1. DACUDAO v.

GONZALES
Facts:
- Petitioners, residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr.
and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy
Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored.
- After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of
charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City
on February 6, 2009.
- On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182),
directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already
filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
- Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have
directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182.

They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their
right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the
rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182.

Held:
No. For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper,
the following requisites must concur, namely:
- (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
- (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
- (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Yet, petitioners
have not shown a compliance with the requisites.
To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions
because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group.

The function involved was purely executive or administrative. The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of
the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
 2. OLAGUER v. RTC

FACTS:
 The parameters of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in relation to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Sandiganbayan are put into issue in this petition.
 Private respondents are the only stockholders with the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI)
Publisher of several daily periodicals such as Manila Journal, People's Journal, etc. Sometime in 1977, PJI
obtained from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) certain financing accommodations and as security
thereof executed a first mortgage in favor of DBP on its acts enumerated in a list attached to the mortgage. The
PJI stockholders assigned to DBP the voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and outstanding voting
shares of stock of the company held by them. The DBP appointed said PJI stockholders as proxies to exercise its
right to vote. Due to some financial difficulty on its part, PJI requested for a restructuring of its loan obligation
with certain conditions.
 The request was granted by the DBP in a letter dated August 4, 1986. Due to the default on the part of the PJI,
the DBP cancelled the proxies in favor of the assigning stockholders on September 30, 1986 and designated as
its proxies petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon.
 Petitioner Olaguer asked private respondent Rosario M. Barreto Olivares to assign qualifying shares not only to
the three proxies of DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so as to enable the five of them to sit in the
PJI board of directors, and that, accordingly, they may be able to coordinate more effectively with DBP as
regards the early evaluation and approval of the request for another restructuring of the PJI loan.
 Although Olaguer was elected chairman of the board and chief executive officer of PJI he failed to comply with
his commitment and that this gave private respondents a reason to cancel the assignment. Olaguer also
committed certain illegal acts which gave rise to the filing of several complaints against him. However, before
these cases could be resolved, Olaguer's appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP was
terminated by President Corazon C. Aquino effective September 9, 1987.
 It is likewise alleged that, the termination notwithstanding, Olaguer continued to exercise and retain full
management and control of PJI. The DBP chief legal counsel wrote to petitioner Reyes informing him of
Olaguer's removal from office and enjoining him from implementing or complying with any instructions from
Olaguer and from disposing of the properties of PJI and disbursing any funds without prior approval of the board
of directors of PJI which will soon be elected, except such amounts needed in the ordinary course of business.
Accordingly, the DBP, acting through its Chairman, Jesus Estanislao and its Director-in-Charge, Jose Mari Velez,
entered into an Interim Agreement with private respondents. The said agreement called for a special
stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors which shall hold office until the next
regular stockholders meeting to be held on February 2, 1988.
 In a letter dated December 14, 1987, the DBP chief legal counsel informed the private respondents that the said
Interim Agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been designated the fiscal
and team leader of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his
actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG Chairman Ramon A. Diaz, and that it is the PCGG which exercises
the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986, including those assigned to DBP and that the
PJI qualifying share now held by PJI Directors came from shares sequestered by the PCGG.
 On January 4, 1988, a motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; that they were not served summons and that the subject matter of
the action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders which
are covered by the provisions of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A so that the matter is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); that the venue for a petition
seeking injunctive relief should be the Sandiganbayan.
 On January 14, 1988, an order was issued by the trial court denying the motion to dismiss. Hence, the herein
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or a
writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
RULING:
 No. The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now under sequestration by the
PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed in the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the
corporations involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos, Romualdez and many
others. The records likewise show that petitioner Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that
as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the
funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," civil
or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
 In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies
have no power to control the other. The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over
the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the
PCGG. By the same token, the regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG
acting for and in behalf of said commission.
 The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the
land. Otherwise, the Commission will be forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such
courts. This will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the Commission. Accordingly, Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in
that: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this order."
 Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the
subject matter of the action (the PJI its properties and assets) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity before the ordinary
courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the Sandiganbayan.
 It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before the respondent judge to the effect
that petitioners are usurpers and have no right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the
PJI are issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.

