Spanish text is "el penado,”
–who is a convict or a person already
sentenced by final judgment. There is thus
no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace
detention prisoners within its reach. Because
it speaks of the buenaconducta observada
por el penado — not one under "prision
preventiva." The allowance for good
conduct "for each month of good behavior"
then unquestionably refers to good behavior
of a prisoner while he is serving his term as
a convict and not otherwise.
Petition is DENIED.
Relevance to the case
The case discussed involves two petitions
for habeas corpus filed by individuals who
had been detained for more than eighteen
years under the charge of the Director of
Prisons. Despite being convicted and
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for the
crime of rebellion, they argued that they
should be released because they had already
served the ten-year sentences. The main
issue was whether Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code, which allows deductions for
good conduct from the period of a prisoner's
sentence, applied to detention prisoners.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Sanchez, interpreted Article 97 as applicable
only to prisoners serving sentence, not to
those who were still under preventive
detention. The opinion emphasized the
distinction between a convict or a person
already sentenced by final judgment and a
detention prisoner, concluding that the latter
was not covered by Article 97.
Justice Fernando dissented, arguing that the
continued detention of the petitioners after
more than eighteen years, despite their
reduced sentence, constituted a denial of
liberty without due process. He stressed the
importance of the due process clause in
safeguarding freedom and asserted that the
constitutional violation warranted granting
the petitions for habeas corpus.
Now, regarding the rules of construction
used in this case:
Lingual Text: This rule refers to the
principle that when interpreting laws written
in multiple languages, the text in the
language in which the law was originally
enacted takes precedence. In this case, the
Spanish text of Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code was deemed to govern over the
English text, as the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish.
The interpretation of "el penado" in the
Spanish text as referring to a convict or a
person already sentenced by final judgment
was crucial in determining the scope of
Article 97.
The connection between the rule of lingual
text and the case lies in how it influenced
the interpretation of Article 97. By relying
on the Spanish text, the court clarified that
the provision did not encompass detention
prisoners, thus impacting the outcome of the
petitions for habeas corpus.
The connection between these rules and the
case lies in how they guided the
interpretation of Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code, which was central to
determining the applicability of good
conduct deductions to the petitioners'
situation. The majority opinion relied on the
Spanish text to conclude that Article 97 did
not cover detention prisoners, while the
dissent emphasized the broader principles of
due process to argue for the petitioners'
release. Ultimately, the court's interpretation
of the law based on these rules influenced its
decision on the habeas corpus
(h) Intent or spirit of law
The intent or spirit of the law is the law
Itself. For this reason, legislative intent or
spirit is the controlling factor, the leading
star, and the guiding light in the application
and interpretation of a statute. The spirit,
rather than the letter, of a statute determines
its construction, hence, a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent
Discuss Peralta v. CSC, G.R. No. 95832,
10 August 1992
Since petitioner had no accumulated leave
credits, DTI deducted from his salary the
amount corresponding to his absences
during the covered period, inclusive of
Saturdays and Sundays. The Civil Service
Commission (CSC) ruled that the action of
the DTI in deducting from the salary of
petitioner (6 days) is in order.
Issue: W/N the CSC resolution is valid. –
NO
Ruling: The construction by the respondent
Commission of RA 2625 is not in
accordance with the legislative intent.
Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with either the letter or the spirit of
legislative enactment.
Where the true intent of the law is clear that
calls for the application of the cardinal rule
of statutory construction that such intent or
spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, since adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain
and vital purpose of the statute (Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-25326, 29 May 1970).
The purpose of [HB 41 / RA 2625] is to
exclude from the computation of the leave
those days, Saturdays And Sundays, as well
as holidays, because actually the employee
is entitled not to go to office during those
days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that
those days should be counted in the
computation of leaves.
RA 2625 specifically provides that
government employees are entitled to 15
days vacation leave of absence with full pay
and 15 days sick leave with full pay,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks
of the granting of a right and the law does
not provide for a distinction between those
who have accumulated leave credits and
those who have exhausted their leave credits
in order to enjoy such a right.