RATIO: Some administrative agencies are bodies corporate with legal capacity to sue and be sued in the courts. The
PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.
---
 3. PADUA V. RANADA
FACTS: On November 9, 2001, the TRB issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the
Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002. For implementation starting January 1, 2002 after its publication once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and that said Provisional Toll Rate Increase
shall remain in effect until such time that the TRB Board has determined otherwise. On December 17, 24 and 31, 2001,
the above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the newspapers of general
circulation. Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that on February 27, 2001
the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the
toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project Stage 1. CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the Supplemental
Toll Operation Agreement (STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim
adjustment of toll rates in the event of a significant currency devaluation. Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S.
dollar had devaluated from P26.1671 in 1995 to P48.00 in 2000, CITRA alleged that there was a compelling need for the
increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRAs petition remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to file on October 9, 2001 an
Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval, this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure
Governing Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB Rules of Procedure). On October 30, 2001, CITRA moved to
withdraw its Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval without prejudice to its right to seek or be granted provisional
relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board
to act on its own initiative. On November 7, 2001, CITRA wrote a letter to TRB expressing its concern over the undue
delay in the proceeding, stressing that any further setback would bring the Projects financial condition, as well as the
Philippine banking system, to a total collapse. CITRA recounted that out of the US$354 million funding from creditors,
two-thirds (2/3) thereof came from the Philippine banks and financial institutions, such as the Landbank of the
Philippines and the Government Service Insurance Services. Thus, CITRA requested TRB to find a timely solution to its
predicament. On November 9, 2001, TRB granted CITRAs motion to withdraw the Urgent Motion for Provisional
Approval and, at the same time, issued Resolution No. 2001-89, earlier quoted.

Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assail before this Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution
No. 2001-89. Petitioner Ceferino Padua, as a toll payer, filed an Urgent Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to
Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases in a petition for mandamus earlier filed by him. In his urgent motion, petitioner Padua
claims that alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional toll rate adjustments
because the TRB is a collegial body. On January 4, 2002, petitioner Padua filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion for a TRO
against Toll Fee Increases, arguing further that Resolution No. 200189 was issued without basis considering that while it
was signed by three (3) of the five members of the TRB, none of them actually attended the hearing. Petitioner Eduardo
Zialcita, as a taxpayer and as Congressman of Paranaque City, filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against TRB and CITRA, impugning the same
Resolution No. 2001-89. He asserts that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant and that the TRB violated its
own Charter, Presidential Decree No. 1112, when it promulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 without the benefit of any
public hearing. He also maintains that the TRB violated the Constitution when it did not express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which Resolution No. 2001-89 was based. And lastly, he claims that Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB
Rules of Procedure is not sanctioned by P.D. No. 1112.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 issued by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is valid

RULING: Yes. The remedy of prohibition initiated by petitioner Zialcita suffers several infirmities. Initially, it violates the
twin doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. P.D. No. 1112
explicitly provides that the decisions of the TRB on petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office
of the President within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof. Obviously, the laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure
have provided the remedies of an interested Expressways user. The initial proper recourse is to file a petition for review
of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need for a prior resort to this body is with reason. The TRB, as the agency
assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training
and skills to judiciously decide matters of this kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner
Zialcitas argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable.
This is obviously a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining
the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB. We take cognizance of the wealth of
jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this
era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former." If the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of
a court. For another, it is not true that it was TRB Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone who issued Resolution No. 2001-
89. The Resolution itself contains the signature of the four TRB Directors, namely, Simeon A. Datumanong, Emmanuel P.
Bonoan, Ruben S. Reinoso, Jr. and Mario K. Espinosa. Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors signed the
Resolution, none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument is misplaced. Under our jurisprudence, an
administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive
evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a
procedure is a practical necessity. At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term administrative body or agency includes
the subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are
the hearing officers through whose eyes and ears the administrative body or agency observes the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their testimonies. It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent
officers to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of an
orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the
cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which is that the tribunal or body or any of
its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate. Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in
cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely
on his recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has
gathered. Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRB's authority to grant provisional toll rate adjustments does not
require the conduct of a hearing. Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support this conclusion. RATIO: The very
characteristics of administrative agencies necessitate that delegation of function and authority be a predominant
feature of their organization and procedure. At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term administrative body or
agency includes the subordinate officials (hearing officers, examiners, investigators) upon whose hand the body or
agency delegates a portion of its authority.
 4. SORIANO v. MTRCB
FACTS:

In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37, made the following remarks directed towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo
and a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively suspending Ang Dating
Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.

Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves
from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
preventive suspension order.

On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from the program Ang Dating Daan.

ISSUES:

W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.

W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack of due hearing in the case.
W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious freedom.
W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and expression.
HELD:

1.) Yes. The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the
law. The authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the possession of authority to
issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or
television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…” Any other construal would render its
power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And
the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986 merely
formalizes the power bestowed by said statute. The IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to
motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures. The MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.

2.) No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in response to a written notice after petitioner
appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee was made.
Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue any time during the pendency of the
case. In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and
of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. At any event, that preventive suspension
can validly be meted out even without a hearing
 Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues that he was unable to answer the criticisms
coming from the INC ministers. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The Court
ruled that petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are
not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof to such allegations.

3.) No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his
statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution,
not by any religious conviction.

4.) No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of
cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or
contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of
speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression touches
upon matters of essentially private concern. The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the
license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum
and with proper regard for the rights of others. A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the analysis
should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as
a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child
literally rather than in the context that they were used.
 5. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS v. NTC
Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner
RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia,
Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-complaint
against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of
the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to
answer the complaint and set the initial hearing.

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and
imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos.

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it.

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered
to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a
legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had
allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to
bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public
service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has
it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but
to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied
from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).
 6. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA
FACTS:
 The City Gov't of Caloocan disposed approx. 350 tons of garbage daily in Tala Estate, Brgy. Camarin against the wishes
of the local residents
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish filed a complaint with the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) to end the operation of the dumpsite, because of the dumpsite’s “harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area”
investigation of the LLDA found that the City Gov’t of Caloocan was maintaining the dumpsite without a legally required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC); LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order
Operation of the dumpsite stopped for a few months but resumed again, and LLDA re-issued a Cease and Desist Order
In September of 1992, The City Gov’t of Caloocan filed a petition seeking to be declared “the sole authority empowered
to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction”
Trial court and the C.A. granted the City Gov’t of Caloocan this order and ruled that the LLDA had no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage
LLDA appealed to the Supreme Court

LAW/S:
 RA No. 4850 as amended by PD No. 813 and EO No. 927
Granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement case
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution
Explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case

RULING:
 YES, LLDA HAS POWER. RA No. 4850 as amended authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution”. While the LLDA was not expressly granted a power to make ex parte Cease and Desist
Orders, such a power was necessarily implied from its broad powers to make orders stopping pollution
NOTE:
Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which
recognize health as a fundamental human right
Article II, section16 of the Constitution guaranteed a right to “a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature,” and that there was a declared state policy to protect and promote the right to health
Art. II, Section 15, 1987 Constitution "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
 7. FREEMAN INC v. SEC