Petition is GRANTED and the challenged
CSC resolutions are declared NULL and
VOID.
Relevance to the case
This case highlights the significance of
administrative interpretations and policy
changes in the context of labor regulations,
specifically concerning salary deductions for
absences. It underscores the interplay
between statutory law, administrative
regulations, and judicial review, shedding
light on how these elements influence each
other in the interpretation and application of
legal principles.
In this case, the petitioner contested the
validity of a policy by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) mandating salary
deductions for absences without leave
credits on days preceding Saturdays,
Sundays, or holidays. Initially, the CSC
enforced a policy where such absences
would result in corresponding deductions for
those intervening days. However, during the
course of the petition, the CSC amended this
policy through Resolution No. 91-540 and
Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of
1991. These amendments essentially
nullified the earlier policy, stating that
employees absent without pay on days
immediately preceding or succeeding
Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays would not
be considered absent on those days.
The case becomes significant in
understanding the rules involving the aids to
construction, particularly the intent and
spirit of the law.
Firstly, the case highlights the importance of
interpreting statutory law in alignment with
its underlying intent and spirit. The
petitioner contested the CSC's policy on the
basis of fairness and equity, arguing that
salary deductions for intervening Saturdays,
Sundays, or holidays seemed
disproportionate. This contention prompts a
deeper examination of the purpose behind
labor regulations, which is often to protect
the rights and interests of employees while
ensuring efficient workforce management.
Secondly, the case underscores the role of
administrative agencies, like the CSC, in
implementing and interpreting statutory
laws. Administrative agencies are granted
the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to effectively carry out the intent
of the law. However, these regulations must
still align with the spirit and purpose of the
underlying legislation. Here, the CSC's
initial policy aimed to regulate attendance
and leave management but was later
amended to better reflect the equitable
treatment of employees.
Thirdly, the case illustrates the principle that
administrative interpretations and policy
changes are subject to judicial review. While
administrative agencies have the authority to
interpret laws and issue regulations, the
courts have the final say in determining the
legality and constitutionality of such
interpretations and policies. In this case, the
court acknowledged the CSC's authority to
issue policies but scrutinized whether those
policies were consistent with the intent of
the law and principles of fairness.
In conclusion, the case demonstrates how
statutory law, administrative regulations, and
judicial review intersect in the interpretation
and application of legal principles. It
underscores the importance of aligning
administrative interpretations with the intent
and spirit of the law while ensuring
equitable treatment of all parties involved.
(i) Policy of Law;
The policy of the law once ascertained
should be given effect by the judiciary. One
way of accomplishing this mandate is to
give a statute of doubtful meaning, a
construction that will promote public policy.
(j) Purpose of law or mischief to be
suppressed
The court must look to the object to be
accomplished, the evils to be remedied, or
the purpose to be subserved, and should give
the law a reasonable or liberal construction
which will best effectuate its purpose.
(k) Dictionaries
While definitions given by lexicographers
are not binding, courts have adopted, in
proper cases, such definitions to support
their conclusion as to the meaning of the
particular words or terms used in a statute,
especially where no strong reason exists
why their dictionary meaning should not be
adopted in the construction of the statute.
(l) Presumptions.
Include: presumptions in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute, of its
completeness, of its prospective operation,
of right and justice, of its effective, sensible,
beneficial, and reasonable operation as a
whole, as well as those against the
inconsistency and implied repeal,
unnecessary changes in law, impossibility,
absurdity, injustice and hardship,
inconvenience, and ineffectiveness.
In construing a statute, the court may
properly rely on presumptions as to
legislative intent in order to resolve doubts
as to its correct interpretation.
Legislative History
It pertains to all antecedents until enactment
(stage including the preparation, submission,
deliberations, of the bill up to the time the
bill becomes a law)
What constitutes legislative history?
Its history properly covers the period and the
steps done from the time the bill is
introduced until it is finally passed by the
legislature.
It includes the following:
● President's message if the bill is enacted in
response thereto
● Explanatory note accompanying the bill
● Committee reports of legislative
investigations and public hearings on the
subject of the bill
● Sponsorship speech
● Debates and deliberations concerning the
bill
● Its amendments and changes in
phraseology in which it undergoes before
final approval
● Senate and House Journal materials
● Governor veto messages
Are personal opinions of some legislators
appropriate aids of construction?
– As a general rule, they are not appropriate
aids of construction. However, if there is
unanimity among the supporters and
oppositions to a bill with respect to the
objective sought to be accomplished, the
debates may then be used as evidence of the
purpose of the act.
How does legislative history aid in
statutory construction?
It is a well settled rule of statutory
construction that where a statue is
susceptible of several interpretations or
where there is ambiguity in its language,
there is no better means of ascertaining the
will and intention of the legislature than that
which is afforded by the history of the
statute.
To determine the purpose of an ambiguous
Enactment. If the statute is based on, or is a
revision of, a prior statute, the latter’s
practical application and judicial
construction, the various amendments it
underwent, and the contemporary events at
the time of its enactment form part of its
legislative history. If the statute is borrowed
from, or modeled upon, Anglo-American
precedents or other foreign sources, its
history includes the history of such
precedents. For proper construction of the
statute sought to be construed, it is
oftentimes essential to review such
legislative history and find authoritative
guidance for its interpretation from such
precedents, their practical application, and
the decisions of the courts construing and
applying such precedents in the country of
origin. Legislative history necessitates
review of "the origin, antecedents and
derivation" of the law in question to
discover the legislative purpose or intent. It
can be assumed "that the new legislation has
been enacted as continuation of the existing
legislative policy or as a new effort to
perpetuate it or further advance it."
(Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration v.
Macroasia)
Discuss Celestial Nickel Mining
Exploration v. Microasia Corp., G.R. No.
169080, 19 December 2007
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and Infanta Mineral and
Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into
a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
Issue: W/N only the Secretary of the DENR
is the only one with jurisdiction to cancel
mining contracts and privileges. – YES
Ruling: It is only the Secretary of DENR
who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463,
EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations,
executive issuances, and case law, we rule
that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has
the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral
lease contracts or mineral agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and
supervision of the DENR Secretary over the
MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation
of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel
or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements.
The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel
mining rights or agreements through the
MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,
Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on
cancellation, revocation, and termination of
a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
Historically, the DENR Secretary has the
express power to approve mineral
agreements or contracts and the implied
power to cancel said agreements. It is a
well-established principle that in the
interpretation of an ambiguous provision of
law, the history of the enactment of the law
may be used as an extrinsic aid to determine
the import of the legal provision or the law.
History of the enactment of the statute
constitutes prior laws on the same subject
matter.
Relevance to the case
This case is relevant to the question because
it delves into the issue of jurisdiction over
the cancellation of mining contracts and
privileges. It clarifies that the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) holds exclusive
authority to cancel such agreements, rather
than the Panel of Arbitrators (POA).
In statutory construction, legislative history
aids in interpreting and understanding the
intent and purpose behind legislative
enactments. By examining the evolution of
laws, executive issuances, and case law, the
court in this case was able to determine the
proper interpretation of the relevant statutes
concerning the cancellation of mining
agreements.
The court scrutinized various legal
instruments, including Presidential Decree
No. 463, Executive Orders No. 211 and 279,
Republic Act No. 7942, and their
implementing rules and regulations. It also
considered executive issuances and case law
to ascertain the legislative intent regarding
the jurisdiction over mining contracts.
By tracing the legislative history, the court
concluded that the DENR Secretary holds
the authority to cancel mining agreements
based on several factors. Firstly, the DENR
Secretary's administrative authority,
supervision, management, and control over
mineral resources under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 establish the
foundation for this jurisdiction. Additionally,
the DENR Secretary's broad powers over the
management and regulation of mineral
resources, derived from the Administrative
Code of 1987, support the conclusion that
cancellation authority lies within the
department.
Moreover, the court examined Republic Act
No. 7942, which grants the DENR Secretary
control and supervision over the Mines and
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) and thereby
the authority to cancel or recommend the
cancellation of mineral rights.