G.R. No. 110265, July 7, 1994

Facts:
 This petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission dated 7 January 1993 in SEC-EB No. 308 denying the action of
petitioners to nullify the 7 January 1992 order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3577.
 Sometime in 1986 and 1987, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN), was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corporation
(EQUITABLE) as evidenced by two (2) promissory notes, P.N. No. 125957 dated 8 December 1986 for
P1,700,000.00 payable 8 December 1987, and P.N. No. TL-369 dated 24 April 1987 for P6,000,000.00 payable 24
April 1988. Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman, Inc., signed as co-maker in both promissory notes.
 When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted collection suit against FREEMAN and Saw
Chiao Lian. EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary attachment.
 On 27 May 1988, private respondents Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, Dionisio Saw, Lina S. Chua, Lucila S. Ruste and
Evelyn Saw filed an answer in intervention claiming that they owned the minority interest in FREEMAN.
 On 12 October 1988, the trial court denied the intervention of private respondents. The denial was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court. 2
 The collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a compromise agreement duly approved by
the court and a decision rendered thereon on 5 December 1988. However, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) and Saw
Chiao Lian, defendants in the trial court, failed to comply with the judgment.
 On 30 January 1989, a writ of execution was issued. Two (2) parcels of land belonging to FREEMAN covered by
TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220 were levied upon and sold at public auction on 31 March 1989. The highest bidder
was one of the petitioners, Freeman Management and Development Corporation (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT),
which thereafter registered its certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.
 On 23 May 1989, before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties purchased at
the auction sale, private respondents, representing the minority shareholdings of FREEMAN, filed a petition with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the dissolution of FREEMAN, accounting and
reconveyance of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220.
 On 5 April 1990, private respondent filed a similar complaint against petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City. The complaint sought to annul the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand
and defendants FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other, as well as the promissory notes executed by Saw
Chiao Lian, the auction sale, and the sheriff's certificate of sale of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220.
 Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was a duplication of the case
pending in the SEC. But the motion was denied. Petitioners went up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the trial court and directed the dismissal of the complaint by reason of the pendency of the case.
 On 7 January 1992, on motion on private respondents in SEC Case No. 3577, and despite the opposition thereto
by petitioners, SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa, Jr., issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction
sale of 31 March 1989, the redemption period having expired on 7 April 1990.
 On 7 January 1992, on motion on private respondents in SEC Case No. 3577, and despite the opposition thereto
by petitioners, SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa, Jr., issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction
sale of 31 March 1989, the redemption period having expired on 7 April 1990.
Issue:
 WON the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the order of
its Hearing Officer granting the writ of injunction enjoining consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT.
Ruling:
 SEC Case No. 3577 arose from the action filed by private respondents as minority shareholders of petitioner
FREEMAN for the dissolution of the corporation and reconveyance of the properties conveyed to another
petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT in a public auction. The SEC maintained that it had jurisdiction to issue the
writ of injunction preventing the consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT on the basis of our
ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals.
 Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals should be understood in the light of two(2) basic legal principles. First,
that administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such can exercise only
those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. 14 Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A,
as amended, provides the cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide.
These include controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and, between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right
to exist as such entity. Section 6 of the same decree empowers the SEC to issue preliminary or permanent
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction.
 The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority stockholders is well within the jurisdiction of the SEC
to resolve in accordance with P.D. No. 902-A. However, the inclusion in the SEC case of FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT of which private respondents are not stockholders for the purpose of compelling it to reconvey
to FREEMAN the properties originally owned by the latter but were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a matter outside of the limited jurisdiction of the SEC. The petition for
reconveyance of properties against FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is not an intra-corporate controversy since private
respondents have no shares or interests whatsoever in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT, a corporation separate and
distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing dissolution proceedings in the SEC.
 The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as highly important in
judicial stability and in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 15 The
SEC is at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no power to control
the other. 16 Moreover, in the instant case, judgment was rendered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-
44404 approving the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand, and FREEMAN and Saw Chiao
Lian on the other. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants to enforce the judgment and two (2)
properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public
auction.
 Finally, the judgment was fully satisfied and a certificate of sale was issued to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT. It is
axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all. 17 It
cannot be modified or altered. Hence, the properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now considered
excluded from the corporate assets of FREEMAN and can no longer be the subject of the proceedings in the SEC
for the dissolution of the latter. Therefore SEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of injunction
enjoining FREEMAN MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership over the two (2) parcels of land it acquired
as highest bidder in the execution sale.
 8. MATIENZO v. ABELLERA MARCH 11,2022
FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents,
however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private
respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their
unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators.”
Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing and granting
applicants provisional authority to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment
of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of
PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the
petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited
to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that,
thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite the
lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:
Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step
towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4,
cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree.
Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their
illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to
eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction under its
broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of
PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority
given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally
necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too,
where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.
 9. ESLAO v. COA
FACTS:
 On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation
operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project was part of the commitment of the Asian Development Bank
("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one
among identical project agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities. Per
advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel
engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant
Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of
Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates of
honoraria and per diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions.
 The BOR approved the MOA and later on PSU issued Voucher No. 8902007 representing the amount of P70, 375
for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the approved honoraria
rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation
Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53.
Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By June 1989,
NCC No. 53 was being complied with. Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess
payments of honoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925 from the amount of P70,37 stated
in Voucher No. 8902007,mentioned earlier. The resident auditor based his action on the premise that
Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4 issued by the Department of Budget and Management which
provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53, also issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the
schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988between the
PSU and the DENR.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a "special project" and that there were excess of payments of
honoraria
HELD:
 Sec. 2.1 of CPG No. 80-4 defines "special project" as an inter-agency or inter-committee activity or an
undertaking by a composite group of officials/employees from various agencies which [activity or undertaking] is
not among the regular and primary functions of the agencies involved. COA, under its constitutional mandate,
is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the
wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside
by the authorized agency of government – i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or illegal and void . The COA, like
all other government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes
and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set
aside in appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme Court
 10. CDA HERRERA v. EBRNARDO
FACTS:

Emelita Bernardo, representing the heirs of Crisanto Bernardo, filed a complaint against Alfredo Herrera for unlawful
claim, interference, disturbance, harassment and trespassing before the Commission of the Settlement of Land Problem
(referred hereafter as COSLAP) over 7,993-square meter portion of land. The land was claimed by the respondents to be
owned by their predecessor Crisanto Bernardo and was acquired later by Crisanto S. Bernardo and covered by Tax
Declaration CD-006-0828 under their name.

Celia Vda de Herrera alleged that the 700-square meter portion of the disputed land was brought by Diosdado Herrera,
father of her (late) husband Alfredo, from a Domingo Villaran. Alfredo inherited the property upon his father's death.

COSLAP ruled in its 6 December 1999 decision in favor of the Bernardos. Alfredo filed a motion of reconsideration about
the said decision and to reopen the proceedings, but COSLAP denied his motion in its 21 August 2002 and 6 December
1999 orders. Alfredo's surviving spouse Celia, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA's 12th division
affirmed COSLAP's decision as stated in its 28 April 2005 decision.

The CA ruled that COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the land dispute, and even if assumingly, COSLAP does not have
jurisdiction over the said case, Celia is estopped to question COSLAP's jurisdiction on the grounds that first, her husband
failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction before that body and second, he actively participated in the proceedings. Celia
filed her motion of reconsideration but the CA denied that through its 17 October 2005 resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the ownership case of the land disputed by Herreras and Bernardos.

HELD:

NO, as their dispute does not fall under situation mentioned in Sec. 3 of E.O. 561. Administrative agencies, like the
COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling
statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged
before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b)
assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical
and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over
a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of
the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction
on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.

Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are
null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right
or create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having
no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the
position they were before the proceedings.

Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches
does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
 11. FETALINO v. COMELEC
FACTS:

President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon
(Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however, adjourned before the
Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential
appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon
merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.

Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec,
pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in its
subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the Fetalino
and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term
of office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five
years salary. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the
assailed subsequent resolution.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-
year lump sum gratuity;

B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and executory;

C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No.
1568.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568,
as amended.

The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the
conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement
takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service
requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who
has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona obviously did
not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of office. While the
Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court
have also positively ruled in that case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.

Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional
remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional
remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of the assailed
resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.

Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous
in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must
be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension,
employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of
their compensation.

DENIED