Finally, the court referenced DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40, which
outlines procedures for cancellation,
revocation, and termination of mineral
agreements, further solidifying the DENR
Secretary's authority in this matter.
In summary, by analyzing the legislative
history and statutory provisions, the court
determined that the DENR Secretary
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the
cancellation of mining contracts and
privileges. This case demonstrates how
legislative history aids in statutory
construction by providing insights into the
legislative intent and the context in which
laws were enacted.
Explain the rules involving the following
as aids to construction:
(a) Explanatory note
Part of the bill when it's submitted A short
exposition or explanation accompanying a
proposed Legislation by its author or
proponent. It contains statements of the
reason or purpose of the bill, as well as
arguments advanced by its author in urging
its passage. Where a statute is ambiguous or
where a statute is susceptible to more than
one interpretation, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity
and ascertain the purpose or intent of the
statute.
(b) Legislative debates, views, and
deliberations
Courts may resort to the legislative
deliberations in the legislature on a bill
which eventually was enacted into law to
ascertain the meaning of its provisions.
Thus, where there is doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means that meaning
which was put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the
bill may be adopted. However, the views
expressed by the legislators during the
deliberation of a bill as to the bill's purpose,
meaning, or effect are not controlling the
interpretation of the law. The opinions
expressed by legislators in the the course of
debates concerning the application of
existing laws are also not given a decisive
weight, especially where the legislator was
not a member of the assembly that enacted
said laws.
(c) Reports of commissions
In the codification of laws, commissions are
usually formed to compile and collate all
laws on a particular subject and to prepare
the draft of the proposed code. A
commission prepared some codes designated
to study or prepare the same.
Examples:
Family Code - Family Code Commission;
Civil Code - Civil Code Commission This
talks about the deliberations of the members
of that Commission and includes
explanations for certain provisions or the
way they resolve certain conflicts involving
provisions (TL).
(d) Prior laws from which statute is based
In ascertaining the intention of the
lawmaker, courts are permitted to look at
prior laws on the same subject and to
investigate the antecedents of the statute
involved. This rule is especially applicable
in the interpretation of codes, revised, or
compiled statutes, for the prior laws which
have been codified, compiled, or revised
will show the legislative history that will
clarify the intent of the law or shed light on
the meaning and scope of the codified or
revised statute. If we are lifting provisions of
a statute from prior laws, then the
interpretation from that prior statute will
also be considered especially when the
current statute and prior law are similar.
(e) Change in phraseology by
amendment;
This indicates a legislative intent to change
the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had. In construing the amended
provision, courts may investigate the history
of the provision to ascertain legislative
intent as to the meaning or scope of the
amended law. Where the legislative history
shows that a statute has undergone several
amendments, the deliberate selection of
language differing from that of the earlier
act on the subject indicates that a change in
meaning of the law was intended, and the
courts should construe that statute as to
reflect such change in meaning.
Discuss Akbayan v. Comelec, G.R. No.
147066, 26 March 2001
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seeks to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
conduct a special registration before the
May 2001 General Elections for new voters
ages 18 to 21.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC exercised grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of voter registration. – NO
Ruling: The COMELEC was well within its
right to do so pursuant to the clear
provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not
absolute. It is regulated by measures like
voter registration, which is not a mere
statutory requirement. A statute may not be
so construed as to require compliance with
what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be
legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed
that the legislature did not at all intend an
interpretation or application of a law which
is far removed from the realm of the
possible.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's
registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times. RA 8189
prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189's
provision is explicit as to the prohibition. It
bears emphasis that the provision of Section
29 RA 8436 invoked by herein petitioners
and Section 8 of RA 8189 volunteered by
respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share
some common ground.
True enough, both provisions, although at
first glance may seem to be at war in
relation to the other, are in more
circumspect, perusal, necessarily capable of
being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the
legislature in the form of amendments to a
statute should be given effect, together with
other parts of the amendment act. It is not to
be presumed that the legislature, in making
such changes, was indulging in mere
semantic exercise. There must be some
purpose in making them, which should be
ascertained and given effect. Similarly,
every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all
should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation. Section 8 of RA
8189 applies in the present case, for the
purpose of upholding the assailed
COMELEC Resolution and denying the
instant petitions, considering that the
aforesaid law explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election. Petition is
DENIED.
Relevance to the case
This case delves into the interpretation of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189, also
known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996," which stipulates the periods during
which voter registration can be conducted.
The petitioners sought to challenge the
denial by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) of their request for a two-day
additional registration of new voters. They
argued that the registration deadline set by
the COMELEC disenfranchised millions of
potential voters and violated their
constitutional right to vote in the upcoming
general elections.
The court's ruling in this case elucidates the
principle of change in phraseology by
amendment as an aid to statutory
construction. Specifically, it underscores
how amendments to legislative enactments
can alter the interpretation of statutory
provisions. In the context of this case, the
court examined the language of Section 8 of
RA 8189, which prohibits voter registration
within specific periods before regular or
special elections. The court found that the
phraseology of the law was clear and
unambiguous, stating that no registration
shall be conducted during certain periods
preceding elections.
Moreover, the court analyzed the legislative
intent behind the enactment of Section 8 and
emphasized the importance of adhering to
the statutory requirements for voter
registration. It highlighted the significance
of registration as a procedural prerequisite to
the exercise of the right to vote,
underscoring the state's interest in ensuring
the integrity and orderliness of the electoral
process.
Furthermore, the court's ruling elucidated
the distinction between ministerial and
discretionary duties of public officers in the
context of the remedy of mandamus.
Mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, can
only be invoked to compel the performance
of ministerial duties, not discretionary ones.
The court held that the decision whether to
conduct a special registration of voters
within the remaining period before the
election date involved the exercise of
discretion by the COMELEC and therefore
could not be controlled by mandamus.
In summary, this case demonstrates how
changes in phraseology by amendment,
legislative intent, and the distinction
between ministerial and discretionary duties
of public officers serve as aids to statutory
construction. It underscores the importance
of interpreting statutory provisions in
accordance with their language, legislative
history, and underlying policy objectives.
(f) Amendment by deletion
As a rule, the amendment by deletion of
certain words or phrases in a statute
indicates that the legislature intended to
change the meaning of the statute, for the
presumption is that the legislature would not
have made the deletion had the intention
been not to change its meaning. The
amended statute should accordingly be
given a construction different from that
previous to its amendment.
Exceptions to the Rule - The rule that an
amendment of a statute indicates a change in
meaning from that which the statute
originally had applies only when the deleted
words or phrases are not surplusage or when
the intention is clear to change the previous
meaning of the old law. The rule does not
apply where the intent, as shown by the
history of the enactment, is clear that the
amendment is precisely to plainly express
the construction of the act prior to its
amendment because its language is not
sufficiently expressive of such construction.
(g) Adopted statutes
The general rule is that where local statutes
are patterned after or copied from those of
another country, the decisions of the courts
in such countries construing those laws are
entitled to great weight in the interpretation
of such local statutes.
Rationale: The legislature, in adopting from
another country, a statute that has previously
received judicial construction in that
country, is deemed to have adopted the
statute with such construction and practical
application in the country of origin. The
adopted statutes are thus generally construed
in accordance with the construction given
similar statutes in the US, unless special
reasons, local customs, and practice require
otherwise. Limitations to the Rule - Where
the local law and the foreign from which the
formed was patterned differ in some
material aspects, where the foreign
construction is clearly erroneous or has not
become settled, or where the adopting state
has given the statute its own interpretation,
the presumption that foreign construction
was adopted with the adoption of the statute
no longer obtains.
Discuss Republic of the Phils. v. Meralco,
G.R. No. 141314, 9 April 2003.
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an
application for the revision of its rate
schedules to reflect an average increase in
its distribution charge. ERB granted a
provisional increase subject to the condition
that should the COA thru its audit report
find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, all excess amounts collected from
the latter's customers shall either be
refunded to them or correspondingly
credited in their favor. The COA report
found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or
crediting of the excess amounts.
Issue: W/N the regulation of ERB as to the
adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid. –
YES
Ruling: The regulation of rates to be charged
by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing
rules for the control and regulation of public
utilities are a valid exercise thereof. In
regulating rates charged by public utilities,
the State protects the public against arbitrary
and excessive rates while maintaining the
efficiency and quality of services rendered.
However, the power to regulate rates does
not give the State the right to prescribe rates
which are so low as to deprive the public
utility of a reasonable return on investment.
Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must
be one that yields a fair return on the public
utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is
reasonable to the public for the services
rendered. A statute adopted from a foreign
country will be presumed to be adopted with
the construction placed upon it by the courts
of that country before its adoption.
American decisions and authorities are not
per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive because no court
holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws
must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such
intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly,
they must be construed to serve our own
public interest which is the be-all and the
end-all of all our laws. And it need not be
stressed that our public interest is distinct
and different from others
Relevance of the case
This case is highly relevant to the question
of whether public interest should prevail
over private profits, particularly in the
context of regulating rates charged by public
utilities. The ruling provides insights into
the principles governing the balancing act
between protecting consumer interests and
ensuring a fair return on investment for
public utility companies.
One key aspect highlighted in the ruling is
the principle that the fixing of just and
reasonable rates involves a delicate balance
between the interests of investors and
consumers. While the State has the authority
to regulate rates charged by public utilities
to protect consumers from arbitrary and
excessive charges, it must also ensure that
these rates allow public utility companies to
earn a reasonable return on their
investments. This balancing act is crucial for
maintaining the efficiency and quality of
services rendered by public utilities while
safeguarding the rights of consumers.
Moreover, the ruling emphasizes the
importance of adopting statutes and
administrative pronouncements as aids to
statutory construction. Specifically, the court
refers to the established rate of return for
public utilities, which is not prescribed by
statute but by administrative and judicial
pronouncements. This underscores the
significance of relying on established legal
principles and regulatory guidelines to
interpret and apply statutory provisions in a
consistent and coherent manner.
Furthermore, the ruling addresses the issue
of income tax treatment as an operating
expense for rate-determination purposes. It
clarifies that operating expenses incurred by
public utilities must be reasonable and
directly related to the provision of services
to consumers. Income tax payments, being
obligations to the government, do not
contribute to the production of services and
should not be passed on to consumers as part
of operating expenses. This principle
ensures that public utility companies do not
unfairly burden consumers with expenses
unrelated to the services they receive.
In summary, this case illustrates how the
principles of balancing interests, relying on
established legal norms, and ensuring
fairness in expense allocation are essential
considerations in the regulation of public
utilities. It underscores the importance of
upholding public interest while also
respecting the rights and interests of private
entities operating in regulated industries.
(h) Principles of common law
While common law, as known in
Anglo-American jurisprudence is not in
force in this country, save only insofar as it
is founded on sound principles applicable to
local conditions and is not in conflict with
existing laws, nevertheless many of the
principles of the common law have been
imported into this jurisdiction as a result of
the enactment of laws and establishment of
institutions similar to those of the US.
Courts may thus properly resort to common
law principles in construing doubtful
provisions of a statute, particularly where
such statute is modeled upon
Anglo-American precedents. However there
is a conflict between a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter
prevails.
(i) Conditions at time of enactment
In enacting a statute, the legislature is
presumed to have taken into account the
existing conditions of things at the time of
its enactment. For this reason, it is proper, in
the interpretation of a statute to consider the
physical conditions of the country and the
circumstances then obtaining which must of
necessity affect its operation in order to
reach an understanding as to the intent of the
legislature, or as to the meaning of the
statute.
(j) History of the times.
The court may look to the history of the
times, examine the state of things existing
when the statute was enacted, and interpret it
in the light of the conditions obtained.
Generally, it may be said that in determining
the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or
constitutional provision, the history of the
times out of which it grew and to which it
may be rationally supposed to bear some
direct relationship, the evils intended to be
remedied, and the good to be accomplished
are proper subjects of inquiry.